If I am right in my assumption that the treatises of the GroÃschrift are united by a focus on the dispute with the Gnostics,1 it is necessary to examine V.8 in the context of both the preceding treatise (i.e. III.8) and the subsequent ones (i.e. V.5 and II.9). Since V.8 comes after III.8, which is devoted to Plotinusâ concept of contemplation, I will first very briefly summarise its conclusions (section 3.1), because it plays an important role in the discussion with the Gnostics. I shall also try to sketch out Plotinusâ notion of contemplation with regard to other treatises. A properly grounded notion of productive contemplation enables Plotinus to maintain simultaneously the continuity and hierarchy2 of the different levels of his universe, which is of importance even for the question of beauty. If Intellect is beautiful, a claim which the Gnostics would probably assent to, and the universe is continuous, albeit hierarchically ordered, it necessarily follows that even the sensible world is, within its own limits, beautiful. Subsequently, I shall discuss the treatise On Intelligible Beauty, along with relevant passages from V.5 and II.9. Once again, I shall divide the treatise in a rather systematic fashion, focusing on sensible (section 3.2), psychic (section 3.3) and intelligible beauty (section 3.4), and on the relation of beauty to the Good (section 3.5). In each section, I shall focus on those aspects and perspectives that are novel as compared to treatise I.6, namely the discussion of Ïá½³Ïνη and the defence of sensible beauty in section 3.2, the beauty of the world soul and the individual souls of heavenly bodies in section 3.3, the means used to describe the supreme unity in multiplicity of Intellect and connect it with beauty in section 3.4 and, finally, further details concerning the relation of beauty to the Good in section 3.5.
3.1 Productive Contemplation
According to treatise III.8, everything stems from contemplation, participates in contemplation and aims at contemplation whenever possible (cf. III.8.7). After all, Intellect, as the structure of the intelligible forms and the paradigm of everything below it, is also an activity of self-contemplation. Consequently, everything that participates in Intellect also participates in contemplation. The being of each thing becomes, on the model of Intellect, the active performance of self-relation. There is thus a continuum of productive contemplation (cf. III.8.8), or as Plotinus puts it, âthat which is produced must always be of the same kind as its producer, but weaker through losing its virtue as it comes downâ (III.8.5.23â24). Specifically, there is Intellect, which contemplates itself as contemplation, so that there is a unity of contemplation and of that which is contemplated. Next, we find soul, whose upper part contemplates Intellect, but as something in soul, i.e. as λόγοι, and in this sense, what it tries to reach remains external to it. The lower part of soul, nature, contemplates these λόγοι, according to which it creates, but they are external to it because they reside in the upper soul (cf. Roloff 1970, pp. 17â22).3 As can be seen, the differentiation of these various levels of knowledge is caused by the gradual disintegration of the unity of contemplation and its object, as it is found in Intellect (cf. III.8.8). Moreover, this disintegration leads to decreasing clarity of contemplation on each individual level, as we descend from the Intellect (cf. III.8.8 and VI.7.7).
As a result, it is also possible to say, albeit in a very specific sense, that there is a supreme kind of contemplation in the Good, which is marked by utter unity. However, we must not understand this unique kind of contemplation as implying any form of duality: we must neither differentiate the Good from its knowledge, nor distinguish between the subject of knowing in the Good and the object known (cf. V.6.6). At the same time, simply to draw the conclusion that the Good does not know itself would be at least as erroneous. âNot knowingâ not only implies the same duality between knower and known, but also a deficiency. For this reason, one can say neither that the Good knows itself, nor that it does not know itself (cf. VI.9.6, VI.7.37), for it is beyond knowing (cf. V.3.12, VI.7.40). The contemplation of the Good must be understood as a form of touching or contact with itself (Î¸á½·Î¾Î¹Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ οἷον á¼ÏαÏá½´; V.3.10.41â44), simple concentration (á¼Ïλῠá¼Ïιβολὴ; VI.7.39.1â2) or immediate self-consciousness (ÏÏ Î½Î±á½·ÏθηÏιÏ; V.4.2.18). All of these are ways in which Plotinus tries to express the absolute transcendence of the Good, which, at the same time, implies the superlative possession of every predicate, in the sense of being its source. When not speaking correctly (οá½Îº á½ÏθῶÏ; cf. VI.8.13), Plotinus even dares to say that, in a sense, the Good generates itself by looking at itself (cf. VI.8.16). In this way, we may conclude that there is a continuity of contemplation even between the Good and the Intellect, although it is, at the same time, accompanied by insurmountable transcendence of the first principle.4
This very brief summary gives us a rough idea of the sense in which contemplation is knowledge. Plotinus goes a step further, however: all contemplation is creative or fruitful. The Good is creative in the sense of overflowingâsince it is perfectly complete (cf. V.2.1, V.1.6, V.3.12, IV.8.6, V.5.12)âor emanating (cf. V.1.6), while remaining in itself (cf. V.5.12), similar to how the sun shines. In its overflowing, Intellect comes to be that which emanates from the Good, turns back to it, receives an imprint from it and thus is constituted (cf. III.4.1, VI.7.16).
In a different context, Plotinus systematically presents his concept of productive contemplation as a double activity that is both internal (á¼Î½á½³Ïγεια Ïá¿Ï οá½ÏίαÏ) and external (á¼Î½á½³Ïγεια á¼Îº Ïá¿Ï οá½ÏίαÏ; cf. V.2.1 and especially V.4).5 The internal activity here denotes the act of self-relation or contemplation in virtue of which everything is what it is. This internal activity is completed by the external activity, which Plotinus expresses with the help of the metaphors of pregnancy and begetting (cf. V.1.6, V.2.1, V.4.1), emanative overflowing (cf. V.1.6, V.2.1) and illumination (cf. V.1.6, V.3.12). In all of these cases, the external activity is said to be an image of the internal one (cf. IV.5.7, V.1.6, V.2.1, V.3.7). As the metaphors of a spring and a source of light suggest, the external activity is fully dependent on the internal one: if the internal activity were to stop, so too would the external one. Conversely, the external activity in no way diminishes or changes the internal one. It is thus more appropriate to conceive of them not as two separate activities, but as one double activity (cf. II.9.8), in the sense of Plotinusâ notion of absolute motions (á¼Ïá½¹Î»Ï Ïοι κινήÏειÏ; cf. VI.1.22 and VI.3.21â26). By âabsolute motionâ, he means that a motion does not need to be completed by its end, as Aristotle thinks.6 This only seems to be the case when we delimit the motion, by qualifying it with some kind of quality or extent (cf. VI.1.16). Examples of absolute motions include, for Plotinus, walking, talking, dancing (cf. VI.3.22), writing (cf. VI.1.19), thinking (cf. VI.1.22), burning or the action of a drug in a body (cf. VI.1.22, V.4.1). All of these are activities that are directed towards themselves and not towards some external end. Nevertheless, in all of these cases there is also something external that these activities produce in an entirely incidental manner, e.g. fire, a drug and walking respectively produce heat, health and footprints. The external act here is merely an expression of the internal one: it is not an independent act, but something produced incidentally, albeit necessarily. The inner activity of the Good described above with reference to treatise VI.8 is, in this sense, called absolute (VI.8.20.4â8). Correspondingly, Intellect is said either to be or to contain a trace (á¼´ÏνοÏ) of the Good (cf. III.8.11, V.5.5, VI.7.17, VI.8.18) and its generation is, in this sense, the external activity of the Good.
Since the concept of internal and external activity is a tool that is employed systematically, we may also apply it to the other hypostases.7 The internal activity of the Intellect is its unique way of thinking itself as the plurality of ideas. What makes it unique is the complete identity of contemplation and its object (cf. III.8.8), a topic that Plotinus also discusses in treatise V.8.4, which I shall address in section 3.4. What, then, is the external activity of the Intellect? In treatise III.2.1â2, Plotinus says that Intellect, while remaining in itself, gives something of itself to matter, i.e. λόγοι, with the help of which Intellect creates everything. At the same time, however, the starting point of the sensible universe, which is, in this sense, a mixture of matter and λόγοι, is soul (cf. III.2.2). As already noted in section 2.3, sensibles can be said to be caused both by the soul and by the Intellect. The former explanation is to be understood as being more advanced or detailed than the latter. It is through λόγοι that soul organises the universe (cf. III.5.9). Every soul possesses all of the λόγοι as a single λόγοÏ, but, so to speak, divides and distributes this Î»á½¹Î³Î¿Ï out into the world (cf. III.2.17, IV.4.16). But is the soul then not the real product of Intellect? It is, because Î»á½¹Î³Î¿Ï is merely an image of Intellect in the soul and, in this sense, it is soul itself, i.e. a soul which has received an imprint from the Intellect after turning back to it (cf. Deck 1967, p. 61). Therefore, soul is also said to be a trace (á¼´ÏνοÏ) of Intellect, i.e. its external activity (cf. V.1.7, VI.7.20) and also a Î»á½¹Î³Î¿Ï and εἰκών of it (cf. III.8.2 and V.1.3).
Of course, there is some sort of creativity even in the contemplation engaged in by soul, or rather in both of its parts (i.e. the upper part and the lower part), as well as in both kinds of soul (i.e. the world soul and individual souls).8 Nature is said to be an unmoved Î»á½¹Î³Î¿Ï silently contemplating itself, which gives a share of itself to the substrate of the sensible world (cf. III.8.2â3), and eternally gives rise to it (cf. III.4.4, IV.3.6, IV.3.9). However, nature itself is a product of the contemplation engaged in by the higher part of soul, which Plotinus claims is clearer and always illuminated by the Intellect, as compared to the blurry and weak contemplation occurring in nature (cf. III.8.4â5). Deck (1967, pp. 42â46) takes these passages to be using ÏοίηÏÎ¹Ï in a looser sense than when it is used in relation to Intellect. The higher part of the soul creates by projecting itself into its product, i.e. into nature. In this sense, there is a combination of mobility and immobility, since the higher part of the soul simultaneously remains in itself and projects itself downwards (cf. V.2.1). The same principle applies to nature, but to an even higher degree, because it creates matter and then turns towards it again in order to form it (cf. III.9.3, IV.3.9, III.4.1).
With this conception of creative contemplation, Plotinus is able to maintain both continuity and hierarchy in his universe. This will be needed in order to defend the beauty of the sensible world not only in treatise V.8, but also, above all, in II.9. After all, Plotinus begins V.8 with a clear reference to his notion of contemplation.
3.2 The Defence of Ïá½³Ïνη and Sensible Beauty
Like treatise I.6, Ennead V.8 also promotes the notion of beauty as form. However, the reasoning is slightly different here. Plotinus begins by rejecting the view that the cause of beauty is matter9 or a physical property, like colour or shape (cf. V.8.2.4â9 and Beutler-Theilerâs com. ad V.8.2.6). He then proclaims the form in which a given thing participates as the true source of sensible beauty (cf. V.8.2.14â16), before finally giving support to his thesis by means of a brief debate with an imaginary opponent, to whom he first objects that if mass (á½Î³ÎºÎ¿Ï)10 was beauty, the reason-principle (λόγοÏ)âwhich his opponent acknowledges to be the productive principle in contrast to massâwould not, as the opposite of mass, be beautiful. Given the principle of the superiority of the cause, however, this implication is unacceptable to Plotinus (cf. V.8.2.19â21). Moreover, the same form can make both what is small and what is large beautiful, so beauty does not depend on mass (cf. V.8.2.21â24).11 Another argument that Plotinus advances in support of his position is that it is not the mass of sensible objects that enters into the soul through the eyes, but only the forms of these objects. If it were the mass that entered the soul, it would be difficult to explain how it would be able to pass through such a small organ as the eye (cf. V.8.2.24â27).12 Finally, Plotinus argues that if the cause of beauty were ugly, it could not create its opposite. If it were neither beautiful nor ugly, it would not be comprehensible why it begets the beautiful rather than the ugly (cf. V.8.2.28â31).
