Introduction
References to medicine and medical writings in Aristotleâs ethical treatises are occasional, isolated and, for the most part, allusive. It is therefore not surprising that they are often neglected when it comes to assessing the importance of medicine in Aristotleâs works as a whole.1
However, as we shall see, there are compelling reasons to be interested in the presence of physicians in Nicomachean Ethics (Eth. Nic.) and Eudemian Ethics (Eth. Eud.). In many cases, in addition to the classical topos that identifies vices with diseases of the soul, the investigation of the human good directly calls upon the skills of the physician. For example, it is important to identify, among incontinent people, those who are the âeasier to cureâ (
This does not mean that, in order to cure incontinence or any other type of moral weakness, one must call a doctor. This is instead a task for political scienceââpolitical scienceâ in the broader sense, including politics and ethicsâwhose prescriptions derive, at least at first sight, from proper ethical and political principles. However, the passage just mentioned suggests that physicians do have something to teach us about this issue, especially when they reveal certain physiological characteristics of human nature, knowledge of which can be useful to the ethical theorist or the practicing politician. Here I would like to define more precisely the nature of this contribution.
It is also difficult in this context to separate medicine (as a set of views about human nature and constitution that belong to the art of healing) from physiology (as a set of views about human nature and constitution that belong to the investigation of the natural world), and sometimes even from natural philosophy as a whole. The case of the âmelancholicâ akratês has already given an indication of this ambiguity. This can be seen as a difficulty and an additional source of confusion. Yet one can also use this partial overlap as a methodological principle for the present analysis. My working hypothesis is precisely that the scattered references to the âphysiologoiâ provide a useful thread for us to follow in order to assess Aristotleâs debt to medicine in his ethical treatises.
Three times in his ethical writings, Aristotle refers explicitly to the âphysiologoiâ: twice in Eth. Nic. Book VII (= Eth. Eud. Book VI) and once in Eth. Eud..3 Let us start with the passage from Eth. Eud.:
[1] ⦠some think that like is friend to like, whence the saying âhow God ever draws like to likeâ; or the saying âcrow to crowâ; or âthief knows thief, and wolf wolfâ. The physicists (
Eth. Eud. 7.1, 1235a5â12 (transl. Solomon, here and below)οἱ δὲ ÏÏ Ïιολόγοι ) even systematize the whole of nature on the principle that like goes to like â¦
In this text, the reference to physicists (more precisely to those, like Empedocles, who endorse the âlike-to-likeâ principle) is quite conventional and general. It sounds like a mere topos, whose main purpose is to introduce the question of friendship in a typically dialectic way.
By contrast, in both passages from Eth. Nic., the physiologoi are taken more seriously, as scientific authorities, on two crucial issues: the resolution of the state of incontinence and the link between pleasure and pain.
About akrasia, Aristotle says:
[2] The explanation of how the ignorance is dissolved and the incontinent man regains his knowledge, is the same as in the case of the man drunk or asleep and is not peculiar to this condition; we must go to the students of natural science for it.
Eth. Nic. 7.5, 1147b6â9 (transl. Ross, here and below)
Î á¿¶Ï Î´á½² λύεÏαι ἡ á¼Î³Î½Î¿Î¹Î± καὶ Ïάλιν γίνεÏαι á¼ÏιÏÏήμÏν á½ á¼ÎºÏαÏá½µÏ ,ὠαá½Ïá½¸Ï Î»á½¹Î³Î¿Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ ÏεÏὶ οἰνÏÎ¼á½³Î½Î¿Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ καθεύδονÏÎ¿Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ οá½Îº á¼´Î´Î¹Î¿Ï ÏούÏÎ¿Ï Ïοῦ Ïá½±Î¸Î¿Ï Ï ,á½Î½ δεῠÏαÏá½° Ïῶν ÏÏ ÏιολόγÏν á¼ÎºÎ¿á½»ÎµÎ¹Î½ .
On the connection between natural functions and pain from a zoological point of view, Aristotle refers to physiologoi in these terms:
[3] For animals are always toiling, as the students of natural science also testify, saying that sight and hearing are painful; but we have become used to this, as they maintain.
Eth. Nic. 7.15, 1154b7
á¼Îµá½¶ Î³á½°Ï ÏονεῠÏὸ ζῷον ,á½¥ÏÏÎµÏ ÎºÎ±á½¶ οἱ ÏÏ Ïιολόγοι μαÏÏÏ ÏοῦÏι ,Ïὸ á½Ïᾶν ,Ïὸ á¼ÎºÎ¿á½»ÎµÎ¹Î½ Ïá½±ÏκονÏÎµÏ Îµá¼¶Î½Î±Î¹ Î»Ï ÏηÏόνΠá¼Î»Î» âἤδη ÏÏ Î½á½µÎ¸ÎµÎ¹Ï á¼Ïμέν ,á½¡Ï ÏαÏίν .4
In this passage, unlike the previous case, given that Aristotle disagrees about the painful nature of the sensory activity,5 the intention of the reference is clearly dialectical, at least in the second part of the quotation (âsaying that sight and hearing are painfulâ). In any case, both passages, despite being somewhat ellipticalâespecially about the identity of the natural scientists they allude toâare valuable for the explicit link they make between questions of political science and the discourse of natural philosophers. This is rarely the case, and it is worth noting, especially if we consider the interest shown by the recent scholarship on this issue. Although medicine is not mentioned in these passages, we may also note that it is probably indirectly involved to some extent, in particular in text [2]. For these reasons, despite the scarcity of the term physiologoi in this context and the allusive mode of expression of both passages, it seems to me that they deserve attention, especially text [2], which is also the most puzzling.
