In this chapter, I deal with the Platonist background of Gos. Thom. 61, a short dialogue between Jesus and a certain woman by the name of Salome. Most scholars believe that the Coptic text of Gos. Thom. 61 is corrupt; therefore, along with interpreting the dialogue, I will also offer philological analyses of certain Coptic words and expressions present in the text. Below is the Coptic text of Gos. Thom. 61 and its English translation:
61:1 ⲡⲉϫⲉ ⲓⲥ︦ ⲟⲩⲛ̄ ⲥⲛⲁⲩ ⲛⲁⲙ̄ⲧⲟⲛ ⲙ̄ⲙⲁⲩ ϩⲓ ⲟⲩϭⲗⲟϭ ⲡⲟⲩⲁ ⲛⲁⲙⲟⲩ ⲡⲟⲩⲁ ⲛⲁⲱⲛϩ61:2 ⲡⲉϫⲉ ⲥⲁⲗⲱⲙⲏ ⲛ̄ⲧⲁⲕ ⲛⲓⲙ ⲡⲣⲱⲙⲉ ϩⲱⲥ ⲉⲃⲟⲗ ϩⲛ̄ ⲟⲩⲁ ⲁⲕⲧⲉⲗⲟ ⲉϫⲙ̄ ⲡⲁϭⲗⲟϭ ⲁⲩⲱ ⲁⲕⲟⲩⲱⲙ ⲉⲃⲟⲗ ϩⲛ̄ ⲧⲁⲧⲣⲁⲡⲉⲍⲁ61:3 ⲡⲉϫⲉ ⲓⲥ︦ ⲛⲁⲥ ϫⲉ ⲁⲛⲟⲕ ⲡⲉ ⲡⲉⲧϣⲟⲟⲡ ⲉⲃⲟⲗ ϩⲙ̄ ⲡⲉⲧϣⲏϣ ⲁⲩϯ ⲛⲁⲉⲓ ⲉⲃⲟⲗ ϩⲛ̄ ⲛⲁ ⲡⲁⲉⲓⲱⲧ61:4 ⲁⲛⲟⲕ ⲧⲉⲕⲙⲁⲑⲏⲧⲏⲥ61:5 ⲉⲧⲃⲉ ⲡⲁⲉⲓ ϯϫⲱ ⲙ̄ⲙⲟⲥ ϫⲉ ϩⲟⲧⲁⲛ ⲉϥϣⲁϣⲱⲡⲉ ⲉϥϣⲏ⟨ϣ⟩ ϥⲛⲁⲙⲟⲩϩ ⲟⲩⲟⲉⲓⲛ ϩⲟⲧⲁⲛ ⲇⲉ ⲉϥϣⲁϣⲱⲡⲉ ⲉϥⲡⲏϣ ϥⲛⲁⲙⲟⲩϩ ⲛ̄ⲕⲁⲕⲉ
61:1 Jesus said: “Two will rest on a dining couch. One will die; the other will live.”61:2 Salome said: “Who are you, man? As if you were from someone (important), you have gotten a place on my dining couch and you have eaten at my table.”61:3 Jesus said to her: “I am the one who comes from the One who is equal (to himself). I was given some of that which is my Father’s.”61:4 “I am your disciple!”61:5 “Therefore, I say: If he is ⟨equal⟩ (to himself), he will become full of light. But if he is divided, he will become full of darkness.”
I start with discussing the setting of the dialogue between Jesus and Salome. I then analyze the contents of the dialogue, primarily how the saying is influenced by the Middle Platonist philosophy. In the end, I address the integrity of the dialogue, since it has been questioned by a number of scholars.
The Setting of the Dialogue
In what follows, I discuss the circumstances in which Jesus and Salome engage in their dialogue. First, I argue that the setting of Gos. Thom. 61:1–2 is that of a banquet. Then, I offer several arguments in support of Harold W. Attridge’s interpretation of Gos. Thom. 61:2 and a suggestion as to how Salome’s reply might be related to Jesus’ opening remark in Gos. Thom. 61:1.
1 Jesus on a Dining Couch
The Coptic noun ϭⲗⲟϭ occurs in Gos. Thom. 61 twice. Even though the primary meaning of ϭⲗⲟϭ is “bed,” in Gos. Thom. 61, it should be understood as “dining couch.” Most probably, the Coptic noun ϭⲗⲟϭ in Gos. Thom. 61 renders the Greek noun κλίνη, since ϭⲗⲟϭ is the most frequent equivalent of κλίνη in the Sahidic New Testament1 and perhaps in other translated texts as well.2 Although it is theoretically possible that ϭⲗⲟϭ here renders κράβαττος,3 the parallel text in Luke 17:34 seems to rule this option out. In turn, the Greek noun κλίνη means both “bed” and “dining couch,” but since, in Gos. Thom. 61:2, we encounter the Greek loan-word τράπεζα, there can be no doubt that the latter meaning was implied.
The ancient practice of reclining on a dining couch (κλίνη) and eating from a table (τράπεζα) is well-known. The following two examples from classical literary sources describe the setting that is essentially similar to the one presupposed in Gos. Thom. 61:4
Then how should I feed these people, Glaucon? I asked.
In the conventional way. If they aren’t to suffer hardship, they should recline on proper couches (ἐπί τε κλινῶν κατακεῖσθαι), dine at a table (ἀπὸ τραπεζῶν δειπνεῖν), and have the delicacies and desserts that people have nowadays.5
Exactly the same thing holds true also in reference to the kitchen: in any establishment where one and the same man arranges the dining couches (κλίνην στρώννυσι), lays the table (τράπεζαν κοσμεῖ), bakes the bread, prepares now one sort of dish and now another, he must necessarily have things go as they may.6
In Gos. Thom. 61:1, Jesus speaks of two individuals reclining on one couch; the saying thus reflects communal dining customs of the ancient world. I believe that Uwe-Karsten Plisch is accurate when he suggests that the setting of Gos. Thom. 61 is a banquet, where Salome is host and Jesus, one of the guests.7 Indeed, this seems to be the most natural way of interpreting the saying. While a couch in a typical Greek ἀνδρών usually measured 1.80–1.90 × 0.80–0.90 m and could accommodate either one or two guests, a couch in a Roman triclinium was larger, measuring 2.20–2.40 × 1.20 m and accommodating three persons.8 It is this latter piece of furniture that Thomasine ϭⲗⲟϭ designates.
Since Salome is the host, she says that Jesus reclines on “her” couch and eats from “her” table. It seems unlikely that she and Jesus recline on the same couch:9 as Matthew B. Roller convincingly argues, a man and woman reclining together in Roman times “thereby announce a licit, proprietary sexual connection.”10
To this must be added that a woman present at a banquet is not necessarily either an entertainer or a prostitute. While in Greece, according to Katherine Dunbabin, “reclining at dinner was a male prerogative,” in Roman times, respectable women “participated in banquets reclining together with men.”11 This phenomenon is attested by both literary and non-literary sources—for example, a mosaic panel from Capua (first or second century CE) depicts “women who to all appearances are portrayed in their dress and demeanour as respectable members of society, participating in the feast on equal terms with men.”12
2 Jesus Has Come from Someone Special
Salome says that Jesus got a place (literally, “came up” or “climbed”) on her dining couch and ate from her table ϩⲱⲥ ⲉⲃⲟⲗ ϩⲛ̄ ⲟⲩⲁ (i.e., “as from one”). The majority of scholars believe that the text “is near to nonsense”13 and therefore has to be emended.