In this list of arguments, I did not include the famous stone-sculpture comparison, because it is part of a relatively independent section of V.8, on the beauty of Ïá½³Ïνη.13 In V.8.1, Plotinus urges his reader to compare an unworked stone with a statue whose beauty is caused by spiritual beauty. However, the statue that he has in mind is not to be shaped in the likeness of a specific person, but rather in the likeness of all beautiful people, i.e. in accordance with a form. Such a statue, which partakes of this mode of beauty, will be beautiful to the extent to which the sculptor has succeeded in giving form to the matter of the stone (cf. V.8.1.6â11). The whole proof that it is a form and not matter which is the cause of beauty in a given thing thus unfolds in four steps:
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As the comparison of an unworked stone and a statue shows, matter is not a sufficient condition for concluding that a thing is beautiful, because in that case the unworked stone would be equally beautiful (cf. V.8.1.11â14).14
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A form is not already in matter (e.g. in a stone). It must first be invested in it by a ÏεÏνίÏÎ·Ï (cf. V.8.1.14â18).
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The beauty which enters into a stone is inferior to the beauty found in Ïá½³Ïνη (cf. V.8.1.18â21).
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The Î»á½¹Î³Î¿Ï that enters into matter does not stay pure. Rather, it is actualised only to the extent that the matter submits to Ïá½³Ïνη (cf. V.8.1.21â22).15 It is necessary to understand this process in connection with Plotinusâ notion of productive contemplation as elaborated in treatise III.8.
The unity of these two aspects, the noetic and the creative, is captured well in Greek by the word Ïá½³Ïνη. ΤέÏνη is one form of human participation in Intellect; it is the spiritual means of knowing, but lacks the quality of being immediately all-encompassing, unlike its model. It is through his productive knowledge, i.e. his participation in Ïá½³Ïνη, that the ÏεÏνίÏÎ·Ï is able to form matter and thus portray a person at all. Beauty in Ïá½³Ïνη, which Plotinus discusses later in the text, is therefore beauty in contemplation, while what is contemplated through λόγοι are the forms themselves, that is, Intellect. In virtue of his participation in Ïá½³Ïνη, the ÏεÏνίÏÎ·Ï makes himself similar to the Intellect, that is, to productive self-contemplation. This is why Plotinus can say that beauty in Ïá½³Ïνη is a higher beauty, while only a lower beauty enters into the sculpture. Furthermore, it does so only to the extent to which the matter of such a mixture, body, submits to what is being createdâin other words, to the extent to which the sculpture participates in the form that it makes present in the world. A form is present in the world, however, as a reason-principle (λόγοÏ), which the ÏεÏνίÏÎ·Ï invests in the thing (cf. Rist 1967, pp. 84â102). ΤέÏνη, as the cause of the beauty of its products, which enables them to participate in what it itself has (i.e. beauty), is more beautiful than its products. According to Plotinus, being more beautiful also implies a higher degree of unification. To illustrate his point, he uses analogies, such as the decrease in bodily strength, heat and potency when these are diffused into space. One could also express this idea by saying that the cause is always homogenous with what is caused, in the sense that the cause lends to the caused what the cause itself has. However, the caused can only accept this characteristic from its cause in a weakened form. Plotinus wishes to apply this principle of the superiority of the cause universally (cf. Emilsson 2017, p. 367), illustrating it here with the example of Î¼Î¿Ï Ïική, as the cause of someoneâs being a Î¼Î¿Ï ÏικόÏ. Indeed, he even mentions a kind of intelligible Î¼Î¿Ï Ïική as the cause of worldly Î¼Î¿Ï Ïική (cf. V.8.1.22â32).16
Consequently, Plotinus opposes those who do not sufficiently appreciate art for its imitative nature.17 He presents three objections against this view: First, nature too is an imitation of something higher, i.e. the Intellect (cf. V.8.1.32â34). Second, a ÏεÏνίÏÎ·Ï has access to the λόγοι behind the sensibles, such that the object of artâs imitation is the same as that of nature (cf. V.8.1.34â36).18 Third, a Ïá½³Ïνη may depict things that do not exist in nature, and even if it does portray something sensible, it adjusts and adds what is fitting (cf. V.8.1.36â38). Plotinus illustrates this in the lines that immediately follow, when he talks about a statue of Zeus that was made by Pheidias not according to something he perceived with his eyes, but according to how it would be if Zeus were to appear before him (cf. V.8.1.38â40; for the context of this example, see Kalligas 2013, com. ad V.8.1.32â40). The statue of Zeus is thus his ideal portrait, which means that it has been created according to an individual form.19
To summarise tentatively the discussion of sensible beauty in treatise V.8, we can say that Plotinus introduces several new arguments for his notion of beauty as form and draws apologetic consequences from it for the notion of Ïá½³Ïνη. However, in the context of the debate with the Gnostics, who disdain the sensible world, a defence of sensible beauty is required in the field of Ïá½»ÏÎ¹Ï rather than Ïá½³Ïνη. Plotinus uses Platoâs texts as a common ground for the discussion with the Gnostics in the GroÃschrift and presents his thesis about the beauty of the cosmos originating in Intellect as the correct interpretation of Platoâs doctrines (cf. V.8.8.7â23). He argues that Plato sought to show, through the beauty of the sensible world, the beauty of the intelligible model in accordance with which it was created, and that Plato did so particularly in Tim. 37câd.20 For it is generally true, Plotinus says, that an image is beautiful when its model is beautiful. As proof of this, Plotinus mentions that those who admire a thing modelled on something else, actually admire or direct their admiration (θαῦμα) towards the model itself, even if they do not know what is happening to them (cf. Phdr. 250â¯f.), as is the case of most lovers (οἱ á¼ÏῶνÏεÏ) and, more generally, admirers of the beauty found down here (οἱ Ïὸ Ïá¿Î´Îµ Îºá½±Î»Î»Î¿Ï ÏÎµÎ¸Î±Ï Î¼Î±Îºá½¹ÏεÏ). The cosmos, he claims, must therefore be considered beautiful or even perfect, to the extent to which it participates in the paradigm (cf. V.8.9.43â47). One can only reproach the cosmos for not being beauty itself, i.e. for not being Intellect (cf. V.8.8.22â23). In this sense, Plotinus here even calls the Intellect âmore than beautifulâ (á½Ïá½³Ïκαλον) as compared to the beauty of the sensible world, but, paradoxically, it is more than beautiful through an overwhelming beauty (κάλλει á¼Î¼Î·Ïάνῳ; cf. V.8.8.11â23, Rep. 509a6 and Darras-Worms 2018, pp. 34â35).
This line of thought is precisely the one that Plotinus develops further in many passages in treatise II.9. For example, in the fourth section he says that we should not judge the bodily world too harshly, concluding that its source is evil because there are unpleasant things in it (cf. II.9.4.22â24). Such a position confuses the intelligible world with its image. We should not despise the sensible world because âwhat other fire could be a better image of the intelligible fire than the fire here?â (II.9.4.26). Plotinus asks even more emphatically in the eighth section why we should not call the sensible world a clear (á¼Î½Î±ÏγήÏ) and beautiful (καλόν) image (á¼Î³Î±Î»Î¼Î±) of the intelligible gods, if âit has come into life in such a way that its life is not a disjointed one [â¦] but coherent (ÏÏ Î½ÎµÏá½´Ï) and clear (á¼Î½Î±ÏγήÏ) and great (Ïολλὴ) and everywhere life (ÏανÏαÏοῦ ζÏá½´), manifesting overwhelming wisdom (ÏοÏία á¼Î¼á½µÏανοÏ)?â (II.9.8.10â16, modified; cf. also Tim. 37c). Plotinus repeats that we can only belittle the bodily world if we judge it by the standards of its paradigm, but this would mean failing to see that it manifests this paradigm to the extent that a beautiful natural image can (cf. II.9.8.16â20 and Gertz 2017, com. ad II.9.8.16â19). In the spirit of this argument, Plotinus criticises the Gnosticsâ scorn for the sensible world further in the thirteenth section. If one fails to understand that an image of something only imitates it to the extent that it can, it would be necessary to despise even Intellect in opposition to the Good (cf. II.9.13.13â33). A superior conception would then involve understanding the continuous decline of what is imitated throughout the hypostases, and accordingly âone should rather meekly (ÏÏá½±ÏÏ) accept the nature of all thingsâ (II.9.13.5â6, modified). If someone were to take the contrary position, it would make that person altogether wicked (ÏάνκακοÏ), showing that they do not understand either the bodily world or its intelligible archetype (cf. II.9.16.1â5 and 12â14). The behaviour of the Gnostics does, however, actually show that they recognise bodily beauty, because they are proud to despise even it (cf. II.9.17.27â31 and Gertz 2017, com. ad II.9.17.21â31). Plotinus illustrates this point with a comparison of living in a beautiful house built for us by the world soul (cf. II.9.18.3â17). We can either despise it, but live in it anywayâas the Gnostics doâor recognise the skill with which it was created and wait for the time when we will no longer be in need of a house. The climax of this line of reasoning is approached in the thesis that if there were no beauty in the sensible world, there could not be any beauty in the Intelligible either, which is a consequence of the notion of productive contemplation (cf. Fattal 2010). However, none of this means that everything in the sensible world is beautiful. Since in bodies, the beauty in a part is not the same as the beauty in the whole (cf. section 2.2), we must correspondingly distinguish between the beauty of the whole universe and that of its parts. However, this distinction probably permits the existence of ugliness of parts when considered on their own (cf. II.9.17.25â33 and Rolof 1970, p. 217). Nevertheless, in relation to the whole, these parts must be considered beautiful if the whole itself is beautiful, because its beauty is distributed to all of its parts (cf. section 2.2).
Similarly, at the end of V.8, Plotinus accuses the Gnostics of not understanding productive contemplation correctly and thus wrongly appreciating the world.21 He once again appeals to Plato, but also to the older mythical tradition to support his thesis. He understands the cosmogony of Îá½ÏανόÏ, ÎÏá½¹Î½Î¿Ï and ÎÎµá½»Ï as an allegory for the procession of Intellect from the Good and of the soul from Intellect (cf. V.8.12â13 and Theog. 126â138 and 453â506). In this allegory, Zeus resembles his father in the same way as a picture resembles its model, and he himself causes the creation of another cosmos, that is, the sensible one, which he rules. This cosmos too emerges like a picture of a beautiful model and is beautiful. Through Zeus, it participates in the beauty, being and life of Intellect and therefore has life, exists as an image and is beautiful as a result of being derived from what is above it. Like its predecessors, it is as a whole also eternal, despite being created, because Intellect and the soul are naturally, necessarily, and eternally characterised by their external activity. However, the created nature of the cosmos should not, according to Plotinus, be taken to imply that there was a time when the cosmos did not exist, because time emerged together with it. In this sense, it has always existed and will continue to exist forever (cf. V.8.12.11â20). Both the claim that the world is a beautiful image and that, as such, it is eternalâderived as they are from Plotinusâ notion of productive contemplation and beauty of Intellectâshould once again be understood as an attack on the Gnostics, who not only misunderstand the notion of an image,22 but dare to talk about the creation and destruction of the world as if it were to happen in time (cf. this recurring theme in II.9.4, 7â8 and 12).
From a different perspective, the existence of sensible beauty could be objected to by pointing out the ugliness of matter. However, in order to defend sensible beauty, Plotinus is even willing to shift from a conception of matter (á½Î»Î·) as a purely negative element to one that emphasises its kinship with beings, on the grounds that it is not the absolute opposite of true being, but only different from it.23 In this sense, it is a kind of last form (Îµá¼¶Î´á½¹Ï Ïι á¼ÏÏαÏον), and Plotinus can therefore understand the cosmos as a whole as the sum of forms (cf. V.8.7.18â28).
Appreciating sensible beauty is, in this sense, only a matter of the correct understanding of the whole or of looking at it through the prism of its paradigm while understanding the concept of productive contemplation. If we look at nature in the right way, that is, if we look at the reason-principle (λόγοÏ) rather than at the motion that it causes, then we understand that nature is actually beautiful and its cause even more so. Plotinus compares the confusion of the person (probably a Gnostic) who does not see spiritual beauty behind the outer façade of nature, with Narcissusâ fatal misunderstanding (cf. V.8.2.34â38 and Miles 1999, p. 44). The ambiguity of beauty has already been touched upon in treatise I.6 (cf. section 2.4) and I hoped to find new clues in V.8. Since, however, V.8 is a part of the GroÃschrift, the search may be naturally extended to V.5, the next treatise in chronological order. In the twelfth section of V.5, the aforementioned ambiguity is explicitly associated with beauty as such, even on the level of Intellect. Plotinus says there that beauty âeven draws those who do not know what is happening away from the Good, as the beloved draws a child away from its father; for Beauty is youngerâ (V.5.12.36â38). The uncertainty about whether it is in the nature of beauty both to stimulate the ascent and to impede it, or whether matter is to be held responsible, cannot be resolved solely by appealing to V.8. However, V.5.12 provides relatively strong evidence in favour of the former position. Even the beauty of Intellect probably poses this kind of threat to the soul.
