Introduction
With this annotated translation of Giulio Aleniâs (1582â1649) Xingxue cushu (A brief introduction to the study of human nature) (see figures 1 and 2), Professors Thierry Meynard and Dawei Pan have convincingly demonstrated that Aristotleâs (384 BCEâ322 BCE) anthropological philosophy reached China through the perspective of two volumes of the Cursus Conimbricensis (1592â1606).1
Portrait of Aleni in Taixi Siji Ai xiansheng xingshu, BNF Chinois 1017
Xingxue cushu, front page, BNF Chinois 3409
Published anonymously but composed by the Portuguese Jesuit Manuel de Góis (1543â97), the first of the two volumes was a commentary on the very core of Jesuit anthropology, namely De anima (On the soul) (see figure 3), while the second was a commentary on Parva naturalia (Short treatises on nature) (see figure 4).
Coimbra commentary of the De anima, Cologne, 1603
Coimbra commentary of Parva naturalia, Lyon, 1608
Góis began composing his commentaries immediately after, or even during, the years in which he taught two philosophy courses (1574â78 and 1578â82) at the Jesuit college in the Portuguese city of Coimbra. During that period, he managed to finish most of the volumes comprising the well-known Cursus Conimbricensis, namely the commentaries on Physica (Physics),2 on Meteororum (Meteorology),3 on Parva naturalia,4 on Ethica (Ethics),5 on De coelo (On the heavens),6 on De generatione et corruptione (On generation and corruption),7 and De anima (On the soul).8 It is those books, together with Sebastião do Coutoâs (1567â1639) volume on Dialectica (Dialectics),9 that make up what is known as the Cursus Conimbricensis (original Latin title: Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu).
Although Aleniâs work is heavily informed by the commentaries that make up the Coimbra course, it would be far from accurate to view his Brief Introduction as a text that simply reproduces the Cursus Conimbricensis for a new audience.10 On several occasions, the two sinologists responsible for this annotated translation have been able to call my attention to Aleniâs innovations, and this is not the least merit of Meynard and Panâs work. In the pages that follow, the two translators demonstrate that, in order to present a âbrief introductionâ of the Jesuit conception of âhuman natureâ to a Chinese audience, Aleni edited his Chinese text while consulting the Coimbra-Urtext11 yet, in doing so, he transformed the Aristotelian thought it contained through the use of expressions and ideas borrowed from Confucianism, which in turn made it more palatable to the Chinese.12
Meynard and Panâs cross-cultural and cross-linguistic philosophical achievement raises numerous questions, all of which will undoubtedly be debated in the years to come. However, given my lack of competence in sinology, I am unable to contribute to such a discussion. In what follows, I instead intend to read Aleniâs Brief Introduction in light of what appears to have been its Urtext. Accordingly, my aim here is simply to provide the reader with some tools that may allow for a better understanding and appreciation of Meynard and Panâs translation.
The Cursus Conimbricensis: A Brief History
The idea of printing the Cursus Conimbricensis originated in the 1550s at the Jesuit College of Coimbra, which was founded in 1542 by Father Simão Rodrigues (1510â79) with the following faculty: Diego Mirón (1516â90), from Valencia; Francisco Rojas (dates unknown) and Francisco de Villanueva (1509â57), from Castile; Poncio Cigordano (dates unknown) and Francisco Gallo (dates unknown), from France; Angelo del Paradiso (1517â95/98) and Martin Parmesano (dates unknown), from Italy; and the Portuguese António Cardoso (dates unknown), Manuel Fernandes (dates unknown), and Lancerote Seixas (dates unknown).13
The first explicit piece of information on what was to become the Cursus Conimbricensis dates from a letter Provincial Miguel de Torres (1509â93) wrote to Rome on February 9, 1560 reporting that one of the masters had prepared some philosophical-literary material (unos ditados de las artes) to be sent to the press (para poderse imprimir). The identity of the Jesuit in question (uno de los lectores de artes [one of the lecturers in arts]) is open to debate.14 While some contemporary scholars claim that it was Cristóvão Gil (1552â1608),15 others are more inclined to the names of Marcos Jorge (1524â1608), Pedro da Fonseca (1528â99), or even Pedro Gómez (1534â1600).16 From the catalog given by manuscript no. 993 of the General Library of the University of Coimbra (BGUC), entitled Rerum Scholasticarum quae a patribus ac fratribus huius Conimbricensis Collegii scripta sunt (Scholastic matters written by the priests and the brothers of this college of Coimbra),17 we know that the Portuguese Fonseca and the Spanish Gómez were, in fact, the first Jesuits to teach an entire philosophical courseâother Jesuits, such as Inácio Martins (1530â98), taught only the fourth level of the course, in 1555, and Sebastião de Morais (1536â88) missed the first level, in the same year. But whereas Fonseca, in 1555, was already occupied with the third and then the fourth levels of the course,18 only Gómez in 1655â59 and Jorge in 1656â60 had taught philosophy without interruption, from the first up to the fourth level. Jorgeâs manuscript is still extant at El Escorial,19 and the manuscript of Luis de Molina (1535â1600), another candidate for the master alluded to in Torresâs letter, does not address all of the subjects that were regarded as comprising an entire philosophical course.
The explicit order issued by Jerónimo Nadal (1507â80) to start working on what would become the Cursus Conimbricensis fell to Fonseca (me dava mayor parte del assumpto [I was given the greater part of the subject]) in 1561. He asked for help from the Spaniards Gómez and Cipriano Soares (1524â93), as well as his countryman Jorge. However, as the methodology Fonseca originally conceived was too rigorous and complex, the honor of having authored the Cursus Conimbricensis belongs to Góis.
Since we know that Góis privileged natural philosophy whereas Fonseca was still laboring on metaphysics, it is correct to say that there was a philosophical dispute over the best way to conceive a philosophical course. Indeed, it may have been Fonsecaâs influence that led Superior General Everard Mercurian (1514â80, in office 1573â80) to refuse the 1575 request of Provincial Manuel Rodrigues (1534â62) to print the extant âcourse.â20 Nevertheless, in 1579, the provincial congregation of the Portuguese Jesuits again appealed to Rome, and in 1581 the new superior general, Claudio Acquaviva (1543â1615, in office 1581â1615), agreed to publish the Coimbra Jesuitsâ philosophical work.
