1 Sankt Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek, 673 and the Evolution of Legal Knowledge
Recently, a well-known German legal sociologist and constitutional lawyer, Professor Karl-Heinz Ladeur, published a small volume of 180 pages under the title Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts (The Beginning of Western Law) with the subtitle Die Christianisierung der römischen Rechtskultur und die Entstehung des universalen Rechts (The Christianization of Roman Legal Culture and the Formation of the Universal Law).1 Basically, Ladeur makes the argument that the emergence and formation of individual rights as fundament of modern legal order was a product of both the Roman legal tradition and its merger with Christian culture. Ladeur’s grand narrative continues a historiographical tradition which could be traced back to the ideas about the history of mankind and law as elaborated by Karl Marx,2 Max Weber3 or later Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy.4 These concepts have inspired more recent works like Harold Berman’s efforts to elaborate the interdependency of Law and Revolution5 or, more recently, Thomas Vesting’s four books about the Medien des Rechts (The Media of Law).6
Against the backdrop of such monumental histories and narratives, the question might arise if and to what extent a workshop on one single legal manuscript – even when it is preserved at such a wonderful venue as the Stiftsbibliothek – is truly legitimate. Harold Berman, for example, argued against a simple “concentrating on bits and pieces of history,”7 and he would, probably, raise even stronger objections against the focus on a single “bit of history” as embodied by the codex Sankt Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek, 673 (Sg in what follows). As a matter of fact, an easy way to delegitimize such kinds of criticism as well their underlying perspectives would be to reveal the multiple profound and deep historical flaws of Berman’s or Ladeur’s arguments, particularly by highlighting their surprisingly limited awareness even of modern handbooks and encyclopedias of legal history,8 or simply by deconstructing these master narratives as historiographic reflections of contemporary cultural changes in perspective. But this approach would be much too simple, and it would probably not be fair either. Moreover, it would not explain the reason for asking several worldwide leading experts in their field to discuss a singular manuscript. But Sg, a manuscript probably from northern Italy and at least since 1461 part of the Stiftsbibliothek collection,9 is apparently special. This is not primarily due to its text collection starting on p. 203a, even though Philipp Lenz has highlighted the importance of this text archive.10 More attention has mainly been given to pp. 3a–203a with its transmission of Gratian texts as 33 causae, its omission of the treatise de consecratione and its unusual presentation of De penitentia.11 This part of Sg has been and still is the subject of intense debates,12 even though some signs of an “oversaturation” have been noticed by Melodie Eichbauer.13 This kind of exhaustion, however, might be present in the current discourse on Gratian14 as a whole.
But Sg is, as I would like to argue here, more than an important piece of evidence for the evolution of Gratian’s Decretum. The manuscript can also be understood as an interesting object for a general history of legal knowledge, its patterns and driving forces as well as the emergence of orders and structures of this kind of knowledge. Some of these phenomena shall be discussed here with reference to the debates about the Decretum version in Sg. In doing so I cannot offer any new manuscript evidence, let alone new manuscripts bearing witness to a specific recension of the Decretum or new readings of Sg. And as a matter of fact, I am not in a position to assess the arguments and opinions of the learned debates about the evolution of Gratian’s text. What I intend in what follows is to present some observations on Sg and the discussions about it, which might put this codex into a broader context. My basic argument is that Sg can be understood as the medial expression for a stage of intense transition in legal knowledge: it points towards different practices of preserving and communicating legal knowledge, which would emerge during the early twelfth century. And it reflects concomitant use of these approaches in a period before the rise of consolidated canons and practices about the communication and presentation of legal knowledge within the canon law discourse.
This is of course not really a revolutionary insight. But it might help to explain some contested characteristics of Sg a little bit.
