1 Colonial Rule in German South West Africa
Pre-colonial Namibian societies today are classified as more open than the fictional European attributions as “tribes”, i.e. supposed biological-ethnic units, would suggest.27
The ‘golden 19th century’28 of the Herero people was shaped by important transformations; it is not accidental that Herero means ‘herders’. The fact that from 1850 they built up large cattle herds had several benefits: The animals provided the important omaere, soured milk, the foundation of life, secured prosperity by a trade route through to the Cape, defined status and were of cultural and sacral importance. Despite seasonal wandering, settlements were not abandoned.29 Watering holes and cisterns were key elements of their landscape as boundary markers, which only became important with the requirements of the colonial masters.30
Germans appeared in the region at the beginning of the 19th century. Whalers, traders seeking natural resources and big-game hunters were the first to come into contact with the native population. Missionaries built mission stations, which also served as trading posts for consumables, guns, cattle and horses. The availability of modern weapons gave the Herero the opportunity to militarise. Through negotiating peace agreements, the missionaries also gained
Within the approximate borders between the line of Outjo to Grootfontein in the north, the Namib desert in the West, the Kalahari desert with its outlier Omaheke (Herero for Sandfeld) in the East and the area around Windhoek in the south lived 70,000 to 80,000 Herero, 30,000 to 40,000 Damara and San as well as 3,000 to 4,000 Basters; the estimates indicate in particular the population distribution. The country of Ovambo (less affected by the colonial occupation) lay at the northern border. To the south lived 15,000 to 20,000 nomadic Nama, many of whose forbears had come from the Cape colony.33
A tobacco merchant, Adolf Lüderitz, exploited their search for support by buying land in 1883 from the Nama Kaptein (“leader”) Joseph Frederiks.34 On 24th April 1884, at Lüderitz‘s request, Imperial Chancellor Otto von Bismarck declared the region a ‘protected zone’,35 to secure it in the competition with European powers for raw materials and other key materials and also international prestige.36
‘The Germans wanted land from Samuel Maharero. Maharero took a tin and gave them soil and he said, there is the soil you asked for’.37 The oral record highlights the commanding behaviour of the Herero towards the arrivals. Maharero
This systematically undermined the foundations of the pastoral Herero society. Therefore, the outbreak of cattle fever of 1987 proved catastrophic.41 Many were poverty-stricken, forced to sell massive parts of their land and to hire themselves out as cheap labour for the Germans. Pastureland was lost to a railroad line. Concerned about unrest, the colonial administration planned reserves, but was primarily focused on the interests of the settlers.42
The balance of power had fundamentally changed. The Herero were politically disempowered, legally discriminated against, economically dispossessed, their society profoundly disrupted. Today this is considered to be the actual cause of the war.43
2
What followed was extreme violence with complex, multi-faceted dynamics.44 The catalyst was a sudden crisis in the south. It was the day to day business of the forces to put down such occasional rebellious flare-ups, but this left the land of Herero people unprotected. The war started on 12th January 1904; the Herero stormed farms, cut train lines and telegraph connections and occupied towns and villages.45 There is a theory of a self-fulfilling prophecy by which the Germans, waiting for an attack by the Herero, who were not intent on war, (over)reacted.46 This is contradicted by the fact that Chiefs had convened the year before to discuss ways out of their problem situation. This indicates a conscious decision, even if the battles did not break out at the same time, which could have been due to coordination problems.47
At the beginning of the war, the Herero killed more than 100 Germans, in particular (male) settlers and traders. In the words of Chief Michael Tjiseseta, ‘I do not wage war on women and children, only on men!’48 The German soldiers were aware of this strategy.49 This supports the theory that the Herero aimed at a limited war to redress political undermining and economic dispossession. New research has found that reports and pictures of atrocities involving women as war victims were propaganda.50
Although the 2000 German soldiers had artillery and machines guns, at the beginning of the war they were still at a disadvantage due to the shift to the south. Initially they conceded considerable defeats. The forces were continuously enlarged by new units, but the heat, lack of water, rough terrain and typhus posed difficulties. During this first phase of the war (January to June 1904) the forces were still headed by Governor Theodor Leutwein. His warfare was limited to the goal of defeating the enemy and forcing it to surrender. Even in wartime he continued to correspond with the Herero.52
His leadership was deemed by the settlers too conciliatory and was harshly criticised. They saw their possessions and lives seriously threatened by the violent conflict and demanded punishment and extermination; the war should be used to give them final ownership of land and property.53 Angry settlers and troops carried out bloody campaigns, which were classed as ‘brutalisation from below’.54
With that grew the fear amongst the Herero of being made accountable without having been involved. ‘Without doubt, the Germans will wreak terrible revenge’,55 they were told by a missionary in February, so that other Chiefs
Certainly, all talks were rejected by Berlin. When the General Staff, not familiar with the terrain, took over the military leadership, it became clear that this was no longer just a case of quashing a rebellion. In differentiating from previous colonial skirmishes, one of the “points of departure”57 towards complete escalation is found here. The change of the overall command on the ground marked the complete break with military convention, by introducing the second war phase (June to December 1904).
