In Parts 1 and 2, we characterized disinformation as a contemporary threat to international security and presented the conditions and tools for its identification. In Part 3, we strive to answer crucial questions related to countering disinformation in international politics. First, we address whether we can combat it effectively in the modern online world, and if so, who should be responsible for doing so. Next, we examine whether the general consensus is that disinformation is harmful. As part of this question, we also examine what it means to build resilience to disinformation and we evaluate its importance at the individual, national, and global levels. Finally, we explain how disinformation is linked in the national and international dimensions.
The age of the internet has brought about a weaponization of disinformation, which is now being utilized by both state and non-state actors in international politics due to its high speed, low cost, and effectiveness in hybrid operations. Disinformation harms individuals, social groups, states, and international organizations, and its perpetrators exploit the global reach and speed of social media and online platforms. Among other Western democratic states, Poland is at the forefront of such actions, particularly against Moscow. Russia’s propaganda aggression against Poland has intensified in parallel with its armed aggression against Ukraine. This aggression against the Polish state image poses a threat to national security by undermining its credibility in NATO and the EU, as well as its position in the Western community and the values of democracy (Kupiecki et al., 2021). Poland, its authorities, and Polish society must take a suitable approach that includes both prevention measures and response. Membership in the European Union and NATO supports Poland’s efforts in defending against Russian propaganda. This membership means that Poland can make the most of working together with its allies and partners and that it can use good practices and mechanisms of policy coordination to strengthen public resilience to disinformation. Ultimately, however, each country is responsible for its own resilience and response measures.
The way that foreign actors now use disinformation is reminiscent of older methods, such as traditional propaganda, lies, corruption, and recruiting agents for disinformation purposes. Past measures and operational undertakings by secret services that counterintelligence once faced pale in comparison to today’s atmosphere. Secret services still keep their arsenal stocked with several hundred thousand leaflets, brochures and forged documents, in combination with using methods such as infiltrating specific milieus and recruiting spies. However, the internet has made it possible to influence the activities of millions of people quickly, cheaply, massively, and effectively without the use of old and outdated methods (Rid, 2020). Moreover, people’s unconscious complicity in creating their own messages or duplicating foreign ones further contributes to this influence. Depending on the needs of the information environment, fake accounts as well as active and dormant bots are employed to achieve this goal. While traditional media environments and disinformation tactics are still used, the internet has exponentially increased the field of information warfare.
Social networks are often blamed for the prevalence of disinformation among internet users. Documents and letters written or signed by politicians or military members are being forged and distributed online. This new digital reality is rapidly transforming the world. Renée DiResta of Stanford University has coined the term “ampliganda,” derived from amplified propaganda, to describe this new environment. She contrasts it with disinformation as a broader and more dangerous phenomenon that can cause avalanche effects through the use of social media, clickbait, and hashtags, even without the user’s ill will or awareness of duplicating false content (DiResta, 2021).
Traditional knowledge – of the enemy’s goals, methods, techniques, codes of intelligence, and diplomatic and political culture – is not enough to combat such amplified disinformation. New abilities, skills, and resources are required and, given the nature of the threat, security services or state institutions alone cannot be responsible for counterattacks. A holistic and integrated approach is essential to tackle disinformation of such magnitude. This approach involves not only the mobilization of state structures, the appointment of inter-ministerial teams, and the adoption of government counteraction strategies and programs but also the participation of civil society, social organizations, researchers, scientists, journalists, teachers, and ordinary internet users. It requires a synergistic combination of these resources in national and international counteraction, with digital civil defense as one of its main components. The importance of such spontaneous actions on a global scale can be seen in the international community’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The response included
Effective defense in the digital world must begin with an understanding of the mechanisms of how false news are spread. State services and expert circles must be familiar with effective methods of countering disinformation. However, to a great extent this defense also depends on the attitudes of individual participants in the infosphere, their digital education, and their understanding of the contemporary conditions of their own cognitive security. Ideally, everyone should understand not only why some people lie in the public space but also why and for what purpose lies are spread en masse and with no serious control. This is the first step toward becoming immune to falsehoods and developing critical and effective media literacy. A basic knowledge of psychology, computer science, and pedagogy is valuable in building the skills to navigate the information space. However, it is unreasonable to expect people to gain this understanding on their own. Media literacy should therefore be included in school education from an early age and in all public education. An increasing number of countries are recognizing the importance of media education and are integrating it into their educational programs. Finland is considered a model country in this regard as it implements educational solutions from pre-school to higher education. The Finnish model works because young children are exposed to the internet from a young age.
