1 Introduction1
The fourteenth century was a golden age in the development of logic and natural philosophy at Oxford. The new ideas and approaches in logic, mathematics (mostly geometry), and physics devised there in the 1330s spawned novel and unconventional ethical notions, methodologies, and theories, especially among the Oxford Calculators.2 Richard Kilvington (ca. 1302–1361), who was one of the founding and most prolific members of the group, was extraordinary even among the Calculators, since he not only came up with a new method for debating ethical problems, but also brought it to a pinnacle of sophistication. His academic time was fruitful and resulted in the penning of several texts: the logical treatise Sophismata (1321–1322), a series of commentaries on Aristotle’s works including Questions on Aristotle’s On Generation and Corruption (1322–1323), Questions on the Physics (1323–1324), and Questions on the Ethics (1324–1325), and finally Questions on the Sentences (1332–1333), a theological commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences.3
Kilvington’s philosophy and methodology are remarkable, because he was the only Calculator to author a commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and also skillfully adopted his own logical and physical ideas to discuss ethical and theological themes. Kilvington applied logical and semantic tools, the calculus of compounding proportions, and the concept of motion in order to inspect ethical “things,” calculate virtues and vices, and dissect the complex structure of the will and its acts as early as in his Sophismata, yet this approach reached its most elaborate form in his Questions on the Ethics and Questions on the Sentences. Kilvington’s ethics and theology, as well as his new methodological apparatus, became an inspiration for his contemporaries and followers, such as Roger Roseth,4 Robert Holcot5 (d. after 1349), Robert Halifax6 (d. ca. 1349), Adam Wodeham7 (ca. 1295–1358), and John Ripa,8 who extensively quoted from, referred to, and discussed his ethical and theological views.
Kilvington’s Questions on the Ethics stands out among medieval ethical commentaries. Firstly, its structure abides by the new standards for theological commentaries that were taking shape at that time,9 where the size of the work was reduced, the number of questions trimmed, their connection with the commented text loosened, and less common and so-called “minor” problems were inserted in the analysis of the “major” ones. Secondly, the minor issues investigated in the Ethics are not merely mentioned, but take up a significant portion of the commentary. Thirdly, the lexical and analytical toolkit employed to examine ethical dilemmas extends far beyond the regular ethical terminology and methodology. Not only does Kilvington have logical and physical terms in his repertoire, but he also copiously uses this vocabulary. A short glance at Table 4.1 above, which presents a basic comparison of the two terminologies, is enough to recognize the specificity of Kilvington’s lexicon in his Questions on the Ethics.
Table 4.1
The ethical vs. logical and physical lexicon in Kilvington’s Questions on the Ethics
|
Ethical terminology |
Number of occurrences |
Logical and physical terminology |
Number of occurrences |
|---|---|---|---|
|
virtus |
745 |
gradus |
316 |
|
habitus |
398 |
consequentia |
242 |
|
voluntas |
271 |
consequens |
160 |
|
vult/velle |
262 |
motus/movere |
107 |
|
virtuosus |
251 |
proportio |
102 |
|
vitium |
191 |
latitudo |
65 |
|
bene |
101 |
antecedens |
61 |
|
vitiosum |
92 |
excessus |
42 |
|
male |
69 |
minimum |
41 |
|
superabundantia |
58 |
resistentia/resistere |
17 |
|
defectus |
19 |
maximum |
12 |
Kilvington’s selection of the sources to be referred to and quoted from is remarkable, too. Expectedly, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is his preferred text, yet he also resorts to Aristotle’s Physics and Averroes’s Physics. Although references to treatises on physics were not entirely uncommon in ethical commentaries, their ample presence, combined with a slew of physical terms and the pronounced role of physical writings in supporting Kilvington’s arguments, testifies to the uniqueness of his work. Thus, it comes as no surprise that question 4, devoted to the will, opens with a reference to Aristotle’s Physics, Book VIII,10 while question 5, concerning courage, starts from the claim that both the virtue of courage and the vice of cowardice have latitudes.11 Of course, Kilvington’s fondness for analogies between natural processes and ethical change did not arise in a doctrinal void, and such parallels can in fact be occasionally encountered in earlier medieval thinkers,12 such as Augustine (354–430),13 Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1225–1274),14 and John Duns Scotus (ca. 1265–1308).15 Yet, it is Kilvington to whom we owe developing this sporadic device into a complex and fully shaped apparatus.
I have discussed one facet of Kilvington’s methodology, namely, the application of logic to the analysis of the will, elsewhere,16 arguing that it “not only sheds light on the beginning of a new trend that was soon to be continued, but may also give some insight into the modes and preoccupations of the Calculatory ethics.”17 In this chapter, I focus on the other—physics-related—facet of Kilvington’s unique analytical perspective and use the example of ethical change to show how it operated. Although I realize that there is a difference between moral change (from good to evil) and ethical change (from mean to generous, or from mean to more/less mean), I will use “ethical change” and “moral change” interchangeably in this chapter.
To begin with, I briefly elucidate Kilvington’s ontology and, in particular, the status of ethical qualities, such as virtues and vices. The ascription of the status of “real things” to ethical qualities provides Kilvington with a theoretical grounding for drawing explicit analogies between physics and ethics, on which he founds his considerations on becoming virtuous. (Section 2). Subsequently, I describe and analyze three scenarios that Kilvington constructed in exploring ethical change and its various aspects. All the three cases largely rely on analogizing ethical change to physical change and on studying ethical change in terms of local motion. The analogies marshaled by Kilvington illuminate the multifaceted structure of moral decision-making that comprises numerous elements and variables (Section 3). Afterwards, I examine the motion-towards-perfection argument, which is based on an assumption that all beings share a unique feature; namely, they gravitate towards perfection. The assumption embraced by Kilvington again justifies comparing ethics to physics (Section 4). Finally, I conclude by outlining the key features of Kilvington’s notion of ethical change and offering some reflections on his concept of the moral agent, which not only captures the dynamics of moral decision-making, but also portrays the human as a morally conflicted being that struggles with her/his weaknesses and wicked temptations, a condition all of us have likely experienced (Section 5).
2 The Ontological Status of Virtues/Vices
Aristotle’s Physics does not simply supply a background argument for Kilvington’s ethical analysis; rather, it represents an important source of views and frameworks for debating core ethical issues, especially virtues/vices and the will. Likewise, physical phenomena frequently provide a starting point for Kilvington’s scrutiny of ethical “things” or ethical change. This approach is underpinned by Kilvington’s ontology. Specifically, in the Questions on the Ethics, he repeatedly claims that virtues and vices are real things (res),18 which echoes William Ockham’s (ca. 1287–1347) minimalist ontology and his mature actus theory, where “entia in anima are real beings; they are qualities in the soul,” as Jenny Pelletier puts it.19 Interestingly, Ockham’s partiality for the term “thing” (res) over “being” (ens) or “something” (aliquid),20 when referring to the things that have real existence, is mirrored in Kilvington’s choice of vocabulary. Probing the issue of what can be classified as a thing, Kilvington, like Ockham, states that substances and qualities are the only real things and, moreover, that they are of permanent nature. Also, he adopts21 Walter Burley’s22 (ca. 1275–1344) distinction between permanent things (whose parts exist simultaneously) and successive things (whose parts exist one after another) to state that “an ethical quality is a permanent thing (res permanens), whereas any ethical change should be classified as a successive thing” (res successiva).23
While Kilvington is rather consistent in granting virtues and vices a positive ontological status, his view of the will is less than straightforward. Although the will might logically seem to be a thing as well (like qualities and the human capacities, cognizance and aptitude for grammatical expression),24 I have not found any passage explicitly stating just that in his writings, though one excerpt in question 7 of his Questions on the Ethics appears to imply that evil volition is also a thing, since it is paired with the virtue of generosity, with both of them claimed to be things.25 Kilvington’s views in the Questions on the Sentences, where he revisits the issue vigorously debating the status of volitions, may shed more light on this problem. Briefly, Kilvington’s analysis in question 4 of his Questions on the Sentences reveals that his position on the ontological status of the will’s acts is complex and theologically entwined, regarding free will, grace, and predestination.26 He claims that good acts of the will are caused by a person, yet because God produces the substance of a volitional will, they are things. However, evil acts of the will are the effects of people’s free will alone and, as such, are not things.27 Nevertheless, Kilvington regards “sin’s ‘lack of being’ neither as a pure deprivation nor as non-being,”28 since the proposition “sin is” is undeniably true. Besides, sin can be classified neither as fictum29 (something that only exists in the mind and has no real existence) nor as “something,” because it was not created by God. Still, sin is not a “non-being,” either. Therefore, evil acts must have some mode of existence that can be labeled as quasi-existence. Kilvington situates evil acts in a liminal phase, suspended between pure nothingness and real actual existence.30 Kilvington’s view on the status of evil acts seems to transgress the simplistic binary of being and non-being, of complete existence and absolute existential void. Paraphrasing Paul Spade, I argue that there is more in Kilvington’s ontology than “things.”31 A similar claim can be made about the acts of the will: although acting does exist (that is, is a form of being), it is not “something.” Presumably, Kilvington draws on Ockham’s concept of being,32 which encompasses not only substances and qualities, but also a wide range of intra—and extramental “objects.”33 Furthermore, Kilvington seems to endorse Ockham’s understanding of “to be” (esse) as referring to different things in different ways.34
3 How Ethical Change Happens
Kilvington’s take on the ontological status of virtues and vices is important for his concept of moral change, because it provides a theoretical scaffolding for his original methodology, which entails a profuse application of analogies between ethical and physical qualities. Simply put, if ethical qualities (virtues and vices) are things the way physical qualities are, they can be analyzed and described in a like manner. One of Kilvington’s reiterated comparisons of ethical to physical qualities concerns ethical change, namely, the increase and decrease of virtues.
