1 Introduction
The present study investigates MikloÌs ApaÌtiâs main intellectual achievement, Vita triumphans civilis, which was published in Amsterdam in 1688.1 Hungarian researchers have long studied Vita triumphans civilis and deemed it as an important work of Hungarian Cartesianism.2 Interpretations have rightly emphasised the parallels between the structure of ApaÌtiâs work and that of Antoine Le Grandâs Institutio philosophiae.3 Analyses of ApaÌtiâs Cartesianism concentrated on Descartesâs late psychology and doctrine of the passions as developed in Passions de lâaÌme by the French philosopher.4 Beyond the Cartesian philosophy of passions, Poiretâs influence has also been stressed in the research.5 However, the aim of the approach in this paper differs essentially from previous studies inasmuch as it accentuates the problem of human freedom in relation to obligation against the background of natural law theory. As will be shown, this is the decisive question with which ApaÌti struggles in Vita triumphans civilis. In order to develop his dilemmas concerning freedom and obligation, it is important to shed light on several influences on this work. As a first step, the paper outlines the presence of Poiretâs indifference theory of human freedom in ApaÌti. As a second step, I will reconstruct Le Grandâs Cartesian theory of freedom as an affirmation of compelling mental content as well as ApaÌtiâs attitude towards this doctrine, which stands in clear contrast to Poiretâs conception. As a third step, the study investigates the problem of free will in ApaÌtiâs paraphrases of Le Grandâs compilations of Pufendorfâs De officio hominis et civis. The paper aims to show that ApaÌti was much more conscious of the problems of free will and Pufendorfian natural obligation than Le Grand, who incorporated Pufendorfâs texts into his Institutio without reflecting on the (in)compatibility of moral necessity with Cartesian theory of freedom. The findings indicate that even ApaÌti did not succeed in reconciling the two motifs. However, the key historiographical question6 on the relation of Cartesian philosophy to the early modern theory of natural law appears in its most transparent form in Vita triumphans civilis.
MikloÌs ApaÌti was born in Debrecen, Hungary, in 1662 to an upper middle class family; his father was a member of the city council.7 After completing his elementary and secondary education, he attended several universities in the Low Countries. A stay abroad for the purposes of higher education in the Low Countries was a usual chapter in the biographies of Hungarian students of the Calvinist confession in Early Modernity.8 His enrolment at the University of Leiden dates from 20 August 1685.9 He defended two theological disputations10 before leaving Leiden commencing his medical studies in Utrecht around the end of 1687 and remaining there until December 1688. ApaÌti left the Low Countries on 15 September 1689 with MikloÌs MisztoÌtfalusiâs mandate to deliver thousands of printed Bibles to Transylvania. The adventurous journey lasted almost a year. ApaÌti and his fellows were arrested and imprisoned in Poland several times before the intervention of Michael II Apafi, Prince of Transylvania secured their release and free movement.11 From 1690 onwards, ApaÌti worked as a preacher in towns and villages in the south-eastern part of Upper Hungary (in present-day Slovakia). In contrast to MikloÌs Bethlen, he never managed to become an appreciated figure of the intellectual scene of early modern Hungary after his return. He died in Debrecen in 1724.
Let us turn to ApaÌtiâs Utrecht period in 1688. Some sources show that he visited Amsterdam several times during that year. Besides the fact that the Epistola nuncupatoria in his Vita triumphans civilis12 is signed in Amsterdam on 10 February 1688, there are other traces of ApaÌtiâs presence in Amsterdam in 1688 that attest to his personal contact with the mystical Cartesian Pierre Poiret (1646â1719). It must have happened during Poiretâs so-called âAmsterdam periodâ13 that the French philosopher contributed an entry to ApaÌtiâs album amicorum and donated three books14 to his Hungarian friend. ApaÌti might have composed his Utilitas pathematum animorum, a work never published and only known today by its title in this intellectual milieu as well. In a letter written later in Hungary in 1713, ApaÌti recalls Poiretâs appreciative judgement of his psychological work: âNo Cartesian has ever exceeded itâ (Nunquam Cartesianorum ullus hoc praestitit).15 Even if ApaÌtiâs âunique friendâ (amicus noster singularis16 ) might ultimately have overestimated the value of ApaÌtiâs lost work, Poiretâs evaluation reveals the context of the framework within which ApaÌtiâs thoughts on natural law theory are situated: the philosophy of Descartes and Cartesianism in the late seventeenth century.
The interpretation developed in this paper faces a complexity of philological-philosophical problems. I have thus included the following section to explain the facts of philology on which the further analysis will rely.
2 Philological Approach
At first glance, ApaÌtiâs Vita triumphans civilis is a compilation of other works. It consists of twenty-nine sections, most of them either following their sources word for word or providing close paraphrases of them, sometimes changing the structure of the original argumentations. Sections 1 and 3â5 are taken from Pierre Poiretâs extensive notes to the âLibertasâ chapter in the third edition of his Cogitationum rationalium de Deo, anima et malo,17 which was published in Amsterdam in 1685 (pages 454â472). Sections 6â29 in ApaÌtiâs Vita triumphans rely mostly on the last book of Antoine Le Grandâs summary of Cartesian philosophy, Institutio philosophiae secundum principia D. Renati Descartes, which was first published in London in 1672. As in Poiretâs case, one can identify the edition used by ApaÌti: it is the 1683 Nuremberg18 edition which claims to be a reproduction of the second edition in London 1675. The versions of Poiretâs Cogitationum rationalium and Le Grandâs Institutio used by ApaÌti in both cases underwent considerable additions and changes compared to their first editions.
There are some other philological details that need to be clarified: it is not only ApaÌti who can be accused of compilation in our story, but the author of his main source, Antoine Le Grand, as well. In his scholarly paper published in 2000, Thomas Mautner highlighted the fact that Le Grand introduced extensive chapters to the last book of his Cartesian handbook while dealing with problems of social philosophy.19 Mautner proved that chapters 22â37 in Part 10 (De Vita hominis recte instituenda) of the second London edition (1675) of Le Grandâs Institutio are equivalent to several chapters of Samuel Pufendorfâs De officio hominis et civis juxta legem naturalem20 (Lund: Junghans, 1673). As many of ApaÌtiâs headings match the titles of Le Grandâs chapters that summarise Pufendorfâs theory, I cannot help accounting for the Franciscan friarâs attempt to incorporate natural law theory into a Cartesian framework of ethics, or, as Mautner puts it, for this âdiscreet acceptance of a new paradigm.â21 After the explanation of Le Grandâs version of Pufendorfâs passages, I will focus on the much-disputed problem of the relationship between Pufendorfâs natural law theory and Cartesianism in ApaÌtiâs work again, in the form of the serious difficulties proposed by the special Cartesianism represented by Poiretâs philosophy in his Amsterdam period.
However, before beginning with the interpretation, let me summarise the philological facts of ApaÌtiâs Vita triumphans civilis in three templates.
