Half a century after the last Moriscos had settled in Morocco, after their successive waves of voluntary departures and forced expulsions, these Muslims of Spanish origin were living in a continuous give-and-take between the country’s rulers and their own wish to pursue their destiny, beyond the aspirations and plans of those first immigrants. This lengthy period ended with a dynastic change and a new way of governing, with sovereigns who were much more powerful that those who had overseen the Moriscos’ arrival in the early seventeenth century. We must recall that other Moriscos, especially from Granada, had taken refuge in Morocco, principally in the north, at the end of the fifteenth century, and they too were affected by the conditions that prevailed in the rest of the country.1 The final stage of this era was marked by political upheavals that resulted in the rise of the new dynasty, which overcame the other regional powers.
In this contribution we hope to explain in simple and understandable terms the situation that prevailed in the country for about three decades, dominated to some degree from 1636 onward by the Dilaite Muḥammad al-Ḥāǧǧ; the principal actors in those events; and the final resolution consisting of the installation and acceptance of the new dynasty, which rules Morocco to this day.2 Of course the Morisco population, especially in Rabat and Tetouan, felt the effects and was forced to adapt to the vicissitudes of each moment. Therefore we will begin by speaking of the Berber al-Zāwiya al-Dilāʾiyya, which managed to take control of the country and can be considered the last bridge dynasty between the Saadians and the Alawites.
A few years later, when matters in Salé were still in a bad state, the marabout Layax [al-ʿAyyāšī] […] was killed through the action of the marabout Benbucar (Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr- the author of the document uses various forms, e.g. Berbucar, Bucar) […] the latter obtained dominion over all the land from the Azamor river to Tetouan, including the Algarve [west] of Barbary [which is almost opposite the Algarve of Portugal], Fez, Salé, Meknes, Alcázar, and Tetouan. The Andalusis of the Arrabal and Alcazaba [Morisco quarter and fortress] of Salé swore obedience to this Benbucar or Bucar (it’s all the same), and once he took control of that town and port, so as to be safer and not fear any mutiny or uprising, he removed the Andalusis from the fortress and placed in it a son of his named Abdala, with local Moorish troops, to defend it and govern that port.4
The chief cause that moved this Moor [ʿĪsā ibn al-Ṭālib], who had proposed ceding the Alcazaba of Salé to Spain in 1619] to commit such a great act as to hand over to Your Majesty the city of Salé and its Alcazaba, together with everything else I have said, is this: this Moor is a marabout and one of the rebels in Barbary against the Šarīfs of Morocco; he is a close relative of the other who has rebelled in the mountains of Morocco, and if the latter has taken no action it is because he has a very old and prudent father who advises him and has not permitted it until he has a basis and strong support in Your Majesty’s favor and protection. All the marabouts of Barbary are convinced that if any of the Šarīfs should rule, he would cut off the heads of all the marabouts. And they know this for certain not only about the Šarīfs, but that any of the marabouts who might rule would cut the heads off all the rest. And so he [ʿĪsā ibn al-Ṭālib] tells me that in speaking with an elderly marabout, that man said to him: my son, if you were to reign, cut off my head and those of every member of our sect; because if I reigned I would cut off yours and all the rest. And if the Ayaxi [al-ʿAyyāšī] who wrote two letters to Your Majesty had the strength and opportunity that this man has, he would have done it already, but he is poor and has no wings to fly with.
Of course, Abū Ḥassūn did enjoy a longer and more effective rule. We should note the mediating role taken by the Dilaites, between Abū Ḥassūn, ruler of Sūs and supporter of Ibn ʾAlī (the founder of the current Alawite dynasty), and his bitter enemies from the town of Tabuʿṣamt in Tafilalt, who had asked for Abū Ḥassūn’s help. We recall this particular episode to offer perspective on the later conflicts between the Dilaites and the Filāli dynasty. In fact, in subsequent years the understanding between the Dilaites and the Filāli Alawites changed to enmity. Abū Ḥassūn, the Alawites’ former friend, also turned
The Dilaites, Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr in particular, would intervene again on the side of the Filālis, who around 1635–36 were under constant attack by the troops of Abū Ḥassūn. This came at a time when the Dilaites had assured the men of Sūs that they would not be their rivals for the power then held by the Saadians; this allayed the fears of Abū Ḥassūn’s men, and restored trust and friendship between the two factions. (Both zawāyā were Berber, the Dilaites from the Middle Atlas and the Sūsans from the Anti-Atlas.) But the situation changed with the death of Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr and the accession of his son Muḥammad al-Ḥāǧǧ to the leadership of the zāwiya, since the latter did seek to conquer the Saadian domains. At this point the old disputes and enmities between the men of Sūs and of Dila arose once more, and a series of adverse events to the former soon led to their decline and disappearance.