Tribes of Africa (…) are all the same in their way of thinking, they only succumb to violence. To carry out this violence with crass terrorism and even cruelty was and is my policy. I exterminate rebelling tribes with floods of blood and floods of money.59
In the drive for an all-embracing and decisive battle, the ‘Panacea of German Warfare’,60 the Waterberg Plateau in the centre of the country was surrounded by the German forces. Approximately 60,000 Herero – men, women and children, had come together there. 6,000 were armed, but did not have artillery or much ammunition. On 11 and 12 August 1904 they were attacked by 4,000 soldiers with 36 cannons and 14 machine guns.61
Trotha commanded that the edges of the desert be patrolled, which proved impossible due to the heat and the type of terrain. The troops then took position at the overloaded watering holes to attack those fleeing. Finally, on 2 October 1904 von Trotha issued a proclamation threatening all Herero with death, whether they had been participated in the fighting or not.66 Prisoners-of-war were to distribute copies. All offers of negotiation or surrender were rejected. More people died at that time of thirst and exhaustion than had in the battles.67
During autumn of 1904 the battles moved south due to attacks by the Nama. The settlers’ rigorous pursuit of their people, as well as rumours about the
3 Concentration Camps and Forced Labour
In December 1904 the firing order against the Herero people was lifted. It seemed sensible to imprison those who had survived in hiding as the German troops were needed elsewhere. This heralded the final phase of the war (December 1904 to January 1908). With the aid of the mission, the prisoners of war, including women and children, were brought to camps.70 Not only would that stop them from supporting the battles or participating in them, they could now also be exploited to build train lines, roads and piers. For the first time, the term ‘Konzentrationslager’ (concentration camp) was used in the German language.71
The prisoners were kept under atrocious conditions: They lacked food, clothing and medical care; they were inadequately protected in cramped quarters and diseases and even epidemics were rampant.72 On top of the extreme
Until 1907 the detention camps admitted approximately 20,000 prisoners of war. Only when German settlers complained about a lack of workers did the colonial policies start to change. Von Trotha had been called back to Berlin in 1905, after the war against the Nama had failed to result in victory. But even then, the administration and military command continued the policy of detention.74 On 31 March 1907 the war was declared over, but the internment was only lifted on 27 January 1908, the birthday of Kaiser Wilhelm ii. As the camps are seen today as a continuation of the war, this date is used to mark its end.75 Moreover, in order to properly convey the devastation, the violent conflict is no longer referred to as a “rebellion”, but as a war.76
Until the invasion of South African military forces during the First World War, the Germans rigidly exercised control. In the face of all fantasies of world dominion, the indigenous group survived with their identities intact, and even during the period of foreign rule society began to (re)organise itself.77 But the war had fundamentally changed the political, economic and social structures.
4
Even more than a century later the effects of the war are still felt as a ‘structural, material and social-psychological legacy’78 in Namibia. This is particularly noticeable in the distribution of land. It is a direct consequence of the colonial occupation that 70 percent of the land is still in the hands of ethnic German or foreign owners who make up five percent of the population.79
In general, the demographic structure of today would be different if the war had not taken place. Today, the Ovambo in the North constitute half of the approximately 2.5 million citizens.80 The Herero, the largest group prior to the war, are now a minority of 7.5 percent with 150,000 to 200,000 people. The Nama now make up five percent alongside other small groups, based on ethnicity and linguistic affiliation. Approximately 20,000 descendants of colonialists speak German as their native tongue; overall around 100,000 Namibians are white (as of July 2018).81 However, the data are not easy to interpret; figures are not collected for all aspects.