Some recent studies have indeed emphasised that political science owes an important debt to the natural sciences. I am thinking in particular of several papers from the volume Bridging the gap, edited by K. Nielsen and D. Henry.6 From this perspective, M. Leunissen has published an important book, in which she supports the claim that natural science is, in some way, âfoundationalâ for political science. She states: âAristotle believes that at least some of the knowledge produced by natural science is âfoundationalâ for political science, in the sense that having knowledge of the facts (to hoti) about human life and nature is an important prerequisite to the political scientistâs task of perfecting or completing human nature so as to make a person goodâ.7 This is a strong claim and I cannot address the problem in its entirety. This would involve evaluating Aristotleâs ethical naturalism as a whole, with a whole host of questions, such as the (possible) biological background of some general assertions regarding ethical principles (e.g., about the proper function, ergon, of human beings), the status of emotions and their connection to virtue and vice, the issue of natural tendencies (to live in a community, friendship, etc.), the issue of natural virtues, and so on.8
The present investigation is much more modest in scope, in that it merely attempts to make sense of Aristotleâs references to medicine and physiology in his ethical works. In principle, three approaches are available: (1) Aristotle simply wishes to eradicate the physiological explanation from the ethical framework in order to impose a strict demarcation between the two disciplines, thereby avoiding a pointless digression. (2) In text [2], Aristotle concedes a degree of epistemological dependence of ethical assertions on natural science and invokes the expertise of the physicists to solve the problem. (3) Some scientific results must be taken into account, without however possessing any real explanatory or even prescriptive function. Here I will adopt this third approach.
If in doing so I reassess in some ways the idea of epistemological connection between physiology and political science, it will be mainly in light of the explicit references to the physiologoi. Although this material does not allow us to decide in what way natural science is âfoundationalâ, generally speaking, for political science, it is significant enough to reformulate the issue. In short, it offers good support to the second part of Leunissenâs claim: texts [2] and [3], and some others, attest to the importance (for the political scientist) of the âfacts (to hoti) about human life and natureâ. And this, in my view, is crucial for our understanding of Aristotleâs agenda in his ethical and political writings. However, it could hardly be used to support the view that political science and practical prescriptions depend, strictly speaking, on physical principles and explanations.
I will first make some general observations about physiology and medicine in the ethical writings before proceeding to consider the three hypotheses I have mentioned.
1 Ethics and Physiology: General Considerations
1.1 Some Connections
To begin with, there are several hints of Aristotleâs interest in medicine and physiology in his ethical treatises. In the first place, there are analogies. In Eth. Nic. 2.5, for instance, the conception of ethical virtue as a mean is related to dietetic recommendations. In 5.15, on justice, the intermediate amount âplays the part here that the healthy does in the medical art, and that good condition does in the art of bodily trainingâ.9 Virtue itself is sometimes compared with states of good health, especially in relation to pleasure.10 It is true that this is not Aristotleâs last word on the topic, since virtue cannot be identified with pleasure. Nevertheless, the idea that there may be a relationship between virtue, pleasure, and good health constitutes a genuine endoxon in the course of the investigation. In fact, at Eth. Nic. 10.5, 1176a13â19, medical considerations serve mainly to highlight the relativity of pleasures: the latter vary according to the state of health of the agentâjust as they differ according to animal species and according to the characters of individual human beingsâin contrast to the stability of virtue as a âmeasureâ of good and bad pleasures. One could give further examples of comparisons between morally significant dispositions and good or bad health.11
Moreover, the connection is not limited to analogies in the strict sense: sometimes, in relation to emotions, for instance, we are dealing directly with scientific facts, which are not only identified and set forth by the natural scientists, but also taken into account by political science. From that point of view, to put it schematically for now, there may be some instances of overlap between the domains of natural philosophy and practical philosophy.
This is true for specialised investigations relating to physiology proper, such as the generation of children in Pol. 7.16:
[4] The precepts of physicians and natural philosophers about generation should also be studied by the parents themselves; the physicians give good advice about the favourable conditions of the body, and the natural philosophers about the winds; of which they prefer the north to the south.
Pol. 7.16, 1335a39âb2 (transl. Jowett)
δεῠδὲ καὶ αá½ÏÎ¿á½ºÏ á¼¤Î´Î· θεÏÏεá¿Î½ ÏÏá½¸Ï Ïὴν ÏεκνοÏοιίαν Ïá½± Ïε ÏαÏá½° Ïῶν ἰαÏÏῶν λεγόμενα καὶ Ïá½° ÏαÏá½° Ïῶν ÏÏ ÏικῶνΠοἵ Ïε Î³á½°Ï á¼°Î±ÏÏοὶ ÏÎ¿á½ºÏ ÎºÎ±Î¹ÏÎ¿á½ºÏ Ïῶν ÏÏμάÏÏν á¼±ÎºÎ±Î½á¿¶Ï Î»á½³Î³Î¿Ï Ïι ,καὶ ÏεÏὶ Ïῶν ÏÎ½ÎµÏ Î¼á½±ÏÏν οἱ ÏÏ Ïικοί ,Ïá½° βόÏεια Ïῶν νοÏá½·Ïν á¼ÏαινοῦνÏÎµÏ Î¼á¾¶Î»Î»Î¿Î½ .
