The interplay (
A contemporary epistemic understanding of conviction focuses on the certainty with which we hold beliefs and values. The hermeneutic notion of conviction extends beyond mere opinion or preference, reflecting a profound commitment that shapes our actions, decisions, and overall orientation. Convictions thus embody and are integral to personal identity, encapsulating what is fundamental to our self-understanding. Conviction is the bedrock of personal identity, guiding our actions and life choices within the inherent limitations of human existence (finitude, Endlichkeit). By acknowledging our mortality, we gain insight into how awareness of our finitude influences our decisions. Recognizing our finitude affects the formation and nature of our convictions, imposing a sense of urgency and gravity on our beliefs, thereby compelling us to seek meaning and purpose within the constraints of our existence. Acknowledging our finite nature necessitates continuous self-reflection and adaptation of our convictions in response to life’s challenges and uncertainties. Genuine self-understanding requires confronting our mortality. By acknowledging death as an inevitable part of life, we gain a deeper understanding of our existence and live more authentically.2
Hermeneutics as the art, philosophy, and praxis of interpretation (
Believing
“When I look, I see clear as a sunflower” (Quando olho, vejo claro como um girassol),4 writes the famous Portuguese poet Fernando Pessoa, by the hand of one of his heteronyms, Alberto Caeiro. And he continues:
Seeing clearly as a sunflower suggests a perspective of lucidity and simplicity in perception. Pessoa’s lines capture a moment of pure, unfiltered observation where seeing brings about an undistorted understanding, much like a sunflower’s pure and vivid image. The sunflower symbolizes attention, precision, and truth in its (re)turning toward the light. Pessoa uses this imagery to convey a sense of seeing things as they are, without the fog of confusion or disorder. The poet emphasizes the importance of direct and authentic experience. However, can we truly see that clearly? St. Paul reminds us that we see darkly, in an obscure manner (1 Cor 13: 12:
“When I look, I see clearly as a sunflower” expresses a deep introspection and a search for authentic experience amidst the complexities of life. It is a beautiful reminder of the power of simplicity in perception and the great clarity it can bring. These lines anticipate a phenomenological breakthrough in the human perception of the world. We open our eyes, we see “things themselves (die Sachen selbst),” and in this “seeing,” we believe that “the world is what we see.” This seeing is a deep-seated set of mute opinions implicated in our lives7 and expresses a faith common to the natural man, the poet, and the philosopher. Such perceptive faith, foi perceptive, is the testimony of an inescapable conviction: the world exists, it is incontestable, and we have, or rather we are, an opening onto it.
Pessoa’s poetic evocation of immediate clarity—“I see clear as a sunflower”—should not be mistaken for an unmediated access to reality. Even the simplest act of perception is already embedded within a web of interpretation. As Gadamer reminds us, all seeing is also a seeing-as, indicating that even the most elementary perception is shaped by prior understanding, language, and historical situatedness.8 The phenomenological impulse to return “zu den Sachen selbst,” echoed here in Pessoa’s lines, does not imply a bypassing of interpretation but rather signals an attentiveness to how things (dis)close themselves within our horizon of meaning. Merleau-Ponty, too, insists that perception is “pregnant with meaning” and that seeing the world is never a neutral act but one laden with a pre-reflective faith in the world’s coherence.9 Pessoa, in his poetic simplicity, highlights that what appears as pure vision is already interpretive—a mode of dwelling in the world that cannot escape hermeneutics, even if it begins in astonishment.
Conviction and Perception: Insights From Merleau-Ponty
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s notion of “perceptive faith” plays a crucial role in his phenomenology, particularly in his Phenomenology of Perception. Perceptive faith involves a foundational trust in the reality of the world, a trust that is pre-reflective and deeply embodied. This notion challenges traditional views of the visual primacy of perception as a passive reception of sensory data or a purely cognitive construct. Instead, Merleau-Ponty emphasizes perception as an active, engaged, and corporeal process. This lived, bodily experience forms the basis of our inter-action or inter-esse with reality (inter-action ou inter-esse avec la réalité).10
Perceptive faith is the very condition of experience that gives the world its solidity and consistency.11 Merleau-Ponty argues that perceptive faith is the underlying assumption or trust that enables our coherent and stable experience of the world. This underscores his belief that perception is an active engagement rooted in a fundamental trust in the world’s reality. This perceptive faith doesn’t have the sense of a decision, and we should refer to it as the meaning of a presence that precedes any theoretical position, even though it motivates and nourishes all possible theoretical perspectives. Perceptive faith is, at its core, an animal faith.12 It is not a typical resolution of the great contemplators who fly over the world to operate on it or to launch upon it the model of the “object” and the primacy of subsumption. On the contrary, perceptive faith is a universal conviction that weaves our fundamental way of being-in-the-world with others. However, there is something strange about this faith: If we seek to articulate it into theses or statements, if we ask ourselves what this we is, what seeing is, and what thing or world is, we enter a labyrinth of difficulties and contradictions.
Merleau-Ponty critiques empiricist and intellectualist perspectives on perception. He argues against the empiricist notion that perception is simply a series of discrete sensory inputs passively received by the mind and challenges the intellectualist view that perception is a mental construct or a process of deduction. His phenomenology posits that perception is an active, embodied engagement with the world.13 It is a pre-reflective, immediate engagement with reality and embodying conditions of the world. The perceptive faith is a fundamental orientation toward the world that is always present (toujours déjà présent) before any act of reflection or judgment. It shapes our understanding of existence and selfhood through lived, embodied experience. This faith is not derived from reason or evidence; it is a condition of our being-in-the-world that underlies all further reflection and knowledge.
Intertwining and the Flesh of the World
Merleau-Ponty introduces the notion of intertwining (l’entrelacs)14 to describe the mutual relationship between the perceiver and the perceived. He suggests that there is a chiasm (
In his later work, Merleau-Ponty develops the idea of the “flesh of the world” (la chair du monde), referring to the shared substance or medium of Being that connects all entities. He expands on perceptive faith by suggesting that all beings are interconnected through this flesh, which is both perceivable and perceiving. His notion of openness to Being carries significant ethical and ontological implications. Ethically, it suggests a responsiveness (re-spondee, Ver-antwortung) to the world and others that acknowledges mutual interdependence. Ontologically, it involves a receptivity to the mystery and depth of existence, being open to the unknown and the unsayable aspects of Being. This openness requires accepting ambiguity and recognizing (reconnaissance, Anerkennung) that existence consistently exceeds our conceptual grasp.16 Merleau-Ponty’s perceptive faith reconfigures phenomenology by emphasizing the primacy of perception as a fundamental mode of engaging with the world. It challenges empirical and intellectualist views, proposing a vision of human experience rooted in embodied perceptual engagement and a profound openness to Being.
Heidegger’s Seinsoffenheit (Openness to Being)
Heidegger’s Seinsoffenheit (openness to Being) initiates the exploration of praxis by an existential openness toward Being. Being uniquely concerned with its existence is a fundamental aspect of Dasein. This openness characterizes Dasein’s capacity to be aware of itself and engage with the question of Being (Seinsfrage). Dasein’s existence is expressed by its relation to Being, which allows it to encounter other beings and question their meaning and presence (Seiendsein des Daseins) in a way that goes beyond mere perception.
Heidegger’s notion of Being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein) is central to this understanding. Positioning Dasein as always already situated within a world of relationships and meanings. Merleau-Ponty’s focus on embodiment and perceptual engagement with the world engages and resonates with Heidegger’s concern with Seiendsein des Daseins. Seinsoffenheit speaks to Dasein’s openness to Being, enabling it to disclose the world not merely as an external reality but as something profoundly meaningful. For Heidegger, understanding is not a detached cognitive act but a mode of being. It is through Seinsoffenheit that Dasein can (re)veal the world in its truth. This process of revealing,
Temporality plays a crucial role in Heidegger’s Seinsoffenheit. Dasein’s openness to Being is inherently temporal, as it involves an awareness of its finitude—more precisely, of its inevitable death (Sein-zum-Tode). This temporal structure and orientation toward death allow Dasein to engage with its potential future possibilities, grounded in its past (Geworfenheit or thrownness) and its present reality (being-in-the-world). Heidegger’s notion of ecstatic temporality (ekstatische Zeitlichkeit)18 highlights how Dasein always projects itself forward into future possibilities, even as it remains rooted in its past. Seinsoffenheit thus reflects an openness to the world and the unfolding of one’s own Being over time through finitude itself.
To live authentically (Eigentlichkeit) in Heidegger’s framework requires a resolute openness to the truth of Being. Authentic existence involves acknowledging one’s finitude and confronting the potentiality of one’s Being. Seinsoffenheit is at the center of this authentic mode of being, as it enables Dasein to remain open to its deepest possibilities and live according to them. This involves an openness not just to life but to death as well. Sein-zum-Tode represents Dasein’s ultimate horizon, revealing the fragility and preciousness of existence. Through this openness to death, Dasein can fully grasp the meaning of Being. Heidegger’s Seinsoffenheit is more than just an existential state; it is a profound attunement to the (un)folding of Being. By encountering the world, Dasein understands its place within it and engages with its future possibilities, ultimately finding its authentic path through life and death.
