In late antiquity, a central debate concerning Aristotleâs logical corpus concerned the subject matter of the Categories. Did it concern words, things, or concepts? As Simplicius says in [T2], none of these proposals seem tenable: it is grammar that deals with words, metaphysics that deals with things, and psychology that deals with concepts.1 So it would not seem to be the task of logic to divide any of these terrains into ten classes, these being the categories (substance, quality, quantity, etc.). An influential solution given by Porphyry is that the Categories concerns âthe primary imposition of expressions ⦠for it concerns simple significant words insofar as they signify things.â He explains the difference between âprimaryâ and âsecondary impositionâ at [T1]: when a term is used for a thing like gold or the sun, this is first imposition, but when one term is used for another, as when âgoldâ or âsunâ is identified as a ânoun,â this is second imposition.
Al-FÄrÄbÄ« adapted the Porphryian account of the subject matter of the Categories to say that the subject matter of logic is utterances insofar as they signify, not âthings,â but âintelligibles (maÊ¿qÅ«lÄt),â and the intelligibles signified by those utterances [T3].2 This gets in all three of Simpliciusâ candidates for the subject matter: things, words, and concepts. Thus the horse in the field is called by the word âhorse,â which expresses the concept of a horse (the same concept would be expressed in other languages by words like âPferdâ or âfarasâ). The logician studies these words and concepts, for instance by observing that the word âhorseâ expresses a concept which is a species. Here horse will be a primary intelligible, since it refers directly to things like the horse in the field, but species will be a secondary intelligible, since it refers to a primary intelligible; this of course is comparable to Porphyryâs distinction between primary and secondary imposition.
That brings us to Avicennaâs influential, but controversial, view [T4, T5, T6].3 The logician does not think about primary intelligibles like horse, but secondary intelligibles like species or genus [T5]. Against al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs conception, Avicenna argues that not just any intelligible is studied in logic, but only those that are at a higher level of abstraction, and thus have no direct correspondent outside the mind [T4]; there can be a horse in the field, but not a species or genus. This seems quite plausible. Though words like âSocrates,â âhuman,â and âhorseâ might appear in a logic textbook, this would only be for the sake of helping the reader by giving an example to illustrate a logical rule. The actual rules, by contrast, would concern more abstract notions, namely the secondary intelligibles. In particular, they would concern these insofar as they can help us to produce new knowledge [T6], paradigmatically by laying down the norms of valid argumentation.
Here we may observe that in one sense, Avicenna has left the ancient dispute behind. He is talking about the subject matter of logic, not of the Categories, a work he in fact considers of dubious relevance for logic anyway.4 On the other hand, he is picking up another idea that carried over from late antiquity to the Arabic medieval tradition: that logic is an instrument, not a part of philosophy, as mentioned by Avicennaâs student BahmanyÄr [T7].5 Its function is to help us reach new scientific knowledge, for instance by explaining how to combine premises validly to reach a conclusion [T6]; see also al-ṬūsÄ«âs explanation at [T19]. This is also the issue which draws the attention of AbÅ« al-BarakÄt [T10], for whom logic is a tool for deductive reasoning, which when employed correctly, will guard us against error and disagreement. He is thus selective in his use of Avicenna: though he keeps the idea of knowledge production, he does not mention secondary intelligibles as the subject matter of logic.
It would be worth pausing at this point to clarify what is meant by talking about the âsubject matterâ of a science in the first place. As our texts repeatedly state, the subject matter is âthat whose necessary accidents are investigated in the science.â This is potentially misleading, since one may easily slip into the assumption that it is the subject matter itself that is being investigated.6 That is not the case, though. Strictly speaking, zoology does not investigate animals, but the intrinsic or necessary features of animals, like their habitats or diets. Applied to logic, this means that on Avicennaâs view the logician should investigate the intrinsic features of secondary intelligibles, with a view to the way these intelligibles may be used to attain new knowledge. The Avicennan view was perpetuated and reformulated by his immediate followers BahmanyÄr [T7] and LawkarÄ« [T8], and also by al-SÄwÄ« [T9] and al-RÄzÄ« [T13], with the latter version being the one most later logicians respond to directly, as at [T15]. Al-SÄwÄ« picks up Avicennaâs explanation of why logicians had since antiquity concerned themselves with language, given that âexpressionsâ play no role in logicâs task according to Avicenna: this is for purely pedagogical reasons. A similarly pragmatic reason for interest in language is found at [T16].
Another noteworthy feature of these reformulations of Avicenna is that they mention the pairing of conception and assent, which we dealt with in the previous chapter. For now, we can say that the contrast is basically between having an understanding of a single term, e.g. having a âconceptionâ of what a giraffe is, and actually endorsing propositions concerning terms, e.g. âassentingâ to the claim âgiraffe is animal.â As we will see, the contrast between conception and assent was important for Avicenna, as it had been for al-FÄrÄbÄ«. But it did not feature in Avicennaâs account of the subject matter of logic. Still, one can easily relate conception and assent to that account, as BahmanyÄr does at the start of [T7]: these are the two forms in which knowledge may arise, and as weâve already seen, logic investigates the features of secondary intelligibles specifically with an eye to knowledge production. This is also how SuhrawardÄ« relates conception and assent to logic in [T11âT12], with commentary by Ibn KammÅ«nÄ at [T27].7 Still it is a sign of things to come that al-SuhrawardÄ« places so much emphasis on conception and assent in this context. In a parallel development at the same time, al-RÄzÄ« structured the logic section of his Mulakhkhaá¹£ in two parts, dealing respectively with conceptions and assents.
Itâs possible that this structure, in such an influential work, inspired al-KhÅ«najÄ«, who was apparently the first to say that the subject matter of logic is not what Avicenna had claimed, but rather the âobjects of conception and assentâ [T14]. On the conceptualization side logic investigates the explanatory phrase that spells out a conception, or classifies the intelligible as a species, a genus, etc. On the assent side logic investigates features of assents, either alone (e.g. that a certain assent is the contrary of another one) or in combination (which is where we would get to the various forms of valid and invalid argument form). This new approach was accepted by al-KhÅ«najÄ«âs student Ibn WÄá¹£il [T15], as well as al-AbharÄ« [T16â17], al-KÄtibÄ« [T20â23], and al-UrmawÄ« [T24â25]. This is a telling point in historical terms, as it illustrates something weâll be seeing repeatedly in this volume, namely that al-KhÅ«najÄ« was a particularly innovative and influential figure in the history of logic.
As al-KÄtibÄ« notes [T20], the dispute is also an important one in philosophical terms. If al-KhÅ«najÄ«âs proposal is correct, then logic has a broader remit than it would on Avicennaâs view: it would consider âthings that do not attach to secondary intelligibles at all,â like essentiality or accidentality, or being a species. Now, this may seem puzzling: arenât things like âbeing a speciesâ secondary intelligibles? Yes, but remember the caution we gave above, that what is investigated in a science is not the subject matter itself, but its intrinsic features. And âbeing a speciesâ is an intrinsic feature of (or âattaches toâ) a primary intelligible like horse, not a secondary intelligible. So with al-KhÅ«najÄ«âs approach we are back to a view more like al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs, according to which primary intelligibles can be included in the subject matter of logic.
There is an obvious objection to be made here, which is that the subject matter of logic becomes too broad, indeed, becomes identical to the subject matter of the sciences in general. After all everything one deals with in any science is âan object of conception or assent.â This is one of the points made by al-ṬūsÄ« in defense of the Avicennan view at [T18], a defense followed by al-ḤillÄ« [T29] and Quá¹b al-DÄ«n al-RÄzÄ«.8 Arguably though the objection had already been anticipated by and answered by al-KÄtibÄ«: a science is identified not only by its subject matter, but also the point of view from which that subject matter is treated [T21]. So for example the logician can study the primary intelligible giraffe, not in the way that a zoologist would, but with a view to the fact that this is a species term, or how it would enter into a validly constructed argument. This same point is stressed in a lengthy discussion of the whole debate found in al-SamarqandÄ«. As he says, the logician is concerned with âthe objects known through conception and assent not as such, but inasmuch as they lead to the thing soughtâ [T28]. So in the end, the ancient idea that logic is an instrument for achieving knowledge, stressed by Avicenna himself, was used to defend an alternative account of logicâs subject matter.
Texts from: Porphyry, Simplicius, Avicenna, BahmanyÄr, al-LawkarÄ«, al-SÄwÄ«, AbÅ« al-BarakÄt, al-SuhrawardÄ«, al-RÄzÄ«, al-KhÅ«najÄ«, Ibn WÄá¹£il, al-AbharÄ«, al-ṬūsÄ«, al-KÄtibÄ«, al-UrmawÄ«, Ibn al-NafÄ«s, Ibn KammÅ«na, al-SamarqandÄ«, al-ḤillÄ«.
[T1] Porphyry, In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium, 57.35â58.3 [trans. Zimmermann]
[terms of second imposition]
Thus it was the work of the first imposition to call this thing âgoldâ and to name the matter that was such as to shine in this way âsunâ, while to say that the word âgoldâ was a noun (onoma) was of the second imposition, which signified what type of word (tous tupous) such and such a word was.
[T2] Simplicius, In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium, 9.8â10.6 [trans. Chase, mod.]