Similarly to all fourteenth-century thinkers, Kilvington was fascinated with the problem of change, whether physical or ethical. He investigated its various dimensions, examining a cluster of issues connected with ethical change, such as its temporal aspects, including: a) the first and the last instant of change; b) willing contradictories at the same instant; c) instantaneous change from being vicious to virtuous and vice versa; and d) the instantaneous production and dismissal of the will’s act. Since I have analyzed these temporal aspects elsewhere,35 I will focus in this chapter on Kilvington’s idea of the maximum and minimum degrees of ethical change, such as a mean person becoming generous. In doing so, I will examine three scenarios studied by Kilvington to capture the characteristic features of moral change and identify the methodological apparatus he employed to probe and depict it.
3.1 Case 1: Courage
When discussing the virtue of courage in question 5 of his Ethics, Kilvington ponders whether a courageous person is virtuous, and whether courage is the midpoint between two vices, which is the central tenet of Aristotle’s virtue theory. Kilvington’s example involves facing two evil/disgraceful options; specifically, he scrutinizes the situation in which to remain virtuous a person must act viciously, and asks whether this vicious act makes the person vicious. The question whether one virtuous act sufficed for a person to acquire moral virtue, inspired by Aristotle’s36 insistence that the virtues were acquired through the repetition of acts and the development of habits, had a long tradition starting from Parisian debates in the 1240s and continuing until the late Middle Ages. The issue was also discussed by the Oxonians, such as Kilvington and Burley.37 In his inquiry into whether it takes one act or a series of acts to generate a virtue, Kilvington adopts an unconventional perspective that sparks an innovative solution, as demonstrated below.
In argument 4 of question 5 of his Ethics, Kilvington comes up with a case of Socrates facing a troublesome choice between two evil outcomes:38
-
committing a disgraceful act (committere aliquod turpe); or
-
allowing Cicero to be killed by Plato (Cicero interficietur a Platone).
Drawing on Aristotle, he states that when confronted with a choice between (either experienced or committed) disgrace and death, a courageous person chooses her/his own death. Yet, he does not hold it to be a strict rule and assumes that there may be circumstances under which the person chooses disgrace over her/his or somebody else’s death, as in the case of Socrates, Plato, and Cicero. His investigation of the factors that can influence such a decision identifies the following: whether death is imminent or delayed;39 whether there is any circumstance that can be an excuse for a disgraceful act;40 how committing a disgraceful act differs from acting disgracefully;41 and how great the disgrace is.42
The choice between disgrace and death is essential in assessing whether a given person acts virtuously (courageously) or rather viciously (cowardly or recklessly). To appraise that, it is vital to determine whether the disgrace is sufficiently grave to dishonor the person and should indeed be avoided even at the cost of death. Since all humans aspire to being virtuous (not vicious), the dilemma looks serious and poses a difficult problem to a courageous person. Kilvington promptly offers a solution by explaining that the issue lies in the degree of disgrace, which is an important factor in the moral agent’s assessment of the scenario. Two measurements need to be considered. One should measure whether the disgrace the person faces is really tiny (quantumcumque parvum/modicum/valde modicum) or rather great (magnum). It is quite obvious that some shameful acts are not entirely damaging, and committing them is excusable. The other measurement, which is indispensable for the previous one, must evaluate how great a disgrace (or, to be precise, what degree of disgrace) it takes for a person to choose death as an alternative.
Evidently, Kilvington’s reasoning relies on the concept of latitude (latitudo), which comprises an infinite number of degrees (gradus) stretched between its maximum and minimum points. Crucial to all the Calculators, the notion of latitude was normally used to describe physical change, for instance, the degree at which water froze or boiled. Briefly, latitude was thought of as a continuum encompassing all possible degrees of intensity.43 In accordance with his standard practice, Kilvington availed himself of it in ethical studies as well, claiming that virtues and vices also had their latitudes (latitudo vitii, latitudo virtutis). Various intensities of a virtue/vice, conceived as its degrees, make up the latitude of this virtue/vice. As ethical change takes place, a quality, for instance courage, does not change as such and remains itself (courage is still courage); what changes is its intensity, with the degree of it increasing or decreasing.
In argument 6 of question 5, Kilvington recommends scaling the disgrace (like ethical qualities) on its latitude as helpful in making the assessments necessary for virtuous action. This procedure will indicate:
-
the minimum inexcusable disgrace to be avoided by opting for death—minimum turpe propter quod sic; and
-
the maximum bearable disgrace that does not necessitate death—maximum turpe propter quod non.44
The ontological framework mapped out by Kilvington by all means permits this procedure: since all qualities are of the same ontological nature, the same tools of measurement can be used to inspect and describe them.
When formulating ethical guidelines on how to act in order to remain virtuous even though a vicious act is required, Kilvington adheres to his standard practice and adds yet another item to this toolkit: willing absolutely (simpliciter) vs. willing conditionally (secundum quid).45 Although grading the disgrace and evilness of two acts provides the chief principles of conduct, the will is thrown into the mix, since, in Kilvington’s view, what matters most is whether either of the acts (or both of them) are willed absolutely or conditionally.46 If neither act is willed absolutely and unconditionally, it does not make a virtuous person vicious. The ultimate evaluation of the ethical scenario and both acts (even if both seem vicious at first sight) depends on the nature of willing. This again showcases Kilvington’s voluntarism and the importance he puts on the type of the will’s act at work.47 Yet, regardless of how small the degree of disgrace brought on by this act is (even if it is a really microscopic degree), some process of change is set in motion while the act is being committed.
3.2 Case 2: A Straw
Although minimal degrees (however small) are possible to calibrate, not all minimal changes can be perceived. The fact that we are unable to see change does not mean that it is not already underway. Case 2, which comes from Kilvington’s Questions on the Physics, will be important for the next ethical case in the following subsection (Case 3).
Kilvington invites his readers to imagine that a straw falls on a rock time and again. Each time the straw falls, it takes away a minute part of that rock, shaving a particle of the rock off its bulk. Although this diminishment is invisible to the naked eye, it is indeed happening, and should the process continue long enough, the difference in the condition of the rock would eventually become noticeable.48 Kilvington’s original example of a straw falling on a rock echoes a more common scenario of water dropping on a rock, frequently borrowed from Aristotle’s Physics49 (which Kilvington actually uses in his Physics as well).50 In accordance with the Aristotelian51 principles of motion, Kilvington enumerates the essential preconditions for any physical change to occur. Specifically, there must be:
-
an element that is acted upon and that has a certain resistance (a rock);
-
an acting element that acts with a certain power (a straw); and
-
the excess (excessus) of power over resistance (resistentia).