Physicians and natural philosophers are distinct groups in this passage; their respective tasks are complementary. However, both kinds of specialists are identified as experts on the physiological conditions for a harmonious generation.
Similarly, certain key notions of ethics and politics are based on physiological considerations about human nature, whether directly or indirectly. The good politician must have at least some understanding of the soul, just as the âholistic physicianâ (the expression is mine) who cares for the eyes must also know about the body as a whole.12 Yet Aristotle does not restrict his interest in psychology to the properties of the soul as such. He probably alludes to psychic faculties as embodied capacities, or functions common to body and soul, in accordance with the psychology of the De anima and especially the Parva naturalia. Although there are of course differences between the technical psychology of the De anima and the Parva naturalia on the one hand, and the summary, and probably simplified, psychology of the ethical writings on the other hand, I posit that there is no fundamental discrepancy between them.13 In this regard, it is significant that, a few lines after the passage where he calls upon the good politician to take an interest in the soul, Aristotle distinguishes psychic parts or faculties (rational, irrational).14 In doing so, he alludes to the activity of the nutritive function during sleep in terms that recall (or announce) the Parva naturalia: sleep is a period of full activity of the nutritive function and of âinertiaâ (
However, at Eht. Nic. 1.13, Aristotle adds the qualification that such knowledge is limited âto the extent that is sufficient for the questions we are discussingâ (
1.2 Political Science and Scientific Authorities: Who Are the physiologoi?
It is therefore not surprising that Aristotleâjust like politicians and sometimes even the citizens as a wholeârefers to the authority of scientists, certainly including himself as a physicist and the scientific work of his own school. But who are the physiologoi?
Firstly, some clarifications are needed in respect to the term âphysiologyâ, which I have used above to designate a set of views about human nature and the human constitution that arise out of the investigation of the natural world. Yet, if one examines Aristotleâs own terminology, things are not quite so simple. There is only one occurrence of the word physiologia in Aristotle,18 and it is not particularly significant for our purpose: he simply states that âthe affections of savours are examined in their proper place in connection with the natural history (
As for the term hoi physiologoi, it is very often apparently synonymous with hoi physikoi, especially in Physics and Metaphysics. This is the case in text [1], in which the term is not directly associated with the study of the organic functions of living beings but with a more general knowledge of nature, or of the kosmos, as a whole.
However, I do not think that the issue is that simple, and instead suggest that, alongside the general meaning of âphysiologoiâ, there is a more specific use of the word, which is aligned with the idea of physiology described above. To put it differently, it is possible that physikoi and physiologoi are the same peopleâafter all, the same physicists before Aristotle had often explored not only the natural world as a whole but also the organic functions of living beings. However, some of them deserve particular attention because of their knowledge of living bodies as such, and Aristotle prefers to call these physiologoi. At the very least, using hoi physiologoi rather than hoi physikoi is more likely to include the physicians belonging to this group of scientists.
This is supported by the following observation: Aristotle never uses the term âhoi phusikoiâ in the ethical writings, but does so twice in the Politics, where he contrasts them with physicians (hoi iatroi; see text [4]). While physicians provide sound advice on the best physiological conditions, natural scientists are more knowledgeable about the winds and their properties. Now such climatological considerations apply only incidentally to the generation of living beings. Beyond the distinction between two categories of scientists, the most important is this: regarding generations, politicians and citizens must take advice from natural scientists and doctors.
According to P. Pellegrin in his French translation of Aristotleâs Politics, winds from the north are more favourable for the birth of males, because these winds are drier than those from the south.21 This is probably the reason why the physicist prefers them. It is uncertain whether Aristotle is referring here to a specific medical treatise. In Airs, Waters, Places, as is well known, the physician pays greater attention to climatic factors. Perhaps the iatros in question in text [4] is not one of the more sophisticated physicians, whose methodology is to some degree informed by natural science, but just an ordinary practitioner, a mere tradesman of therapeutic procedures.22 In any case, Aristotle is probably thinking of certain medical doctrines, since kairos is a central concept in the Hippocratic corpus.23 The most significant point is this: in this passage, the phusikoi are the most informed about the external factors and probably the elementary properties, whereas the iatroi have a better understanding about what may occur within the body at a given time. Therefore, we cannot rule out the possibility that, when describing the specific tasks of the physicists, Aristotle sometimes prefers to use hoi physikoi about external and elementary factors, and hoi physiologoi in a more restricted sense, in reference to bodily states, affections, or functions. Yet it must be said that this distinction is one of emphasis only, and does not imply an epistemological demarcation between two clearly identified disciplines within physics.
However this may be, there is probably a degree of permeability between the skills of the physicians and those of natural scientists, especially if the latter are physiologoi in the restricted sense. After all, among the different areas of natural science, physiology is probably the nearest to medicine. It is certainly no coincidence that the most explicit connections between medicine and natural science are found in the Parva naturalia, in De sensu24 and De vita et morte;25 that is, at the beginning and at the end of the book as we read it today. As Aristotle says in the De sensu:
[5] we may say of most physical inquirers, and of those physicians who study their art more philosophically, that while the former end with a discussion of medicine, the latter start from a consideration of nature.