[questions about the scope of the Aristotleâs Categories]
Now some say that [the Categories] are about words (phônai), and that the aim and scope (skopos) has to do with simple words, and that it is the first part of logic. Just as the first part of the book on propositions [i.e. On Interpretation] is about composite words, but not about things (pragmata), so this [book], being about the parts of the proposition, would be about words. [â¦] [9.19] Others, however, do not accept this as the aim and scope. It does not, they say, pertain to the philosopher to theorize about words, but rather to the grammarian, who investigates their modifications, configurations, and changes in word-endings, as well as their proper usages and their types. They say the aim and scope is the very beings (onta) which are signified by words; and that these are what is said (ta legomena). [â¦] [9.28] In opposition to these considerations, however, is [the fact that] the present book is a part of the study of logic, whereas to occupy oneself with beings as such is to engage in that philosophy which is metaphysical, and in general, primary. Others say that the aim and scope is neither significant words nor the things signified, but rather simple concepts (noêmata). For if, they say, the discussion in the [Categories] is about the ten genera, and these are posterior and [merely] conceptual (ennoêmatika), then the discussion is about such concepts. [â¦] [10.4] These people, however, should have considered that to speak about concepts as such does not pertain to the study of logic, but rather to that of the soul. Of all these people, each one had an imperfect grasp of the aim and scope [of the Categories].
[T3] Al-FÄrÄbÄ«, IḥṣÄʾ al-Ê¿ulÅ«m, 17.5â18.3 [trans. Karimullah, mod.]
[the subject matter of logic is utterances insofar as they signify intelligibles]
As for the objects (al-mawá¸Å«Ê¿Ät) of logic, i.e., those things about which rules are given, they are intelligibles insofar as they are signified by utterances, and utterances insofar as they signify intelligibles. This is so, because we justify an opinion to ourselves by thinking, then giving an account, and then setting up in our minds (nuqÄ«mu fÄ« anfusinÄ) objects and intelligibles (umÅ«ran wa-maÊ¿qÅ«lÄtin) whose role is to justify this opinion. We justify [the opinion] to other people by presenting them with arguments (aqÄwÄ«l) by which they will understand the objects and intelligibles whose role is to justify this opinion. Nor is it possible to justify any opinion with just any chance intelligible, in any number and under any chance condition, composition or order. Rather, each opinion we want to prove needs definite objects and intelligibles (umÅ«rin wa-maÊ¿qÅ«lÄtin maḥdÅ«da) that are of a certain number, standing in certain conditions, and composed and ordered in a certain fashion. And this is also how the verbal utterances by which we express these intelligibles must be, when we want to justify our opinion to someone else.
[T4] Avicenna, ShifÄʾ, Maná¹iq, Madkhal, 46.3â48.4 [trans. Di Vincenzo, mod.]
[the subject matter of logic is not âutterances insofar as they signify meaningsâ]
There is no good in the claim of those who state that the subject matter of logic is the inquiry into utterances insofar as they signify meanings, and that the logicianâs art is precisely to speak of utterances insofar as they signify meanings. On the contrary, the state of affairs must be conceived as we mentioned.
Those who became confused and perplexed about this did so simply because they did not really (bi-l-ḥaqīqa) determine the subject matter of logic and the class of existents to which it is proper. For they found that existence is of two sorts: of things in external reality, and their existence in the mind. They therefore assigned the inquiry into external existence to one or more philosophical disciplines, while the inquiry into mental existence, and how [existence] is conceived in [the mind], was assigned to a discipline or to a part of [another] discipline, not having made any differentiation, or realized that items in the mind are either things that are conceived in the mind and acquired from external reality, or items which, insofar as they are in the mind, have nothing corresponding to them in external reality. As the understanding of both of these pertains to a discipline, one of the two becomes a subject matter for the discipline of logic with respect to an accident that occurs to it. As to which of these two it is, it is the second member of the division [sc. things in the mind with no correspondence to external reality]. As to which accident occurs [to it], it is either that it leads to the realization in the soul [24 Madkour] of another intellectual form that was not there before, or that it is useful for, or an obstacle to, attaining [a new intellectual form].
Since these [philosophers] did not really distinguish either the subject matter of the discipline of logic, or the respect under which it is its subject matter, they stammered and were confused. You by contrast will learn later, through a more powerful explanation, that each theoretical discipline has a subject matter, and that it inquires into nothing but the accidents and states of its subject matter. You will also know that the inquiry into the subject matter itself can pertain to one discipline, while the inquiry into its accidents pertains to another discipline. This then is what you need to know about the state of logic.
[T5] Avicenna, ShifÄʾ, IlÄhiyyÄt, 7.16â19 [trans. Sabra, mod.]
[the subject matter of logic is secondary intelligibles]
As you have learned, the object of the science of logic is the secondary intelligible concepts (al-maÊ¿ÄnÄ« al-maÊ¿qÅ«la al-thÄniya)âthose that depend on (tastanidu ilÄ) the primary intelligible conceptsâwith respect to how they may be used to arrive at the unknown from the known, not insofar as they are thoughts (maÊ¿qÅ«la) having a mental existence that is not attached to matter at all or is attached to non-corporeal matter.
[T6] Avicenna, Maná¹iq al-mashriqiyyÄ«n, 10.15â20
[the subject matter of logic is meanings combined to reach new knowledge]
The subject matter [of logic] is meanings insofar as they are subjected to a composition by which a connection is reached for the attainment of something in our minds that was not in our minds [before]. But not insofar as these are things in concrete reality (fÄ« l-Ê¿ayÄn), like substances, quantities, qualities, etc. For if we turn to their being substances, quantities, qualities, etc., then even if this is why they are âthings,â this is only an effect of, or judgment about, the way in which they are suitable to be part of an explanatory phrase or an argument.
[T7] BahmanyÄr, Taḥṣīl, 5.7â6.12
[logic is the science that teaches the correct form and matter of definitions and arguments]
Logic is the theoretical art by which it is known which forms and matters yield a correct definition, one that is [properly] called âdefinition,â as well as correct syllogisms, which are then called âdemonstrationâ (burhÄn). It also teaches about which forms and matters yield a [merely] adequate (iqnÄÊ¿Ä«) definition, which is then called a âdescriptionâ (rasm), and a [merely] adequate syllogism, which is then called âstrongerâ when it yields an assent that is alike to the certainty attained in dialectic, or âweakerâ when it yields only a prevailing opinion (áºann ghÄlib), as in rhetoric. And it reveals which form and matter yield an incorrect definition, and from which form and matter the incorrect syllogism derives (it is then called âfallacyâ or âsophismâ); and which form and matter yield a syllogism that does not evoke assent at all, but only imagination, such that the soul desires something or shuns it, or loathes it, or rejects it or pursues it, which is then called âpoetic syllogismâ.
And this is the utility of the art of logic. Its relation to reflection (rawiyya) is like the relation of grammar to speech, and of prosody to poetry. However, whereas a sound innate disposition and good taste (dhawq salÄ«m) may dispense with learning grammar or prosody, there is for the most part nothing in the human disposition that could dispense with first acquiring this instrument (ÄlÄ) in order to make [good] use of reflection.
[logic as an instrument]
[6] It is true to say of logic that it is a part of science in an unqualified sense (al-Ê¿ilm al-muá¹laq), which is the inquiry into things unknown, and it is also true to say of it that it is an instrument, because it is used outside of logic too. Insofar as it is an instrument, logic has a more general concept predicated of it, namely science. Just as a human being, as such, takes as a predicate a more general concept, namely âanimal,â so that it is said: âhuman being is an animal.â The difference between its being a part and being an instrument is the difference between these two concepts, as one of them is more specific and the other more general. Hence, everything that is an instrument for science in this way is a part of science in the unqualified sense, but not vice-versa.
Logic is assigned a different [role in] knowledge in that it is a measure (mikyÄl) for [knowledge], and the measure is also its matter (mÄdda) in some respect, since the object of inquiry (maá¹lÅ«b) is logical. When we say âevery moving [thing] is a body, and the soul is not a body, therefore the soul is not a moving [thing],â in this [syllogism] there is no logical matter at all. Rather, the knowledge of logic in this example lies in our learning that this composition is productive. The utility of logic in this [example] lies in the fact that it is a measure. If you say, âthis figure is productive,â you have made use of logic, because it is the matter in this case.
[T8] Al-LawkarÄ«, BayÄn al-ḥaqq, 119.3â120.3
[reformulation of Avicennaâs view on the subject matter of logic]9
The quiddities (mÄhiyyÄt) of things may be in concrete reality (fÄ« l-aÊ¿yÄn), or in conception (fÄ« l-taá¹£awwur), and they are considered from three perspectives (iÊ¿tibÄrÄt). (a) The quiddity insofar as it is such.10 (b) The perspective insofar as [the quiddity] is in concrete reality, in which case there are accidents accruing to it that are proper to this [type of] existence for that quiddity. (c) The perspective insofar as it is in conception, in which case, [again], there are accidents accruing to it that are proper to this [type of] existence, like being-a-subject or being-a-predicate, or within predication, universality or particularity, and substantiality or accidentality, and still others that we will treat [in due course]. However, in extramental existents there is nothing that would [correspond to] substantiality or accidentality in predication, and nothing that would [correspond to] a grammatical subject (mubtadaʾ) or a grammatical predicate (khabar), nor to premise or syllogism, or other things of that sort. Hence, if we want to reflect on the things and their order, we necessarily need to make them enter into [120] our conception, and thus they will necessarily have [certain] features in the conception. Thus we unavoidably need to consider [these] features that they have in the conception. We look, in our thought (fikra), to attain things [that were heretofore] unknown, and we do that by [starting out] from things that are known.