While Merleau-Ponty emphasizes embodiment and the primacy of perception—highlighting a direct, lived engagement with the world through our bodily experience and perceptive faith—Heidegger focuses on ontological (dis)closure and the fundamental question of Being. Seinsoffenheit represents an ontological stance, an openness that allows Dasein to confront the truth of Being and its existence. Merleau-Ponty’s openness to Being is rooted in the pre-reflective and immediate nature of perception, advocating for an openness to the world as directly perceived. He emphasizes embodied perception and our intertwining with the world rooted in lived experience. By contrast, Heidegger’s Seinsoffenheit involves an existential inquiry into the nature of Being, requiring a reflective openness to the meaning of Being and the ontological structures that outline existence. For Merleau-Ponty, the ethical implications lie in our responsiveness to the world and others, recognizing our interconnectedness through the “flesh of the world.”19 For Heidegger, Dasein’s authenticity involves being faithful to our possibilities and remaining open to the finitude and contingency of existence. These perspectives offer a deeper understanding of Dasein, underscoring the importance of engagement, receptivity, and authenticity in our relationship to Being.
Emmanuel Falque, a contemporary French philosopher known for his work in phenomenology and theology, deeply engages with philosophical and theological traditions, often reinterpreting and criticizing established ideas. Falque’s phrase, cogito, sum credendus, is a reinterpretation of René Descartes’ cogito, ergo sum. This is the prejudice of all prejudices: cogito, sum credendus.20 As a foundational statement in Western philosophy, Descartes’s cogito, ergo sum asserts that the very act of doubt or thought implies the existence of the self as a thinking subject. It is considered a fundamental element of epistemological certainty. By modifying Descartes’s statement to cogito, sum credendus, the emphasis shifts from mere existence (I am) to credibility or trustworthiness (I am to be believed). This implies that thinking and reasoning grant the thinker credibility and make them worthy of belief. The phrase further suggests that rational thought or self-reflection establishes a basis for trust and belief in the thinker’s statements or existence. If one is capable of thinking, one also deserves credibility. Concerning the authority or trustworthiness of the thinking subject, it means that thinking not only confirms existence but serves as a foundation for others to believe in the thoughts and statements of the thinking subject. In the context of hermeneutics in discussing communication and understanding, sum credendus potentially highlights the role of trust in communication. Thinking and reasoning foster an environment where beliefs or statements must be trusted and taken seriously.
Falque’s phrase also reflects a more skeptical stance toward Descartes’s cogito. While Descartes uses the cogito to establish an indubitable foundation for knowledge, sum credendus introduces an element of interpersonal trust and social validation. As such, it indicates that the certainty of our existence through thinking is not just a solitary endeavor but involves being believed by others. The modified phrase underscores the idea that existence and thought have an interpersonal dimension: understanding and believing are social activities requiring the participation of others. It emphasizes that belief in our existence and thoughts is also about credibility or convincing others. Cogito, sum credendus, as a remarkable play on Descartes’ cogito, ergo sum, shifts the focus from the certainty of existence through thought to the credibility and believability of the thinker. Thinking proves existence and establishes trustworthiness and the right to be believed. Cogito, sum credendus introduces an interpersonal and epistemic dimension, highlighting that credibility and belief are fundamental to understanding and interpreting in philosophical discourse.
Falque’s concept of belief challenges the idea that philosophical inquiry can rest solely on rational certainty without acknowledging the role of faith and trust. The move from ergo sum to sum credendus opens the philosophical inquiry to mystery and transcendence, acknowledging that elements of existence and knowledge require a leap of faith, an openness to the unknown, and a trust in something greater than oneself. This reinterpretation emphasizes the relational, communal, and faith-based aspects of existence and knowledge by shifting from a focus on the certainty of the self to the necessity of being believed. In this way, Falque bridges philosophical inquiry with theological reflection, suggesting that thinking and being are deeply interconnected with believing and being believed.
Augustine’s Reflection on Time and the Human Condition: A Hermeneutic Exploration of Temporality
Augustine’s reflections on time align with the central themes of conviction, finitude, and the search for meaning, connecting these to broader hermeneutic inquiries. Time is not merely an objective measure but a mental and spiritual experience that emerges through memory, perception, and anticipation. Augustine’s interpretation of time bridges theological and philosophical concerns, offering insights that resonate deeply with the hermeneutic approach to human understanding in Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Ricoeur. Augustine’s understanding of the distension of the soul provides a rich framework to explore how temporality shapes human existence and informs the quest for selfhood amidst the constraints of finitude. Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on foi perceptive are similar to St. Augustine’s considerations when he meditates on time. In Augustine’s Confessions, particularly in Book XI, he presents a profound and nuanced exploration of time. He views time as a personal experience shaped by memory, perception, and anticipation, contrasting human temporality with divine eternity. Time is a phenomenon experienced as distentio- a “distension of the soul.” It (un)folds through the soul’s engagement with existence: memory represents the past, perception captures the present, and anticipation envisions the future. This nuanced exploration aligns with broader philosophical inquiries into the nature of human existence, emphasizing time as a deeply personal and inner experience rather than a fixed, external entity.
“Quid est ergo tempus? Si nemo ex me quaerat, scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio.”21 “What then is time? I know if no one asks me; if I wish to explain it to one that asketh, I know not.” Augustine discusses time and how it is difficult to explain, even though we intuitively understand it. He reflects on how we seem to have an innate understanding of time when we are not required to explain it. However, when asked, we struggle to articulate it clearly. This (dis)closes the complexity and mystery of the fundamental concepts that are easily understood instinctively but are challenging to define precisely. Acknowledging that while time feels familiar and understandable intuitively, explaining what time is becomes perplexing. Augustine also indicates the limitations of human knowledge and language. Several aspects of human experience and understanding go beyond verbal explanation. Some knowledge is pre-linguistic and non-verbal, rooted in experience rather than definitions. Augustine’s understanding touches on a universal experience: the struggle to express thoughts or feelings that are apparently clear in our minds but challenging to communicate.22 He uses this to delve into deeper theological and philosophical inquiries about existence, the nature of God, and human understanding.
“Si nemo ex me quaerat, scio” captures the paradox of knowledge. It encourages reflection on the limits of language and the nature of human cognition and understanding. Implicit knowledge is a form of understanding we possess without thinking about it consciously. However, converting it into explicit knowledge is often remarkably difficult. Augustine’s reflection on this paradox suggests a philosophical humility regarding human knowledge. It acknowledges that our grasp of reality is limited and often fragile even when it feels certain. Our apparent certainty can dissolve the moment we try to examine it closely or communicate it to others. This humility is essential to Augustine’s theological perspective, as it recognizes the limits of human reason and points toward a reliance on faith and divine understanding, where human knowledge and its expression fall short.
Augustine underscores that time is an intuitive concept. This reflects the complexity of philosophical inquiry into everyday phenomena, where familiarity does not equate to conceptual clarity. “Nec praeterit futura nec praeterit praesentia, cum sola praeterit praeterita”: “Neither the future passes away, nor does the present pass away, since only the past passes away.” “Neither do things past exist, nor things future, nor is it properly said, ‘there are three times: past, present, and future’; but perhaps it might be properly said, ‘there are three times: a present of things past, a present of things present, and a present of things future.”23 Augustine challenges the conventional understanding of time as divided into past, present, and future. Instead, he proposes that all three dimensions of time exist within the present moment: the present as we remember the past (memory), the present as we experience the now (perception), and the present as we anticipate the future (expectation). This insight redefines time as a subjective experience located in the consciousness. “Praesens autem tempus, si semper praesens esset et non in praeteritum transiret, iam non esset tempus, sed aeternitas.”: “But present time, if it is always present, and never pass into time past, verily it should not be time, but eternity.”24 Augustine distinguishes between time and eternity. If the present were to remain without changing into the past, it would cease to be time and become eternity. This highlights the nature of time as inherently fleeting and transient, in contrast to the unchanging nature of eternity.
“Distentio animi est: nec immerito tempus est. Non itaque vere dicimus tempora esse, nisi quia tendunt; non solum de praeterito in praesentia, et de praesenti in futura, verum de futura in praeteritum, de praeterito in futurum: nec in semetipsa tendunt nisi in seipso tendente.”: “Time is the distension of the soul. I do not see it as it is; I hear it measured. But it is a strange phenomenon. It is not the future or past but stretched out between the past and future. It has a strange kind of ‘is-ness’ to it.”25 Augustine introduces the idea of time as a “distension” or stretching of the soul. This distention is not something external but an experience of the soul as it stretches between the memory of the past, the perception of the present, and the expectation of the future. Augustine implies that time is not a physical or objective reality but a psychological experience rooted in human consciousness. His “distentio animi”26 can also be translated as “the distraction of the mind” (Confessions, book XI, chapter 29). He grapples with how humans experience time and its passage, noting that time can often feel stretched or distended, reflecting a spiritual or psychological tension. It contrasts with the eternal nature of God, who exists outside of time and is not subject to its divisions or changes. God experiences everything in a timeless present, while humans experience time as past, present, and future. Building upon Augustine’s meditations on the subjective nature of time, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological approach similarly investigates how human beings inhabit time, though his focus shifts toward perception and embodied existence. While Augustine reflects on time as a distension of the soul, Merleau-Ponty brings to light the intertwining of perception and temporality, where time is understood through the lived, bodily experience of being in the world.