In order to make my argument more plausible and to shape its structure, I would like to discuss two observations on Sg and the research on it. My first observation is about the apparent fluidity of legal knowledge throughout the formation of Gratian’s Decretum which is particularly present in Sg (below 2.). My second and very small observation is about the handling of Roman law in Sg and the early Gratian versions, which also indicates a kind of tentative approach to the handling of new legal knowledge (below 3.).
2 “Oscillation” as the Defining Mark of Sg
The making of Gratian’s Decretum is a perfect example for a long-stretched process of evolving legal knowledge: since Anders Winroth’s findings it has been well established that Gratian’s Concordia discordantium canonum15 was not created as a closed body of texts and comments. Instead, it took several stages of development, as embodied particularly in the two recensions which Anders Winroth has identified.16 In 1999, Carlos Larrainzar introduced Sg into the debate for the first time claiming that it would represent an earlier stage in the emergence of the Decretum.17 His characterization of Sg as borrador, as first draft of the Decretum, in the title of his 1999 article has become famous not only due to his conciseness, but also as something like an expression for the rapid enhancement of our knowledge about the text witnesses for the development of Gratian’s Decretum. Since Carlos Larrainzar’s first several publications on this subject18 a very broad debate has unfolded, covering a huge spectrum of positions.19 They range from the idea that Sg predates the first recension20 or that it at least refers to an earlier version, which has been called “Ur-Gratian” on the one hand,21 to the argument that Sg is something like an abbreviation of the first recension,22 which, however, includes elements of the second recension,23 on the other hand.
It seems, however, that there is consensus with regard to at least one point: that Sg is everything but witness of a consolidated stage in the evolution of Gratian’s Decretum. To the contrary, it appears as if the transitory character of Sg is its defining mark. Melodie Eichbauer has used the term “living text” for Sg and other codices of the Decretum,24 and in fact, when it comes to Sg, this codex shows an intense life. This is true for the presence of numerous corrections and glosses from different hands in the manuscript, which corresponds to the fact that the Gratian text in Sg as a whole has apparently been produced by different scribes and thus at different times.25 It might be that this multiplicity of hands and thus presumably of scribes corresponded in some ways to the adoption of different layers of Gratian texts. But this is, of course, a risky hypothesis. In one point, however, the layout in Sg makes the transitions between different evolutionary stages of the Decretum visible as, for example, the adjustment of the numbering of what was initially 33 causae to the usual, widespread number of 36 causae.26 In this kind of editing the transition between Sg in its first, original state towards another, later and generally adopted version of the Decretum becomes literally visible. It fits in this pattern of fluidity that the texts in Sg show a certain kind of oscillation between Gratian’s first recension and the second recension, as for example in the case of De pen., D. 7 c. 2, as has been shown impressively by John Wei.27 On the other hand, there is apparently also a certain kind of consensus that Sg is in general closer to the first recension28 – particularly in its language, in its kind of analytical reflection29 and probably also in its word order30 – while the precise quality of this relationship is not clear, in particular because Sg demonstrates a certain kind of autonomy with respect to the first recension.31 However, this does not exclude the argument that Sg represents probably not an epitome, but nevertheless a kind of partially transformed, but mainly abbreviated version of the first recension. And it does also not exclude the idea that Sg represents from a doctrinal point of view a more or less earlier stage of reflection than the second recension.