Poiretâs texts in ApaÌtiâs Vita triumphans civilis
Le Grandâs texts in ApaÌtiâs Vita triumphans civilis (without equivalences to Pufendorf)
Le Grandâs texts in ApaÌtiâs Vita triumphans civilis (with equivalences to Pufendorf)
3 Human Freedom as Moral Indifference (Poiret)
ApaÌti opens his work with a massive critique of Spinozaâs determinism.22 He raises Poiretâs question about the ontological status of fate: if the world is determined absolutely by inevitable necessity, what kind of existence is appropriate to fate? It cannot be res cogitans because it should exist either by its very nature or by the virtue of another thing as res cogitans. In the former case, fate would be God, and, in the latter case, fate would not be fate because it would be dependent on the thing by the virtue of which fate exists. If fate is res extensa, there are two options again. If it exists by its own virtue, fate ceases to be a merely extended thing because no res extensa is able to exist by its own virtue without being animated, i.e. connected to some res cogitans. If fate exists by the virtue of another thing as res extensa, then, again, fate cannot be fate because of its dependence.
There is no need to recapitulate the rest of the argumentation against Spinozism: the refutation runs into the idea of freedom existing in the world. Human freedom is created freedom: above all, freedom exists as the property of God. In Section 2, ApaÌti addresses the Cartesian problem of the relationship between Godâs freedom and the eternal truths, citing Descartesâs famous claims from the Sixth Set of Replies: God is indifferent âwith respect to everything which has happened or will ever happen.â23 Nothing can be thought of in the divine intellect as true or good âprior to the decision of the divine will to make it so.â24 Omitting Descartesâs examples, ApaÌti quotes the French philosopherâs conclusion: âThus the supreme indifference to be found in God is the supreme indication of his omnipotence.â25 However, in Section three, ApaÌti does not follow Descartesâs explicit distinction between created human freedom and divine freedom, only attributing total indifference to the latter.26 Instead, the Hungarian author turns to Poiretâs notes to the âLibertasâ chapter in the third book of his Cogitationum rationalium. An interpretation of human beingsâ created freedom requires an investigation of Godâs will particularly from the perspective of creating human freedom. As human freedom is different from God (and from Godâs freedom, which is identical with God), it falls under Godâs indifference. God could have created the world without freedom.27 God was free to create human freedom and did so, but the creation of human freedom implies that Godâs creature bears an eminent similarity to him. Following Poiretâs discussion, the central problem of the nature of human freedom is joined to the question of whether God was free to create something to His similitude as free. Does Godâs relation to His own freedom allow for reduplicating it in a created thing? On the one hand, God is necessarily free in the sense of His all-embracing indifference; on the other hand, all created essences and values depend indifferently on His unconstrained will. According to Poiret, Godâs omnipotence is unlimited to such a degree that His indifferent will can even create a being similar to Himself, that is, a creature with free will being exactly indifferent in the way Godâs free will is. God is able to will that his total indifference be represented in a creature distinct from Him.28 The distinctive mark of indifference in created freedom does not turn the act of its creation into a necessary process: although humans resemble God due to their indifferent freedom, God created them and their freedom âex hypothesi, si velit; non ex necessitate.â29 Following Poiretâs argumentative strategy on this point as well, ApaÌti conceals the problem of free will and intellectual certainty in Descartes â implying serious difficulties for freedom as indifference â and addresses Spinozistic determinism again: the theory of human freedom is not a mere consequence of prejudice and uncritical ignorance of âfatal causesâ that necessarily determine the world.
Human will is essentially indifferent to its objects. Following Poiret, ApaÌti describes individual freedom as âalways determining and never determinedâ30 and as something to which nothing external is added. Freedom determines the faculties of will, desire and love as well as the attention of the intellect; nevertheless, nothing can determine freedom without freedomâs own activity. These features are part of human will essentially, and they are inseparable from it. Further, human freedom cannot undergo changes. It remains the same in the various scenes of its presence: in the heavens, in our world, in hell, in good persons (in probis), in vicious persons and in persons who convert themselves from evil to good or from good to evil.31 ApaÌti establishes a systematic order for Poiretâs rather dispersed notes on this theme. Even if the angelsâ freedom is related to bright and good (luminosa & bona) objects, it is determined to accept and contemplate these objects without any constraint.32 In our world, where good things are mixed with evil things and vice versa, freedom is determined neither through good nor evil objects alone.33 The presence of evil cannot destroy the freedom to choose good; similarly, human will is not determined to choose good, even if bright and good objects are presented to it, as in the case of angels. In the latter case, ApaÌti introduces a slight interpolation to the text: âaccording to the dreams and the nonsenses of the Arminians.â34 For ApaÌti, the indifference theory of human freedom, as he learned it from Poiret, is obviously an appropriate polemical tool against the Arminian concept of human freedom. On the other hand, the confused objects of evil do not turn out to be irresistible for the damned; the wretched always have freedom as regards their election.35 The fourth scene of the immunity of indifferent freedom is the case of âgood personsâ: here culminates the challenge against the indifference theory of freedom raised by intellectual or theological irresistibility. At first glance, Godâs proposal for âgood personsâ is compelling: God offers them preparations through His inner touch in their minds; His offer contains contents from which the mind cannot turn away: the cognition of truth, the love of divine good or true faith in God.36 Nevertheless, there still remains a moment of human freedom. At a last instance, the human mind affirms cognition of truth and inner divine touch because âit absolutely pleases the mind not to will to admitâ the contrary of Godâs offer.37 Of course, âgood personsâ will never refuse Godâs offer. The human mind (of âgood personsâ) freely subscribes to Godâs eminently irresistible offer, even if the human mind would never opt to reject it.
However, the immunity of freedom does not result in its complete separation from perceptions, whether intellectual or sensual. ApaÌti illustrates the relationship of freedom to these external factors by citing Poiretâs similitude.38 Freedom relates to perceptions as a prince to his counsellors: while being independent of them in his voluntarily decisions, the prince respects their counsel and does not refute a thing without their dissent.
Chapters 11â21 in Section 4 outline a taxonomy of the properties of human freedom under various considerations: human freedom can be considered as positive, spontaneous, negative, directive, privative, admissive, rejective etc., but, in a most eminent way, it is indifferent.39 Under the last aspect, the typology of indifference also follows Poiretâs discussion.40 Having warned his readers of the more sophisticated content of the subsequent passages with Virgil (Eclogue IV, 1), Muses of Sicily, let me sing a little more grandly, ApaÌti refers to Descartesâs letter to Voetius,41 in which he claims the freedom to philosophise. The ideal of libertas philospandi means, however, that he will continue compiling Poiretâs remarks.
Indifference of the will is understood in theological moral terms42 as related to adiaphora, that is, actions that can be performed or omitted without sin being committed. From a logical point of view,43 indifference represents hesitation, incertitude and dubitation related to judgement about dubious objects. In the physical sense,44 indifference is the suitability of some subject to receive various forms as well as the mindâs aptitude to contemplate different objects indifferently. These aspects do not pertain to the essence of liberty: ApaÌti omits the theological moral sense as appropriate to a theological discussion instead of to his philosophical point of view â a remark missing in Poiretâs passage. While Poiret deduces logical indifference from ignorance or from intellectual obscurity, ApaÌti omits this problem from his analysis. The physical aspect considers the subject as passive matter as such; it does not pertain to the discussion of indifference as a feature of an essentially active free will â for either ApaÌti and Poiret.
