Leibnizâs claim that it is possible for us to gain metaphysical knowledge through reflection on the self has intrigued many commentators, but it has also often been criticized as flawed or unintelligible. A similar fate has beset Leibnizâs arguments against materialism. In this paper, I explore one of Leibnizâs lesser-known arguments against materialism from his reply to Bayleâs new note L (1702), and argue that it provides us with an instance of a Leibnizian âargument from reflectionâ. This argument, I further show, does not constitute a flawed appeal to mere introspection, but is in fact securely grounded in an important corollary of the Principle of Sufficient Reason: Leibnizâs Principle of Intelligibility.
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| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 428 | 80 | 9 |
| Full Text Views | 107 | 8 | 5 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 166 | 19 | 8 |
Leibnizâs claim that it is possible for us to gain metaphysical knowledge through reflection on the self has intrigued many commentators, but it has also often been criticized as flawed or unintelligible. A similar fate has beset Leibnizâs arguments against materialism. In this paper, I explore one of Leibnizâs lesser-known arguments against materialism from his reply to Bayleâs new note L (1702), and argue that it provides us with an instance of a Leibnizian âargument from reflectionâ. This argument, I further show, does not constitute a flawed appeal to mere introspection, but is in fact securely grounded in an important corollary of the Principle of Sufficient Reason: Leibnizâs Principle of Intelligibility.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 428 | 80 | 9 |
| Full Text Views | 107 | 8 | 5 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 166 | 19 | 8 |