1 Introduction
Debates about the value and effects of federalism and legal pluralism have tended to occur in isolation, despite the apparent overlaps. This chapter, and this edited volume more generally, represent steps towards a more coherent or unifying research agenda that conceptualises and measures federalism, legal pluralism, and how they relate, specifically as steps towards the development of a “law of diversity”. This chapter focuses on ethnic diversity and ethnic accommodation, building on an approach first detailed in Breen 2018.1
Federalism is a common yet often imprecisely used term. In some cases it is used interchangeably with respect to a specific system of government, a federation,2 and at other times more loosely to capture a range of decentralised states and polities.3 Traditionally, federalism was taken to refer to a system of government with at least two levels of territorially defined and constitutionally sovereign governments, each with their own powers derived from a constitution.4 Wheare5 reduced it to a system whereby each level of government has at least one matter on which they have the final say. These definitions were based largely on the US constitution, which was considered to be the paradigmatic case of federalism. But as different approaches to federalism proliferated, these definitions gave way to more nuanced perspectives.
There are several different types of federal systems. The most well-known are the federations, such as the US, Australia and Switzerland. But Watts and others also conceive of constitutionally decentralised unions, where powers are divided according to a constitution, but the central government remains supreme, which are relatively commonplace in Asia. The European Union, according to Watts, represents a confederation. Iceland has a kind of federal system, whereby Greenland has autonomy but little role in the governance of Iceland as a whole, known as a federacy. Watts also established a kind of residual category of hybrid federal system. Using this approach, we can think of federalism as a set of normative principles and an organisational logic unrestricted by preconceptions based on existing federal systems, like the US federation.
In other words, federalism as a normative principle can underpin a framework for classifying the instruments and institutions for the accommodation of diversity. This acknowledges that not every institution of interest can be considered as a characteristic component of a federal system. For example, an electoral system is an institution that is often designed to maximise diversity accommodation, but an electoral system is not normally considered to be a federal feature. Nevertheless, we should consider such institutions alongside more specifically federal institutions because they interact and work towards the same or similar objectives. Thus, to understand how a federal system works in practice and the extent to which it achieves its (diversity accommodation)
Another way of categorising federalism is according to whether it is ethnic (multinational), territorial (regional) or some hybrid thereof. Minority ethnic groups and Indigenous Peoples tend to seek ethnic federalism, which is institutionalised through the design of provincial boundaries that reflect the distribution of different ethnic groups, or to recognise traditional homelands, and in doing so enable special rights for the given ethnic group(s).10 This can be compared to territorial federalism, where the corresponding federal boundaries are based on non-ethnic factors, like geography, viability and infrastructure, and laws are based on principles of neutrality and are blind to ethnicity and cultural difference.11
Legal pluralism refers to different sets of laws or legal systems pertaining to different groups or territories within a single state or polity. Legal pluralism is present to at least some extent in all federal systems because federal systems have different legislative systems at the federal level as compared to the regional or provincial level, or some variation thereof. In those federal systems that are ethnic, or multinational, legal pluralism is much more prominent. This is because the state, at the time of federalisation, tends to recognise and (aims to) institutionalise ethnic diversity. This means that different subnational units will be empowered to create laws and legal systems that account for that unit’s titular or dominant ethnic group’s cultural and linguistic distinctiveness and, in many cases, their unique traditions and customary practices. Ethnic federal systems are also often asymmetrical. It is through this accommodation of diversity that we see the most fundamental overlap between the (recognition of) unity in diversity that is central to federalism and to legal pluralism. Indeed, conceived in this way, the two do not just overlap but are mutually reinforcing.
Thus, what defines an ethnic federal system in this context is the accommodation of ethnic diversity. This may be through the delineation of territories forming provinces, through political representation rights, through the recognition of different legal systems and customary laws, and through other special rights (e.g. language rights). Notably, these “ethnic” features are usually aimed towards minorities and the provision or recognition of minority rights. However, we are increasingly seeing a greater emphasis and incorporation of rights for all ethnic groups. For example, the recent Constitution of Nepal includes quotas for different ethnic groups, including the dominant Khas Arya, while the now defunct Constitution of Myanmar (2008), incorporated ethnic affairs ministries on a non-territorial basis where groups became small minorities in the territorial units (states and regions). The largest number of those ministries were allocated to the dominant group, the Bamar, who are also designated as one of the eight Indigenous “national races”.
