Since the systematic explosiveness of Hegel’s theory of recognition was rediscovered in German-language philosophy almost fifty years ago, it has become the source of a series of fruitful developments in a wide range of disciplines; not only in philosophy itself, but also in social theory, pedagogy and political theory, new and hitherto overlooked properties and facts of the respective object of research have been uncovered, so that real advances in knowledge soon followed. Even though the initial enthusiasm may have waned somewhat in the meantime, this process of conceptual restructuring of entire fields of study has continued unabated to the present day; in the field of political philosophy and social ethics in particular, the concept of recognition has made significant progress in recent years. The amount of groundbreaking insights that have been gained in these fields as a result of this process can hardly be adequately surveyed in the present.
The book by Irakli Dekanozishvili, which is to be presented here, represents a further step in this long-standing process of making Hegel’s theory of recognition fruitful for political philosophy. The topic of the young Georgian philosopher, who completed his doctorate at the University of Münster with this work, does not, however, lie in any of the above-mentioned areas of research; rather, he seeks to determine what types of social recognition are necessary to maintain a vibrant democracy. At first glance, this does not sound like a completely new question either, since there already seem to be works that attempt to determine the specific form of recognition that should govern the democratic relationship between citizens. But Dekanozishvili aims for much more. He is not satisfied with a merely political concept of democracy; rather, he wants this form of government to be understood by referencing Hegel’s idea of “ethical life” as a whole life-form, permeating all the pores of a society. Once this step towards a “social” understanding of democracy has been taken, it is no longer sufficient to analyze only the desirable relations between citizens in terms of recognition theory; instead, it becomes necessary to examine all the central areas of life in democratic societies to determine what kinds of recognition relations people in them should maintain to be able to communicate and determine their common will. Hence, for Irakli Dekanozishvili, the concept of “democratic recognition” encompasses much more than what is conventionally understood by it: in his view, we no longer owe each other only respect if we want to cooperate with each other as democratic subjects, but also, depending on the social sphere, other forms of mutual recognition that demand more than just respect for the legal autonomy of the other.
In a subtle analysis of the normative obligations in these different relationships of recognition, Dekanozishvili’s book develops step by step a comprehensive theory that he himself calls a “recognition-theoretical model of democracy”. Its great advantage over alternative understandings of democracy is that it provides us with insights into the complicated and multi-layered preconditions of democratic autonomy; contrary to what liberalism teaches us, creating and maintaining a democratic polity requires much more than can be expressed in legal precepts for the protection of private or negative freedom. Anyone who wants to know what additional normative attitudes and mindsets are required to make a democracy worthy of the name should read this impressive study by Irakli Dekanozishvili.
Axel Honneth, in February 2025