Parv. nat., Sens. 1, 436a29âb2 (transl. J.I. Beare; with slight modifications)
διὸ ÏÏεδὸν Ïῶν ÏεÏὶ Ïá½»ÏεÏÏ Î¿á¼± Ïλεá¿ÏÏοι καὶ Ïῶν ἰαÏÏῶν οἱ ÏιλοÏοÏÏÏá½³ÏÏÏ Ïὴν Ïá½³Ïνην μεÏιόνÏÎµÏ ,οἱ μὲν ÏÎµÎ»ÎµÏ ÏῶÏιν Îµá¼°Ï Ïá½° ÏεÏὶ ἰαÏÏικá¿Ï ,οἱ δ âá¼Îº Ïῶν ÏεÏὶ Ïá½»ÏεÏÏ á¼ÏÏονÏαι .
So if physicists extend their investigations into medicine, while cultivated physicians to some extent engage with natural philosophy, there will inevitably be an overlap between the two disciplines. I cannot discuss at length the exact nature of this connection;26 briefly put, Aristotleâs stress on the connection between medicine and natural philosophy in these two key passages of the Parva naturalia is due to the fact that the subject matter of these investigationsâthe study of attributes or states âcommon to body and soulââis precisely the place where both disciplines characteristically overlap. Parva naturalia are in fact much more preoccupied with particular states or properties of the compound than with the faculties as such (nutritive, sensitive, rational). This latter area seems to be reserved for the De anima.27 Now, each particular state of the compoundâas opposed to the faculties as such, whose presence is not susceptible to degreesâentails a certain balance or imbalance of contraries, especially of hot and cold, either directly or indirectly. Consequently, in accordance with the standard Aristotelian definition of health and disease,28 each state studied in the Parva naturalia corresponds, even if only implicitly, to a certain state of health or disease. Hence, studying states that are âcommon to body and soulâ requires a good understanding of health and disease as principles of variation of the relatively ânormalâ state. From that perspective, medicine is necessarily related to the specific purpose of the Parva naturalia. Aristotle therefore has every reason to exhort the student of nature to learn at least the starting points of medicine and, in turn, to urge the more learned and open-minded physicians to continue to use the principles of physics as their starting point: this is not an emphatic appeal to general culture but a consistent and philosophical justification of the overlap.
To sum up, the specific identity of the physiologoi in the ethical treatises cannot be ascertained. Nevertheless, it is clear that in this framework Aristotle recognises as authorities those who have identified certain facts about what is common to the body and the soul. From this point of view, allusions to the Parva naturaliaâor to the corresponding topicsâwhere natural science is explicitly involved with medicine, are fully justified. These allusions, then, reinforce the hypothesis of a joint appeal to medicine and physiology. As we will now see, the Parva naturalia are precisely at the core of Aristotleâs strategy in relation to akrasia.
2 The physiologoi on akrasia (Eth. Nic. 7.5)
2.1 First Hypothesis: Setting Physiology aside
Let us now return to text [2], Eth. Nic. 7.5, 1147b6â9. Although the issue of akrasia has received greater attention from scholars, this particular sentence has been relatively neglected.29 A notable exception is Francis,30 who offers a careful and detailed analysis, and I generally agree with her conclusions. The text is sometimes read as a mere parenthesis, whose purpose is essentially negative: Aristotle simply wants to reject the physiological explanation, as the clause â
Aristotle does indeed seem to refer to the kind of explanation he gives in the Parva naturalia, about sleep and awakening:
[6] Owing to the fact that the blood formed after the assimilation of food is especially in need of separation, sleep occurs until the purer part of this blood has been separated off into the upper parts of the body, and the more turbid into the lower parts. When this has taken place animals awake from sleep, being released from the heaviness consequent on taking food.
Parv. nat., Som. 3, 458a21â25 (transl. Beare)32
διὰ δὲ Ïὸ γίγνεÏθαι á¼Î´Î¹Î±ÎºÏιÏá½½ÏεÏον Ïὸ αἷμα μεÏá½° Ïὴν Ïá¿Ï ÏÏοÏá¿Ï ÏÏοÏÏοÏὰν á½ÏÎ½Î¿Ï Î³á½·Î³Î½ÎµÏαι ,á¼ÏÏ á¼Î½ διακÏιθῠÏοῦ αἵμαÏÎ¿Ï Ïὸ μὲν καθαÏá½½ÏεÏον Îµá¼°Ï Ïá½° á¼Î½Ï ,Ïὸ δὲ θολεÏá½½ÏεÏον Îµá¼°Ï Ïá½° κάÏÏÎ á½ Ïαν δὲ ÏοῦÏο ÏÏ Î¼Î²á¿ ,á¼Î³Îµá½·ÏονÏαι á¼ÏÎ¿Î»Ï Î¸á½³Î½Ïα Ïοῦ á¼Îº Ïá¿Ï ÏÏοÏá¿Ï βάÏÎ¿Ï Ï .