Between 1581 and the spring of 1591, work on the Conimbricensis seems to have advanced slowly, even if Góis had some collaborators, such as Richard Gibbons (c.1547â1632), an English Jesuit lecturer of mathematics in Coimbra (1590/91).21 On May 13, 1591, the count-bishop of Coimbra, Dom Afonso de Castelo Branco (1522â1615), signed his imprimatur for the first volume, and on July 26, the volume received the approval of the Inquisition Council, signed by António de Mendonça (dates unknown) and Jacob de Sousa (dates unknown). Two days later, it received the consent of the universityâs Senate, signed by Jerónimo Pereira (dates unknown), Jacob Lameira (dates unknown), and Damião de Aguiar (1535â1618). Finally, on October 23 of the same year (1591), acting on behalf of the Society of Jesus, and of the superior general, Acquaviva, Fonseca, in the capacity of superior, gave the ânihil obstatâ (i.e., the necessary certification stating that the book had been examined and found to contain nothing contrary to the Christian faith) to the effective publication of the first volume of the Conimbricensis. Fonsecaâs license of October 1591 is interesting because it recognizes (1) the existence of oral lessons in the Coimbra College of Liberal Arts, all sharing or depending on common manuscripts; that (2) Superior General Acquaviva had issued an order to review, enrich, develop, and print them; (3) without mentioning Góisâs name, it also acknowledges that such a task (i.e., the book on Physics [de naturali auscultationi]) had already been âcarefully, wisely, and duly corrected thanks to the commitment and intelligence of the mastersâ; (4) with his license, Fonseca also acknowledges that, with the exception of Dialectics, the other commentaries were already being improved; and (5) he finally agrees that, since it would not be fair to make the students wait any longer, it was not necessary to wait for the book on Dialectica to complete âthe edition of the whole philosophical courseâ (editio totius Philosophiae curriculum). As a consequence, Fonseca explained that the printing process would proceed in the following way: âWhile some books are being printed, others are reviewed, and others finished.â
Designed for philosophy studies at the Societyâs many colleges, from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains, the more than three thousand pages that comprise the Cursus Conimbricensis comment on Aristotleâs work and thought. In seeking to achieve this end, the Portuguese Jesuits produced a work that was in keeping with the European context in which it was created and without ever imagining that what they were writing would eventually be read by a sophisticated Eastern audience.
Although the Conimbricensis courted criticism from several European Jesuit colleges, the work nonetheless had a number of merits as far as the Jesuit order was concerned, not least because (1) as an anonymous set of books, the Conimbricensis could easily be identified with the Society of Jesus as a whole, giving the Society a kind of philosophical identity; (2) with the exception of Metaphysics, all of the main Aristotelian books were dealt within the frame of what was then considered a philosophical (not humanistic) course; and (3) the Conimbricensis offered a systematic presentation of what was to be understood as âcommon Christian philosophyâ following the spirit of the Council of Trent (1545â63).
The Decision to Use the Conimbricensis in the East
When Aleni arrived in Lisbon in 1609 to board the ship that was to take him to the East, he was already well trained in mathematics and astronomy, having previously been educated in Parma (1602) and the Roman College (1607), and he could not but also have been familiar with Jesuit philosophy. This would mean that he had read Aristotleâs philosophy through the perspective of the way it was taught at the Collegio Romano, thus ensuring that he would also have been familiar with the work of Francisco de Toledo (1559â69),22 Benet Perera (1558â97),23 and Francisco Suárez (1580â85),24 three scholars who played a vital role in establishing the early Society of Jesusâs philosophical and theological identity.
It is not known if Aleni ever stepped foot in Coimbra during his stay in Portugal, a city two hundred kilometers from the busy imperial harbor of Lisbon. What we do know is that, after his arrival in the Far East, Aleni remained in Macao until 1613 and his Brief Introduction was composed ten years later (in 1623; published c.1640).
Coming from all over Europe, the Jesuit missionaries in East Asia were operating in the vast Eastern Portuguese assistancy. In order to have an idea of its huge dimensions, it suffices to note the well-known engraving (1667) of Athanasius Kircher (1602â80), inspired by Abraham Orteliusâs (1527â98) planisphere (1570), depicting the astonishing immensity of the Portuguese assistancyâsurely a larger territory than could possibly have been managed by such a small country (in terms of population and geography), hence it becoming a truly international endeavor.
However, notwithstanding their shared destiny in carrying out their mission in the Portuguese assistancy, each of the Jesuits in China had received their own unique philosophical formation, and this had the potential to cause difficulties when it came to choosing the philosophical manual (vademecum) that would be used in the East. One obvious option would have been Francisco de Toledoâs (1532â96) Roman course, published between 1561 and 1575, or possibly the work of Perera and Suárez, given the prestige they had attained as philosophers. Pereraâs De comunibus omnium rerum naturalium principiis et affectionibus (On the principles and properties common to all natural things) was published in 1576 before quickly reaching Italy, the German-speaking lands, France, and England; and Suarezâs metaphysical masterpiece, the Disputationes metaphysicae (Metaphysical disputations), composed between 1593 and 1597, would also have been an obvious choice as a philosophical basis for the Societyâs theological and missionary goals.25
The decision to use the course produced by the Jesuits in Coimbra may have resulted from the prestige of its college due to Fonsecaâs philosophical work, Commentariorum in libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis (Commentary on Aristotleâs Metaphysics [from 1577 onward])26 or from Suárezâs theological tenure at the University of Coimbra; or merely from the fact that the ships that took the Jesuits to East Asia sailed not far from that city.27
Aleni and the Coimbra-Urtext
While Aleni would have been aware that he was part of an elite of committed Christian scholars aiming to present Christian philosophy and religion to Chinese Confucian intellectuals, he would also have been aware that the Brief Introduction was likely to set a precedent, since his title preceded all other philosophical Jesuit efforts related to anthropology. At the very beginning of his China text, and aligned with the Coimbra-Urtextâs conception of philosophy as a science, Aleni claims that his exposition is informed by a scientific outlook (see 4.19), adding that the âWestern wisdomâ28 he is going to teach cannot be wrong because âit has been transmitted from generation to generationâ (7.21). A small number of expressions, such as the âancient sages/scholarsâ (2.4, 2.36, 2.39, 7.35), an explicit reference to the Egyptians (7.6), and mention of the Bible/scriptures (2.18, 2.41, 2.46) and Job, the only biblical name mentioned (4.23), are indications that Aleni intended to partake of the longer Coimbra lesson attributing the creation of all arts and sciences to God, which, thanks to Adam, later were spread to all humanity (see Dialectica, proÅmium), as well as the tradition of the âphilosophia perennisâ that also pervades the Conimbricensis (see Physica, proÅmium), a lesson common in the manuals but mostly in the catechisms of that time.