3.3 The Beauty of Soul: The Cosmic Dimension
In the third section of V.8, Plotinus offers a brief summary of his position: nature too, not just Ïá½³Ïνη, contains the reason-principle (λόγοÏ) in virtue of which the physical thing is beautiful. In both cases, it comes from the soul (cf. V.8.3.1â3). What must be meant here is that nature, as the lower part of soul, acquires its Î»á½¹Î³Î¿Ï from the upper part, which contemplates more clearly than nature does and is always illuminated by the Intellect (cf. III.8.4â5). Beauty in the upper part of the soul is thus necessarily more beautiful, according to the principle of the superiority of the cause. The beauty of the soul is evident especially in virtuous souls, for they approach primary beauty (i.e. Intellect) by means of purification (cf. V.8.3.3â8). In fact, the sight of the spiritual beauty of an ugly person (like Socrates; cf. Kalligas 2013, com. ad V.8.2.35â41) is sufficient reason to call that person beautiful. Anyone who did not want to do so, would not even be able to see himâor herself as beautiful. Such a person would therefore remain on the sensible level, ensnared in self-deception, just like Narcissus, not understanding that the beauty of soul is greater than that of bodies (cf. V.8.2.38â44).
On the other hand, beauty may also inspire us to contemplate its cause (cf. V.8.3.4â8). In fact, Plotinus already suggests that this is the case in the very first section of V.8, where he lays out the plan of the treatise: he addresses a (morally) advanced reader, who has already managed to contemplate the spiritual cosmos and together with whom he wishes to examine how to attain the beauty of the Intellect (cf. Smith 2018, com, ad V.8.1.1â4). At the same time, however, he assumes that a person who beholds the beauty of Intellect will also be capable of a spiritual relationship with the Good (cf. V.8.1.1â6). We may understand this as follows: to behold the beauty of Intellect means to truly understand Intellect, and, for Plotinus, to understand something means to be able to articulate its causes (cf. Wagner 1996). Then again, this also means to be able to grasp Intellect as an activity of emerging, self-constituting and returning to its source. (cf. Gatti 1996), or as an internal and external activity (cf. Emilsson 2007). In the case of Intellect, this means being able to contemplate it in relation to the Good. As Rolof (1970, p. 36) puts it, one of the organising principles of the GroÃschrift is the question of how to attain the Good. The beauty of the Intellect is, in this sense, to be understood as a means of a run-up (á½Ïμή; cf. Rep. 506e2) to the Good.
In the case of soul, however, it is necessary to expand on this interpretation. It is not possible, as it is with Intellect, to identify the understanding of the beauty of the soul with the understanding of the soul as such. For the soul, unlike Intellect, can also be ugly, namely, when it mixes with the body and imitates it.24 As Plotinus says in treatise I.2.4, soul is by nature good, but, at the same time, it is unable to remain in the real good, and thus has a natural tendency in both directions. Hence, the reference to the cause in V.8.3.4â8 must rather concern the character of beauty itself. This also corresponds to how Plotinus speaks about that which inspires us to ascend: âby adorning (κοÏμέÏ) the soul and giving it light from a greater light which is primarily beauty it makes us deduce by its very presence in the soul (á¼Î½ ÏÏ Ïῠὤν) what that before it is likeâ (V.8.3.5â7, italics O.G.). When adorned, i.e. made beautiful, the soul becomes an image of or a reference to the Intellect. In section 2.5, I already discussed what it means for a soul to become beautiful: it must be purified, converted and become like the god, which will restore it to its original state, whose archetype lies in the activity of the Intellect. When the soul becomes aware of itself as a part of the Intellect in this sense, it also becomes a λόγοÏ, which imprints itself in those parts of the soul that are not united with it. Those parts, in turn, become virtuous and acquire a share in the beauty that the highest part becomes.
In the GroÃschrift, Plotinus also considers the beauty of the souls of heavenly bodies and that of the world soul. He touches upon this point in V.8.3, where he proposes to investigate the intellect of the gods in order to get a glimpse of Intellect itself, since it is more active and visible in them (cf. V.8.3.12â23). Plotinus differentiates between two kinds of gods, both of which have in common their superiority over the human soul, that is to say, their greater proximity to the Intellect (V.8.3.27â31).25 The gods of the first kind live in the heavens, and raise their heads above its outer edge in order to catch sight of the contents of Intellect. The clear reference to Phdr. 246dâ249d (cf. Heitsch 1997, p. 101) suggests that Plotinus may be referring to heavenly bodies, which imitate Intellect with their regular circular movements. In treatise II.9.8, we do indeed find questions addressed to the Gnostics, who consider heavenly bodies to be evil archons seeking to prevent them from reaching the intelligible universe. If what Plotinus has shown is true, i.e. if the intelligible universe is beautiful and everything is creative contemplation, while the sensually perceptible universe is a beautiful image of Intellect, âwhy then are not the stars, both those in the lower spheres and those in the highest, gods moving in order, circling in well-arranged beauty?â (II.9.8.31â33). The gods of the second kind merge with the forms themselves (cf. Rolof 1970, pp. 46â47), and, as Plotinus figuratively puts it, live in another heaven.
Let us now examine in more detail what it means for such a soul to have a share in the Intellect. Why are the lesser gods beautiful? With reference to Platoâs Tim. 34a, treatise II.2(14) On the Movement of Heaven raises the question as to why the cosmos moves in a circle. This is also what the lesser gods do, according to II.9.8. The universe moves in this way because it imitates the Intellect in this fashion (cf. II.2.1). âThe soulâs power is movement round its centreâ (II.2.2.7), but this centre must be understood as referring to God, i.e. Intellect as the source of soul (cf. II.2.2). Because the soul âcannot go to him (scil. to God; O.G.), it goes round himâ (II.2.2.15â16) and it âembraces him lovingly and keeps round him as far as it canâ (II.2.2.13â14). Since the intelligible is not in place and is, in this sense, everywhere, the universe seeks to acquire it by performing circular movements, because the soul âmoves it continually in drawing it continually, not moving to some other place but towards itself in the same place [â¦] and so gives it possession of soul at every stage in its progressâ (II.2.1.46â49). Hence, the heavenly bodies not only possess spherical motion, corresponding to that of the whole universe, but each of them is also endowed with an individual motion around its centre, imitating Intellect according to its own nature (cf. II.2.2).
All of this obviously applies to the world soul, which governs the heavens, and to the individual souls of heavenly bodies. But how do things stand with individual souls below the level of the celestial bodies? Plotinus says only that there is also a natural tendency in us to perform circular movements, but as the part of our soul in question is earthly, it does not rotate easily. Additionally, there is a further constituent in us which moves in straight lines (cf. II.2.2), as bodies do (cf. II.2.1). This claim parallels what Plotinus says in treatise IV.8[6] On the Descent of the Soul into Bodies, where he acknowledges two reasons why the soulâs fellowship with the body is treacherous: the body acts as a hindrance to thought and fills the soul with pleasures, desires and griefs (cf. IV.8.2). Both the earthly character of the lower part of our soul and the natural tendency of our body to move in straight lines refer to the peculiar involvement of our soul with particular bodies. This involvement distorts the circular motion of soul and makes it difficult for these souls to govern bodies.26 As Plotinus puts it in treatise IV.8.2, our souls govern bodies that are much worse than that of the world soul. They were obliged to sink more deeply into the world on account of these bodies, which would otherwise disintegrate, since their elements would be carried off to their proper places. This makes it necessary to constantly take care of our particular bodies: âThere are two kinds of care of everything, the general, by the effortless command of one setting it in order with royal authority, and the particular, which involves actually doing something oneself and by contact with what is being done infects the doer with the nature of what is being doneâ (IV.8.2.27â31, modified).
If, in treatise V.8, Plotinus says that the lesser gods are beautiful because they are gods, i.e. because they have a share in Intellect (cf. V.8.3.23â24),27 this means that they are beautiful because they perform circular movements. By doing so, they imitate the stability and purity of Intellect and direct themselves towards it. It seems possible to combine this partial conclusion with what was said in section 2.5 about the participation of the soul in Intellect. There, we discussed the attainment of virtue by an individual soul, which needed to be purified and converted, as well as to become like Intellect. The latter process restored it to its original and beautiful state, whose archetype lies in the activity of Intellect. As we have noted, an individual soul becomes aware of itself as a part of Intellect when it accomplishes this purification, and it also becomes a Î»á½¹Î³Î¿Ï which imprints itself on those parts that are not united with Intellect and restores them in their original, orderly form. If we consider the fact that the world soul never actually lost its original, orderly form, as well as the fact that the individual souls may be influenced by their involvement with particular bodies, which causes them to lose the global perspective of the world soul, it seems to follow that the Î»á½¹Î³Î¿Ï received by an individual virtuous soul restores the original circular movement of the soul. In support of this claim, we can refer to passages from treatise I.2, where Plotinus says that the world soul desires Intellect in a similar way to how we do, and that this is why our good order also comes from Intellect (cf. I.2.1). Therefore, both the world soul and the individual souls receive good order from the Intellect.
Do the ordered state of an individual soul and that of the world soul differ in any way? I believe that they do, because restoring the circular motion of an individual soul surely does not cause the attached body to start rotating on its axis and then launching into orbit. I am sure that Porphyry would have recorded such an entertaining event, if it had occurred during one of Plotinusâ four henoses. Rather, it means that our thinking is set into such motion, while our bodily movements continue to differ from those of the heavenly bodies, because being virtuous still means being an individual whose role differs from that of the gods.28 Indeed, our analysis of V.8.3 has already shown that becoming virtuous means, among other things, understanding that one is merely a part of a larger whole. Similarly, in treatise IV.8, Plotinus admits that individual souls may share in the rule of the world soul, âlike those who live with a universal monarch and share in the government of his empireâ (IV.8.4.7â8). The restoration of a soulâs circular movement is then perhaps the strange transformation a soul undergoes when it becomes virtuous, which is responsible for the fact that the linear movements of perceived bodies do not disrupt the soulâs movements and, as referenced in section 2.5, the soul âonly makes itself aware of pleasures when it has to, using them as remedies and reliefs to prevent its activity being impeded [andâadded by O.G.] it gets rid of pains or if it cannot, bears them quietly and makes them less by not suffering with the bodyâ (I.2.5.7â12). This was, for Plotinus, obviously one of the points of Tim. 34bâ37c and 42eâ44d.
Let me add, however, that while it may seem, at the moment, that an individual soul is, in this sense, never as great or as dignified as the world soul, this is only half of the truth. An individual soul can shift between the different ontological levels becoming aware of itself as Intellect and even uniting with the Good. The latter is something the world soul never does. This is probably why Plotinus also says, at the beginning of V.8.3, that beauty of the soul is especially evident in virtuous souls, since they approach the primary beauty. On the other hand, he says a bit later that Intellect is more active and visible in gods, i.e. they are also more beautiful. This once again shows the ambiguous nature of our individual souls. They are both inferior to individual astral souls and the world soul and superior to them, because our souls may ascend to a higher level than them. Much more often, however, our souls remain sunk down below them. It seems that Plotinus lays particular emphasis on the superiority of the world soul when addressing people like the Gnostics (cf. II.9.7â9).
3.4 The Correct Understanding of Intellect and Its Beauty
Sensible beauty, as well as that of all of the various kinds of soul, is derived from the beauty of Intellect. In treatise I.6, Plotinus does not really explain how to understand this and he could even be accused of confusing his reader, since he almost carelessly oscillates between referring to the Good and the Intellect as the primary beauty. As noted in section 2.6, however, this situation is due to the fact that Plotinus here has the limited objective of showing that beauty comes from there in I.6. A treatise entitled ΠεÏὶ Ïοῦ νοηÏοῦ Îºá½±Î»Î»Î¿Ï Ï (by Porphyry of course) thus naturally raises great expectations with respect to the details it promises (cf. p. 38). This will be the topic of the present section, insofar as the âthereâ from I.6 is coextensive with the Intellect. Its overlap with the Good will then be analysed in section 3.5.