If we cannot convincingly interpret the text as it stands, an emendation would certainly be in order. If this were the case, the best option would probably be to accept H.J. Polotsky’s proposal that *ὡς ξένος of the Greek Vorlage was mistranslated as *ὡς ἐξ ἑνός.14 Indeed, the improved text fits nicely into the setting of the dialogue, as it was described above. While Salome is the host of this banquet, Jesus is lying on her dining couch and eating the food from her table as her guest.15
As insightful as Polotsky’s proposal is, it is every scholar’s duty to try to interpret the text as it stands, and propose emendations only after proving that the text as it stands is meaningless.16 Hence, I would like to discuss the proposals of Harold W. Attridge and Ismo Dunderberg, who both believe that the phrase in question “can be understood as it stands.”17
In his 1977 translation of the Gospel of Thomas, Lambdin rendered ϩⲱⲥ ⲉⲃⲟⲗ ϩⲛ̄ ⲟⲩⲁ “as though from the One.”18 According to Attridge, this translation is inaccurate: “If ⲟⲩⲁ is indeed a translation of a Greek ἑνός, used in this metaphysical sense, we would certainly not expect it to be anarthrous in either language.”19 According to Attridge, ⲟⲩⲁ renders τὶς, which in this context means “someone special.”20
Indeed, this special meaning of τὶς is securely attested in early Christian literature—see, e.g., Acts 5:36, “claiming to be someone (important) (λέγων εἶναί τινα ἑαυτόν),” and Ign. Eph. 3:1, “I do not give you orders as if I were someone (important) (ὡς ὤν τις).” Yet Attridge does not give any examples where the indefinite pronoun ⲟⲩⲁ renders τὶς with this meaning.21 There is, however, at least one example that supports his hypothesis. In the Lycopolitan (dialect L6) text of the Acts of Paul, published by Carl Schmidt from P.Heid. Inv. Kopt. 300+301,22 τινές (here, “some important people”) is rendered as ϩⲁⲉⲓⲛⲉ (ϩⲟⲉⲓⲛⲉ in Sahidic), the plural form of ⲟⲩⲁ:
And Paul, seeing Onesiphorus, smiled; and Onesiphorus said, “Hail, O servant of the blessed God.” And he said, “Grace be with you and your house.” And Demas and Hermogenes were jealous and showed greater hypocrisy, so that Demas said, “Are we not of the blessed God that you have not thus saluted us?” And Onesiphorus said, “I do not see in you the fruit of righteousness, but if you are some important people (εἰ δὲ ἔστε τινές = [ⲉϣⲱⲡⲉ ⲇⲉ ⲛ̄ⲧ]ⲱⲧⲛ̣ ϩⲁⲉⲓⲛ̣[ⲉ]), come also into my house and refresh yourselves.”23
Attridge’s hypothesis seems to be the most convincing explanation of Salome’s words. Dunderberg, however, disagrees with Attridge. According to him,24 ϩⲱⲥ ⲉⲃⲟⲗ ϩⲛ̄ ⲟⲩⲁ might render either *ὡς ἐξ ἑνός or *ὡς ἀφ’ ἑνός.25 Dunderberg argues that there are two possible interpretations for Salome’s words. First, since, in Exc. 36.1, εἷς occurs without the article and since “it is doubtless used in the metaphysical sense meaning God,” the same might also be true of Gos. Thom. 61. Second, Salome might have the equality of all people in mind, as the author of Hebrews does in Heb 2:11.26 Both these suggestions are very insightful, but I do not find them compelling.
Both expressions that, according to Dunderberg, might have been present in the Greek Vorlage (i.e., either *ὡς ἐξ ἑνός or *ὡς ἀφ’ ἑνός) are present in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysica. (i) In his comment on Metaph. 988b22–24, Alexander says that there are those who (erroneously) think that the universe (τὸ πᾶν) is one, because it has only one (material) cause. If this is the case, says Alexander, ἓν ὡς ἐξ ἑνός—i.e., “(the universe is) one as (coming) from one (thing)” (Comm. Metaph. 64.17 Hayduck). (ii) In his comment on Metaph. 1003b16, Alexander says that there is one science (ἐπιστήμη μία) that deals with the things that are said in various ways ὡς ἀφ’ ἑνός τε καὶ πρὸς ἕν—i.e., “by derivation from one thing and with reference to one thing” (Comm. Metaph. 244.10 Hayduck; trans. A. Madigan). These two examples show that it is not true that the expression as it stands “is near to nonsense,” since it is quite meaningful in Alexander’s commentary. Moreover, it is evident that the expression might have been used in a metaphysical sense. Having said that, I would like to point out that in different metaphysical contexts ἑνός has different metaphysical meanings, but the one that Attridge rejects (ϩⲱⲥ ⲉⲃⲟⲗ ϩⲛ̄ ⲟⲩⲁ = “as though from the One”) is indeed impossible in Gos. Thom. 61:2. The two examples from Alexander’s commentary illustrate Attridge’s point:
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Since it originates from a single source (and not from two, three, etc., sources), the universe is one (= there is no second universe);
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One science deals with multiple objects as long as these objects come from one thing (and not from two different things).
The second example is, in fact, very similar to the two parallels Dunderberg draws in his book:
ἐν ἑνότητι μέντοι γε προεβλήθησαν οἱ ἄγγελοι ἡμῶν, φασίν, ⟨εἷς ὄντες⟩,27 ὡς ἀπὸ ἑνὸς προελθόντες.
They say that it is in unity that our angels were put forth, for they ⟨are one⟩, having come forth from one.28
ὅ τε γὰρ ἁγιάζων καὶ οἱ ἁγιαζόμενοι ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντες.
For the one who sanctifies and those who are sanctified are all from one (God).29
The point in Heb 2:11, Exc. 36.1, and in Alexander’s comment on Metaph. 1003b16 is the same: there are multiple objects that have something in common, because they originated from one and the same thing. Even though all these passages, including Heb 2:11, are metaphysical in a sense, none of them refers to the metaphysical concept of “the One.”
As for the second interpretation proposed by Dunderberg—i.e., “as (coming) from one (Father) you have gotten a place on my dining couch and you have eaten from my table”—it does not seem to be supported by the context for a couple reasons. First, the Father is not mentioned in the dialogue yet; therefore, it would not be clear to whom Salome is referring. Second, Salome is not saying that both Jesus and she are “from one.” Remarkably, Gos. Thom. 61:2—unlike Heb 2:11, Exc. 36.1, and Alexander’s comment on Metaph. 1003b16—does not mention multiple objects that are “from one.” Only Jesus is said to be “from one.”
Hence, it is very unlikely that Salome speaks about her or someone else’s equality with Jesus. Since Dunderberg’s proposal is open to criticism, I accept Attridge’s hypothesis as the most likely explanation of ϩⲱⲥ ⲉⲃⲟⲗ ϩⲛ̄ ⲟⲩⲁ and render this expression with “as if you were from someone (important).”
The last question I address in this section is how the initial words of Jesus and Salome’s reply are related to each other. The brevity of the saying does not seem to allow us to give a decisive answer to this question. Nevertheless, I would like to present what I believe to be the most plausible option.
As Plisch has pointed out, Jesus’ opening remark and Salome’s reply are linked by the catchword ϭⲗⲟϭ; therefore, “Salome obviously understood the saying in the first sentence as referring to a situation at a banquet.”30 Thus, Salome’s answer means that she sees Jesus’ words as a threat. It is tempting to assume that, when Jesus spoke of “the one who will die,” Salome deduced that he spoke about her. In this case, his words are a wake-up call of sorts: even though we are dining together now, something bad may happen to you in the near future if you do not seek salvation. This option is, however, very unlikely. First, as I have noted above (p. 165), nothing indicates that Jesus and Salome are lovers; therefore, they probably recline on separate couches. Second, if the author of the saying wanted to say that Jesus would live and Salome would die, he would not have used two masculine pronouns (i.e., ⲡⲟⲩⲁ), but rather one masculine and one feminine (i.e., ⲧⲟⲩⲉⲓ).
It is, therefore, reasonable to surmise that Salome thinks that Jesus is speaking about the guests of the banquet she is hosting. She understands his words as a grim prophecy of sorts and is terrified by them. She wants to know who gave him the authority to talk like this. Perhaps she even interprets his words as a direct threat to everyone present at the banquet. It is possible that she suspects him to be a representative of the Roman authorities and that he came to her banquet as a participant in a punitive expedition. All in all, her question indicates that she is in the dark about Jesus’ divine nature; her reply invites Jesus to reveal who he truly is.
