Index
A-Closure (Alethic-Closure)
87–89, 112–116
Additivity of Evidence Principle (AE)
164–165
Alethic deflationism see deflationism (about truth)
Alethic deflationism (monist)
79, 93
Alethic leaching problem
86–93, 113–116
Alethic pluralism
74, 81–83, 86–93, 109–116
Alethic pluralism, (ecumenical)
82–83, 89
Alethic functionalism
90–91
Ashton, Natalie
102–109
Astrology
32–33, 37
Brain-in-a-vat scenario
3, 7, 9–10, 14
Burge, Tyler
8, 13
Campbell, John
212, 218–200, 224
Carnap, Rudolph
76
Cartesian scepticism
123–125
Certainty
211–215, 217, 219–221, 224–224, 227–228
Chess
11
Chisholm, Roderick
3
Cleverly disguised mule
140
Clifford’s Principle
1
Clifford’s Thesis
1
Cognition
36–39, 45
Cognitive paralysis
33
Coherence
253
Coherence (meta-cognitive)
253–255, 258–260
Coliva, Annalisa
5–8, 11–14, 32, 33 (n. 13), 39, 41–47, 55–71
Conee, Earl
2–4, 152–153, 160–163, 170, 173–174, 179–180
Constitution (epistemic)
30–31, 42, 44
Constitution (psychological)
30–31, 43
Cornerstone proposition
19, 212, 122–124, 126–128, 130–136, 230–233; and satisfiability 234–235, 244; and epistemic value 246–249, 255
Cornerstone Epistemology
3–4,
Deflationism (about truth)
74, 79–83, 91, 93, 109–111
Delusion
211–213, 217–229
Descartes, R.
39
Dialectical inescapability
35
Dilemma
199, 201–208
Dogmatism
171, 187–188, 190–191
Dominant strategy
9–10, 127–131, 133
Doubt, sceptical
28–30, 34, 36, 41, 49, 52
E
160–161
EJ
160–161
ES
160–161
Entitlement of cognitive project
8–11
Entitlement of rational deliberation
8
Entitlement of substance
8
Entitlement Theory
121, 134–136
Epistemic circularity
238, 244
Epistemic consequentialism
127, 247–250; and value monism 250–253; and value pluralism 253–259
Epistemic Conservatism
3–4; and belief as evidence 161–166; and evidentialism 160–161; and scepticism 156–160; as minimal positive evidence 156; characterisation of 153–154
Epistemic entitlement
8–13, 121, 125–126, 133–134, 136, 140–142, 245; and epistemic rationality and reasons 142–144; as epistemic warrant 140–144; and intellectual desires 144–148; and scepticism 149–150; and teleological explanation 142–144
Epistemic pluralism
131
Epistemic project
140–151
Epistemic rationality
142–144; and epistemic value 141–143; intellectual desires 144–148
Epistemic reasons
13, 142–144
Epistemic relativism
55–56, 61–71, 102–109
Epistemic risk
134–136
Epistemic value
132–133, 142–144, 244–247, and epistemic externalism 253 260; epistemic internalism 253, 254, 260; and value monism 251–252; and value pluralism 253–259
Epistemic warrant
140–144
Equal validity
64, 103–105
Equivalence Schema
79–82
Evidence
235, 237, 239–240
Evidential fit
2
Evidential warrant
141, 143, 146
Evidentialist principles
160–161
Evidentialism
1–4
Explanationism
157–159, 174, 177, 178,
Explanationist response to scepticism
157–159
Extended rationality
11, 14, 41–47, 55–57, 65
External world scepticism
5–10, 128–129, 156–159
Evidentialist epistemology
1
Feldman, Richard
2–4, 152–153, 160–163, 170, 173–174, 179–180
Framework
212, 218–219, 224, 226–227
Gendler, Tamar
199–202
General hinge
12
Giere, Ronald
139 (n. 1), 149
Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem
236, 240, 241 (n. 15); and relative satisfiability 241–242
Harman, Gilbert
3–4
Hinge
3–9, 11–14, 211, 213–215, 216, 219, 221, 224–225, 227
Hinge proposition
97–102, 108, 109, 112, 116
Hinge proposition (a-rational)
12
Hinge proposition (anti-sceptical)
28
Hinge proposition (inescapable)
27–28, 35–41, 45, 48, 51–52
Hinge proposition (personal)
49–51
Hinge proposition (über)
49–51
Hinge alethic pluralism
79, 86–91
Hinge epistemology
27, 97–109
Hinge epistemology (empirical)
39
Hinge epistemology (local)
39, 44–47
Hinge epistemology (transcendental)
27, 39–41, 44–47, 51
Horwich, Paul
79–80, 82
Huemer, Michael
176, 187, 191
Humean scepticism
123–125
I–II–III argument
6–9
Imagining
222
Incommensurability
102, 106
Inductive scepticism
10
Inferential justification
171, 178–179, 185, 190
Inflationary argument against deflationism
111
Instrumental rationality
148–150
Intellectual desire
144–148
Internalist evidentialism
3
Involuntarism
148
Kim, Jaegwon
183–184
Kitcher, Philip
139 (n. 1), 149
Kuhn, Thomas
63, 106
Laudan, Larry
139 (n. 1), 149
Leaching problem
12–13, 121, 134
Littlejohn, Clayton
173, 180, 182
Lycan, William
3–4
Lynch, Michael P.
