As the Trump administrationâs agenda of âAmerica Firstâ, demanding submission to its dictates and impositions, took the United States increasingly on a path of conflict and confrontation with much of the world, many eyes, especially in the developing world (the Global South), became fixed on China. As the second largest economy in the world and a country that in a not too distant past experienced the humiliation of colonialism and its accompanying predatory politics, many in the developing world hoped that Chinaâs âEastern sensibilitiesâ and its professed guiding ideology of ârespect for sovereigntyâ, ânon-interventionâ, âpeaceful riseâ and âwin-winâ economic ties would predispose it to be opposed to hubris, arrogance, and wars of conquest that were the hallmark of the global rise and hegemony of Western powers in the last 200 years.
Chinaâs remarkable economic transformation in the last forty years, marked by an annual rate of growth between 6 and 10 per cent (with the exception of the covid-19 pandemic-induced rate of growth of 2.69 per cent in 2020), is the largest and the fastest rate of economic growth in recorded history. The size of Chinaâs economy has doubled every eight years for the last four decades. In the same time period, by 2008, it had brought more than 400 million people out of poverty. According to some sources this number has doubled, reaching 800 million since. This constitutes the largest poverty reduction in the world to date. The average income of a Chinese person in the same period has increased sevenfold. All of these developments have made China one of the most successful examples of development in recent history (Zakaria, 2008, p. 89). The contrast of Chinaâs economic performance with the United Sates since 1950 makes this point even more clear. In terms of Purchasing Power Parity (ppp), in 1950, the US was responsible for 27.3 per cent of the worldâs gross domestic product (gdp), while Chinaâs share was only 4.5 per cent. In 1990, the US share was 20.6 per cent, and Chinaâs share was a mere 3.86 per cent. In 2018, the US share plummeted to 15 per cent while Chinaâs share rose to 18.6 per cent (Mahbubani, 2020, p. 10).
This impressive economic achievement may explain why there is so much interest among developing nations to see if they can replicate Chinaâs âeconomic miracleâ. The fact that Chinaâs rise so far has been for the most part peaceful, and the Chinese leadership has displayed an aversion to getting
As Chinaâs economic and political prominence on the global stage has expanded, its self-perception and political and economic posture has also evolved. If in the early period of Chinaâs global rise, the slogan that guided its foreign policy during the Deng Xiaoping presidency was âbiding our time, maintaining a low profile, and not drawing attention to ourselvesâ, the more assertive and expansive signature initiative of the Xi Jinping presidency, the Belt and Road Initiative (bri), heralded Chinaâs coming out party; an indication that China was no longer a rising power, it has risen, and it better act like it, and assume its rightful place among the community of nations. No longer, the âlargest developing nationâ, as the Chinese leaders were fond of referring to themselves until recently, but a great power in its own right, the second largest economy, that according to several scholars, is poised to overtake the United States as the largest economy in the world by 2035. Chinaâs economy has grown from less than 2 per cent of gross world product in 1978 to over 15 per cent in 2019. It is responsible for one-third of global growth, and currently is the worldâs largest exporter and trading country (Tammen, 2006, p. 57; World Economic Forum, 2019, pp. 1â5).
Chinaâs Opportunities
Arguably, the bri is the culmination of Chinaâs impressive economic development, partially chronicled above, and the most ambitious project that Chinese leadership has initiated to expand its power and influence globally so far. According to Parag Khanna, if in the nineteenth century the world was Europeanised, and in the twentieth century it was Americanised, in the twenty-first century, in large part, led by China, the world is becoming irreversibly Asianised. Khanna asserts that the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (mena) must consider moving away from colonial borders and redefine themselves as a part of West Asia, where most of them are geographically located. He believes the countries adjacent to the Persian Gulf are going
According to other scholars, China is poised to win the race to dominate the G5 as well as artificial intelligence (ai) technologies and plans to create ai colonies that would advance scientific research in this field. Thus, playing a leading role in creating the technologies of the future that is going to serve as the next engine of economic growth globally (Kai-Fu Lee, 2018). China has also raced ahead of the United States on âPatent filing and produces at least 8 times as many stem graduates a year than the USâ (Escobar, 2020).