The Contents of the Dialogue
In what follows, I argue that we might gain better insight into the words of Jesus in Gos. Thom. 61:3 and 61:5, if we appreciate their indebtedness to the Platonist metaphysics of divine immutability and indivisibility.
1 Divine Immutability
In Gos. Thom. 61:3, Jesus says that he “exists from ⲡⲉⲧϣⲏϣ.” As Antti Marjanen observes, the meaning of ⲡⲉⲧϣⲏϣ is problematic. For the same reason, a number of recent translations interpret ϣⲏϣ “in light of its present context and in light of Thomasine theology” (e.g., “to be integrated,” “to be undivided,” “to be whole”), even though “no parallel for this kind of use of ϣⲏϣ has been found.”31
Two details should be pointed out with regard to the Greek Vorlage of this expression. First, different forms of ϣⲱϣ almost always render ἴσος and ἴσος + a verb in the Sahidic New Testament.32 Second, according to W.E. Crum, the Greek adjective ἴσος and its derivatives are quite often rendered ϣⲏϣ, the stative form of ϣⲱϣ33—see, for instance, the Sahidic translations of Athanasius of Alexandria, Vit. Ant. 14.4,34 Exod 26:24, Ezek 40:5, Mark 14:56, Can. ap. 7 (= Const. ap. 8.47.22–24 Metzger),35 Zech 4:7, Sir 9:10, Pseudo-John Chrysostom, Jos. cast. PG 56:587.26.36 The Concordance du Nouveau Testament sahidique adds Rev 21:16 to the list.37 Since the examples are quite numerous,38 I believe it is reasonable, then, to conclude that the Coptic translator had ἴσος or a cognate form of ἴσος in the Vorlage.39 Therefore, in Gos. Thom. 61:3, Jesus says that he comes either from “the one who is equal” or from “the thing that is equal.”
I do not find the second option compelling. To be sure, ⲡⲉⲧϣⲏϣ might be a rendering of a Greek neuter noun (i.e., τὸ ἴσον). This expression does come up in philosophical literature—e.g., Plato discusses αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον (i.e., “the equal itself”) in Phaed. 74a–75c (cf. 78d), and Alexander of Aphrodisias says that there are various species (τὰ εἴδη) of τὸ ἕν: τὸ ταὐτόν, τὸ ὅμοιον, τὸ ἴσον and many others (Comm. Metaph. 255.5–7 Hayduck). Still, the context hardly allows us to assume that Jesus speaks about an abstract entity different from the Father. Perhaps one could argue that “what is equal” refers to the divine realm as a whole; if this is the case, the point of the next sentence is that Jesus is not only from the divine realm, but also has an intimate connection with the Father himself. Yet this interpretation implies that Gos. Thom. 61:3 presupposes a complex system of divine beings, which does not seem to find any support in the other Thomasine sayings. Therefore, I prefer the simplest solution: since Jesus talks about the Father in the second sentence of Gos. Thom. 61:3, ⲡⲉⲧϣⲏϣ in the first sentence of Gos. Thom. 61:3 most certainly refers to the Father as well.
The problem is, as Dunderberg points out, that, in Gos. Thom. 61:3, “being equal” “is maintained without defining the point of comparison (to whom is one equal?).”40 My suggestion is that, in this instance, Gos. Thom. 61 is indebted to the Platonist tradition, and that the philosophical texts contemporary with Gos. Thom. 61 might shed light on this text.
In what follows, I show that a number of Middle Platonist sources state that ultimate reality is (among other things) always equal to itself. I would like to start with two remarkable passages in Philo.41 First, according to Aet. 43, God is equal to himself:
For God is equal to Himself and like Himself (ἴσος γὰρ αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ καὶ ὅμοιος ὁ θεός); His power admits neither relaxation to make it worse, nor tension to make it better.42
It is worth noting that Valentin Rose attributed Aet. 39–43 to Aristotle; he listed this passage as a fragment of the lost Aristotelian work De philosophia (fr. 21 Rose = fr. 19c Ross).43 Yet, as Bernd Effe points out, in Aet. 43–44, we encounter Philo’s own thoughts.44 As for the statement that God is “equal to Himself and like Himself,” it is quite possible that Philo borrowed the expression from De universi natura, a second-century BCE pseudepigraphon ascribed to the ancient Pythagorean Ocellus of Lucania. According to Univ. nat. 5, the universe (τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ πᾶν) “always remains the same, equal to itself and like itself (ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως διατελεῖ καὶ ἴσον καὶ ὅμοιον αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ).”45 In Aet. 12, Philo says that he read (ἐνέτυχον) De universi natura, and there is thus no reason to doubt his testimony.46 In turn, the expression ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως in Univ. nat. 5, clearly comes from Plato’s dialogues.47
The second Philonic passage that is relevant for this discussion is Sacr. 8–9. In this passage, Philo takes as a point of departure Exod 7:1 LXX, where God says to Moses, “I have given you as a god to Pharaoh (δέδωκά σε θεὸν Φαραώ).” Since God “appointed him as a god (εἰς θεὸν αὐτὸν ἐχειροτόνει),” Moses “had room for neither addition nor taking away (μήτε πρόσθεσιν μήτε ἀφαίρεσιν κεχωρηκώς).” Thus, not only God is equal to himself; Moses, being a god, was also equal to himself:
A god is not subject to either reduction or addition, being complete and eminently equal to himself (πλήρης καὶ ἰσαίτατος ὢν ἑαυτῷ).48
The second important philosophical source is Apuleius. In his handbook, he makes a distinction between the intelligible substance and the sensible:
Οὐσίας, quas essentias dicimus, duas esse ait, per quas cuncta gignantur mundusque ipse; quarum una cogitatione sola concipitur, altera sensibus subici potest. Sed illa, quae mentis oculis conprehenditur, semper et eodem modo et sui par ac similis inuenitur, ut quae uere sit; at enim altera opinione sensibili et inrationabili aestimanda est, quam nasci et interire ait. Et, sicut superior uere esse memoratur, hanc non esse uere possumus dicere.
He [i.e., Plato] says that there are two οὐσίαι (we call them “substances”). Everything comes into being through them, including the world itself. One of them is grasped only by thought, the other one may be laid before the senses. The one that is comprehended by the eyes of intellect is always found in the same state, equal and similar to itself, since it truly is. The other one should be estimated by sensible and irrational opinion. He says that it comes into existence and ceases to be. And, since it is said that the former truly is, we can say that this one truly is not.49
It is worth noting that neither Philo nor Apuleius invented the concepts they formulated in the passages quoted above, but rather follow the Platonist speculative tradition and spelled out the ideas that were generally accepted among Platonists. The idea that God is immutable and always the same comes from Resp. 380d–381e; it was a locus communis in Middle Platonism. For instance, in order to prove that the incarnation of God is impossible, Celsus simply paraphrases Plato’s words:
I have nothing new to say, but only ancient doctrines. God is good and beautiful and happy, and exists in the most beautiful state. If then He comes down to men, He must undergo change, a change from good to bad, from beautiful to shameful, from happiness to misfortune, and from what is best to what is most wicked. Who would choose a change like this? It is the nature only of a mortal being to undergo change and remoulding, whereas it is the nature of an immortal being to remain the same without alteration (κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν). Accordingly, God could not be capable of undergoing this change.50
Apuleius’ doctrine of the two substances comes from Plato’s dialogues as well (see, e.g., Phaed. 79a). It is also present in the works of the Middle Platonist authors (Plutarch, Def. orac. 428b; Alcinous, Didasc. 4.7).51 According to Plutarch, there are two natures, “one evident to the senses, subject to change in creation and dissolution, carried now here now there, while the other is essentially conceptual and always remains the same (ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσα)” (trans. F.C. Babbitt).