Taken together, Sg reveals on several levels and in several ways a remarkable fluidity and thus oscillation of legal knowledge as contained in Gratian. As a matter of fact, other canon law sources sometimes show similar features: pre-Gratian canonical collections like the Collectio Tripartita, the Pseudo-Isidorian decretals or the Liber Tarraconensis were transmitted in different recensions.32 And we also know different recension of decretalist works like the different recensions of Hostiensis’ lectura of the thirteenth century,33 let alone the complex layers of glosses to the Decretum.34
But Sg is different. It is different in its obviously complex relationship to earlier or later textual witnesses, which is very difficult to comprise with linear perspectives. At the same time, Sg represents a high grade of transitional quality when compared to other cases. This points to another challenge within research on Sg, which can only be indicated here: presumably, the complex fungible quality of Sg has something to do with the rise of academic teaching in general35 and of law in particular,36 be it that Sg served in the context and for the needs of teaching,37 or be it that Sg was something like the result of teaching (like a reportatio).38 In this regard, Sg is also different from the other cases, where the teaching situation was much less evolved as in the pre-Gratian cases or had already reached a much higher level of differentiation than in the beginnings of the school in Bologna.39
3 Gratian, Roman Law, and Sg
Gratian adopted Roman law sources.40 But his handling of the Roman law sources changed between the completion of the first and the second recension of the Decretum:41 Gratian’s knowledge of Roman law apparently evolved from a poor state to a better command of the sources of Roman law jurisprudence. Again, Sg appears to represent a kind of transitional state in this evolution of legal knowledge. This can be demonstrated by an interesting example of an apparent outreach to new sources by Gratian: in Sg, Gratian made use of the slave names Stichus/Pamphilius in C.29 q.1 d.a.c.1, which were apparently derived from the digest, while the first as well as the second recension would use Plato/Virgilius.42 On the other hand, it has been demonstrated by Kenneth Pennington that Sg used the term arbiter delegatus in C.2 q.6 d.p.c.33. This kind of arbiter had, however, as Ken Pennington has made clear, “disappeared from practice if not from the pages of the Corpus iuris civilis.”43 It is difficult to know what to make of this phenomenon. Certainly, the use of a term, which actually was no longer in practical use, highlights the autonomy of Sg in relation to the first recension. Moreover, it could be argued that the use of this apparently older term points to a very early production of Sg. On the other hand, the arbiter delegatus as judge delegate was part of the Codex Justinianus (3.1.16) and thus part of an authority. So, in using this term Gratian would follow only the authority of a text which had authority for him, while the question of whether or not the Roman law concept of the arbiter delegatus was still in practical use would have had no relevance for him. At this point, the ambivalence of Gratian’s use of Roman law, as represented in Sg, becomes particularly clear: in a certain way, Gratian followed the famous sentence ecclesia vivit lege romana (as transmitted in the Lex Ribuaria and the Liber Papiensis).44 Certainly, Gratian used Roman law and the Justinian corpus, for example, in order to extend the deadline of appeals (cf. C.2 q.6 c.28)45 and he even highlighted in Sg the fact that Justinian had changed a more severe rule given by Theodosius.46 So, it appears as if Gratian started to use Roman legal sources with more intensity in Sg. But the patterns of his use are not quite clear. On the one hand, as we have seen, he apparently followed simply the authority of a Roman law text, which was applicable to an ecclesiastical legal problem, even though the legal concept of this text was no longer in use. Moreover, the Justinian law was also a source of higher authority for Gratian when it came to deciding between Justinian’s rules and former Roman law as embodied in the Theodosian code. In this regard, it might be said that Sg indicates a potential impact of contemporary teaching of Roman law as maintained since the first quarter of the twelfth century in Bologna with the Corpus iuris civilis as an essential source of authority47 and with the rise of the ordines iudiciorum, informed strongly by Roman legal procedure.48 On the other hand, however, it remains an open question if patterns of Gratian’s use of Roman law can be identified. Sg presents a use of Roman law which has a more or less tentative character and which is very difficult to understand in its approach. Overall, however, this fits into the picture of Sg as a fluid stage in the evolution of Gratian’s work.
4 Concluding Remarks
Sg presents its readers with a whole series of questions and challenges, including not only its relationship to both recensions, but also the potential contexts of its use and the history of its corrections and emendations. But it offers also some potential insights into the formation of legal knowledge. From my point of view the most important insight is the fact that the evolution of legal knowledge – at least in Gratian – does not follow a strict linear path. Sg shows anything but a clear line of development with its oscillation between a kind of epitome of the first recension on the one hand, and its tendency towards a certain kind of autonomy, with its many adoptions and adjustments to the later form of Gratian’s Decretum and also with its tentative use of Justinian as authority, on the other hand. In this regard, Sg reflects the unique situation of the formation of a new approach to legal normativity when general standards of structures and order of knowledge had not yet been established and when the actors were still in a process of creating such a kind of episteme. It will be interesting to learn if and to what extent these assumptions will be refuted or maybe even confirmed a little bit.
Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts. The Christianization of Roman Legal Culture and the Formation of the Universal Law (Tübingen, 2018).
Magisterial account by Peter Landau, “Karl Marx und die Rechtsgeschichte,” Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis/Revue d’Histoire du Droit/The Legal History Review 41 (1973), 361–371.
Gerhard Dilcher, “From the History of Law to Sociology: Max Weber’s Engagement with the Historical School of Law,” Max Weber Studies 8 (2008), 163–86 (“Von der Rechtsgeschichte zur Soziologie – Max Webers Auseinandersetzung mit der Historischen Rechtsschule,” Juristenzeitung 2007, 105–112); Kaius Tuori, “Weber and the Ideal of Roman Law,” Law and History: Current Legal Issues 6 (2003), 201–214; see also Andreas Thier, “Max Weber’s Interpretations of Medieval Canon Law and its Contemporary Narratives of Legal History,” in Recht als Kultur? Beiträge zu Max Webers Soziologie des Rechts, ed. Werner Gephart, Daniel Witte (Frankfurt a. M., 2017), 185–197.
Johannes Liebrecht, Die junge Rechtsgeschichte. Kategorienwandel in der rechtshistorischen Germanistik der Zwischenkriegszeit (Tübingen, 2018), 116–117, 233 and 255–256; Andreas Leutzsch, Geschichte der Globalisierung als globalisierte Geschichte. Die historische Konstruktion der Weltgesellschaft bei Rosenstock-Huessy und Braudel (Frankfurt a.M., 2009); for a survey including an excellent bibliographical account see Klaus-Gunther Wesseling, “Rosenstock-Huessy (nur selten: Rosentock-Hüssy), Eugen,” in Biographisch-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon 8 (1994), 688–695, updated version available at https://www.bbkl.de/public/index.php/frontend/lexicon/R/Ro/rosenstock-huessy-nur-selten-rosentock-huessy-eugen-67729.
Harold Berman, Law and Revolution, vol. 1: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, Mass. et al., 1983), Law and Revolution, vol. 2: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, Mass., 2003). For a broad spectrum of recent views on Berman’s legal history perspective see the contributions in Rechtsgeschichte – Legal History 21 (2013), 156–227.
Thomas Vesting, Die Medien des Rechts, 4 vols (Weilerswist 2011–15); for an account of Vesting’s perspective and its legal history problems see Andreas Thier, “Rechtstheoretische Meistererzählung und die Herausforderung der Geschichte. Beobachtungen zum Werk von Thomas Vesting über ‘Buchdruck’,” Der Staat 56 (2017), 277–291.
Berman, Law and Revolution I, p. 21 (on this aspect see Andreas Thier, “Harold Berman’s ‘Law and Revolution’: A Necessary Challenge for Legal History Research,” Rechtsgeschichte – Legal History 21 (2013), 173–175 and 174).