However, the critics are not convinced of this sanguine scenario about the future prospects for Chinaâs economy, in general, and its bri, in particular. They assert that Chinaâs proposed bri routes in many parts of the developing nations lack the necessary prerequisites for economic success. Rather, it is alleged, the nations with which China has partnered feature political instability, little respect for the rule of law, a lack of transparency, the absence of well-trained labour forces, no entrepreneurial culture, and chronic corruption that permeates the social and political fabric. Each one of these problems pose a formidable challenge for China to overcome in order to ensure the success of the bri. Critics also regard the bri as a debt trap for many nations who would sign up to it. They contend that it is a âneo-colonial schemeâ to exploit the weaker nations, and it would generate new forms of dependencies that would have detrimental long-term impact on the host countries. Finally, the critics argue, as it stands currently, the bri is a unidirectional initiative that starts from Beijing and it is primarily designed to benefit China. As such, it would be difficult for the host nations to embrace the âChina dreamâ as their own.
The bri however, is not as of yet a completed project. It is a project in the making. Chinese leaders may not have an exact idea about the fine details of its implementation or its final destination. They learn from their mistakes through a process of trial and error and modify and adjust their tactics and policies as they go along. Despite its shortcomings and flaws, early indications justify optimism about its possible profound transformative, and for the most part, mutually beneficial future prospects.
The ancient Chinese were the masters of trade and commerce through the Silk Road, long before the rise of capitalism in the West. Their relations with
While the initial capital investment for the bri was $1 trillion that encompassed sixty-seven countries in three continents (Asia, Africa, and Europe), currently, it encompasses five continents with Latin America and Antarctica joining in. In 2019, Italy and Switzerland became the first European nations to formally join the bri along with Vietnam, Cambodia, and several other countries in East Asia who had been watching and deliberating from the side lines for a fair few years. By 2019, the bri had attracted some 131 nations to sign a memorandum of understanding that they intend to join, and eighty have formally signed up to it, pledging their support and partnership. By 2019, China was the number one trade partner for 130 countries in the world. In 2015, nine hundred deals related to the bri were underway worth $890 billion. In that year, 44 per cent of Chinaâs engineering projects were in the bri countries. By 2016, 52 per cent of Chinaâs engineering projects were in the bri partner nations. (âOur bulldozers, our rulesâ, 2016; Ferdinand, 2016, p. 950). In 2019, the infrastructure-related contracts of Chinese companies with their bri partners was valued at $128 billion. In 2017, the inner bri trade was valued at a whopping $1.7 trillion and it surpassed $2 trillion in 2018. It is anticipated that the bri-related investment would expand to between $5 and $8 trillion by 2030 (Macaes, 2019). The evolution of the name of the project since its inception in 2013, from The New Silk Road and the New Maritime Silk Road to One Belt, One Road, to Belt and Road reveals an attempt by Chinese leaders to be all-inclusive as several regions and countries that were not on the path of the original plan, namely in Latin America, demanded to be included. While the bri is yet to be fully implemented, these developments are evidence of early success.
As China unfolds its ambitious global project, the bri, it is important to be mindful that despite much of the attention of the mainstream media on the economic dimensions of this initiative, as impressive as they have been so far, as outlined above, the bri is not and should not be just about trade and commerce. Potentially, it could be a transformative force, pregnant with changes that would go far beyond economics; encompassing political, social, and cultural realms with intended and unintended consequences that would alter the lives of ordinary people. Investment in infrastructure, roads, railways, transportation, communication, and broadband, can create jobs and social welfare and usher in prosperity. The briâs larger transformative power however, may lie in the realm of bringing connectivity between the people of different faiths and cultures. On its path are Buddhists, Christians, Muslims, Jews, and people of other faiths and denominations. Brought together through the transfer of technology and knowledge, the spread of ideas and cultures could potentially foster coexistence and cooperation and could become a catalyst for a new political realm marked by multi-polarity and a new configuration of power globally (Bianchi, 2019).