Describing the human soul as being stretched between past, present, and future, Augustine suggests that this stretching creates a sense of distentio because the mind is pulled in different directions: remembering the past, experiencing the present, and anticipating the future. This experience can lead to psychological or spiritual disquiet (inquietudo) because it reflects our inability to grasp or control time fully. The soul is in a state of tension because it is constantly being pulled between what has been, what is, and what is to come. Augustine uses distentio animi to express the human condition’s fragmented nature. Humans, unlike God, live within the bounds of time, and this experience shapes much of our thoughts, emotions, and behavior. The triadic structure of the soul’s tension expresses how humans perceive and live through time, yet it also binds us to a fragmented existence. Memory holds onto the past, attention engages with the present, and anticipation looks toward the future. The distentio arises from the soul’s struggle to integrate these aspects into a creative understanding of existence. It is not just a psychological phenomenon but a spiritual challenge, an indication of the soul’s restlessness and yearning for unity and peace, which can only be found in God, who is beyond the constraints of time. The soul’s unrest is caused by its separation from this divine eternity. This restlessness can also be a catalyst for seeking God. In this pursuit, the soul aims to transcend the limits of time and achieve a sense of wholeness and peace that is only possible in eternity. The stretching or distension of the soul reflects humanity’s fallen state and separation from divine eternity. Spiritual fulfillment comes from aligning the soul with God’s eternal presence, reducing the tension caused by time’s passage.
What Augustine says of time may be said of the world. A fundamental conviction thus ceaselessly calls the philosopher into the infinite task of reinspecting and redefining their most deeply held and well-grounded notions. To believe is to relentlessly undertake, again and again, the path of understanding, the calling of letting the sense be (dis)closed to us. It is a difficult task. And yet, everything is simple: In the deaf oscillation of emotion, in the derealized reverberation of a dream, in the unannounced disturbance of an anonymous movement of the body, something manifests itself that has the authority of a presence, something that seems to be an index of a difference, of otherness, perhaps of a past that holds the memory of our primordial inscription in the world, or rather, that keeps the very force of the world’s silent in-scription in us. An irreducible es gibt looms in the background of perceptive faith, an il-y-a that I can’t help but believe in because its mode of presence is so fervent, even if it begins in silence. Here is a crucial task: To render expression to the world’s silence, to co-respond to it.
However, with the task comes the difficulty: How do we move from the experience of what we perceptively believe (and which is the most obvious), from the experience of such a silent presence to the determination of the respective meanings (first and foremost, philosophical)? Any projection of a definitive meaning seems insufficient to account for such a presence. Everything happens as if what is was a kind of primordial layer of belonging (which makes us all perceptively believers) that challenges us as something “prior to the centrifugal activity of consciousness”27 as subversive of all the categories with which we have become accustomed to describing the world. This was already Husserl’s question, which Merleau-Ponty takes up radically: The consciousness of the world is a consciousness whose mode is the certainty of belief, and this is why it is the still mute experience that we must bring to the expression of its meaning:
What do I know?” is not only “what is knowing?” and not only “who am I?” but finally: “what is there?” and even: “what is the there is?” These questions call not for the exhibiting of something said which would put an end to them, but for the disclosure of a being that is not posited because it has no need to be, because it is silently behind all our affirmations, negations, and even behind all formulated questions, not that it is a matter of forgetting them in its silence, not that it is a matter of imprisoning it in our chatter, but because philosophy is the reconversion of silence and speech into one another: “It is the experience … still mute which we are concerned with leading to the pure expression of its own meaning.”28
Merleau-Ponty explores the fundamental nature of philosophical inquiry, the relationship between knowing and being, and the interplay between silence and speech in understanding existence. His initial question, “What do I know?” suggests a personal inquiry into one’s knowledge. It expands into “What is knowing?” questioning the nature of knowledge itself. Then, it further broadens to “Who am I?” indicating a shift toward self-inquiry and the nature of identity. Finally, it reaches “What is there?” and “What is the there is?” moving toward an ontological inquiry, questioning the nature of existence.
Merleau-Ponty suggests that these questions do not look for definite answers or final truths that can be exhibited or fully expressed in words. Instead, they point toward the (dis)closure of Being—a fundamental reality that underlies all our thoughts and expressions but is not directly articulated or posited. Being is described as something that does not need to be in a propositional sense because it is already silently behind all our affirmations, negations, and questions. This implies that Being is the primordial reality (Wirklichkeit), the inexhaustible source of all thought and discourse. In this context, philosophy is not merely creating new statements but engaging with the silence of the origin, the unsaid (das Ungesagte) that underlies all spoken language and thought.29 Philosophy is the reconversion of silence and speech into one another.30 This means that philosophical inquiry involves a movement between the mute, pre-reflective experience (silence) and the articulation of meaning through language (speech). True philosophical expression is not about imposing words upon silence but leading this still mute experience to express meaning. It’s an effort to make the implicit explicit, to reveal what is already there but not yet articulated.
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological approach focuses on returning to direct, lived experience before it is conceptualized or reduced by scientific or objective knowledge. He emphasizes that understanding reality (Being) is not just a matter of accumulating facts or definitions. Instead, it involves a deeper engagement with existence itself—a reality that underlies all knowledge and experience and is encountered pre-reflectively. Philosophy is not about coming to definitive conclusions but a continuous movement of discovery. It suggests balancing silence (the raw, immediate experience) and speech (the articulation of that experience). This process respects and bears witness to the mystery and openness of Being, recognizing that reality consistently exceeds our capacity to articulate it fully. Merleau-Ponty advocates for a form of philosophy that uses language to bring out the depth of pre-reflective experience rather than to dominate or reduce it to mere concepts. The ultimate aim is not to say everything that can be said about Being but to (dis)close it—letting Being show itself through an engagement that respects its unspeakable depth and its presence in every act of thought and speech. Merleau-Ponty’s meditation on the nature of philosophical inquiry (dis)closes the profound relationship between knowledge, self, language, and existence. He calls for a philosophy that articulates the fundamental nature of Being while acknowledging its irreducible mystery. Such a philosophy brings speech and silence into a dynamic interplay to engage more authentically with the reality that underlies all experience.
Language, Silence, and the Intermediary Space in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics
Any philosophical effort that aims at returning to the things themselves and tackling the world’s silence will inevitably be faced with the question of its capacity for expression. In this regard, the philosopher and the poet are not far apart: they inhabit die Mitte der Sprache, as Gadamer puts it, the midst or middle of language, and they know firsthand what enables what is said to resonate—corresponding to silence—with the whole of what remains unsaid.
Gadamer’s notion of die Mitte der Sprache is essential in human experience and knowledge.31 Language is not just a tool for communication but the fundamental medium through which reality is (dis)closed and understood. Gadamer indicates language’s central position as a mediating space where understanding (un)folds. All understanding is interpretative and occurs through language. Language is the environment in which thoughts and meanings are articulated and shared. The middle or center of language signifies its role as an intermediary between us and the world. Language shapes how we perceive, interpret, and engage with reality, making it an essential medium for all human experience. Die Mitte der Sprache implies that there is no direct access to reality that can bypass linguistic expression. Language is not just something we use; it is where we find ourselves and let the world speak to us.
Gadamer emphasizes the dialogical or conversational nature of understanding. By referring to the middle of language, he underscores that understanding emerges from dialogue—from the back-and-forth of questioning, responding, and interpreting. This dialogical process indicates that meaning is open to further interpretation and refinement. Die Mitte der Sprache is a space where this dynamic interplay of understanding occurs, reflecting the fluid and evolving nature of language and meaning.32 The middle of language reflects Gadamer’s notion of language as a shared horizon. Language is not just an individual possession but a communal space where meanings are negotiated and shared. This shared nature of language means that understanding is inherently social and historical. Die Mitte der Sprache represents a common ground where different perspectives can meet, merge, and contribute to a richer, more nuanced understanding. Gadamer recognizes the finitude and openness of language. The middle is not a fixed center but an open space allowing continuous expansion and reinterpretation. Language is finite in its forms but infinite in its potential meanings. Die Mitte der Sprache captures the tension between the limits of language (its finitude) and its potential for infinite interpretation. Every act of understanding is also an acknowledgment of the limits and possibilities of language. Die Mitte der Sprache is ethical in its essence. Since language is a shared space, there is an ethical responsibility to engage with others in good faith, listen, and remain open to different interpretations and perspectives. Understanding is not about imposing our viewpoint but finding common ground and allowing meanings to unfold in a mutual, respectful dialogue. The middle of language highlights the dynamic, dialogical, and communal aspects of understanding, stressing the openness, finitude, and ethical dimensions of engaging with language and others.
Perceiving something in our human world is complex because this something is never a simple object, neutrally accessible, or crystal-clear. The silence talks to us as if a latent meaning is already insinuating itself in our lives and words. What a thing really is—say, a glass of water or the pen with which we write—is not, in its fundamental presence within our experience, something we can verify employing objective science, something we could locate in space and time. The pen is more than an external object; it becomes our pen, a lived extension of our arm, symbolizing the promise of writing, the memory of its purchase, and the potential gesture of lending it as an act of friendship, the happiness and satisfaction of a word written on a piece of paper, the anticipation of the finite possibilities and sadness of writing as the ink drops, the dream of buying another pen similar to this one, etc. In this sense, to perceive something is beyond grasping and taking and invokes a broader, deeper mode of being. We pay attention not only to the written and said but also to the unwritten and unsaid. And in which we are able to listen to how silence is already working our interpretations of a familiar, personal, and always lingually mediated human experience.