As Kilvington argues, any excess of power over resistance suffices for motion to happen.52 He lists four ways in which an excess of power over resistance can be described. These are, as worded by Elżbieta Jung and Robert Podkoński:
1) by a minimum excess of an acting power over a resistance which is sufficient for motion (minimum quod sic); 2) by a maximum excess which is not sufficient for motion (maximum quod non); 3) by such an excess which is sufficient to continue motion but not to initiate it; 4) by such an excess which, when sufficient to continue motion, is sufficient to initiate it.53
While subscribing to Aristotle’s view on the preconditions of physical change, Kilvington modifies the Aristotelian theory of motion, according to which movement can take place as long as the ratio of power to resistance is greater than 1. Formulating a new rule of local motion,54 Kilvington claims that since it is impossible to determine either a minimum power or a maximum resistance that would initiate motion, for motion to occur whatever excess is required, with degrees ranging from zero to infinity; as Jung observes, “Kilvington maintains that any small excess of force over resistance suffices for motion to commence and continue; thus, whenever force is greater than resistance, motion occurs.”55 This modification, which can explain motions that are very slow, not only has an impact on Kilvington’s theory of local motion, but also is consequential for his ethics. Transplanting this idea onto ethical theory reasserts that there is a similarity between physical and ethical changes and contributes to formulating an original concept of moral change. Case 3 below illustrates the implications it has for the notion of ethical change.
3.3 Case 3: Generosity
In question 7 of his Ethics, which deals with the virtue of generosity, Kilvington devotes the whole of argument 2 to debating the issue of becoming generous and to analyzing the factors and circumstances affecting a person’s choices that influence her/his generosity. Kilvington’s reasoning revolves around a complex scenario in which a generous person must decide to which of two needy people s/he should give the only small thing s/he has. This complicated case comprises multiple variants, each with its own array of conditions and factors to be taken into account when making the right decision. Kilvington’s story is:
And supposing that a generous person has one small thing to give, and that there are two persons equally in need, and they are equally moving [towards the generous, and] following her judgment, she determines herself to give it solely to one of them; however, one [of those in need] is moving with a greater force and is more in need than before, with the other factors being equal, so she would [be willing to] give this one small thing to the person who is more, rather than less, in need, because that is what reason dictates. Then, supposing that the generous, [when being] initially at a distance (in prima distantia) equally moved by those two, Socrates and Plato, directs herself to Socrates; and that the distance to Socrates continuously weakens the impression of [how great] Socrates’s need is and bolsters the impression of [how great] Plato’s need is. Then, I argue as follows: the generous directs herself to give it to Socrates, but she cannot do it unless by moving locally towards Socrates, and supposing that the generous is not hindered [in any way], then she will begin to move towards Socrates to give it to Socrates. Yet, I prove that she will not, because in any instant after this Plato will appear to be more in need than Socrates, and the generous will be willing to give it more readily to the one in greater need than [to the one] in lesser need, with the other factors being equal; therefore, before any instant after this the generous will contrarily begin to move towards Plato in order to give it to Plato; therefore, she will be moving towards Socrates for no time whatsoever; and, consequently, the generous does not begin to move towards Socrates [at all]. Yet, it could be said that it is not possible that in the view and judgment of the generous, Plato begins to be in greater need than Socrates simply because of the movement of the generous towards Socrates, because not every excess is perceptible, nor every movement is sensible, nor every space to be traversed by Socrates is perceptible, and any of these [can be] an obstacle in the assumed case.56
This scenario resembles a mathematical equation with multiple variables on which its final result depends. Kilvington takes into account: the number of people in need, the time required to make a decision, the duration of a given person’s neediness, the accuracy with which the generous one perceives the situation and its dynamic changes, the exactness of the judgment of the need, and the distance from the one in need. All of these aspects have a part in assessing the intensity of the need of each person involved in order to make the right decision. However, changes in these factors may be indiscernible to the generous person, whose impression and judgment prove insufficient for proper decision-making. The reason is that the intensities of Socrates’s and Plato’s neediness may differ only infinitesimally and thus be indistinguishable. Also, change in their respective needs may be of such a small degree that it cannot be grasped by the generous person. Simply put, not all instances of the prevalence of one person’s need over the other’s are perceivable to the generous individual. Interestingly, this scenario was reused by Roger Roseth in his Sentences to debate the possibility of the existence of simultaneous contraries, and to be precise simultaneous willing and nilling.57 Roseth takes into account almost all the variables indicated by Kilvington, such as the initial distance from the people in need, a change in the distance, the first and last instant of the process, and so forth.
Depending on which variable we consider, we end up analyzing a different scenario. Kilvington uses the ceteris paribus analytical tool to study the interrelation of only two factors of the situation, while its other factors are supposed to remain unchanged. Any alteration of the factors or conditions can influence a given case, produce various, if not contradictory, outcomes, and consequently prompt quite different solutions to the analyzed dilemma. As a result, the generous person changes her/his mind all the time. The element of vacillation and irresolution, caused by the dynamic fluctuation of the scenario’s various factors, adds an important layer to Kilvington’s theory and makes it a convincing version of virtue ethics. Moral hesitation, doubts, deferring the decision, and reappraising the decisions already made, all help Kilvington avoid the charges of positing an unrealistic moral agent, which are leveled against Aristotle’s virtue ethics. In Aristotle’s view, a virtuous person is defined by having no moral conflicts and enjoying a moral stability, which contradicts common human experience and paints a travestied image of a moral agent. As Marcia Baron rightly observes:
Insofar as […] [a] perfectly moral person is conceived of as someone who has all and only virtuous desires and acts in accordance with them, never deliberating before acting, this perfectly moral person is not an agent at all. But this would be a caricature of him.58
3.4 Case 4: Courage Again
In his analysis of change from being virtuous to being vicious and vice versa in question 5 of his Ethics, Kilvington uses both physical and ethical vocabulary to refer to the concept of the excess of power over resistance. His go-to terms are, respectively, “excess” (excessus) and “superabundance” (superabundantia). Debating the possibility of change from being a coward to being a courageous person, he ponders whether such a change can happen in an instant.59 He argues that if such an instantaneous and total change is to occur, the entire latitude of cowardice must be replaced by the latitude of courage, which means that two conditions must be met:60
-
the person must acquire the greatest degree of courage at the onset of change; and
-
there must be no resistance from the corresponding vice (meaning no degree of cowardice) in the person.
Since Aristotle’s virtue ethics holds that the acquisition of virtue is a process happening over time through a repeated performance of acts, obtaining the entire latitude of any virtue or vice, including its highest degree, with and through one act in an instant appears a sheer impossibility. Thus, the first condition is unfulfillable. To understand Kilvington’s conclusion, another two of his principles should be outlined at this point. Like Aristotle,61 Kilvington believes that all change must happen between contraries, or at least between two different degrees, which means that it unfolds from a point where it begins (terminus a quo) to a point to which it heads (terminus ad quem).62 What is more, the highest degree of virtue is the endpoint of augmenting and eventually acquiring the full-fledged habit of virtue.63 This takes us to Kilvington’s other principle to be brought up here, which stipulates that change does not have to come to pass between extremes, but may occur between any two different degrees, even of the same quality.64 Consequently, although Kilvington does not state this explicitly, it can be reasonably assumed that the second condition above is unfulfillable, either. Given that a) change happens from one state to its opposite (or from one degree to another); and b) the person was supposed to become courageous, that is, to undergo change from being less courageous to being more courageous, the person inferably already had some degree of courage. Yet, this was not the point of this scenario, which considered the possibility of an instantaneous change from being cowardly to being courageous. Kilvington concludes that immediate total change is impossible, and that this kind of change must take place successively.
Although Kilvington winds up his argument by stating that the term “resistance” is only used metaphorically with respect to virtuous change,65 his comment66 on how difficult the change is reinforces this analogy. Virtue is never acquired without struggle, since it always entails wrestling with one’s weaknesses, which impede becoming virtuous. This is the very resistance that a person must overcome. Moreover, there is a correlation between resistance and the generation of virtues, since the smaller resistance is, the easier it is to produce a virtuous deed.67
4 The Motion-Towards-Perfection Argument
Throughout his ethical commentary, Kilvington insists that there is a similarity between physical and ethical qualities (including their process of increase and decrease). His repertory of arguments is expanded by adding yet another one, which holds that motion towards perfection characterizes all beings. In question 2 of his Ethics, Kilvington says:
In reply to argument 6, it is confirmed that virtues can increase. […] And thus, Aristotle says in Book VII of the Physics that virtues are perfections; and thus, motion towards them is not coerced or executed by necessity. Likewise, Aristotle says that vices are perfections in the same vein, since evidently motion towards them [is not a result] of its subject being coerced; and thus, Aristotle claims that virtues and vices are perfections, yet [he does not make this claim] about the color and white or black, towards which the aforementioned motion happens.68
Although the argument gestures at the specificity of ethical qualities (virtues), whose change, unlike that of natural qualities, is not necessary, it restates Kilvington’s general idea and relies on an analogy between the motion or change of physical and ethical qualities. This argument, which recurs in question 5 of the Sentences, where temporal aspects of willing are discussed,69 draws on Aristotle’s view on the perfection of a power in the process of physical change which was articulated in the Physics70 and reiterated by Averroes.71 This view was soon transplanted onto the ethical ground. The inclination/movement towards perfection inheres in all beings, but is of the greatest importance to humans. Consequently, this concept was frequently cited not only in physical commentaries,72 but also in ethical and theological contexts. It was addressed by multiple thinkers, such as Thomas Aquinas,73 Henry of Ghent,74 and Duns Scotus,75 to list but a few.