Namibia is economically extremely unequal. Although the general economy displays a good middle income, it suffers seriously from poverty (Gini Index: 61.0). While it occupies a middle position in the Human Development Index (hdi) (0.647), the inequalities according to the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (ihdi) are comparatively large (0.422) with a difference of 34.8 percent between the two indicators.82
The memory of the war lives on in the direct descendants of the victims and is the main reference for their identity construction. It is also about symbolic power in national memory, where the dominant narrative of the numerically superior and politically leading Ovambo was long the struggle against the
See Gesine Krüger, ‘Das Goldene Zeitalter der Viehzüchter. Namibia im 19. Jahrhundert’ in Jürgen Zimmerer and Joachim Zeller (eds), Völkermord in Deutsch-Südwestafrika: Der Kolonialkrieg (1904–1908) in Namibia und seine Folgen (3rd edn, bpb 2016) 17; see also appended map 1, war zone in German South West Africa, 80.
See Dag Henrichsen, Herrschaft und Alltag im vorkolonialen Zentralnamibia: Das Herero-und Damaraland im 19. Jahrhundert (Basler Afrika Bibliographien 2011) xv for the history of the Herero, also known as Ovaherero.
For details about the Herero during the 19th century see Gesine Krüger, Kriegsbewältigung und Geschichtsbewusstsein: Realität, Deutung und Verarbeitung des deutschen Kolonialkriegs in Namibia 1904 bis 1907 (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1999) 30.
A typical colonial transformation into a territorial society according to Henning Melber, ‘Grenzen des (post-)kolonialen Staates: Von Deutsch-Südwest nach Namibia’ in Joachim Becker and Andrea Komlosy (eds), Grenzen Weltweit. Zonen, Linien Mauern im historischen Vergleich (2nd edn, Promedia-Verlag 2006) 129.
On the mission stations as new centres of power see Krüger, ‘Das Goldene Zeitalter’ (n 27) 21.
See Dag Henrichsen, ‘Die Hegemonie der Herero in Zentralnamibia zu Beginn der deutschen Kolonialherrschaft’, in: Larissa Förster, Dag Henrichsen and Michael Bollig (eds), Namibia – Deutschland. Eine geteilte Geschichte: Widerstand, Gewalt, Erinnerung (Ed. Minerva 2004) 46.
Numbers for 1892 according to Theodor Leutwein, Elf Jahre Gouverneur in Deutsch-Südwestafrika (Mittler 1906) 11; see Jürgen Zimmerer, Deutsche Herrschaft über Afrikaner: Staatlicher Machtanspruch und Wirklichkeit im kolonialen Namibia (2nd edn, lit Verlag 2002) 18.
Lüderitz acquired the Bay of Angra Pequena (later ‘Lüderitz Bay’) through a dubious agreement.
The term is decidedly about the protection of German interests, see Stefan Engert, ‘Politische Schuld, moralische Außenpolitik? Deutschland, Namibia und der lange Schatten der kolonialen Vergangenheit’, in Sebastian Harnisch, Hans W. Maull and Siegfried Schieder (eds): Solidarität und internationale Gemeinschaftsbildung (Campus Verlag 2009) 28.
See Ulrike Lindner, ‘Deutscher Kolonialismus im internationalen Kontext’ in Deutsches Historisches Museum (ed), Deutscher Kolonialismus: Fragmente seiner Geschichte und Gegenwart, (Theiss Verlag 2016) 19; see also Rainer Tetzlaff, Afrika. Eine Einführung in Geschichte, Politik und Gesellschaft (Springer vs 2018) 97. On 15 November 1884 Bismarck opened the Berlin Conference, to vote for the European interests.
See Karla Poewe, The Namibian Herero: A History of their Psychosocial Disintegration and Survival (Mellen Press 1985) 69 n 17, even though the paper on the psychological disease-mongering of the Herero people during the post war years has been criticised, namely from Krüger, ‘Kriegsbewältigung’ (n 29) 12.