Consistent with Aristotle, the Coimbra-Urtext (see Physica, prooemium) primarily views âscienceâ as âetiologyâ (the study of the causes). But Aleni takes etiology in medias res, without dwelling on the epistemology of the causes. Sticking to a brief presentation of the number of the causes (1.1), he avoids what would have been a long digression on epistemology. Let us remember that Aristotelian science is perfect when it considers its apodictic cause in both the order of knowledge and being.29 In contrast to the Conimbricensis, what characterizes Aleniâs Brief Introduction is its attempt to return to the basic principles that had to be taught and to present them in the briefest possible way (see 1.1 to 1.6), inevitably transforming the structure of the Coimbra-Urtext in the process. Here is an example to which Meynard and Pan have called our attention: in the last subject matter of the eighth juan (8.58 onward), Aleni makes abundant use of the second editorial appendix of the Coimbra De anima volume, the Tractatio aliquot problematum ad quinque sensus spectantium (Treatise on some problems relating to the five senses), by Cosme de Magalhães (1551â1624), as well as its question/answer methodology, faithful to the structure of the Problemata physica (Physics problems).30
Whereas most of the titles that make up the Conimbricensis employ three types of methodologiesâa reproduction of the Latin Aristotelian text, its explanatio,31 and the quaestiones to be discussedâAleniâs Brief Introduction is largely dialogical, thus distinguishing his method from that used by other Jesuits in China vis-Ã -vis the Coimbra-Urtext.32 The dialogical style pervading the Brief Introduction replaces the sententiae, a method of commentary already in use in medieval universities that tried to make Aristotleâs philosophy accessible to those with an interest in theologyâas typified, for instance, by Thomas Aquinasâs (1224/25â74) Sententia libri De anima (Commentary on the books on the soul)âand left an imprint on the explanatio-section of the Coimbra-Urtext. I do not wish to imply that there is no dialogue in the Conimbricensis. Quite the opposite, since the almost predominant quaestio-section (it even occurs in the explanatio) is nothing but a detailed dialogue in which listening to the opponent is an imperative in a common quest for truth.33 But whereas the vague form of the Latin (inquit [he says] or quaeri solet/dicendum [it is often asked/it must be said]) suggests a school atmosphere, the Chinese âsomeone said/askedâ and âI answeredâ (wen/yue å/æ°) immediately puts the reader into a polite or, better still, intimate ambience. The allusion to a school milieu seems to come from the smaller number of times that objections are welcomed (1.20, 2.22, 2.26, 8.16) or when Aleni, referring to his work as a âcursory introductionâ (6.30), dwells on several enumerations (6.30 or 6.32, 8.14, etc.) or uses the methodology of internal cross-references (1.18, 3.3, 4.1, 5.14, 8.29, 8.35).
Since Aleni was supposed to be producing an exposition of Aristotelian âanthropology,â the best Coimbra parallel text would of course have been Góisâs commentary on De anima and what he viewed as its doctrinal appendix, the small books known as Parva naturalia (see De anima, proÅmium). Besides the astonishing presence of the latter title in Aleniâs work, as documented by Meynard and Pan in their editorial notes, what immediately strikes the reader of the Brief Introduction is his use of other Coimbra volumes, such as those on De generatione et corruptione, Physica, De coelo, Ethica, and Dialectica. Aleni was thoroughly acquainted with the Conimbricensis, and nothing would prevent him foreseeing the possibility of adapting all (or at least other sections) of the Coimbra-Urtext. In this respect, Meynard and Pan have underlined the possibility that Aleni intended to work with De generatione et corruptione (since the vegetative, not to mention the sensitive faculties, could only be described as starting from an examination of the four elements; see 3.6); and with Góisâs commentary on Ethica (since the final sections will show a clear dialogue with that volume; see, e.g., 6.20). Let us briefly recall that, generally, the Coimbra volume on Physics deals with the more common principles of Aristotelian natural philosophy (matter, form, etc.); the volume On Heaven deals with the mobile being, the structure and composition of the universe; the volume On Generation and Corruption deals with the corruptible dimension of the universe; the volume on Ethics with happiness and freedom; and, finally, the volume on Dialectics deals with language, ontology, and epistemology.
From a Western point of view, the discussion of the role of the two more relevant books from an anthropological perspective, De anima and Parva naturalia, and the subsequent decision to use the former rather than the latter, meant that the soulânot the animated bodyâis the first object to be addressed by anyone who wishes to study life and human life in particular. In order to refute Paul of Veniceâs (c.1369â1429) thesis (in the proÅmium to De anima), Góis envisages âphysisâ in its widest and original, or creationist sense.34 Instead, even if Aleniâs statements about the Christian doctrine of the creation out of nothing are unequivocal (1.2, 1.3, 1.42), he prefers discussing the âsimilarities and differences between the words soul and nature.â This emphasis on words such as âsoulâ and ânatureâ may have come from the belief that âwords in China are used freely, with different meanings in the booksâ (1.8; see also 6.8) as well as from the fact that, faced with Eastern literature, the Mencius in this case, one should acknowledge that ânames are all different, but refer to the same substanceâ (1.9; see also 6.4). According to the Conimbricensis, conversely, despite words being necessary for teaching,35 things are what really matter in any true philosophy.36 Thus, it is as if the Western emphasis on the âsoulâ as the culmination of anthropology (intellective soul) was substituted by the Eastern emphasis on ânatureâ (intellective nature). That ânatureâ would be a more appropriate topic in a work addressing an Eastern audience, for Aleni, coincides with what he writes in juan 6.1, distinguishing between sensitive and intellective natures in an effort to refute the âlong-standing ignoranceâ of Confucians and Buddhists. At the same time, by sticking to words, he intended to teach the âone single truth, clear and without confusion,â namely that the âspiritual is another name for natureâ (6.2).