In fact, the parenthesis concludes right after text [2] and Aristotle moves directly to the question of the final premise of the practical syllogism. Broadly speaking, the proper description of intemperance, in the context of Eth. Nic. 7, consists in showing, through the model of the practical syllogism, that the weak akratês opposes his appetite and the perception of the particular (and the opinion that goes with it) to the universal and first premise. Consequently, as Socrates rightly argued, intemperance does not involve real knowledge, but only perception. Now, Aristotle can reach this conclusion independently from any physiological account.
It seems then that here he applies the rule, fixed in the Posterior analytics, which in most cases prohibits epistemological kind-crossing, metabasis eis allo genos. There are exceptions to this rule, as Aristotle himself points out in the Posterior analytics, but subordination of ethics or politics to natural philosophy does not count, at least explicitly, as a valid exception to the rule. Moreover, the Posterior analytics are remarkably quiet about practical philosophy as a scientific area, and when Aristotle comes to talk about ethics, it is precisely in order to dissociate ethics from psychology.33
Generally speaking, I do not believe that Aristotleâs practical philosophy is absolutely independent from theoretical assertions and principles.34 On the other hand, we know that Aristotle highlights the differences between the disciplines several times in the Nicomachean Ethics. He frequently insists that practical philosophy has a specific purpose: not knowledge for its own sake, but in its practical application. From that point of viewâwhich, again, is not the only oneâhe may justify passing over scientific investigations when they are not necessary for his argument and restricting his analysis to the elements which are directly relevant for moral or political activity.
For all these reasons, it is quite understandable that many scholars take text [2] as a supplementary proof of scientific demarcation. According to this line of interpretation, this passage, like text [3] about animalsâ natural exertion, would only indicate that physiological explanations are indeed available but are not necessary for the present survey. From that perspective, the general view is apparently the same as at the beginning of the study of friendship:
[7] The scientific problems we may leave alone (for they do not belong to the present inquiry); let us examine those which are human and involve character and feeling â¦
Eth. Nic. 8.2, 1155b8â10
Ïá½° μὲν οá½Î½ ÏÏ Ïικὰ Ïῶν á¼ÏοÏημάÏÏν á¼ÏείÏÎ¸Ï (Î¿á½ Î³á½°Ï Î¿á¼°ÎºÎµá¿Î± Ïá¿Ï ÏαÏούÏÎ·Ï ÏκέÏεÏÏ )Î á½ Ïα δ âá¼ÏÏὶν á¼Î½Î¸ÏÏÏικὰ καὶ á¼Î½á½µÎºÎµÎ¹ Îµá¼°Ï Ïá½° ἤθη καὶ Ïá½° Ïάθη ,ÏÎ±á¿¦Ï âá¼ÏιÏκεÏώμεθα  â¦
However, in view of this, how are we to justify the frequent allusions to medicine and the borrowings from physiology we have already discussed?
2.2 Second Hypothesis: a Scientific Explanation
Text [2] is in fact more accurate and more instructive than it appears at first glance, and this is due to internal and contextual reasons. Let us take a closer look at text [6], on sleep and awakening. By applying this explanatory model, the kind of ignorance that characterises intemperance would be dissolved when the purest blood flows upwards. One may suppose that the akratês recovers the ability to infer, or merely to grasp, the right conclusion from the premises he knows. This explanation might work quite well if one admits that the state of intemperance is a period of physiological confusion due to a mixture of different kinds of blood in the region of the heart. This is perfectly understandable if one keeps in mind that, according to the famous physical definition of anger in De an. 1.1, anger is a sort of âboilingâ (
[8] Passion also is sometimes reckoned as courage; those who act from passion, like wild beasts rushing at those who have wounded them, are thought to be brave, because brave men also are passionate; for passion above all things is eager to rush on danger, and hence Homerâs âput strength into his passionâ and âaroused their spirit and passionâ and âbitter spirit in his nostrilsâ and âhis blood boiledâ. For all such expressions seem to indicate the stirring and onset of passion.
Eth. Nic. 3.11, 1116b24â30
The last quotation, âhis blood boiledâ (
Moreover, the change described in text [2] is a âdissolutionâ, a lusis, as indicated by the use of the verb
Aristotle shows in the Parva naturalia that sleep is an âincapacityâ (adunamia) and âbondâ (desmos) for sense-perception, while waking up is a sort of lusis. The following text, in this sense, clearly echoes our text [2]:
[9] we assert that sleep is, in a certain way, or, as it were, a motionless bond, imposed on sense-perception, while its loosening or remission constitutes the being awake.
Parv. nat., Som. 1, 454b24â27 (transl. Beare)
Ïá¿· Î³á½°Ï Î±á¼´ÏθηÏιν á¼Ïειν á½¥ÏιÏÏαι Ïὸ ζῷον ,Ïá¿Ï δ âαἰÏθήÏεÏÏ ÏÏá½¹Ïον Ïινὰ Ïὴν μὲν á¼ÎºÎ¹Î½Î·Ïίαν καὶ οἷον δεÏμὸν Ïὸν á½Ïνον εἶναί Ïαμεν ,Ïὴν δὲ λύÏιν καὶ Ïὴν á¼Î½ÎµÏιν á¼Î³ÏήγοÏÏιν .