The need for media education for young people is further confirmed by an analysis done by the American RAND Corporation. The findings included over 200 research reports, 64 of which were in-depth, from around the world. The reports were reviewed to identify recommendations on how to counter disinformation. One of the obvious conclusions was the need to develop media education programs that teach people to use media wisely, especially in the world of social media. Such programs are crucial for educating all generations (Helmus & Keep, 2021).
Decision-makers responsible for implementing programs to combat disinformation should not be discouraged by skeptical expert opinions. Some experts claim that information manipulation does not significantly impact social behavior or strategic decisions in foreign and security policy, as mentioned in the first part of this book. If this were true, however, it would demonstrate the massive immunity of democratic systems. The lack of effect of disinformation operations would discourage their organizers from taking similar actions in the future. It would also demystify the risks associated with them and alleviate concerns about the credibility of electoral processes, the
In discussions about the ineffectiveness of external disinformation, however, an important theme is the responsibility of Western societies for this phenomenon. Their responsibility is supposed to result from internal social divisions exacerbated by social media. It is difficult to argue with this thesis, even if it is not easy to measure the cause-and-effect dependence of social polarization on digital interference from abroad. Consideration of independent studies and government reports in states affected by informational aggression reveals that the scale of this phenomenon is currently unprecedented in international relations and poses actual and potential threats to democracy worldwide, regardless of the internal conditions of societies (McInnis & Starling, 2021).
Assessing the effects of influence operations and countering them will always be difficult. In general, however, the social and political consequences of disinformation are clear; for example, its effect on democratic elections. Disinformation has led to several related problems, including the deepening of divisions and differences of opinion, internal tensions, disinterest in participating in the election process, and reduced confidence in public institutions. Even established democracies, like the United States during the presidency of Donald Trump or the United Kingdom during the Brexit referendum campaign, have been affected by disinformation. Canadian special service reports have also identified constant targets for disinformation (Carvin, 2021). Similarly, analyses of foreign interference preceding the parliamentary elections in Germany in September 2021 highlighted similar risks. Disinformation was one of the key instruments used by Russian attackers on German democratic institutions. Fortunately, Germany thwarted the disinformation attempts thanks to thorough preparation and responses from the part of state structures and civil society.
During the 2016 U.S. election campaign, pro-Kremlin Facebook accounts organized demonstrations by two opposing groups, pro- and anti-immigrant, to incite riots as part of the Heart of Texas operation. Fortunately, casualties were avoided, but the goal of increasing local tensions and disputes was achieved. The outcome was also used to criticize American democracy and diminish its image abroad. More tragic consequences followed the presidential election in November 2020. Street protests grew at an unprecedented pace, fueled by emotional comments on social media by Trump supporters reacting to the election results. Within 24 hours, the Facebook group Stop the Steal mobilized
With the social polarization, tensions, and associated strong emotions that come with online networks, mobilizing people through social media is simple and effective. Fast and extreme messages resonate with users who are already awakened to a particular issue. People leave many traces of everyday activity on social media that testify to their political or election sympathies. Mass data sets are processed using software that allows for defining the preferences of users and adjusting the messages, whether commercial or political, that appear on their screens. Algorithms evaluate, organize, and provide detailed information about users and their preferences. They decide what information and content will engage recipients the most and encourage them to click and like content, which in turn generates viewership, economic profits, or election victories. Recipients become individual addressees, pushed to buy a specific product, express a desired opinion, or support a candidate or political party.