When Philo states that God is equal to himself and when Apuleius states the same with regard to the intelligible substance, they hardly say something new, but rather rephrase the widespread concept that ultimate reality is not subject to any changes. The next logical step in this line of reasoning would be to maintain that equality as such is one of many divine attributes. As I will show, this step was made not only in Gos. Thom. 61, but also in a number of other Platonist and Platonizing texts, both Christian and non-Christian. One of the texts that attribute equality to God is Clement of Alexandria’s Stromata:
It is hidden from them, even though they happen to be near us, that God gave us so many things that have nothing to do with him. He gave us birth, even though he was not born. He gave us food, even though he is self-sufficient. He gave us growth, even though he is in equality. He gave us happy decline of life and happy death, even though he is immortal and ageless.52
It is worth noting that, as Otto Stählin points out, this passage is dependent on Philo, Sacr. 98; 100:53
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Philo, Sacr. 98; 100 |
Clement, Strom. 5.11.68.2 |
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μυρία γὰρ ἡμῖν ἡ φύσις54 ἐπιβάλλοντα ἀνθρώπων γένει δεδώρηται, ὧν ἀμέτοχος ἁπάντων ἐστὶν αὐτή, γένεσιν ἀγένητος οὖσα, τροφὴν τροφῆς οὐ δεομένη, αὔξησιν ἐν ὁμοίῳ μένουσα … τίς οὖν ἀγνοεῖ ὅτι εὐγηρία καὶ εὐθανασία μέγιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀγαθῶν ἐστιν, ὧν οὐδετέρου κοινωνὸς ἡ φύσις ἀγήρως τε καὶ ἀθάνατος οὖσα; |
λέληθεν δ’ αὐτούς, κἂν πλησίον ἡμῶν τύχωσιν, ὡς μυρία ὅσα δεδώρηται ἡμῖν ὁ θεός, ὧν αὐτὸς ἀμέτοχος, γένεσιν μὲν ἀγένητος ὤν, τροφὴν δὲ ἀνενδεὴς ὤν, καὶ αὔξησιν ἐν ἰσότητι ὤν, εὐγηρίαν τε καὶ εὐθανασίαν ἀθάνατός τε καὶ ἀγήρως ὑπάρχων. |
In his paraphrase, Clement changed ἐν ὁμοίῳ μένειν to ἐν ἰσότητι εἶναι. The expression μένειν or διαμένειν ἐν ὁμοίῳ (“to remain in the same condition”) occurs quite regularly in Philo’s corpus.55 Although Clement introduced several changes to the Philonic passage,56 there is no reason to think that he disagreed with Philo’s understanding of divine nature. Philo would most certainly consider these two expressions synonymous—see, for instance, Spec. 4.143, where he says that the laws established “at the beginning (ἐξ ἀρχῆς)” should be kept ἐν ἴσῳ καὶ ὁμοίῳ (i.e., “in an equal and similar state”). Therefore, to say that God is immutable is the same as to say that his distinctive feature is equality, that he is “equal.”
An even closer parallel to the words of Jesus in Gos. Thom. 61 comes from a lost Hermetic writing, a fragment of which is preserved in Cyril of Alexandria’s C. Jul. 1.46.28–35:
Καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐν λόγῳ πρώτῳ τῶν “Πρὸς τὸν Τὰτ διεξοδικῶν” οὕτω λέγει περὶ Θεοῦ· Ὁ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ Λόγος, ὦ τέκνον, ἀΐδιος, αὐτοκίνητος, ἀναυξής, ἀμείωτος, ἀμετάβλητος, ἄφθαρτος, μόνος, ἀεὶ ἑαυτῷ ὅμοιός ἐστιν, ἴσος δὲ καὶ ὁμαλός, εὐσταθής, εὔτακτος, εἷς ὢν μετὰ τὸν προεγνωσμένον Θεόν·57 σημαίνει δέ, οἶμαι, διά γε τουτουὶ τὸν Πατέρα.
And the same person [i.e., thrice-greatest Hermes] says the following about God in the first of the “Detailed Speeches to Tat”: “O child, the word of the creator is eternal and self-moved, it does not increase, it does not diminish, it is immutable, immortal and unique, it is always like itself, equal and even, it is stable and well-ordered, being one after the God who is beyond knowledge.” I believe he means the Father by this term.58
The expression ὁ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ λόγος in the Hermetic fragment is a bit puzzling. This “creator’s word” is probably identical to the “creative word” (ὁ δημιουργός λόγος) mentioned in other Cyril’s quotations (see C. Jul. 1.46.11–12 and 15). According to Cyril’s source, the creative word is ungenerated (ἀγέννητος) and infinite; being the first power of “the lord of all” (ὁ πάντων δεσπότης), it emerges from him and rules over everything he has created (C. Jul. 1.46.15–18). The “creator’s word” is, therefore, a divine being (or perhaps a divine hypostasis) and not the visible world,59 even though, as A.D. Nock points out, many of the creator’s word’s attributes seem to come from Aristotle’s De caelo.60
The fragment nicely illustrates the intellectual context in which the point Jesus makes in Gos. Thom. 61:3 becomes understandable. When Salome shows her ignorance of Jesus’ true identity, he says that he comes from the one who is equal. He could also say that he comes from “the one who is alike” or “the one who is even,” because all these characteristics describe the same thing—viz., the immutability of the divine realm. In order to make sure that Salome is headed in the right direction, Jesus reformulates the same thought in a more explicit manner—i.e., “I was given some of that which is my Father’s.”
There is one last parallel that has to be mentioned in this context. According to the Tripartite Tractate (NHC I 67.36–37), the Father61 did not “reveal his equality (ⲡⲓϣⲱϣ ⲛ̄ⲧⲉϥ)62 to those who had come forth from him” (trans. H.W. Attridge and E.H. Pagels).63 In saying that being equal is divine, the Tripartite Tractate is most certainly on the same track as Gos. Thom. 61, yet I do not think that this gives us a reason to assume that the Gospel of Thomas “was read by some Valentinians and that it had an impact on their beliefs.”64 As the sources I cited above seem to show, due to Middle Platonist speculations, the idea that divinity is equal was quite well-known in the first centuries CE. Hence, it is safer to suggest that the Gospel of Thomas and the Tripartite Tractate share the same outlook without being dependent on one another.
In Gos. Thom. 61:5, this discourse on divine equality takes another twist: it is not only God who is equal to himself; human beings could also and indeed should become equal to themselves. As we have already seen, this idea is not unprecedented; according to Philo, not only is God equal to himself, but Moses was also “eminently equal to himself.” Moreover, the idea that underlies this expression (viz., that of becoming an immutable being) was well-known. Perhaps, the most illustrative example is Strom. 7.10.57.5, where Clement says that the Gnostic who enters the Lord’s dwelling-place becomes “light that stands firm, always remains the same, and is absolutely and in every respect immutable,” φῶς ἑστὸς καὶ μένον ἀϊδίως, πάντῃ πάντως ἄτρεπτον.
As I have pointed out in chapter 5, Clement’s understanding of human perfection is similar to his description of the deity, especially in Strom. 1.24.163.6, where he speaks of “God’s stable permanence and his unchanging light, which no form can catch (τὸ ἑστὸς65 καὶ μόνιμον τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τὸ ἄτρεπτον αὐτοῦ φῶς καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον)” (trans. J. Ferguson).66 As Walther Völker points out, comparing these two passages reveals that Clement’s idea of perfection gravitates around the notion of “becoming as like God as possible”; his perfect Gnostic is a reflection of his perfect God.67 As I have pointed out, the same holds true for Philo, and it holds true for the Gospel of Thomas as well: the description of the Father in Gos. Thom. 61:3 clearly matches the idea of human perfection expressed in Gos. Thom. 61:5.