3.4.1 How Shall We Describe the Intellect?
In V.8, Plotinus approaches the description of Intellect with caution. The Intellect lies, by nature, on the boundary of speech, by means of which it is and yet is not graspable. Intellect is not graspable, because it is a model for speech and, in this sense, it is beyond speech. However, it is graspable to the extent that speech reflects the immanent structure of Intellect (cf. V.8.3.11â16). In the same spirit, Plotinus argues that it is impossible to imagine the creation of the cosmos, as if its plan had first been gradually developed and then executed in a similar way to how ÏεÏνá¿Ïαι produce various objects (cf. Platoâs Tim. and the interpretation of Plotinusâ understanding of it in section 6.1). One of the reasons29 why this is impossible is that this kind of plan could not be used to create the cosmos, because discursive thought (λογιÏμόÏ), which would be responsible for developing the plan for its construction, exists only in the world and operates with images from experience, comparing them to the forms in Intellect (cf. V.8.7.8â10). In other words, λογιÏÎ¼á½¹Ï is merely an image of Intellect and it is thus necessary to be careful in making use of it. Catching sight of Intellect is, according to Plotinus, possible through oneâs own inner purification and the understanding of oneâs own partial nature. We are merely parts of a larger whole and stand in need of purification, like a piece of gold that we have found and must wash, as well as coming to understand that we do not possess all gold, but just some of it (cf. V.8.3.12â18).
Plotinusâ famous thought experiment in V.8.9, through which he endeavours to familiarise his reader with his concept of Intellect, should be understood in this way. He appeals to the reader to try using discursive thought (διάνοια) to grasp the cosmos as a whole, by preserving the distinctness of its parts, while thinking about it as one, i.e. as a network of relations of the individual parts and the whole. From this thought, Plotinus claims, it is still necessary to remove all matter (but not in a way that would somehow reduce the size of the sphere in our imagination) and call upon God, who is the creator of the cosmos, in the hope that he appears. If he does appear, we shall contemplate his immense unity, which, however, retains the differentiation between its parts. These parts are, at once, all of the other parts and the whole (á½Î¼Î¿á¿¦ δέ εἰÏι καὶ á¼ÎºÎ±ÏÏÎ¿Ï ÏÏÏá½¶Ï Î±á½ á¼Î½ ÏÏá½±Ïει á¼Î´Î¹Î±ÏÏá½±Ïῳ; cf. V.8.9.1â26).
3.4.2 The Unity and Multiplicity of Intellect: A Debate with Aristotle
One way of understanding how everything in Intellect can be everything else and the whole, and how it is possible at the same time to talk about differences among the forms, is to approach this topic from the perspective of Plotinusâ debate with Aristotle. In several places in the Metaphysics, Aristotle addresses a question which Plotinus must have understood as threatening his understanding of the Intellect. In Book XII of the Metaphysics, the question is whether that which is thought can be said to have parts. But there, Aristotle argues that Intellect would change when passing from one part to the other. Moreover, since it has no matter, the intelligible cannot be divided (cf. Met. XII.9, 1075a6â11). Plotinus will react to this by qualifying the use of δύναμιÏ-á¼Î½á½³Ïγεια distinction on Intellect as improper and by introducing intelligible matter (I will return to both of these issues in due course). In Book XIV, the question is similar, but this time with respect to what is eternal. Can the eternal be said to have parts? No, says Aristotle, because this would entail potentiality, i.e. what may or may not be, and it could therefore not be eternal (cf. Met. XIV.2, 1088b14â28). Plotinusâ answer will once again be to deny the applicability of the δύναμιÏ-á¼Î½á½³Ïγεια distinction to Intellect. Aristotle further adds that whatever has parts is actually one and potentially many. As a composite whole, it always requires an efficient cause to unify it. Of course, this cannot be the case of the unmoved mover, which is the ultimate cause. Plotinusâ solution is to introduce a principle superior to Intellect, i.e. the Good, and a transformation of Aristotleâs understanding of causality in productive contemplation. Moreover, in Book VII, Aristotle claims that οá½Ïία cannot be composed of actual οá½Ïίαι, just as numbers are either unities (and as such are not composed) or not unities (and then can be said to have parts). His reasoning is as follows: what is actually two cannot be actually one, but only potentially one. Conversely, what is actually one can only be two potentially. Therefore, given that substance is one, it cannot have parts (cf. Met. VII. 13, 1039a3â14). It seems that Plotinusâ reaction to this involves a strict dematerialisationâas well as de-quantificationâof Intellect, such that it is not only not composed of parts in the same way that sensible substances are, but it is not even composed of parts in the same way that countable numbers are. Rather, it is οá½ÏÎ¹á½½Î´Î·Ï á¼ÏιθμόÏ, i.e. a defined multiplicity, which countable numbers only imitate (cf. chapter 5). Therefore, there are various reasons for denying that Intellect has parts, and all of them (except for the external efficient cause) are based on the Aristotelian notions of Î´á½»Î½Î±Î¼Î¹Ï and á¼Î½á½³Ïγεια.
In order to avoid these consequences, Plotinus reinterprets these notions in treatise II.5, where he focuses on the distinction between that which is Î´Ï Î½á½±Î¼ÎµÎ¹ and á¼Î½ÎµÏγείᾳ, on the one hand, and that which is Î´á½»Î½Î±Î¼Î¹Ï and á¼Î½á½³Ïγεια, on the other. That which is Î´Ï Î½á½±Î¼ÎµÎ¹ is that which is potentially something else and needs an external agent to become actual. Consequently, being potentially is always relative to being actual and vice versa (cf. II.5.1.10â21, 28â29 and 3.28â31). ÎύναμιÏ, by contrast, is a power to create or actualise something (cf. II.5.1.23â26). Something that was Î´Ï Î½á½±Î¼ÎµÎ¹ in Intellect would necessarily remain so forever, because no change can happen in Intellect and because there is no time there, but only eternity. Not even intelligible matter can be said to be Î´Ï Î½á½±Î¼ÎµÎ¹, because it is a form, and therefore an actuality. It is only in our thought that we distinguish between matter and form in Intellect (cf. II.5.3.4â19). Similarly, Intellect is á¼Î½á½³Ïγεια, and can be said to be á¼Î½ÎµÏγείᾳ only as a means differentiating it from the sensible things which can never be entirely actual (cf. II.5.3.22â40). Therefore, when applying the Î´Ï Î½á½±Î¼ÎµÎ¹-á¼Î½ÎµÏγείᾳ distinction to Intellect, one must bear in mind that it is, strictly speaking, inappropriate, a point which Plotinus underlines, albeit not systematically, by using οἷον.
3.4.3 The Unity and Multiplicity of Intellect: The Matter-Form and Science-Theorem Analogies
That said, it seems to me that the Î´Ï Î½á½±Î¼ÎµÎ¹-á¼Î½ÎµÏγείᾳ pair is one of Plotinusâ preferred means of talking about the Intellect, as can be seen from two examples. As is obvious from the parts of the Metaphysics discussed above, the Î´Ï Î½á½±Î¼ÎµÎ¹-á¼Î½ÎµÏγείᾳ distinction is linked with the distinction between matter and form. Although Plotinus denies that Intellect is composed of form and matter, in the sense that it is found in the bodies, he is willing to introduce the notion of intelligible matter, in order to be able to talk about parts of Intellect. More precisely, he uses it to designate that which all of the forms share. The form, by contrast, is that which differentiates them. This allows Plotinus to talk about genera and species in Intellect (cf. II.4.4.2â7). However, intelligible matter is, at the same time, never a substrate of change because in Intellect, everything is already and forever formed and because everything is already everything else. Intelligible matter is thus never shapeless (cf. II.4.3). Rather, it is Î½Î¿Î¿ÎµÎ¹Î´á½µÏ (cf. V.1.3.22â25 and section 3.4.6). Consequently, it is only in our minds that we separate form from matter in Intellect, considering the residual substrate undefined and shapeless. However, this signifies that the matter-form distinction, and with it also that of being potentially and actually, cannot, in fact, be properly applied to the Intellect.
The second example is that of science and its theorems. Plotinus uses this example to illustrate both that all souls are one (esp. IV.9.5, IV.3.2, III.9.2, VI.4.16, V.8.5) and that Intellect (VI.2.20, V.9.8, V.8.4) and its contents are one. The structure of the analogy is as following:30 There is a single whole (science), which has parts (theorems or propositions) that present an aspect of it. A theorem qua theorem is a piece of knowledge. What differentiates it as a piece of knowledge from other propositions is the fact that it is linked together with all of the other theorems belonging to the science and with the science as a whole. It makes sense as a theorem only against the background of the whole science and in relation to all of the other theorems. Plotinus uses the image of background and foreground to explain his claim that a theorem is actually what it is and potentially the whole of the science. But since, according to treatise II.5, the Î´Ï Î½á½±Î¼ÎµÎ¹-á¼Î½ÎµÏγείᾳ pair cannot be properly used for Intellect, there is indeed a tension here. In Intellect, everything is rather actuality itself (á¼Î½á½³Ïγεια), so that the science-theorem analogy must, in the end, be transcended. This is obvious in V.8.5, as well, where Plotinus dismisses this analogy and replaces it with the metaphor of a picture (for further details, see section 3.4.5). Therefore, Plotinus uses the other meaning of Î´á½»Î½Î±Î¼Î¹Ï instead in order to explain the science-theorem analogy. Someone who understands a theorem qua theorem has the power (δύναμιÏ) to explain the theorem within the context of the whole science, i.e. to explain the other theorems as well. The opposite is also true: the whole science is potentially all of the theorems, i.e. it is in the power of the one who has the knowledge corresponding to the whole science to actualise it in each of its theorems. The whole as such is, in this sense, greater than each individual part and greater than even their sum. It is the Î»á½¹Î³Î¿Ï in soul, which cannot be expressed, because each expression is only the actualisation of a part.
In VI.2.20, where this analogy is used for Intellect, a further element is added: science as a whole is divided into particular sciences with their theorems. However, the basic principle remains: the relationship of the theorems to partial science is the same as the relationship of partial science to science as a whole. Within the Intellect, this seems to imply that the relationship of a genus (science) to its species (particular sciences) is precisely like this, such that a genus-species relation is an integral part of the science-theorem analogy. The analogy should thus be interpreted within this context as suggesting that a genus has the power to generate its species and that a species is actual, as an expression of its genus. However, the genus is potentially present in the species, because, as a species, it makes sense only against the background of the genus.
For this reason, Plotinus seems to think that there is no tension between these two analogies. Why should there be? After all, the science in the background of a theorem is not flat, but is itself structured, i.e. there are more and less general theorems. However, there is a tension, if one understands the genus-species relation as Aristotle did. According to him (cf. Cat. V.5), a species is that in which the primary substance is included, and which is a kind of quality related to a substance specifying what kind of substance it is. A genus, on the other hand, is that in which the primary substance and its species is included, and which is a kind of quality related to substance/species specifying what kind of substance/species it is. Finally, Aristotle claims that genera and species are predicated of primary substances as their names and their λόγοι, i.e. we use them univocally. Aristotleâs account seems to imply only vertical relations, which are, moreover, all ontologically based on the primary substances (there is even a hierarchy of being more or less substance). By contrast, the theorem-science analogy implies the relation of each part to all of the other parts and the whole, in which the whole is primary, generating theorems and constituting them as theorems.
In any case, Plotinus relies more on Plato than Aristotle when introducing the species-genera model. In Platoâs Soph. 254bâ259b, the relation of everything to everything else is also introduced, since everything is derived from the highest kinds. The existence of the highest kinds also implies different types of relations among the forms, such that understanding a form amounts to understanding it within the structure of the intelligible. In other words, to intellectually grasp a form is to understand both what it is in itself and how it is different from everything else. In Plato, the idea that the μέγιÏÏα γένη are principles is also implicitly present, although it is not clear whether they are still to be considered genera in the ordinary sense, as Plotinus seems to suggest (cf. section 4.1).