To change the functionality of social media used by manipulators, we must promote content capable of engaging various sides of the political and social spectrum in a civilized discourse. This will prevent manipulators from being rewarded with visibility on the web through posts that manipulate emotions or target basic needs. Essentially, platforms such as Facebook should be less provocative and more conducive to public debate. With less hate speech and aggression on the internet, the field of activity for foreign manipulators will automatically narrow. However, the social good does not necessarily align with the business goals of internet platforms. It is not altruism that drives these platforms but rather the financial measurability of actions. In the absence of top-down regulations and restrictions, financial incentives are their main motivation.
The fundamental premise is that, as part of a comprehensive approach to the problem, online platforms, especially large social networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter, or YouTube, should be obligated to counteract emotions on the web. In other words, technological solutions limiting the spread of hate, misinformation, and extremism should be utilized. The problem lies in the scale and effectiveness of such activities. For example, YouTube deletes
Nevertheless, the social media industry cannot avoid co-responsibility for the effects of information manipulation as they are often a component of influence operations that involve various other instruments of political influence. These include cyber infrastructure attacks, economic and energy blackmail, political corruption, espionage activities, and military measures that may lead to open military aggression. The January 2022 report of the special commission of the European Parliament investigating foreign interference in the internal affairs of EU Member States highlighted these aspects (EU should, 2022).
External interference in the internal affairs of states may not necessarily aim to impact electoral processes but to deepen or induce social polarization, impose or strengthen specific narratives, exacerbate public debate, or blur the line between facts and opinions. Such interference can also be part of preparations for the future. One example is the operation carried out in Ukraine in 2014 by CyberBerkut, most likely associated with GRU, which aimed to influence voters and make them doubt the process and the results.
In response to this phenomenon, the European Union and NATO have taken more robust actions against disinformation, with the primary aim of strengthening the social resilience of their member states and partners. These decisions were made quickly and without hesitation following Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, despite previous political and administrative barriers. Activities of state-owned Russian propaganda media, such as RT and Sputnik, have been banned within the European Union. Euro-Atlantic institutions view resilience to disinformation and other hybrid challenges as the ability not only to withstand and overcome challenges but also to do so in an irreversible, fair, and democratic manner. Such an approach places resilience in the context of fundamental values and goals, where problem-solving and crisis recovery do not occur at the cost of violating the guidelines of the rule of law and democracy, such as censorship of free media. Resilience, in this sense, begins with the awareness that if the authorities cannot defend themselves against such challenges, they also lose the trust of their citizens. This is particularly crucial for
To create an optimal system of responses to disinformation, both at national and international levels, multiple conditions must be fulfilled simultaneously. Governments, societies, and individuals require a set of instruments that are interconnected to build this system. When referring to foreign models at the national level, it is essential to consider that solutions that work in one country may not necessarily apply to another. For instance the Swedes, who do not have a large Russian minority, find it generally easier to detect and combat Russian disinformation than the Latvians, given that a Russian minority constitutes a quarter of the entire population and half of the population of the capital city, Riga.
Regardless of different national approaches, it is important to recognize that the key link to resilience against disinformation is the individual recipient of these messages, who can act as the first line of defense in the information struggle. It is crucial for internet users, especially public officials, to understand why disinformation exists, how to avoid spreading it, and how to use media, particularly online. They should also be aware of the methods used by disinformers and practice basic digital hygiene to reduce the risk of intrusion into their communication tools. Media education and training can also improve individuals’ ability to verify facts, and fact-checking is becoming increasingly accessible not just to experts or journalists but to ordinary internet users as well. By engaging in individual or group crowdsourced fact-checking, individuals can more effectively combat conspiracy theories and disinformation (Corlin & Önnerfors, 2021).