The Dilaites’ relationship with the warrior al-ʿAyyāšī followed a similar arc: an early stage of understanding and mutual aid turned into enmity, so that the Dilaite leader eliminated al-ʿAyyāšī. We shall see the same pattern later in the dealings of the Alawite Šarīfs with the Dilaites, whom they would eventually destroy in turn.
To return to the first of these three relationships, the one between al-ʿAyyāšī and the Dilaites: it would have begun in the city of Salé in the circle of its leader and patron ʿAbd Allāh ibn Ḥassūn, where al-ʿAyyāšī and Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr met each other. There they formed a strong friendship, marked by their similar ideologies and an affection that led al-ʿAyyāšī to reveal all his plans for attacking Morocco’s Christian occupiers. The Dilaite, for his part, did all he could to build support for his friend and fellow student. After the death of Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr in 1636, the leadership of the zāwiya fell to his son Muḥammad al-Ḥāǧǧ, a man of very different temperament: he openly aspired to seize power from the Saadians, whom he perceived as seriously weakened and unable to defend their territory against the Christian threat. But he continued to support al-ʿAyyāšī, so long as the latter did not interfere with his plans. For example, at al-ʿAyyāšī’s request in 1638 he came to the aid of the people of Fez, who were being repeatedly attacked and pillaged by the tribes of Ḥyayna and Šraga.
As we have related, the Andalusis of Salé had conspired against al-ʿAyyāšī and joined to attack him; he had heard of their treachery against Islam and the Muslims when they counseled them and encouraged them to doubt their faith. Therefore he consulted the religious authorities on whether it was legal to fight them, and they ruled that it was. Then Sīdī Muḥammad [al-ʿAyyāšī] fell upon them for many days, killing every one that he found. Most of them fled; a few went to Marrakesh, some to Algiers, and others sought refuge with the Christians. A number of them went to the Dilaites, who approached Sīdī Muḥammad al-ʿAyyāšī to request clemency for the Andalusis. But he refused, citing the accepted opinion that they should be exterminated. When the Dilaites saw their request for clemency denied, they were angered and decided to combat al-ʿAyyāšī.8
According to the historian Muḥammad Ḥaǧǧī, the enmity between these two leaders must have arisen because Muḥammad al-Ḥāǧǧ wanted to eliminate al-ʿAyyāšī, a rival who occupied strategic locations that stood in his way of conquering the whole of Morocco.9 In fact the Dilaites managed to kill al-ʿAyyāšī in 1641, but without getting rid of his loyal supporters such as the rais al-Khādir Ġaylān, son of one of al-ʿAyyāšī’s comrades in arms, who would take up the struggle to avenge his leader’s death. In any event, Rabat and its Alcazaba would never yield to the Dalaites without a direct clash between two very different mentalities: one of them Berber and shaped by its indoctrination in Islam, and the other from a European milieu and culture and seeking to relieve the suffering of a forced exile.
In the summer of 1651 Ġaylān began his campaign against the Portuguese in Tangier, managing to pitch his camp on (this side) of the Jews’ River, something the Muslims had never dared to do before.