[T9] Al-SÄwÄ«, Baá¹£Äʾir, 29.1â30.11
[the subject matter is secondary intelligibles]
The subject matter of every science is that whose features (aḥwÄl) that belong to it essentially are investigated in that science. These features are called âessential accidentsâ; you will learn about them [later]. Now the usefulness of logic has become clear: its fullest extent is making known (taÊ¿rÄ«f) the explanatory phrase and argument [form] taken without qualification. That is, by way of universal and general rules that are not specific to one thing rather than another. Then, once this is known, one may dispense with learning every definition and demonstration anew, [one by one]. Rather, the rules [of logic], stripped of any specific subject matter, apply to all specific definitions and proofs. The subject matter of [logicâs] inquiry, therefore, is the meanings (maÊ¿ÄnÄ«) which are the matter (mawwÄd) of the pure [forms] of definitions and proofs, insofar as they are prepared through an arrangement conducive to grasping something (taḥṣīl amr) in the mind. And these meanings are the secondary intelligibles.
What we mean by âsecondaryâ is this: in the human mind, there are forms and quiddities of things that exist outside the mind. Then the mind operates on them, making judgments about some in light of others, or attaching to some of them things that do not belong to them [intrinsically], or else subtracting from some of them accidents that are external to their true natures. This operation of the mind makes some of them a judgment (ḥukm), others something upon which judgment is passed (maḥkÅ«m). Addition and subtraction are features that belong to these quiddities as they exist in the mind, so the quiddities are the primary intelligibles and the features that belong to them after they obtain in the mind are secondary intelligibles, namely the quiddities being predicates or subjects, universals or particulars, and others that you have already learned.
Therefore, the subject matter of logic is these secondary intelligibles, insofar as they lead to grasping knowledge that was not there [before].
[the role of the primary intelligibles]
As for the primary intelligibles, one inquires into them only when one seeks to apply these rules, once internalized, to the specific definitions and proofs, so as to align them [with the things defined]. In this case, one turns to the primary intelligibles that are the quiddities of existent things, like their being a substance, a quantity, a quality, and so forth; in short, the genera of existent things, as you will learn [later].
[why the study of language is included in logic]
Thus humans could in principle study logic by plain thinking and on their own, without asking for the help of an instructor lecturing or teaching about it, if this were possible. But since teaching has to proceed by way of lecturing and teaching, and this can be done only with the help of utterances, utterances inevitably also become objects of [logical] inquiry, especially as humans think in combined meanings that cannot be separated from imagining their utterances together with them, to such an extent that it is as if humans talked to themselves by means of imagined utterances when they begin to talk or think.
[the structure of logic]
The meanings and utterances which are the matter (mawwÄd) of explanatory phrases and arguments are composite. Hence, they can only be known in their composition once the individual elements have been grasped. And that not just in any way, but insofar as they are prepared for the composition. Of course, we must first know the features of simple utterances and simple meanings in this way, and then we follow this by getting to know the explanatory phrase leading to a [new] conception. Since conception naturally precedes assent, it deserves to be put first. But we shall preface this by making known what the explanatory phrase requires in terms of composition, and then go on to make known the arguments according to their types, then the types of their composition that exemplify them.
So our book shall comprise, in line with this approach, three parts: the first on simple [utterances and meanings], the second on the explanatory phrase that leads to conception, and the third on phrases that lead to assent.
[T10] AbÅ« al-BarakÄt, MuÊ¿tabar, 5.7â7.8
[logic as the art of reaching new knowledge on the basis of previous knowledge]
Among all the scholars (Ê¿ulamÄʾ), it is the philosophers (ḥukamÄʾ) who seek the knowledge of existents and the truth of it as it is in itself. But among them there is disagreement and dispute about their sciences and the schools of thought that have been passed down from them. The beginner seeking knowledge despairs because of this. When dispute arises, this indicates failure to get things right, either entirely or partially, and then the beginner says: if the human being were to reach through his inquiry the clear truth which obtains for him with reliability and certainty, then there would be no difference of opinion among the scholars, and dispute would cease among the philosophers, about whom it is said that they seek the truth as it is in itself in the science of existents, not according to a variety of goals that differ in what they seek on account of the different schools of thought. [â¦]
[5.15] Concerning this they made scattered and dispersed statements in their scientific theories. Then these were enlarged by theories and supplemented by thoughts, until Aristotle wrote a book on this called The Science of Logic, in a number of parts, which comprise the methodological arts used in teaching rational and theoretical [things] (al-taÊ¿lÄ«miyya al-fikriyya al-naáºariyya) regarding which human beings perform conceptualization and assent. For this aim, this book is more complete [than others] and the intended aims are more comprehensive than anything that was transmitted to us from the ancients in this art.
The arguments (kalÄm) [of the book] indicate that its intended aim is to mention the causes on grounds of which I have responded to scholars of the theoretical sciences concerning their theories, and dealt with the differences between them regarding their schools of thought and sciences, so that as a result of these [causes], one may either arrive at the correct position, or fall into error. [And its aim is to mention] how the former is achieved and the latter is avoided, because the subject matter that [6] the logician is concerned with is that by which one may arrive at an understanding of things [formerly] unknown and the knowledge of them. This [sc. that by which one reaches understanding] consists in meanings (maÊ¿ÄnÄ«) that were already in peopleâs minds, even before they inquired into whatever they wanted to reach in terms of understanding and acquired knowledge. These [meanings] are used in this [undertaking], by deploying them in a certain way, so as to acquire a composed form [sc. that of a valid argument], as we mentioned.
For this reason, [Aristotle] says that each teaching occurs in the mind (dhihnī), by way of previous knowledge. Hence, what is sought in [the science of logic] is how human beings arrive, by means of prior understanding and knowledge, at the attainment of the acquired understanding and knowledge that was sought; and in which way this happens. The goal [of logic] is to supply that by which human beings get to acquire understanding and knowledge of things that were [formerly] unknown, and to understand the true reality of [these things], as opposed to what is false, and the truth in what is said about them, as opposed to what is wrong.
[critique of the view that the subject matter is significant utterances]
Some people say that the subject matter of logic is utterances insofar as they signify meanings, but they are wrong. That is in fact [the subject matter of] the science of linguistics. The aim of logic is to use it with regard to what is called âsignified,â because the logician does not include utterances in his science except accidentallyâjust as they are included in the other sciences and communicative (mufÄwaá¸a) arts. But he applies his mind to understanding things [formerly] unknown on the basis of things [formerly] known. But the instances of knowledge that one seeks to understand, and those that were already in the mind, have no need for utterances. Even if utterances are part of this science, then their being part of the scope [of logic] is only accidental, not essential, as you will learn is the case in Dialectic, Rhetoric, Sophistics, and Poetics: whereas these people [sc. the upholders of the view that utterances are the subject matter] suppose the case of the others to be like that of [logic]. This being so, what is intended essentially are the meanings, and the utterances are merely accidental, and [are included] for the sake of [the meanings]. The fact that utterances are involved in language for those who are present, insofar as they signify meanings [for them], is just like the fact that writing is part of language for those who are not present, insofar as it signifies utterances [for them]. But just as it does not follow that writing is the subject matter of the science of logic, merely because it encompasses acts of writing; so it is not necessary that utterances be the subject matter for it, merely because one uses them to talk and communicate. Only someone who is mistaken about this issue will refuse to admit that utterance can dispense with writing, and that other things [sc. thinking about meanings] can dispense with utterance.
[usefulness of logic]
[7] The upshot of what has been said is that the usefulness of this science is that it guides minds towards the true realities of cases of understanding and knowledge, and keeps one clear of the deviances and errors that beset them. Its aim is the understanding of that by which there is guidance and refraining from error, and how these two occur. Its subject matter is that by which one arrives at the aforementioned guidance and refraining from error, on the basis of prior understanding and knowledge of things in the mind, insofar as one arrives at the former by means of the latter.
The things sought [in logic, then,] are the rules by which one gains acquired understanding and knowledge by means of prior understanding and knowledge in the mind. These rules are the theoretical guide which [allows us to move] from prior understanding and knowledge to that which is acquired through them and from them.
[T11] Al-SuhrawardÄ«, MashÄriÊ¿, Maná¹iq, 7.1â8.10
[the aim of logic is to learn how to reach conception and assent; cf. T7]
You have learned from the books that there is no object of inquiry (maá¹lÅ«b) that is not either a conception or an assent, and that the way to reach these is the explanatory phrase and the argument, respectively. The aim of logical inquiry lies in the ways to reach [an object of inquiry] and in the simple [elements] of which the composites are made up, as well as the form (ḥayʾa) of compositions. In general, it is the inquiry into the matter of these two ways to reach [an object of inquiry] and their forms [with regard to their being, in the case of arguments] sound or not, and [in the case of explanatory phrases] sufficient or deficient.
