In Posterior Analytics 71b9â12, we find Aristotleâs definition of scientific knowledge. The definiens is taken to have only two informative parts: scientific knowledge must be knowledge of the cause and its object must be necessary. However, there is also a contrast between the definiendum and a sophistic way of knowing, which is marked by the expression âkata sumbebekosâ. Not much attention has been paid to this contrast. In this paper, I discuss Aristotleâs definition paying due attention to this contrast and to the way it interacts with the two conditions presented in the definiens. I claim that the ânecessityâ condition ammounts to explanatory appropriateness of the cause.
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| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 4250 | 509 | 21 |
| Full Text Views | 171 | 7 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 357 | 8 | 0 |
In Posterior Analytics 71b9â12, we find Aristotleâs definition of scientific knowledge. The definiens is taken to have only two informative parts: scientific knowledge must be knowledge of the cause and its object must be necessary. However, there is also a contrast between the definiendum and a sophistic way of knowing, which is marked by the expression âkata sumbebekosâ. Not much attention has been paid to this contrast. In this paper, I discuss Aristotleâs definition paying due attention to this contrast and to the way it interacts with the two conditions presented in the definiens. I claim that the ânecessityâ condition ammounts to explanatory appropriateness of the cause.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 4250 | 509 | 21 |
| Full Text Views | 171 | 7 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 357 | 8 | 0 |