Chapter 4 Evidence Type, Evidence Location, Evidence Strength
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This paper investigates the question of whether ‘direct’ evidentials are amenable to an analysis as epistemic modals. Much recent literature advances modal analyses of evidentials, but direct evidentials pose prima facie problems for a modal analysis. In particular, typical epistemic modals differ from direct evidentials in that the former disallow direct witness, and convey reduced speaker certainty. In this paper I examine evidential elements in St’át’imcets (a.k.a. Lillooet; Salish), Gitksan (Tsimshianic), Nuu-chah-nulth (Wakashan), Cuzco and Wanka Quechua, English, Nivacle (Matacoan-Mataguayan), Cheyenne (Algonquian), Korean, and Tibetan. Based on the data presented, I propose that evidential contributions are more complex than is often assumed. Specifically, there are three different dimensions of meaning which evidentials may encode: (1) Evidence type (whether the evidence is visual, sensory, reported, etc.), (2) Evidence location (whether the speaker witnessed the event itself or merely some of its results), and (3) Evidence strength (the trustworthiness/reliability of the evidence). Each of the three dimensions has direct and indirect values, and particular evidential morphemes may be semantically complex, encoding information about one, two or all three of the dimensions. I then argue that contrary to what we might expect, evidentials which encode direct values on any of the three dimensions are compatible with modal semantics.