Indifference of freedom is essentially metaphysical indifference.45 In this respect, âindifference is not a necessarily established principle for the determination of oneâs actions according to a certain and determined consideration or a particular mode.â46 There are infinite modes, according to which human freedom can perform or suspend its actions without limitations.47 After introducing criticism of Spinoza again, Poiret continues with a discussion of Godâs free will related to the creation of created indifferent freedom.48 These arguments have already been incorporated into Section 3 of the Vita triumphans civilis by ApaÌti, as I have presented above. ApaÌti picks up the line of Poiretâs thinking in describing the four elements of metaphysical indifference: endurance, illimitation, independence and indifference.49 The arguments rely on the idea of the similitude of created metaphysical indifference to Godâs freedom. ApaÌti summarises his paraphrases from Poiret concerning human indifference: indifference determines itself for one or another object only because it wills that option so that its nature consists merely in its will; in turn, this essential will follows the internal principle of indifference without any necessity or external motif. This is the indifference that resides in metaphysical indifference.
Here, ApaÌti completes his compilation based on Poiretâs Cogitationum rationalium. The last chapter of Section 4 explains âthe value of free willâ from different points of view. The indifference theory of freedom enables us to understand ourselves as certain images of and similitude to God. However, there are new elements provided by the previous discussions on free will that anticipate the following sections.50 The theory of free will has its value as regards our distant attitude toward passions, acquiring virtues and living in accordance with them. Free will makes us familiar with the supreme good possible for humans as regards our natural condition, and it allows us to realise the satisfaction and delight of the mindâs possessing knowledge of this supreme good. These claims may awaken a certain surprise in the reader because there is at least a little bit more accent on the intellectual grasping at the supreme good than could be expected against the background of the indifference theory of free will. However, the continuing series of themes that fall within the competency of free will provides an even wider perspective. Free will makes us realise the duties of humans in general and the duties of citizens in particular: it lets us recognise which action is to be taken as good (honestum) and which action is to be avoided as bad (turpe) according to the prescription of nature. These claims may seem suspicious for us as well: Poiretâs special version of Cartesian philosophy thoroughly lacks the social dimension adumbrated in ApaÌtiâs claims. In his closing remarks in Section 4, ApaÌti introduces the two main topics in the rest of his work: the passions and social life. At the same time, he explicitly establishes a strong link between these new themes and the indifference theory of human freedom. Let us see whether they can stand together.
4 Paraphrases and Omissions from Le Grand
Antoine Le Grandâs Institutio philosophiae secundum principia D. Renati Descartes has a strictly organised structure. After the introductory parts about logic and natural theology, it proceeds towards a description of inorganic and organic being and towards an explanation of the human body and mind accounting for passions, virtues and, finally, social life. ApaÌtiâs paraphrases target Le Grandâs exposition of the latter themes. Le Grand provides the reader with an account of the passions following Descartesâs Les Passions de lâaÌme51 and develops the Cartesian ethical programme of the rule of the mind over the passions being the supreme good for humans and assuring the exertion of cardinal virtues. As concerns the ethical perspective of the passions, Le Grand remained true to his sympathy towards Stoic ethics proper in his Lâhomme sans passions52 (1662) before his Cartesian turn. Reading the headings of the closing chapters 22â37 in the Part 10 of the Institutio, one may have the impression that Le Grand simply ties his passages, which he took from Pufendorfâs De Officio, to the theory of passions and virtues.53
With rich additions of historical examples, ApaÌtiâs Sections 5â7 follow Le Grandâs treatment of the passions (Institutio Part 9)54 but sometimes refer directly to Henri Desmaretâs (1633â1725) Latin version55 of Descartesâs Les Passions de lâaÌme: one reads an exact quotation of the classification of mental cogitations (PA 1, 17), of the general definition of the passions (PA 1, 27) and of the explication of its elements (PA 1, 28). ApaÌti agrees with Descartes that the primary cause of the passions is the agitation of spirits on the little gland (PA 2, 51). Sections 8â11, which explain the cardinal virtues, are equivalent to Le Grandâs Institutio 10, chapters 9â1256 and there are essential similarities between ApaÌtiâs (Section 12) and Le Grandâs (Institutio 10, 3â6) account of the supreme good naturally possible for humans.57 However, there are two important chapters (Institutio 10, 19â20)58 that function as a bridge between the Stoic-Cartesian theory of ethics asserting the mindâs control over the passions and the theory of civic obligations that close the whole book. ApaÌti passes over these passages of Le Grandâs in silence, and he had urgent theoretical reasons for this.
Le Grand dedicates Institutio 10, chapters 19â20 to the problem of human freedom. His point of departure is that passions and virtues can only contribute to the happiness of human life incompletely. Happiness of human life, i.e. the supreme human good consisting in a satisfied state of mind, can only be realised if there is a free will to rule over the passions and exercise virtues. Everyday experience teaches us the existence of free will: performing speech acts or remaining silent, walking or being at rest, lending a hand to the wretched or just passing them by â these all depend on our free decision. Similarly, establishing laws, rewarding good acts and punishing bad ones presuppose elementary freedom as a human feature. Therefore, as Le Grand concludes, God allowed human beings to have the power of free will and to be influenced by His will instead of necessity in their actions.
However, even if each person experiences this ability of choice and perceives that his will is not dependent on any created agent in his determinations, it should not yet be supposed that it [scil. his will] is wholly independent. For if we attend merely to us, as Descartes claims,59 free will cannot be thought of as not being independent. But if we turn our mind to the infinite power of God, we are not able not to believe that all things depend on him. Therefore, even our free will is not released from his authority. It would imply a contradiction to claim that God created humans with nature such that the actions of their will did not depend on Godâs will. This would be the same as someone claiming that his power is finite and infinite simultaneously: finite, because there would be something not dependent on him, yet infinite because he could have created this thing to be independent.60
This is, of course, a short outline of Descartesâs attempt at a theodicial justification61 of human free will and its compatibility with unlimited divine freedom.62 Le Grand walks around opposite sides of the problem. Even if my cognition of divine existence bears the greatest certainty, it cannot refute the certitude as concerns my free will. On the other hand, the cognition of our free will should not raise any doubt about the existence of God. The independence we experience in human freedom is not incompatible with the dependence of that other kind according to which all things are subjected to God. Le Grand perceives that this problem should be observed in more detail and devotes chapter 20 to the relationship between human freedom and divine omnipotence.
The difficulty of the inconsistency between human freedom and divine omnipotence can be avoided if one claims that, although God is the total and universal cause of all things, He still does not relate in the same way to everything. As regards the production of things which are not subject to any created will, God regarded only His own will and decreed them absolutely in a certain way. On the other hand, as concerns those things to which human will has a certain right, God had not regarded His will as exclusive. Instead, He had included the consent of our will into His decree as well.