Hence, the accommodation of diversity is about more than just the institutions traditionally understood to characterise a federal system, as conceived by Watts.15 The logic, the underpinning principles and the institutional approaches of federalism and legal pluralism overlap and in order to progress
This chapter puts forward an approach to the definition and measurement of the accommodation of diversity that is built around the institutions for federalism (broadly conceived). The measurement approach features a number of indicators that can be aggregated and disaggregated to focus on one or the other, and to understand how they relate. It is state-centric, but it does not need to be. It can be used, and has been used, to theorise how and why institutions change, and under what conditions, and to analyse the outcomes of different combinations of institutions.16 From this we can make normative claims about (the desirability and design of) federalism and legal pluralism and the impact of various institutional configurations.
The paper is structured as follows. Following this introduction, Section 2 conceptualises federalism, legal pluralism and accommodation while Section 3 describes the measurement approach and the definition of key indicators. Section 4 applies the approach to three cases in Asia that have faced considerable challenges arising from their ethnic diversity, namely Myanmar, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Section 5 considers further the relationship with democracy, followed by a conclusion.
2 Conceptualising Federalism and Accommodation
Taking a principle-based approach to federalism and the accommodation of diversity means that federal systems should be considered along a continuum, between unitary on the one end, and federal on the other, and include a dimension of inclusion. Inclusion can be high or low, independent of the extent of federalisation. Federal systems can be more or less federal, depending on their institutional design and implementation. They can display, for example, the features of a federation, like the US, or a constitutionally decentralised union, like Sri Lanka, or even be a predominately unitary state with important federal
Matrix of federal and inclusion dimensions of the accommodation of diversity
At the same time, a federal system can be more or less accommodating of diversity. It is not necessarily true that a system that could be categorised on the far (federal) end of a federal continuum is also accommodating, as per Figure 8.1. For example, Australia’s federal system emphasises legal neutrality and purports to be identity-blind. It has legal pluralism in its different orders of government, but it largely stops there. There is no part of its federalism that
So, what do we mean when we talk about accommodation? I define accommodation as a mixture of inclusion (representation and voice in political institutions) and autonomy, which I elaborate on in the following section. Like federalism, accommodation can be measured along a continuum of assimilation to integration to accommodation, each defined according to their approach to cultural difference (see Figure 8.2).18 Specifically, assimilation seeks to erode or eliminate cultural differences and to build a common identity. Integration respects cultural differences but treats them as private affairs within a framework that otherwise focuses on individual rights and state neutrality. Accommodation recognises cultural differences and institutionalises group rights.19 Federal systems can be designed in a way that is accommodating, such as in an ethnic federal system; integrating; or assimilating. Several federal systems including the US and arguably Malaysia have been designed in a way that cross-cuts ethnicity, with a view towards assimilation.20
Continuum from assimilation to accommodation
adapted from breen 2018b
In the Asian region, federalism is invariably a kind of holding-together ethnic federalism.21 The explicit treatment of ethnic groups in federal systems in Asia thus make it a fruitful ground for elaborating and testing an approach to
My methodology is grounded in new institutionalism, specifically historical institutionalism, which pays attention to path dependencies and critical junctures as opportunities for substantive change. I define institutions following March and Olsen:22 An institution is a relatively enduring collection of rules and organised practices, embedded in structures of meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals and changing external circumstances.
My measurement approach distinguishes between formal and informal institutions, or institutions as formal rules and informal organised practices. This is consistent with approaches to legal pluralism that distinguish between formal and informal legal systems, with the former comprising those official and written laws and practices, and the latter encompassing traditional, customary and personal (family) laws, some of which may also become formal.