The bri and Chinaâs eastern cultural heritage and sensibilities, that stands on the shoulders of a grand civilisation, and its recent history of struggle against colonial rule provide it with a unique opportunity to recast and reconfigure global politics through a new âmoral imaginationâ that does not see the political domain as one of conquest and dominance, but as the realm of interdependence and inter-connections that can and should foster mutually beneficial outcomes, thus ushering in mutual respect for our diversity in a shrinking planet (Ling, 2020) . The zero-sum game of dominance and subjugation of other people, and their treatment as inferior, the mentality that âI win only if you loseâ belongs to another age. Our interdependent world demands win-win strategies, creating realms of co-prosperity and coexistence. In fact,
Because, unlike the West, Chinaâs global rise so far has been peaceful, Beijing has a unique opportunity to look beyond commerce and commercial gain, as legitimate goals they may be, and put the international relations on a new trajectory and lead by example, providing an alternative to the power politics of old that has been accompanied with war and bloodshed. Can China seize this opportunity and its moment in history, and turn the bri to a vehicle not only for its own economic gain, but also for remaking the world on the basis of a new and more humane foundation?
Chinaâs Challenges
These are Chinaâs opportunities, but what about Chinaâs challenges? The sudden eruption of the coronavirus that was first detected in the Wuhan region of China in December 2019 and from there spread to the rest of the world has revealed that the rise of China is neither inexorable nor a linear forward march. As of 1 April 2021, there were 130,186,559 cases of covid-19 infection globally, and 2,840,296 deaths. In the United States alone by this date, more than 555,000 people had perished because of the pandemic. President Xi Jinping has characterised the pandemic as a âhistoric crisisâ, attempting to mobilise the Chinese population to remain vigilant in fighting the disease and cooperating with the authorities to contain it. While China managed to contain the spread of the disease in a short period of time, the rest of the world was not as lucky, as the virus rampaged lives and livelihood throughout the world. Due to vaccine nationalism and many countries refusing to share their vaccine with other nations, there is a vaccine immunity gap. By 1 April 2021, still some thirty countries in the world, many of them in Africa, had not yet started vaccinating their people. Because the pandemic is global, without providing the vaccines globally, and creating mass immunity, the pandemic cannot be tamed and new coronavirus mutations would continue to spread, creating health and economic crises in many parts of the world, including in the nations that have signed onto the bri.
The short-term impact of covid-19 was to diminish Chinaâs rate of annual economic growth in 2020 to just 2.69 per cent. Many foreign companies, including some from the United States, closed shops and operations in China. The number of tourists dwindled significantly and the cost of caring for the
Due to global economic slow-down, bri-related trade shrank substantially. To cope with this new reality, and the negative consequences of the Trump administrationâs trade war and the ensuing attempt at economic decoupling, Beijing was led to focus on developing its vast domestic consumer market and further invest in building its infrastructure and technological capacity in order to reduce reliance on US technology. These developments revealed that there are unforeseen circumstances that could temporarily damage or derail the fragile bri.
As the main source of supply chains in the global market, the threat to the Chinese labour force and economic slow-down had a clear negative global ripple effect. In the United States, for example, the stock market experienced a steep decline of 3,000 points between 24 and 27 February 2020. A major slump in the price of oil at about the same time, in anticipation of declining energy demand in China, led to an economic downturn in many oil-producing nations, including those in the mena region. The crippling fear associated with covid-19 compelled people around the world to venture out less, travel less, and consume less. Economies like the United States, for which consumer purchasing accounts for 70 per cent of its total value, suffered severely, thus effecting USâChina trade ties as well as the larger global economy. Poor management of the pandemic by the Trump administration further compounded economic problems.
The early indications are that the negative impact of the trade war between the Trump administration and China, despite a temporary deal signed in 2019, may continue under the Biden administration. The USâChina conflict is structural and is rooted in a competition for global supremacy. It is unlikely that the United States is going to sit by passively and watch China rise at its own expense (Allison, 2017). In February of 2020, in his address to the Munich Security Conference, the US Secretary of Defense, Mark Esper, declared China to be âthe greatest threatâ economically and militarily to the United States and the global order and tried to marshal the support of its European allies in containment of China. While they may differ on means, tactics, and policies, the Democratic Party in the United States that now controls the White House and the US Congress is no less committed to containing the rise of China economically and politically as its Republican counterpart. The confrontational tone of the meeting between US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and the National Security Advisor Jacke Sullivan with Chinese Foreign Minister and State Councillor Wang Yi and Yang Jiechi, Director of the Central Foreign Affairs
Besides unforeseen consequences surrounding the spread of covid-19 and the escalation of trade wars with the United States, additional challenges lie in wait for China. As Chinaâs investments around the world increase, including in the politically polarised mena region, for how long can China remain a friend to all and ally to none? How long can China afford to stay above the fray in regional conflicts? Should China decide to change course and assume a more proactive political posture what would be the possible fallout and how would it affect Chinaâs rise and the future of the bri?