We have already seen that the Coimbra volume On the Soul culminates, metaphysically, with the Treatise on the Separated Soul, whereas the eighth and last juan in Aleniâs philosophical work ends, physically, with the treatment On Breath, more specifically with Life and Death (8.58). This was not the order followed by Francesco Sambiasiâs (1582â1649) Lingyan lishao éè¨è ¡åº (Humble attempt at discussing matters pertaining to the soul), which is more committed to spirituality.37 As far as Aleniâs perspective is concerned, the structure he used would have been more appropriate for a Confucian context.38 Nevertheless, keeping in mind that seventy-three percent of the Conimbricensis is related to physics, it should clearly be acknowledged that Aleniâs natural and physical perspective does not disregard the Urtext. Moreover, everything seems to indicate that Augustineâs influence in Aleniâs Brief Introduction takes its origin from Góisâs Parva naturalia, where Augustine is quoted as an authority at least thirty-two times (in particular his De trinitate [On the Trinity] 10, Confessionum [Confessions] 10, and several sections of De Genesi ad litteram [Literal commentary on Genesis]). By now, it should be clear that Aleniâs lessons reveal a preference for a physical anthropology, thus framing the history and the ontology of each and every individual, philosophically speaking, between life and death. Whereas Góis had to follow Aristotleâs text, Aleni is freer to organize his âvignettesâ the way he thinks more adequate to his audience and catechetical purposes.39 Meynard and Pan have rightly highlighted, for instance, the way Aleni changed the order of the Coimbra books on Parva naturalia. Whereas Góisâs commentary begins with On Memory before proceeding to On Sleep, On Dreams, On Divination in Sleep, On Respiration, On Youth and Old Age, On Life and Death, and On Length and Shortness of Life, in Aleniâs work the last title, On Length and Shortness of Life, precedes the two edited immediately after, namely On Youth and Old Age and On Life and Death. His exposition, following a rational order, finishes as it should, dealing with the end of life: âEverything is arranged by the great kindness of the Creator, and breath is no exceptionâ (8.20).
Whereas Góis begins the âscientia de anima (intellectiva)â by studying how and to what extent such a philosophical endeavor pertains to ânatural philosophyâ (De anima, proÅmium, q. unica), after summarizing the theory of the four causes, Aleni immediately addresses several problems related to the intellective nature, which will give the major lines of anthropology to be conveyed to his Chinese audience. According to our interpretation, this anthropology can be summarized as follows: hierarchically or ontologically speaking, between angels and animals (2.20), each and every person, as a unique entity (1.16) with a unique life history (1.28), possesses an innate intelligence, with two features (moral knowledge and intellective capability) (1.9) of a purely spiritual and intellectual nature (1.12; or substance: 2.19) that are clearly distinct from the body (2.1, 2.4)âthat is, with nothing in common with other things (1.21)âand is created by God alone (1.42), not by his/her parents (1.32), and their autonomy comes from his/her will until the day of the final judgement (1.30) (i.e., people are eternally imperishable [2.18], whether with joy or with pain [2.37]).
The reason why the metaphysical, as well as ontological, anthropology that pervades the entire Chinese Brief Introduction is similar to the Coimbra-Urtext, and does not conflict with Aleniâs focus on physics, lies in something crucial to the Conimbricensis, namely the exemplary (in the medieval sense of the word âexemplarâ) character of anthropology: from human nature, all others below may be deduced (3.1 and 4.1). Or in Góisâs more Aristotelian words: the study of the soul provides complete knowledge of the truth (De anima, proÅmium). Yet two different strategies are actually present here. If the Coimbra-Urtext is adapting, for a Renaissance ideology, the eulogy Aristotle himself made of the âhistoria peri psychesâ (the study of the soul) (402a4â5), the Chinese text focuses all its effort on showing the truest sense of ânatureâ (i.e., the spiritual) by scanning all its major physical roots and manifestations; one could even dub it a âhistoria peri physeosâ (study of nature). Since âhuman beings [are] between angels and animalsâ (2.20) and âthe soul is eternal and imperishable,â it suffices to teach the reason for âthe difference between human beings and animalsâ (2.29).
The emphasis on an innate structure, naturally broadening the presence of neo-Platonism, and the way in which Aleni develops and explores his rationale, diverge from the Coimbra-Urtext. When Aleni asks why it is possible to communicate despite the human diversity he has personally experienced, he answers that a natural entity (xingti) exists that transcends any kind of physicality, a lesson he also interprets by drawing a comparison between a boat and its captain (2.15). As Meynard and Pan correctly note, it seems that Aleni is here on the verge of the Aristotelian doctrine, even though, and contrary to Matteo Ricci (1552â1610), he does not suggest two independent entities but two different actualities.40 Such a difficulty, a doctrine âextremely difficult to fathomâ (2.15), points to the anthropological program mentioned above that has morals as its horizon. In other words: moral philosophy is the more appropriate terrain to highlight the spirituality of human nature. Thus, the separation of the soul is crucial for the imperishable nature God has given to humans, and the present world is unable to fulfil humans (2.21). âKnowing the world is the duty of Confucians,â but âthings are often beyond human agency and human beings cannot impose their will on the world. No need to be sad about thisâ (8.72).