We learn from the studies of Rais Ġaylān in Les Archives Marocaines and Menezes’s Historia de Tánger that Ġaylān often used Abdulcader Cerón, a Morisco from Hornachos, as a negotiator with the Portuguese who then occupied the city of Tangier. In one of his letters to them Ġaylān calls Cerón his trusted agent and says that they can deal with him as if he were Ġaylān himself. Cerón hoped to gain Tetouan and expel Sidi ʿAbd Allāh, son of Abū Bakr (Benbucar), from Salé, because the Dilaite had expelled him from that city. The Alcazaba of Buregreg was governed by was governed by Cerón’s father.12
At this period, while Ġaylān was carrying out operations against the Portuguese in Tangier, the latter were fighting the Spaniards on another front during their war of independence from Spain. That made it difficult for them to come
That was how Tangier changed from Portuguese to English hands in 1662, creating a new enemy for the Moroccans and for Ġaylān in particular; he now had to face these new occupiers, who inherited the hatred he had felt for their predecessors. He soon turned from his fight against the Dilaites to encamp an army of 10,000 men one league away from Tangier, on 22 March 1662.13
Ġaylān went off to besiege Tetouan and, while unable to conquer it, did keep it under his control. Its governor, ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Naqsīs, feared he would receive no help from Benbucar, (Abū Bakr) so he offered to make peace with Ġaylān as a way of saving his city and its treasures. In June 1662 Ġaylān consented, on the condition that the governor supply him with troops and that one of his own men should govern alongside al-Naqsīs.14
[…] the port […] is one of the most desirable on the coast of Barbary, because of the shelter that it and its surroundings can provide to the fleets of Your Majesty and your vassals, [because of] the large volume
of trade that will result, because it rids [us] of the enemies of our holy Catholic faith, and because this [port] protects and links with Ceuta. And from both shores of the Strait we can prevent everything that threatens the security of the Strait and the coasts of Spain […]. And without comparison this port and site is of the greatest benefit, profit, usefulness, and consequence among all those of Your Majesty across the sea, including Larache.15
Ghaïlán, in spite of defiant messages, had at length given up all hope of taking Tangier, and turned again to the easier task of besieging Salli. This time he was successful—the English were unable to intervene; and in October 1664 some men of Sûs in the Salli garrison let him in without need of a blow.16
We imagine that the “men of Sûs” to whom Routh refers were Ajenui’s troops; he remained in his post, but in March 1665 Rais Ġaylān sent another of his brothers, Sidi Sybi, to live in the Alcazaba. The soldiers of Sūs who had been
To understand fully the context surrounding Tangier and Ġaylān, we must consider the tension caused by the looming war between Holland and England, which could affect England’s recent acquisition of Tangier: “Throughout the year 1664 a good understanding with Spain became every day more necessary to English interests in the Mediterranean, for every day brought with it sure tokens of a coming war with the Dutch.”17
In Appendix 2 we summarize Routh’s interesting information about the final stage of Ġaylān’s conflict with Mawlāy Rašīd and the nature of his relations with England. Routh’s account includes revealing details and descriptions of the activities of those involved at that place and time: the English in Tangier, the Spaniards, the French, the Dutch, and the Moroccans.
In spite of these complications, Ġaylān was not discouraged: he continued to fight and to defend his possessions. For instance, his troops suffered a serious defeat near Alcázar in June 1666; on hearing of it he tried to repair the damage, but most of his fighters had deserted.
Ġaylān’s swift consolidation of his rule in Morocco was seen with some alarm by the governors of the Christian garrisons on the North African coast. The English began trying to maintain a balance of power in the country, supporting Ġaylān against the Alawite dynasty that was on the rise. Tetouan was now in the hands of Mawlāy Rašīd, and Salé was inclining toward him. In August 1666 Ġaylān brought a large force to Arzila, where it remained until 1668. Month by month he starved off the city’s surrender; when his hungry troops threatened mutiny he distracted them with successful raids against the enemy’s herds, and with reserves of flour sent from Tangier. Aware that his influence was waning, he made secret plans to flee; in July 1668, when discontent in Arzila broke out into open revolt, he gained a brief respite from the timely arrival of his brother, who came to his aid and resupplied the fortress with two shiploads of stolen wheat and a crew of Turks. Before the mutineers could take revenge on him, he boarded ship with his wives and some three hundred faithful followers, and, it was rumored, three million pieces of eight. He sailed from Arzila to Tangier, and finally entered as a fugitive the city gates that he had hoped to pass through as a conqueror.