For Gadamer, there is much more in a lived life (das gelebte Leben) than what can be apprehended by a pure verification of what happens. When philosophy asks about the possibility of understanding the world in the context of a tournant in the direction of the lived experience, it is also concerned with praxis and the interpretation of praxis. In Gadamer’s phenomenological hermeneutics, praxis is closely related to human action, ethics, and applying knowledge in lived experience. Within this framework, praxis refers to the knowledge and action that arises from practical engagement with the world, as opposed to theoretical or technical knowledge (
Gadamer draws on Aristotle’s distinction between different forms of knowledge: theoretical knowledge (
Gadamer distinguishes praxis from theoretical knowledge, emphasizing that practical wisdom (
To give expression to what we know without knowing about the human condition is to engage meaningfully with themes of finitude and death, freedom, others, and ourselves, and which Plato first recognized as anamnesis (
Freedom, Conviction, and Ethical Life
The relationship between freedom and conviction plays a crucial role in ethical decision-making. Moral autonomy requires us to act freely, guided by our convictions shaped by reason, experience, and moral principles. Living authentically means exercising our freedom by our deepest convictions. This alignment between freedom and conviction demonstrates integrity, confirming that our actions are consistent with our beliefs and values. While freedom involves the capacity for autonomous action, conviction provides the guiding principles that shape and direct that freedom. They contribute to a nuanced understanding of authenticity, responsibility, and ethical life. Although convictions can enable and constrain freedom, they ultimately provide the framework within which freedom becomes meaningful and purposeful, allowing us to act by our true selves and values. The interplay between freedom and conviction highlights the dynamic tension between individual autonomy and the external influences that shape our choices. This relationship reveals the complexity of exercising freedom in a way that remains true to our convictions, all while navigating the social, cultural, and historical contexts in which we live. Exploring their relationship reveals how convictions shape our understanding of ethical behavior, authenticity, and responsibility.
Freedom, as the ability to act and make choices without external constraints, embodies autonomy, self-determination, and the power to decide our actions based on personal conviction. Positive freedom is the ability to achieve self-realization or fulfill our potential. It involves acting upon our free will in alignment with our true self or rational self-interest. Negative freedom emphasizes freedom from external constraints or interference, focusing on the absence of obstacles to action and allowing us to pursue our goals without hindrance. Conversely, conviction is a strong belief or commitment to a particular principle, value, or truth. It involves a sense of certainty about our beliefs, which guides actions and decisions. Convictions are central to forming identity, influencing how we perceive ourselves and how others perceive us.
The relationship between freedom and conviction is multifaceted, significantly influencing and constraining each other. Without convictions, freedom could become aimless or arbitrary. Convictions give purpose and direction to our free actions, making freedom meaningful. However, conviction can also be a constraint on freedom. Strong convictions can limit freedom by narrowing the range of choices we are willing to consider. Holding convictions implies a responsibility to act according to personal beliefs, which can constrain freedom, limiting actions that would go against our convictions. The dialectic between freedom and conviction reflects the nuanced balance necessary for authentic human existence. It involves navigating the tension between autonomy and responsibility, choice and commitment, allowing for a deeper understanding of ethical life and personal identity.
Hermeneutic Transformation: The Role of Application, Dialogue, and Conviction in Gadamer’s Phenomenological Hermeneutics
Gadamer’s phenomenological hermeneutics intricately weaves together Anwendung (application), Wende (turn), and Wendung (turning or twisting) to frame understanding as a continuous, transformative process. Interpretation is not a purely theoretical act; it engages actively with the present, shaped by the historical and cultural circumstances of the text and the interpreter. Understanding always requires applying meaning to the interpreter’s current context, a key feature of the fusion of horizons. In this process, the text’s historical horizon meets the interpreter’s contemporary perspective, allowing for the reinterpretation of meaning in light of the present. In challenging the traditional separation of understanding, interpretation, and application, Gadamer positions Anwendung as a fundamental aspect of understanding. This notion implies that interpretation is inherently practical, always shaped by the interpreter’s particular historical moment. Understanding is a dynamic and evolving happening wherein past and present merge through the application of meaning. This fusion lets interpretation remain relevant to the interpreter’s context, breathing new life into texts and ideas. Gadamer’s Wendung deepens the transformative nature of understanding. This turn reflects the unpredictable shifts we experience as we engage with what needs to be understood, allowing new meanings to emerge. The interpretative process is creative and open-ended, shaped by the interpreter’s unique historical and cultural circumstances. By highlighting Anwendung, Wende, and Wendung, Gadamer presents understanding as a transformative process. The interplay between tradition, dialogue, and transformation offers a profound framework for navigating the complexities of conviction within the human condition. It involves applying the meaning of the text to the present context (Anwendung), undergoing shifts in perspective to gain new understanding (Wende), and embracing the transformative twists that emerge in interpretation (Wendung). Anwendung allows tradition’s insights to be applied to the present, Wende encourages a receptive turn toward the text and the other, and Wendung highlights the richness and unpredictability of what can emerge in this engagement.
In the context of conviction (Überzeugung), Gadamer stresses the dialogical nature of understanding, where conviction arises through open engagement with other perspectives. Conviction involves a readiness to be (trans)formed by dialogue and an openness to reevaluate our beliefs through encounters with others. True conviction is dynamic, shaped, and reshaped through continuous interpretation and interaction with tradition. Conviction does not imply a closed-minded and strict adherence to a particular standpoint. Instead, the encounter with the other requires a readiness to be changed. Gadamer argues that true conviction requires balancing firm beliefs and openness to new interpretations. This balance is crucial for understanding dialogue because it enables participants to genuinely consider the other’s position and potentially integrate aspects of it into their worldview. Prejudices shape convictions but are also open to (trans)formation through understanding. Recognizing and examining our prejudices is critical to developing a more reflective conviction. Tradition plays a significant role in shaping convictions, allowing for continuity and change. The hermeneutic experience is an encounter that (trans)forms understanding by continuous questioning and interpretation. It leads to a deeper conviction, awareness of its limitations, and openness to further development. Genuine understanding requires a form of committed and open conviction. This form of conviction goes beyond subjective certainty to engage with what Gadamer sees as the claim to truth (Wahrheitsanspruch) inherent in all acts of understanding. It is a commitment to an ongoing search for truth that recognizes the provisional nature of all understanding.
While Gadamer does not explicitly identify conviction with
The hermeneutic circle suggests that understanding is always a process of moving back and forth between the parts and the whole of a text or tradition. This movement is not predetermined but involves the creative act of reinterpreting and reconfiguring our understanding. Hence, Überzeugung could be seen as the result of a poietic process within the hermeneutic circle. As we engage with texts, traditions, or other interlocutors, convictions are formed, (trans)formed, and sometimes even discarded. This continuous process of reinterpretation and reconfiguration parallels the notion of
Ricoeur on Conviction: Interpreting Belief, Action, and Ethical Responsibility
Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of conviction ties personal belief to ethical responsibility and communal experience of meaning. In his framework, conviction is an existential commitment to something fundamentally true and meaningful. It reflects an integration of deeply held beliefs into our actions, embodying inward reflection and outward ethical engagement. Conviction is shaped by ongoing interpretation and reevaluation through our engagement with texts, symbols, and narratives. This process of continuous refinement prevents convictions from becoming dogmatic, ensuring they remain dynamic and open to new insights and experiences. Ricoeur closely connects conviction to ethical responsibility. To hold a conviction is to be accountable for its values and principles. This accountability (responsabilité) extends beyond the individual to the communal sphere, as convictions are formed within social contexts and subject to the scrutiny and validation of others.35 Ricoeur’s conviction is personal and relational, requiring that beliefs be tested and refined through dialogue with others.
A critical aspect of Ricoeur’s thinking is the relationship between conviction (conviction) and witness (témoin, témoignage). Witnessing is testifying to something beyond oneself, whether a personal experience, historical event, or moral truth. It is a form of ethical testimony, linking conviction with a responsibility to convey truth and fidelity in recounting the past or representing an ethical stance. Through the act of witnessing, convictions are expressed and validated. Bearing witness can lead to a firm personal conviction about what has been witnessed. Witnessing is also an interpretive act. It involves interpreting and discovering the sense of what we have seen or experienced. Convictions formed through witnessing are always subject to reinterpretation and dialogue. Witnessing also serves as a test of conviction. To bear witness is to put our convictions on display, subjecting them to the scrutiny and judgment of others. This can reinforce our convictions and lead to their revision in light of new perspectives or evidence. They require ethical responsibility for our beliefs and actions while witnessing requires fidelity to truth and justice in recounting our experience. Conviction without witness risks becoming blind dogmatism, while witness without conviction lacks the depth and commitment necessary for meaningful ethical engagement.
Memory plays a significant role in this process, where recollection is seen as an active, interpretive process rather than passive recall. Witnesses engage in a dialogical interaction between past and present, bridging individual experience with collective memory. Ricoeur underscores the communal nature of witnessing, emphasizing that a witness’s credibility is established through engagement with others who either affirm or challenge their testimony. This communal interaction reinforces that the disclosure of meaning and truth are social processes formed and reformed through dialogue. Conviction and witness are intertwined with ethical life. Conviction demands responsibility, not only for personal beliefs but also for how these beliefs are acted upon and shared with others. Witnessing, in turn, provides the ethical ground upon which convictions are tested, scrutinized, (trans)formed, and remain open to new interpretations and perspectives.