The Oxonians were no exception. Apart from Kilvington’s ethical and theological commentaries, this concept can also be found in Adam Wodeham’s Ordinatio, question 8, where a similar passage referring to the virtue-perfection-change issue is entwined within the analysis of the temporal aspects of the will.76 Such strategies are best visible in Richard FitzRalph (ca. 1300–1360), who uses the motion-towards-perfection argument in his Lectura in Sententias (composed between 1328 and 1329),77 question 10, article 2, where he dwells upon the freedom of the will and the possibility of the will’s acting in an instant.78 FitzRalph, likewise, employs other physics/ethics analogies and references to the motion, so abundantly applied by Kilvington. For instance, he employs them to consider the activity and passivity of the will. The arguments both for and against the active nature of the will in article 1, question 10 of FitzRalph’s Lectura are fundamentally underpinned by the comparison of the will to motion. Adopting Aristotle’s concept of local motion, FitzRalph79 argues that the will’s acting resembles the local motion of a physical object: there must be a cause that moves the will and an object; any new movement (of both an object and the will) must be preceded by another movement; and there must be a first movement that starts the following movements of the object and the acting of the will.80 Like Kilvington, FitzRalph frequently employs such analogies as an effective analytical tool to probe the will, yet he invariably stresses that there is a significant difference between local motion and the will’s acting.81 This methodological similarity between the two Oxonians may suggest that Kilvington’s fascination with the idea was in fact sparked by FitzRalph. More studies are needed to ascertain the influence, but it seems likely that FitzRalph inspired Kilvington to transform the comparative approach into an elegant and complex methodology. Nevertheless, their perspectives on debating virtues and the will situate them both “in the circle of physics-oriented theologians.”82
5 Conclusion
The incorporation of the rules of motion and natural philosophy into ethics reveals a pivotal facet of Kilvington’s philosophy. He not only offers comparisons of ethical to physical qualities and changes, but also provides a theoretical framework for this approach and grounds its validity on his ontology. The resemblance he champions helps establish a set of rules applicable to ethics. To conclude, I will list the core features of moral change as conceived by Kilvington and the methodological apparatus he used to describe it. Ethical change (from being virtuous to vicious or vice versa) is affected by the same factors and conditions as physical change. To discuss the nature of ethical change, several aspects need to be taken into account, including: 1) the excess-resistance principle comprising a) an element that is acted upon and has a certain resistance (a virtue/vice in the soul); b) an acting element that acts with a certain power (a virtuous/vicious act); and c) the excess of power over resistance. 2) Every excess of power over resistance (no matter how miniscule) contributes to change. The minimal degrees (however small) can be calibrated, yet not all acts contributing to change are perceivable. 3) Change does not happen in an instant, but is stretched over time, so a sustained repetition of acts (even if each of them separately causes a minute change) will eventually turn a vicious person into a virtuous one (or vice versa). This yields an optimistic conclusion: keep trying! Even if your good deed goes unnoticed, it counts anyway and is never for nothing.
One may argue that this is an unsound approach to ethics. To claim that there can be rules in the form of equations and sets of complex guidelines that facilitate and clarify ethical choices, consequently making them easier to assess, may sound ridiculous to some. I claim, however, that this approach reflects our lives, in which moral decision-making is complex and perplexing, and projects a moral agent who is a living and breathing person, rather than a sheerly theoretical construct. Kilvington’s ethical perspective vividly captures the conflicts and qualms a moral agent experiences when facing extreme moral choices, choosing between two evils, or simply trying to do good. Choice is impeded not only by a multitude of variables that impact the moral scenario and should be considered, but also by the fact that these factors, rather than being constant, change over the time of making a decision. The complexity of the scenarios constructed by Kilvington foregrounds yet another vital feature of his ethical theory: it makes room for irresolution, for changing one’s mind, for being uncertain, indecisive, permanently morally perplexed, and lacking moral rigidity. This makes a moral agent constantly active, obliged to be morally alert to the changing circumstances, and steeped in doubts and hesitations. S/he lives with no breathing space, since any moment that is unfolding right now can tip the balance on the scale of a given ethical quality and make a virtuous person a vicious one. Ethical mindfulness promoted by Kilvington is an inalienable part of human existence and moral decision-making.
The research on this chapter and the publication of this study in Open Access have been funded by the National Science Centre, Poland, under grant agreement UMO-2022/47/B/HS1/00071. I wish to thank Edit Lukács and Andrea Nannini for their insightful comments on the first draft of this chapter.
The literature on the Oxford Calculators is extensive; see, e.g., Di Liscia, 2007; Di Liscia, Sylla, 2022; Grant, Murdoch, 1987; Murdoch, 1969; Sylla, 1971, 1973, 1991, 2010.
For a new dating of Kilvington’s Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum, see Jung, Michałowska, 2023, pp. 5–6. On Kilvington’s life and career, see Jung, 2000, pp. 181–223; Kretzmann, Kretzmann, 1990, pp. XVIII–XXXIV; Michałowska, 2016, pp. 3–10. For an updated account of Kilvington’s philosophy and theology, see Jung, 2022.
For an example of Kilvington’s influence on Roseth, see Michałowska, 2021, pp. 16–19.
Chantelle Saville has shown that up to 80–90 % of Holcot’s quodlibets 81 and 82 were plagiarized from Kilvington’s Ethics. For more particulars on Holcot’s extensive employment of and plagiarism from Kilvington’s ethical concepts and methodology, see Saville, 2018 and Chapter 1 by Monika Michałowska and Edit Lukács, in this volume, p. 5.
For a more detailed account of Halifax’s approach inspired by Kilvington’s ideas, see Lukács, 2022, pp. 77–95. See also chapter 6 by Edit Lukács in this volume, pp. 142–162. More comparative studies of Kilvington’s and Halifax’s ethical and theological theories are likely to be encouraged by the publication of critical editions of Halifax’s and Kilvington’s commentaries on the Sentences. Lukács and I are currently collaborating on a critical edition of questions 5 and 6 of Halifax’s commentary (q. 5, Utrum aliquis actus voluntatis possit esse subito productus a voluntate; q. 6, Utrum voluntas respectu cuiuscumque actus sui et obiecti sit libera). I am also working on a critical edition of questions 5, 6, 7, and 8 of Kilvington’s commentary (q. 5, Utrum peccans mortaliter per instans solum mereatur puniri per infinita instantia interpellata; q. 6, Utrum aliquis nisi forte in poena peccati possit esse perplexus in his quae pertinent ad salutem; q. 7, Utrum omnis actus factus extra gratiam sit peccatum; q. 8, Utrum aliquis possit simul peccare venialiter et mereri vitam aeternam).
On Kilvington’s influence on Wodeham and Wodeham’s witty replies to and development of Kilvington’s concepts, see Kitanov, 2023, pp. 232–273.
For Kilvington’s influence on Ripa, see John Ripa, Lectura super primum Sententiarum. Distinctio prima (ed. Nannini, 2023, p. 230, n. 429 – p. 241, n. 444). See also the introduction to the edition, pp. V–CLXVII.
For a depiction of the new standard, see Courtenay, 1987, pp. 253–254, 308; Bakker, Schabel, 2001.
Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum, q. 4, arg. 1 (ed. Michałowska, 2016, p. 165: 5–10): “Et probatur quod non, quia tunc primus motor libere potuisset generasse mundum vel saltem fecisse mundum de novo, quod est contra totum processum VIII Physicorum de aeternitate mundi, ubi dicit Aristoteles quod a voluntate antiqua non fit actio nova, et per hoc probat aeternitatem mundi. Et prima consequentia patet, quia cum voluntas sit libera et possit suos actus producere, et ita sine omni causa movente posset facere suas actiones novas.”
Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum, q. 5, arg. 1 (ed. Michałowska, 2016, p. 208: 5–6): “Et probatur quod non, quia latitudo timoris est infinita et etiam latitudo audaciae, ergo inter istas non est medietas.”
For a discussion of this issue, see chapter 5 by Valeria Buffon in this volume, pp. 99–141, esp. pp. 110–111, 116–119, 124–125.
Augustine, De libero arbitrio, lib. III, cap. 1.1–1.2 (ed. Green, 1970, p. 273).
Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I–II, q. 52, art. 3, Utrum quilibet actus augeat habitum (editio Leonina, VI, 1891, p. 336: 17–23): “Si igitur intensio actus proportionaliter aequetur intensioni habitus, vel etiam superexcedat; quilibet actus vel auget habitum, vel disponit ad augmentum ipsius; ut loquamur de augmento habituum ad similitudinem augmenti animalis. Non enim quodlibet alimentum assumptum actu auget animal, sicut nec quaelibet gutta cavat lapidem, sed, multiplicato alimento, tandem fit augmentum. Ita etiam, multiplicatis actibus, crescit habitus.”
John Duns Scotus, Quodlibetum, q. 16, n. 3 (ed. Noone, Roberts, 2007, p. 160: 12 – p. 161: 11): “Arguitur quod non: Quia necessitas et libertas videntur repugnare, iuxta illud Augustini II De libero arbitrio: ‘Satis,’ inquit, ‘compertum est nulla re fieri mentem servam libidinis, nisi propria voluntate.’ Et statim post: ‘Qui motus, si culpae deputatur, non est naturalis sed voluntarius; in eo quidem similis motui illi quo deorsum lapis fertur, quod sicut iste est proprius lapidis sic ille animi, sed in eo dissimilis quod in potestate non habet lapis cohibere motum quo fertur deorsum; animus vero non ita, etc.’ Et sequitur: ‘Ideo naturalis lapidi est ille motus, animo vero iste voluntarius.’ Haec verba Augustini. Et, paulo post, verba discipuli ab Augustino quidem approbata sequuntur ista: ‘Motus, quo voluntas convertitur, nisi esset voluntarius et in nostra positus potestate, neque laudandus neque culpandus homo esset neque monendus; monendum autem non esse hominem quisquis existimat, de hominum numero exterminandus est.’ Ex istis satis patet quod repugnent naturalis motio et libera respectu eiusdem.”
Michałowska, 2023a.
Michałowska, 2023a, p. 227.
Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum, q. 1, arg. 1 (ed. Michałowska, 2016, p. 64: 12–14): “Et tunc aliqua res permanens, sicut virtus, posset manere per instans tantum, quod est contra Aristotelem VIII Physicorum.” Ibidem, q. 1, arg. 1 (ed. Michałowska, 2016, p. 66: 5–6): “Item, cuiuslibet rei permanentis est accipere primum instans sui esse; virtus est res permanens; ergo eius dabitur etc.” Ibidem, q. 2, arg. 3 (ed. Michałowska, 2016, p. 95: 4–7): “Similiter patet illud de eodem individuo, quia eadem res quae nunc est virtus postmodum est vitium superabundantiae sine aliqua intensione vel remissione virtutis […].” Ibidem, q. 2, ad arg. 3 (ed. Michałowska, 2016, p. 115: 17–18): “Et moraliter loquendo talis est corruptio virtutis quando res quae fuit virtus nunc non est virtus.” Ibidem, q. 10, arg. 1 (ed. Michałowska, 2016, p. 316: 13–16): “Sed inter res diversae speciei una non intenditur adveniente altera, sicut patet de liberalitate et temperantia, cum gradus multum intensus in una virtute compatiatur secum remissionem alterius virtutis, et proportionaliter ita est de prudentiis.”
Pelletier, 2013, p. 85 [italics original]. For more details on Ockham’s actus theory, see McCord Adams, 1977; Pelletier, 2013.
Pelletier, 2013, p. 102: “Certainly, Ockham himself uses ‘being’ (ens) and ‘thing’ (res) interchangeably, with a preference for ‘thing.’ Whenever he wants to argue that something can or cannot exist, i.e. what counts as a being on his ontology, he usually uses the term res not ens. The formulation he ubiquitously employs to designate the entities that he considers to be what can exist as such is ‘res distinctae.’ When he claims that a given pseudo-entity is indeed pseudo, like relations and quantities, he argues that such a ‘thing’ is not distinct from substance or quality.”
Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum, q. 1, arg. 1 (ed. Michałowska, 2016, p. 66: 5–6): “Item, cuiuslibet rei permanentis est accipere primum instans sui esse; virtus est res permanens; ergo eius dabitur etc.” Ibidem, q. 5, arg. 3 (ed. Michałowska, 2016, pp. 210–211).
For an outline of Burley’s concept of change, see chapter 2 by Marek Gensler in this volume, pp. 26–44. See also Gensler, 2007, pp. 104–107; Gensler, 2013, p. 319; Shapiro, 1965, pp. 164–166.
Michałowska, 2022a, p. 176.
Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum, q. 10, arg. 2 (ed. Michałowska, 2016, p. 321: 10–15): “Si dicatur quod scientia concomitans prudentiam non est pars prudentiae, sed res alia totaliter distincta, tunc, cum duabus rebus totaliter distinctis possibile sit simpliciter vel per imaginationem unam esse sine alia, sequitur quod prudentia posset esse sine scientia.” Ibidem, q. 10, arg. 2 (ed. Michałowska, 2016, p. 321: 31–32): “Consequentia patet per hoc quod duae res eiusdem speciei non aggregantur simul in anima, ut duae grammaticae et huiusmodi […].”
Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum, q. 7, arg. 6 (ed. Michałowska, 2016, p. 260: 13–14): “Sed iam probatur quod in Socrate sunt tales res duae, scilicet liberalitas et mala volitio.”
On the status of evil acts, see also Jung, Michałowska, 2023, pp. 40–48.
Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum, q. 3 (ed. Jung, Michałowska, 2023, p. 134: 18 – p. 135: 1): “Et de alio quod dicit quod volitio non est malum quo homines sunt mali dico quod intellegit quod volitio non est tantum malum in quo homines sunt mali, quia per aliquas circumstantias potest fieri homo malus sicut propter finem malum—de isto alias diffuse tractabo sic: habitus mentis, qui est vitium, non est a Deo, igitur nec actus, et per consequens actus voluntatis non est res.”
Jung, Michałowska, 2023, p. 47.
On the fictum theory, see McCord Adams, 1977; Pelletier, 2013, pp. 80–89.
I distinguish between real existence and actual (present) existence, since some things can exist at present but not in reality, such as the thought of my cat in my mind, while others can have real existence but not at present, such as future contingents.
Spade, 1999, p. 110: “There is more in Ockham’s ontology than ‘things,’ more than can be signified by absolute terms.”
Spade, 1999, p. 111: “Ockham’s ontology, therefore, consists, as I see it, of (1) ‘things’—entities that can be expressed nominally, can be signified, of which terms can be predicated. These include individual substances, individual qualities, a few theological relations, and nothing else. And (2) other factors—what cannot be expressed nominally and cannot be signified, of which terms cannot be predicated, but that cannot be fully paraphrased away and yet are real enough to affect the truth values of propositions. […] Ockham’s ontology as a whole is not as sparse as sometimes portrayed. It includes much more than individual substances, qualities, and a few relations; but it still includes much less than do the ontologies of many of his predecessors and contemporaries.”
Cf. Pelletier, 2013, pp. 197–198: “If we expand the signification of the concept of being to include what can be a being, what was a being, or what will be a being, the same holds. In modal and tensed propositions, as long as the subject term personally supposits for a substance or quality, the predicate term ‘being’ is subordinate to the concept of being and continues to indicate that the subject term supposits for a thing that can, or was, or will be, a being. Therefore, the set of beings that the predicate term ‘being’ can be predicated of contains possible, past, and future substances and qualities, possibilia and temporalia. […] ‘Being’ is even univocally predicable of those mental acts that are concepts which have no signification like ‘chimera’.”
Pelletier, who offers a comprehensive analysis of this issue in Ockham’s thought, registers three ways of understanding the term; Pelletier, 2013, pp. 121–126.
For an in-depth account of the temporal aspects of willing, see Michałowska, 2022a.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.1, 1103b14–25.
For a thorough discussion of this issue in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, see chapter 5 by Valeria Buffon in this volume, pp. 99–141, esp. pp. 105–132.
Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum, q. 5, arg. 4 (ed. Michałowska, 2016, p. 212: 7–14): “Item, ponatur Socrates virtuosus in tali perplexitate quod vel committet aliquod modicum turpe vel quod interficietur a Platone, et faciat Plato perplexitatem in Socrate. Et arguitur sic: si Socrates in tali perplexitate fuerit positus, videlicet quod vel Socrates committet turpe modicum vel Cicero interficietur a Platone, et Socrates secundum rectam rationem prius committet tale turpe ita modicum quam velit Ciceronem interfici, ergo a multo fortiori in prima perplexitate citius deberet Socrates committere turpe quam velle se ipsum interfici a Platone.”
Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum, q. 5, arg. 4 (ed. Michałowska, 2016, p. 213: 16–20): “Item, arguitur sic: tale turpe modicum commissum in tali casu in aliquo excusatur propter circumstantiam mortis imminentis, ergo aliqua pars turpis in toto excusatur, et illa pars est vitiosa et turpis, ergo turpe aliquod commissum quod foret aequale illi parti tali posset in toto excusari, et sic non foret turpe ipsum committere.”
Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum, q. 5, ad arg. 4 (ed. Michałowska, 2016, p. 224: 11–16): “Unde non est idem aliquod turpiter committere et aliquod turpe committere, quia aliquod turpe commissum in toto potest excusari per aliquam circumstantiam bonam, sicut est de iocoso mendacio, ut patet ex processu Aristotelis, sed nihil turpiter commissum vel vitiose, quod idem est ad praesens, potest ex toto excusari per aliquam circumstantiam quamcumque bonam.”
Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum, q. 5, ad arg. 4 (ed. Michałowska, 2016, p. 224: 11–12): “Unde non est idem aliquod turpiter committere et aliquod turpe committere […].”
Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum, q. 5, arg. 4 (ed. Michałowska, 2016, p. 211: 20–21): “Si dicatur primum, videlicet quod fortis sit perplexus, citius deberet pati mortem quam sic aliquod turpe, quantumcumque parvum, committere […].”
Kilvington defines the notion of latitude in his Physics. [Latin courtesy of Elżbieta Jung, transl. Michałowska, 2022a, p. 175]. Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super Physicam (Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Lat. VI 72 (2810), f. 95vb): “Et consimiliter est de latitudine caliditatis, nam eadem res realiter est latitudo caliditatis et caliditas, et latitudo caliditatis habet partes sicut tempus, et eadem caliditas ut est in transmutari dicitur latitudo, et quando non transmutatur dicitur caliditas et non latitudo.” [“And likewise [it is said] about latitude, since the latitude of heat and heat are the same thing in reality, and the latitude of heat has parts just like time; thus heat, as it undergoes change, is called the latitude of heat. When it does not undergo change, it is called heat, not latitude.”]
For an examination of Kilvington’s concept of the latitude of virtue/vice, see Michałowska, 2011, 2018. On the Oxonians’ notions of latitude and degree, see Sylla, 1973, 1982.
Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum, q. 5, arg. 6 (ed. Michałowska, 2016, p. 216: 2–10): “Sexto ad principale: tunc, sicut prius, Socrates in casu deberet aggredi usque ad mortem propter turpe vitandum, et tunc aliquod foret minimum turpe propter quod vitandum Socrates, qui est fortis, ut suppono, deberet pati mortem, vel maximum turpe propter quod vitandum Socrates non deberet mortem pati. Consequentia patet, quia, ut dicit Aristoteles et prius probatum est, non propter quodcumque turpe vitandum eligenda est mors, et ita per augmentationem vel diminutionem alicuius turpis ratione cuius non est mors eligenda est devenire ad minimum turpe vel maximum quod non est etc.”
On this distinction in Kilvington’s voluntarism, see Michałowska, 2023a, pp. 210–231.
Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum, q. 5, ad arg. 4 (ed. Michałowska, 2016, p. 225: 16–24): “Ad aliam, quando arguitur quod Socrates citius deberet committere modicum turpe quam velle Ciceronem interfici a Platone, dicitur quod non, quia neutrum debet velle Socrates simpliciter. Socrates tamen citius debet pati Ciceronem interfici a Platone sub tali condicione quod non committat turpe quam deberet committere turpe sub tali condicione ne permittat Ciceronem interfici a Platone, et neutrum velle sic condicionatum est vitiosum, sicut prius dictum est. Et ideo quando arguitur quod de duobus malis minus etc., dico quod illa propositio intellegitur sic quod minus malum est minus fugiendum, sed in proposito neutrum sic condicionatum est malum.”
For more particulars on Kilvington’s voluntarism, see Michałowska, 2018, 2022a, 2022b, 2023a.
Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, q. 5 (ed. Jung, 2022, p. 230: 21 – p. 231: 15): “Quinta opinio dicit propter istas, quia si stramen caderet super lapidem durissimum aliquam partem posset dividere licet insensibilem. Nam si stramen potest istam partem lapidis, supra quam cadit, dividere, capiatur aliud agens quod partem aliam illius lapidis posset dividere, sit illud agens B, et partem lapidis divisam C. Tunc qualis est proportio B ad stramen praedictum in potentia divisiva talis est proportio C ad aliquam maiorem partem lapidis, quae sit D; ergo permutatim sicut B ad C ita stramen ad D. Consequentia patet I De coelo commento 62 et 63. Ergo si B potest dividere C, sequitur quod stramen possit dividere D. Et assumptum probo, nam medietas praedicti lapidis est subduplae difficultatis ad dividendum quam totus lapis, et eadem ratione quarta pars subquadruplae difficultatis et sic infinitum, ut pars inexistit ⟨toti⟩; ergo supra aliquam partem lapidis, ut inexistit, dominatur stramen sufficienter ad dividendum. Antecedens probo, quia si agentia aequalia econtrario dividant lapidem praedictum quousque sibi obviaverunt in medio, tunc facerent actiones aequalis difficultatis; ergo iste duae actiones simul sumptae sine difficultate ⟨altera⟩ ad alteram sunt, ergo tota resistentia lapidis est in duplo maior quam resistentia alterius medietatis, quatenus inexistit toti. Et sic de omnibus partibus proportionalibus illius lapidis fieri potest simile argumentum. Ergo aliquam partem lapidis potest stramen dividere.” Cf. Ibidem (ed. Jung, 2022, p. 260: 10–12): “Et ulterius potest concludi conclusio et satis rationabiliter, quia stramen cadens super lapidem durissimum aliquam partem potest dividere.”
Aristotle, Physica, VIII.3, 253b15–23. For other authors who used this example, see chapter 5 by Valeria Buffon in this volume, pp. 124–127, 134.
Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, q. 5 (ed. Jung, 2022, p. 260: 13–17): “Et quando arguebatur ‘quod quaelibet gutta cadens super lapidem aliquam partem aufert’—concedo. Et ad Philosophum textu commenti 23—dico quod intelligit sic, quod ultima gutta tangit lapidem sensibiliter et praecedentes guttae disponunt ad cavilationem sensibilem per ablationem partium insensibilium.”
Aristotle, Physica, III.3, 202a–b; V.1, 224a–b; VIII.7, 260a26–b7. For a systematic account of Aristotle’s physics, see Bodnár, 2023; Judson, 1991.
Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, q. 5 (ed. Jung, 2022, p. 252: 11–13): “Pro primo articulo dico, quod quilibet excessus sufficit ad motum. Et haec opinio sufficienter probari potest per argumenta adducta in primo et principali articulo quaestionis.”
Jung, Podkoński, 2022, pp. 59–60. Cf. Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, q. 5 (ed. Jung, 2022, p. 215: 1–7): “Et probo quod non, quia tunc vel esset dare: ⟨1.⟩ minimum excessum sufficientem ad motum, ut ponunt quidam; ⟨2.⟩ vel maximum excessum non sufficientem, ad motum, ut ponunt alii; ⟨3.⟩ vel quiscumque excessus sufficeret ad continuandum motum non tamen ad incohandum, ut ponunt tertii; ⟨4.⟩ vel quiscumque excessus sufficeret ad incohandum motum sicut ad continuandum, ut ponunt quarti.”