The harmful nature of disinformation has become increasingly apparent on a global scale due to the COVID-19 pandemic and hostilities aimed at Ukraine. False or manipulated information about the rate of the disease spreading and new mutations of the virus in India led to fear in countries thousands of miles away. Anti-vaccine protests were organized in Germany using social networks in Australia, and anti-vaccine misinformation spread around the world, especially on TikTok among teenagers (Fox, 2021). The popularity of new social media sites, such as Rumble and Gap (Kaplan, 2021), also increased. The pandemic highlighted the unprecedented global scale of deliberate manipulation of information by some states and non-state actors and resulted in a greater awareness of the impact of falsehoods on the web and other forms of communication. As a result, national and international actors have taken more vigorous actions, leading some platforms to consent to the voluntary EU Code on Counteracting Disinformation.
The methods and means of disinformation discussed in earlier parts of this book can be supplemented with the migration of internet users across social messaging platforms. After Twitter blocked former U.S. President Donald Trump’s account, supporters flocked to the GETTR platform. He also planned to launch his own website to provide a place for outreach to his political and curious supporters. Despite claims that the movement is fading due to reduced social media presence, supporters of conspiracy theories and anti-establishment beliefs, such as QAnon, have not disappeared; instead, they have migrated to other sites, including those involving foreign influence agents. Changes in the tools employed can also be observed in Estonia and Ukraine, where pro-Kremlin media lost their licenses and attempted to resume activity under new names. Following the failure of the local version of Sputnik in Sweden due to little interest from recipients, Russian or affiliated entities purchased local online media to domesticate operations of influence, disseminating foreign content and narratives through seemingly native sources. Russian and other disinformation organizers are increasingly utilizing the growing
Changes in disinformation tactics and operational methods are linked to advancements in data processing capabilities, creating the possibility of even faster, more insidious, and harder-to-detect distortions of reality. For instance, a detected network of 350 fake accounts spreading pro-China narratives in the French news community featured profiles created using artificial intelligence (Carmichael, 2021), which highlights the new challenges and threats emerging. Deepfake technology, which allows for the creation of fake images or videos using artificial intelligence, presents ethical dilemmas in cases like the one of a deceased artist whose voice was used in a documentary about him. The manipulation of recordings featuring politicians and public figures is politically dangerous, especially when deepfakes aim to ridicule, discredit, or incite street protests and violence.
The combination of disinformation and technology creates new cyber threats that are increasingly complex and manipulative, targeting national security and election processes. In 2016, hacker attacks targeted the Democratic Election Committee and John Podesta, Hillary Clinton’s campaign manager, during the U.S. election campaign. In 2021, the Russian military services GRU-associated group, APT29 (also known as Cozy Bear), launched an attack on the Republican Party. They did this simultaneously with cyber-attacks by criminal hacker organizations on critical infrastructure, the DarkSide group and the oil Colonial Pipeline, and the business entities, REvill and Kaseya (Turton & Jacobs, 2021). These events have raised concerns about the security of critical systems and led to criticisms of authorities for ineffective countermeasures. Despite attempts to resolve these problems through dialogue, further attacks continue. Russia’s asymmetrical actions aim to balance the potentials of both countries, as illustrated by Putin’s plan to create a national cyber-wall modeled after China, which would give the government an information monopoly and censor citizens from external content. The Kremlin has already censored content related to Russian military operations in Ukraine and introduced penalties for activities deemed improper or anti-state, including the use of the words “war of aggression” in online communication.
In the West, on the other hand, experience is being accumulated, studies and analytical volumes are increasing, and as a result, there is a better overall understanding of the disinformation environment and its actors, goals, and methods. In addition, there is a growing number of social and journalistic initiatives focused on media education and fact-checking. While the group of global disinformers is growing in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s
2 The Challenges of Regulating Online Platforms
Growing awareness of the risks and pressure from experts and societies are leading to new political and legislative initiatives on both sides of the Atlantic, with a view to regulating social media and online platforms more consistently than ever before. They entail:
- –Regulation of the social media business model.
- –Incorporating transparent policies and practices.
- –Protecting users’ personal data.