In the Alcazaba of Salé, leadership passed to Abd el-Kader Merino, who was chosen by the Hornacheros and Andalusis; in Salé itself, al-Ḥāǧǧ Muḥammad Fannīsh took command. That situation was short lived: in August 1665 Merino
The events that took place at the mouth of the Buregreg after the half-century of independence and self-rule that followed its settling by Moriscos from Spain cannot be separated from what was happening elsewhere in Morocco, which affected the general political trends in the country. Mawlāy Rašīd was establishing himself as the ruler who could bring order out of the chaos we have been describing, both at the mouth of the Buregreg and elsewhere; with new forces and new followers, he felt empowered to advance on all fronts. He gained additional prestige by eliminating a powerful Jew, Ibn Mishʿal, who had ruled as a despot in the region of Taza.
Mawlāy Rašīd, however, had his own rivals and opponents who shared his desire to rule the country; there were also the foreigners, whose ambitions he had to counter with skill and a clear head. These were the circumstances that conditioned the general atmosphere in Morocco amid the decline of the situation created at the mouth of the Buregreg by the arrival of the Moriscos expelled from Spain in 1610.
Among those ambitious foreigners were the French, who were pursuing commercial plans that might serve as a beachhead for future activity, still undefined. Along Morocco’s Mediterranean coast, Spanish ships were keeping an eye on the movements of French forces that sought to establish a trading post at Alhucemas. The situation is clear in a letter from the duke of Medinaceli to Queen Mariana, dated 9 September 1667 (see Appendix 3). Later the prince of Montesarcho, also writing to the queen, stated that the Spaniards had already intended to take control of those areas. Thus he justifies his sudden occupation of the island of Alhucemas in 1673: “It brought to mind what had been proposed and discussed, in the matter of preventing other nations from using the port of Alhucemas in Africa as a haven for pirates and enemies.”19
During this time the occupation of Alhucemas was in the planning stage. The French, potential rivals of the Spaniards, managed to take possession of the island of Alhucemas through Rolland Fréjus, who, as a merchant from Marseille, an adventurer, and a paid agent of King Louis XIV, tried to establish a trading post there. He had appeared in the area of Temsaman between 1664 and 1672, with a poorly disguised company chartered in Albuzeme, to open trading relations in that port, on a spot on the bay near the site of the ancient town of Mezemma.21 He presented this proposal to Sultan Mawlāy Rašīd. The Spaniards, who did not want to see a French presence in the region, increased their vigilance to avoid unwelcome surprises. In 1667 the Moroccans had increased their attacks on Melilla and had even managed to seize one of its four fortresses on 26 September with French assistance. Melilla, left unprotected, sent repeated petitions for aid, which arrived late or not at all. Its governor, in a desperate move, promised freedom to the prisoners confined there once the fight against the Moroccans had been won.
With the rise of the new Sharifian dynasty, Morocco ended the tense situation that had dominated the mouth of the Buregreg since the immigration of the Spanish Moriscos. It began to recover the Atlantic ports occupied by Spain (except for Tangier at the point where the Atlantic met the Mediterranean, held by England); it brought under central control the territories that had eluded royal sovereignty for half a century. But at the same time, in Alhucemas, a new Spanish occupation began in the Mediterranean, as that port was added to the Spanish possessions of Melilla and Vélez de la Gomera; all three still belong to Spain today. The occupation of Alhucemas began at about the time that the Alawite dynasty began its rule, though it was not consolidated for another seven years. That series of occupations ended with the taking of the Chafarinas Islands in 1848.
Treatise between Ġaylān and the English
AGS E2684
Portada: + Su Mgd. M(adri)d mayo 1666
Al Duque de M(edi)na Zeli
/P.1/ Artículos de paçes concluidos y confirmados por su Exa Dn Juo Bellaír Conde de Berlaby, Capn Gl de todas las Armas de Su Mgd. el Rey de la Gran Bretaña, en África, vizalmirante de su Arm(a)da Rl en la mar de la costa de Berbería, y Gov(ernad)or desta ciudad de Tánxar, y sus distritos, de parte de su Sacara Mgd. Dn. Carlos Seg(un)do Rey de la Gran Bretaña, Françia y Irlanda etta. con el muy Exmo. Sr. Çid Hamet el Hader Benali Gaylan, Príncipe de la Bervería, el Poniente, Arzila, Alcázar, Tetuán, Zalé, y su Arraval, Almocad del Habet, y Sor. del Algarve y todas sus cávilas y distritos etta. las dhas. paçes han de correr para siempre con todos sus Dominios, y vassallos, y corren desde oy día de la f(ec)ha desta que es en 2 de Abril del a(ñ)o. de 1666.