As Elżbieta Jung claims in Jung 2002, p. 129: “Kilvington is aware of the fact that the proper understanding of Euclid’s definition of operations on ratios necessitates a new interpretation of Aristotle’s and Averroes’s rules of motion. On the one hand, Euclid’s and Archimedes’s theory of arithmetical operations on ratios concludes that doubling a ratio corresponds to squaring the fraction which we form from the ratio. On the other hand, Aristotle’s and Averroes’s statements clearly point to a proportion between active power and resistance, which is not squared, but simply multiplied by two. Having noticed the contradiction of these two views, Kilvington first presents two main arguments against the Aristotelian proposition, and finally concludes that, when talking about a power moving one half of a mobile, Aristotle means precisely a double ratio between F and R; when talking about a power moving a mobile twice as heavy, Aristotle means taking the square root of the ratio of F/R. In these cases, the general mathematical rules meet those of Aristotle only in one case: if the ratio of the power of the mover to that of its mobile is two to one, the same power will move half the mobile with exactly twice the speed. Kilvington’s function provides values of the ratio of F to R greater than 1:1 for any speed down to zero, since any root of a ratio greater than 1:1 is always a ratio greater than 1:1. Hence he avoids a serious weakness of Aristotle’s theory, which cannot explain the mathematical relationship of F and R in very slow motions.” For more details, see Jung, 2002, pp. 113–133; Jung, Podkoński, 2007, pp. 81–101.
Jung, 2022 [italics mine].
Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum, q. 7, arg. 2 (ed. Michałowska, 2016, p. 252: 4–25): “Et ponatur quod liberalis iste habeat unum minimum dandum, et quod duobus his aequaliter indigentibus, et aequaliter moventibus secundum iudicium suum ipse determinet se ad dandum uni tantum; sed uni fortius moventi et magis indigenti, ceteris paribus, prius det quam uni minus indigenti, quia istud dictat ratio. Pono tunc quod iste liberalis in prima distantia aequaliter motus ab istis duobus, Socrate et Platone, determinet se ad Socratem; et quod accessus ad Socratem continue remittat apparitionem indigentiae Socratis et intendat secundum apparitionem indigentiam Platonis. Tunc arguo sic: iste liberalis determinat se ut det Socrati, et hoc non potest nisi moveatur localiter versus Socratem, ut suppono, et iste liberalis non impeditur, igitur incipiet moveri versus Socratem ut Socratem [corr. ex sibi] det. Sed probo quod non, quia in quolibet instanti post hoc Plato apparebit Socrate plus indigens, et iste liberalis citius volet dare magis indigenti quam minus, ceteris paribus, igitur ante quodlibet instans post hoc incipiet iste liberalis econtra moveri versus Platonem ut det Platoni, igitur per nullum tempus praecise movebitur versus Socratem; et per consequens ille liberalis non incipit moveri versus Socratem. Sed forte dicetur quod non est possibile quod Plato incipiat secundum apparitionem et iudicium istius liberalis magis indigere Socrate per motum illius liberalis versus Socratem tantum, quia non quilibet excessus est sensibilis, nec quilibet motus sensibilis, nec quodlibet spatium pertranseundum a Socrate est sensibile, et quodlibet istorum impedit in proposito.” [transl. M.M.]
Roger Roseth, Lectura super Sententias, q. 4, art. 2 (ed. Hallamaa, 2005, pp. 217–218): “Praeterea, probo hoc etiam in aliis contrariis, quod aliqua contraria possunt esse simul in eodem, et si aliqua, tunc et quaecumque alia. Probo assumptum. Nam pono quod Cicero et Plato indigentes sunt coram Sorte divite, et volo quod Plato appareat minus indigens quam Cicero, et cum hoc volo quod, quandocumque Plato apparebit minus indigens quam nunc apparet ⟨Cicero⟩, quod Sortes nolit sibi subvenire, et quandocumque apparebit aeque indigens, sicut Cicero nunc apparet, quod tunc velit sibi subvenire. Isto casu posito volo quod Sortes moveatur ab illis, et maneant in eodem situ quo prius tam Plato quam Cicero. Tunc per talem motum Plato apparebit Sorti ita indigens sicut nunc apparet Cicero, quia volo quod per talem motum Plato semper appareat magis indigens et magis. Aut ergo est dare primum, in quo Plato apparebit Sorti ita indigens, sicut nunc apparet Cicero, aut ultimum in quo non. Si detur ultimum in quo non, sit illud instans A. Tunc in A Plato non apparebit ita indigens Sorti sicut apparet Cicero. Ergo Sortes tunc sibi nolet subvenire per casum. Arguitur tunc sic: in A Sortes non vult subvenire Platoni, ergo ⟨immediate⟩ post A adhuc nolet sibi subvenire et immediate post A volet sibi subvenire Platoni, ergo simul volet et nolet subvenire Platoni. Quod autem immediate post volet sibi subvenire patet per hoc, quod immediate post A Plato apparebit ita indigens sicut nunc apparet Cicero, ex quo A erit ultimum in quo Plato non apparebit ita indigens sicut Cicero nunc apparet. Et ita sequitur quod immediate post A Plato apparebit Sorti ita indigens sicut nunc apparet Cicero, et per consequens immediate post A volet sibi subvenire. Et ita simul volet et nolet sibi subvenire. Et per consequens contraria sunt simul, scilicet volitio et nolitio respectu eiusdem.” Ibidem (ed. Hallamaa, 2005, p. 219): “Quod autem immediate post nolet sibi subvenire probo, quia immediate post A Sortes erit propinquior Platoni quam erit in A, quia ponatur quod in A incipiat redire versus Platonem sicut possibile est. Ergo Plato immediate post apparebit minus indigens Sorti quam apparebit in A. Cum ergo in A apparebit ita indigens sicut Cicero nunc apparet, ergo immediate post A Plato apparebit minus indigens quam nunc apparet Cicero. Et ultra, immediate post A Plato apparebit minus indigens quam nunc apparet Cicero; ergo immediate post A Sortes volet sibi subvenire et immediate post A nolet sibi subvenire. Ergo Sortes sim volet et nolet subvenire, et per consequens contraria simul, quod fuit probandum.”
Baron, 1983, p. 286.
Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum, q. 5, arg. 3 (ed. Michałowska, 2016, p. 210: 18–20): “Tertio ad principale: si quaestio sit vera, tunc fortitudo foret alicui possibilis, et tunc acquireretur subito omnino indifferenti ad ipsam et vitia sibi opposita subito vel successive.”
Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum, q. 5, arg. 3 (ed. Michałowska, 2016, pp. 210–211).
Aristotle, Physica, V.2, 226a–b.
Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum, q. 1, ad arg. 3 (ed. Michałowska, 2016, p. 82: 16–19): “Ideo in tempore medio in quo fit talis transitio, sic transitus est dispositus ad virtutem et vitium, communiter loquendo de dispositione; sed proprie loquendo de dispositione, dispositio solum est respectu termini ad quem transitum est in transire.” Ibidem, q. 7, arg. 2 (ed. Michałowska, 2016, p. 252: 30–32): “Item, arguitur sic: aliquis potest realiter per aliquod tempus minus continue indigere quam prius, et alius potest per idem tempus continue magis indigere, sicut est de motu alterationis versus terminos oppositos.”
For a more thorough analysis of the highest degree in Kilvington’s ethics, see Michałowska, 2011, pp. 481–492.
Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum, q. 2, arg. 6 (ed. Michałowska, 2016, p. 102: 1–5): “Item, si virtus posset intendi vel remitti, cum subiectum virtutis sit in actu, igitur ad virtutem esset motus, quod est contra praedictum processum. Consequentia patet, quia ad motum sufficiunt subiectum in actu et forma intensibilis vel remissibilis, ut patet ex dictis Averrois super V Physicorum commento 10.”
Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum, q. 5, ad arg. 3 (ed. Michałowska, 2016, p. 223: 27 – p. 224: 5): “Unde non est idem de actione methaforice et proprie dicta quantum ad remissionem vel resistentiam, quia in huiusmodi generatione virtutis non est resistentia aliqua dicta proprie, sed solum communiter, quae est respectu difficultatis actionis et non respectu virtutis intensioris generandae proportionaliter, ut remittitur intensio inclinans ad vitiosam actionem.”
Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum, q. 4, arg. 13 (ed. Michałowska, 2016, p. 185: 4): “[…] quia virtus consistit circa difficile […].” Ibidem (ed. Michałowska, 2016, p. 186: 19–21): “Item, arguitur sic: operari aliquam operationem virtuosam cum difficultate proveniente solum ex naturalibus est virtuosius et melius quam operari eandem sine tali difficultate, quia aliter virtus non foret circa difficile.”
Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum, q. 5, ad arg. 3 (ed. Michałowska, 2016, p. 224: 5–7): “Unde potest concedi quod cum resistentia in duplo minori qualis est in generatione virtutis erit actio virtuosa in duplo minoris difficultatis, et sic proportionaliter.”
Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Ethicorum, q. 2, ad arg. 6 (ed. Michałowska, 2016, p. 121: 11 – p. 122: 1): “Ad sextum principale: dicitur concedendo quod virtus potest intendi. […] Et ideo dicit Aristoteles VII Physicorum quod virtutes sunt perfectiones; et ideo ad illas non est motus necessario coactus vel perfectus. Et consimiliter dicit Aristoteles quod vitia sunt perfectiones ad intellectum datum, quia scilicet in eis non est motus per coactionem sui subiecti; et ideo dicit Aristoteles de virtutibus et vitiis quod sunt perfectiones, et non de colore et albedine ⟨vel nigredine] add. L⟩, in quibus est motus supradictus.” [transl. M.M.]
Cf. Richard Kilvington, Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum, q. 5, Utrum peccans mortaliter per instans solum mereatur puniri per infinita instantia interpellata, art. 8 (Bologna, Biblioteca Comunale dell’Archiginnasio A. 985, f. 35rb): “⟨Hoc⟩ patet per illud etiam Physicorum: ad perfectiones non est motus, et per consequens tales causantur in instanti.”
Aristotle, Physica, VII.3, 246b.
Averroes, Commentum super libro Physicorum (transl. Michael Scotus), lib. VII, comm. 18, p. 175ra: “Virtus enim perfectio quaedam est. […] Deinde induxit signum super hoc et dixit: Virtus enim est aliqua perfectio, id est et in perfectione non est motus alterationis, ergo in virtute non est alteratio, cum generatio eius non sit alteratio et cum posuit quod virtutes sunt perfectio.”
See, for example, William Ockham, Expositio in libros Physicorum Aristotelis, lib. VII, cap. 4 (ed. Wood et al., 1985, p. 649: 10–12): “Quia virtus est perfectio; sed secundum perfectionem non est alteratio nec motus; ergo secundum virtutem non est alteratio nec motus.”
Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus. De caritate, q. unica, art. 3, arg. 12 (p. 760): “Sed virtutes sunt perfectiones potentiarum animae.”
Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet IX, q. 8, solutio (ed. Macken, 1983, p. 173: 80–99): “In quantum vero anima hominis perficit secundum rationem rationalis sive intellectualis, licet quantum ad naturam substantiae animae, univoce perficit semper, quantum tamen ad rationem ipsius potentiae rationalis pure aequivoce perficit cum aliis potentiis. […] Apparet enim quod quaedam eius virtutes sunt perfectiones partium corporis, secundum quod formae naturales perficiuntur per materiam, et tale impossibile est ut sit abstractum ab eo per quod perficitur. Sed hoc non est manifestum in omnibus partibus eius, cum sit possibile ut aliquis dicat quod quaedam pars eius non est perfectio alicuius membri corporis.” [italics original]
John Duns Scotus, Lectura, lib. III, dist. 33, q. unica, ad quaestionem, opinio propria (editio Vaticana, 2004, n. 61, p. 287): “Secundum hoc igitur dici potest quod ex quo virtutes morales sunt perfectiones perficientes hominem secundum quod homo, id est secundum quod est natus secundum rationem vivere, oportet quod ponantur maxime in illa parte in qua fuerunt necessariae homini pro omni statu, quia talia maxime videntur pertinere ad perfectionem hominis in quantum homo.” Cf. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, lib. III, dist. 33, q. unica, ad quaestionem, opinio propria (editio Vaticana, 2007, n. 33, p. 233): “Ad quod est persuasio talis: quia virtus est perfectio aliqua hominis, et non totalis, quia tunc sufficeret virtus una moralis; quando autem sunt plures perfectiones partiales alicuius, illud potest esse perfectum simpliciter secundum unam perfectionem et imperfectum simpliciter secundum aliam […].”
Adam Wodeham, Ordinatio Oxoniensis, q. 8, Utrum voluntas possit simul et subito producere actum voluntarium meritoriae et liberae dilectionis (Paris 1512, ff. 25vb–26ra): “Sed hic respondent aliquando quod licet sensatio, intellectio, et volitio successive producantur et intendantur, tamen dicuntur perfici in instanti, quia quando coniunguntur cum alia transmutatione corporis vel animae tunc sunt imperfectae, sed quando anima omnino est in quiete et sine turbatione tunc fiunt perfectae, ut patet VII Physicorum. Sic etiam dicitur VII Ethicorum, quia delectatio non est vera generatio nec verus motus sicut nec visio, quia est perfecta in instanti. Sic etiam dicitur VII Physicorum quod in virtutibus moralibus non est motus, quia non sunt nisi perfectiones, omne autem perfectum consistit in quiete et in indivisibili, et ad istum gradum indivisibiliter attingunt primo in instanti hoc est quod sint perfectae in suis speciebus in instanti, nec tunc requirunt aliquam actionem successivam immediate praecedentem, sed sunt imperfecta quiete animae et corporis, et tunc maxime sunt perfectae.” [based on Witt’s transcription with my modifications and punctuation]
Dunne, 2010, p. 405; Dunne, 2019.
Richard FitzRalph, Lectura in Sententias, q. 10, Utrum omnis amor procedat ab aliqua notitia, art. 2 (ed. Michałowska, Dunne, forthcoming): “Simili modo loquuntur Philosophus et Commentator VII Physicorum, commento 18 probantes quod in virtutibus moralibus non est motus, quia virtutes sunt perfectiones et consistunt in indivisibili, quia esse perfectum virtutum consistit in quiete et in indivisibili, scilicet in instanti, et similiter quaecumque actio perfecta virtutis. Secundum hunc modum loquitur Philosophus III De anima et Commentator commento 28, ubi dicunt quod intellectio et similiter visio sunt actiones perfectae et sunt in non-tempore nec eas praecedit actio diminuta, hoc est quod sensatio et intellectio sunt perfectae in suis speciebus in instanti, nec tunc requirunt actionem successivam immediate praecedentem, sed certe in perfecta quiete animae et corporis maxime perfecta sunt.”
For more details of FitzRalph’s approach to debating the will, see Michałowska, 2023b.
Richard FitzRalph, Lectura in Sententias, q. 10, Utrum omnis amor procedat ab aliqua notitia, art. 1 (ed. Michałowska, Dunne, forthcoming): “Si in voluntate sit facta ista mutatio, aut ergo a se vel ab extrinseco. Si ab extrinseco, ergo non libere produxit istam volitionem. Si a se, tunc quaerendum est de ista mutatione sicut de ista volitione: Utrum nunc primo habeat voluntas posse sufficiens respectu illius vel non? Et erit processus in infinitum ita quod omnem mutationem factam in voluntate praecessit immediate alia mutatio quae fuit causa istius mutationis. Si dicatur, supposito priori casu, quod voluntas habuit prius posse sufficiens ad volendum hoc delectabile, ergo prius voluit hoc delectabile, cum sit necessarium quod producat suum effectum quandocumque habet posse sufficiens, quia aliter haberet voluntas eandem habitudinem ad suam volitionem in tempore in quo non produceret istam et in tempore in quo produceret istam, et per consequens simul produceret et non produceret. Iste totus modus arguendi patet per Commentatorem VIII Physicorum, commento 6 et 7, ubi probat per hoc argumentum quod omnem motum factum de novo praecessit alius motus.”
Richard FitzRalph, Lectura in Sententias, q. 10, Utrum omnis amor procedat ab aliqua notitia, art. 1 (ed. Michałowska, Dunne, forthcoming): “Et de posse movente naturaliter est totum argumentum illud bonum quod fit et non valet per voluntatem.” Ibidem: “Ad aliud quod omne quod movetur, movetur ab alio, verum est: si moveatur proprie, movetur proprie ab alio; si improprie, tunc improprie sive metaphorice movetur ab alio, et sic voluntas movetur ab obiecto et similiter a cognitione obiecti, nec sequitur quin moveatur cum hoc a se. Vel potest dici quod non intellegitur illud dictum nisi de motu proprie dicto, scilicet ubi est aliqua contrarietas, qualis non est volitio, sed talis motus est in quacumque virtute sensitiva coniunctus cum suo motu spirituali, sicut dicit Commentator VII Physicorum, commento 12, et ideo de motionibus cuiuscumque virtutis materialis intellegitur illa conclusio et aliae conclusiones eiusdem libri, sed non habent locum de actione intellectus et voluntatis immanentae.”
Michałowska, 2023b, p. 111.
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