For Berman see Peter Landau, “Review: Harold Berman, Law and Revolution (1983),” University of Chicago Law Review 51 (1984), 937–943; Rudolf Schieffer, “‘The Papal Revolution in Law?’ Rückfragen an Harold J. Berman,” BMCL 22 (1998), 19–30. The problems in Ladeur’s account might be demonstrated by the following statement (Ladeur, Anfang [n.1], 120): “Nach dem Ende des (weströmischen) Reiches kam es aber erst in der Karolinger Zeit [sic] zu systematischen Sammlungen des kirchlichen Rechts. Es ist bezeichnend, dass die ersten Sammlungen von Karl dem Großen angeregt worden sind, und zwar zu Beginn des 9. Jahrhunderts.” On the Concordia canonum, composed by Cresconius in the sixth century, one of the early systematic collections see Klaus Zechiel-Eckes, Die Concordia canonum des Cresconius. Studien und Edition, 2 vols (Frankfurt a.M., 1992). On the history of the canon law collections, arising since the fourth century, see the handbook by Lotte Kéry, Canonical Collections of the Early Middle Ages (ca. 400–1140) (Washington D.C., 1999). On the collectio Dionysio-Hadriana, which was probably referred to by Ladeur, but whose official affiliation has become subject to debate, see Kéry, Canonical Collections (n.8), 13–20 with further references; and Abigail Firey, “‘Mutating Monsters’: Approaches to ‘Living Texts’ of the Carolingian Era,” Digital Proceedings of the Lawrence J. Schoenberg Symposium on Manuscript Studies in the Digital Age: vol. 2/iss. 1, Article 1 (2010), available at https://repository.upenn.edu/ljsproceedings/vol2/iss1/1.
Formal description by Philipp Lenz, “Cod. Sang. 673,” in Die Handschriften der Stiftsbibliothek St. Gallen, ed. Philipp Lenz, Stefania Ortelli, vol. 3 (Wiesbaden, 2014), 17–20, and Lenz, “The Codicology (in this volume).”
Philipp Lenz, “The Context of Transmission of the Decretum Gratiani in Sankt Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek, Cod. 673 (= Sg): An Investigation of pp. 201a–246b,” in Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Congress of Medieval Canon Law: Toronto, 5–11 August 2012, ed. Joseph Goering, Stephan Dusil, Andreas Thier, MIC C/15 (Vatican City, 2016), 95–114.
For a survey of the contents see Carlos Larrainzar, “El borrador de la ‘Concordia’ de Gratiano: Sankt Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek MS 673 (= Sg),” Ius ecclesiae 11 (1999), 593–666, 601–606 and 653–664; and more recently Enrique de Leon, “Collectio Sangallensis,” BMCL 27 (2007), 57–67.
In more detail, see below, section 2.; as an informed survey of recent date see Stephan Dusil, Wissensordnungen des Rechts im Wandel. Päpstlicher Jurisdiktionsprimat und Zölibat zwischen 1000 und 1215 (Leuven, 2018), 331–334.
Melodie Harris Eichbauer, “Gratian’s Decretum and the Changing Historiographical Landscape,” History Compass 11/12 (2013), 1111–1125, available at https://doi.org/10.1111/hic3.12119.
Groundbreaking: Anders Winroth, The Making of Gratian’s Decretum (Cambridge, 2000); as an early survey Anders Winroth, “Recent Work on the making of Gratian’s Decretum,” BMCL 26 (2004/2006), 1–29; for a more recent survey Eichbauer, “Gratian’s Decretum (n. 13),” 1112–1118, and already Melodie Harris Eichbauer, From Gratian’s Concordia discordantium canonum to Gratian’s Decretum: The Evolution from Teaching Text to Comprehensive Code of Canon Law (PhD thesis Washington D.C., 2010), 2–27.
For a survey on Gratian’s Decretum in general see Peter Landau, “Gratian and the ‘Decretum Gratiani’,” in The History of Canon Law in the Classical Period, 1140–1234: From Gratian to the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX, ed. Wilfried Hartmann, Kenneth Pennington (Washington D.C., 2008), 22–54. For a survey on the complex history of research in Gratian see Carlos Larrainzar, “La investigación actual sobre el Decreto de Graciano,” ZRG.KA 90 (2004), 27–59.
Winroth, Making (n. 14), 122–144 and passim.
Larrainzar, “El borrador (n. 11),” 593–666.