Le Grand illustrates the conflict between divine and human freedom by quoting Descartesâs famous letter to Princess Elizabeth, in which he presents the king and the duellers.63 As to his absolute will, God wills everything to happen as it appears; however, as to His relative will, He wills that humans obey His laws in contingent states of affairs. Le Grand enumerates three motifs that, according to authors on moral matters, can impede our use of free will â these are more important for our purposes than Descartesâs illustration of the problem in his letter to Princess Elizabeth. The performance of acts in respect of freedom of will is hindered either by fear, ignorance or coercion. In the case of fear, there are two aspects of free will that can be affected psychologically: the spontaneity and freedom of our acts. While one can imagine a situation for the first kind of hindrance (there are acts performed only and exactly due to fear of the contrary of the favourable outcome of a situation), fear cannot impede freedom of will in the second sense
because the nature of free will does not consist in indifference, as we stated above. We do nothing voluntarily and freely, but what we are determined to do by urgent causes. This happens when we are pressed by fear. Even if the object displeases us and we would rather choose the contrary if it were possible [â¦], we accomplish it and prefer the lesser evil instead of the greater.64
Le Grandâs obvious rejection of the indifference theory of human freedom must have been a decisive reason for ApaÌtiâs omission of his chapters on liberty. For Le Grand, there must exist some urgent causes that determine the very act of free will: either freedom of will is determined by these urgent causes or it ceases to be free will. Choosing the lesser evil can provide the persons in the situation with the appropriate urgent cause to avoid the menacing greater evil, even if they are motivated by fear. The psychological state of fear is stronger than the immunity that the allegedly indifferent will might have to it.
Le Grand refers to his previous passage, i.e. the second part of his work.65 Here, while developing his natural theology, he attributes indifference to divine will and denies that any object could have existed in and for the divine mind prior to its creation proceeding from Godâs absolute and indifferent free will. It is only the essence of humans, with regard to which indifference implies an imperfection, which is the lowest level of freedom. As the free author of the world, God is devoid of any coercion. Godâs will has been indifferent from eternity in relation to whatever has been created and whatever has occurred in the world.
5 ApaÌti, Le Grand and Pufendorf
ApaÌtiâs attempt to engage certain elements of Poiretâs and Le Grandâs moral philosophy into a united argumentation faced incredible challenges. Obviously, he wanted to emphasise the indifference of human freedom against all intellectual motifs that determine will, and he likewise insisted on the theoretical programme of an intellectual ruling over the passions on the basis of irresistible cognition appropriate to the mind. For the purpose of maintaining both of these positions â freedom as indifference and freedom as affirmation of compelling mental cognition â ApaÌti did not hesitate to invent his own concept to describe a state of mind that bears the feature of freedom. Mens humana libero arbitrio bene disposita:66 for ApaÌti, there must exist a state of mind disposed appropriately by the freedom of will. On the one hand, the mind in this well-disposed state should behave indifferently toward its objects. On the other hand, it should have evident cognitions that assure the voluntary affirmation of intellectual cognition as well as the critique of passions. These two concepts imply a certain theoretical tension in sections of Vita triumphans civilis that deal with human freedom, passions and virtues â concealed cautiously by the author. However, the concern about the divergent conceptions of freedom must become apparent once we arrive at the Pufendorfian idea of obligation,67 which is treated in detail by Le Grand as well as by ApaÌti.
First of all, it is important to shed light on Le Grandâs revision of Pufendorfâs doctrine. The first parallel headings read âDe humanarum Actionum regulaâ by Le Grand (Institutio 10, 22)68 and âDe actione humanaâ and âDe norma actionum humanarum seu de lege in genereâ by Pufendorf (De officio I, 1â2).69 Following Pufendorf, Le Grand classifies the rules of human actions as pertaining either to the intellectual act of conscience or to the voluntary feature of obligation. As regards obligation, Le Grand introduces the definition of Roman law: obligation is a legal bond, according to which we are necessarily compelled to perform some act. There is a certain coercive power residing in our mind by the virtue of obligation that does not allow one to act against oneâs conscience. It restricts our free will in a certain way and compels us with necessity, even if we cognise ourselves as free and even if we are able to desire that which is contrary to the intended thing/act. Le Grand presents much of the essential elements from Pufendorfâs first chapters. Only humans are able to stand under obligation. This feature of humans requires a Superior whose will imposes an obligation on His subjects. Beyond authority, the Superior must provide good reasons (justae causae) in explaining the voluntarist imposition of obligation. The rule of human actions is law or decree, through which the Superior, aided by His public authority, obliges the subjects to perform acts in accordance with His law.
Two things must be noted in connection with Le Grandâs paraphrase of Pufendorfâs short discussion of obligation at the very beginning of De officio. First, the description of the initial state of liberty lacking the motif of obligation is missing in Le Grandâs work. Pufendorf describes his abstract individuals in the theoretical stance prior to obligation as disposing of a kind of freedom, which is indifferent toward its objects.70 Due to absolutely different theoretical aims and backgrounds, the freedom of Pufendorfian natural persons in their abstract individuality is entirely indifferent just like the freedom of Poiretâs Cartesian individuals with their mystical leanings. However, one may explain why Le Grand abandoned the idea of the initial freedom in abstract natural persons without the motif of obligation. The Franciscan Cartesian must have realised that the original Pufendorfian indifference is hardly compatible with his own concept of freedom as the affirmation of compelling mental content. Undisturbed by this obvious contradiction, Le Grand holds that Pufendorfian natural obligation makes up the essence of natural laws that are engraved in each human heart and common to all nations. There is not the least reference to or reflection on the previously articulated theory of human freedom as an affirmation of irresistible mental content in Le Grandâs whole summary of Pufendorfâs moral necessity. This unreflective recitation of the theory of the German philosopher breaks the unity of Le Grandâs Institutio into fragments. If there is any kind of order of values, offering themselves to be grasped at irresistibly for the intellect, then the obligation imposed on human will cannot totally determine it. According to Pufendorf, the possibility of any â say, Stoic or even Cartesian â moral philosophy independent of natural law theory destroys the holistic totality of obligation. Moral necessity must originate in the formal idea of obligation without any reference to any positive ethical content. The one and only ethical content that provides true moral necessity is the purely formal idea of being obligated. According to Pufendorfâs theory, this was the very motif that Grotius failed to notice: if we take away God, nothing is left at all for natural morality. Moral necessity is not a property inherent in an objective order of values, but is rather produced by the will of God as the Superior imposing on us our state of being under obligation. In sum, as Le Grand reiterates the Pufendorfian doctrine of moral obligation more or less faithfully, he cannot remain faithful to himself and to his previously developed theory of human freedom.
ApaÌti begins his Section 14 (De Obligatione, vel si mavis, Obsequio in Genere)71 with a clear diagnosis: the necessity contained in the idea of obligation contradicts the indifference theory of freedom. Indifferent freedom cannot be compelled by necessity; it cannot take on determination of any kind. Determined will ceases to be appropriately disposed free will. For ApaÌti, the impossibility of constraining free will is a common doctrine among authors writing on ethical matters. As regards jurisprudence, however, ApaÌti announces a new observation on obligation.