- –Implementing transparency practices around political advertising mechanisms on the web.
- –Programming algorithms that regulate the way platforms function in interaction with and between users.
At the same time, there is an ongoing discussion regarding possible agreement (and international coordination) between state regulators and the owners of global media and internet platforms. In the first decade of this century, the U.S. was of the option that the solution to misinformation was providing more information rather than limiting its spread and filtering out harmful content. This viewpoint shifted during the pandemic, however, when YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter started moderating the content on their platforms more rigorously. In response to countering Russian military propaganda against Ukraine, further measures were taken, which will be discussed later in this book.
According to analysts, global internet corporations like Facebook face a complex problem that extends beyond the technology of their media platforms. With 3.5 billion global users, Facebook is considered to be the largest information autarkic entity in the world. It collects various data from each user, processes it, and uses it as commercial and informational products. Mark Zuckerberg, the CEO of Facebook, has compared the potential of his company to that of a superpower and has even boasted about his company’s rivalry with China in the production of cryptocurrency. However, the issue of power and control over privacy, identity, and information processes has become increasingly apparent. As a result, Facebook appointing teams such as supervisory
These actions are not enough, but they are a step in the right direction. At the same time, we must not lose sight of the fact that time works in favor of increasingly powerful corporations at the expense of global social interest. Critics of this model accuse Facebook of “ostentatiously abandoning morality” and using lies, predicting the collapse of our current civilization as a result. Facebook has failed to adequately respond to hate, propaganda, conspiratorial visions of history, and even terrorist recruitment carried out on user profiles. The users of the platform who are media-educated and aware of the risks could provide the greatest potential counterweight to such practices. Nevertheless, even if half of users were to abandon Facebook, about a quarter of humanity would remain within the circle of influence of Facebook’s authorities (LaFrance, 2021).
With the complexities of these issues, changes in the functions of social media present a challenge for Western countries. Additionally, there is a concern that regulating online platforms could lead to their demise. Controlling the negative aspects of their activities could risk destroying the freedoms they provide. There are also concerns about how to censor undesirable content while not undermining their position in undemocratic countries where they serve as a source of alternative information for state propaganda, and where they face pressure and sometimes blackmail from governments. The dilemma of promoting freedom or preserving profits remains another concern.
As the example of Russia shows, the differences in the ways of managing digital space are deepening between democratic countries that aim to protect the rights and freedoms of individuals and authoritarian countries that prioritize the interests of the authorities. It is currently still unclear where internet segmentation may lead and how it will affect freedom and democracy, as it could create closed or disintegrated information spaces on the web. However, the problem of closed information spaces clearly weakens the role of the internet as a tool for promoting democratic values not only in China but also in Russia and many other smaller dictatorial or authoritarian countries.
3 Humankind in the Face of the Threat of Disinformation
In such a complex information, economic, and political environment, the individual level remains key in building resilience to disinformation. This is where the problem of the impact of disinformation and the weaknesses of prevention come into play. It is important to remember the reasons for telling
Psychologists suggest that the ability to manipulate without the use of physical force has likely been advantageous in the competition for resources and partners, much like the evolution of deceptive strategies in the animal kingdom, such as camouflage. Sissela Bok, an ethicist at Harvard University, has noted that “Lying is so simple compared to any other means of gaining power” (Fullinwieder, 2007). In essence, there is no need for weapons when lying can be easily employed. Disinformation crafted and disseminated by a single person, acting under state control, can reach millions and achieve the desired effect. When choosing his career, Vladimir Putin appeared to be fascinated by this peculiarly understood minimalism, in which one person’s influence can have a significant impact on the course of history.