See Henrichsen, Herrschaft und Alltag (n 28) 282; Gerhard Pool, Samuel Maharero (Gamsberg Macmillan Publishing 1991) 1.
See Reinhart Kößler and Henning Melber, ‘Völkermord und Gedenken. Der Genozid an den Herero und Nama 1904–1908’, in: Irmtrud Wojak, Susanne Meinl, Fritz Bauer Institut (eds), Völkermord und Kriegsverbrechen in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts (Campus-Verlag 2004) 43; Susanne Kuß, Deutsches Militär auf kolonialen Kriegsschauplätzen: Eskalation von Gewalt zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts (2nd edn, Links 2010) 80.
See Leutwein (n 33) 246; the standard works reveal backgrounds in detail, see Horst Drechsler, Südwestafrika unter deutscher Kolonialherrschaft. Der Kampf der Herero und nama gegen den deutschen Imperialismus (1884– 1915) (Akademie-Verlag 1966) 150 and Helmut Bley, Kolonialherrschaft und Sozialstruktur in Deutsch-Südwestafrika 1894-1914 (Leibnitz-Verlag 1968)189.
In some places, 95 percent of the cattle herds died, see Jan-Bart Gewald, Towards Redemption: A Socio-Political History of the Herero of Namibia between 1890 and 1923 (cnws Publications 1996) 138.
For example, areas rich with water were cut off from it, see Krüger, Kriegsbewältigung (n 29) 63.
The process has been described as an ‘erosion’ by Zimmerer, ‘Deutsche Herrschaft’ (n 33) 27; bestätigend Susanne Kuß, ‘Der Herero-Deutsche Krieg und das deutsche Militär: Kriegsursachen und Kriegsverlauf’, in Larissa Förster, Dag Henrichsen and Michael Bollig (eds), Namibia – Deutschland. Eine geteilte Geschichte: Widerstand, Gewalt, Erinnerung (Ed. Minerva 2004), 64. A letter proves that the Herero themselves recognised this, see Krüger, Kriegsbewältigung (n 29) 44, 55.
A recent reference to the influence of emotion on extreme violence gives Matthias Häussler, Der Genozid an den Herero: Krieg, Emotion und extreme Gewalt in „Deutsch-Südwestafrika“ (Velbrück Wissenschaft 2018) 11; see also appended map 1, war zone in German South West Africa, 80.
This was conveyed in a telegram to the Foreign Office in Berlin from Lieutenant Johannes Techow, Windhuk (sic), (11 January 1904), Federal Archive (Germany), location Berlin-Lichterfelde, inventory Imperial Colonial Office, Barch R 1001/2111 <
See Gewald, Towards Redemption (n 41) 178.
See Kuß, ‘Der Herero-Deutsche Krieg’ (n 43) 67.
This was stated by a missionary, Hanni Ziegler, ‘Erinnerungen aus dem Herero-Aufstande’ (1906) 42 Daheim 11.
See Kommandeur Ludwig von Estorff, Wanderungen in Südwestafrika, Ostafrika und Südafrika 1894–1910 (Meinert 1979) 110.
See Gesine Krüger, ‘Bestien und Opfer: Frauen im Kolonialkrieg’, in Jürgen Zimmerer and Joachim Zeller (eds), Völkermord in Deutsch-Südwestafrika: Der Kolonialkrieg (1904–1908) in Namibia und seine Folgen (3rd edn, bpb 2016) 148. To some extent, a historical narrative accusing the Herero of great brutality has survived to the present day, perhaps as a result of this propaganda.
Preußen Großer Generalstab, Die Kämpfe der deutschen Truppen in Südwestafrika auf Grund amtlichen Materials bearbeitet von der Kriegsgeschichtlichen Abteilung I des Großen Generalstabs, Band 1: Der Feldzug gegen die Herero, Mittler 1906–1908, 17. See also Kuß, Deutsches Militär (n 39) 82.
See Horst Drechsler, Aufstände in Südwestafrika: Der Kampf der Herero und Nama 1904 bis 1907 gegen die deutsche Kolonialherrschaft (Dietz 1984) 67 and Kuß, Deutsches Militär (n 39) 83.
See Dierk Walter, ‘Kein Pardon. Zum Problem der Kapitulation im Imperialkrieg’ (2012) 21 (3) Mittelweg 36 107.