See in particular: Carlos Larrainzar, “La formación del Decreto de Graciano por etapas,” ZRG.KA 87 (2001), 67–83, at 68 and 72; Carlos Larrainzar, “La ricerca attuale sul ‘Decretum Gratiani’,” in La cultura giuridico-canonica medioevale: premesse per un dialogo ecumenico, ed. Enrique de León, Nicolás Álvarez de las Asturias (Milano, 2003), 45–88 and 72–97; Carlos Larrainzar, “Datos sobre la antiguedad del manuscrito Sg: su redacción de C.27 9.2,” in ‘Panta rei’. Studi dedicati a Manlio Bellomo, ed. Orazio Condorelli, vol. 3 (Rome 2004), 205–237; Carlos Larrainzar, “Métodos para el anàlisis de la formación literaria del Decretum Gratiani: ‘etapas’ y ‘esquemas’ de redacción,” in Proceedings of the Thirteenth International Congress of Medieval Canon Law: Esztergom, 3–8 August 2008, ed. Peter Erdö, Szabolcs Anzelm Szuromi (Città del Vaticano 2010), 85–115, at 97–98, 105 and passim.
For a recent survey: Eichbauer, From Gratian’s Decretum (n. 14), 10–14; see also Atria A. Larson, Master of Penance. Gratian and the Development of Penitential Thought and Law in the Twelfth Century (Washington D.C., 2014), 18–20, and, more recently, John C. Wei, Gratian the Theologian (Washington D.C., 2016), 6–9.
Kenneth Pennington, “Gratian, Causa 19 and the Birth of Canonical Jurisprudence,” in La cultura giuridico-canonica medioevale: premesse per un dialogo ecumenico, ed. Enrique de León, Nicolás Álvarez de las Asturias (Milano, 2003), 211–232; updated version in ‘Panta rei’. Studi dedicati a Manlio Bellomo, ed. Orazio Condorelli, vol. 4 (Rome, 2004), 339–355. On a similar line Atria A. Larson, “The Evolution of Gratian’s Tractatus de penitentia,” BMCL 26 (2004/06), 59–123, at 93–115; reluctant, however, Atria A. Larson, Master of Penance, 19 with n. 44; see also Atria A. Larson, “Early Stages of Gratian’s Decretum and the Second Lateran Council: A Reconsideration,” BMCL 27 (2007), 21–56, at 25–26.
Larrainzar, “El borrador (n. 11),” 607–612; see also Carlos Larrainzar, “La edición crítica del Decreto de Graciano,” BMCL 27 (2007), 71–103, at 83.
Anders Winroth, “Recent Work on the Making of Gratian’s Decretum (n. 14),” 11–21. See also Alfons Maria Stickler, “Iter Helveticum,” Traditio 14 (1958), 462–484. Along the same line Jean Werckmeister, “Le manuscrit 673 de Saint-Gall: un décret de gratien primitif?,” RDC 60 (2012), 155–170, at 168–170. See also Jean Werckmeister, Décret de Gratien. Causes 27 à 36. Le Mariage, Source canonique 3/Revue de droit canonique 58/59 (Paris, 2011), 16.
John Wei, “A Reconsideration of St. Gall, Stiftsbibliothek 673 (Sg) in Light of the Sources of Distincions 5–7 of the De penitentia,” BMCL 27 (2007), 141–179, at 142 with the argument of Sg representing an “abbreviation of a first-recension manuscript interpolated with canons taken from a second-recension manuscript.”
Eichbauer, From Gratian’s Decretum (n. 14), 15 with n. 41, see also 30, 230 and passim.
Cf. Lenz, “Cod. Sang. 673 (n. 9),” 17. In more detail see the appendices in Larrainzar, “El borrador (n. 11),” 662–666.
Cf. for example Sg 8a with marginal references to distinctio 33 (Sankt Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek, Cod. Sang. 673: Decretum Gratiani, https://www.e-codices.unifr.ch/de/list/one/csg/0673). For a more detailed analysis see Larrainzar, “El borrador (n. 11),” 634–635, 653–654.