Taking a holistic approach to federalism requires us to consider its purposes when identifying features. I focus on Asia in my conceptualisation and apply the measurement approach to three countries. Asian federal systems, as holding together federal systems in ethnically divided contexts, focus on the accommodation (and sometimes integration or assimilation) of different ethnic groups. Therefore, institutions that seek to achieve or otherwise affect these ends should be incorporated into the concept and measured, especially when they interact with federal institutions and contribute to the aim of unity in diversity. This includes legal pluralism (outside of the conventional occurrence in federal systems), mechanisms for proportional representation and the recognition of cultural rights.
In doing so, I develop a new approach to understanding and evaluating federalism as a means of accommodating diversity. Together, these aspects work towards unity in diversity, “based on the presumed value and validity of combining unity and diversity and of accommodating, preserving and promoting distinct identities”.23 It does not have to be about minority ethnic groups alone, but it should be acknowledged that dominant groups are usually in effect already accommodated. It is well established that states, including
3 Measuring Federal Systems and Accommodation
My approaching to measuring the management of ethnic diversity maps formal and informal institutions along a continuum from assimilation to accommodation. The higher the score, the more accommodating it is. The indicators have been subcategorised to enable disaggregation and comparison of component parts, for example, consociational elements, those that address legal pluralism specifically, those that relate to traditional federal systems, and those that relate strictly to the ethnicity afforded in the federal design.
The formal federal system indicators and their operationalisation are:
- –Autonomy: the extent of centralisation (e.g. intervention rights) offset against the extent of constitutional autonomy afforded to the units;
- –Constitutionalism: the constitutional change, interpretation and dispute resolution processes;
- –Bicameralism: how units are represented in the centre, such as whether there are two relatively equal houses of parliament, or whether units are formally represented in other central institutions.
But a federal system as mentioned is not necessarily accommodating, unless it is designed in such a way that ethnic groups have some kind of autonomy, such as through the provincial boundaries that are aligned with territorial clustering of ethnic groups or forms of special autonomy. Hence the incorporation of an ethnicity in federalism indicator, which is measured primarily according to the proportion of units which are based primarily in a single ethnicity, mixed or territorially based. Additional factors informing the measurement of this indicator are the extent of asymmetry, the strength of local government and presence of provisions for special autonomy.
- –Representation: how ethnic groups are represented in key institutions, particularly the legislature, including electoral systems; and,
- –Cultural rights: the extent to which diverse cultural rights, such as those relating to language and religion, are positively protected or undermined, such as through personal law systems and non-territorial autonomy.
Informal or behavioural components are recorded as actions that reinforce or undermine the formal institutions and their purposes, or as the implementation or not of those formal institutions. If a constitutional provision is not implemented within three years, its score is removed. Scores are also adjusted if either the legislature or executive of a unit is dissolved, or legislation is disallowed by a higher tier and according to the proportionality of electoral results and the basic composition of executives (such as whether minimum, oversized or consensus). Further details are provided in Table 8.1.
The scoring system is informed by the approach of Lijphart26 but adapted. Lijphart famously used ten variables to identify and analyse the contrast between majoritarian and consensus democracies. I adapt his variables, although I do not measure central bank independence or the strength of civil society and I look at the specific mix of power allocation for autonomy and centralization measures. I use Gallagher’s Index27 to measure proportionality, and an adaptation thereof to look at ethnic inclusion. For comparing with and controlling for democracy and internal conflict, I use the Polity Project’s timeseries data.28
I do not consider democracy as a prerequisite or essential element of federalism or accommodation. It is often argued that accommodation of minorities is less likely, and that federalism, or federal systems, cannot work in an authoritarian regime.29 But this is to downplay or disregard the significance of hybrid arrangements and successful forms of accommodation in countries that are considered to be not fully democratic, such as those in Malaysia and
Other controls and points of comparison that I have incorporated in order to understand the reasons for, and timing of, institutional change are the extent of internal conflict, when regime type changes occur, when there is either major marketisation or an economic crisis and when there is international intervention or other contingent event, like a natural disaster. Positive changes are scored as one, and negative changes as negative one, and are generally not cumulative.
I also measure infrastructural capacity. Infrastructural capacity, building on Ziblatt,33 refers to the representational and institutional arrangements of minority ethnic groups. Infrastructural capacity in this sense can be taken to refer to an informal legal pluralism, and its presence incentivises the central state to recognise that legal pluralism through federal arrangements mitigates secession risk.34 My measurement approach has been tried and tested in my 2018 book35 and journal article36 covering Nepal, Myanmar and Sri Lanka, and a subsequent article expanding its use to a further five countries in Asia.37 The examples in Section 4 are drawn from these publications, which provide further detail on the methodology.