How should China meet the political challenges of managing its own rapid growth in domestic and global power? The successful implementation of the bri requires building not just financial institutions of governance as China has done so far. This includes the brics and The Asian Bank for Investment and Infrastructure, but also political ones, beyond existing China-initiated institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (sco). What international institutions of governance is China going to initiate to manage the bri effectively? How is China going to move from an initiative that so far has been unidirectional with its epicentre in Beijing, to one that is multidirectional, in which the partner nations of the bri will buy into the âChina dreamâ and see it as their own dream, as equal stakeholders in a multipolar world. Only then can they feel as active and engaged participants in using the bri to transform their own societies rather than the passive recipients of Chinese manufactured goods and commerce, designed to primarily benefit China economically. Only then can China transform from a global economic leader, to a global political leader and shed the mantel given to it by some Western scholars as âpartialâ or a mere âmercantilistâ power (Shambaugh, 2013). As the ancient sages of both the East and the West have taught us, the true enduring power is âlegitimateâ power that is perceived by those who are its recipients as benign and compassionate. To carry the mantel of global leadership as a legitimate power, China must also rise to the political challenges of reform at home and abroad, thus transforming global governance by basing it on a more just and humane foundation.
It used to be the case that early in its global rise, China was content to chip away at Americaâs influence among nations that had frayed relations with the United States. Iran, Sudan, and Venezuela were clear examples. As it became economically more powerful and as it was further integrated into the global economy, China began to expand substantially its trade and commercial relations with such traditional US allies as the Cooperation Council for the Arab
The political ramifications of this trend are going to be impactful and profound and it would cast a long shadow on the Chinese leadershipâs assessment of the future of USâChina bilateral trade ties. The value of bilateral trade ties between China and US in 2017 amounted to $527 billion. In 2018, this amount increased to $558 billion. But due to a trade war, in 2019, this amount dwindled to $452 billion (âU.S. trade with China tops $555 billion through December 2019â, 2019).
The volume of Chinaâs expanding trade with the Arab world alone means that as the bri expands, China in the future would have many more trade partners and USâChina trade may not be as indispensable as it has been in the past. If this scenario materialises in the near future, it may also mean that with the âdecouplingâ and the diminishing volumes of USâChina trade, US leverage on China would also diminish.
Conclusion
Since the Democrats agree with the Republicans that US bilateral trade terms with China need to be modified substantially, it remains to be seen what would be the impact of lingering USâChina economic tensions and trade wars, in general, and how it would affect the bri, in particular, under Bidenâs presidency? Would USâChina rivalry culminate in a full-fledged new Cold War or would it merely give rise to a new relationship based on âcompetitive coexistenceâ (Erickson, 2019)? Would China remain content with a status quo in which it does not directly challenge US hegemony but nevertheless continues to steadily and incrementally gain economically at its expense? Or would a more politically assertive China emerge to safeguard its economic interests and its expanding power in the global system? These are broad questions, the answers to which will leave an indelible mark not only on the future of the bri but also on the parameters that define the vicissitudes of the global transition of power currently underway.
The bri has opened up a significant gateway to Chinaâs global ambitions for economic power and influence. While economically it is driven by the neoliberal preference for the market economy and the mercantilist logic of economic gains, it remains to be seen whether China can rise to the political challenges
Clearly, China stands at a crossroads and this is its historical moment to seize and transform global politics. In the years and decades ahead, we would be witness to the drama of the continued rise of China and the evolution of the bri as an important pillar of this rise. The way that the bri is implemented and the role of Chinaâs leadership in this implementation will reveal much about the new world that we will inherit.
The able editors of this comprehensive volume have assembled valuable contributions by some of the leading experts in the field who shed light on the complexities and the nuances of Chinaâs multifaceted expanding ties with the regions and the opportunities and the challenges that await all sides. By providing a synthesis of theoretical observations on the nature of Chinaâs engagement with case study of key countries and regions that are Chinaâs partner in Belt and Road Initiative; this book offers students, scholars and policy makers alike much food for thought and valuable insights, enabling them to put the rapid changes surrounding Chinaâs global rise and the regional transformation in context.
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