[T12] Al-SuhrawardÄ«, Maná¹iq al-TalwīḥÄt, 2.1â3.3
[form and matter in logic]
For each object of knowledge, non-existence or existence is not [determined] by thinking, but on the basis of what is presently available, or that which is to be made available. So there must [already] be something known in order to arrive at something unknown, not by chance, but by some arrangement (tartīb), through which one is led to what is unknown. What is [already] known to thought plays the role of matter, while the arrangement plays the role of form. Thought will get things right when these two are right, and get things wrong when one of them is wrong. Each of the two, I mean matter and form, may be either complete or deficient; and the deficient and false may resemble the complete. Innate human disposition is not sufficient to discern between these two states, otherwise there would be no confusion among the sages; only the Son of Man is helped by the holy spirit, and sees things as they are. But we [normal people] need an instrument to discern wrong from right. Logic, then, is a science in which are taught the types of arrangement that bring one [to the intended object of knowledge]: whatever follows this is correct, whereas what does not is incorrect.
[the role of proofs]
Now, the unknown just like the known falls into two categories [sc. conception and assent]. For each of the things unknown in these two categories, there must be a composite [item of] knowledge related to it. If the non-innate does not end in the innate, then what is to be made available will not be available. The conceptions leading to such things are called âexplanatory phrase,â and may be definition or something else, while the assents leading to such things [are called] âargument,â and may be demonstration or something else. The explanatory phrase and the argument are two methods in the sciences. It has become the business of the logician to know the parts of the connections and their compositions, to form an argument leading to the desired conclusion in each of the two, as a specific arrangement of forms and matters. And when the composite stands in need, both in concrete reality and in the mind, of a verification of the simple [parts], then [the logician] first needs to investigate the simple parts of which the composition is made upânot in every respect but insofar as they are fit to be so composed. Utterances are the counterparts of meanings, so that inquiry into [utterances] frees one from having to inquire into the meanings [themselves], as [the utterances] are parallel to them. The parts of what leads [3] to a conception are prior to it [i.e., the conception]; and they are also prior to the parts of the argument [sc. the premises], because, being prior to the former, they are prior to the latter. There are items of necessary knowledge (á¸arÅ«riyyÄt) that are [simply] pointed out, without the need for [prior] knowledge or any instrument; and much of this science [sc. logic] is like that. On this, other [rules] are built. There is no need for yet another set of rules, otherwise there would be an infinite regress.
[T13] Al-RÄzÄ«, Maná¹iq al-Mulakhkhaá¹£, 9.14â10.11
[the subject matter is secondary intelligibles; logic divided into study of conceptions and study of assents]
The subject matter of every science is that whose accidents it investigates, insofar as these belong to it as such. [10] The subject matter of logic is the secondary intelligibles, insofar as it is possible to proceed by means of them from things [already] known to things [as yet] unknown.
Explanation of âsecondary intelligiblesâ: human beings first have conceptions of the true natures of things, then they judge some of them by means of others, either by way of restrictive specification (taqyÄ«d), or by predication (khabar). A quiddityâs being made the target of a judgment in this way, is something that accrues to it only once it has first been conceptualized. Hence it is of the second order. Therefore, the inquiry into these notions (iÊ¿tibÄrÄt)ânot absolutely, but with regard to how one may correctly proceed by means of them from things known to things unknownâthis is logic. Without doubt then, the subject matter of [logic] is the secondary intelligibles in the sense just mentioned. Since you now know that the utmost objective of this science is the knowledge of the rules (qawÄnÄ«n) by which one may attain the knowledge of unknown things by way of conceptions and assents, we have of course arranged our objectives for this science in two parts [that is, dealing with conceptions and assents].
[T14] Al-KhÅ«najÄ«, Kashf al-AsrÄr, 8.13â9.2
[the subject matter is objects of conception and assent]
Logic investigates the objects of conception and assent, not as such, but insofar as they lead to one of the following: (a) an object of inquiry that is conceptualized, either (a1) in a proximate way, and in this sense it is called âexplanatory phraseâ; or (a2) in a remote way, like their being universal, particular, essential, accidental, genus, specific difference, and the like; or (b) an object of inquiry that involves assent, either (b1) in a proximate way, and in this sense it is called âargument (ḥujja),â or (b2) in a remote way, like being a proposition, or being the contrary of a proposition, or being the contradiction of some other [proposition], and so on; or (b3) even more remotely than this, their being subjects, predicates, and the like. These notions are no doubt external to the concept (mafhÅ«m) of these objects of knowledge, and are attached to them insofar as they are what they are, and the subject matter of every science is that [9] into whose accidents it investigates, those that attach to it insofar as it is what it is. So it is obvious that the subject-matter of logic is the objects of conception and assent.
[T15] Ibn WÄá¹£il, Nukhbat al-fikar, fol. 4v15â5v2
[Presentation of al-RÄzÄ«âs view and its rejection in favor of al-KhunajÄ«âs view]
As for the subject matter [of logic]: you should know that the subject matter of every science is that whose essential accidents are investigated in that science. By âessential accidentsâ we mean whatever belongs to a quiddity when considered by itself (bi-iÊ¿tibÄrihÄ fÄ« nafsihÄ) or when considered [5r] as coextensive (musÄwin) with it in terms of generality and specificity, regardless of whether in itself it is more general, more specific, or coextensive. Thus, the subject matter of geometry is measures, while the subject matter of medicine is the human body with regard to what heals it or what makes it sick: their essential accidents are studied by the geometer and the physician.
Now that you know this, we say: the ImÄm Fakhr al-DÄ«n [al-RÄzÄ«] and others held that the subject matter of logic is secondary intelligibles insofar as it is possible to proceed by means of them from the known to the [formerly] unknown. The meaning of âsecondary intelligiblesâ is that which belongs to the forms of things existing outside the mind, like being-a-subject, being-a-predicate, being-a-genus, being-aâspecific-difference, and other such notions (iÊ¿tibÄrÄt). And these things are intellectually grasped secondarily, after having firstly grasped things outside [the mind]. Since the inquiry is about these notions insofar as it is possible to proceed by means of them from the known to the unknown, this must be [the subject matter] of logic.
You should know, however: the truth is that the subject matter of logic is conceptions and assents, as our master Afá¸al al-DÄ«n al-KhÅ«najÄ« held, may he rest in peace. For that whose essential accidents the logician investigates is [conceptions and assents]. These are conducive to what is sought as a conception, either in a immediate way by considering [what is sought as a conception] as being an explanatory phrase, or in a remote way, by considering it as being one of the five predicables. Or [these are conducive] to what is sought as an assent, either in a immediate way by considering [what is sought as an assent] as being an argument (ḥujaj), or in a remote way by considering it to be propositions that are contraries or not, salva veritate conversions or not, contradictories or not; or in a still more remote way, by considering it as being its subject or predicate. As for the questions [to be treated in logic], this is the inquiry into these [5v] accidents in themselves. And as for the principles [of logic], we already mentioned that these are either immediate (badihiyya), or derived from theoretical reasoning (naáºariyya) that depends on what is immediate and free from error.
[T16] Al-AbharÄ«, KhulÄá¹£at al-AfkÄr, 104.7â105.10
[the subject matter of logic is conceptions and assents, not secondary intelligibles, nor utterances inasmuch as they signify meanings]
We say then: a simple meaning does not lead to assent, nor to the conception of the true nature of a thing. Rather, the way to reach them must be a composition. The logician studies the composition that leads to conceptions, this being called the âexplanatory phraseâ; and [studies] the composition leading to assent, this being called an âargument.â But the study of compositions requires the study of the simple items insofar as they are prepared for the composition. Hence, the logician inquires into conceptions and assents insofar as they lead to conceptions, or insofar as being led to these depends on them, like being-universal, being-particular, being-essential, or being-accidental. [Also the logician studies them] insofar as they lead to assent, or insofar as being led to these depends on them: either immediately, like their being-a-proposition or the contradictory of a proposition, the contrary and the contradictory of its contrary; or remotely, like their being predicates or subjects. Thus the subject matter of logic, that is, the thing about which the logician inquires with regard to its concomitants insofar as it is what it is, is nothing other than conceptions and assents.
It is wrong to say that the subject matter of logic is secondary intelligibles (al-maÊ¿qÅ«lÄt al-thÄniyya), that is, definitional or predicative combinations, insofar as it is possible that one is led by means of them to things [formerly] unknown. For just as the logician studies [secondary intelligibles], so does he study their simple [constituents]. Nor is it right to say that the subject matter of logic is utterances (alfÄáº) inasmuch as they signify meanings. For the logician studies utterances only from the perspective of communication, because it is impossible to learn logic without utterances. So if this were possible merely by thought without utterances, that would suffice. Also, it is difficult for the soul to arrange meanings without imagining utterances. So necessity demands the use of utterances. This being so, it follows that utterances have different features on account of which the meanings arranged in the mind are different. Therefore, the logician is required to study the features of utterances from this perspective.
[T17] Al-AbharÄ«, TanzÄ«l, Quoted from al-ṬūsÄ«, TaÊ¿dÄ«l, 144.14â20
[the subject matter of logic is conceptions and assents]
The subject matter of logicâI mean that about which the logician inquires with regard to its concomitants, insofar as it is what it isâis nothing other than conceptions and assents. For [the logician] inquires into what is connected to conceptions, and what this requires, in terms of the thing being universal or particular, essential or accidental, and so forth; and also inquires into what is connected to assent, and what this requires, either in terms of immediate requirements, like the thingâs being a proposition and a contrary and a contradiction, and so forth, or in terms of remote requirements, like the thingâs being a subject or a predicate. These are the states that belong to conceptions and assents insofar as they are what they are. For sure then, the subject matter of [logic] is conceptions and assents.