Finally, it is necessary to comment on the ethical dimension of the term ἴσος. Knowing that the Father is “equal,” ancient readers of the Gospel of Thomas would probably assume that he is “equal” not only in the metaphysical sense, but also in moral one—i.e., “impartial” and “equable.”68 The following examples from early Christian authors illustrate these notable nuances in the meaning of the term ἴσος.
Already in classical texts, the adjective ἴσος can mean “impartial” if applied to a human being—e.g., to a judge (see, for instance, Plato, Leg. 957c). Clement in his Protr. 6.69.3, applies this term to God. It is worth noting that in this passage Clement alludes to Phaed. 78c–80b (see above, p. 172); thus, in his view, divine immutability goes hand in hand with divine impartiality:
But the one true God, who is the only just measure, because He is always uniformly and unchangeably impartial (ἴσος ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχων), measures and weighs all things, encircling and sustaining in equilibrium the nature of the universe by His justice as by a balance.69
The Gnostic, according to Strom. 7.12.69.1, is also ἴσος; since he is free from passions, he treats all people equally, even if some of them are hostile to him:
But the Gnostic, being such as we have described him in body and soul, is found to be fair alike (ἴσος καὶ ὅμοιος) towards all his neighbours, whatever their legal position, whether servant or foeman or whatever it be.70
The term is employed in a similar fashion by Athanasius of Alexandria. In his Vit. Ant. 14.3–4, Athanasius describes the equability Anthony achieved after about twenty years of ascetic life. The Coptic text of Vita Antonii renders ἴσος εἶναι with the stative form of ϣⲱϣ, thus giving us an interesting parallel to Gos. Thom. 61:71
The disposition of his soul was pure again, for it was neither contracted from distress, nor dissipated from pleasure, not constrained by levity of dejection. Indeed, when he saw the crowd, he was not disturbed, nor did he rejoice to be greeted by so many people. Rather, he was wholly balanced, as if he were being navigated by the Word (ὅλος ἦν ἴσος, ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου κυβερνώμενος = ⲛⲧⲟϥ ⲧⲏⲣϥ̄ ⲉⲛⲉϥϣⲏϣ ϩⲱⲥ ⲉⲣⲉⲡⲗⲟⲅⲟⲥ ⲣ̄ ϩⲙⲙⲉ ⲙⲙⲟϥ) and existing in his natural state.72
The context in which the word ⲡⲉⲧϣⲏϣ is employed in Gos. Thom. 61:3 seems thus to accentuate the metaphysical dimension of the term—i.e., the divine immutability. It is, however, important to bear in mind that the same term had an important ethical dimension along with the metaphysical one. This moral dimension of the term may be the reason why, in Gos. Thom. 61:5, ⲉϥϣⲏ⟨ϣ⟩ defines human perfection.
2 Divine Indivisibility
The word ⲡⲏϣ in Gos. Thom. 61:5 is the stative form of the verb ⲡⲱϣⲉ; it means “to be divided,” “to be separated.” Two different interpretations of the phrase ⲉϥϣⲁϣⲱⲡⲉ ⲉϥⲡⲏϣ, “if he is separated,” are possible. It means that someone is either divided—i.e., separated from himself—or separated from someone else, perhaps from God. The latter interpretation was proposed by Hans-Martin Schenke: “If he is ⟨equal⟩ (to God), he will become full of light. But if he is separated (from God), he will become full of darkness.”73 I do not find this interpretation compelling, since it presupposes that ϣⲏϣ has different meanings in Gos. Thom. 61:3 and 61:5—i.e., “equal (to himself)” and “equal (to God).” It is more probable that, in both instances, we are dealing with an idea of being equal in an “absolute” sense, which in turn leads to the conclusion that the term ⲡⲏϣ is also used in an “absolute” sense. The idea is that someone is divided, not that someone is separated from God; being “divided” (ⲡⲏϣ) is, therefore, the opposite of being “one and the same” (ⲟⲩⲁ ⲟⲩⲱⲧ).74
Since the use of ⲡⲉⲧϣⲏϣ in the dialogue of Jesus and Salome shows that Gos. Thom. 61 most probably took on certain elements of Platonist metaphysics, it is reasonable to surmise that Platonist motifs might be present elsewhere in Gos. Thom. 61. It seems that, in Gos. Thom. 61:5, Jesus spells out the anthropological implications of what has been said in Gos. Thom. 61:3. In what follows, I will show that, just like immutability, indivisibility is a Platonist attribute of ultimate reality; in other words, to be divided means to be outside the divine realm.
Middle Platonists often attributed indivisibility to ultimate reality. The following passage from Numenius is quite illustrative in this regard:
Ὁ θεὸς ὁ μὲν πρῶτος ἐν ἑαυτοῦ ὤν ἐστιν ἁπλοῦς, διὰ τὸ ἑαυτῷ συγγιγνόμενος διόλου μή ποτε εἶναι διαιρετός.
Being in himself, the first God is simple, because, as the one who keeps company with himself, he is in no way divisible.75
In fact, a view similar to the one of Numenius is expressed already by Aristotle who states in Phys. 267b25–26 that the “first mover” is ἀδιαίρετος and ἀμερής. Alcinous in his Didascalicus offers an explanation why God is indivisible: “God is partless (ἀμερής), by reason of the fact that there is nothing prior to him. For a part, and that out of which a thing is composed, exists prior to that of which it is a part” (10.7; trans. J.M. Dillon).76 The Christian Platonists were also aware of this idea:
For God does not exist in darkness. He is not in space at all. He is beyond space and time and anything belonging to created beings. Similarly, he is not found in any section. He contains nothing. He is contained by nothing. He is not subject to limit or division.77
Elsewhere (Strom. 5.12.81.5–6), Clement describes God in terms of the first hypothesis of Plato’s Parmenides. Clement calls God “the One” (τὸ ἕν) and, just like Plato (see Parm. 137c–d; 142a), describes the One as not being a whole (ὅλον), having no parts (μέρη), infinite (ἄπειρον), without form (ἀσχημάτιστον), and nameless (ἀνωνόμαστον). According to John Whittaker, who discovered the dependence of this passage on Parmenides,78 Clement seems to draw “from a theologically inclined Middle Platonic commentary upon the Parmenides, or at least from a Middle Platonic theologico-metaphysical adaptation of the First Hypothesis.”79 For the purposes of the present discussion, it is worth noting that, according to Clement, the One is not composed of parts (οὐδὲ μὴν μέρη τινὰ αὐτοῦ λεκτέον), because it is indivisible (ἀδιαίρετον γὰρ τὸ ἕν).
All these statements about divine nature have important implications for the overall anthropology. As Francis M. Cornford puts it, “the World-Soul and all individual souls belong to both worlds and partake both of being and of becoming.”80 On the one hand, as Plato puts it in his Phaedo, “the soul is most like the divine, deathless, intelligible, uniform, indissoluble (ἀδιάλυτος), always the same as itself, whereas the body is most like that which is human, mortal, multiform, unintelligible, soluble (διαλυτός) and never consistently the same” (Phaed. 80b; trans. G.M.A. Grube). On the other hand, the World-Soul (and, consequently, the individual souls) belongs to both the noetic realm, distinguished by its indivisibility, and to the sensible realm, distinguished by its divisibility (Tim. 35a).
According to Plato, the soul is made up of three components: first, a mixture of the being that is “indivisible and always changeless” (ἡ ἀμέριστος καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχουσα οὐσία) and the being that is “transient and divided in bodies” (ἡ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένη μεριστή); second, a mixture of the part of the same (ταὐτό) that is indivisible (ἀμερής) and the part of the same that is divided in bodies; third, a mixture of the part of the different (θάτερον) that is indivisible and the part of the different that is divided in bodies.