Analysts have identified that misinformation is often perpetuated by mental shortcuts, cognitive biases, and illusions that discourage critical thinking and fact-checking. This has led to growing concerns about the harmful effects of disinformation and propaganda online. To address this challenge, tech giants like Google have partnered with research institutions to develop innovative approaches to combatting extremism and disinformation. For example, Jigsaw, a research unit of Google, has collaborated with the Laboratory for Research on Polarization and Extremism at American University to test the effectiveness of psychological inoculation. This is also known as attitude inoculation which is a technique that helps people to resist manipulated messages (Courchesne et al., 2021). A study was conducted to specifically test the effectiveness of psychological inoculation against narratives of male supremacy and white supremacy. The experiment aimed to build psychological immunity by exposing subjects to a weakened or persuasive message and causing them to reject it. This controversial method was therefore about the use of some information manipulation to build resistance to more harmful forms.
Eight hundred participants, mostly white men aged 18 to 35, were recruited for the study. This demographic group is often targeted by white supremacist propaganda. Participants were shown a short video containing rhetorical techniques characteristic of racist propaganda. They were then divided into five groups and presented with film messages of varying degrees of extremist narrative intensity: one with a blatantly racist message, another with a milder
Unfortunately, human psychology shows that the effects of disinformation can be lasting. In 2015, Australian researcher Briony Swire-Thompson conducted a study at the University of Western Australia which showed the ineffectiveness of providing evidence-based information in refuting false beliefs. The experiment involved presenting one of two statements to approximately 2,000 American adults: “Vaccines cause autism” and “Donald Trump said vaccines cause autism”. Since Trump has repeatedly suggested that there is such a link despite lacking scientific evidence on the matter, it is unsurprising that Trump supporters showed greater confidence in the validity of this misinformation when his name was associated with it. After the initial test, the participants were presented with a brief explanation, citing a large-scale study, as to why the claim about a link between vaccines and autism is false. They were then asked for their opinion again, and this time, many accepted the explanation refuting the link. However, a week later, in subsequent tests, their belief in the misinformation had substantially reverted to its earlier level (Courchesne et al., 2021).
Other research (Courchesne et al., 2021) has shown that refuting lies with evidence can actually strengthen belief in those lies. Denying false information can sometimes be harmful and further the damage of disinformation. This is because people tend to believe that the information they have is true, or that they themselves have sufficient competence to verify it, as seen in the explanation of the Dunning-Kruger syndrome earlier. When they are challenged, there is a risk that the recipient will develop a psychological defensive reaction against a change of position. Paradoxically, this will make corrective information less effective in the long run.
The question that arises is how to correct erroneous opinions and beliefs without causing a yo-yo effect. To address this issue, a group of researchers from renowned research centers in various Western countries created a manual with a positive message. The manual assumes that, while it is better to act preventively as part of appropriate communication strategies in the long term, denying fake news can be effective when following a few clear rules: clearly state the facts, explain disinformation without scientific or professional jargon, and ensure that the denial is provided by competent individuals (Debunking Handbook, 2020).
- –Aggregation of data about each user and their behavior.
- –Data algorithmizing, or data management with the use of computer programs with special processing capacity.
- –Anonymity of aggregation, management, and dissemination of information.
- –Automation of content publication and interaction with it and other users (Bradshaw, 2020).
This combination of technology has enabled both the public dissemination of disinformation and the corporations profiting from it. With an annual revenue of $100 billion USD, Meta’s (the owner of Facebook) income surpasses the national product of most countries in the world. Its long-term influence, beyond its financial power, stems from the accessibility of data and the capability to employ it across all four of the above potentially harmful dimensions.
In data transmission, the traces of users’ activity on the network allow platform managers to gather unregulated personal information, including data on users’ political or election sympathies. Algorithms analyze this data and provide feedback to users based on their preferences, prompting them to engage with certain content. The profits of digital platforms from personalized and more clickable content are constantly increasing. However, this approach limits the independence of internet users. Algorithms suggest content based on individual preferences, leading to decisions that increasingly move beyond the recipient, who is no longer a decision-maker but an object of socialization. The cognitive weakness of an individual makes them more susceptible to the effects of this mechanism.