Capítulo 1º. Que desde oy día de la f(ec)ha y para siempre ha de haver una paz firme y verdadera, y no se ha de pedir satisfaçión alguna de una, ni otra parte por ningún agravio antiguo, ni succesos que ayan pasado hasta oy entre ambas partes.
2º. Se conçede de ambas partes que los de Tanjar han de tener todo el campo que empieça desde el Río de los Judíos, corriendo por donde está la línea señalada, hasta el Río de los Leacecos en Tanxar la viexa, en lo qual podrán sembrar todos los géneros que quisieren de la línea para adentro, menos plantar árboles ni viñas, ni haciendo fosos, ô, vallados, ni cosa que parezca chica, ni grande.
3º. Que en faltando leña â la Plaça de Tanjar, y mandando Su Exa. Sr. Gl. persona â avisar â Su Exa. el Çid Jamet Gaylan será obligado de embiar guardas mientras la estén cortando, y cargando hasta entrarla en Tanxar, y las personas que asistieren en ello hasta tener efecto es obligado Su Exa. el Sr. Gl. De Tanxar a pagarles su asist(enci)a.
4º. Que todo género de embarcaciones de ambas partes puedan entrar y salir, tratar, y contratar en los puertos de ambas partes, entrando y saliendo sin pasaportes cada quando que sea su voluntad.
5º. Que todas las veçes que el Su Exa. el Sr. Genl. de Tanxar neçesitare de algún género de refresco, vacas, gallinas, carneros, ô, otro género, avisando a Su Exa. el Çid Hader, ô a quien estubiese governando en su lugar, será /p.2/ (será) obligado de mandárselos dar pagando los precios acostumbrados demás de los gastos de conduçirlos â Tanjar.
7º. Que todos los que se huyeren, fueren ô vinieren de una y otra parte siendo ladrones, serán obligados, ambas partes, a ponerlos en buen recado, y entregarlos para que sean castigados con lo que traxeren, bolviéndolo a sus dueños.
8º. Que todas las veçes que vengan cáfilas â la ciu(da)d de Tanxar pasando de diez camellos, se han de parar en las partes a donde les señalaren hasta que vayan entrando de diez en diez, y descargando sus cargas p(ar)a bolver a salir fuera, y que ninguno ha de entrar con Armas si no fueren los cavalleros, y si qualquiera persona de una parte â otra se agraviaren el uno al otro han de ser castigados conforme las leyes, y mereçimiento de la causa a que son obligados.
9º. Que está conçedido por parte del Exmo. Sor. Çid Hamet el Hader que los varcos de Tanxar pueden tomar en la lengua del Agua todas las piedras que les pareçiere para la obra del muelle, que ay entre el cavo Espartel y el cavo al leste de la Vahía de Tanxar.
10º. Que Su Exa. el Çid Hader Gaylan será obligado de asistir con las fuerças que tiene â la çiudad de Tanxar contra qualquier ex(érci)to xptiano que salte en tierra o puesto â la çiu(da)d.
11º. Y por quanto Su Mgd. Dios le g(uar)de el Rey de la Gran Bretaña se alla agradeçido de la amistad y buena voluntad de Su Exa. Cid Hader Gaylan conçediéndole el pedaço de campo nombrado en los Artículos arriva, da por bien se le conçeda a Su Exa. dho. Cid Hader Gaylan duçientos Barriles de pólvora fina, y han de ser en la forma siguiente; cinqüenta Barriles luego que traigan los Artículos firmados, y otros çinqüenta Barriles al cavo de tres meses, y de tres meses en tres meses çinqüenta Barriles de pólvora durante estas paçes.