Aleni claims that a spiritual life possesses a cognitive feature as well as a moral (2.23) one. This is crucial for religion (or metaphysics, according to Coimbraâs epistemology). The idea of sanctity (shengshen) is explicitly stated, a status attained by those who do not ignore the principles of morality and determine their will to pursue those principles (2.47). The catechetical outlook of the Chinese text is evident mostly vis-à -vis the exegetical dimension of the Coimbra-Urtext. This does not, however, mean that Aleniâs Brief Introduction lacks any kind of philosophical function; on the contrary, it even follows the decrees of Trent, according to which biblical doctrines ought to be proved philosophically. Besides the division between physical entities (the five Aristotelian sensibles and four elements) and spiritual entities (2.1 and 2.2), Aleni presents nine arguments proving that the human soul is imperishable âaccording to the studies investigating the principle and to several ancient sagesâ (2.4), and more arguments âaccording to what the Bible has transmittedâ (2.18). Meynard and Pan have spotted the presence of the Tractatus de Anima separata by Baltasar Ãlvares (1560â1630), not to mention the philosophical discussion refuting the theory of transmigration. The difference here between the Coimbra-Urtext and Aleniâs text lies in the fact that whereas Góisâs discussion takes place between Averroes (1126â98) and his alleged Renaissance followers, Aleniâs discussion involves Zen Buddhism. And the discussion takes place with a Confucian interlocutor who is well informed about âour/your [i.e., Christian] teaching/scripturesâ (2.41, 2.46) as well as having an emphasis on morality that is lacking in the Coimbra-Urtext.
Given that Aleni, unlike Góis, was not commenting on the Aristotelian text, the Italian Jesuit was not tied to a bottom-up anthropology (i.e., from sensitive to intellective knowledge), but could instead work on a top-down solution: asserting, first, the intellective nature created by God and then going to the various forms of developments and kinds of perceptions (see, e.g., 4.1). A superficial reading of the Brief Introduction may suggest that it relies on Aristotleâs De anima from the third to the seventh juan, which mostly deal with sensory perception (De anima 2, 5â11). Confronted with the Coimbra-Urtext, other shortcuts could also have occurred in the Brief Introduction: (1) a mere allusion to the epistemological doctrine of science, according to the Posterior Analytics (71a9â12)ââfor the studies of the fathoming of the principle, it is necessary before discussing something to first determine whether it exists or not, and then to discuss its species and attributesâ (1.10); (2) the possibility of avoiding a complex discussion about the problem of the pluralism of forms (1.16, 1.20, 2.19); (3) the discarded discussion on the presence of the soul throughout the body (1.24; De anima 2,c.1.q.9.a.2), or about quantity (1.30; Physica, proÅmium, q.1.a.6). Thus, provided the foregoing interpretation is correct, the emphasis on nature referred to above may explain the new arrangement of Aleniâs philosophical exposition, which concludes with the book On Life and Death.
I would like to end this contribution by briefly examining two further topics, one related to the senses and the other to morals. Both may help us to better understand Aleniâs possible method of work in light of the Coimbra-Urtext. There is no doubt whatsoever that Aleni did not follow Coimbraâs doctrine on the number of the inner senses, instead advocating Aquinasâs longer solution, whereas Góis pleads for a reduction of their number. There is also no doubt that Aleni seems to be an independent thinker when he departs from Góis over the importance he attributes to the sense of hearing (De anima 2, 8) to the detriment of the sense of vision (De anima 2, 7). There is no need to invoke the importance of the five external senses and its Aristotelian hierarchy, even followed by Saint Ignatius (c.1491â1556), who gives those examples in the Spiritual Exercises: seeing the fires of hell, hearing the cries, perceiving the smoke, experiencing the tastes, and feeling how the flames touch the souls and burn them (Ex. 66â70). Aristotleâs De anima 2, 7â12 can be regarded as a treatise on the dematerialization of sensory perception and, in this respect, several Jesuits were discussing the differences between the senses of seeing and of hearing. Góis, as well as Suárez, following Aristotleâs position, believed that no sense overcomes vision in perfection (perfectissimus sensus).41 In juan 4.7, Aleni refers to a chapter entitled âStudies on Vision,â and with all probability this would have followed Góisâs version in De anima 2, 7, mainly questions 6 and 7. But Aleni is much more thorough with hearing (4.24â4.57) than with seeing (4.3â4.23),42 thus inverting the wider spectrum Góis attributes to seeing (a total of nine questions in De anima 2, 7) to the detriment of hearing (only four questions in De anima 2, 8). This may represent a particularity of Aleni, consistent with the relevance we have found of morals. Nonetheless, Jesuit thinkers did recognize the importance of hearing as well, mainly in faith.43 Mention could also be made of the relevance Góis attributes to hearing for the arts, sciences, apprenticeships, eliciting emotions, and, of course, faith (fides).44 Suárez teaches that the pleasure provided by the sense of hearing is spiritual (delectatio quaedam, quodammodo spiritualis).45 And, following Aristotle, on several occasions, Couto parallels the social nature of men and women with their use of speech,46 which necessitates hearing as its condition. Finally, Magalhães reports several arguments in favor of the value of hearing, which, as Meynard and Pan have noted, became authoritative in Aleniâs version (4.39). Magalhães even admits that, with the sole exception of intuitive knowledge, the spirit is more deeply impressed with what it only hears.47 In the end, without ignoring Aleniâs particularity in this respect, it seems that it is impossible to say not only that his teaching is original but also that his lessons are incompatible with what could be also found in the common doctrine of the Coimbra-Urtext.