[T18] Al-ṬūsÄ«, TaÊ¿dÄ«l, 144.21â146.3 [Responding to T17]
[three arguments against al-AbharÄ«âs view that the subject matter of logic is conceptions and assents]
I say: if [al-AbharÄ«] meant by âconceptions and assentsâ everything to which these two names apply, which is [all] sorts of knowledge in its entirety (fa-hiya al-Ê¿ulÅ«m bi-asrihÄ), because knowledge is divided into these two, then in that case the implication (mafhÅ«m) is that the subject matter of logic would be all sorts of knowledge. But clearly this is not the subject matter of logic. If, however, he meant by âconceptions and assentsâ [145] what these two [terms] signify insofar as they are conceptions and assents, then they cannot be the subject matter of logic from this perspective [either, and for three reasons]:
First: the conception, insofar as it is a conception, cannot include any concept other than that of âconception,â such as âuniversalâ and âparticular,â âessentialâ and âaccidental,â and so forth. For it is a conception only insofar as it is just a plain perception, whereas it is âuniversalâ inasmuch as it possesses an [additional] concept (mafhÅ«m) because it applies to a plurality. There can be no doubt about the difference between these two perspectives. This applies likewise to assents, and whatever else [al-AbharÄ«] mentioned or failed to mention.
Second: given that [al-Abharī] acknowledges that the logician inquires into whatever is connected to conception, to assent, or both, [the subject matter of logic] cannot be conception insofar as it is conception and the assent insofar as it is assent, because a thing is not connected to itself.
Third: conception and assent, insofar as they are conception and assent, are not definition or syllogism, insofar as those are definition and syllogism. Conception and assent are by their quiddities perceptions (idrÄk), whereas definition and syllogism are by their quiddity statements (qawl); definition and syllogism are not essential accidents for [conception and assent] nor do they fall under their genera, or vice versa. âConceptionâ and âassentâ are only true of what is understood (mafhÅ«m) from their parts, and of that which has definition and syllogism connected to it. They are true of other sorts of knowledge not because they are conception and assent, but because one, the other, or both apply to all of this by way of a general accidental predication of their accidents.
If it is said: what is connected to a conception or assent is a cause for it, and the study of something remains incomplete if its cause is not studied, so the study of definition and syllogism remains incomplete unless conceptions and assents are studied. Then we say: the study of the cause of the subject matter of a science is not part of the science which investigates that subject matter. Otherwise, the study of affirming the Necessary Existent would be a part of all sciences.
[Avicennan view: the subject matter of logic is secondary intelligibles]
The truth is that the subject matter of logic is secondary intelligibles, insofar as their study leads from things known to things [formerly] unknown, or to something similar to that, like implications, convictions, [146] imaginations, and so forth. Conception and assent belong to the class of secondary intelligibles, just like definition and syllogism and their parts. The universal and the particular, the subject and the predicate, proposition, antecedent, conclusion, and so forth, also belong to the class of [secondary intelligibles], as specified by the aforementioned stipulation explained by the adepts of this art.
[T19] Al-ṬūsÄ«, AsÄs al-iqtibÄs, 5.12â22
[logic is the science of manipulating meanings to acquire new knowledge]
The science of logic is the understanding of meanings through which one may reach the various types of acquired knowledge, and to reach each piece of knowledge from another one. It is the knowledge (dÄnestan) of how to manipulate (taá¹£arruf) a meaning in a way that leads to the object of inquiry (maá¹lÅ«b), and of the ways that it fails to do so (or if it does, then not in the correct way). The art of logic consists in there being, besides the understanding of meanings and the knowledge of how to manipulate them, also a faculty combining these two virtues such that it understands, without deliberation or thinking, the various sorts of meanings, and through various types of manipulation, establishes an ability to discover the various types of knowledge, warding off error and confusion, and from following in the footsteps of those who fall prey to error. This much is a pointer (ishÄrat) to the conception of the quiddity of the science of logic, and a reminder (tanbÄ«h) of its utility, within the bounds of what is possible in this chapter, because to fully circumscribe its essence (kunh) is only possible after it has been set out in detail.
[T20] Al-KÄtibÄ«, JÄmiÊ¿ al-daqÄʾiq, fol. 4r5â4v1611
[the subject matter of logic as secondary intelligibles]
The subject matter of every science is that whose essential accidents are investigated in [that science]. [By essential accidents] I mean that which attaches to (a) the essence, like the capacity to wonder attaches to âhuman beingâ; or (b) what is coextensive with that, such as the capacity to laugh for âhuman being,â for this attaches to it by means of the capacity to wonder, which is coextensive with it; or (c) to something more general under which it falls, like movement [attaches] to âhuman being,â because [the human being] is a body; or (d) to something more general under which it does not fall, as movement [attaches] to âthe whiteâ because [the white] is a body; or (e) to something more specific, as the capacity to laugh [attaches] to âanimalâ, because [animal] is human being, and in that case it is an extraneous accident.
Now that you have learned this, we say: the subject matter of logic is secondary intelligibles inasmuch as it is possible to proceed by means of them from things known to things [formerly] unknown. Explanation of âsecondary intelligiblesâ: human beings first conceive the true realities of things, and then they judge some of them by means of others, either by a definitional or by a predicative judgment, taking them to be universal or particular, an essence or an accident, a genus, a specific difference, or a species, a subject or a predicate, and other such features (aḥkÄm) besides. Those true realities are primary intelligibles, and once they are investigated, [further] features are predicated of them, which only came to attach after those were known first. Therefore, these features are on a second level of intellection. Logic, then, is the investigation of these featuresânot absolutely, but with regard to how one may correctly proceed by means of them from things known to things [formerly] unknown. As a result, it follows that [logicâs] being an investigation of how to proceed from them in the way mentioned is, from this perspective, an essential accident of secondary intelligibles. Thus said the Shaykh [Avicenna] in the ShifÄʾ and the ImÄm [al-RÄzÄ«] in the Mulakhkhaá¹£.
[the relevance of this subject matter to conception and assent]
Now, some people made the subject matter [of logic] the objects [4v] of conception and assent. This would inevitably be more general than [a consideration of] secondary intelligibles in the way mentioned, since one would include conceptions that are not among the features [just] specified (al-aḥkÄm al-taqyÄ«diyya). And this is closer to being correct, since the logician may investigate things that do not attach to secondary intelligibles at all, let alone in the way mentioned, but are simple meanings that arise in the mind. For he also investigates the concepts of being an essence or an accident, a species, a genus, a specific difference, a subject or a predicate, and other intelligibles attaching to simple meanings.
Now that you have learned this, you should know: the logician investigates conceptions insofar as they lead to another conception, either (a) by a immediate connection (that is, without any intermediary), and considered in this way it is called the explanatory phrase; or (b) he may investigate them insofar as they lead to another [conception] by a remote connection (that is, with an intermediary), like their being universal, particular, essential, accidental, genus, specific difference, and so forth; or (c) he investigates assents insofar as they lead to another [assent] either by a immediate connection, and when considered this way, this is called an âargument (ḥujja)â; or (d) he investigates them by a remote connection, like their being a proposition, its contrary or its contradictory, and so forth; and (e) he also investigates conceptions insofar as they lead to assent by a still more remote connection, like their being subjects and predicates.
There can be no doubt that these notions attach to conceptions and assents in one of the ways mentioned, so the subject matter of [logic] is what we have just mentioned. Explanatory phrase is stipulated as being prior to argument, whereas the priority of conception to assent is by nature. For every assent inevitably needs a conception of the subject and the predicate [involved in the assent], either as essential or as true under some aspect, it being possible to express [the assent only] by these two and by the conception of the judgment [itself], because whoever is ignorant of one of these three cannot possibly pass a judgment about two given things.
[T21] Al-KÄtibÄ«, Munaṣṣaá¹£, fol. 5v11â6v2 [Commentary on T13]
[the view of the âverifiersâ that the subject matter of logic is secondary intelligibles]
I say: The subject matter of each science is that thing whose essential accidents are investigated in the science. By âessential accidentsâ I mean the concomitants that attach to a quiddity as such, that is, to it in itself (li-mÄ hiya hiya ayy li-dhÄtihÄ). [â¦]
[5v22] We say: Logic also investigates the secondary intelligibles, insofar as it is possible to proceed by means of them from things known to things [formerly] unknown. And if âproceeding by means of them from things known to things [formerly] unknownâ belongs to secondary intelligibles as such, then surely it should be said that the subject matter of logic is secondary intelligibles insofar as it is possible to proceed by means of them from things known to things [formerly] unknown.
Explanation of âsecondary intelligiblesâ: A person either has a conception of the true realities of things, or does not. (a) Then he may manipulate them by judging some of them to hold of others in the form of a restrictive judgment (this being a compound, in which the second part restricts the first). And then one may introduce an utterance for the two taken together, so that the phrase may be replaced by a single utterance, as when we say âhumanâ in place of ârational animal.â However, not in the sense that every single one of its individual parts is replaced by a single utterance, because generally it is not possible that the individual parts of a restrictive compound are signified without single utterances. Thus when we say ârational, knowing, worshipping, sitting animal on a given day in a given house, which engages in sewing and goldsmithery,â no single utterance may replace this, [6r] since we do not have a single utterance which signifies what is signified by âanimalâ with the above qualifications. And there are many compounds like this. But if we restrict ourselves to just some of the individual phrases, then we may replace them with single utterances. Know this!