Wei, “Reconsideration (n. 23),” 148–151, 166–168, 173–175.
Very strongly in this direction Titus Lenherr, “Die vier Fassungen von C. 3 Q. 1 D.P. C. 6 im Decretum Gratiani. Zugleich ein Einblick in die neueste Diskussion um das Werden von Gratians Dekret,” AKKR 169 (2000), 353–381 (<https://doi.org/10.30965/2589045X-16902002>), at 375.
On this aspect see José Miguel Viejo-Ximénez, “La composición del decreto de graciano,” Ius Canonicum 90 (2005), 431–485, at 467–468 and passim; same direction of argument in Larson, “Evolution (n. 20),” 110.
Frederick Paxton, “La Cause 13 de Gratien et la composition du Décret,” RDC 51 (2001), 233–249.
Titus Lenherr, Ist die Handschrift 673 der St. Galler Stiftsbibliothek (Sg) der Entwurf zu Gratians Dekret? Versuch einer Antwort aus Beobachtungen zu D. 31 und D. 32, without date, MGH Library, call-nr. a 117039, online available <https://www.mgh-bibliothek.de/dokumente/a/a117039.pdf>, 17–18; Lenherr, “Die vier Fassungen (n. 28),” 374–375, and in particular Wei, “Reconsideration (n. 23),” passim. See also, below, section 3, for the use of Roman law.
See as a still very valuable survey and introduction Kéry, Canonical Collections (n. 8), 100–117, 214–215, 244–250, with further references.
Kenneth Pennington, “An Earlier Recension of Hostiensis’s Lectura on the Decretals,” BMCL 17 (1987), 77–90, reprinted in Popes, Canonists and Texts, 1150–1550, ed. Kenneth Pennington (Aldershot, 1993). In general see Kenneth Pennington, Bio-Bibliographical Guide to Medieval and Early Modern Jurists (2019, online <https://amesfoundation.law.harvard.edu/BioBibCanonists/HomePage_biobib2.php>), no. a266 (<https://amesfoundation.law.harvard.edu/BioBibCanonists/Report_Biobib2.php?record_id=a266>).
Rudolf Weigand, Die Glossen zum Dekret Gratians. Studien zu den frühen Glossen und Glossenkompositionen (Rome, 1991), summarized by Rudolf Weigand, “The Development of the Glossa ordinaria to Gratian’s Decretum,” in The History of Canon Law in the Classical Period, 1140–1234: From Gratian to the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX, ed. Wilfried Hartmann, Kenneth Pennington (Washington D.C., 2008), 55–97.
For a survey Cédric Giraud, “Introduction: Schools and the ‘Renaissance of the Twelfth Century’,” in A Companion to Twelfth-Century Schools, ed. Cédric Giraud (Leiden/Boston, 2019), 1–9 (online <https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004410138_002>).
James A. Brundage, “The Teaching and Study of Canon Law in the Law Schools,” in The History of Canon Law in the Classical Period, 1140–1234: From Gratian to the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX, ed. Wilfried Hartmann, Kenneth Pennington (Washington D.C., 2008), 98–120; James A. Brundage, “Legal Learning and the Professionalization of Canon Law,” in Law and Learning in the Middle Ages. Proceedings of the second Carlsberg Academy Conference on Medieval Legal History 2005, ed. Helle Vogt (Copenhagen, 2006), 5–27; Kenneth Pennington, “The Beginnings of Law Schools in the Twelfth Century,” in A Companion to Twelfth-Century Schools, ed. Cédric Giraud (Leiden/Boston 2019), 226–249 (online https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004410138_012); Anders Winroth, “The Teaching of Law in the Twelfth Century,” in Law and Learning in the Middle Ages. Proceedings of the Second Carlsberg Academy Conference on Medieval Legal History 2005, ed. Helle Vogt (Copenhagen, 2006), 41–62.