In my understanding, being simultaneously a genus and a principle implies the following change in the understanding of genera-species relationship: every species is related to the highest kinds indirectly, through the genera-species structure, insofar as they are γένη, and directly insofar as they are principles (cf. also section 4.1). There is thus a double link which could be compared to the relationship between a university scientist and the dean, who is the highest superior in the faculty. If, for example, you have a complaint, you do not go directly to the dean but rather talk to your direct superior, who then talks to the vice-dean and then to the dean. But if this scientist is, at the same time, involved in a research project led by the dean, he will talk directly to the dean. Similarly, insofar as the being, movement, rest, otherness and sameness of each form is concerned, they relate directly to the âdeanâ, i.e. to the highest kinds, although in other respects (e.g. insofar as it is a question of being a rational, as opposed to an irrational animal), it is only through their genera.
In any case, the question remains how we ought to combine all of these claims made by Plotinus. It is difficult to really explain how individual forms differ from each other, since Plotinus basically dismisses all possibilities for distinguishing between them. Of course, they are not distinguished by occupying a different spatial or temporal position. Rather, they must differ in virtue of their âpositionâ within the genus-species hierarchy. But how can this be if everything is everything else and the whole, and if you at the same time dismiss the Î´Ï Î½á½±Î¼ÎµÎ¹-á¼Î½ÎµÏγείᾳ pair as not properly applying to Intellect, claiming that everything is actuality in Intellect? What is this âpositionâ in the hierarchy? One possibility might be to say that all forms differ in virtue of their δύναμιÏ, i.e. the power to be actualised as different in what is below, but this âbecoming itself in anotherâ does not sound very Plotinian to me. Moreover, the cheap answer that our soul (or at least its discursive part) cannot comprehend the true unity and multiplicity of Intellect is not really helpful.
3.4.4 The Unity and Multiplicity of Intellect: The Five Perspectives
So far, I have touched upon two important reasons for calling Intellect the most unified multiplicity of all that is:
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There is a specific connectedness of different forms with each other and with the whole of Intellect. All of the forms are to be thought similar to the theorems or propositions of a science, which each contain all of the other axioms, as well as the whole of the science. Since each part in Intellect is all of the other parts and the whole of it, everything is, in a sense, one in Intellect, although, at the same time, it is also many. This reason for the Intellectâs unity is given from the perspective of the nature of intelligible objects.
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Some of the forms are not only united with all of the others, but unite other forms in the sense of being superordinate to them, i.e. in being genera. However, some forms are not only genera (γένη), but also principles (á¼ÏÏαί), i.e. the primary kinds (ÏÏῶÏα γένη). This means that all of the other forms necessarily partake in them both in order to exist at all and in order to exist as what they are, as opposed to what they are not. They even constitute all of the forms, in the sense that the latter can be viewed as the highest genera unfolded31 and their constitution as a procession from the highest kinds.32 In this sense, the highest kinds contain the whole of Intellect and unite it. However, since Plotinus explicitly relates the topic of the primary kinds to beauty, I will address this explanation of the unity and multiplicity of Intellect in more detail in chapter 4.
However, these two are not the only reasons for calling Intellect the most unified multiplicity of all that is. It seems to me that, throughout the Enneads, Plotinus provides further reasons for thinking this:33
As is obvious, these reasons are interconnected. In its genesis, Intellect receives an imprint of the One (cf. V.3.11.1â18 and point 5 above), which is itself one, but one in being, and according to its being one, it becomes number and can be said to be a preliminary sketch of all the forms (cf. VI.6.10.1â4 and point 4 above). In this process, Intellect is constituted precisely as Intellect, i.e. it thinks itself, and unfolds gradually (cf. III.8.8.34â38, V.3.10.52 and points 2 and 3 above) into the complete living being, i.e. into all forms, starting from the highest kinds, which were always already present with Being (cf. VI.7.13 and point 2 above). In the language of treatise VI.6, Intellect becomes number unfolded and all forms as substantial numbers are born on the model of the one (cf. VI.6.9.30â38 and V.5.5.1â4). However, the contents of Intellect are themselves intelligible. Therefore, they must be one, or rather one-many, distinct in their powers or otherness (cf. VI.9.8.29â33, V.1.4.39â41, V.9.6.7â9) and cannot differ in virtue of being in a different place (cf. VI.4.4.26, VI.9.8.31, V.8.9; cf. point 1 above and Rist 1985, pp. 79â80).
3.4.5 The Unity and Multiplicity of Intellect: Wisdom
After this general exposition, let us now turn back to treatise V.8, since large parts of it are devoted to the description of Intellect and the kind of unitas multiplex proper to it (basically, sections 3â6 and 9). In brief, Plotinus first draws on Homerâs Illiad 6.138, in order to describe Intellect as the easy life of the gods, for whom the truth is a mother and a nurse, existence and sustenance (cf. V.8.4.1â2). He then adds the characteristic predicates of Intellectâtrue being, transparency, the total absence of darkness, clearness to the core without resistance, all of which he ultimately summarises in the expression âlight is transparent to lightâ (Ïá¿¶Ï ÏÏÏá½·, scil. ÏανεÏὸÏ; O.G.; V.8.4.6). In the next section (cf. V.8.4.47â50), Plotinus introduces the science-theorem analogy and emphasises both the unity of all axioms and their distinctness. This unity is illustrated elsewhere in V.8 by identifying the Sun, the stars, the great and the small (cf. V.8.4.8â10), the man, the animal, the plant, the sea, the earth, and the heavens (cf. V.8.3.32â34) in Intellect. The latter, i.e. the distinctness of all forms, is understood as being fully determined (explicitly in V.8.9, cf. also VI.9.8.29â33, V.1.4.39â41, V.9.6.7â9 and VI.6.7.7â10). Furthermore, Plotinus touches upon the contemplation proper to Intellect by means of yet another literary reference, this time to the mythical figure of Lynceus,34 who possessed the ability to see through solid objects. Not only are the objects of Intellectâs contemplation absolutely transparent, but the very act of contemplation is a penetrative seeing.35 Plotinus adds, moreover, that this is not a gaze that could satiate itself with its object, since the term âsatiateâ implies a prior emptiness, but there everything is eternal and inexhaustible and lives the best life.
The perspective of intelligible objects and that of the act of intellection are cleverly combined by calling the Intellect wisdom (ÏοÏία), since it is understood as the immediate, ordered accessibility and uncoveredness of everything to everything. Plotinus inventively expresses this with the image of walking over ground that is itself the walker and, perhaps even better, comparing the simultaneity to an ascent during which the person ascending is followed all the way, step by step, by their own starting point (cf. V.8.4.15â18). He further illustrates the fact that Intellect is always, so to say, accompanied by wisdom,36 by comparing it with Sophoclesâ statement from OC 1381â1382 that Justice sits beside the throne of Zeus in their common revelation. Plotinus even considers the correct understanding of wisdom to be central to remaining faithful to Platoâs legacy, which is based on understanding that knowledge is not different from that which it itself is in (cf. V.8.4.23â55).37 In this case, however, wisdom is all beings and all beings are wisdom, from which their worth and substantiality derives. Consequently, those beings that are not identical with wisdom itself cannot, according to Plotinus, even be called true substances (cf. V.8.5.15â19).
Plotinus further endeavours to describe wisdom, which is Intellect and resides in its immediate and ordered inclusiveness of everything in everything, using a contrast between scientific theorems and beautiful images. He now turns away from his otherwise standard science-theorem analogy, in the belief that he can express the unitas multiplex of Intellect more precisely by comparing it to a beautiful image, because it better captures the immediacy of the view of the whole, together with the ordered nature of diversity. However, he corrects this analogy too, when he seeks, quite paradoxically, to understand images not as painted, but as real or true (á½Î½Ïα; cf. V.8.5.19â25).
Plotinus also develops his comparison of wisdom to a beautiful image by referring to the practices of the Egyptian sages (cf. V.8.6). In order to convey wisdom, these sages did not use letters imitating the successive nature of uttered speech, but pictures,38 which enable general insight and do not engage the dianoetic and bouletic parts of the soul. The successive thinking found in speech can, however, be derived from these images for the specific purposes of explaining individual phenomena, as was the case with Ïá½³Ïναι derived from the wisdom of nature. According to Plotinus, if we wish to glimpse the beauty of things, we must look to the wisdom in them, which endows them with beauty.
In general, these passages from V.8 emphasise Intellectâs unity, distinctness, inaccessibility to the senses, inexhaustibility, unlimitedness, immediate givenness, the character of being whole at once, the absence of corporeal substance, and the absence of parts, in the sense in which bodies have parts. Intellect is therefore an intense unity in multiplicity, while every psychic and sensible unitas multiplex is merely an imitation of it, as the original. In naming the second hypostasis ÏοÏία, in the sense of the immediate and ordered inclusiveness of everything in everything, Plotinus inventively captures the intensity of the unity of Intellect.39 And since Plotinus connects ÏοÏία with beauty, we now turn to the central theme of the treatise, intelligible beauty.
3.4.6 Intellect Is Everywhere in Beauty: Intelligible Matter
In V.8.4, Plotinus stresses that all of the parts of Intellect are pure (καθαÏá½±), since they are not disturbed by their opposites, in the same way that rest is not disturbed by motion. Interestingly, Plotinus also mentions beauty in this context, explaining that it is not mixed with something not beautiful, but is everywhere in beauty (V.8.4.11â15). This can be taken to mean two different things: First, since everything is everything else in the Intellect, everything is also beauty. In this sense, beauty is everywhere in beauty (cf. V.8.4.14â19; and Rolof 1970, p. 50).40 Second, it could be interpreted as implying that there cannot be matter in Intellect, since, up to this point, Plotinus had connected beauty to form in contrast to the ugliness of matter. Therefore, if there were matter in the Intellect, beauty would be in something not beautiful. Things are, however, more complicated here and Plotinus addresses this issue in treatise II.4 On Matter.
Matter surely cannot be a part of Intellect, if we understand it to be something undefined (á¼á½¹ÏιÏÏον) and shapeless (á¼Î¼Î¿ÏÏον), while claiming that the forms are simple and cannot contain anything of this sort (cf. II.4.2). However, Intellect is not merely simple but also diverse. Therefore, this question requires an enquiry of its own. Plotinus begins by urging us not to despise automatically everything that is undefined and implies shapelessness. In some cases, a thing of this kind might give itself to what is above it, as a soul gives itself to Intellect, in order to receive form from it and become perfected by it. If the matter in the sensible world is a substrate (á½Ïοκείμενον) of incessant change, this cannot be the case of intelligible matter because in Intellect everything has and always has had the same form. It cannot change into anything else, because everything is already everything else. Intelligible matter is never shapeless (cf. II.4.3). It is only in our minds that we separate all form from a substrate and claim that the residual substrate is something undefined and shapeless. Nevertheless, it is necessary to presuppose a substratum even in Intellect, since there must be something shared by all the forms, namely, intelligible matter, as well as something else which differentiates them, their individual forms. We should therefore imagine this unique unity of Intellect as varied and endowed with many shapes (cf. II.4.4). The intelligible matter receives an intelligible, defined life when it is formed, whereas the matter in the bodies is merely a decorated corpse. In this sense, intelligible matter is something true (á¼Î»Î·Î¸Î¹Î½á½¹Ï) and substantial or, as Plotinus puts it, correcting himself, formed matter as a whole is an illuminated substance (ÏεÏÏÏιÏμένη οá½Ïία). The principle (á¼ÏÏá½µ) of such matter is Otherness (á¼ÏεÏá½¹ÏηÏ) and first movement (ÏÏá½½Ïη κίνηÏιÏ), which create it and which one might attempt to identify with the highest genera (cf. II.4.5, chapter 4 and sections 6.3â6.4). Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that intelligible matter is something ugly only when we in our minds separate it from the forms and contrast it with them, while, in reality, there is always a formed, living substance. In this sense, intelligible matter should not be considered something that could cause beauty in Intellect not to be in beauty, for it is itself beautiful, because it is simple (á¼Ïλá¿) and has the form of Intellect (νοοειδὴÏ; cf. V.1.3.21â25).