Federalism as the accommodation of diversity: indicators
Indicator |
Operationalisation |
|---|---|
Autonomy |
Extent of autonomy, based on breadth indicated by the sharing of four key kinds of powers, and the scope of that autonomy (legislative, executive) |
Constitutionalism |
Constitutional change requirements (e.g. supermajority or minority veto), independence of judiciary and dispute resolution procedures |
Interdependence |
Bicameralism including type of representation and role of upper house, and legislative executive relations (parliamentary, presidential etc.) |
Subnational units |
Basis of provincial level units (ethnic) and presence and strength of local level and other special structures |
Asymmetry |
Differences in powers and representation of subnational units and constituent ethnic groups |
Representation |
Identity/ethnic elements of representation, such as reservations, proportional representation |
Cultural rights |
Recognition of languages, personal laws, traditional dispute resolution, customary laws, non-territorial autonomy |
Federal behaviours |
Increases or reductions in the powers of subnational units, changes in the number or boundaries of units, impositions of states of emergencies and other major acts of intervention, secession events, major changes to the independence of the courts |
Behaviours associated with inclusion and cultural rights |
Representation of ethnic groups in the executive, extent of proportionality (ethnic) in the legislature, empowerment of ethnic groups to manage own affairs (where not covered above such as in a constitution), exercise of minority veto, minus assimilating activities such as education or language reforms that prioritise the dominant group. |
Infrastructural capacity |
Strength of regional or identity-based administrative and representative structures, comprising existence and type of regional administration and its services, and the type(s) of political / negotiating organisation |
4 Applying the Measures – Myanmar, Nepal and Sri Lanka
When applied to Myanmar, Nepal and Sri Lanka, these measures reveal several conditions and incentives for the accommodation of minorities,38 and demonstrate the relationship between different kinds of institutions, for example federalism (that accommodates diversity) and democracy. Starting with Nepal, and its process towards federal democracy, Figure 8.3 maps the change in the level of accommodation (formal and combined) since the establishment of its modern state in 1948, along with the level of democracy (democratisation) and the peripheral infrastructural capacity.
Accommodation, democratisation and infrastructural capacity in Nepal 1945–2016
adapted from breen 2018b
Figure 8.3 shows that there have been three main approaches to the accommodation of diversity in Nepal. Firstly, Panchayats (people’s assemblies), provided a bottom-up approach to decentralisation. They existed in both democratic and authoritarian regimes (see democracy line in Figure 8.4). The clustering of ethnic groups, and the deliberate delineation of Panchayats that aligned with this clustering meant that they entailed important approaches
Secondly, a new democratic regime was put in place in 1990 in response to a popular uprising. But it was a highly centralised unitary system that reinforced the culture and identity of the dominant group. It did recognise multiethnicity and increase inclusion, but it kept in place identity-based nation-building tools, like a national religion and restrictive citizenship rules. There was some observance of customary laws, personal laws and traditional dispute resolution, though with little formal recognition. We can see a middle rating (integration) though in fact it was a mixture of accommodating and assimilating policies, with little space for formal legal pluralism.
Thirdly, the establishment of an interim and then federal constitution in 2008 and 2015 respectively, bought in a range of accommodating institutions and formal recognition of diversity and legal pluralism. For example, quotas and proportional representation in various sectors including politics, multilingualism, institutionalisation of personal laws and customary dispute resolution. The accommodation of diversity score is quite high. It is notable that this change followed internal conflict and a major contingent event (crisis), which provided an opportunity for significant change (i.e. a critical juncture that enabled a new path to be established).41
Figure 8.4 compares those elements marked as federal, those that encompass cultural rights, and those that are about inclusion (focused on representation). They are mutually reinforcing, but they are not the same. Sometimes they move independently of the other, at other times they are linked to a package of institutional reforms. Representation is a prime example, while cultural rights have also occurred at high levels in the absence of federal structures.