(b) Alternatively [one may form a judgment that is] predicative, which means that [the quiddity] is judged to be (b1) universal, particular, essential, accidental, as a genus, a specific difference, a species, a subject, a predicate, and other such features (aḥkÄm); or (b2) [there are judged] to attach to some of them certain other items (umÅ«r) that are not among the [ones just mentioned], or (b3) [they are judged] to lack certain external accidents. This judgment, attachment, or deprivation are items superadded to these quiddities, and they accrue to them [only] after they have arisen in the mind.
Hence, these quiddities are first intelligibles, but they are then made the object of two types of judgment just mentioned, that is, restrictive and predicative judgment, so that an item that is not among [the first intelligibles] is either taken from them or attached to them, which only attaches to the quiddity once it has arisen in the mind, so that they are on a second level. These things, then, are the secondary intelligibles.
[logic contrasted to metaphysics and psychology]
Now, the investigation of these notions, I mean these quiddities being universal, particular, essential, accidental, a genus, a specific difference, a species, a subject, or a predicate, and other such features, judged by restrictive judgments taken from them or attached to them, is not [an investigation of them] absolutely. For if they are investigated with regard to the question of whether they exist or not, then they are, from that perspective, investigated by the science that investigates existence and its concomitants, which is First Philosophy. Whereas if they are investigated as to whether they exist in the soul, or both in the soul and outside it, then they are, from that perspective, investigated by psychology. But [when they are investigated] with respect to how one may proceed by means of them from things known to things [formerly] unknown, this is logic.
[different sciences investigate the same thing from different points of view]
You should know that this does not correspond to their [sc. the verifiersâ] explanation of the subject matter absolutely, for they offered the explanation that the investigation [in logic] concerns its essential accidents. In this case the subject matter would be whatever these essential accidents belong to absolutely, without restriction or any particular perspective. In the abovementioned examples, they [only] restricted the bearer of accidents in the ways mentioned, that is, with respect to their essential accidents, and made them the subject matter [of logic]. But in that case, they ought to restrict the subject matter, or isolate the bearers of the accidents in the examples given from the restrictions that have been mentioned, and then they could make them subject matters.
But this latter idea [i.e., that one ought to consider only those essential accidents that are relevant to logic] is absurd, because then a single thing would have some of its essential accidents investigated in one science, and others in another science. Take for instance the body of the celestial sphere: if the natural philosopher investigates it insofar as it moves and rests, while the expert of shapes studies it insofar as it has certain dimensions, and we make the celestial body the subject matter of both, then the two sciences will not be distinguished. But if we restrict the celestial body in one of the two sciences by a certain restriction, and in the other science by another restriction, then there will be a distinction between the two. Hence, we must say that the subject matter of each science is that whose essential accidents are investigated in [that science], not absolutely, but insofar as it is the subject of inherence (maḥall) for these accidents, corresponding to the subject matter mentioned in the examples.
[why a logician might nonetheless deal with primary intelligibles and utterances]
As for the primary intelligibles, these are the quiddities that are substances, quantities, qualities, and others besides from among the highest genera. The logician only investigates them because he tries to teach the student the applicability of these rules to definitions and demonstrations specific to them. This is why the Master [Avicenna], in the IshÄrÄt, excluded inquiry into the ten categories from logic. This [applies] when a person learns logic on their own, without the recourse to anyone else. But when teaching and learning does happen in [logic], this is possible only by means of utterances. So utterances, too, came to be investigated in it. And how could it be otherwise? For a personâs thought, [consisting] in a combination of meanings, becomes insignificant when separated from the imagination of utterances, so that it is as if he were talking with himself by means of imagined utterances.
Further, since the ultimate intention and the highest object sought in this science is understanding of the rules by which it is possible to acquire things [formerly] unknown from conceptions and assents, and the investigation of the composite is possible only after having investigated the simple parts (not absolutely, but from the perspective of how they are suitable for composition), surely then the logician must first investigate simple utterances and simple meanings, with a view to how they are suitable to be combined into explanatory phrases and arguments. Next, this is followed by what is needed in order that the explanatory phrase may be composed; and then [the logician] understands the explanatory phrase. This is in turn followed by what is necessary for an argument to be composed; and then [the logician] knows the argument in its [different] [6v] forms (aá¹£nÄf). This is why the ImÄm [al-RÄzÄ«] initially undertakes an investigation into how conceptions are acquired, before the investigation of how assents are acquired, for conceptions are by nature prior to assents, according to what you have learned above.
[T22] Al-KÄtibÄ«, Sharḥ Kashf al-asrÄr, fol. 6r12â31 [Commentary on T14]
[distinction between immediate and remote items connected to the objects of conception and assent]
I say: the aim of these words [of KhÅ«najÄ«âs] is to maintain that the subject matter of logic is conceptions and assents. Before we get into the explanation of this, you should know that the subject matter of each science is that whose essential accidents are investigated by the person considering the science, like shapes in geometry, numbers in arithmetic, or the human body (insofar as it is healthy or sick) in medicine, or obligatory acts in jurisprudence.
Now, by âessential accidentsâ we mean the concomitants that attach to a subject as such, that is, by virtue of its essence, or by virtue of being coextensive with its essence, or else by being more general than something that enters into the true reality of the subject. By contrast, the concomitant that attaches to the subject by virtue of being more general and external to the true reality of the subject, or that is more specific than the subject, is not an essential accident of it; it is merely said to be a immediate accident of it.
Having understood this, you should know that the subject matter of logic, according to what we have just said in the explanation, consists in things known by conception and assent (al-maÊ¿lÅ«mÄt al-taá¹£awwuriyya wa-l-taá¹£dÄ«qiyya). For the logician investigates the essential accidents of these. For he investigates conceptions insofar as they connect [to form] a conception [that was formerly] unknown, by way of a immediate connection, that is, without intermediary. When considered as such, it is called an explanatory phrase, which is a definition, a description, or the like. But [the logician] investigates them also insofar as they connect [to form] a conception by a remote connection, that is, with an intermediary. For he investigates them as to whether they are universal, particular, essential, accidental, a genus, specific difference, species, proper accident, and so forth, as you will learn. He also investigates assents, insofar as they connect [to form] an assent that [was formerly] unknown by a immediate connection. When considered as such, it is called an argument, which is either a syllogism, a deduction, or an induction. But he investigates them also insofar as they connect [to form] an assent that [was formerly] unknown by a remote connection, because he investigates them insofar as they are a proposition, the contrary of a proposition, the contradictory of a proposition, a consequence of a proposition, an antecedent or a consequent. And he investigates conceptions insofar as they connect [to form] an assent by a yet more remote connection, because he investigates them insofar as they are subjects or predicates, an object of judgment, a means of judgment, objects of description, or descriptions. These notions are the essential accidents of conceptions and assents, because they are items that are external to them, but attach to them as such.
[T23] Al-KÄtibÄ«, Sharḥ Kashf al-asrÄr, fol. 7r21â7v18
[response to T13: report and criticism of the Avicennan/RÄzÄ«an view]
The Master [Avicenna] in the ShifÄʾ held that the subject matter of logic is the items that accrue to true realities in the mind, insofar as the latter are in the mind, not dwelling on them as something extramental inasmuch as accidents accrue to those. These are [then] connected, so that another intellectual form arises in the soul, either by furthering or by preventing that connection.
The ImÄm [al-RÄzÄ«] held the same in the Mulakhkhaá¹£, except that he presented this view in full detail, saying that the subject matter of logic is second intentions insofar as it is possible to proceed by means of them from things known to things [formerly] unknown. He explains âsecondary intelligiblesâ by saying that people first have conceptions of things, then judge some of them to hold of others, either by way of restrictive specification (taqyÄ«d), as when we say ârational animalâ, or by predication (khabar), as when we say âhuman is rationalâ. A quiddity is made an object of judgment in this way only once it has been conceptualized. Hence this perspective on it belongs to the second order. Next, [al-RÄzÄ«] says that therefore, the inquiry into these notionsânot absolutely, but with regard to how one may correctly proceed by means of them from things known to things unknownâthis is logic. So it follows that the [property of] being such that one may proceed by means of them from things known to things [formerly] unknown, by the correct path, is an essential accident of secondary intelligibles in the way mentioned. As you have learned, the expert of any science inquires precisely into the essential accidents of its subject matter.
But this calls for further investigation. If this notion [i.e., the property of secondary intelligibles that one may proceed by their means from things known to things formerly unknown] were an essential accident of secondary intellgibles in the way mentioned, then knowing them in this way would imply [7v] necessarily having knowledge of this notion. For whatever attaches to a thing essentially, whether by way of being coextensive or by being something more general that enters into its true reality, is implied [by knowledge of that thing]. Otherwise, to know what attaches to it, one would need some other intermediary, so that what attaches to each of these items would attach to something else again [and so on, ad infinitum]. This is absurd, and clearly is not the case. For if the knowledge of secondary intelligibles implied, in the way mentioned, the knowledge of this notion, then the one who knows those in this way would also know logic. But obviously this is not so.