The same can also be said about morals, despite it being the topic where Aleni makes the clearest departure from the Coimbra-Urtext, given that morality is not at the core of the latter work. After discussing the issues related to sensitive cognition, morality prevails in Aleniâs text up to the explanation of longevity and shortness of life (8.21). Since the âhuman being is the most intelligent among the myriad of thingsâ (1.24) and âthe noblest among all [the beings] that have sense-perceptionâ (6.37), the references related to animal/human perception provide the passage from ontology to morals. As Meynard and Pan observe, whereas the Coimbra text prefers a âpsychologicalâ explanation, Aleni accentuates morals (7.25, 7.29). If âhuman beings are the noblest among all that have sense-perceptionâ (6.37), it is because sense-perception culminates in understanding, and the will is âlike the emperor,â and understanding âlike the prime ministerâ (6.39). This political metaphor is not to be interpreted as if Aleni, contrary to the Coimbra-Urtext, did not partake of the general thesis of the importance of the will over the intellect. It is instead to be interpreted in accordance with Góisâs lessons, divided into the book on De anima and the book on Ethica. From a general point of view, reason presides over will, or in Aleniâs words, âintellect is in charge, using the will to decide the directionâ (6.39), but from a concrete point of view, the will is the queen. The way Aleni deals with the passions testifies to his free use and liberty regarding the whole (or at least some books) of the Coimbra-Urtext. Góisâs volume on De anima does not of course discuss this subject matter, but the same does not apply in his volume on Ethica. The possible interpretation Aleni might have had of the latter is indicative of his method of working, understandably looser with regard to philosophical technicalities. He ignores details such as the refutation of Gabriel Bielâs (c.1420â95) logical distinction between irascible and concupiscible appetites48 and, consequently, he does not dwell on Coimbraâs real distinction between those two appetites. Contrary to Góisâs concerns, Aleni does not even pay any attention to Aquinasâs possible hesitation on the inner order between them. Instead, he clearly says that âgenerally, anger weights higher than delightâ (6.16), which could be an option for De veritate (On truth), q.25.a.2 (Aquinasâs text quoted by Góis to put the irascible before the concupiscible) to the detriment of Summa theologiae IâII, q.25.a.1 (the text Góis quotes to illustrate the opposite view). It is clear that Aleniâs text moves away from Góisâs solution in distinguishing two different points of view when considering such an issue.49 Overall, Aleni follows the common doctrine on: (1) the âmanifestations of appetiteâânote, for example, that 6.20 and 6.21 coincide exactly with the brief diagram with which I have elsewhere summarized the Coimbra theory;50 (2) the total number of the passions according to Aquinas (even if Góis is more inclined to reduce their number51 ); and (3) attributing the seat of passions to the heart (see Appendix, table 1).
Rather than being an introduction to virtues (as is the case with Góisâs seventh disputation of the Ethica), juan 6.35 is a catechetical apex of Aleniâs accent on morals. If one takes into consideration that âhuman beings are infected by the original sin,â as well as having âneglected the intellective nature that belongs to them,â then the following would be the consequence: âBe mindful of the intellect so that selfish desires have no chance to rebelâ (6.35).52 This is different from Góisâs dialogue with the neo-Stoicism of his epoch and the European context in which he lived and worked. In Aleniâs version, that would be substituted in 6.30â34 with the enumeration of the arguments that, for one side, distinguish appetite and will (a kind of physics of the passions on the verge of compromising the hylomorphic theory, in 6.30) and, on the other side, confirm that the will is superior to the appetite (the control of emotions pointing toward a moral of virtues, in 6.31).
Conclusion
Reading juan 2.13, it is impossible not to be touched by Aleniâs recognition that âhuman beings are different. Countries [â¦] and family vary [â¦]; their dispositions and preferences differ from each other, yet they can communicate and imitate each other.â This had already been recognized in the West and the Conimbricensis, a work that alludes to the discovery of the New World.53 However, given the Eastern context in which he was operating, Aleni makes that recognition sound different in order to convey the same message to a Chinese audience. In doing so, Aleni ultimately produced a work that contains a lesson of continuing relevance today: being something more than a mere language game, a translation is able to reveal the real or ontological common ground that necessarily joins all humans together, notwithstanding their differences.
For an updated bibliography related to the Cursus Conimbricensis and its authors (Manuel de Góis, Sebastião do Couto, Cosme de Magalhães, and Baltasar Ãlvares), see www.Conimbricenses.org, an online encyclopedia of Coimbra Aristotelianism.
Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu, in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae (Coimbra: Mariz, 1592).
Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu, in libros Meteororum Aristotelis Stagiritae (Lisbon: Lopes, 1593).
Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu in libros Aristotelis, qui Parva naturalia appellantur (Lisbon: Lopes, 1593).
In libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum, aliquot Conimbricensis cursus disputationes in quibus praecipua quaedam Ethicae disciplinae capita continentur (Lisbon: Lopes, 1593).
Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu, in quatuor libros De coelo Aristotelis Stagiritae (Lisbon: Lopes, 1593).
Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu, in duos libros De generatione et corruptione Aristotelis Stagiritae (Lisbon: Lopes, 1597).
Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu, in tres libros De anima Aristotelis Stagiritae (Coimbra: Mariz, 1598).
Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Iesu, in universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae (Coimbra: Loureyro, 1606). As regards the second author in importance of the Cursus Conimbricensis, Sebastião do Couto, see Robert Wardy, Aristotle in China: Language, Categories, and Translation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
On Aleni, see Tiziana Lippiello and Roman Malek, eds., âScholar from the Westâ: Giulio Aleni, S.J. (1582â1649), and the Dialogue between Christianity and China (Sankt Augustin: Monumenta serica, 1997).
