Relationality and Evil: Judging Bystanders
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“Bystanders” at the scene of acts of moral extremity are, by the nature of the term, connected to it: situated in more or less proximate relation to those to whose suffering they are not attending. Yet the culpability of bystanders seems anomalous, and difficult to calibrate in the terms of conventional moral discourse. Against this background, this paper explores two main points: firstly, whether the moral and cultural “relationality” of bystanders’ acts and omissions makes any difference to judgements as to the “evilness” of such behaviour; and secondly, the idea that “evil” might be applied as much as to relations between individuals, as to the thoughts and actions of individuals themselves. Using recent work by Stanley Cohen, Norman Geras and Alan Norrie as reference points, and building on an insight from St Augustine, I argue not only that there is sense in this idea, but that it offers a greater depth of explanation than a “methodologically individualist” conception of evil, by itself, is able to.