We respond to this objection by saying: We do not concede that whatever attaches to something by means of one of the aforementioned ways [i.e., by being coextensive with or by being more general than it] is necessarily implied. [â¦] [7v7] For when we [first] conceive of secondary intelligibles in the way mentioned, and [then secondly] we conceive of how it is possible to proceed by their means from things known to things [formerly] unknown by the correct path, the mind need not get to the second stage, because nothing at the first stage involves turning to anything further. This would only have followed if the essential accident were implied by an intermediary coextensive with the subject and by a general concomitant of it, and if the implication of the intermediary coextensive with it were obvious. But this is not so. [â¦]
[agreement with al-Khūnajī]
[7v13] From what the ImÄm [al-RÄzÄ«] mentioned, it is clear that what the Master [Avicenna] meant by the things that accrue [as accidents] to what is in the mind are the restrictive and predicative judgments. And it is [also] clear that the truth is what the author [of Kashf al-asrÄr, i.e. al-KhÅ«najÄ«] holds, because logic investigates things that do not accrue to secondary intelligibles and things that do accrue to them in the way mentioned. The former, because it investigates conceptions insofar as they are universal, particular, essential, accidental, genus, specific difference, species, proper accident, general accident, etc., in the way that you have learned. The latter, because it investigates assents insofar as they are a proposition, the contrary of a proposition or a contradictory.
[T24] Al-UrmawÄ«, Maá¹ÄliÊ¿, 4.8â15
[the subject matter is conceptions and assents, and in the first instance conceptions]
The subject matter of every science is that whose accidents are investigated [in this science], which attach to it as such (al-lÄḥiqa li-mÄ huwa huwa). It is conceptions and assents whose accidents, which attach to them as such, are investigated in logic. These [accidents] consist in their bringing one to a sought conception or sought assent, by a connection that is either immediate or remote. So these [sc. conception and assent] are the subject matter of logic. When they are connected immediately so as to form a conception, this is called âexplanatory phraseâ; and so as to form an assent, an âargument.â The former is prior by convention, because of the priority of conceptions to assents, and by nature, because if the initial knowledge of the subject and predicate involved [in the assent] were not conceptualized, then no judgment would be possible. But the judgment about something need not mean conceptualizing it in its true reality; as one may judge that a certain body occupies space while being ignorant of its true reality.
[T25] Al-UrmawÄ«, BayÄn al-ḥaqq, fol. 2r11â18
[the accidents of conceptions and assents]
Know that every science has a subject matter, namely that whose accidents are investigated [in this science], which attach to it as such, like the human body in medicine, and the natural body in the science of physics, and legally obligatory acts in jurisprudence. Now you will learn that what is investigated in logic are conceptions and assents, not without qualification, but with regard to how one proceeds from known conceptions and assents to things [formerly] unknown, to conceptions and assents that are reached either immediately or remotely. That which is reached immediately with regard to conception is simply an explanatory phrase, like definition and description. What is reached remotely are, for example, the fact that the conceptions are universal or particular, genus or specific difference, and so on. While what is reached immediately with regard to assent is simply an argument, like syllogism and induction (istiqrÄʾ), what is reached remotely is the proposition being universal or particular, predicative or hypothetical, a converse or a contraposition, or particular-quantified, and so on. And there is no doubt that these items attach to conceptions and assents as such. Hence, conceptions and assents are the subject matter of logic in the way mentioned.
[T26] Ibn Al-NafÄ«s, Sharḥ al-WurayqÄt, 7.6â8.10
[the subject matter is concomitants of essences that exist mentally]
Logic is the science in which one knows how to discriminate between the true definition and the ways that [definition] can go wrong; and between the valid syllogism and the ways that it can go wrong.
Its usefulness is that its precepts prevent the mind from error in thought.
The subject matter [of logic] is secondary intelligibles with regard to how we put together a compound (taʾlīf) through which we come to know what [was formerly] unknown.
Verification of âsecondary intelligiblesâ: every true reality has certain concomitants (a) when considered by itself. For example, every triangle has three angles whose sum is equal to two right angles. And [every true reality] has certain concomitants (b) when considered as existing extramentally. For example, every [8] triangle in the actual world has some position (jiha). And [every reality] has certain concomitants (c) when considered as existing in the mind. For example, it necessarily belongs to triangle when conceived in the mind that it be a universal, and a genus for equilateral [triangles], and a species for [geometric] figures. This last sort of [concomitants] are the subject matter of logic. There is no doubt that their existence in the mind comes only after the [mental] existence of the quiddities; they are intellected in a second step.
The reason we say this is the subject matter of logic is simply that logic investigates the definition and the syllogism and what goes along with them, and both of these are composed. But every compound can be known only once its simple elements are known, with regard to their being suitable for composition.
The simple elements of a definition are, for instance, genus and specific difference. As for the syllogism, it is put together from premises, which in turn are put together from simple elements. The logician investigates these with a view to what is made a subject, and what a predicate, and the premises insofar as they are universal or particular, etc. But these are all secondary intelligibles.
[T27] Ibn KammÅ«na, Sharḥ al-TalwīḥÄt, 17.12â20.4
[commentary on T12]
I say: from the beginning of the section up to here, this is an introduction to explain the scope (gharaá¸) of logic. Here at this point, [al-SuhrawardÄ«] explains both the scope and the quiddity of logic. That of which a composite consists is the matter (mawÄdd), and correct procedure (intiqÄl) is what leads to the object of inquiry (maá¹lÅ«b), whereas the incorrect [procedure] is what does not lead to it.
By his words âthe unknown just like the known falls into two categories,â [al-SuhrawardÄ«] means that, just as the thing known is divided into known conception and known assent, so the unknown is divided into unknown conception and unknown assent. And with his words âthere must be a composite [item of] knowledge related to it,â he points to what I mentioned, namely that the unknown [18] does not correspond to just any known thing. Rather, for every unknown it must be possible to obtain a corresponding object of knowledge. By his words âdegrees of forms and mattersâ he means their perfection, and also deficiency or invalidity, which [however] resemble perfection.
The meaning of his words â[the logician] first needs to investigate the simple parts of which the composition is made upânot in every respect but insofar as they are fit to be so composedâ is that the simple parts out of which the composition consists can be investigated in various ways. But the logician need not to investigate those simple parts in all respects, just like the builder need not investigate the bricks as to whether they are composed of atoms, or whether they are the end of a regress that calls for an existent that is necessary in itselfârather [the builder] needs to know which of them are loose or firm, and other things that play a role in their being fit for composition. And that is what we mean by their being essential, accidental, a genus or a specific difference, as concerns simple parts that lead to a [new] conception. This [sc. what leads to conception] is the âexplanatory phrase.â As for their being particular, unquantified, positive, modalized, absolute, contrary, or not contrary, this concerns simple elements insofar as they lead to a [new] assent. This [sc. what leads to assent] is âargument.â
[Al-SuhrawardÄ«] said: âUtterances are the counterparts of meanings, so that inquiry into [utterances] frees one from having to inquire into the meanings [themselves], as [the utterances] are parallel to them.â I say: this is as we explained, namely that utterances signify meanings in one of three ways, and from this we know that the meanings are signified in the same ways. If an utterance is known as being universal, or particular, then this is known about the meaning, too. This and similar cases are what is meant here by âcounterparts.â
[Al-SuhrawardÄ«] said: âThe parts of what leads to a conception are prior to it; and they are also prior to the parts of the argument [sc. the premises], because, being prior to the former, they are prior to the latter.â [19] I say: The part is necessarily prior to the whole. For if the part does not exist, neither does the whole, whether extramentally or in the mind. But the opposite is not necessarily true. The parts of what leads to a conception (which is the explanatory phrase) are for instance the essential and the accidental, and genus, specific difference, and proper accident. The parts of the argument are the propositions in their different kinds and forms. Since conception, which is reached by explanatory phrase, is prior to assent, which is reached by way of argument, it follows that one must discuss explanatory phrases before discussing arguments. Now, the parts of the explanatory phrase are prior to the explanatory phrase itself, because the part is prior to the whole. In turn the explanatory phrase is prior to the parts of the argument, because its parts are the propositions, and they are composed from the simple elements, which in some cases may need to be made known by the explanatory phrase. The parts of the argument are prior to the argument itself, according to what [was said] above. Since the natural arrangement is like this in the bare facts (fÄ« nafs al-amr), it is more appropriate that the arrangement of the discussion be laid out in such a way as to correspond to it.
[Al-SuhrawardÄ«] said: âThere are items of necessary knowledge (á¸arÅ«riyyÄt) that are [simply] pointed out, without the need for [prior] knowledge or any instrument; and much of this science [sc. logic] is like that. On this, other [rules] are built. There is no need for yet another set of rules, otherwise there would be an infinite regress.â I say: this argument is, as it were, the answer to an anticipated question. The question would be this: if this logic is made up of items of necessary knowledge, then there would be no need to learn it. If on the other hand it is among the things known by inquiry, then it either needs itself, which is absurd, or it needs another set of rules, and then the same argument will be applied to them, and an infinite regress would follow, because each set of rules would need another set of rules, and so on to infinity. Which is also absurd. The answer is that we reject the initial set of options, and say instead: some of it is known necessarily, some of it by inquiry. Furthermore, the part that is known necessarily may still need to be learned, because there are items of necessary knowledge that have to be called to attention and [20] for which one needs a reminder (tanbÄ«h). The reason it is known necessarily is not that it never escapes the mind, but that it needs no prior object of knowledge or instrument to acquire it. Much of this science is like that, for instance the productive mood in the first figure [of a syllogism]. Other [rules] are built on that, this being the part of logic known by inquiry, like the moods of the two other [syllogistic] figures. And part known by inquiry needs no further set of rules, as that would lead to a regress.