Like Le Grand, ApaÌti introduces the definition of obligation according to Roman law,72 qualified by Pufendorf as the vulgar conception (De officio, I.ii.3).73 Obligation is a legal bond. Further, civic obligation is the bond of civil rights, and natural obligation is the bond of equity. Following Vinniusâs commentaries on the Justinian codex,74 ApaÌti regards the Justinian definition as pertaining only to civic obligation and clearly distances his own approach from the juridical meaning in Roman law. He observes obligation in the widest sense to embrace natural, civic and mere civic obligation, the latter resulting from the penultimate under contingent circumstances. Compared to Le Grand, ApaÌti rejects the Roman law conception of obligation much more consciously in favour of modern approaches.
In order to maintain the indifference of freedom concerning acts prescribed by rules, ApaÌti draws a terminological distinction between obligation and obsequiousness.75 In contrast to obligation, obsequiousness excludes necessity. ApaÌti warns his reader that even if the term âobligationâ occurs in the following passages, he will use it in this sense
inasmuch as a human being is freely ready to grasp at a certain duty, that is, inasmuch as he or she determines himself or herself to will or not to will this or another thing, to will to will, to will not to will, to will to act or to will to omit, while freedom remains within his or her own power.76
Equipped with this distinction (and emphasising the presence of freedom even in obligation and thus somewhat confusing his readers), ApaÌti replaces the term obligatio with the term obsequium in several passages, expressing the idea of natural obligation, while leaving the rest of the sentences unchanged. In this sense, natural laws inscribed in the heart of each human being are the most legitimate ones; âtherefore, they must be obeyed (obsequi) following even our natural drive.â77 In the hypothetical case that civil law commands citizens to observe something that is alien to divine law or contrary to the right reason, civil law âdestroys its capacity to call citizens to obeyâ (ad Obsequium alliciendi).78 This is the reason why divine and natural law must be obeyed (Obsequium) above all.79 The most striking example is the paraphrase of Pufendorfâs claim that moral obligation requires a Superior who imposes obligation on moral persons. This idea is expressed by ApaÌti as follows: âsomeone, in order to become obsequious in this way, must have a Superior and must recognise that he is subjected to the laws established by the Superior.â80
Even if this terminological trick seems odd at first glance, ApaÌti was aware of the difficulties inherent in his method. In order to save human freedom as indifference within the framework of the language appropriate to theories of natural law, he had to face the problem of the metaphysical status of natural law. To elaborate this problem, ApaÌti inserts extensive passages from Johannes Behrentâs disputation De prima inter homines lege, ex jure mundi81 proposed at the University of Leiden in 1686 under the presidency of Johannes Voet.
Natural law is eternal law. As such, it cannot be changed by humans or God. For the idea of immutability of eternal law from Godâs perspective, Behrent quotes Johann Georg von Kulpisâs82 (1652â1698) interpretation of Grotius from his popular Collegium Grotianum.83 ApaÌti incorporates Behrentâs argumentation without indicating Kulpisâs work as its original source. God cannot change eternal law because God, proceeding from His absolutely indeterminate consideration, after imposing moral necessity on certain actions of the rational nature created by Him, obliged Himself to this necessity as well. This is the core argument of the first Exercitatio in Kulpisâs Collegium Grotianum which aims to reconcile Pufendorfian voluntarism and Grotian moral realism. In Behrentâs version, the argument serves as a tool to refute both voluntarist and intellectualist approaches to Godâs relation to natural law. There are two lines of interpretation of Godâs self-subjection to eternal law that threatens Godâs omnipotence. First, this self-submission should not be interpreted as if there were a Superior who could impose an obligation on God to subject Himself to eternal law. Second, divine will revealing itself in self-subjection to eternal law should not be conceived of as honest or right because of its conformity to the eternal law to which it is subjected. Behrent supports his refutation of both voluntarist and intellectualist arguments against Kulpisâs theory of Godâs self-determination to eternal law with a quotation from Anselmâs Cur Deus Homo.84 Again, ApaÌti follows Behrentâs wording exactly and without reference to its original source. God is free from any subjection to any law. The values of justice and equitability are dependent on His will alone, while the negative values of injustice and inequitability do not pertain to His will. The latter claim is not a limitation of divine omnipotence resulting from some higher instance of law prescribing the negative validity of these values independently of divine will. Injustice is simply beyond the competency of divine freedom. ApaÌti follows Behrentâs conclusion: in the sentence âGod subjected himself to eternal law,â the word âlawâ does not function in the proper sense. If law in this case were understood with its proper signification, it should be either natural or positive law. However, as regards God, neither the higher instance of moral objectivism nor the voluntarist obligation of a Superior applies.
If eternal law were natural law, that would oblige God. According to the theory of moral objectivism, it would dispose of the principle of law, which also determines Godâs will. Following Behrentâs discussion closely, ApaÌti imports the standard terminology of the critique of intellectualist conceptions of natural law: natural law merely indicates how values are naturally disposed instead of commanding them.85 Hence, the correct theory of Godâs self-obligation to eternal law is the following: God decreed absolutely freely that a certain act should not be performed. After His decision, God is not able to act against His own decree, i.e. he is not able to implement a new decree that prescribes acts contrary to the former. The reason for Godâs inability does not lie in the prohibition He has put into force by His decree. It results from the following contradiction: if God performed an act against His absolute decree, then He would have contrary decrees concerning one and the same thing at the very same time and from eternity. In other words, in this case, God would absolutely be willing two contradictory things at the same time. Therefore, the impotence of divine will in performing an act against His decree does not result from the prohibition, but from the nature of the thing (natura rei). Otherwise, we should suppose imperfection and privation in God, which cannot be considered âwithout the utmost wickedness.â
This allusion to Grotiusâs famous formulation etiamsi daremus is a strange reversion of the classical argument. First of all, it runs against Grotiusâs intention: Godâs existence is necessary for the explanation of the metaphysical status of natural law. However, in ApaÌtiâs argument taken from Behrent, Godâs existence does not play the role of the voluntarist warrant for obligation as stated in classical conceptions.86 Instead, Godâs entirely perfect existence functions as an intellectual explanation for His self-submission to the natural law decreed by His absolutely indifferent will.
ApaÌti continues by quoting Behrent and enters the sphere of human freedom. Eternal law cannot be changed by humans either. God gave human beings a nature such that it was impossible for them not to be conjoined with moral necessity as regards the performance or the omission of certain acts that are naturally good or bad. It is in this sense that the law is eternal for humans. According to ApaÌti, following Behrent,87 the necessity in question must be fine-tuned by the distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity. Whether an act conforms to natural or eternal law is demonstrated by its accordance with or its divergence from the rational and social nature of humans. However, the social nature of humans had not been inserted into humans by inevitable and immutable necessity, but according to the arbitrariness of divine will. Therefore, as regards the very time of its constitution, it was not eternal, as if it could not have been otherwise. Nevertheless, it became eternal and immutable after its constitution. This is why in De jure naturae et gentium I.ii.6 â thus the explicit reference by both Behrent and ApaÌti â Pufendorf claims that the fact that human beings are endowed with a rational and social nature was not imposed by absolute necessity, but only by hypothetical necessity.88 However, this hypothetical necessity does not imply that natural law could be altered by humans.