Similarly,
Let us now take a closer look at the immediate context of text [2]. Although the main line of argumentation about akrasia is not itself dependent on physiology, the physiological considerations in text [2] are not isolated. A few lines before, Aristotle reminds us that the same person can in a sense have knowledge and yet not have it, as in the case of a person âasleep, mad or drunkâ (1147a13â14); accordingly, Aristotle adds, emotions alter âour bodily condition as wellâ (
I do not intend here to take a position on the chronology of the treatises, and I could not say whether or not the Nicomachean Ethics could refer to pre-existing works that comprise the Parva naturalia. Even the chronology of the Parva naturalia is debatable. Some of them seem to belong to the last stages of Aristotleâs psychology (if we accept a degree of evolution in this domain), but others probably have several layers and may have been written, elaborated, or compiled over a long period.
At any rate, we can draw two conclusions from this reading of text [2]:
-
Aristotle does not dissociate ethical arguments on akrasia from the physiological account of it. He clearly thinks that states of moral disorder are also states of bodily disorder.
-
When he refers to the physiologoi in text [2], this should not necessarily be understood as an allusion only to Aristotleâs predecessors or to contemporary physicists outside the school. He refers also, and in fact probably mainly, to himself or to his own school.
2.3 Third Hypothesis: Considering Natural Facts
My second hypothesis proposed that we give a positive meaning to the expression â
Does this entail that the physical explanation is necessary for the ethical account of intemperance in the sense that it should be inserted in the reasoning that leads to the conclusion of the enquiry? The answer must be negative, since, although this chapter undoubtedly has a physiological background, the line of thought would be consistent even without these physiological data. Moreover, Aristotle does not draw any explicit conclusion from text [2]. As previously noted, the text comes to an abrupt stop and is immediately followed by new claims about the final premises of the practical syllogism.41
In addition, the information presented does not provide us with practical solutions. It does not help solve the practical problem of the cessation of akrasia. How can intemperance be cured? Our brief passage remains silent on this. Aristotle also says that the explanation of the lusis âis not peculiar to this conditionâ (
For all these reasons, I do not believe that, in this caseâwhere, exceptionally in the Ethics, Aristotle explicitly refers to the authority of physiologoiânatural philosophy offers scientific principles or foundational propositions or explanations for the ethical investigation. At this point of the analysis, it seems that there is no satisfactory solution.
However, if physiological explanation, properly speaking (the text clearly alludes to a sort of explanation:
The distinction between explanation and fact, between to dioti and to hoti, is emphasised and explained in the Posterior analytics (I, 13; II, 1â2), but it is also present in Eth. Nic., for instance in text [10]:43
[10] Presumably, then, we must begin with things familiar to us. Hence any one who is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is noble and just and, generally, about the subjects of political science must have been brought up in good habits. For the facts are the starting-point, and if they are sufficiently plain to him, he will not need the reason as well; and the man who has been well brought up has or can easily get starting-points.
Eth. Nic. 1.2, 1095b3â8
á¼´ÏÏÏ Î¿á½Î½ ἡμá¿Î½ γε á¼ÏκÏέον á¼Ïὸ Ïῶν ἡμá¿Î½ γνÏÏίμÏν .διὸ δεῠÏοá¿Ï á¼Î¸ÎµÏιν ἦÏθαι ÎºÎ±Î»á¿¶Ï Ïὸν ÏεÏὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίÏν καὶ ὠλÏÏ Ïῶν ÏολιÏικῶν á¼ÎºÎ¿Ï Ïόμενον á¼±ÎºÎ±Î½á¿¶Ï .á¼ÏÏá½´ Î³á½°Ï Ïὸ á½ Ïι ,καὶ εἰ ÏοῦÏο ÏαίνοιÏο á¼ÏκούνÏÏÏ ,οá½Î´á½²Î½ ÏÏοÏδεήÏει Ïοῦ διόÏιΠὠδὲ ÏοιοῦÏÎ¿Ï á¼Ïει á¼¢ λάβοι á¼Î½ á¼ÏÏá½°Ï á¿¥á¾³Î´á½·ÏÏ .
We must start with facts and, in certain circumstances, when they are clear enough, there is no need to search for explanations strictly speaking. It is true that in his ethical writings Aristotle refers mainly to anthropological and social facts: how people live, what their customs and habits are, etc. Yet nothing prevents us from inferring that, in text [10], some data derived from natural philosophy also are alluded to. Indeed, in some circumstances, scientists have to start from facts, and Aristotle shows in the Posterior analytics (1.13) in what sense there can be âsyllogisms from the factsâ. For example, from the fact that some stars do not twinkle, we may infer by induction that they are close. However, the real explanation is not given by this kind of syllogism, but by the deduction that starts from the closeness of the stars. Even if we are dealing with scientific facts (not with ordinary, common observations), and even when we can start from them, they cannot be foundational for subsequent propositions (in our case: ethical assertions), in the same way that real principles or explanations (of the same epistemological kind) can.