Automation enables the use of fake accounts or bots programmed to engage much more frequently and consistently on platforms within set information parameters. In operations of influence, these bots act as generators of the popularity of content by interacting with and sharing it. They are also used to launch aggressive attacks on opponents with hate speech or manipulated information. The creators of these bots will benefit from technological advances, increasingly augmented by artificial intelligence. So far, the response from platforms, governments, and supranational regulators has focused on
Such changes are imperative because societies generally place their trust in internet media regardless of their awareness of the potential for manipulation. Research from the past indicates that people who received information through press, radio, and television, including official messages, also trusted these sources and considered them credible. However, with the current speed of internet broadcasts, the proliferation of sources, and the de-monopolization of the roles of official broadcasters, people have remained uncritically trusting of sources, particularly among the older generation. In other words, the vast majority of internet users believe in the information distributed, which they then willingly and naturally pass on.
Research on the effectiveness of platforms’ responses to disinformation and influence operations is scarce and often inadequately documented. Some general conclusions can be drawn based on studies that employ sound methodology and reliable research questions that allow for statistically reliable comparisons of results related to the real world of international politics (Bateman et al., 2021). The most significant findings highlight the importance of fact-checking, warnings against disinformation, and the provision of credible sources. However, it should be acknowledged that knowledge about the effectiveness of other methods used to counteract information manipulation is still relatively limited. This applies to measures such as:
- –Deterring and disrupting manipulation.
- –Strengthening the moderation of network activity.
- –Changing algorithms.
- –Limiting microtargeting.
- –Building social credibility through strengthening of the media.
- –Changing the incentive system by developing antitrust activities and using de-monetization.
The research concerned mostly American internet users and was largely focused on Facebook and Twitter, leaving the matter open for the research of other platforms along with their geographic, cultural, linguistic, and thematic dilemmas (Bateman, 2021).
Due to the natural cognitive limitations of humans and the challenges arising from the business models of online platforms, social media users encounter numerous obstacles in their individual struggle against disinformation. State and societal action is therefore necessary, which could be based on existing
Civil society plays a key role in shaping the desired information space. It can offer innovative, practical solutions in specific social and cultural contexts. Its activities raise awareness and civic engagement both online and offline and increase the competences of ordinary citizens to combat disinformation. Civil society also suffers from resource scarcity that industry, governments, and international organizations could address through increased support.
The international community has significant untapped synergetic potential, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 12. Due to the multitude of actors, goals, and methods of disinformation by domestic and foreign perpetrators, it is only through the joint action of the international community that effective solutions can be developed at both national and international levels. The objective is not to universalize solutions but to coordinate them with each other, jointly address general regulatory and technological problems, share best practices, and exchange information. Furthermore, the response to disinformation must be multifaceted and comprehensive, encompassing both institutions and people and resources. It should also be adapted to the local environment and challenges, which may differ in terms of the intensity of the problem and its local specificity.
To counter disinformation in international politics, it is crucial to gain a better understanding of its constituent features, including the goals, methods, and actors involved, and monitor their activities. International organizations, particularly those in the Western world, play a crucial role in this effort. NATO and the European Union rely on studying and understanding the information environment, including its participants, narratives, message content, and impact on their member states. They evaluate these factors within the context of threats to their member states and use this information as their first line of defense against disinformation.
In the aftermath of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014, NATO’s communication strategy took on a new dimension, with countering disinformation becoming an even higher priority in the wake of the 2022 invasion. NATO has been developing an analytical project for many years, using breakthrough technologies and the ability to evaluate large amounts of data to identify the behavior of both perpetrators and recipients of disinformation. This project has been successful in increasing the Alliance’s ability to monitor its information environment, assess the situation, and take countermeasures with more precision.
The topics discussed in this chapter lead to the conclusion that countering disinformation is becoming a top priority in the policies of many countries and international organizations in the international arena. Moreover, there is a growing number of research and analytical centers, fact-checking organizations, and media education initiatives collaborating with each other in the non-governmental community. These entities also form important international clusters in regions and countries with less experience or response capacity. This environment will be discussed more comprehensively in the next chapter.