6 Conclusion
If we consider ApaÌtiâs patchwork compiled from divergent sources, we cannot but suspect it of being fragmentary at least to the degree that Le Grandâs Institutio is. If Le Grand can be accused of not paying attention to the incompatibility of his own concept of free will with Pufendorfâs theory, then ApaÌti can be similarly criticised because of the insufficient elaboration of indifference theory of will within the framework of natural law theory. Both Le Grand and ApaÌti experience the challenge posed by Pufendorfâs theory against their conceptions of freedom. Le Grand had to remain silent about Pufendorfâs point of departure, the indifference of human will as abstracted from natural obligation; Le Grand paid this price for incorporating the social philosophy of the German scholar into his Cartesian handbook. In contrast, ApaÌti developed an explicit indifferent theory of free will while formulating paraphrases of Poiretâs Cogitationum rationalium in the introductory sections of Vita triumphans civilis. He had to face the Pufendorfian challenge from quite the opposite point of view than Le Grand did. For Pufendorf, the preliminary and miserable state of isolated individuals with their indifferent will was something to be surpassed or left behind via the moral necessity of obligation. Being fascinated by Poiretâs theory, ApaÌti did not subscribe to Pufendorfâs ascribing moral indifference only to the miserable state of individuals.
It is beyond doubt that ApaÌti endeavoured to maintain the indifference theory of free will within the paradigm of natural law on which he likewise insisted. His strategy of composing the text bears clear witness to his efforts. ApaÌti disregards Le Grandâs paraphrase of Pufendorfian obligation in the equivalent Section 14 of his Vita triumphans civilis and substitutes it for Behrentâs much more sophisticated discussion of the topic. ApaÌtiâs decision to change his source testifies to his worries about Le Grandâs revision of De officio I.iâii. Indeed, ApaÌti showed sensitivity to Behrentâs metaphysical account of obligation concentrated in the Pufendorfian idea of hypothetical moral necessity. He emphasised the hypothetical character of moral obligation to avoid moral objectivism, which threatens the indifference theory of human freedom. In this sense, ApaÌti solved the problem that emerged in the last part of Le Grandâs Institutio. Despite all his awareness of related problems, ApaÌti did not succeed in developing a collection of compiled texts without contradiction. There was too much at stake: Poiretâs indifferent will could not be incorporated into the world of natural law theory introduced by Grotius and Pufendorf.
Acknowledgement
The research was supported by the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (âOTKA 137963 History of Hungarian Philosophy in Early Modernity (1570â1710)â). I am indebted to GaÌbor GaÌngoÌ for his comments and to Thomas Williams for the proofreading.
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MikloÌs ApaÌti, Vita triumphans civilis sive universa vitae humanae peripheria, ad mentem illustris herois et philosophi, D. Renati Des Cartes, ex unico centro deducta (Amsterdam: Abraham a Someren, 1688).
JoÌzsef TuroÌczi-Trostler, âMagyar cartesianusok [Hungarian Cartesians],â Minerva-könyvtaÌr 12 (1933/1): 20â68, esp. 32â44 (reprint: JoÌzsef TuroÌczi-Trostler, Magyar irodalom â vilaÌgirodalom (Budapest: AkadeÌmiai, 1961), vol. I., 173â216); ZaÌdor Tordai, âA magyar kartezianizmus törteÌneteÌnek vaÌzlata [An outline of the history of Hungarian Cartesianism],â Magyar FilozoÌfiai Szemle, 6 (1961/1): 54â79.
TuroÌczi-Trostler, âMagyar cartesianusok,â 43â44.
The most important contribution is Gyula LaczhaÌzi, âA karteziaÌnus szenvedeÌlyelmeÌlet magyar recepcioÌjaÌroÌl [On the Hungarian reception of the Cartesian theory of passions],â KelleÌk 32 (2007): 119â125.
TuroÌczi-Trostler, âMagyar cartesianusok,â 40â42. LaczhaÌzi, âA karteziaÌnus,â 122.
See, for example, Ian Hunter, Rival Enlightenments: Civil and Metaphysical Philosophy in Early Modern Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
For biographical details, cf. IstvaÌn WeszpreÌmi, Succincta medicorum Hungariae et Transilvaniae biographia, Centuria tertia, decas I. et II. Tom. IV. (Vienna: Trattnern, 1787), 15â27; JoÌzsef Angyal, Barock in Ungarn (Budapest, Leipzig and Milano: Danubia, 1947), 88â89; Imre BaÌn, âAdatok ApaÌti MikloÌs eÌletrajzaÌhoz [Details on MikloÌs ApaÌtiâs biography],â FiloloÌgiai Közlöny 4 (1958/3â4): 433â439; RoÌbert OlaÌh, âEgy reformaÌtus lelkeÌsz könyves műveltseÌge: ApaÌti MadaÌr MikloÌs olvasmaÌnyai IâII. [The erudition of a Calvinist preacher: The lectures of MikloÌs ApaÌti MadaÌr],â Magyar Könyvszemle 129 (2013/2): 145â164 and 129 (2013/3): 322â335.
See PeÌter BalaÌzsâs and GaÌbor GaÌngoÌâs chapter in this volume.
William N. Du Rieu, Album studiosorum Academiae Lugduno Batavae MDLXXVâMDCCCLXXV (Hagae Comitum: Nijhoff, 1875), 676.
MikloÌs ApaÌti, Disputatio theologico-critica tripertita naturae tÅn uÌrÄ«m we-tuÌmÄ«m Urim et Thummim ad mentem Scripturae Sacrae [â¦] pars IâIII [praes. Christoph Wittich (1625â1687)] (Lugduni Batavorum: Elzevier, 1686); MikloÌs ApaÌti: Disputatio theologica de virga Mosis [praes. Jacob Gaillard (1620â1688)] (Lugduni Batavorum: Elzevier, 1687).
BaÌn, âAdatok,â 437.
ApaÌti, Vita, n.p.
Gustav A. Krieg, Der mystische Kreis. Wesen und Werden der Theologie Pierre Poirets (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979), 20â37.
These were volumes of Antoinette Bourignonâs works as edited by Poiret in Amsterdam after her death. The volumes contain ApaÌtiâs inscription testifying to their being donations from Poiret. Cf. RoÌbert OlaÌh, âEgy reformaÌtus lelkeÌsz,â II 334, and RoÌbert OlaÌh, âPierre Poiret ajaÌndeÌka, AdaleÌk ApaÌti MadaÌr MikloÌs peregrinaÌcioÌjaÌhoz [Donation from Pierre Poiret: A contribution to MikloÌs ApaÌti MadaÌrâs study stay],â Könyv eÌs KönyvtaÌr 28 (2006): 183â192.
ApaÌtiâs letter to MihaÌly VaÌri, quoted in WeszpreÌmi, Succincta, 26â27.
ApaÌti, Vita, 28.
Pierre Poiret, Cogitationum rationalium de Deo, anima et malo libri quatuor (Amsterdam: Blaeu, 1685). The first edition (1677) had not yet contained Poiretâs remarks paraphrased by ApaÌti. For the differences between the first and second editions of Poiretâs Cogitationum, cf. Krieg, Der mystische Kreis, 87â102.
Antoine Le Grand, Institutio philosophiae secundum principia D. Renati Descartes: Nova Methodo Adornata, & Explicata (Nürnberg: Zieger, 1683).