Conviction and the Hermeneutics of Selfhood: Ricoeur’s Narrative Identity and Ethical Responsibility
In his hermeneutic philosophy, Ricoeur explores the self as a dynamic, evolving entity formed through the interplay of narrative, ethical responsibility, and interpretation. Selfhood is not something fixed or given. It is continually shaped by the stories we tell about our lives. These narratives provide coherence and continuity, allowing us to construct and make sense of our identities in relation to personal experience and historical and cultural contexts. The narrative process begins with the prefiguration of lived experiences, where events, actions, and emotions exist before they are consciously arranged into a story. As these experiences are shaped into a coherent narrative, we select, order, and interpret them, imbuing our lives with meaning and continuity. This narrative identity is actualized through interpretation as we and others engage with these stories, extracting meaning that contributes to the ongoing formation of selfhood. The self is an interpretive project. Like a text, it requires constant interpretation to reveal its meaning. This ongoing process allows the self to adapt, change, and evolve in response to new experiences and insights. In this sense, selfhood is the subject and the object of interpretation—actively participating in shaping its narrative while also being shaped by the world and others.
Central to Ricoeur’s understanding of selfhood is the role of temporality. The self exists in time and is shaped by the past, present, and future interplay. Ricoeur’s notion of narrative identity captures this temporal dimension of identity, which reflects the tension between continuity and change over time. He conceptualizes this through the dialectic of idem and ipse. The distinction between idem (sameness) and ipse (selfhood) mirrors Augustine’s contemplation on time as distension and Merleau-Ponty’s reflection on perception as central to Being. For Ricoeur, these dual aspects of identity underscore the temporal tension that defines selfhood, revealing continuity and change as essential components of human existence. Idem, or sameness, refers to the aspects of identity that remain stable over time. These might include fixed characteristics like a person’s name, traits, or certain core values that provide a sense of continuity. On the other hand, ipse, or selfhood, reflects the self’s ability to remain coherent while evolving. It encompasses the capacity of the self to change in response to new experiences and maintain a sense of integrity. The dynamic interplay between idem and ipse highlights how identity is stable and fluid: the self retains a core essence while being open to (trans)formation, allowing for growth, personal development, and adaptation to new contexts.
The ethical dimension of selfhood is equally essential. Ricoeur argues that understanding oneself is about constructing a coherent narrative and recognizing one’s responsibilities toward others. He introduces the notion of the ethical aim (visée éthique), which involves the aspiration to live a good life “with and for others in just institutions.”36 This ethical aim is central to forming selfhood, guiding how we interpret our actions and commitments. Ricoeur emphasizes that the self is inherently relational. The self does not exist in isolation; it is always in dialogue with others and is shaped by the ethical demands of these relationships. Conviction, in turn, requires a deep engagement with these relational contexts, ensuring that our beliefs are continuously tested and validated through the ongoing interplay with the world and others.
A key notion in Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of conviction is attestation (l’attestation).37 An attestation is a form of self-certainty or self-assurance in which we affirm the truth of our convictions while remaining open to reinterpretation and dialogue with others. It reflects a commitment to authentically living out our narrative identity, recognizing the continuity of selfhood (through idem) and its capacity for (trans)formation (through ipse). Through attestation, the self acknowledges its ethical obligations toward others. Conviction is thus deeply tied to ethical responsibility, as we are accountable for our beliefs and how we enact those beliefs in our relationships with others. Attestation bridges personal conviction and ethical action, ensuring that beliefs remain aligned with the ethical aim of living well with and for others.
Ricoeur places great emphasis on symbolic mediation in the formation of selfhood. Language, symbols, myths, and metaphors provide the means through which we articulate and understand our experiences. Language is the framework through which we make sense of the world and ourselves. Symbols and metaphors allow us to express complex aspects of our identity that may not be fully accessible through language. Figurative language opens up new dimensions of meaning, providing insights into the deeper, often hidden layers of selfhood. Ricoeur’s hermeneutics also involves the hermeneutic circle by which understanding moves between the part and the whole. Just as we interpret texts by moving between specific details and the broader narrative, we interpret the self by constantly engaging with individual experiences in the context of the overarching narrative of our lives. This circular movement of understanding is central to selfhood’s dynamic, evolving nature. Through this process, conviction plays a role in maintaining coherence and unity within the self when new experiences and insights reshape the self.
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of selfhood offers profound insights into the human condition, particularly in relation to conviction, finitude, and freedom. Conviction guides us through life’s challenges, helping us navigate the tension between finitude and the exercise of freedom. Narrative identity facilitates confronting our mortality and limitations while finding meaning and direction through our convictions. Conviction shapes selfhood while simultaneously responding to it. By enabling us to make sense of our existence in the face of uncertainty and change, it offers a stable yet flexible framework for ethical action and personal growth. Selfhood is an ongoing interpretative project requiring narrative, ethical responsibility, and symbolic mediation engagement. Through this interpretative journey, we can achieve a deeper sense of authenticity and navigate the existential challenges of life with conviction, clarity, and purpose.
In La Critique et la Conviction, Ricoeur offers a deeply personal and philosophical reflection on conviction as something distinct from epistemic certainty. The powerful distinction between je pense and je crois opens a crucial space in Ricoeur’s hermeneutics, in which conviction is situated not within the Cartesian logic of cogito-based assurance but within a lived commitment to meaning. Je crois does not imply blind faith but a critical and tested belief. Ricoeur’s idea of conviction as what remains when we have gone through all the objections does not position it in opposition to critique but as its necessary complement.38 Conviction is forged through the fire of critique and emerges not as dogma but as attestation—a fragile yet resilient affirmation that holds even when all certainties are shaken. This dialectic is fundamental in Ricoeur’s broader hermeneutic approach. In Soi-même comme un autre, Ricoeur explains that conviction is intimately connected to attestation as the ethical assurance of being a self capable of action and responsibility. It is never absolute but is sustained in the face of suspicion and the ever-present possibility of error.
Conviction is not merely an internal state but a response to the ethical demand to live with and for others in just institutions. It is a lived testimony (témoignage) to one’s belief, continuously open to revision, dialogue, and the witness of others. This is why, for Ricoeur, conviction is inherently relational—it is never a private assertion but always shaped in the space between self and other, forged through historical consciousness, moral responsibility, and narrative identity. To be convicted, in Ricoeur’s terms, is not to cling obstinately to a belief, but to hold it responsibly, aware of its provisionality, and to affirm it in the context of a life lived ethically and dialogically. Conviction is the existential counterpart to critique, marking a return from suspicion to trust, from deconstruction to engagement, from je pense to je crois—from thought to belief that is no less rigorous for being humble.39
The philosophical inquiry into conviction explores how firmly held beliefs shape our navigation through the challenges of finitude and the quest for freedom. As we confront life’s inherent limitations, conviction becomes the compass by which we orient ourselves in the world with others. Finitude, the recognition of mortality, instills a sense of urgency, compelling us to commit deeply to particular beliefs and actions. Inextricably linked to freedom, conviction helps shape what we believe and how we act. It is the freedom to live in alignment with our convictions, acknowledging that these beliefs provide direction and coherence to our choices. The self is constantly in flux, perpetually negotiating between past experiences and future aspirations. Conviction offers continuity amidst this dynamic process. As Heidegger, Gadamer, Merleau-Ponty, and Ricoeur suggest, conviction is deeply embodied, forming part of the fabric of our lived experience. This ongoing interpretative process of self-formation underscores the importance of conviction as a central, dynamic force in our identity.
Conviction, Constraint, and the Boundaries of Being: The Interplay of Finitude, Freedom, and Selfhood
Conviction drives us to pursue meaning within the constraints of life’s inherent limitations, shaped by the recognition of death as a constant background. With Heidegger, we argue that confronting death authentically leads to a more profound understanding of existence. Finitude presses us to commit deeply to beliefs and actions, provoking existential reflection on living authentically. Heidegger’s Seinsoffenheit clarifies how conviction is linked to an existential openness to the world, a stance that requires confronting our mortality and finitude. Merleau-Ponty’s foi perceptive complements this by exploring how human beings engage with the world pre-reflectively, rooted in trust in the reality of what is perceived. Conviction is a mode of being-in-the-world, where existence is committed to certain values and truths. Merleau-Ponty highlights the role of the body in conviction, suggesting that conviction is not merely an intellectual or cognitive process but is deeply embodied. Our bodies engage with the world directly and immediately through perceptive faith, providing the foundation for our convictions. This phenomenological approach counters Cartesian dualism, positing that the self’s convictions are not separable from its lived, bodily experiences. Conviction thus becomes a deeply felt and lived reality, not just a mental abstraction.
Modernity often breeds cynicism, as seen in Peter Sloterdijk’s Critique of Cynical Reason.40 Cynicism emerges when convictions are eroded and skepticism prevails. Sloterdijk argues that modern societies are rife with cynicism because people are enlightened enough to recognize the failures of their beliefs but lack the will or ability to replace them with something better. This cynicism is an enlightened false consciousness that undermines collective efforts toward meaningful change. Conviction becomes a way to resist the overwhelming forces of cynicism by reasserting meaningful engagement with the world.
The relationship between conviction and belonging is of particular relevance. Our sense of place shapes convictions—culturally, geographically, and socially. We explore the phenomenology of place, arguing that conviction about who we are is closely tied to where we are. Through architecture and spatial theory, we investigate how places are not just backdrops for human life but active participants in shaping human conviction. This interplay between finitude, freedom, and place underscores the importance of the environment in forming convictions.
We also delve into the intersection of conviction, selfhood, and religion. Drawing on thinkers like Paul Ricoeur and Jean-Luc Marion, it is possible to extend this study to examine how conviction plays a role in religious belief and the search for transcendence. In religious contexts, conviction takes on a moral and existential dimension, guiding individual actions and the broader understanding of our place in the cosmos. The hermeneutic approach is particularly significant in exploring religious conviction as it allows for a nuanced interpretation of the self in relation to the divine and coextensively for the study of political conviction. For most of human history, religious and political convictions were intimately linked.