Institutions linked to the accommodation of diversity in Nepal, 1948–2016
adapted from breen 2018b
Accommodation, democratisation and infrastructural capacity in Myanmar 1945–2016
adapted from breen 2018b
Following a series of crises, significant change began in 2008 with the establishment of a new semi-democratic constitution that was federal (a constitutionally decentralised union) with designated ethnic states, but still it privileged Bamar Buddhists and lacked recognition of customary and personal laws. The military also retained 25% of seats in all parliaments and executive offices, and conflict continued in significant parts of the country. This constitution and the federal system it established was effectively ended in 2021 by another military coup. Figure 8.6 below shows these substantial fluctuations
Figure 8.6 compares those elements marked as federal, those that encompass cultural rights, and those that focus on representation. In this case, there have been significant fluctuations in the federal system measures, but complete consistency with respect to (the lack of) representation and cultural rights.
Institutions linked to the accommodation of diversity in Myanmar, 1945–2016
adapted from breen 2018b
In Sri Lanka, the state has been more or less a democracy since independence in 1948. However, it has consistently implemented an assimilating nation-building agenda, contributing to a gradual decline in the quality of its democracy (see democracy indicator in Figure 8.7). Similar to Myanmar and Nepal, it privileged one religion (Buddhism), had only one national language (Sinhala) and failed to respond to minority ethnic groups’ demands for autonomy, leading eventually to a devastating twenty-five-year civil war. The major change that can be seen in Figure 8.7 in 1987 is the introduction of a kind of federal system (constitutionally decentralised union), involving two ethnic provinces (which were at one stage merged) and seven provinces for the dominant Sinhala group. However, many provisions of this constitutional change were not implemented, and it failed to halt the civil war.
Accommodation, democratisation and infrastructural capacity in Sri Lanka 1945–2016
adapted from breen 2018b
Recent efforts to reform the constitution and again establish an accommodating federal system were halted by the 2019 election of Gotabaya Rajapaksa, former defence minister and brother of former president Mahinda Rajapaksa, as president. They campaigned on an agenda of ethnic and religious nationalism and did little to appease aggrieved minorities. At the time of writing, there is a major economic crisis, and we can anticipate that this will precipitate further institutional reform.
Figure 8.8 compares those elements marked as federal, those that encompass cultural rights, and those that are about inclusion (focused on representation). There is no change in the level of cultural rights, representation or ethnicity in federalism. It maintained much the same provincial structure and continued to preference Sinhala language. Although Sri Lanka introduced proportional representation in its electoral system, the threshold was so high
Institutions linked to the accommodation of diversity in Sri Lanka, 1945–2016
adapted from breen 2018b
From the analysis of these changes, we can conclude that the accommodation of diversity is more likely to occur, and to be more robust, in a democratic
5 Applying the Measures – Federalism and Democracy in Asia
In a separate study, I applied the same federal system measure, without the cultural rights and representation (inclusion) features, but with a measure of ethnicity in provincial design, to a study of eight countries in Asia that have a federal system.42 This used the four key institutions: autonomy (powers) of provinces, intervention powers or dominance of the centre, bicameralism and constitutionalism (including an independent court), as described in Table 8.2, as well as the measure of the extent of ethnicity in federalism based on the proportion of provinces based on ethnicity. From this I compared at an aggregate and individual level federalism with democracy, proportionality, the effective number of political parties and executive (in)stability. I report here on the relationship with democracy.