For all these reasons, we should take the physical considerations of the ethical writings as based on a minimal and pragmatic physiology, rather than engaged with a scientific technical discourse or discipline, on which political science would in turn be dependent. By âminimal and pragmatic physiologyâ, I mean that these kinds of considerations are simplified (in contrast to technical scientific explanations) and subordinated to the specific needs of practical philosophy. These specific needs are, in simple terms, how to realize good actions or how to acquire the knowledge that is necessary to govern a city.44 From that point of view, the physiological discourse is primarily instrumental, in so far as it contributes to an additional argument that servesâand is subordinate toâthe overriding ethical purpose. In the case of akrasia, this is apparently to identify a phenomenonâa lack of control due to a physiological stateâwhich usually escapes our notice whereas it can have important practical consequences. If things work like this, the difficulty of kind-crossing sciences, caused by conflating different scientific disciplines, as envisaged in the Posterior analytics, is significantly reduced, if not eliminated.
Are natural facts foundational for ethical propositions? In a loose sense, perhaps they are. They are archai, in the sense of âstarting-pointsâ in text [10], at 1095b6.45 In text [3], significantly, what hoi physiologoi (or the physical treatises) teach us, or âattestâ (
Lastly, what exactly is the fact in question about akratic ignorance? Clearly the simple fact that its dissolution is similar to waking up and recovering from drunkenness. In other words, the fact that this dissolution depends on physiological factors and is therefore not absolutely under control. This is by no means a marginal issue: Aristotle several times addresses the question of what control we have over our dispositions. Changing our habits is no easy task, as he says for instance at Eth. Nic. 5.1, 1129a13â16 or at 3.7, 1114b30â1115a4 about what is voluntary (ekousion), when discussing responsibility for our dispositions.46 He compares them to diseases (
But the most important point is this: it is crucial for the ethical purpose to bear in mind that the cessation of akratic ignorance is at least partly beyond our control. Now, this is precisely what we are told by the physiologoi, and probably by some physicians as well. To solve the practical problem, this information is not sufficient, and scientific explanations are not fully relevant because they do not lead to a practical conclusion. If someone explains, from the physiological point of view, why it is so, it is not of very much help. However, knowingâthat is, grasping the factâthat there is a lack of control is crucial if one wants to evaluate the limits of voluntariness and, conversely, to be aware of what role habits play in right action. After all, the acquisition of the virtue of temperance through moral education and habits remains the surest way to prevent akrasia.
The preceding discussion has focused on short passages, which are not in themselves sufficient to solve the general issue I addressed at the outset, and a wide range of additional problems need to be considered. However, these texts are significant and at the very least invite us to reformulate the issue: rather than asking whether physiology, taken as a distinct scientific discipline, is or is not foundational for political science, they instead suggest that we should reflect on the kind of support political science can expect to receive from a minimal and pragmatic physiology as I have defined it. From that point of view, mentioning facts is perhaps more useful than invoking complete scientific explanations. This physiology, clearly connected to medicine, is simplified and summary in nature, so that it is accessible to non-specialists of natural science. Nevertheless, it is precisely in this way that the specialist of political science must investigate the soul, that is: âto the extent which is sufficient for the questions we are discussingâ.48 In other words, if any information is to be borrowed from physiology and medicine in ethical writings, it is probably observed facts rather than real scientific principles.
Finally, a nuanced approach is needed. On the one hand, based on the texts discussed above, neither medicine nor physiology provide us with practical solutions or prescriptions for the political and ethical spheres. On the other hand, it is crucial to take into account the physiological aspects of moral states. Given that certain moral disorders are at the same time physical disorders, examining moral facts implies that we are also able to identify certain states that are common to both the body and the soulâexactly the sort of facts that medicine and physiology bring to light.
For example, there are no more than three references to Eth. Nic. (and these only in footnotes) and none to Eth. Eud., in C. Oser-Groteâs book Aristoteles und das Corpus Hippocraticum. See Oser-Grote (2004); Van der Eijk (2012) 1504. I am especially grateful to Robert Bostock for correcting my English, and to István Bodnár for his close reading of my text on the occasion of the Prague conference. Among participants I also thank Philip van der Eijk, Sophia Connell, Lesley Dean-Jones and Ronja Hildebrandt for their useful remarks and suggestions. I would also like to thank Pavel GregoriÄ for his remarks on a previous version of the text and Carlo Natali for his helpful comments on my lecture in the framework of the seminar on Nicomachean Ethics at the University of Rome, Tor Vergata in 2021, organised by Daniela Taormina and Francesco Aronadio.
Eth. Nic. 7.11, 1152a27â30.
Euh. Eud. 7.1, 1235a10; Eth. Nic. 7.5, 1147b9; 7.15, 1154b7.
Should we read
See e.g. Metaph. 1.1, 980a2.
Henry-Nielsen (2015). See also Van der Eijk (2022) 107â108, 118.
Leunissen (2017) xxiv.
More generally, one may ask whether there is or is not some kind of epistemological subordination of political science to natural philosophy. There is a wide range of interpretations and numerous surveys on this topic. More recently, Silvia Berryman (2019) has published a book on the sources of the ethical life, with strong objections against the naturalistic readings of Aristotleâs ethics and politics. For a recent general survey of these issues and debates see also Morel (2021).
Eth. Nic. 5.15, 1138a30â31.
See e.g. Eth. Nic. 7.15; 10.5, 1176a13â15.
See e.g. Eth. Nic. 1.13, 1102b18â21, where Aristotle compares the uncontrolled impulses of the irrational part to the uncontrolled movements of the body parts due to paralysis. On the medical background of Aristotleâs doctrine of the mean, see Johnson, this volume.