In my reading of Tim. 35a, I follow the proposal made by G.M.A. Grube.81 It is most certainly the correct understanding of the Greek text. As Cornford points out, this interpretation Tim. 35a is attested by several ancient sources, most notably, by Alcinous in his Didasc. 14.2.82 It is worth noting, however, that the majority of ancient commentators tended “to simplify Plato’s account of the composition of the soul” by identifying the indivisible being with the same and the divided one with the different.83
Be that as it may, it is evident that, regardless of how the ancient Platonists interpreted Tim. 35a, they all agreed that, as a combination of both intelligible and sensible realms, the soul is both divisible and indivisible. As A.E. Taylor put it, “The soul can be neither simply a thing eternal nor merely a creature of time; in its life the eternal and the temporal must somehow be combined in the closest interpenetration.”84 From this point of view, a human being is divisible in two different aspects: as a union of a body and a soul and as a union of two realms in the soul itself.
To be clear, I do not intend to maintain that Gos. Thom. 61 is engaged in the discussion on the correct exegesis of the Timaeus. My suggestion is merely that the author of this saying was aware of certain Middle Platonist ideas; he knew that ultimate reality is indivisible and believed that a human being is capable of becoming “undivided.”
There was at least one philosopher, Philo, who also believed that such a transformation is possible. As I have pointed out in chapter 4, Philo understands human perfection as becoming a monad (μονάς). The most important example is, once again, Moses: as a human being, he was a dyad (δυάς) and consisted of a soul and a body, but afterwards, he was transformed by God into a mind (νοῦς), and thus became a monad (Mos. 2.288).
What is important for the interpretation of Gos. Thom. 61:5 is that the Philonic monad is indivisible (ἀδιαίρετος), while the dyad is divisible (διαιρετός) (Spec. 1.180; cf. Gig. 52). The monad is unmixed, simple, and suffers neither combination nor separation (Deus 82). Moreover, it is important that Moses was transformed into νοῦς, since νοῦς as the rational part of human soul, τὸ λογικόν (sc., ψυχῆς μέρος), is indivisible (ἄτμητος) and undivided (ἄσχιστος) (Her. 232; cf. Agr. 30).85 Therefore, when Philo says that Moses became a monad and a mind, he is implying that Moses became undivided. I think that, in Gos. Thom. 61:5, Jesus suggests that his followers should try to do the same thing as Philo’s Moses did.
It is worth noting that the Gospel of Thomas is not the only early Christian text that understands human imperfection as being divided. As I have pointed out in chapter 4, Clement and the Valentinians express the same sentiment. All of them, however, have distinguishing features. Clement understands being divided as the separation of a person from the Son, caused by the person’s unbelief; Valentinians, as the separation of the elect from their angelic bridegrooms; the Gospel of Thomas, just like Philo, as the involvement in the corporeal realm.
As I have pointed out earlier, the understanding of equality as human perfection has not only a metaphysical dimension, but also an ethical one. The same seems to hold true in the case of indivisibility. Let us now turn to Gos. Thom. 72, another Thomasine saying that employs the verb ⲡⲱϣⲉ:
72:1 [ⲡⲉ]ϫ̣ⲉ̣ ⲟ̣ⲩⲣ̣[ⲱⲙ]ⲉ̣ ⲛⲁ̣ϥ ϫⲉ ϫⲟⲟⲥ ⲛ̄ⲛⲁⲥⲛⲏⲩ ϣⲓⲛⲁ ⲉⲩⲛⲁ̣ⲡⲱϣⲉ ⲛ̄ⲛ̄ϩⲛⲁⲁⲩ ⲙ̄ⲡⲁⲉⲓⲱⲧ ⲛⲙ̄ⲙⲁⲉⲓ72:2 ⲡⲉϫⲁϥ ⲛⲁϥ ϫⲉ ⲱ ⲡⲣⲱⲙⲉ ⲛⲓⲙ ⲛ̄ⲧⲁϩⲁⲁⲧ ⲛ̄ⲣⲉϥⲡⲱϣⲉ72:3 ⲁϥⲕⲟⲧϥ̄ ⲁⲛⲉϥⲙⲁⲑⲏⲧⲏⲥ ⲡⲉϫⲁϥ ⲛⲁⲩ ϫⲉ ⲙⲏ ⲉⲉⲓϣⲟⲟⲡ ⲛ̄ⲣⲉϥⲡⲱϣⲉ72:1 A [man said] to him: “Tell my brothers that they have to divide my father’s possessions with me.”8672:2 He said to him: “Man, who made me a divider?”72:3 He turned to his disciples (and) said to them: “I am not a divider, am I?”
It is quite clear that the point Jesus makes here is not that he is merely unqualified for the task (i.e., that he is not an arbitrator). The fact that Jesus repeats the same question twice enhances the dramatic effect of the scene, as if Jesus were deeply insulted by the request to divide someone’s property.87 According to Gos. Thom. 61:5, everyone who is divided is wretched; the point of Gos. Thom. 72 is, therefore, that Jesus has nothing to do with division.88 It is, therefore, evident that the notion of division in Gos. Thom. 72 has a metaphysical ring; nevertheless, it is quite remarkable, that it is the matter of business that triggers this reaction. We can, at any rate, deduce that the idea of indivisibility as human perfection has important ethical implications. To be indivisible means to refrain from worldly activities. It is likely, therefore, that Gos. Thom. 72 spells out the practical consequences of the metaphysical idea expressed in Gos. Thom. 61:5.
The Integrity of the Dialogue
The last question that I would like to address is the integrity of Gos. Thom. 61. I believe that it is not necessary to assume that “some words have been erroneously omitted,” as Lambdin suggested, in order to make sense of Gos. Thom. 61:5.89 I also disagree with Schenke and Plisch who argue that Gos. Thom. 61:5 “falls entirely outside of the narrative framework”90 of the saying and that the best solution to the problem is to suggest that the speaker of Gos. Thom. 61:5 “is neither Jesus nor Salome, but a commentator.”91 According to Plisch, the word-play in the Coptic text (ϣⲏ⟨ϣ⟩ and ⲡⲏϣ) indicates that the last sentence “could be a Coptic gloss that entered the text rather late.”92 I disagree for the following reasons.
First, I admit that the fact that there is a pun in the Coptic text may be indicative of the editorial activities of the Coptic scribes, though one might wonder whether it is merely a coincidence that two words in the same sentence have similar endings. Be that as it may, there is no reason to think that the Greek Vorlage lacked Gos. Thom. 61:5, though it is unlikely that the Greek text contained a similar pun.
Second, Gos. Thom. 61:5 makes good sense as the concluding remark uttered by Jesus. The main question is to whom Jesus is referring. The most reasonable answer seems to be that, in Gos. Thom. 61:5, Jesus refers to the two individuals mentioned in Gos. Thom. 61:1. Jesus therefore returns to the initial topic of the dialogue and explains why one of these two individuals will live, while the other will die. According to Gos. Thom. 61:5, these two individuals illustrate the two options which every human being has. He who is equal will live, or, in other words, will become full of light; he who is divided will die, or, in other words, will become full of darkness.
If my interpretation is accurate, we may conclude that life and death in Gos. Thom. 61:1 are meant metaphorically. It is possible that, before it became a part of Gos. Thom. 61, the saying about two individuals lying on a couch was “a straightforward wisdom saying pondering the apparent capriciousness of death.”93 However, in its present context, Gos. Thom. 61:1 most certainly refers to spiritual perfection, or lack thereof.
Moreover, as April D. DeConick points out, the Gospel of Thomas follows the Jewish tradition, which uses the word “living” as an attribute of the deity; thus, in the incipit of the Gospel of Thomas, “Jesus is portrayed as a divine being because he too has the title ‘living.’ ”94 Since, as we have seen, Gos. Thom. 61 urges its readers to imitate God’s equality, it is reasonable to conclude that “to live” in Gos. Thom. 61:1 means to get one’s own fair share of the divine realm.
I would like to conclude this section with a brief summary of the dialogue between Jesus and Salome as I understand it. The dialogue takes place at a banquet hosted by Salome. Jesus, as one of her guests, reclines on a couch. In his opening remark, Jesus utters a cryptic saying about two individuals lying on one couch (Gos. Thom. 61:1). The subject matter of this saying is influenced by the fact that Jesus is himself lying on a couch. As we will later learn from Gos. Thom. 61:5, the point of his remark is that everyone in the room has to choose from two options: either to assimilate to God and live, or to be sunk in the corporeal realm and die.