3.4.7 Beauty and Being
In addition to its being everywhere in beauty, Plotinus introduces a further important characteristic of Ïὸ καλόν. There is a mutual conditionality or even identity of being and beauty. Plotinus explicitly states that they are of one nature (Ïá½»ÏιÏ) and that deficiency in beauty (á¼Î½ Ïá¿· Î³á½°Ï á¼ÏολειÏθá¿Î½Î±Î¹ Ïοῦ καλοῦ) implies deficiency in being (á¼Î»Î»Îµá½·Ïει καὶ Ïῠοá½Ïá½·á¾³) and vice versa. Moreover, as beauty is the object of erotic desire, so too is being, and beauty is such an object because it is being. Plotinus demonstrates the identity of being and beauty in sensibles. They become more beautiful the more they participate in a formâfor beauty was identified with the reign of formâwhich also means the more they exist (cf. V.8.9.36â47).
The identification of beauty and being that Plotinus introduces here is of great importance. If we consider what it means for a thing to be, we should be able to conclude what it means to be beautiful. Plotinus considers this question in treatise VI.9 On the Good or the One. Everything that can in any sense be said to be (ÏάνÏα Ïá½° á½Î½Ïα [â¦] καὶ á½ Ïα á½ÏÏÏοῦν λέγεÏαι á¼Î½ Ïοá¿Ï οá½Ïιν εἶναι), exists according to the first section of this treatise by one (Ïá¿· á¼Î½á½· á¼ÏÏιν á½Î½Ïα; cf. VI.9.1.1â2). Plotinus illustrates this thesis by showing that it applies to different kinds of beings.41 Discrete entities (διεÏÏηκόÏ), such as an army, a choir or a flock, are what they are only insofar as they are unities (cf. VI.9.1.4â6). The same can be said about things having a continuous magnitude (ÏÏ Î½ÎµÏῠμεγέθη), i.e. a continuous body, like a house or a ship. If they are dissolved into parts, i.e. if they lose the unity they had (they are called á¼Î½ á¼ÏονÏα), then they are no longer what they were (cf. VI.9.1.5â10). The last example taken from bodily entities are organisms such as plants or animals, which are also said to exist in virtue of being one (they are called á¼Î½ á½Î½Ïα) on the same grounds as before, i.e. that they cease to exist as plants or animals when broken down into multiplicity (cf. VI.9.1.10â14). Plotinus claims, however, that even things such as the health of a body, the beauty of a soul or virtue42 are things because they possess unity: âThere is health when the body is brought together into one order, and beauty when the nature of the one (ἡ Ïοῦ á¼Î½á½¸Ï Ïá½»ÏιÏ) holds the parts together; and the soul has virtue when it is unified into one thing (Îµá¼°Ï á¼Î½) and one agreement (Îµá¼°Ï Î¼á½·Î±Î½ á½Î¼Î¿Î»Î¿Î³á½·Î±Î½)â (VI.9.1.14â17).
I mentioned these passages in section 2.3, when analysing similar statements made in treatise I.6. It was said there that a sensible thing becomes united and ordered by participating in a form insofar as the formative principle dominates in matter. Moreover, these theses were connected with Plotinusâ rejection of a non-distributive notion of beauty, i.e. his insistence that, if a formative principle dominates in a body, it unites its parts and that in order to do this, the parts must themselves become united. In this sense, beauty is distributed from the whole of a body to its parts if a formative principle takes hold of this body. The present identification of beauty and being supports these conclusions because: 1) a unified thing becomes what it is through the domination of a form that unites all of the parts of the constituted whole; 2) this same form simultaneously makes the whole beautiful; and 3) both the being and the beauty are distributed to all of the parts, because a whole cannot consist of non-existing, i.e. non-beautiful, parts.43 The identification of being and beauty is therefore enabled here by the fact that both are primarily Intellect and that both are connected with being a unified multiplicity (cf. Halfwassen 2003, pp. 88â89). However, the distinction between them, if there is one, is not clear in V.8 and I will enquire into it later (see sections 4.4 and 7.3).
As was already the case with the beauty of soul and virtue, Plotinus maintains the connection of beauty, being and unity even above the level of bodies. Furthermore, in VI.9, he goes on to ask whether it is the soul that provides the one and whether it is the one that is sought. His answer is, of course, negative. The soul rather gives what it itself does not have or is not. It does so by looking to the one that is above it, i.e. to Intellect (cf. VI.9.1.17â26). The different degrees of being, and consequently also of beauty, therefore correspond to the degree of unity of a thing. A soul exists more fully than bodies do, it is more beautiful than they are, and it correspondingly possesses a different unityâit is not composed of parts, like bodies are, but nonetheless âthere are very many powers in it, reasoning, desiring, apprehending, which are held together by the one as by a bondâ (VI.9.1.40â42). Intellect, being and beauty itself constitute a unity in multiplicity of an even higher grade. Different beings in the Intellect differ by their powers (Î´Ï Î½á½±Î¼ÎµÎ¹s), but are, at the same time, one manifold power (μιᾷ Î´á½»Î½Î±Î¼Î¹Ï Ïολλá¿; V.8.9.17â18), a universal power (Î´á½»Î½Î±Î¼Î¹Ï ÏᾶÏα) extending to infinity and powerful to infinity (Îµá¼°Ï á¼ÏειÏον ἰοῦÏα, Îµá¼°Ï á¼ÏειÏον δὲ Î´Ï Î½Î±Î¼á½³Î½Î·; V.8.9.25â26). Intellect is, in other words, a unity where all the parts are all the other parts and the whole. The identification of being and beauty and their connection with unity also supports the thesis that the primary seat of beauty is in Intellect.
3.4.8 How Can We Contemplate the Beauty of Intellect? The Phaedrus Myth
By the end of V.8, Plotinus attempts to combine: 1) his previous description of the enormous unity and multiplicity of Intellect (cf. sections 3.4.2â5) with 2) the outcomes of his analysis of Intellectâs beauty (cf. sections 3.4.6â3.4.7) and 3) one of the leading questions of the treatise âhow is it possible for anyone to contemplate the beauty of Intellect?â (cf. V.8.1.5â6). This overlap of perspectives is mediated by the myth in Platoâs Phaedrus (246eâ249d; see further Darras-Worms 2018, pp. 29â34), according to which the souls follow one of the twelve gods on their ride across the heavens. Among the gods, Zeus is the supreme leader, arranging and governing everything. However, since the souls of the godsâ followers are different from those of the gods themselves, the former are only able to get a glimpse of the true beings and their beauty, seeing them only partially and with difficulty. Plotinus emphasises in this image that some souls are, in fact, unable to withstand the sight of beauty, since it shines so brightly that the eyes of the one who looks hurt, as if that person were gazing directly at the sun. In this sense, the beauty of the forms may even terrify the soul (cf. V.8.10.4â10). However, for those who can withstand its intensity, beauty manifests itself in multiple forms, e.g. as justice itself or temperance itself. In other words, Plotinus claims, in the spirit of Plato, each individual at first sees Intellect from the perspective of his or her own nature. Only the bestâi.e. those who have glimpsed much of Intellect: the gods themselves and the souls in Zeusâ retinueâultimately manage to see the true nature of beauty (cf. V.8.10.1â4 and 16â2244). This is why they do not behold Intellect only partially, but as the unity of the parts and the whole, seen all at once. Moreover, they see it in themselves, or rather they become this sight which sees itself, since they assimilate themselves to the beautiful. Plotinus illustrates this thought with an image, which preserves the verticality of spiritual motion: in assimilating itself to Intellect, the soul becomes beautiful, like people who, in climbing mountains, take on the colour of the soil there. As usual, however, Plotinus immediately corrects his analogy: beauty is the colour of Intellect, that is, everything in Intellect is colour and beauty which permeates everything (cf. V.8.10.22â31).
This correction allows Plotinus to better describe the unity of seeing beauty and becoming beauty. Such a distinction no longer exists in Intellect, because beauty can only be seen if one becomes beauty, but also because Intellect is of the nature of self-thinking. The difference between the beholder and what is beheld ultimately disappears, with the two poles becoming one (cf. V.8.11.1â24 and Hadot 1993, pp. 42â44). Further enhancing the already intense unity of Intellect, Plotinus even considers the suitability of talking about beholding it (á½ ÏαÏιÏ). He points out that, insofar as beholding implies a relationship to what is external, the activity of Intellect cannot be described in this way. It may be called á½ ÏαÏÎ¹Ï only if this is taken to mean non-physical self-perception (ÏύνεÏÎ¹Ï ÎºÎ±á½¶ ÏÏ Î½Î±á½·ÏθηÏιÏ; cf. V.8.11.19â24). Intellect is the model of beholding and, as such, it both beholds and transcends beholding. Uniting with Intellect or beauty is, in this sense, not an act of knowing. Rather, it is a return to oneâs own being. The unified being of the knower and the known is, however, knowledge par excellence, even though it may not seem so to the senses.45 One must therefore internalise the beauty one sees and unite with it. Finally, Plotinus compares this unity of seeing beauty and being beautiful to being possessed by one of the Muses, when a person is controlled by a divine force, which communicates through them, that is, when the person is, and at the same time is not, this force (cf. V.8.10.31â43). The person is to the extent to which they become one with it. However, this person is not to the extent to which this force merely communicates through them. Similarly, in Intellect one cannot speak of looking at an object, because the object beheld is itself the beholding subject, but one can speak of it, insofar as each thing in Intellect is distinct.
Plotinus concludes this passage by suggesting that in order to contemplate the beauty of Intellect, one must assimilate to the god to whose retinue one belongs. This assimilation is interpreted as the internalisation of beauty and uniting with oneself that ultimately leads one to become aware of oneself as a part of Intellect. At first, Intellect is understood only partially, but in order to see its beauty, one must comprehend its wisdom, i.e. the immediate ordered accessibility of everything in everything. With this advance, one catches a glimpse of the bond of everything, the nature of beauty, that is the Good.
3.4.9 The Îá½ÏανόÏâÎÏόνοÏâÎÎµá½»Ï Myth
Plotinus offers a further myth to express what one sees in Intellect and to ultimately reject the Gnostic disdain for the sensible world. One sees a god (θεόÏ) who painlessly gave birth to everything, who holds it in himself and who governs and enjoys his beautiful descendants (Ïá½¹ÎºÎ¿Ï ÎºÎ±Î»á½¹Ï), with whom he is identical and creates a unique glow. This god, who is called Cronus later in the text, is Intellect itself. Like the mythical character, it is satiated or full of its children, i.e. the forms.46 Of all of Cronusâ descendants who are said to be siblings (á¼Î´ÎµÎ»Ïοί), Zeus, the youngest son (á½ÏÏαÏÎ¿Ï Ïαá¿Ï), emerges of necessity, and is here clearly identified with soul (cf. Kalligas 2013, com. ad V.8.12.7â15 and Beutler-Theilerâs com. ad V.8.12.1). Zeus resembles his father in the same way as a picture resembles its model, and he himself brings about the creation of another cosmos, i.e. the sensible one, which he rules. Cronus provides beauty to Zeus, i.e. soul has a trace of Intellect in itself (á¼´ÏÎ½Î¿Ï Î±á½Ïοῦ, scil. Ïοῦ θεοῦ) and is beautiful precisely for this reason (ÏούÏῳ á¼ÏÏὶ καλὴ Ïὴν Ïá½»Ïιν). Aphrodite, who is identified with the world soul,47 continues in her intensive participation in Intellect and is correspondingly beautiful. Individual souls, by contrast, can both increase and decrease their degree of participation in Intellect and can thus become more or less beautiful (cf. V.8.13.12â22).