In this direction apparently Larson, “Evolution (n. 20),” 114, and Kenneth Pennington, “The Big Bang. Roman Law in the Early Twelfth Century,” Rivista internazionale di diritto commune 18 (2007), 43–70, at 64, 69.
Towards that direction Lenherr, “Handschrift 673 (n. 31),” 18, and Lenherr, “Die vier Fassungen (n. 28),” 375; on the reportatio in general see Olga Weijers, “Methods and Tools of Learning,” in A Companion to Twelfth-Century Schools, ed. Cédric Giraud (Leiden/Boston 2019), 95–112, at 112; see in more detail Francesco Siri, “Lectio, disputatio, reportatio. Note su alcune pratiche didattiche nel XII secolo e sulla loro trasmissione,” in Per Alfonso Maierù. Raccolta di studi dei suoi allievi, ed. Massimiliano Lenzi, Cesare A. Musatti, Luisa Valente (Rome, 2013), 109–128, at 125–128.
See the references in n. 36.
Adam Vetulani, “Gratien et le droit romain,” Revue historique de droit français et étranger 4e série 24–25 (1946–1947), 11–48 (reprinted in Adam Vetulani, Sur Gratien et les décrétales: Recueil d’études, ed. Wacław Uruszczak [Aldershot, 1990]); Winroth, Making (n. 14), 148–157; José Miguel Viejo-Ximénez, “Las etapas de incorporación de los textos romanos al Decreto de Graciano.” in Proceedings of the Eleventh International Congress of Medieval Canon Law: Catania, 30 July–6 August 2000, ed. Manlio Bellomo (Città de Vaticano, 2006), 139–152 (see already José Miguel Viejo-Ximénez, “El Derecho Romano ‘nuevo’ en el Decreto de Graciano,” ZRG.KA 88 [2002], 1–19, and José Miguel Viejo-Ximénez, “Les étapes de l’incorporation des textes romain dans le Décret de Gratien,” RDC 51 [2001], 251–260).
Winroth, Making (n. 14), 156–157; on this point in agreement with Winroth is Pennington, “Big Bang (n. 37),” 53.
Cf. Pennington, “Big Bang (n. 37),” 60–61, referring to Sg 170: Error personae est ut cum putatur Stichus ipse est Pamphilius. For the first recension see the preliminary edition of the first recension of Gratian’s Decretum by Anders Winroth, online available <http://gratian.org/app/download/767795281/Decretum+Gratiani.pdf>, page 765, line 35–36 (Error persone est, quando hic putatur esse Virgilius, et ipse est Plato).
Pennington, “Big Bang (n. 37),” 49.
Andreas Thier, “Ecclesia vivit lege Romana,” in Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, 2nd edition, ed. Albrecht Cordes, vol. 2 (Berlin, 2008), cols. 1176–1177.
On this aspect see Viejo-Ximénez, “Etapas (n. 40).”
Sg 55a: Iustinianus in suis hoc correxit constitutionibus et infra x. dies appellationis remedium cuiquam dandum decreuit in illa lege; see also Pennington, “Big Bang (n. 37),” 47 with n. 16.
Cf. Pennington, “Beginnings (n. 36),” 227–237.
Linda Fowler-Magerl, Ordo iudiciorum vel ordo iudiciarius. Begriff und Literaturgattung (Frankfurt/Main, 1984); id., Ordines iudiciarii and Libelli de ordine iudiciorum. From the Middle of the Twelfth to the End of the Fifteenth Century (Typologie des sources du moyen âge occidental 63) (Turnhout, 1994); Knut Wolfgang Nörr, “Ordo iudiciorum und ordo iudiciarius,” Studia Gratiana 11 (1967), 327–344. See also Kurt Röttgers, “Anmerkungen zum Ursprung des juristischen Prozessbegriffs,” Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 29 (1985), 116–124.