Eth. Nic. 1.13, 1102a5â25.
Accordingly, the fact that there is no trace of hylomorphism in the ethical writings does not mean that body and soul are not seen as two interrelated terms of the same substantial whole, even in this context.
Eth. Nic. 1.13, 1102a26â1103a10.
See e.g. Parv. nat., Insomn. 3.461a4, on the âinertiaâ (
Eth. Nic. 1.13, 1102a24â25.
On this important text, see Thein, this volume.
Parv. nat., Sens. 4.442b25.
See Mingucci (2015) 15â16.
Parv. nat., Sens. 1.436a1âb2. On this agenda and its function within the biological framework, see e.g. Morel (2007).
Pellegrin (2015) 513 n. 3.
On this distinction, see Politics, 3.11, 1282a3â7; on the specific task of âcultivatedâ physicians and there engagement with natural philosophy, see Arist., Parv. nat., Vit. 5.480b21â480b30; on the medical interpretation of dreams, see Arist., Parv. nat., Div. somn. 1.463a5. On the contrast between sophisticated doctors and mere therapeutic artisans, see Van der Eijk (2005) 193â195.
As recently emphasised by Longhi (2020) 166â167.
Parv. nat., Sens. 1.436a1âb2.
Parv. nat., Vit. 5.480b21â480b30.
On this, see Van der Eijk (2005); BartoÅ¡ (2015) 283â286; Lefebvre (2019); BartoÅ¡ (2021); Morel (forthcoming).
Parv. nat., Sens. 1.436a1.
See especially the treatise On life and death (de vita et morte) in the Parv. nat. See also Ph. 7.3, 246b3â6; An. post. 1.13, 78b18â19, where health is defined as a sort of balance, summetria, and sickness a lack of it.
M. Leunissen does not quote the passage in Leunissen (2017), but she does in Leunissen (2015) 226 n. 20.
Francis (2011). See also Van der Eijk (2007, 412) about Eth. Nic.: âla faiblesse morale, lâakrasia, y est présentée comme le produit dâune constitution physiologique anormale et pathologique.â See also Van der Eijk (2022) 117.
See in this sense Gauthier-Jolyf (1970); Aubry (2009) 249 n. 39. From this perspective, regarding the weak akrates, who is unable to draw the right conclusion from the premises he knows, or to act in accordance with it, D. Charles (2007, 197) observes: âno doubt, it will be said, more work is needed at the psychological level, involving perhaps the study of self-deception, to fill out the relevant description. But, it may be said, for Aristotle this is the task of an independent scientific (or physiological) investigation.â
On drunkenness and sleep, see also Ph. 7.3, 247b13â16, and the analysis of this important chapter by Leunissen (2017) 110â138. On the different sorts of blood within the body and the consequences of this distinction for the explanation of âintelligenceâ, see Part. An. 2.2, 647b29â648a19. On the fact that the quality of the blood depends on nutrition, see Part. An. 2.3, 650a32âb13. On the interaction between blood, natural heat, brain and sleep, see Part. An. 2.7, 653a10â20. With consequences for disease, death or temporary madness: 653b2â8. Cf. Leunissen (2017) 15â21. For a recent survey of blood and its modifications in Aristotle, see Bubb (2020).
An. Post. 1.33, 89b7â9.
For this line of argument one can refer, among other studies, to Johnson (2015, 186), who argues that âan architectonic conception of philosophy in which theoretical science is authoritative is essential to any interpretation of Aristotleâs practical sciences.â See also Karbowski (2019) on the scientific and deductive aspects of Aristotleâs practical philosophy.
De An. 1.1, 403a31.
As pointed out by Zingano (2020).
Morel (2016); Morel (2021) 83â95.
For
Aph. 7.42 (IV.588.13 L. = IV.202 Loeb). On the medical background of the passage, see Francis (2011).
Parv. nat., Mem. 2.453a19; Som. 3, 457a27; Insomn. 3.461a22; Div. somn. 2.463b17; 464a32.
âNow, the last proposition both being an opinion about a perceptible object, and being what determines our actions â¦â (
Examples of the use of oikeion in this sense in An. post.: 1.2, 71b23; 72a6; 6, 74b26; 12, 77a39; 17, 80b18 sq. With idion: 1.7, 75b18â20; 9, 76a16; a38âb3.
See also Eth. Nic. 1.7, 1098b1â2. In a different context (Eth. Eud. 1.6, 1216b36â39), Aristotle urges the specialist of politics to consider not only the facts, but also the explanation (to dioti).
This type of consideration could be extended to other texts, such as the famous âergon argumentâ in Eth. Nic. 1, 1097b22â1098a1, whose scientific features are rather schematic, and do not presuppose a detailed scientific understanding of human nature. See further Henry (2015) 189; Morel (2021) 106â121.
Natali (2017) 60.
See also, in Eth. Nic. 7.11, 1152a30. Intemperance is not in itself a habit, to the extent that it is not exactly a vice, even if some people seem to be incontinent because of their habits.
See e.g.: Parv. nat., Mem. 2.453a14â31; Ins. 2.459a23âb7; Phys. 4.8, 215a 15; 8.10, 266b28â267a20; see also DC 3.2, 301b23â30.
In this sense, Leunissen (2015) 226â227.
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