In the spirit of responsibility for ourselves and our world, we turn to the political implications of conviction. Convictions are not formed in isolation; they are shaped by dialogue. Political conviction is a crucial element in the undertaking of democratic life. We question how political convictions are formed and maintained in a society that values individual freedom and collective responsibility. The dialectic of personal conviction and social belonging underscores the tension between autonomy and solidarity, illustrating how political life hinges on balancing these competing demands. Our thinking together presents conviction as a continuous hermeneutic process, an ongoing event of understanding (Geschehen des Verstehens) that defines our relationship with the world. We view conviction as a philosophical insight and a lived reality that shapes every aspect of our lives, from personal identity to political action and from religious faith to aesthetic experience. By thinking hermeneutically, we offer an exploration of what it means to hold convictions in a world that is constantly shifting and transforming.
The hermeneutic path of conviction is, by its nature, fragmented and discontinuous, with many stops and steps. It is nourished by numerous encounters and fortified by countless conversations shaped by critique, cynicism, skepticism, deception, irrationality, education, promise, faith, ethics, love, the sensible experience of transcendence, enskinment, embodiment, emplacement, freedom, alterity, gender, hope, recognition, virtues, nature, and politics. This path emphasizes understanding through dialogue and interpretation rather than adhering to fixed truths. It reflects a commitment to continuously revisiting and reevaluating beliefs in light of new experiences and insights, embodying the hermeneutic tradition of understanding as an evolving, ongoing, and unfinished endeavor.41 By highlighting the importance of a hermeneutic approach to philosophical inquiries into selfhood, freedom, and conviction, this volume advocates for a dynamic (un)folding experience that embraces complexity and uncertainty.
The hermeneutic path of conviction is an interpretive journey that emphasizes the continuous exploration and reevaluation of beliefs through a dynamic process of dialogue and reflection. In this way, seeking a deeper, more nuanced understanding of the human condition is possible by fostering practical wisdom, ethical engagement, and open dialogue. This hermeneutic journey is a conversation between the interpreter and the text (or event, experience, etc.). It requires desire and willingness to be (trans)formed by the encounter, which can lead to a genuine conviction about what we have understood. The hermeneutic path of conviction suggests that being in the world with others is always an ethical endeavor, grounded in an openness to dialogue and the recognition of the other. Hence, it is an interpretative journey toward a profound and (trans)formative understanding. We recognize and question our prejudices and are open to being challenged and changed by the interpretative encounter, in the spirit of a profound, well-considered understanding that is open to further reflection and development.
Connecting Conviction: Finitude, Freedom, and the Hermeneutics of Selfhood with the broader thematic framework of the series Hermeneutics in Enactment: International Research in Hermeneutics and Phenomenology (Brill/Fink), we recognize that the present volume and the series are deeply embedded in the philosophical and hermeneutic traditions that seek to explore the nature of human existence, interpretation, and the disclosure of meaning. The series’ focus on enactment (Vollzug) stresses that hermeneutics is not merely a theoretical activity but an active engagement with the world, a process through which understanding is brought into Being. The title Conviction: Finitude, Freedom, and the Hermeneutics of Selfhood emphasizes how interpretation (
In our globalized yet fragmented and deeply conflicted world, the importance of international and transdisciplinary collaboration cannot be overstated. The series Hermeneutics in Enactment brings together researchers from diverse disciplines and cultural backgrounds, reflecting the necessity of drawing on multiple perspectives to address the complex issues we face today—issues often characterized by power, domination, and the suppression of freedom. This kind of collaboration is not only academic; it is an ethical and political engagement. Hermeneutics offers a framework for understanding the plurality of voices, experiences, and perspectives on the human condition. International and transdisciplinary collaboration fosters the kind of dialogue that transcends national borders and disciplinary silos. Understanding conviction requires an international and interdisciplinary approach, acknowledging the interconnectedness of human life across diverse contexts. In a world obsessed with power and domination, the themes of conviction, finitude, and freedom take on a new urgency. Conviction becomes an act of resistance and commitment to a set of values or beliefs that refuses to be subjugated by external forces. Conviction is also intimately tied to freedom: the freedom to follow one’s beliefs, even in the face of oppression, but not to exercise personal and collective freedoms at the expense of others. This is particularly relevant in today’s global context, where the freedom of peoples and nations is constantly under threat from authoritarian regimes, economic exploitation, and social injustice.
Conviction: Finitude, Freedom, and the Hermeneutics of Selfhood and the series Hermeneutics in Enactment are united by a common goal: to explore the meaning of human existence in an interconnected and divided world. By bringing together diverse perspectives and addressing the global challenges of our era, the authors highlight the importance of dialogue, interpretation, and mutual understanding. In this sense, hermeneutics is an academic pursuit and a political and ethical imperative—an enactment of freedom in a world that often seeks to suppress it.
The notion of “interplay” highlights the intricate relationships and dynamics that define the interaction between elements. The verb
“Schon das ‘Denken an den Tod’ gilt öffentlich als feige Furcht, Unsicherheit des Daseins und finstere Weltflucht. Das Man läßt den Mut zur Angst vor dem Tode nicht aufkommen. Die Herrschaft der öffentlichen Ausgelegtheit des Man hat auch schon über die Befindlichkeit entschieden, aus der sich die Stellung zum Tode bestimmen soll. In der Angst vor dem Tode wird das Dasein vor es selbst gebracht als überantwortet der unüberholbaren Möglichkeit. Das Man besorgt die Umkehrung dieser Angst in eine Furcht vor einem ankommenden Ereignis. Die als Furcht zweideutig gemachte Angst wird überdies als Schwäche ausgegeben, die ein selbstsicheres Dasein nicht kennen darf.” (“Even the ‘thought of death’ is publicly regarded as cowardly fear, insecurity of existence, and gloomy escapism. The they (das Man) does not allow the courage for anxiety in the face of death to arise. The dominance of the public interpretation of the they has already decided the mood (Befindlichkeit) from which the stance toward death is to be determined. In the anxiety of death, Dasein is brought face to face with itself as entrusted to the unsurpassable possibility. The they ensures the reversal of this anxiety into a fear of an impending event. Anxiety, rendered ambiguous as fear, is further dismissed as a weakness that a self-assured Dasein must not know”). Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, GA2, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), 338. “Der Tod als Ende des Daseins ist die eigenste, unbezügliche, gewisse und als solche unbestimmte, unüberholbare Möglichkeit des Daseins. Der Tod ist als Ende des Daseins im Sein dieses Seienden zu seinem Ende.” (“Death, as the end of Dasein, is the most individual, non-relational, certain, and as such indeterminate and unsurpassable possibility of Dasein. Death, as the end of Dasein, belongs to the being of this being toward its end”). Ibid., 343. “Die vorlaufende Entschlossenheit ist kein Ausweg, erfunden, um den Tod zu ‘überwinden,’ sondern das dem Gewissensruf folgende Verstehen, das dem Tod die Möglichkeit freigibt, der Existenz des Daseins mächtig zu werden und jede flüchtige Selbstverdeckung im Grunde zu zerstreuen. Das als Sein zum Tode bestimmte Gewissen-haben-wollen bedeutet auch keine weltflüchtige Abgeschiedenheit, sondern bringt illusionslos in die Entschlossenheit des ‘Handelns.’” (“Anticipatory resoluteness is not an escape invented to ‘overcome’ death, but rather the understanding that follows the call of conscience, which opens up the possibility for death to take hold of Dasein’s existence and dispel any fleeting self-concealment at its core. Wanting to have a conscience determined as being-toward-death does not mean retreating into a world-escaping isolation but instead brings an unillusioned resoluteness into ‘action”). Ibid., 410.
For Gadamer, a person who is called experienced has become so not only through experiences but by being open to new experiences. “Die Wahrheit der Erfahrung enthält stets den Bezug auf neue Erfahrung. Daher ist derjenige, den man erfahren nennt, nicht nur durch Erfahrungen zu einem solchen geworden, sondern auch für Erfahrungen offen. Die Vollendung seiner Erfahrung, das vollendete Sein dessen, den wir ‘erfahren’ nennen, besteht nicht darin, daß einer schon alles kennt und alles schon besser weiß. Vielmehr zeigt sich der Erfahrene im Gegenteil als der radikal Undogmatische, der, weil er so viele Erfahrungen gemacht und aus Erfahrungen gelernt hat, gerade besonders befähigt ist, aufs neue Erfahrungen zu machen und aus Erfahrungen zu lernen. Die Dialektik der Erfahrung hat ihre eigene Vollendung nicht in einem abschließenden Wissen, sondern in jener Offenheit für Erfahrung, die durch die Erfahrung selbst freigespielt wird.” (“The truth of experience always contains a reference to new experience. Therefore, the person we call experienced is not only shaped by their past experiences but also remains open to new ones. The fulfillment of their experience, the completed being of the one we call ‘experienced,’ does not lie in knowing everything or being able to claim superior knowledge. On the contrary, the experienced person is revealed to be radically undogmatic. Having had many experiences and learned from them, they are particularly well-equipped to continue having new experiences and learning from them. The dialectic of experience finds its fulfillment not in definitive knowledge, but in the openness to experience that is itself unlocked by experience”). Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, Gesammelte Werke, vol. 1 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1986), 361.
In “Quando olho, vejo claro,” Pessoa differentiates between looking at (olhar) and seeing (ver). It is a hermeneutic movement from direct attention toward something to a deeper level of perception or clarity in what is being perceived. He indicates the progression (processio) from actively looking to clearly seeing—moving from focused observation to deeper understanding.