12º. Y porque ay muchos varcos extranjeros que van y vienen â esta plaza de Tanxar, en que por la mayor parte los sers. Ingleses son interesados /p.3/ se conzede que no han de ser apresados por las embarcaçiones vasallas al dicho sor. Cid Gaylan estando dentro de la punta llamada Fehad Sefe, y por los ingleses el punto más acá del Río de los Judíos, y por el levante hasta la Punta grande que haçe la Vahía de Tanjar llamado en Arávigo Carfe Almenar.
13º. Es conçedido por parte de Su Exa. Sor. Genl. de Tanxar que en las ocasiones que se ofrescan haver men(este)r, Su Exa. el Cid Hader Gaylan, algunos navíos p(ar)a contra enemigos suyos (no siendo amigos de los ingleses) se le darán los navíos que se allaren promptos en la Vahía de Tánjar, y siendo los suso dichos amigos de los ses. Ingleses, son obligados de no asistirles, no favoreçerles en cosa alguna por mar, ni por tierra.
Todos estos Artículos arriba dhos. confirmados, y ajustados por ambas partes en Tanjar â 2 de abril de 1666.
Selected Passages from: Routh, E. M. G. Tangier England’s Lost Atlantic Outpost 1661–84 (81–91)
“During the time of the Dutch war intercourse with Ghaïlán was limited to a series of more or less friendly negotiations (…). The fact was that Ghaïlán’s power was already half-eclipsed by the shadow of the “Great Taffiletta,” the Emperor Mulai Er Rasheed II., whose star was rapidly rising over the plains of Morocco. News of Moorish affairs travelled very slowly to Europe, and the Spanish and Dutch diplomatists who promised help to Ghaïlán if he would attack Tangier had little idea that the Moor, who answered their proposals with so much arrogance, was being ousted by a new power from his hard-won dominions, and was forced to delay by sheer necessity. An inkling of the truth filtered into Tangier, whence it was reported that “the Saint was upon the back of Guylan with a considerable army” (…).
Ghaïlán was indeed hard pressed by his old enemy Ben Boukir, and by the renowned warrior Er Rasheed. The Shereef Mohammed, whose claim to the throne he had, nominally at least, supported, had been killed in 1664, and Ghaïlán was now fighting openly for his own hand against the sacred Shereefian dynasty. Day by day he felt his hold on Morocco loosening, as his adherents one after another deserted him and went over to his victorious enemy, and Alcazar and Tetouan, Salli and Azîla, threatened to slip from his grasp.
As Ghaïlán’s power waned, his friendship for the English grew apace, and in May 1665 he began to treat for peace, though he still made a show of offering it as a favour, and couched his letters in terms of unabated pride. He asserted that he had never broken peace with the English, and that hostilities had always been begun by them, and still demanded the demolition of all forts built since the beginning of 1664 (…). The Governor seems to have found it hard to realise that the once redoubtable enemy of Tangier was now little better than an outlawed fugitive, whose treaties were worth just so much as the paper on which they were written.
Early in 1666 Ghaïlán made a final attempt to regain prestige among his followers by attacking the Spanish garrison of Laraiche. This attempt failed, and in April of the same year he at last made a treaty of peace and alliance with the English.”
AGS, Guerra Antigua. Legajo GA 2287
“Señora: En cumplimiento de la Real orden de V. Mgd. de 5 del pasado, envié al capitán Manuel de Castro, persona de mi satisfación, con un piloto práctico de aquellas costas a reconocer el puerto de las Alhucemas y saber qué intentos avía manifestado el francés por medio de las personas que imbió, de qué utilidad le puede ser, y de qué daño nos puede ser a nosotros (…).
El intento que tubo el francés fue querer que el Rey de Fez le permitiese hacer una fortificación entre la Alcazava, y el puerto, lo qual no se lo consintió aquel moro, pero quedando amigos le permitió que un francés viniese en la Alcazava para cónsul de los franceses que quisiesen comerciar.
Permitíale también que hiciese el fuerte en uno de los tres escollos, pero no aviendo agua en ninguno dellos, no lo admitió el francés, y oy no ha quedado allí sino éste que se tiene por cónsul, y juzgan que los moros están tan advertidos de que no les conviene la vecindad del francés, como lo podemos estar nosotros (…).