Figure 8.9 shows the positive relationship between federal systems and democracy, which should be no surprise. But even controlling for overlap of institutions, the relationship is still strongly positive. Several institutions are mutually reinforcing, like an independent court. Federalism makes democratic participation easier by bringing government closer to the people, and it is more accommodating of diversity. Indeed, between 2010 and 2020, democracy in each of the eight federal countries was maintained at the same level or increased, whereas many unitary countries in Asia have seen their democracies go backwards (such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, Thailand).43
Federalism and democracy averages for eight countries in Asia: 1948–2017
adapted from breen 2022
Notably, Figure 8.9 shows three distinct periods in the history of federalism in Asia. The first period (from about 1948 to the early 1960s) shows an initially high level of democracy and a low level of federal institutionalisation. A series of democratic failures followed, as these initial institutions failed to adequately accommodate diversity. The second period shows experimentations with undemocratic federal systems, like Nepal’s partyless Panchayats (assemblies) and Myanmar’s single party federal structures. These too failed. Finally,
6 Conclusion
Federalism is an ideological and normative principle encompassed in the phrases “unity in diversity” and “self-rule plus shared rule”. In this sense, federalism is fundamentally about the accommodation of diversity. Federalism in its institutional manifestation can be described as a federal system, but even this is too narrow. Federalism as a principle and a federal system as an institutional configuration should be able to provide us with a framework for understanding, organising and assessing the accommodation of diversity through a range of mechanisms, including legal pluralism, non-territorial autonomy, participatory and deliberative processes and political inclusion. Ethnic federalism is a logic of federalism that prioritises the accommodation of ethnic diversity.
In the preceding discussion, I have demonstrated that accommodation of diversity is more likely to occur, and to be higher, in a democratic regime, and that the mixing of accommodating and assimilating institutions is likely to contribute to instability and conflict, and is unlikely to be sustainable. Further, substantive change in the extent of accommodation is more likely to occur at times of crisis, particularly when economic crises converge with other crises (e.g. natural disasters).44 Elsewhere,45 I have shown that federalism (as accommodation of diversity) reduces conflict, secession and regime instability. But only under arrangements that incentivise deliberation and inter-ethnic engagements, at the same time as enabling autonomy, through ethnoterritorial provinces, mixed party systems and mixed yet majoritarian executives.
We can use the above conclusions towards the construction of a Law of diversity. We can see the different (potential components) and how they relate. We can make the claim that accommodation should be democratic because it is likely to be of a greater extent and more sustainable. The experience of Asia also indicates the importance of local participatory institutions, which can accommodate a broader range of (smaller and scattered) minorities. And we can also argue that federalism is a major and potentially necessary underpinning principle of a system that accommodates diversity and recognises and institutionalises legal pluralism.
This approach to the measurement of accommodation is one that can contribute to the development of a Law of diversity, its assessment, and its further refinement. But it is only one step. It is fundamentally an institutional analysis (even if it includes informal institutions and behavioural elements) and can inform theory development but not take the place of it. As such a theory develops, we can build on the framework and refine measures, add new measures, and make it adaptable to the idea that federalism can provide a framework for analysis but not provide a prescription or model for accommodation. Models
One potential avenue for further development is to address more explicitly the deliberative and participatory institutions. In Breen (2018)46 I drew out the deliberative incentives that are incorporated within the above analysis and proposed that the incorporation of deliberative incentives in federal design can help to overcome tensions between competing theories of consociationalism and centripetalism for ethnic conflict management. In Breen and He,47 I demonstrated that deliberative methodologies are effective means of moderating ethnic division and overcoming polarisation. I believe this, together with the further development of measures of participation, provides fruitful ground for further empirical analysis of the effects and benefits of different approaches to the accommodation of diversity and the associated theoretical development.
Michael G. Breen, The Road to Federalism in Nepal, Myanmar and Sri Lanka: Finding the Middle Ground, Politics in Asia (London-New York: Routledge, 2018).
For example, Brian Galligan, A Federal Republic: Australia’s Constitutional System of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
See for example Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1987).
For example, William H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964).
Kenneth Wheare, Federal Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1947).
Ronald L. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems (2nd ed., Montreal; London: Published for the School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University by McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1987).
See also Preston King, Federalism and Federation, (London: Croom Helm, 1982) and Elazar, Exploring.
Elazar, Exploring.
Watts, Comparing.
Will Kymlicka, Multicultural citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and, “Multi-nation Federalism,” in Federalism in Asia, eds. Baogang He, Brian Galligan and Takashi Inoguchi (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2007), 33–56.
David Brown, “Regionalist Federalism: A Critique of Ethno-national Federalism,” in Federalism in Asia, eds. Baogang He, Brian Galligan and Takashi Inoguchi (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 2007), 57–81; Yash Ghai and Jill Cottrell, Federalism and State Restructuring in Nepal: The Challenge for the Constituent Assembly, (Kathmandu: United Nations Development Programme, 2007).