Fernando Pessoa, The Collected Poems of Alberto Caeiro, trans. Chris Daniels (Exeter: Shearsman Books, 2007), 16.
1 Cor 13: 12. In the Vulgate version, we read: “Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate: tunc autem facie ad faciem.” Through a mirror, dimly, like in a riddle,
Pessoa, The Collected Poems of Alberto Caeiro, 3.
“Auch die als adäquat gedachte Wahrneh mung würde niemals ein einfaches Abspiegeln dessen sein, was ist. Denn sie bliebe immer ein Auffassen als etwas. Jedes Auffassen als … artikuliert das, was da ist, indem es wegsieht von …, hinsieht auf …, zusammensieht als …—und all das kann wiederum im Zentrum emer Beachtung stehen oder am Rande und im Hintergrunde bloß ‘mitgesehen’ werden. So ist es kein Zweifel, daß das Sehen als ein artikulierendes Lesen dessen, was da ist, vieles, was da ist, gleichsam wegsieht, so daß es für das Sehen eben nicht mehr da ist; ebenso aber auch, daß es von seinen Antizipationen geleitet ‘hineinsieht,’ was gar nicht da ist. Man denke auch an die lnvarianztendenz, die im Sehen selber wirksam ist, so daß man die Dinge immer möglichst genau so sieht.” (“Even perception that is considered adequate would never be a simple mirroring of what is. For it would always remain an apprehending as something. Every apprehension as … articulates what is there by looking away from …, looking toward …, seeing together as …—and all of this can either be at the center of attention or merely be ‘co-seen’ on the periphery or in the background. Thus, there is no doubt that seeing, as an articulating reading of what is there, overlooks much of what is present, so that it is, in effect, no longer there for the act of seeing. Likewise, it is guided by anticipations, ‘seeing into’ things that are in fact not there at all. One must also consider the tendency toward invariance, which operates within seeing itself, such that one always tries to see things as much as possible the same way.”) Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, 96.
“Au creux du sujet lui-même, nous découvrions donc la présence du monde, de sorte que le sujet ne devait plus être compris comme activité synthétique, mais comme ek-stase, et que toute opération active de signification ou de Sinn-gebung apparaissait comme dérivée et secondaire par rapport à cette prégnance de la signification dans les signes qui pourrait définir le monde.” (“In the very depths of the subject himself, we thus discovered the presence of the world, so that the subject was no longer to be understood as a synthetic activity, but as ek-stasis; and every active operation of signification or Sinngebung appeared as derived and secondary in relation to this pregnancy of meaning in signs that could define the world.”) Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), 490. Merleau-Ponty is here arguing against a purely idealist or intellectualist understanding of meaning as constructed by the subject. Instead, meaning is already at work before conceptualization or judgment—it is embedded in the world as it appears to the perceiving body. This “pregnancy” denotes both richness and immanence of meaning in perception itself. This poetic metaphor captures Merleau-Ponty’s core idea that perception itself carries an implicit, embodied intelligibility—meaning is not added to perception but is inherent in its very (un)folding. Perception itself is meaningful before and beyond any reflective or interpretative act.
Heidegger and Arendt engage deeply with the motion of inter-esse, but they approach it from different philosophical perspectives. For Heidegger, inter-esse, this in-betweenness, relates to Dasein’s way of being-in-the-world, where existence is fundamentally relational. Heidegger emphasizes that our Being is always already “thrown” into a world of relationships and meanings, thus, inter-esse reflects our inherent connectedness to the world and others. In this sense, inter-esse denotes a form of Being that is always intertwined with the reality we inhabit and co-create, rather than a detached, individual experience. Arendt, on the other hand, uses inter-esse in the context of the public and political sphere. For Arendt, inter-esse signifies the “in-between” that arises in human interaction, particularly in the space of plurality where individuals come together to act and speak in the
“Le mouvement de fixation au stéréoscope est lui aussi une réponse à la question posée par les données et cette réponse est enveloppée dans la question. C’est le champ lui-même qui s’oriente vers une symétrie aussi parfaite que possible et la profondeur n’est qu’un moment de la foi perceptive en une chose unique. Le dessin perspectif n’est pas d’abord perçu comme dessin sur un plan, puis organisé en profon deur.” (“The fixation movement in the stereoscope is itself a response to the question posed by the data, and this response is already contained within the question. It is the field itself that orients toward a symmetry as perfect as possible, and depth is merely a moment of the perceptual faith in a single, unified thing. The perspectival drawing is not initially perceived as a drawing on a plane and then organized into depth”). Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception, 303.
Cf. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, ed. Claude Lefort, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1968). Merleau-Ponty’s notion of “perceptive faith” as an “animal faith” is deeply rooted in his phenomenology of embodiment. This faith is animal-like in that it is pre-discursive, non-propositional, and lived before it is thematized, “Faith” in perception does not mean religious or doctrinal faith but a primordial trust in the stability and continuity of the world. This trust is not rationally constructed; it is embodied, instinctual, and operative before thought. It is “animal” because it belongs to the realm of pre-linguistic, embodied existence, the way animals engage with their surroundings without a need for propositional knowledge.
Aristotle described humans as
Merleau-Ponty’s corporeal schema (schéma corporel) is a fundamental concept in his phenomenology, particularly in his exploration of perception as an active, embodied engagement with the world. It emphasizes that perception is an ongoing, bodily interaction with the environment, mediated through habit, movement, and pre-reflective experience. The corporeal schema does not represent the body in the mind (as in Cartesian dualism) but rather a lived, operative understanding of one’s body in space. It allows for fluid, pre-reflective coordination with the world. The body is not an object in the world but a medium through which we perceive and engage. Perception is not a mirror-like reflection of reality but an active, embodied engagement. The body is not a passive receiver of sensory information but is always engaged in structuring perception through movement, posture, and responsiveness to the environment. The corporeal schema operates with the perceptive faith, the primordial trust in the coherence of the world. Like animals navigating their environment without reflective thought, human perception is rooted in habitual, bodily knowing rather than detached cognition. The corporeal schema resists full intellectualization; we cannot grasp its meaning entirely through language or conceptual analysis. Perceptive faith is animal faith because of the corporeal schema, which orients us in the world without requiring explicit thought or verification.
The notion of l’entrelacs (intertwining or interlacing) is central to Merleau-Ponty’s later philosophy, particularly in Le visible et l’invisible. L’entrelacs captures the intricate relationship between subject and object, self and world, and the visible and invisible. It reflects these realms’ fundamental interdependence and co-constitution in our embodied experience. Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the inseparability of perception and the perceived, challenging traditional dualisms in philosophy.
In Greek,
Cf. Paul Ricoeur, Parcours de la reconnaissance (Paris: Éditions Stock, 2004). Ricoeur uses reconnaissance to capture this dynamic interplay, much like Hegel’s Anerkennung, particularly in the dialectic of master and slave. Ricoeur’s reconnaissance parallels Anerkennung by addressing the multifaceted nature of recognition in philosophical discourse, both in interpersonal relations and broader societal contexts. Ricoeur expands Hegel’s concept beyond social struggles to include personal identity, justice, and ethical relations.
The word perception originates from the Latin perceptio, which derives from percipere, per (thoroughly, completely) and capere (to take, seize, grasp). The Proto-Indo-European (PIE) root of capere is kap-, meaning to grasp, seize, and take hold of. Hence, perceptio is the act of seizing or grasping. (
“Die Zeitlichkeit ermöglicht die Einheit von Existenz, Faktizität und Verfallen und konstituiert so ursprünglich die Ganzheit der Sorgestruktur. Die Momente der Sorge sind durch keine Anhäufung zusammengestückt, so wenig wie die Zeitlichkeit selbst sich erst aus Zukunft, Gewesenheit und Gegenwart ‘mit der Zeit’ zusammensetzt. Die Zeitlichkeit ‘ist’ überhaupt kein Seiendes. Sie ist nicht, sondern zeitigt sich.” (“Temporality enables the unity of existence, facticity, and fallenness, thereby originally constituting the wholeness of the care structure. The moments of care are not pieced together through any accumulation, just as temporality itself is not assembled ‘over time’ from future, past, and present. Temporality ‘is’ not a being at all. It does not exist but temporalizes itself”). Heidegger, GA2: 434. Heidegger’s notion of ecstatic temporality (ekstatische Zeitlichkeit) refers to the way Dasein experiences time, not as a series of present moments, but as a unified whole where past (having-been), present (making-present), and future (being-toward) are interrelated. This structure is called ecstatic because it goes beyond the ordinary, linear sense of time, instead being stretched across these three dimensions.
For Merleau-Ponty, the flesh is not matter, is not mind, is not substance. To designate it, we would need the old term “element” in the sense in which it was used to speak of water, air, earth, and fire. It is the tie between the seer and the visible, the toucher and the touched, and on the pattern of this fundamental synergy, we must understand all the phenomena of the flesh, including the other person’s body with mine. Cf. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1968). This underscores the ethical implications of our inherent responsiveness to the world and others, as we are bound by this elemental “flesh” that forms the basis of our perception and ethical relation.
Emmanuel Falque, La chair de Dieu (Paris: Les éditions du CERF, 2023), 307.
The quote “Quid est ergo tempus? Si nemo ex me quaerat, scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio,” which translates to “What then is time? If no one asks me, I know; if I wish to explain it to someone who asks, I do not know,” is from St. Augustine’s Confessions, Book XI, Chapter 14.