See Matthias Häussler, Trutz von Trotha, ‘Brutalisierung von ‘unten’. Kleiner Krieg, Entgrenzung der Gewalt und Genozid im kolonialen Deutsch-Südwestafrika’ (2012) 21 (3) Mittelweg 36 57; see also Henrik Lundtofte, ‘“I Believe that the Nation as such must be Annihilatedˮ. The Radicalization of the German Suppression of the Herero Rising in 1904’, in Steven L. B. Jensen (ed), Genocide: Cases, Comparisons and Contemporary Debates (Danish Centre for Holocaust and Genocide Studies 2003), 29.
Missionary August Elger to the Rheinische Mission, 10 February 1904 quoted from Drechsler, Südwestafrika unter Deutscher Kolonialherrschaft (n 40) 169.
See Zimmerer, Deutsche Herrschaft (n 33) 33; see also Pool (n 38) 223.
Zimmerer, ‘Krieg, KZ und Völkermord’ (n 1) 49. A “military-dominated phalanxˮ is recognized by Kirsten Zirkel, ‘Military Power in German Colonial Policy: The Schutztruppen and Their Leaders in East and South-West Africa, 1888–1918’ in David Killingray and David Omissi (eds), Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers c. 1700–1964 (Manchester University Press 1999) 99.
Drechsler, Aufstände in Südwestafrika (n 52) 75. Trotha fought in German East Africa in 1896 and in China in 1900/01, and was known for his brutality.
Letter from General Lothar von Trotha to Gouverneur Theodor Leutwein (5 November 1904), quoted from Drechsler, Südwestafrika unter deutscher Kolonialherrschaft (n 40) 180. Drechsler describes von Trotha’s statement as brutal and primitive.
See Kuß, ‘Der Herero-Deutsche Krieg’ (n 43) 71 with reference to this means in the later strategic-operational ‘Schlieffen-Plan’ on German operations and with considerations as to whether the inclusion of a natural obstacle had already been tested at the Waterberg.
See Preußen Großer Generalstab (n 51) 158; about the process Conrad Rust, Krieg und Frieden im Hererolande: Aufzeichnungen aus dem Kriegsjahre 1904 (Kittler 1905) 370; see Kuß, Deutsches Militär (n 39) 88; about the violence Dominik J. Schaller, ‘Genocide and Mass Violence in the ‘Heart of Darkness’: Africa in the Colonial Period’, in: Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies (Oxford University Press 2010) 345.
See Wilhelm Anz, ‘Gerechtigkeit für die Deutschen in Südwestafrika!’ Die christliche Welt (Marburg, 7 July 2004) 657. See Dag Henrichsen, ‘„Ehi rOvaherero“. Mündliche Überlieferungen von Herero zu ihrer Geschichte im vorkolonialen Namibia’ (1994) 9 WerkStatt Geschichte 1 and Krüger, ‘Bestien und Opfer’ (n 50) 149 for the important supporting role of the Herero women in the war.
This assumes Pool (n 38) 253; agreement from Kuß, ‘Der Herero-Deutsche Krieg’ (n 43) 72.
Discussed by Walter Nuhn, Sturm über Südwest. Der Hereroaufstand von 1904: Ein düsteres Kapitel der deutschen kolonialen Vergangenheit Namibias (Bernard & Graefe 1989) 229; see Kuß, Deutsches Militär (n 39) 90.
Preußen Großer Generalstab (n 51) 207.
Lothar von Trotha, Proclamation to the Herero people, 2 October 1904, quoted from Michael Behnen (ed), Quellen zur deutschen Außenpolitik im Zeitalter des Imperialismus 1890–1911 (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1977) 291. Transcripts can be found in the Bundesarchiv Berlin Lichterfelde and in the Militärarchiv Freiburg, a version in Otjiherero from the Botswana National Archives is found in Jan-Bart Gewald, ‘The Great General of the Kaiser’ (1994) 26 Botswana Notes and Records 73. The source is printed in the appendix to this publication on page 71. For interpretation and history, see also Kuß, Deutsches Militär (n 39) 93.
See Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany (Cornell University Press 2005) 44; for victim numbers see Zimmerer, Deutsche Herrschaft (n 33) 39.