Alfred C. Stepan, “Federalism and democracy: Beyond the US model,” Journal of Democracy 10, no. 4 (1999): 19–34.
Michael G. Breen, “The Origins of Holding-Together Federalism: Nepal, Myanmar and Sri Lanka,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 48, no. 1 (2018): 26–50.
See Baogang He, Michael G. Breen and Laura Allison-Reumann, Comparative Federalism in Asia: Democracy, Ethnicity and Religion, (London-New York: Routledge, 2023).
Watts, Comparing.
See Breen, “The Origins,” and The Road to Federalism.
Galligan, A Federal Republic.
John McGarry, Brendan O’Leary, and Richard Simeon, “Integration or Accommodation? The Enduring Debate in Conflict Regulation,” in Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, ed. Sujit Choudhry, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 41–88.
McGarry, O’Leary and Simeon, “Integration or Accommodation.”
Liam D. Anderson, Federal Solutions to Ethnic Problems: Accommodating Diversity, Exeter studies in Ethno Politics (London-New York: Routledge, 2013); and William Case, “Semi-democracy and Minimalist Federalism in Malaysia,” in Federalism in Asia, eds. Baogang He, Brian Galligan and Takashi Inoguchi, (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2007), 124–133.
Breen, The Road to Federalism; and Michael G. Breen, “Federal and Political Party Reforms in Asia: Is there a New Model of Federal Democracy Emerging in Ethnically Diverse Countries,” Government and Opposition 2, no. 7 (2022): 296–317.
James March and Johan Olsen, “Elaborating the New Institutionalism,” The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, eds. Sarah A. Binder, Roderock A. W. Rhodes and Bert A. Rockman, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 3.
Watts, Comparing, 6.
Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship; and Ian O’Flynn, Deliberative Democracy and Divided Societies, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995).
Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship; and Ian O’Flynn, Deliberative Democracy.
Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-six Countries, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).
Lijphart, Patterns, 145.
Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2015, Polity iv Project, (Vienna: Centre for Systemic Peace, 2016).
For example, Stepan, Federalism and Democracy; Elazar, Exploring; Michael Burgess, In Search of the Federal Spirit: New Comparative Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Thomas O. Hueglin and Alan Fenna, Comparative Federalism: A Systematic Inquiry (2nd ed., Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015).
For examples see Will Kymlicka and Baogang He, Multiculturalism in Asia, (Oxon: Oxford University Press, 2005).
Susan J. Henders, Territoriality, Asymmetry, and Autonomy: Catalonia, Corsica, Hong Kong, and Tibet, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
Jacques Bertrand and Andre Laliberte, Multination States in Asia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
Daniel Ziblatt, “Rethinking the Origins of Federalism: Puzzle, Theory, and Evidence from Nineteenth-Century Europe,” World Politics 57, no. 1 (2004): 70–98.
See Breen, “The Origins.”
See Breen, The Road to Federalism.
See Breen, “The Origins.”
See Breen, “Federal and Political Party,” including supplementary online data.
For further detail, see Breen, The Road to Federalism, 83–119.
David N. Gellner, “Ethnic Rights and Politics in Nepal,” Himalayan Journal of Anthropology and Sociology 2 (2005): 1–17; D.P. Kumar, Nepal: Year of Decision, (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1980); Thomas B. Smith, The Ideology of Nepal’s Panchayat Raj (Master thesis, University of Arizona, 1967).
Although I do not specifically define ranges or definite lines between accommodation, integration and assimilation (being a continuum), scores above five may generally be regarded as accommodating, while assimilative approaches tend to score below zero.
See Breen, The Road to Federalism, 87–92.
See Breen, “Federal and Political Party,” including supplementary online data.
Breen, “Federal and Political Party,” 314.
Breen, The Road to Federalism.
Breen, “Federalism and Political Party.”
Breen, The Road to Federalism, 172–175.
Michael G. Breen and Baogang He, “Moderating Polarised Positions on Questions of National Identity and Sovereignty: Deliberative Surveys on Federalism in Myanmar,” International Area Studies Review 23, no. 1 (2020): 93–113.
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