3.5 The Îá½ÏανόÏâÎÏόνοÏâÎÎµá½»Ï Myth: Consequences for Beauty and the Good
In the final section of V.8, Plotinus draws on his firmly established position that beauty is Intellect itself, together with the mythological vocabulary of the theogony, in order to ultimately refer to the Good itself. He begins by repeating the claim that Intellect transfers rule over the sensible world to the soul, referring to Intellect as Cronus, in accordance with his earlier identification of the soul with Zeus. It would be improper for so distinguished a god to be concerned with anything lower, and thus he âmerelyâ remains calmly in himself, contemplating his own beauty. Above him, however, there is still Uranus, the Good, which is explicitly said to be what does not belong to Cronus and is too great to be beautiful, once again implying that Intellect is the primary seat of beauty (cf. Darras-Worms 2018, pp. 22â23). Intellect is furthermore explicitly said to have remained beautiful in the primary sense (ÏÏá½½ÏÏÏ á¼Î¼ÎµÎ¹Î½Îµ καλόÏ). Cronus is therefore located in the middle (μεÏαξύ), between Uranus and Zeus, the Good and the soul. Plotinus explains this intermediate position, on the one hand, in terms of its differentiation from the One (Ïá¿ Ïε á¼ÏεÏá½¹ÏηÏι Ïá¿Ï ÏÏá½¸Ï Ïὸ á¼Î½Ï á¼ÏοÏομá¿Ï), and, on the other hand, in terms of the tie that binds it (Ïá¿· á¼Î½á½³ÏονÏι á¼Ïὸ Ïοῦ μεÏâ αá½Ïὸν ÏÏá½¸Ï Ïὸ κάÏÏ Î´ÎµÏμῷ) and makes it superior to soul (cf. V.8.13.1â15). Its intermediate position therefore derives from its being a specific kind of unitas multiplex.48
Thus, there are two reasons why Intellect is said to be beautiful in the primary sense: First, there is nothing that is not beautiful in Intellect, since every part of it is both the whole and all of the other parts, such that beauty is, in this sense, everywhere in beauty. Even the intelligible matter, the offspring of Otherness and first movement, as something always formed and living a defined and intelligible life, can be said to be beautiful and does not hinder beauty in Intellect from being everywhere in beauty (cf. section 3.4.6). Second, Intellect lies precisely between what can be called the deficiently beautiful and what is more than beautiful (cf. V.8.8.5 and 13â15).
In addition to the Îá½ÏανόÏâÎÏόνοÏâÎÎµá½»Ï myth, treatise V.8 addresses the relationship of beauty to the Good in two other places:
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In V.8.1, Plotinus assumes that beauty of the Intellect is a run-up (á½Ïμή) towards the Good. However, having more carefully considered sections V.8.10â11 (cf. section 3.4.8), it is now possible to take this interpretation slightly farther. From the perspective of soul, the nature of beauty, i.e. the Good, appears last in Intellect, since it is, as it were, the bond holding everything together (cf. Phd. 99c5â6).
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V.8.8.1â5 claims that Intellect is what is beautiful in the primary sense (καλὸν οá½Î½ ÏÏá½½ÏÏÏ) and that the Good does not want to be beautiful (οá½Î´á½² καλὸν á¼Î¸á½³Î»ÎµÎ¹ εἶναι) because it precedes Intellect, confirming again that the primary seat of beauty is Intellect.
Furthermore, treatise V.5, the next part of the GroÃschrift, directly addresses the relationship between beauty and the Good.49 It does so in section 12, which Pierre Hadot (1993, p. 74) uses as the foundation for his distinction between the gentle nature of the Good and the terrifying beauty of Intellect. In this passage, Plotinus states that the beautiful (i.e. Intellect) needs the Good but that the Good does not need beauty (cf. V.5.12.31â33). Compared to Intellect, the Good âis gentle (ἤÏιοÏ) and kindly (ÏÏοÏηνήÏ) and gracious (á¼Î²Ïá½¹Ï)â, whereas âBeauty brings wonder (θάμβοÏ) and terror (á¼ÎºÏληξιÏ) and pleasure (ἡδονή) mingled with pain (á¼Î³Î±Î¸á½¹Ï)â (V.5.12.34â35, transl. modified). This distinction obviously refers to the desire of the ascending soul. However astonishing Intellect may be, the soul still feels pain, so to speak, because it has not yet achieved the ultimate goal of its desire, the Good. This distinction is already implied in the preceding passages of treatise V.5, where the Good is compared to a king sitting on a beautiful pedestalâwhich, in fact, actually hangs from himâand ruling over the inconceivable beauty of the procession unfolding before him. An increasing degree of regal dignity may be observed in this procession, but when the king himself is suddenly revealed, all of the spectators prostrate themselves before him and prayâor rather not all, because some of them have already left, because they thought they had seen enough (cf. V.5.3.3â15) or had merely stuffed themselves in their gluttony with foods, because they considered these more real than the god whom they came to celebrate (cf. V.5.11.12â16).50 Plotinus also stresses in V.5.3.15â21 that such a king rules over his own kind and is not alien to it.
In V.5.12, Plotinus gives three more reasons for differentiating the Good from the beautiful. First, the Good is longed for by everyone, as if by a divine instinct (á¼ÏομανÏεύομαι), and it is something without which nothing can exist. It is present even to those who are asleep, although they are, of course, not aware of it. However, when they do become aware, they recognise the Good as something that is always already present, such that it is never terrifying. Beauty, on the other hand, is something which must first be seen, in order to arouse longing, á¼ÏÏÏ, and when we behold it, it terrifies us and causes pain. Therefore, as Gerson (2013, com. ad V.5.12.15â17) points out, love of beauty is always conscious (ÏÏ Î½á½·Î·Î¼Î¹) and thus implies differentiation of subject and object, which further shows that beauty cannot be the First. Moreover, Plotinus implies here that beauty makes us remember what lies above it, as its cause, whereas the Good does not, because it is recognised as always already present, i.e. in fact never forgotten. Therefore, Plotinus concludes, the fact that the desire for the Good is more ancient than the desire for beauty also shows that the Good is prior to beauty (cf. V.5.12.7â19). Second, whereas the Good is good for others, so that if one attains it, it suffices, beauty is beautiful for itself and not for the one who sees it. Therefore, it belongs only to the one who has it (cf. V.5.12.19â23). In other words, there is ultimately a difference in that the Good is good for others and not for itself (cf. VI.7.27 discussed in section 6.5 and Tornau 2011, com. ad V.5.12.19â24), whereas beauty is beautiful only for itself. As Kalligas (2013, com. ad V.5.12.14â33) suggests, this could also be interpreted as connecting the Good with what is general (for all) and beauty with what is particular (for itself). Third, it never suffices to have the Good only apparently, whereas, for some people, this is enough in the case of beauty (cf. V.5.12.23â24).
Having examined these passages from treatises V.8 and V.5, we now have a slightly more nuanced understand of the relationship of beauty and the Good. Even though it may seem in some passages of the Enneads that the primary beauty is not Intellect, but the Good, we must understand this as belonging to a context-dependent approach to the first principle, which reveals the Good as simultaneously beautiful and not beautiful (cf. section 6.6). The primary seat of beauty is Intellect, which received it from the Good. The latter is, in turn, beyond beauty. At the same time, since the Good is understood in the Platonic fashion as a bond embracing and holding together all things (cf. Phd. 99c5â6), and since beauty is this bond (unity) applied to all being (differentiated multiplicity), there is an intimate relationship between them, in the sense that the Good is the nature of beauty. Or rather, from a mythological perspective, Uranus is the father of Cronus.
See chapter 1 and Darras-Worms (2018, pp. 9â15), who also makes an interesting comparison between V.8 and the other treatises of the GroÃschrift (pp. 23â25).
I use the word âhierarchyâ here and in what follows as a shorthand for the relationship between prior and posterior. Cf. OâMeara 1996.
The details of this conception are not very clear. Plotinus divides soul into a lower part, i.e. nature, and an upper part which is said to seek and to love learning (cf. III.8.5). When Plotinus discusses it, he also considers how action is contemplation (cf. III.8.5â6). But whereas nature probably refers to the lower part of the world soul, the things said about the upper part seem rather to relate to the individual soul. This situation raises many questions, especially about the hierarchy between the different parts of the individual soul as compared to those of the world soul. It seems reasonable to differentiate various aspects of contemplation, in which one part of a soul can be said to be superior to another. For example, the contemplation engaged in by nature is probably superior to that of the lower part of an individual soul, in that it possesses its object of contemplation without having had to search for it. On the other hand, it contemplates as if it were sleeping and its contemplation is thus dim. For a discussion of this problem, see Deck 1967, pp. 68â72. Nevertheless, all parts of both the individual soul and the world soul must be contemplation.
For all of these reasons, I side with Deck (who mentions them as well), as against Rolof, who thinks that contemplation only applies to Intellect and what lies below it. On the latter position, cf. Rolof 1970, pp. 16â17 and 23â27. For Deckâs discussion of the topic, see Deck 1967, pp. 17â21.
The following passages on double activity and complete motions are heavily indebted to Emilssonâs analyses. Cf. Emilsson 2007, chapter 1, Emilsson 2017, pp. 48â57 and Emilsson 1999. See also Bussanich 1985.
Cf. Phys. VIII.
Strictly speaking, of course, it applies primarily to Intellect and can be used for the Good only by analogy.
However, cf. again footnote 3 above, as the details of the whole concept are not fully clear.
Matter is represented here by menstrual fluid (cf. Smith 2018, com. ad V.8.2.7, Kalligas 2013, com. ad V.8.2.1â9, Darras-Worms 2018, com. ad V.8.2.6â14, and Corrigan 2005, p. 207).
For the relationship between matter and mass, see II.4.11. Mass is indefinite (á¼á½¹ÏιÏÏοÏ) matter defined as extension (μέγεθοÏ).
This is perhaps a reference to Aristotleâs definition of beauty in Poet. 1450b.
It must be added, however, that Plotinusâ own position raises far more difficult questions. For example, how can something that is not spatial be present in the physical, that is, how can the soul be present in the body? Plotinus repeatedly struggles with questions of this kind in IV.3, IV.9 and VI.4â5. For a discussion of Plotinusâ theory of sense perception, see Emilsson 1988. In IV.7.6.19â24, Plotinus deals with the same problem of how sensibles can enter the soul through a small organ, such as the eye. There, however, he says that all perceived objects are unified in the pupils.
I leave untranslated the Greek words Ïá½³Ïνη and ÏεÏνίÏÎ·Ï because the English equivalents, âartâ and âartistâ, may in this case be misleading. The Greeks understood the term Ïá½³Ïνη as the âability to produce things so long as it was a regular production based on rulesâ (Tatarkiewicz 1980, p. 50; cf. also the definition of Pseudo-Galenus in his Intro. 14.685.3â4). Consequently, Ïá½³Ïνη was by definition an intellectual activity and was linked to knowledge, not to inspiration, intuition or imagination. For the latter, the Greeks reserved the term Î¼Î¿Ï Ïική, in which the Î¼Î¿Ï ÏÎ¹Îºá½¹Ï communicated with the gods and was inspired by them. That is also attested by the fact that Î¼Î¿Ï Ïική arose from the traditional ritual purification, which used imitation to represent order, and the Greeks called it ÏοÏεία. See Parker 1986, pp. 254â274. ΤέÏνη was therefore something definitely learnable, which stands in direct contradiction with later theories of the artist-genius. Nor was Ïá½³Ïνη primarily linked with beauty. The definition of beauty as the common denominator of most kinds of art, as we understand it today, was not settled on until the late 18th century, after much debate. See Kristeller 1951, pp. 19â20.
Armstrong suggests in a comment ad loc. that this contradicts I.6.2, where it is said that nature sometimes gives beauty to a single stone. I do not see the supposed contradiction. Plotinus says here only that if the matter were the cause of the beauty, then an unworked stone would need to be just as beautiful as one invested with form by a sculptor. This does not, in any way, prevent an individual stone from being beautiful. On the contrary, if its matter were the cause of a stoneâs beauty, all stones would necessarily be beautiful and nature would not give it beauty only in certain cases.
Matter is used here in the Aristotelian sense with regard to the forming principle, that is, not in the technical sense of á½Î»Î·, as the most remote emanation of the Good. For in a stone, á½Î»Î· is already formed by the form of stone through the agency of the world soul.
This example is not, however, fully analogous to the previous causal order in Ïá½³Ïνη. We have here an intelligible Î¼Î¿Ï Ïική as the cause of its worldly counterpart. This could still be interpreted as the aforementioned distinction between the knowledge of Intellect and its image, i.e. human knowledge. Nevertheless, the causality of Î¼Î¿Ï Ïική and of the man of the muses is not analogical to Ïá½³Ïνη and its product. Moreover, Ïá½³Ïνη is the cause, for example, of a statue, through the mediation of a sculptor. Therefore, the sculptor could be called the cause of the sculpture, and sculpting itself, that is, the Ïá½³Ïνη, could be called the cause of his sculpting nature. That said, Plotinus perhaps only wishes to illustrate the superiority of the cause, as we saw above, and is less concerned with finding a precise analogy.