Salome’s reply shows that she does not grasp the metaphorical meaning of Jesus’ remark (Gos. Thom. 61:2). She understands his words literally and thinks that Jesus is threatening her guests. In her reply, she inquires about Jesus’ identity; she wants to know who invested him with the authority to make such statements.
Salome’s question invites Jesus to reveal who he truly is (Gos. Thom. 61:3). He reveals that he comes from God, who is immutable, always the same, and equal to himself. Jesus is God’s son, and it is God who shared with Jesus his authority, giving him “some of that which is his.”
After Salome realizes whom she is talking to, she declares herself Jesus’ follower (Gos. Thom. 61:4). This is, however, not what Jesus wants her to do. Once again, Salome, like the rest of his disciples, misses his point (cf. Gos. Thom. 22:3). Jesus does not reveal his identity in order to make her his disciple. As Antti Marjanen points out, the ultimate goal of spiritual progress is exactly the opposite—i.e., to become masterless, like Thomas did (see Gos. Thom. 13:5). Jesus exhorts people to become like him (see Gos. Thom. 108), not to follow him.95
In his concluding statement, Jesus returns to the initial topic of the conversation (Gos. Thom. 61:5). The formula “therefore I say,” ⲉⲧⲃⲉ ⲡⲁⲉⲓ ϯϫⲱ ⲙ̄ⲙⲟⲥ ϫⲉ, belongs to Jesus, not to a commentator, as Schenke and Plisch suggested. First, the formula connects Gos. Thom. 61:5 with Gos. Thom. 61:3: Jesus comes from God; therefore, he is within his rights to speak of life and death. Second, it explains Gos. Thom. 61:1 on the grounds of Gos. Thom. 61:3: God is immutable; therefore, in order to assimilate to God and live, one should become immutable, or else he or she will be enslaved by the corporeal realm and die.
Conclusions
I would like to sum up the suggestions that were made above. As I tried to point out, Gos. Thom. 61:3 and 61:5 make good sense, if we approach them from the Middle Platonist point of view. When Jesus says that he comes from “the one who is equal,” he is referring to the generally accepted Platonist view that God is immutable. As the sources that are either somewhat earlier than or roughly contemporary with Gos. Thom. 61 indicate, the idea that ultimate reality is immutable might be expressed in different ways, and the attribution of equality to Godhead is just one of many options. To be sure, the “absolute” use of the word “equal” is a bit unusual, but it is not entirely unprecedented. Perhaps this “absolute” use of the word “equal” indicates that, at the time Gos. Thom. 61 was composed, this word was known as a technical term.
Gos. Thom. 61:5 seems to be an anthropological corollary to what Jesus says in Gos. Thom. 61:3. If equality is a divine attribute, then it is essential for everyone who seeks salvation to become equal. As I have pointed out, Gos. Thom. 61 is not the only ancient text to suggest that a human being is capable of becoming ἴσος (i.e., equal to him- or herself): Philo expresses the same idea, when he says that, having been appointed as a god (Exod 7:1), Moses became equal to himself.
According to Gos. Thom. 61:5, becoming equal is the opposite of becoming divided. Why are these two conditions set against each other? I suppose that the answer is that dividedness and indivisibility are also philosophically loaded concepts. Both equality and indivisibility are Platonist attributes of ultimate reality; therefore, to be equal means to be divine, while to be divided means to lack divinity.
Platonist sources maintain that ultimate reality is indivisible, while both human body and soul are of composite nature and, therefore, divisible. According to Gos. Thom. 61:5, in order to reach the perfect state, one should seek to attain indivisibility. Once again, the Gospel of Thomas shares this sentiment with Philo, who spoke of the transformation of Moses from the dyad of body and soul into the indivisible monad of pure mind.
Finally, it is significant that the notion of perfection as being equal as well as the notion of imperfection as being divided both have not only a metaphysical, but also an ethical dimension. While an ancient reader could understand Gos. Thom. 61:5 as a metaphysical statement on human perfection (i.e., as an exhortation to become immutable like Philo’s Moses), he or she could also read it from the ethical perspective (i.e., as advice to become equable like Clement’s Gnostic). Similarly, the same reader could interpret the notion of division in Gos. Thom. 61:5 from the point of view of metaphysics (viz., as a defect of human nature that Philo’s Moses was able to escape), but he or she could also understand it as a state of moral corruption condemned by Jesus in Gos. Thom. 72.
Draguet 1960, 114.
See Crum 1939, 815a.
See Wilmet 1957–1959, 3:1695–1696.
As for the early Jewish and early Christian literature, the same practice seems to be attested in Ezek 23:41 LXX: “you would sit on a covered couch (ἐπὶ κλίνης ἐστρωμένης), and a table adorned in front of it (τράπεζα κεκοσμημένη πρὸ προσώπου αὐτῆς)” (NETS). In the New Testament, κλίνη seems to mean “dining couch” in Mark 7:4 and Luke 17:34.
Plato, Resp. 372d–e, trans. G.M.A. Grube and C.D.C. Reeve.
Xenophon, Cyr. 8.2.6; trans. W. Miller.
Plisch 2008, 151.
See Dunbabin 2003, 38–40.
Pace Corley 1999, 86 and 88–89; Alikin 2010, 22–23; Gathercole 2014a, 443.
Roller 2006, 121.
Dunbabin 2003, 22–23.
Ibid., 68.
Plisch 2008, 150.
See Layton 1989, 1:74.
See LSJ, s.v. “ξένος,” I.2.
Another alternative is to suggest that the Coptic translator understood the interrogative pronoun τίς as the indefinite pronoun τὶς. See Petersen 1999, 198–199. As I point out below, the Coptic text makes good sense as it stands; therefore, there is no reason to think that the translator misunderstood the Greek expression.
Dunderberg 2006, 90.
Lambdin 1977, 125.
Attridge 1981, 31. It seems that Lambdin found Attridge’s argumentation convincing, since “the One” is not mentioned in subsequent editions of his translation. Thus, in Layton’s edition of the Gospel of Thomas, Lambdin notes that the passage is corrupt, leaving ϩⲱⲥ ⲉⲃⲟⲗ ϩⲛ̄ ⲟⲩⲁ untranslated (Lambdin 1989, 75); it is worth noting that, due to a misprint, the text is missing an ellipsis (cf. Lambdin 1996, 133, where, instead of translating ϩⲱⲥ ⲉⲃⲟⲗ ϩⲛ̄ ⲟⲩⲁ, he puts “…”).
See Attridge 1981, 31–32; cf. LSJ, s.v. “τις,” A.II.5; BDAG, s.v. “τὶς,” 2.
Thus, of the two examples cited above, the Sahidic translation of Acts 5:36 reads, ⲉϥϫⲱ ⲙⲙⲟⲥ ⲉⲣⲟϥ ϫⲉ ⲁⲛⲟⲕ ⲡⲉ, “saying about himself, ‘I am someone important’ ”; for a discussion of the nominal sentence pattern employed in this passage, see Layton 2011, 221 (§ 283). As for Ign. Eph. 3:1, no Coptic translation of this verse is preserved; only the very beginning of the Sahidic version of the letter survived—see Lefort 1952, 52.
See Schmidt 1905, 4*–19*.
Acts Paul 3.4, trans. J.K. Elliott, altered.
Dunderberg 2006, 95.
Both retroversions are possible. In the Sahidic New Testament, ⲉⲃⲟⲗ ϩⲛ̄ ⲟⲩⲁ renders ἀφ’ ἑνός in Heb 11:12 and ἐξ ἑνός in Acts 17:26, Rom 5:16 (var. ⲉⲃⲟⲗ ϩⲓⲧⲛ̄ ⲟⲩⲁ), and Heb 2:11.
