Ofra Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State within a State. Boulder, CO and London, UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012, xiv + 346 pp., (ISBN 978-1-58826-836-5), (hardcover).
There are now a number of credible scholarly analyses of the Kurds of Iraq, but Ofra Bengio, a first-class Israeli scholar, may well have written the single best one to date. This is not particularly surprising given her many years of studying the question and proven ability to draw upon a wealth of rich source materials to trace and analyse “the profound vicissitudes of [Iraqi] Kurdish fortunes over the last half-century” (p. 1).
After a thoroughly documented, wide-ranging introductory analysis of the evolution of Kurdish nationalism, Bengio divides her reader-friendly, fast-paced treatise into four parts. (1) The Kurds and the Iraqi State, 1968–1980. (2) Caught in the Crossfire, 1980–1998. (3) A Kurdish Entity in the Making, 1998–2010. (4) Conclusion in which she reconsiders the old adage concerning the Kurds, “No friends but the mountains.” Thus, Bengio, grippingly explains how the Iraqi Kurds “had long been branded as the losers of the twentieth century … like the phoenix, rose out of the ashes of the wars and civil strife … to establish a self-governing Kurdish entity” (p. ix), the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
To do so, Bengio addresses some of the following important questions. How did Kurdish-Iraqi state dynamics lead to the ultimate collapse of the centralised Baathi state and the rise of the KRG? What were the internal and external obstacles to building the KRG? To what extent have the Iraqi Kurds succeeded in these tasks? What caused the differences between the KRG and the remainder of Iraq as well as the differences between the KRG and the Kurdish communities in the contiguous states? Maybe most importantly, how profound has been the impact of the KRG’s rise upon the geostrategic map of the entire region, “the sea changes in the regional and international arena that took place at the end of the twentieth century” (p. 7) as she so aptly puts it. Indeed, in the more than two years since Bengio’s 2010 cut-off date, this changing geostrategic situation brought on by the rise of the Kurds has come to profoundly affect not only the future of Iraq, but also surprisingly Syria and of course Turkey. So far, however, Iran seems to be the odd man out in this historical process.
In her trenchant analysis of the making of the KRG, the author characterises “the process of Kurdish nation building as a continuum” (p. 274) and lists the following factors that propelled the Kurdish national project: “The steady decline of the Baathi regime and the resulting weakening of the Iraqi state; the end of the Kurdish civil war [1994–1998] and the slow normalisation process that followed close on its heels; the convergence of interests, for the first time in modern history, between a superpower, the United Sates, and the Kurds; a gradual change in the international community’s position on the sanctity of borders after the collapse of the Soviet Union; and, most importantly, the demise of the Baathi state in 2003” (p. 273).
Bengio notes that although KRG president Mas’ud Barzani has specifically declared that the post-Saddam Iraqi federation “leaves only foreign policy, national defence, and financial affairs in the hands of the central government” (p. 245), the KRG still proceeded to take upon itself authority in these very matters. Tellingly, Bengio then observes that “the classic definition of an [independent] state includes the capacity to enter into relations with other states’” (Ibid.) and this, of course, is exactly what the KRG has been increasingly doing since its inception in 1992 and especially since the fall of Saddam in 2003. “Indeed, one of the … unintended … consequences of the Kurdish civil war [was] … that it helped upgrade relations with outside powers. … In other words, the KRG established foreign relations inch by inch, using mediation as a springboard (p. 246). “In time, the Kurds, who were first viewed as a moral burden on the United States, became allies of sorts” (p. 260). Although this US role has remained all important, ironically “Turkey could be depicted as the reluctant builder of Iraqi Kurdistan” (p. 252).
The author adds that “generally speaking, the existence of a large Kurdish diaspora in Europe … and the United States … served as a catalyst for internationalising, the Kurdish issue” (p. 281). “The horrors of the Halabja and Anfal massacres, from which almost no Kurdish family was spared [and with which the author compares the Holocaust in helping create Israel], were the final catalyst for the crystallisation of a Kurdish identity and entity” (p. 280). The author also notes that “the most dangerous domestic enemies were the various Kurdish Islamist groups” (p. 277), while adding that continuing tribalism was “the enemy from within” (p. 279).
Bengio, of course, covers the broad contours and specifics that all who study the saga of the Kurds of Iraq are already familiar with, so the main strength of her book is her cogent, at times even brilliant, interpretations of events. Her superb analysis also stands as a testimony to excellent, reader-friendly prose that will serve very well both the scholarly community, practitioners, and intelligent lay public, while at the same time put to shame those other scholars who continue to hide what they may or may not have to say behind mind-boggling jargon. Her book also includes a short list of acronyms, two useful maps, a wide-ranging bibliography, and thorough index complete with useful sub-entries.
Of course, fast-moving events since this book’s 2010 cut-off date, will call for the author to consider a second edition or maybe even a follow up book analysing the KRG’s subsequent struggles against Baghdad over oil and territory that may well lead it to eventual independence. In addition, the Iraqi Kurds’ role in the Syrian civil war that has been raging since March 2011 and continuing development of the all-important economic and now increasing political links to Turkey also demand close attention. At the same time the role of the United States, while still important, has been lessening and is now viewed as less supportive than what the Kurds have come to expect.