According to Rist (1967, p. 184), this concerns Plato himself, whose negative attitude to depicting Ïá½³Ïνη emerges particularly in Rep. X. This is a widespread cliché: cf. Smith 2018, com. ad V.8.1.20 and V.8.1.32â40, Emislsson 2017, p. 368, Beierwaltes 2013, pp. 15â20, Scott 2011, Büttner 2006, pp. 80â81, OâMeara 1993, p. 95, Armstrong 1975, Tatarkiewicz 1970â1975, Rich 1960, de Keyser 1955, Freeman 1940, Gilbert and Kuhn 1939 and Svoboda 1926. For my disagreement with this interpretation of Plato, see Gál 2014 and cf. also Jinek 2009. Plato only condemns that subtype of art which imitates the sensible world. But this does not mean that a different type of art, which would imitate the paradigm, cannot exist. If nothing else, art plays a crucial role in the proposed education system of Kallipolis (cf. Rep. II and III), but must be carefully supervised by philosophers (cf. Leg. VII 801d), because it mixes truth with falsehood, or beauty with ugliness (cf. Rep. II,377a, 383a, Apol. 22aâe and Men. 99câd). Corrigan (2005, p. 210) agrees, noting that, at the very least, Plotinus must have somehow understood Plato in this fashion. See further Szlezák 1979, pp. 21â28. Plotinusâ objections may rather be directed at Aristotle (cf. Protrep. Fr. B 13, Meteor. IV.3.381b6, Phys. II.2 194a21â22).
Consequently, I cannot agree with Schubert (1973, p. 67) who claims that Plotinus appreciates the beauty of nature more than that of Ïá½³Ïνη. According to him, the soul, or the life that the soul gives to things, ought to be the distinguishing criterion. There is, however, no reason to assume that the ÏεÏνίÏÎ·Ï could not, in principle, have equal abilities to nature. It is certainly true that Plotinus sometimes praises the world soul for ordering bodies without being impeded by them in any way (cf. IV.3.9), and without having to plan or consider its product (cf. IV.3.10) or to correct it (cf. II.9.2). In this sense, nature creates better images than technai (cf. IV.3.10). On the other hand, both nature and a ÏεÏνίÏÎ·Ï are on the same level as far as the aspect of μίμηÏÎ¹Ï is concerned. If we follow Plotinusâ line of thought in III.8.5â6, it is obvious that the contemplation of an individual soul may be elevated even above the contemplation of nature. For a discussion of this, see Rolof (1970, pp. 36â44), and Deck (1967, pp. 64â72). The same objections also apply to the interpretation of Kuisma (2003). His position is convincingly critiqued by Omtzigt (2012, pp. 60â66). A well-balanced discussion of the topic is to be found in Vassilopoulou 2014, pp. 493â498.
The question of individual forms or ideas is of course a peculiar one. Personally, I am convinced that individual forms could be kinds of logoi of universal ideas, into which these develop in the movement of unfolding, but which remain at the level of Intellect because they are immediately ârolled back up intoâ the general structures of relations. I imagine the mechanism as analogous to the one described in the case of species and genera in III.8.8 and V.3.10 as unfolding (á¼Î¾ÎµÎ»á½·ÏÏÏ), as movement (κίνηÏιÏ), process (ÏÏόοδοÏ) or activity (á¼Î½á½³Ïγεια) in VI.7.13. For an overview of this topic, see the classical discussion between Rist (1963, 1970) and Blumenthal (1966), as well as the re-examination by Kalligas (1997). For a broader discussion of the question with respect to Plotinusâ understanding of individuality, see Tornau 2009.
For the analysis of Platoâs conception of the world as an image of the divine paradigm, see KarfÃk 1995. See Darras-Worms (2018, pp. 35â37) for a discussion of the impact of the Timaeus on treatise V.8.
See section 3.4.1.
A more detailed discussion of this is to be found in Fattal 2010.
He thus touches upon the difficult question of the status of matter (á½Î»Î·). It seems to me that Plotinus ultimately holds two contradictory views, considering matter as being simultaneously the absolute and the relative opposite of the Good. Evidence for both conceptions appears in treatises II.4.16 and II.5.5. For interesting interpretations of this topic, see OâMeara 1997, OâBrien 1996, Corrigan 1996 and Narbonne 1992.
Never entirely, of course, i.e. not with respect to its highest part which is part of Intellect. Cf. however footnote 30 in chapter 2.
However, cf. the discussions of this topic both in footnote 3 above and my comments on pp. 55â56.
Cf. II.1.4; IV.8.8; II.9.2, 4; IV.4.12; III.2.2; V.8.12. See also Smith 2011.
Plotinus is even more specific on this point. Being Intellect is said not only to represent the immediate ordered givenness of everything in everything (i.e. wisdomâsee section 3.4.5), but also intellection which is âalways right in the calm and stability and purity of Intellectâ (V.8.3.25â26). This intellection is directed at divine matters which Intellect sees, i.e. the forms (cf. V.8.3.23â27).
Cf. Plotinusâ hesitation in ascribing virtue to the world soul in I.2.1.
The second reason is that the idea of creating the cosmos according to a plan entails an incorrect notion of the process of creation. Artisanal work implies a kind of shaping for which one needs hands, feet and so forth, in other words, everything that has yet to be created (cf. V.8.7.10â12). Moreover, such a notion of creation is derived from the human way of creating, which is not primary (cf. III.8.2). This way of imagining the creation of the cosmos is, according to Plotinus, characteristic of the Gnostics and must be abandoned (cf. II.9.4 and 12.). For these two reasons, Plotinus thinks that although the cosmos was created, and created as an image of Intellect by the agency of the soul, it was created suddenly, as it were (οἷον á¼Î¾Î±á½·ÏνηÏ), all at once.
The following summary is heavily indebted to Tornau 1998.
The verb á¼Î¾ÎµÎ»á½·ÏÏÏ is used for the constitution of the whole Intellect in III.8.8.37 and implicitly used in the context of the highest kinds also in V.3.10.52.
Cf. the use of κίνηÏιÏ, á¼Î½á½³Ïγεια and the verbs ÏÏοέÏÏομαι and ÏÎ»Î±Î½á½±Ï in this sense in VI.7.13, where these are, moreover, explicitly related to the highest kinds.
For a general discussion of this topic and the analogies Plotinus utilises to describe Intellectâs unity and multiplicity, see Smith 1981.
One of the Argonauts. See Hornblower, Spawforth 1999, s.v. âArgonautsâ. Cf. of course Argonautica by Apollonius of Rhodes.
Perhaps Rolof (1970, pp. 52â53) is right to claim that this is the reason why the life of the Intellect is called easy in the beginning of V.8.4.
Interestingly, Plotinus uses the word αá½ÏοεÏιÏÏήμη in V.8.4.40. This absolute knowledge must however be understood as a reference to Platoâs Phdr. 247dâe and thus as synonymous with wisdom. What is much stranger here is Plotinusâ specification of this αá½ÏοεÏιÏÏήμη as á¼Î½Ïαῦθα, which Armstrong surprisingly does not translate at all. Accordingly, there are two possible readings of this passage: 1) we emphasise á¼Î½Ïαῦθα (cf. H-S in apparatu: Ficino; and also the latest English translation by Gerson et al.: âscientific understanding itself hereâ) and interpret αá½ÏοεÏιÏÏήμη as a solely human way of achieving wisdom, such that the point of the comparison with Zeus and Justice is precisely to say that they are different (I defended this reading in my paper Gál 2011); 2) we emphasise αá½ÏοεÏιÏÏήμη, ignoring á¼Î½Ïαῦθα (which may be a mistaken attempt to emend the original text), and interpret the comparison as saying that wisdom always accompanies Intellect. The latter reading seems to me now more probable, because αá½ÏοεÏιÏÏήμη is, for a Platonist, too loaded, and this reading also better fits the context.
In V.8.5, Plotinus undertakes a journey to the self-thinking intrinsic to Intellect. The starting point is that all creation takes place in accordance with some wisdom, in other words according to some plan, with a certain intention or aim. One example of a creation of this sort are the individual Ïá½³Ïναι, whose knowledge Plotinus describes as diversity composed into unity. This is why craftsmen skilled in their field turn to the wisdom of nature, which is one and which they pull apart into diversity for their purposes. However, Plotinus distinguishes between the reason-principle (λόγοÏ) in nature and nature itself. Therefore, he enquires into the source of the Î»á½¹Î³Î¿Ï which is the very plan (and therefore wisdom), according to which nature realises its potential as productive. The reason-principle must come from Intellect and even there we must ask where Intellect got it from. The answer, according to Plotinus, is that Intellect acquired wisdom from itself, since Intellect is wisdom itself.
For a discussion of this understanding of Egyptian writing or temple drawings cf. de Keyser 1955 and Kalligas 2013, com. ad V.8.6.1â9.
There is also a polemical motif running through in this whole section, since ÏοÏία wasâin a senseâconsidered the cause of evil by the Gnostics, or, at least, her fall led to the generation of evil. Of course, this made no sense to Plotinus. His claim that a correct understanding of wisdom is central to remaining faithful to Platoâs legacy is thus also aimed at the Gnostics. For a more detailed analysis of this layer of the text, see Darras-Worms 2018, pp. 25â27, 30â31 and 37â41.
The meaning of beauty being everywhere in beauty will be further refined in section 6.4.
Plotinus adopts here distinctions made by the Stoics. Cf. SVF II, 366â368 and 1013 and the discussion of Meijer (1992, pp. 68â97).
These examples are also of Stoic origin. Cf. SVF III 278 and Meijerâs discussion (1992, pp. 68â97).
On the other hand, if we take into account the above-mentioned parts of treatise II.9 (cf. section 3.2), Plotinus does admit that some parts of bodies are less beautiful or even ugly, but only if these are taken on their own, i.e. not as parts of a whole, but as wholes themselves. In this case, it is possible to conceive of less beautiful or even ugly bodily parts, because they do not, in fact, exist on their own (e.g. an ugly nose), but only as parts of a larger whole, and, as such, are indeed beautiful.
With H-S2 and Gerson et al. (2018), I believe that the context requires us to supplement ἡ in line 16 with Ïοῦ καλοῦ Ïá½»ÏιÏ.
This is, I think, suggested by the strange example of illness and health. Illness, according to Plotinus, is something external to man and this difference allows for a clear distinction, i.e. determination and knowledge. Health, by contrast, is something that essentially belongs to our being, something that we ourselves are, and therefore we often do not perceive it and are unable to grasp it firmly. However, it is clear that this metaphor is largely unsuitable, because it implies clearer knowledge of the external than of the internal, whereas in fact it must be the other way around. Plotinus makes clear that the knowledge which Intellect has and is can be seen as dubious only from the perspective of sense perception, which is directed towards external objects. In other words, sense perception cannot rightfully be considered a judge in questions of being, which, according to Plotinus, is evident anyway from the fact that we can never look at ourselves entirely from the outside, though we do not doubt that we exist (cf. V.8.11.24â40).
According to V.1.7.36 (and, of course, already according to Platoâs Crat. 396b), it is even etymologically derived from the state of fullness of Intellect because it is κόÏÎ¿Ï Î½Î¿á¿¦Ï. Cf. also the analysis in relation to Hesiodâs Theogony by NÄmec 2004 and Hadot 1981.
In the Enneads, Aphrodite is typically associated with soul. Cf. treatises VI.9.9, III.5 and the interpretations of NÄmec 2004, KarfÃk 2003 and Hadot 1981. I agree with Smith (2018, com. ad V.8.13.15) that Zeus is to be identified with the hypostasis Soul and Aphrodite with the world soul.
See also the analysis of Hadot (1981), who shows how Plotinus merges the motifs of the binding in chains, castration and swallowing of Cronusâ children, and how he transforms them in order to weaken the violent impression caused by the myth.
Treatise VI.7[38] from the same creative period deals with the relation of beauty to the Good in much more detail and will thus be discussed separately in chapter 6 (for the relevant passages see section 6.6).
The metaphor is of course slightly different as compared to V.5.3. Here, people do not see the god at a festival, whereas in V.5.3 they do not see a king. The point is, however, the same.