There is also a third interpretation proposed by Dunderberg (viz., Salome speaks about the equality of friends sharing a meal), but, grammatically speaking, this is not a significantly different option.
The manuscript reads εἰσιόντες, “going in.” The emendation ⟨εἷς ὄντες⟩ was proposed in Schwartz 1908, 131.
Exc. 36.1.
Heb 2:11. Translation from NRSV, slightly altered.
Plisch 2008, 151. The following interpretation differs from the one offered by Plisch, since he relies upon the text altered according to Polotsky’s emendation. According to Plisch, Salome’s reply is a reprimand: she finds Jesus’ words inappropriate, as killing the guests’ mood and thus reminds him that he is but a guest (*ξένος) in her house.
See Marjanen 1998c, 91.
See Draguet 1960, 105.
See Crum 1939, 606.
Garitte 1949, 20.
Lagarde 1883, 211.
Rossi 1889, 21.
See Wilmet 1957–1959, 3:1310.
This list can easily be expanded. For instance, while one of the Coptic versions of the Wisdom of Jesus Christ reads ϩⲓⲥⲟⲛ (NHC III 95.8), the parallel passage in another version reads ϣⲏϣ (BG 87.2).
I do not agree with Jesse Sell that the Vorlage had “some form of ἴσος εἶναι” (Sell 1980, 30), since, in fact, there are many cognates of ἴσος attested for ϣⲏϣ, any of which could have been used here.
Dunderberg 2006, 97.
The references to Philo’s works are from Stählin 1965, 3:351 (Stählin’s reference “Sacr. AC, 10” is to be corrected to “Sacr. AC, 9”).
Aet. 43, trans. F.H. Colson.
See Rose 1886, 36–37. For the arguments in favor of this attribution, see Effe 1970, 16–17.
See Effe 1970, 20.
Cf. Cyril of Alexandria’s quotation from a Hermetic writing, below (pp. 175–176), where Aristotelian attributes of the universe are applied to a deity.
Pace Harder 1926, 32; cf. Niehoff 2006, 46.
See especially Phaed. 78c–80b; cf. the same expression in Plutarch, Celsus, and Clement in the passages cited below.
Sacr. 9.
Apuleius, Plat. Dogm. 193.
Origen, Cels. 4.14, trans. H. Chadwick.
The reference to Plutarch is from Moreschini 1966, 41.
Strom. 5.11.68.2.
See Stählin, Früchtel, and Treu 1985, 371.
It is worth noting that ἡ φύσις in this passage is equivalent to God. Cf. Goodenough 1969, 51.
Opif. 97; Cher. 37; Gig. 25; Deus 28; Agr. 167; Plant. 91; Mut. 87; Somn. 1.154; 1.192; Jos. 134; Mos. 1.30; 1.118; 2.26; 2.264; Spec. 1.47; Virt. 21; 151; 193; Aet. 61; 115; Legat. 241; QG 4.204.
Most notably, Clement changed ἡ φύσις to ὁ θεός. On this subject, see van den Hoek 1988, 167 and 226.
Iamblichus (Myst. 10.7) and Lactantius (Inst. 4.7.3) were aware of a similar Hermetic name for the supreme deity: ὁ προεννοούμενος θεός, “the God who transcends intellection” (for this translation see Clarke, Dillon, and Hershbell 2003, 353). This expression is also attested in De sancta ecclesia ascribed to Anthimus of Nicomedia (this text was probably written by Marcellus of Ancyra; for a survey of scholarly arguments for and against this attribution see Logan 2000, 82–87). According to Sanct. eccl. 15, Hermes gave this name to the second god. This contradicts the reports of Iamblichus and Lactantius; thus, Nock, in his edition of this passage from Pseudo-Anthimus, assumed that there was a lacuna (see Nock and Festugière 1945–1954, 4:143). It is not necessary, however, to think that the text is corrupt. As A.-J. Festugière points out, when the expression ὁ προεννοούμενος θεός is applied to the second god, it probably means that the second god is simply envisaged by the first god before everything else (Nock and Festugière 1945–1954, 4:112 and 4:144).
Cyril of Alexandria, C. Jul. 1.46.28–35.
Cf. the divine triad of Poimandres: Mind the God (ὁ νοῦς ὁ θεός), the creative mind (ὁ δημιουργός νοῦς), and the word of God (ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος) (Corp. Herm. 1.9–11). See also Kroll 1928, 56–57.
See Nock and Festugière 1945–1954, 4:136. Nock refers to Cael. 277b27–29, where Aristotle says that the heaven is εἷς, ἀΐδιος, and ἄφθαρτος. One might also keep in view Cael. 288a34–288b1 (ἄφθαρτος and ἀμετάβλητος); see also 270a12–14 (the “primary body”—i.e., αἰθήρ, the fifth element—is ἄφθαρτος and ἀναυξής) and 287a23–24 (the motion of the heaven is ὁμαλής and ἀΐδιος).
According to Attridge and Pagels 1985, 273, the subject of NHC I 66.5–67.37 is the Son. It is more likely, however, that, starting from NHC I 66.29, the subject is the Father “en tant qu’ il est révélé comme une unité-dans-le-multiplicité dans le Fils” (Painchaud and Thomassen 1989, 311).
According to Painchaud and Thomassen 1989, 312, ϣⲱϣ here probably renders ἰσότης of the Greek Vorlage.
The reference is from Dunderberg 2006, 97.
Ibid., 99.
For a discussion of the notion of transcendental “standing” in Strom. 7.10.57.5 and 1.24.163.6, see chapter 5 (pp. 149).
Cf. Strom. 6.12.104.3 (God always remains “unchangeably the same in his beneficence,” ἐν ταὐτότητι τῆς ἀγαθωσύνης), 7.3.13.1 (the Gnostic souls are honored with “an unchanging preeminence,” ταὐτότης τῆς ὑπεροχῆς), and 7.3.15.4 (God is “unchangeably the same in his just beneficence,” ἐν ταὐτότητι τῆς δικαίας ἀγαθωσύνης).
See Völker 1952, 513.
See LSJ, s.v. “ἴσος,” II.3, and PGL, s.v. “ἴσος,” B.
Protr. 6.69.3, trans. G.W. Butterworth.
Strom. 7.12.69.1, trans. J.B. Mayor and H. Chadwick.
See Garitte 1949, 20.
Vit. Ant. 14.3–4, trans. D. Brakke.
Schenke 2012, 881.
For a discussion of the motif of being/becoming one, see chapter 4.
Fr. 11.11–13 des Places (= Eusebius, Praep. ev. 11.18.3).
Therefore, as Plutarch puts it, “it is surely fitting that things permanent and divine should hold more closely together and escape, so far as may be, all segmentation and separation (τομὴν ἅπασαν καὶ διάστασιν)” (Plutarch, Def. orac. 428c; trans. F.C. Babbitt).
Clement, Strom. 2.2.6.1–2, trans. J. Ferguson.
See Whittaker 1976, 156–157; cf. Whittaker 1983, 305–306.
Whittaker 1976, 158.
Cornford 1956, 63.
See Grube 1932, 80–81.
See Cornford 1956, 64–65.
Runia 1986, 210–211.
Taylor 1928, 135.
See also Baer 1970, 16–18.
In the translation of the Berliner Arbeitskreis, the word “Father” is capitalized (Bethge et al. 2005, 537; Plisch 2008, 173; Bethge et al. 2011, 17). No explanation of this decision is given, and Plisch’s commentary implies that the text refers not to a divine being, but to an actual parent. In a personal communication, Plisch wrote to me, clarifying that “Father” was merely a misprint.
Cf. Plisch 2008, 173–174.
Cf. Baarda 1975, 140.
Lambdin 1989, 75.
Schenke 2012, 892.
Plisch 2008, 152.
Ibid.
Patterson 1993, 47; cf. Patterson 2011a, 800–801, 810.
DeConick 1996, 123–124.
See Marjanen 1998c, 92.