[T28] Al-SamarqandÄ«, Qisá¹Äs, 77.2â81.4
[each science studies the essential accidents of its subject matter]
The subject matter of every science is that whose essential accidents it investigates, the essence being the basis of their exposition. These may either be without intermediary, like âcapacity for wonderâ in the human, or by way of being coextensive, like âcapacity for laughter,â by the intermediary of âcapacity for wonder,â or by way of being a part of it, like motion by the intermediary of being a body. For the basis for the exposition of these classes (aqsÄm) is the essence. Concerning that which is an accident by the intermediary of an external item, this is either something more specific, like âcapacity for laughterâ for animal, by dint of being human, or it is more general, like movement for the white thing by dint of being a body. But it is not an essential accident if the essence does not enter into the basis of this exposition. This applies likewise to that which is an accident by intermediary of something else, like heat for a body by way of heating. They call the first two categories âremote accidentâ and obviously the third belongs to this type too. So, there are six categories: three of them are essential accidents, and three are not. The list should thus be clear.
[the secondary intelligible view]
The verifiers (muḥaqqiqÅ«n) among both the early and later logicians said: logic in itself investigates universal and particular, essential and accidental, subject and predicate, in other words the secondary intelligibles. But not as such, for that would belong to first philosophy. The inquiry about them in logic is about the principles, not the questions, but with a view to the way in which it is possible to proceed by means of them from things known to things [formerly] unknown, and also in which way this should be constructed. Itâs like how, when the investigation is about columns and bricks, they are not investigated inasmuch as they are simple or compound, hot or cold by nature, organic or inorganic, but with regard to how the house can be put together from them, and how the completion of the house depends on them, like their being loose or firm, straight or crooked, big or small. Likewise, logic investigates them [i.e. the secondary intelligibles] only insofar as they are needed for the business of joining [them together]. Secondary intelligibles are then the subject matter of logic.
[primary, secondary, and tertiary intelligibles]
The meaning of âsecondary intelligiblesâ is this. When we conceive of the quiddities and true natures as such, then these are primary intelligibles. [79] But when we pass judgments on these, whether definitional (taqyÄ«diyya) or predicative (khabariyya), for example that this is universal and that essential, and this accidental, and other such judgments, then their being so are secondary intelligibles. Then, when we pass judgments about secondary intelligibles, whether definitional or predicative, then their being so is at a third level. Logical inquiry operates at this level [too], since it investigates [the intelligibles as] being a genus, specific difference, species, proper accident, general accident, definition, description, and their being a proposition, the contrary of a proposition, and the contradictory of a proposition, syllogism and analogy, and so forth. This is the perspective from which logic investigates them as part of the secondary intelligibles and uses them in the business of conjoining them. These are the essential accidents of secondary intelligibles, since being-a-genus and being-a-specific-difference only belong to the essence inasmuch as it is essential. And the proper and general accident belong to the accidental inasmuch as it is accidental. The proposition belongs to the combination of subject and predicate and the judgment, inasmuch as they are subject, predicate, and judgment, while the syllogism accrues to the combination of propositions. This is the teaching of the verifiers.
[rival view: the subject matter is more general]
But some of the later logicians [i.e. al-KhÅ«najÄ«]12 disagree, and say: the logician investigates universal and particular, essential and accidental, subject and predicate, and these are among the âquestionsâ (masÄʾil) [raised in the science]. But they take the subject matter to be more general than secondary intelligibles, so they incorporated these features in logic.
[correct view: logic studies intelligibles insofar as they connect to yield knowledge]
The correct view is for us to say: the subject matter of logic is the objects known (maÊ¿lÅ«mÄt) through conception and assent not as such, but inasmuch as they lead to the object of inquiry (maá¹lÅ«b) by a immediate connection, which when considered as such is called âexplanatory phrase,â or by a remote [connection], like being universal, particular, essential, accidental, genus, species, proper accident, or general accident; or else, [as they lead to] a object of inquiry (maá¹lÅ«b) as an assent by an immediate connection, which when considered as such is called âargumentâ, or by a remote [connection], like being a proposition, a contrary, another contradictory, and so forth, or by another remote [connection], like being subjects and predicates, and the like. This is what they [sc. the âlater logiciansâ] mentioned.
[81] Perhaps they overlooked the fact that these [i.e. objects of conception and assent] are the principles, as we have established. Alongside which they would be forced into another mistake, namely holding that everything which logic investigates is either a conception or an assent. So if the subject matter of logic is set down as being the objects of conception and assent, then logic would be investigating the subject matter itself, and not its accidents. Thus far the verification of this issue.
[T29] Al-ḤillÄ«, AsrÄr, 10.16â11.5
[refutation of al-FÄrÄbÄ«âs view]
Some people thought that the subject matter of [logic] was utterances.
But this is a ridiculous error. For the logicianâs inquiry into utterances is not of the first order (bi-l-qaá¹£d al-awwal); if it were possible to pass on what is in the mind to someone else without the mediation of utterances, then one could dispense with utterances altogether. The relation of the utterance to those who are present is like the relation of writing to those who are absent. Why then did they make the subject matter of [logic] concern something that applies only to those who are present, and not those who are absent?
[refutation of al-KhÅ«najÄ«âs view]
The later [logicians] thought that the subject matter of [logic] was conception and assent, because the logician studies the means to reach these (like the explanatory phrase and the argument) and that on which these two depend (like being-a-genus, [11] being-a-specific-difference, being-an-essence, being-an-accident, being-a-subject, being-a-predicate, the proposition and its contrary), and the latter items belong accidentally to things known by way of conception and assent, which therefore are the subject matter [of logic].
But this too is an error, because if they meant by âconceptions and assentsâ everything to which these names apply, namely all of the sciences, then one must understand from this that the subject matter of logic is all of the sciences in their entirety, which is wrong.13
For a fuller selection of passages on the question see R. Sorabji (ed.), The Philosophy of the Commentators, 200â600â¯AD: a Sourcebook in Three Volumes (London: Duckworth, 2004), vol. 1, 3b; the following quotation from Porphyry is passage 3b1, taken from his commentary on the Categories, 58.3â6.
See K. Karimullah, âInfluence of Late-Antique (ca. 200â800â¯A.D.) Prolegomena to Aristotleâs Categories on Arabic Doctrines of the Subject Matter of Logic: Alfarabi (d. ca. 950â¯A.D.), Baghdad Peripatetics, Avicenna (d. 1037â¯A.D.),â Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 99 (2017), 237â299.
See A. Sabra, âAvicenna on the Subject Matter of Logic,â Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980), 746â764.
See our chapter on the Categories below.
See K. Ierodiakonou, âAristotleâs Logic: an Instrument, Not a Part of Philosophy,â in N. Avgelis and F. Peonidis (eds), Aristotle on Logic, Language and Science (Thessaloniki: 1997), 33â53; T.-S. Lee, Griechische Tradition der aristotelischen Syllogistik in der Spätantike (Göttingen: 1984), ch. 2; and for the Arabic reception P. Adamson, âThe Last Philosophers of Late Antiquity in the Arabic Tradition,â in U. Rudolph and R. Goulet (eds), Entre Orient et Occident: la philosophie et la science gréco-romaines (Vandoeuvres: 2011), 1â43.
This point is made well by K. El-Rouayheb, âPost-Avicennan Logicians on the Subject matter of Logic: Some Thirteenth- and Fourteenth-Century Discussions,â Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 22 (2012), 69â90, at 82. This article has more generally been invaluable to us in putting the present chapter together.
For the immediate context of [T12] see [T10] in our chapter Conception and Assent.
For his remarks on the topic see El-Rouayheb, âPost-Avicennan Logicians,â 85â87.
The text is an almost verbatim rendering of Avicenna, ShifÄʾ, Maná¹iq, Madkhal, p. 15.1â¯ff.
An alternate reading spells out the point: âinsofar as it is this quiddityâ (bi-mÄ hiya tilka l-mÄhiyya), which is also Avicennaâs wording.
The manuscript used in this volume, MS Istanbul: Topkapı Serayı Müzesi, Ahmet III 3372, corresponds but is superior to MS Paris: Bibliothèque nationale de France, Arabe 2370, used in the previous volume. There also is a new edition that appeared too late to be taken into account for this volume: al-KÄtibÄ« al-QazwÄ«nÄ«, Shams al-DÄ«n. JÄmiÊ¿ al-daqÄʾiq fÄ« kashf al-ḥaqÄʾiq. Ed. by Ê¿A. IsmÄÊ¿Ä«l and R. Ê¿Abd al-JawwÄd RabÄ«Ê¿. Cairo: 2023.
Al-KhunajÄ« is named (with the sobriquet âauthor of the Kashfâ) as the proponent of this view in al-SamarqandÄ«âs commentary on his own text, Sharh Qisá¹Äs al-afkÄr (MS Yale: University Library, Beinecke, Nemoy 1410), at 14r13.
The passage goes on to repeat almost verbatim al-ṬūsÄ«âs arguments against al-AbharÄ« in T18.