82, 89 (n. 27 continued), 90–92, 114–115
Maximization (of epistemic value)
248, 255–256
McCain, Kevin
170, 173–174, 177, 180–182
Memory
223
Mentalist evidentialism
3–4
Minimal positive evidence
154–159, 161, 163–166
Mixed compounds problem
86–93
Mixed inferences problem
86–93
Moore, George E.
5
Moore’s proof of an external world
5
Moruzzi, Sebastiano
109–116
Multimundialism
106
Narrow rationality
11, 13
Non-Evidential justification
121–122, 125, 127, 132–135
Non-Evidentialism
1–4
Non-evidentialism (strong)
171, 185
Non-evidentialist epistemology 1; as hinge epistemology
3–4
Non-evidential warrant
139–141, 233, 244, 259–260; and epistemic value pluralism 253–259; and the question of value 245–247
Normative argument
82–85
Normativity
34–35
Nozick, Robert
139 (n. 1), 149
On Certainty
4, 12, 27, 47, 211
Pedersen, Nikolaj
89 (n. 29 contd.), 90, 129–133, 139, 142–145,
Perceptual justification
3, 11, 178–179, 185–191
Perceptual seeming
176–177, 188–191
Personal hinge
12
Phenomenal Conservatism
187–188
Phenomenalism
105, 108–109
Pragmatic reasons
13
Presumption
155–158, 163
Presuppositions
55, 62
Practical normativity
202, 205
Practical rationality
149–150
Practical reasons
198, 205
Practical stance
197–198, 204, 208
Principle of Credulity
154
Principle of Epistemic Evidentialism
1
Principle of Warrant Transmission Failure
6
Pritchard, Duncan
5, 8, 12–14, 30 (n. 5, n. 6), 47–52
Probability
135
Problem of the Criterion
159
Propositionalism
171, 173–179, 183, 185, 188
Pryor, Jim
171, 176, 187–191
Psychologism
171–179, 185
Quine-Davidson Criterion
183
Rational evaluation thesis
47–48
Rationality
59–60
Rovane, Carol
69, 106
Satisfiability
232, 236
Scepticism
41, 49, 70 (n. 14), 73 (n. 1), 98, 100, 121–125, 128–129, 149–150, 197–198, 230–233, 258–260
Scepticism (mathematical)
235–245
Stereotypes
199, 201–208
Stereotypical beliefs
199, 201–208
Strategic entitlement
8–11, 121, 126–136
Teleological explanation
142–144
Teleological value
142
Truth (deflationary)
79, 80 (n. 14), 88, 90–92
Truth (plain)
111, 114–116
Truth (substantial)
75–79
Truth-aptness
75, 77, 80
Trust
126–134
Über hinge
12
Veritic dual goal monism
121, 131–133, 136
Warrant
5–7, 57–60, 122
Warrant transmission failure
5–7
Weak Non-Evidentialism
171, 185–191
William K. Clifford
1
Williamson, Timothy
170, 173, 179–180
Wittgenstein, Ludwig
4–5, 12, 27, 29, 47–49, 211–214
Wright, Crispin
5–14, 82–83, 110–111, 121–136, 139–141, 145, 149 (n. 7), 198, 204, 230–231, 245, 262 (n. 31)
Zanetti, Luca
97–102