Having the meaning of the original or the earliest version of a text, to which later versions can be compared, the notion of a âUrtextâ may also be appropriate, methodologically as well as epistemologically, to future approaches that aim to provide a clearer picture of how and to what extent the Conimbricensis was transferred to the East. Apart from Wardyâs Aristotle in China: Language, Categories, and Translation, see also Joachim Kurtz, The Discovery of Chinese Logic (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 21â88; Thierry Meynard, âAristotelian Works in Seventeenth-Century China: An Updated Survey and New Analysis,â Monumenta serica: Journal of Oriental Studies 65, no. 1 (2017): 67â91; Isabelle Duceux, La introducción del aristotelismo en China a través del De anima: Siglos XVIâXVII (México: D.F., 2009); Willard J. Peterson, âWestern Natural Philosophy Published in Late Ming China,â Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 117, no. 4 (1973): 295â322; Qiong Zhang, âTranslation as Cultural Reform: Jesuit Scholastic Psychology in the Transformation of the Confucian Discourse on Human Nature,â in The Jesuits: Cultures, Sciences, and the Arts 1540â1773, ed. John W. OâMalley et al. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 364â79; Noël Golvers, âVerbiestâs Introduction of âAristoteles Latinusâ (Coimbra) in China: New Western Evidence,â in The Christian Mission in China in the Verbiest Era: Some Aspects of the Missionary Approach, ed. Noël Golvers (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1999), 33â53; Golvers, Portuguese Books and Their Readers in the Jesuit Mission of China (17thâ18th Centuries) (Lisbon: Centro Cientifico e Cultural de Macau, 2011); Thierry Meynard, âAristotelian Ethics in the Land of Confucius: A Study of Vagnoneâs Western Learning on Personal Cultivation,â Antiquorum philosophia 7 (2013): 145â69; Meynard, âThe First Treatise on the Soul in China and Its Sources,â Revista filosófica de Coimbra 47 (2015): 203â42; Ugo Baldini, âAs assistência Ibéricas da Companhia de Jesus e a actividade cientÃfica nas missões asiáticas (1578â1640): Alguns aspectos culturais e institucionais,â Revista portuguesa de filosofia 54 (1998): 195â246.
Meynard, âAristotelian Works in Seventeenth-Century China,â 68.
Fausto Sanches Martins, Arte, culto, vida quotidiana: JesuÃtas de Portugal; 1542â1759 (Porto: Livraria Manuel Ferreira, 2014), 279â82; see in particular Francisco Rodrigues, História da Companhia de Jesus na assistência de Portugal, 2 t., 4 vols. (Porto: Apostolado da Imprensa, 1931â38), t. I/I, 302â19.
Mário Santiago de Carvalho, âIntrodução geral,â in Comentários do Colégio Conimbricense da Companhia de Jesus sobre os três livros Da alma de Aristóteles Estagirita, trans. Maria da Conceição Camps (Lisbon: Edições SÃlabo, 2010), 9â157, here 27.
Domingos MaurÃcio, âAs âannotationes in librum de generatione et corruptioneâ do P. Cristóvão Gil e as origens do Curso Conimbricense,â Las ciencias 21 (1956): 83â100; Roque Cabral, âFilosofia no Colégio das Artes de Coimbra (séc. XVI): SubsÃdios para a sua história,â Revista portuguesa de filosofia 38, no. 2 (1982): 903â8. Father Cristóvão Gil taught in Coimbra between 1587 and 1591.
João Pereira Gomes, JesuÃtas: Ciência e cultura no Portugal moderno; Obra selecta de Pe. João Pereira Gomes, S.J., ed. Henrique Leitão and José Eduardo Franco (Lisbon: Esfera do Caos, 2012), 164. Fonseca taught during two periods (1555â57 and 1557/61), as did Gómez (1555/59 and 1559/63); Jorge taught between 1556 and 1560.
The manuscript is already accessible thanks to Joaquim de Carvalho; see Boletim da Biblioteca da Universidade de Coimbra 8 (1927): 439â48.
See José Sebastião da Silva Dias, A polÃtica cultural da época de D. João III (Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra, 1969), 658n4.
Charles Lohr, âRenaissance Latin Commentaries: Authors GâK,â Renaissance Quarterly 30 (1977): 697â741.
Gomes, JesuÃtas, 165.
Based on a letter from Richard Gibbons to Superior General Claudio Acquaviva, dated January 15, 1592 (ARSI, Lus. 71, 27râ28v), Ugo Baldini conjectures that this lecturer of mathematics in Coimbra (1590/91) intervened in the final proofreading of the Physica volume (praeses corrigendae typographiae curriculi philosophici, quod sub prelo est [correcting in the printing press the forthcoming philosophical course]); âAs assistência Ibéricas da Companhia de Jesus,â 229.
There is not, to my knowledge, an up-to-date monograph on Toledo, but in relation to his teaching period in Rome, see Ricardo GarcÃa Villoslada, Storia del Collegio Romano dal suo inizio (1551) alla soppressione della Compagnia di Gesù (1773) (Rome: Gregorian University, 1954); or Ugo Baldini, Legem impone subactis: Studi di filosofia e scienza dei gesuiti in Italia, 1540â1632 (Rome: Bulzoni, 1992), 569; see also Carlo Giacon, La seconda scolastica: II precedenze theoretische ai problemi giuridici; Toledo, Pereira, Fonseca, Molina, Suárez (Milan: Fratelli Bocca, 1946), 25â44, 51â65.
On Perera, see Marco Lamanna and Marco Forlivesi, eds., Benet Perera (Pererius, 1535â1610): A Renaissance Jesuit at the Crossroads of Modernity (Turnhout: Brepols, 2014).
On Francisco Suárez, see Benjamin Hill and Henrik Lagerlund, eds., The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Victor M. Salas and Robert L. Fastiggi, eds., A Companion to Francisco Suárez (Leiden: Brill, 2014).
See Mário Santiago de Carvalho, âBetween Rome and Coimbra: A Preliminary Survey of two Early Jesuitsâ Psychologies (Benet Perera and the Coimbra Course),â Quaestio: Annuario di storia della metafisica 14 (2014): 91â110, here 91.
On Fonseca, see António Martins, Lógica e ontologia em Pedro da Fonseca (Lisbon: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1994).
See George E. Ganss, ed. and trans., The Spiritual Exercises of Saint Ignatius (Chicago: Loyola Press, 1992), 136.