Thomas Mautner, âFrom Virtue to Morality: Antoine Le Grand (1629â1699) and the New Moral Philosophy,â Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik / Annual Review of Law and Ethics, 8 (2000): 209â232.
I refer to Pufendorfâs works according to the critical edition: Samuel Pufendorf, De officio hominis et civis juxta legem naturalem, ed. Gerald Hartung (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1997); Samuel Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium, ed. Frank Böhling (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1998).
Mautner, âFrom Virtue,â 224.
ApaÌti, Vita, 1â3; cf. Poiret, Cogitationum rationalium, 463.
ReneÌ Descartes, âMeditationes de prima philosophia,â in Oeuvres de Descartes, vol. VII. ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris: Cerf, 1904) (further: AT), 431â432, ReneÌ Descartes, The Philosophical Writings, transl. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) (CSM), vol. II 291.
AT VII 432; CSM II 291.
ApaÌti, Vita, 5: âEst ista summa Indifferentia in Deo, summum est ejus omnipotentiae argumentumâ; cf. AT VII 432; CSM II 292.
For the problem of indifference in Descartes, see Vere Chappell, âDescartesâ Compatibilism,â in Reason, Will, and Sensation: Studies in Descartesâ Metaphysics, ed. John Cottingham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 177â190 and Joseph Keim Campbell, âDescartes on Spontaneity, Indifference, and Alternatives,â in New Essays on the Rationalists, ed. Rocco J. Germaro and Charles Huenemann (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 179â199.
ApaÌti, Vita, 6â7; cf. Poiret, Cogitationum rationalium, 461.
ApaÌti, Vita, 6â7.
ApaÌti, Vita, 7; cf. Poiret, Cogitationum rationalium, 461.
ApaÌti, Vita, 11: âVera & Individua Libertas, sive Principium mere determinans, in hoc Puncto indivisibili consistit, quod semper determinet, & nunquam determineturâ; cf. Poiret, Cogitationum rationalium, 456.
ApaÌti, Vita, 12; cf. Poiret, Cogitationum rationalium, 457.
ApaÌti, Vita, 12; cf. Poiret, Cogitationum rationalium, 456.
ApaÌti, Vita, 12â13; cf. Poiret, Cogitationum rationalium, 457.
ApaÌti, Vita, 13: âtunc etiam objecta bona aut luminosa non efficiet Libertas, ut somniant & nugantur Arminiani.â
ApaÌti, Vita, 13; cf. Poiret, Cogitationum rationalium, 457.
ApaÌti, Vita, 13â14; cf. Poiret, Cogitationum rationalium, 457.
ApaÌti, Vita, 13: ânihil etiam est magis impossibile, quam ut Mens eo flectatur, quo ipsi absolute placet non velle verti.â
ApaÌti, Vita, 16; cf. Poiret, Cogitationum rationalium, 457.
ApaÌti, Vita, 16â18; cf. Poiret, Cogitationum rationalium, 455â456.
ApaÌti, Vita, 19â28; cf. Poiret, Cogitationum rationalium, 460â465.
AT VIII-2, 3.
ApaÌti, Vita, 19â20; cf. Poiret, Cogitationum rationalium, 460.
ApaÌti, Vita, 20; cf. Poiret, Cogitationum rationalium, 460.
ApaÌti, Vita, 20; cf. Poiret, Cogitationum rationalium, 460.
ApaÌti, Vita, 20â22; cf. Poiret, Cogitationum rationalium, 460.
ApaÌti: Vita, 20: âIndifferentia est principium non necessario alligatum ad determinandum actus suos certo determinatoque consilio aut modo particulariâ; cf. Poiret, Cogitationum rationalium, 460.
Here, ApaÌti readily quotes Descartesâs degrading statement on the indifference conception of human freedom from the Fourth Meditation, âindifference [â¦] is the lowest grade of freedom; it is evidence not of any perfection of freedom, but rather of a defect of knowledgeâ (ApaÌti: Vita, 20; cf. AT VII, 58; CSM 70). ApaÌti obviates this challenge by referring Descartesâs claim to the logical realm of indifference. Indifference as the âlowest grade of freedomâ is logical indifference explaining human freedom as ignorance or a defect of knowledge. Metaphysical indifference, in contrast, has no such limits: human freedom is boundless even if the mind grasps at clear and distinct notions without any doubt. For the same thought, see Poiret: Cogitationum rationalium, 563.
Poiret, Cogitationum rationalium, 460â461.
ApaÌti, Vita, 22â28; cf. Poiret, Cogitationum rationalium, 464â466.
Let us quote ApaÌtiâs passage, where he extends the competency of indifferent freedom of will to the supreme good of ethics first and then to the obligations of political theory. ApaÌti, Vita, 30: âUtilis & Jucunda est Libertatis Arbitrii scientia, immo necessaria; tantus enim est Valor L[iberi] A[rbitrii] ut ejus ratione rectoque usu Nos-ipsos Imaginem quandam & Similitudinem Dei redolere intelligere: Passionibus generose succensere: Virtutes acquirere & exercere: Summum nobis Bonum, naturale quod dicitur, comparare, & ex eo Beatitudinem seu Mentis gaudium & satisfactionem ex possessione Summi Boni resultantem legitime creare: Munera Hominis in genere, mox boni Civis in specie, & quid uterque tanquam Honestum apprehendere, & quid tanquam Turpe omittere secundum naturae praescripta debeant, insinuareâ (italics in the original).
AT IX, 291â497. On Le Grandâs Cartesian psychology, see Gary Hatfield, âThe Cartesian Psychology of Antoine Le Grand,â in Cartesian Empiricisms, ed. M. Dobre and T. Nyden (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 251â274.
Antoine Le Grand, Le sage des Stoïques, ou lâhomme sans passions (LaHaye: Broune & LâEscluse, 1662).
Compare the templates above.
ApaÌti, Vita 31â57; cf. Le Grand, Institutio, 682â735.
Passiones Animae per Renatum Des Cartes. Gallice ab ipso conscripta, nunc autem in exterorum gratiam Latina civitate donatae Ab H.D.M [Henri Desmaret], in Renati Des-Cartes Opera Philosophica (Amsterdam: Elzevirius, 1651).
ApaÌti, Vita, 57â95; cf. Le Grand, Institutio, 763â780.
ApaÌti, Vita, 96â115; cf. Le Grand, Institutio, 743â753.
Le Grand, Institutio, 799â805.
This is a verbatim quotation from Descartesâs letter to Princess Elizabeth, AT IV 330â334. For the Latin version cf. ReneÌ Descartes, Epistolae (Amsterdam: Bleau, 1682), vol. I 24â26, esp. 25.
Le Grand, Institutio, 801 (10, 19): âSed quamvis quisque eam eligendi potentiam experiatur, sentiatque Voluntatem suam a nullo Agente creato, in suis determinationibus pendere; non est tamen existimandum, omnimode esse Independens, quia scilicet liberum Arbitrium, ut ait Cartesius, si ad nos tantum attendamus, non possit non concipi Independens; si vero ad Infinitam Dei Potentiam, Animum advertimus, non possumus non credere, omnia ab illo pendere, & proinde liberum nostrum Arbitrium, ejus imperio solutum non esse. Implicat enim contradictionem, Deum creasse Homines ejusmodi naturae, ut Voluntatum eorum Actiones ab ejus Voluntate non pendeat. Quia idem est, ac si quis diceret, Potentiam ejus finitam esse, simul & infinitam: finitam, cum aliquid sit, quod ab illo non pendet; Infinitam vero, quum potuerit rem hanc independentem creareâ (italics in the original, but not in Descartes).