To Cameroon and Togo – ‘a hugely painful Odyssey’ for all involved, see Kuß, ‘Deutsches Militär’, 100.
20.876 troops were sent. 888 died in battle or through accidents, 725 died of diseases. Kommando der Schutztruppen im Reichs-Kolonialamt, Sanitätsbericht über die Kaiserliche Schutztruppe für Südwestafrika, Band 1: Administrativer Teil, Mittler 1909; 8 sowie Band 2: Statistischer Teil, Mittler 1920, 2. See also Kuß, Deutsches Militär (n 39) 306.
See Jürgen Zimmerer, ‘Kriegsgefangene im Kolonialkrieg. Der Krieg gegen die Herero und Nama in Deutsch-Südwestafrika (1904–1907)’ in Rüdiger Overmans (ed), In der Hand des Feindes. Kriegsgefangenschaft von der Antike bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg (Böhlau Verlag 1999) 285. See also map 2, labour camps in German South West Africa, 81.
This term, nowadays used only for Nazi death camps, was coined in 1896 by Spanish colonialists in Cuba to describe the detention of civilians. See Joël Kotek and Pierre Rigoulot, Das Jahrhundert der Lager: Gefangenschaft, Zwangsarbeit, Vernichtung (Propyläen 2001) 27.
This was very clearly documented by missionaries’ reports e.g. Heinrich Vedder, Kurze Geschichten aus einem langen Leben (Verlag der Rheinischen Missionsgesellschaften 1953) 135; see also Jon Bridgman and Leslie J. Worley, ‘Genocide of the Hereros’ in Samuel Totten, William S. Parsos and Israel W. Charny (eds), Century of Genocide: Eyewitness Accounts and Critical Views (Routledge 2004) 37.
See Casper W. Erichsen, ‘Zwangsarbeit im Konzentrationslager auf der Haifischinsel’ in Jürgen Zimmerer and Joachim Zeller (eds), Völkermord in Deutsch-Südwestafrika: der Kolonialkrieg (1904–1908) in Namibia und seine Folgen (3rd edn, bpb 2016) 83.
See Krüger, ‘Kriegsbewältigung’ (n 29) 54. Only very slowly was the detention policy changed into workforce policy.
See Jürgen Zimmerer, ‘Der erste Völkermord des 20. Jahrhunderts. Über den schwierigen Umgang mit Deutschlands kolonialem Erbe’ in: Deutsches Historisches Museum (ed), Deutscher Kolonialismus: Fragmente seiner Geschichte und Gegenwart (Theiss Verlag 2016) 60; also Jeremy Sarkin, Colonial Genocide and Reparations Claims in the 21st Century: The Socio-Legal Context of Claims under International Law by the Herero against Germany for Genocide in Namibia, 1904–1908 (psi 2009) 17.
See Kuß, ‘Der Herero-Deutsche Krieg’ (n 43) 74.
This process, the creative Otjiiserandu culture of remembrance and the funeral of Chief Samuel Maharero as the initial event for development of the nation is described by Jan-Bart Gewald, ‘Die Beerdigung von Samuel Maharero und die Reorganisation der Herero’ in Jürgen Zimmerer and Joachim Zeller (eds), Völkermord in Deutsch-Südwestafrika. Der Kolonialkrieg (1904–1908) und seine Folgen (3rd edn, bpb 2016) 215.
See Kößler and Melber, Völkermord – Und was dann (n 22) 12, 45; Kößler and Melber, ‘Völkermord und Gedenken’ (n 39) 60.
Data according to the Namibia Statistics Agency, ‘Namibia Land Statistics Booklet’ (September 2018) <
Since they were less impacted by colonial occupation, there was no population census during this period.
Data from Central Intelligence Agency, ‘The World Factbook’ (1 November 2023) <
Data from Human Development Report of the development programme of the United Nations (undp), ‘Human Development Index and its Components’ (2019) <
See Holger Stoecker, ‘Knochen im Depot: Namibische Schädel in anthropologischen Sammlungen aus der Kolonialzeit’ in: Jürgen Zimmerer (ed), Kein Platz an der Sonne: Erinnerungsorte der deutschen Kolonialgeschichte (bpb 2013) 452; see also Krüger, Kriegsbewältigung (n 29) 265.