Intentionality and Modeling of Conception
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The article studies intentionality of conceptions and presents an abstract model of conception. Intentionality of conceptions is analysed in two settings, the notion of a mental phenomenon or act, in the sense of Brentano and Twardowski, and the notion of a mental state, in the sense of Searle. To determine characteristics which separate conceptions from other mental states, the relation between conceptions (German: Auffassungen) and presentations (German: Vorstellungen) is analysed. The following is found: conceptions have intentionality, but they differ from presentations and do not fully fit the characteristics of mental phenomena. They can, on the other hand, clearly be identified as undirected intentional mental states with the distinguished role that any intentional mental state either is a conception or rests on a conception. From the study of their ontological status, and from the reading of sets as presentations and of set theories as theories of conceptions, further insight into the requirements on their modelling is provided. The model then is a conceptual metamodel the main features of which reflect the findings on conceptions as intentional mental states. It is intended to generally apply to the modelling of intentional relations and of situations with characteristics of perspectivity and of subject and context dependency.