Y en fin (Señora) lo que alcanzo de la materia es que ni el estado de la Monarchía, ni las conveniencias que este puerto nos ofrece son para tomar empeño para ocuparle, ni para mantenerle; Nro. Sr. Gde. la C.R.P. de V. Mgd. al bien de la xptiandad como es menester, Pto. de Sta. Mª. 9 de S(eptiemb)re de 1667.
(Sigue el documento en letra diferente): Sra. Las llaves de España son Gibraltar y Cádiz. Estas están por cerrar de sus primeras murallas, no sé quién puede aconsejar a V.M: que divierta a otros fines los efectos R(eale)s primero que a la seguridad de estas plazas. (Firma del Duque)”.
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Menezes, Fernando. Historia de Tánger durante la dominación portuguesa. Lisbon: Ferreiriana, 1732.
Péretié, A. “Le Raïs El-Khadir Ghaïlan.” In Archives Marocaines, vol. 18, 1–186. Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1912.
Routh, Enid M.G. Tangier England’s Lost Atlantic Outpost 1661–1684. London: John Murray, 1912. https://historiasdealboran.wordpress.com/2017/12/17/la-aventura-britanica-en-tanger-1662-1684/
Mercedes García-Arenal, “The Moriscos in Morocco: From Granadan Emigration to the Hornacheros in Salé,” in The Expulsion of the Moriscos from Spain: A Mediterranean Diaspora, ed. Mercedes García-Arenal and Gerard A. Wiegers (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 286–326.
Transliterations of Arabic names may be inconsistent, as they follow the forms found in the original documents.
Muḥammad Ḥaǧǧī, Al-Zāwiya al-Dilāʾiyya wa-dawruhā l-dīnī wa-l-ʿilmī wa-l-siyāsī (Rabat: Maṭbaʿat al-Naǧāḥ al-Ǧadīda, 1988), 31.
Hossain Bouzineb, La Alcazaba del Buregreg: hornacheros, andaluces y medio siglo de designios españoles frustrados (Rabat: Publicaciones del Ministerio de Cultura, 2006), document no. 50.
Bouzineb, La Alcazaba del Buregreg, document no. 13. See also Hossain Bouzineb and Gerard Wiegers, “Tetuán y la expulsión de los moriscos,” in Tiṭwān ḫilāl Al-Qarnayn 16 Wa 17 (Tetouan: Faculty of Arts, 1995), passim.
Muḥammad al-Ṣagīr al-Īfrānī, Nuzhat al-Ḥādī bi-aḫbār mulūk al-qarn al-ḥādī, edited by Octave Houdas (Paris: Ernst Leroux, 1888), 267, and see the contribution by Amine Oulad Lmaroudia about him in this volume.
Gaspard de Rastin to Richelieu, 16 July 1639, in Henry de Castries (ed.), Les Sources inédites de l’Histoire du Maroc [hereinafter SIHM] Archives et bibliothèques de France, 1e serie-Saadiens, tome I (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1911), t. 3, 584–91, 584.
Al-Īfrānī, Nuzhat al-ḥādī, 270.
Ḥaǧǧī, Al-Zāwiya al-Dilāʾiyya, 168–69.
Péretié, “Le Raïs El-Khadir Ghaïlan,” in Archives Marocaines, vol. 18 (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1912), 22–23.
Péretié, “Le Raïs,” 27.
Fernando de Menezes, Historia de Tánger durante la dominación portuguesa (Lisboa: Ferreriana, 1732), 244.
Péretié, “Le Raïs,” 48.
Péretié, “Le Raïs,” 50.
Bouzineb, La Alcazaba del Buregreg, doc. no. 49.
Enid MG Routh, Tangier England’s Lost Atlantic Outpost 1661–1684 (London: John Murray, 1912), 76.
Routh, Tangier England, 76.
Introduction. Les Trois Républiques, in: Henry de Castries(ed.), SIHM, Pays-Bas, 1e serie- Saadiens, t. V, XXVII–XXVIII.
AGS, Guerra Antigua, Legajo GA 2287.
José Luis Comellas, Historia de España moderna y contemporánea (Madrid: Rialp, 1980), 263.
Enrique Arques, Las adelantadas de España (Madrid: CSIC, 1966), 121.