For a detailed analysis, see Clyde P. Ragland, The Will to Reason. Theodicy and Freedom in Descartes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
The argument of the present paper moves along the borderline between Poiretâs unconditional indifference and Descartesâs intellectually motivated freedom. In this constellation, Poiretâs metaphysical indifference is situated outside of Descartesâs conception of indifference as the âlowest grade of freedom.â We are therefore not delving into the subtle details of the problem of Cartesian freedom. However, for this problem, cf. Marcelo de Araujo, Scepticism, Freedom and Autonomy (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 2003), passim; and DaÌniel Schmal, A kezdet neÌlküli kezdet. Descartes eÌs a karteÌzianizmus probleÌmaÌja [Beginning without Beginning: Descartes and the Problem of Cartesianism] (Budapest: Gondolat, 2012), 243â272.
AT IV 351â357.
Le Grand, Institutio, 803: âquia liberi Arbitrii natura, non in Indifferentia consistit, ut dictum est antea, quum nihil aeque voluntarie, atque adeo libere faciamus, quam ea, ad quae urgenti Causa determinamur. Quod accidit, quando metu premimur; quoniam etsi tunc objectum displiceat, mallemusque, si fieri posset, contrarium eligere [â¦], illud amplectimur, & minus Malum majori anteponimusâ (italics in the original).
Le Grand, Institutio, Part 2, ch. 12, 154â155.
Cf. ApaÌti, Vita, 48, 51â53.
For general presentations, cf. Craig L. Carr and Michael J. Seidler, âPufendorf, Sociality and the Modern State,â in Grotius, Pufendorf and Modern Natural Law, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Dartmouth: Ashgate, 1999), 133â157, and Knud Haakonssen, Natural law and moral philosophy. From Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 37â43.
Le Grand, Institutio, 807â811.
Pufendorf, De officio, 13â21.
Cf. Samuel Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium. Dritter Teil: Materialien und Kommentar, von Frank Böhling (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2014), 72â73.
ApaÌti, Vita, 120â130.
ApaÌti, Vita, 121; cf. Le Grand, Insitutio, 808.
Pufendorf, De officio, 18.
Arnold Vinnius, In quatuor libros Institutionum imperialium commentarius academicus et forensis (Amsterdam: Elzevir, 1569), 572â579, esp. 574â575.
As regards this distinction, ApaÌti refers to Ulrik Huber, De Jure Civitatis libri tres (Franeker: Gyselaar, 1684), 318.
ApaÌti, Vita, 123: âEatenus sumitur, quatenus ipse Homo se libere accingit alicui muneri capessendo: hoc est, se determinat ad hoc aut illud velle aut nolle, vult velle, vult nolle, vult facere, vult negligere, Libertate manente in sua potestate.â
ApaÌti, Vita, 124: âLeges Naturales inscriptae omnium hominum cordibus cum sint opus Pii Opificiis, sunt justissimae & legitimae, unde illis Obsequi vel ex naturae ductu debemus.â
ApaÌti, Vita, 124: âimmo hoc si fiat, vim suam perdit Cives ad Obsequium alliciendi.â
ApaÌti, Vita, 124.
ApaÌti, Vita, 124: âAc idcirco oportet, ut quis hoc modo Obsequiosus fieri queat Superiorem habeat, & conditis ab eo Legibus, debere se obtemperare agnoscat.â Cf. Le Grand, Institutio, 809: âAc idcirco oportet, ut quis obligari possit, Superiorem habeat, & conditis ab eo legibus, debere se obtemperare agnoscatâ; further: Pufendorf, De officio, 19 (I.ii.4): âSequitur ergo, ut ille obligationis sit capax, qui & superiorem habeat, & normam praescriptam potest cognoscereâ (my italics â JS).
Johannes Behrent, Disputatio inauguralis De prima inter homines lege, ex jure mundi (Leiden: Elzevier, 1686).
For Kulpisâs career as a jurist and diplomat in the service of the Duke of Württemberg, cf. Bernd Roeck, âKulpis, Johann Georg von,â in Neue Deutsche Biographie 13 (1982), 280â282 [Online-Version]; URL: https://www.deutsche-biographie.de/pnd100212204.html#ndbcontent, accessed on 15 February 2021. Unlike Behrent, Kulpisâs name had a certain renown among jurisconsults of the late seventeenth century as a specialist in public and constitutional law. From the former point of view, Kulpis belonged to the Giessen school of public law. Cf. Michael Stolleis, âReformation und öffentliches Recht in Deutschland,â Der Staat 24 (1985/1): 51â74, esp. 57, and Johann Stephan Pütter, Litteratur des Deutschen Staatsrechts, vol. 1 (Göttingen: Wittwe Vandenhoek, 1777), 254â256. However, his fame was established by his critical commentary on Pufendorfâs De statu imperii Germanici, Pufendorfâs chief contribution to German constitutional law, published under the pseudonym Monzambano in 1667. Johann Georg von Kulpis, In Sev. de Monzambano, de statu Imperii Germanici librum commentationes academicae (Stuttgart: Zubrot, 1688, several editions later). Cf. Detlef Döring, âUntersuchungen zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Reichsverfassungsschrift Samuel Pufendorfs (Severinus de Monzambo),â Der Staat, 33 (1994/2): 185â206, esp. 186; Fiammetta Palladini, Discussioni seicentesche su Samuel Pufendorf. Scritti latini 1663â1700 (Milano: Il mulino, 1978), 154sqq.
Johann Georg von Kulpis, Collegium Grotianum, Super Iure Belli Ac Pacis In Academia Giessensi XV. Exercitationibus Institutum (Frankfurt am Main: Faber, 1682), 9.
S. Anselmus Cantuariensis, Libri duo Cur Deus homo, ed. Hugo Laemmer (Berlin: Schlawitz, 1857), 23â24 (1, 12).
Francisco SuaÌrez, De legibus ac Deo legislatore (Coimbra: Didacum Gomez de Loureyro, 1612), 120 (II.6.iii): âIn hac re prima sententia est, legem naturalem [â¦] esse legem indicantem, quid agendum, vel cauendum sit, quid natura sua intrinsece bonum, ac necessarium, vel intrinsece malum sitâ (my italics â JS). Cf. Haakonssen, Natural Law, 16â24.
Cf. SuaÌrez, De legibus, 121 (II.6.iv).
Behrent, of course, is thinking of Pufendorfâs De jure naturae et gentium, I.ii.6.
Pufendorf, De jure (as in note 20), 32 (I.ii.6): âUt adeo ista his â¨attributa sit &â© competat non ex necessitate absoluta, sed hypothetica, posita ea conditione, quam homini prae reliquis animantibus DEUS libere assignavit.â