The presence of the West in Aleniâs references is precise as well as loose; he either explicitly quotes several Western names, such as Hippocrates (c.460âc.370 BCE) (7.57, 7.58), Philo (c.20 BCEâc.50 CE) (5.24), Cicero (106 BCEâ43 CE) (7.81), Tertullian (c.155âc.240 CE) (7.35, 7.56), Jerome (c.347â420 CE) (7.82), Saint Augustine (354â430 CE) (5.17), Gregory of Nyssa (c.335âc.395) (1.6, 7.39), Gregory the Great (c.540â604 CE) (7.65), Seneca (c.4 BCEâ65 CE) (4.23), Pliny (23â79 CE) (4.31, 5.25, 5.26, 7.3, 8.69), Ovid (43 BCEâ17/18 CE) (7.35), Avicenna (c.980â1037 CE) (5.2), or Cornelius Jansen (Jansenius [1510â76]) (7.3); or he uses general expressions, such as âthe philosophers of the Western schoolâ (2.40), âWestern scholars/sagesâ (7.10, 7.16, 8.9, 8.35) or a âWestern maxim/sayingâ (1.32, 7.57, 7.82) or âWestern historiesâ (7.12) or âWestern wisdomâ (7.21), âPhysicians in the Westâ (7.65), and so on. There is also a reference to an enigmatic âfamous doctor in the ancient West, called Rannadiyaâ (2.37), probably an Arab thinker, and to Jililu (7.5). See also the note above on the Aristotelian quotations. To summarize, contrary to Góisâs hypertext (Serhii Wakúlenko, âEnciclopedismo e hipertextualidade nos Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Iesu in Universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae [Coimbra 1606],â in Enciclopédia e hipertexto, ed. Olga Pombo et al. [Lisbon Edições Duarte Reis 2006], 302â57), by going to the main references, Aleni has done a great deal of work to cleanse his Urtext of authorities.
Commentarii in libros Aristotelis Stagiritae de Posteriore resolutione, in Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Iesu, in universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae 1.c.2.q.1.a.2, 350.
Aleni seems to follow Góisâs decision to refrain from commenting on De sensu et sensatu, since the subject matter of the latter had already been dealt with in the book on De anima, see Commentarii [â¦] In libros Aristotelis, qui Parva naturalia appellantur, proÅmium, 2. It should be noted that the Pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata physica pervades other titles, mainly Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu, in quatuor libros De coelo Aristotelis Stagiritae, 405â20.
The explanatio-section is included in the major Coimbra commentaries, namely Physica, De coelo, De generatione, De anima, and, partly, Dialectica.
Meynard writes: âBoth the Huan you quan and the Mingli tan by Furtado and Li Zhizao follow closely the two methods of Coimbra, that is, the direct commentary and the scholastic method of quaestio, and so it is quite easy to see the parallels between the Latin text of the Coimbra commentaries and the Chinese text. In many instances, the Latin text is translated word by word, sentence by sentence.â See Meynard, âAristotelian Works in Seventeenth-Century China,â 84.
Thomas Aquinas, In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio I.XII, lect. 9n2566; see also Miguel Baptista Pereira, Ser e pessoaâPedro da FonsecaâO método da filosofia (Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra, 1967), 194.
See Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu, in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae 2.c.1.q.1.a.1, 217â18.
In libros Aristotelis de Interpretatione, in Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Iesu, in universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae (Coimbra, 1606), 1.c.1.q.3.a.2, 30.
Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu, in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae, proÅmium, q.4.a.1, 32.
See Meynard, âAristotelian Works in Seventeenth-Century China,â 72n16.
Elisabetta Corsi, âLa diffusione delle conoscenze ottiche in Cina: Il primato della visione nel Xingxue cushu (1623) di Giulio Aleni S.I.,â in Il liuto e i libri: Studi in onore di Mario Sabattini, ed. Magda Abbiati and Federico Greselin (Venice: Edizioni Caâ Foscari, Digital Publishing, 2014), 231â40, here 236.
More original, vis-à -vis the Coimbra-Urtext, and despite being based on De memoria et Reminiscentia by Góis, is the section on mnemonics of Aleniâs Brief Introduction (7.1).
See note 61 of the English translation of juan 2.15.
Francisco Suárez, Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis de Anima, d.7.q.16, §2 (Madrid: Editorial Labor, 1981), 2:766.
In the article mentioned above, Corsi emphasizes the importance of the sense of vision in Jesuit texts; see also Maria da Conceição Camps, âDo visÃvel ao invisÃvel: A teoria da visão no Comentário aos três livros Da alma do Curso jesuÃta Conimbricense (1598)â (PhD diss., Faculdade de Letras do Porto, 2012).
Tractatio aliquot problematum ad quinque sensus spectantium per totidem sectiones distributa, in Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu, in tres libros De Anima Aristotelis Stagiritae (Coimbra, 1598), s. 2, §11, 548.
Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu, in tres libros De Anima Aristotelis Stagiritae 2, c.8.q.4, a1, 212.
Francisco Suárez, Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis De anima, d.7.q.16, §2, 766; Francisco de Toledo, Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in tres libros De anima 2, c.7, t. 66, in Franciscus Toletus: Opera omnia philosophica, vols. 1â3 (Cologne, 1615/16), fols. 81rbâ81va; Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu, in tres libros De anima Aristotelis Stagiritae 2, c.7, explanatio, 162.
In libros Aristotelis De interpretatione, in Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Iesu, in universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae (Coimbra, 1606), 1, c.1.q.4.a.2, 43â44.
Tractatio aliquot problematum ad quinque sensus spectantium per totidem sectiones distributa, s.2, 548.
In libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum, aliquot Conimbricensis cursus disputationes in quibus praecipua quaedam Ethicae disciplinae capita continentur, d.6.q.1.a.2, 49.
In libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum, aliquot Conimbricensis cursus disputationes in quibus praecipua quaedam Ethicae disciplinae capita continentur, d.6.q.1.a.2, 50.
Mário Santiago de Carvalho, âPsicofisiologia e teologia das paixões: Breve contributo para o tema da (des-)valorização das paixões no século XVI tomista,â in De las pasiones en la filosofÃa medieval: Actas del X Congreso Latinoamericano de FilosofÃa Medieval, ed. Giannina Burlando (Santiago de Chile: Société Internationale pour lâétude de la Philosophie Médiévale/PontifÃcia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2009), 391â402, here 402, diagram II.B.
Compare Aleniâs juan 6.23 with In libros Ethicorum, d.6.q.5.a.2 (and a.1 for a different number of passions).
There is another allusion to original sin in juan 7.42.
See Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu, in quatuor libros De coelo Aristotelis Stagiritae 2, c.14.q.1.a.2, 317.