“The essential linguality of understanding, the enactment of historically effected consciousness in language, calls for an ongoing search for the primal words in which Being is always already expressed, the verbum entis. Language is the mirror of finitude, that is, the mirror of temporality, because ‘every language is constantly being formed and developed the more it manifests Being. It is finite not because it is not all other languages at once but simply because it is language.’ Language is the Vollzug of the self-disclosure of Being … Expressing what has not yet been said and what is yet to be said represents our ongoing search for language, more than the externalization of inner experience, the primordial expression of Being. In this search for Being, the dialogical nature of our understanding plays an essential role. Being comes to language in the dialogue with ourselves, each other, and the tradition, the ongoing ‘conversation that we are.’ The verbum interius is the ground and modus experiendi of Being. The nature of language needs to be rethought in the light of the uncovering of the verbum interius as the ground of the universality of hermeneutics. The “inner” of verbum interius is not a spacial “inner.” The procession from the verbum interius to the verbum exterius is not a movement through space, but a procession in time, an ecstatic self-transcendence. The limitations we experience in language do not reflect limitations in ipsum esse, which John tells us is always with Word and the Scholastics confirm as infinite. In a certain respect, they are the limitations of being-in-time. Being manifests itself in language, which is also our language, in which our understanding finds its Vollzug. Language makes possible the infinity of constellations of meaning. That which can be said can never be fully exhausted since what is said is only an answer to a preceding question and invites another question … No particular constellation of words can definitively articulate hermeneutic experience. Yet we cannot but continuously search for a more meaningful form, to find that one and only word, suffused with all the pain and joy of temporality and filled with all the colors of life, a word that could adequately convey our thinking, something dear to us, almost absolutely inaccessible, and yet concrete, tangible.” Andrzej Wierciński, Existentia Hermeneutica: Understanding as the Mode of Being in the World (Zürich: LIT Verlag, 2019), 89–90; idem, Hermeneutics of Education: Exploring and Experiencing the Unpredictability of Education (Zürich: LIT Verlag, 2019).
Augustinus, Confessiones, ed. James J. O’Donnell (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1992, Book XI, Chapter 20. Here, Augustine reflects on the nature of time, discussing how only the past “passes away,” while the future and present have their forms of existence in memory and perception. In this deep philosophical contemplation on time, the past is gone, but the future and present remain in the soul’s experience.
Ibid., Book XI, Chapter 14. Augustine meditates on the nature of time, arguing that time is transitory, whereas eternity is unchanging and ever-present. This passage is central to Augustine’s philosophical examination of time, where he contrasts temporal existence with the concept of eternity.
Ibid., Book XI, Chapter 26. Augustine explores his theory of time, describing it as a “distention” or stretching of the mind, where the soul moves between the past, present, and future. Time exists as a tension or stretching of the soul, moving across different temporal dimensions.
The word “distentio” comes from the Latin verb “distendere,” which means “to stretch apart,” “to extend,” or “to spread out.” As the act of stretching apart or the state of being stretched, “distentio” takes on a deeper philosophical and spiritual meaning. It describes a state of psychological or spiritual tension—a feeling of being pulled in different directions.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Le philosophe et son ombre,” in idem, Signes (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), 254.
Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 129. Cf. Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction To Phenomenology, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960), 38–39.
In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger not only poetically broadens the horizon of understanding but also revolutionizes the mutual relationship between that which is said and the unsaid: “What is said is poor, what is unsaid abounds in richness”: “Das Gesagte ist das Dürftige, das Ungesagte erfüllt mit Reichtum.” Martin Heidegger, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, GA3, ed., Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1991), 249.
For Merleau-Ponty, language and silence are intertwined, each giving way to the other in expressing lived experience, resonating with his philosophical approach to embodying meaning. Expression must be understood as the process whereby an experience discharges its existential meaning, first into gestures and then speech. Language, far from the result of a long development, is the essence of this life of consciousness, which unites silence and speech.
“Nun ist die hermeneutische Erfahrung, die wir von der Mitte der Sprache aus zu denken suchen, gewiß nicht im selben Sinne Erfahrung des Denkens, wie diese Dialektik des Begriffs, die sich von der Macht der Sprache ganz zu befreien beansprucht. Gleichwohl wird auch in der hermeneutischen Erfahrung so etwas wie eine Dialektik gefunden, ein Tun der Sache selbst, ein Tun, das im Gegensatz zu der Methodik der modernen Wissenschaft ein Erleiden, ein Verstehen, das ein Geschehen ist.” (“The hermeneutic experience, which we seek to think from the middle of language, is certainly not an experience of thinking in the same sense as this dialectic of the concept, which claims to free itself entirely from the power of language. Nevertheless, even in hermeneutic experience, something like a dialectic is found—a doing of the matter itself, a doing that, in contrast to the methodology of modern science, is a suffering, an understanding that is an event”). Gadamer, GW1: 469.
“Daß die Sprache eine Mitte ist, in der sich Ich und Welt zusammenschließen oder besser: in ihrer ursprünglichen Zusammengehörigkeit darstellen, hatte unsere Überlegungen geleitet. Wir haben auch herausgearbeitet, wie sich diese spekulative Mitte der Sprache gegenüber der dialektischen Vermittlung des Begriffs als ein endliches Geschehen darstellt. In allen analysierten Fällen, sowohl in der Sprache des Gesprächs wie in der der Dichtung als auch in der der Auslegung, zeigte sich die spekulative Struktur der Sprache, nicht Abbildung eines fix Gegebenen zu sein, sondern ein Zur-Sprache-kommen, in dem ein Ganzes von Sinn sich ansagt.” (“That language is a middle in which self and world unite—or better: are presented in their original belonging-together—has guided our reflections. We have also demonstrated how this speculative middle of language, as opposed to the dialectical mediation of the concept, presents itself as a finite event. In all the cases analyzed—whether in the language of conversation, poetry, or interpretation—the speculative structure of language revealed itself not as a mere representation of something fixed and given, but as a coming-to-language, in which a whole of meaning announces itself”). Gadamer, GW1: 478.
Aristotle speaks of the deliberation about things to be done,
Lk 22:39:
Ricœur’s responsabilité is ethical and relational, grounded in the call of the Other and the narrative identity of the self. In Soi-même comme un autre, he develops the idea of the capable human being (l’homme capable), whose identity involves being author of one’s actions (l’auteur de ses actes), being responsible for oneself before the other (responsable de soi devant autrui), and being called to respond (appelé à répondre). Cf. Paul Ricoeur, Soi-même comme un autre (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1990).
“Appelons ‘visée éthique’ la visée de la ‘vie bonne’ avec et pour autrui dans des institutions justes. Les trois moments forts de cette définition feront successivement l’objet d’une analyse distincte. Ce sont ces trois mêmes composantes qui, dans les deux études suivantes, formeront les points d’appui successifs de notre réflexion sur le rapport de la norme morale à la visée éthique.” Ricoeur, Soi-même comme un autre, 202.
The concept of l’attestation in Ricoeur’s Soi-même comme un autre is developed throughout the work, but a particularly rich and focused treatment is found in the Tenth Study, especially in the section titled “Vers quelle ontologie?” Ricoeur defines l’attestation as a form of assurance or trustworthiness—a kind of self-certifying belief that is fundamentally different from Cartesian certainty. It is a mode of confidence (créance and fiance) that resists both the hyper-certitude of the Cogito and the radical suspicion of Nietzsche. “Créance est aussi fiance. Ce sera un des leitmotive de notre analyse: l’attestation est fondamentalement attestation de soi. Cette confiance sera tour à tour confiance dans le pouvoir de dire, dans le pouvoir de faire, dans le pouvoir de se reconnaître personnage de récit, dans le pouvoir enfin de répondre à l’accusation par l’accusatif: ‘me voici!’, selon une expression chère à Lévinas.” Ibid., 34–35. Further, Ricoeur notes: “Et, si l’on admet que la problématique de l’agir constitue l’unité analogique sous laquelle se rassemblent toutes nos investigations, l’attestation peut se définir comme l’assurance d’être soi-même agissant et souffrant.” Ibid., 35. This ontological-existential dimension culminates in Ricoeur’s affirmation that l’attestation is the ultimate response to the ever-present threat of le soupçon (suspicion), which is its shadow or dialectical opposite.
“One does not know oneself, that one has to go by way of the detour of others, always valuing the detour of critique.” Paul Ricœur, Critique and Conviction: Conversations with François Azouvi and Marc de Launay, trans. Kathleen Blamey (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 33.
“It seems to me that however far back I go in the past, I have always walked on two legs. It is not only for methodological reasons that I do not mix genres, it is because I insist on affirming a twofold reference, which is absolutely primary for me. In the course of my reflections, I have given this a number of formulations, perhaps the most precise of these, the one I prefer today, is expressed by the relation between conviction and critique—to which I ascribe, moreover, a very strong political sense, from the perspective of democratic life: we form a culture which has always had strong convictions, intertwined with certain moments of critique. But this is only one manner of expressing the polarity of conviction and critique, for philosophy is not simply critical, it too belonging to the order of conviction. And religious conviction itself possesses an internal, critical dimension.” Ibid., 139.
Peter Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, trans. Michael Eldred (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).
Cf. Andrzej Wierciński, “The Happening of Education as an Unfinished Project,” in Kamila Drapało, Barbara Weber, Klaudia Węc, and Andrzej Wierciński, ed., Subject, Identity, and Care: Educational (Dis)closures (Paderborn: Brill/Fink, 2024), 353–384.