1. Introduction
Albrecht of Hohenzollernâs feudal homage to the King of Poland, Sigismund I in 1525 and the emergence of the Duchy of Prussia marked the end of long and inconclusive wars with the Teutonic Order. Yet, in a realistic view, it was a halfway solution to the Polish-Lithuanian geopolitical competition with the Order in the fifteenth century. Nevertheless, Albrechtâs rules in Ducal Prussia became acceptable for the Polish nobles since the latter were interested in expansion of the eastern and south-eastern borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and began to consider the Prussian case as secondary. In the same vein, the policy of subsequent Polish kings towards their Prussian fiefdom served their ad hoc interests and lacked any general and consistent strategy. This stimulated the Brandenburg Hohenzollernsâ attempts to break the feudal ties and become the sovereign rulers in Ducal Prussia. The power preponderance of the Polish-Lithuanian state over the Brandenburg-Prussia reduced the Hohenzollernsâ ambitions and their political opportunism for a long time. Yet the obvious overextension of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and its deep domestic crisis in the middle of the seventeenth century marked dynamic changes in the power relations between the two states.
Indeed, the fall of the Polish-Lithuanian power and the spectacular rise of the Kingdom of Prussia completely reversed the geopolitical relations in the region a century later. It was now Polish Prussia, the Polish province on the Baltic coast, which became an object of interest to the Prussian expansion. Neither the considerable decline of the Polish-Lithuanian power nor the spectacular rise of the Kingdom of Prussiaâs military capabilities are unusual for a realism as the âoldest theoryâ of international politics. Yet, the course and consequences of its relations with the Prussian fiefdom provokes a fundamental question about geopolitical mistakes in the Kingdom of Polandâs foreign policy. In a realistâs view, the mistakes were obvious and their consequences lasting.
Nevertheless, the chapter is not a historical study. It is far from a âtotal explanationâ which might offer a complete, detailed and nuanced picture of the problems (Roberts, 1995; Wohlforth, 2011). Besides, the case of the Duchy of Prussia and its relations with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was a subject of extended historical works, including those by Janusz MaÅÅek, Karin Friedrich and Christopher Clark. Instead, it looks at the problems from the realist theoretical perspective, which focuses on power and the struggle for power, the competition of national interests as well as the hierarchy of power in the international system. The chapter combines in this regard both the structural realist considerations about the impact of systemic constraints on a stateâs foreign policy (Waltz, 1979) as well as more nuanced concepts of classical realism (Morgenthau, 1948), which pay more attention to leaders and nuances in foreign policymaking. The latter, including the perception of power, become indispensable in the analysis of the rise and fall of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and its relations with the Duchy of Prussia.
Finally, references to the historical context in theories of international relations and studies in political science often face the âhindsight biasâ, meaning that the knowledge of the outcomes of historical processes affect their contemporary perception and assessment (Hawkins, Hastie, 1990). This is, in line with Igor KÄ kolewski, the memory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealthâs partition which has for a long time affected the study on the Commonwealthâs relations with its Prussian neighbour (KÄ kolewski, 2009, 273, 284-285). In this chapter, however, the âhindsight biasâ does not change the general realist conclusions on the power relations between the two states and the mistakes in the Polish-Lithuanian policy towards its Prussian fiefdom.
2. Identifying the Geopolitical Problem â the Duchy of Prussia and the Consequences of the Polish-Teutonic Rivalry
The main religious function of the Teutonic Order, invited to Masovia in 1225 by Duke Konrad, was to Christianise the pagan tribes living in the Baltic area, and mainly the Masoviaâs pagan neighbours: the Prussians. In a political sense, however, the Order received a privilege granted by the Holy Roman Emperor that any lands captured by the Knights in Prussia would become the Orderâs own territory. This made the Orderâs expansion to the southeastern coast of the Baltic Sea a process of creating its own state, extending its territories and building their administrative and economic structures (Munro, 2009, 9-10, 14). In the late fourteenth century, the centralised and well-organised state of the Teutonic Order in Prussia became a powerful and active actor in regional affairs. Its expansion worried the rulers of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, since the Lithuanians were the last pagan tribe in the area and the obvious target of the Orderâs religious and political expansion. Moreover, the Lithuanian region of Samogitia bordering the Baltic Sea separated the lands of the Teutonic Order in Prussia and the Livonian Order (the lands of contemporary Latvia and Estonia), which formally had been an autonomous branch of the Teutonic Order since 1237. This gave the Teutonic-Lithuanian rivalry a clear geopolitical context (Munro, 2009, 14-15; Hay, 2014, 245).
The Teutonic State became a political and geopolitical challenge for the Kingdom of Poland, as well. In 1308, the Knights took advantage of the feudal fragmentation of the Polish Crown and seized Pomerania, including the city of GdaÅsk (Danzig). In so doing, they deprived the Polish Kingdom of an access to the Baltic Sea for over a century. The return of central royal power and the gradual rise of the Kingdom of Poland during the reign of Casimir III the Great (1333-1370) made tensions with the Order obvious and constant. In line with Munro,
it was no secret that Poland was seeking a better and more secure access to the Baltic Sea, while the Order sought to widen the land passage along the Baltic coast between Prussia and Livonia, effectively blocking access to the Baltic for Poland (Munro, 2009, 16).
In this realistic view, the struggle for power and position in the region between both states escalated as their interests became difficult to accommodate and a final confrontation appeared inevitable.
The Polish-Lithuanian personal union in 1385 changed the power relations in the region. The obvious aim of the Union of Kreva was to strengthen both statesâ position against the Teutonic Order (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 39-40). The conversion of Jagiello, the new Polish King and the Grand Duke of Lithuania, to Christianity also undermined the sense of the Teutonic Orderâs original mission in the Baltic area since the pagan tribes there, including Lithuanians themselves, had already been christianised or open to christianisation (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 40; Munro, 2009, 15). This, however, did not prevent the struggle for power in the region and the Polish-Lithuanian political competition with the Teutonic Order from culminating in the Great War of 1409-1411. The Battle of Grunwald (Tannenberg) in 1410 was decisive in this campaign since it marked the Orderâs spectacular defeat, including the death of the Grand Master, Ulrich von Jungingen, and most of the Orderâs dignitaries (Kowalska-Pietrzak, 2015, 81-82; Hay 2014, 245).
The Battle of Grunwald diminished the military power of the Order and pushed it into the defensive. It undermined the Orderâs military prestige and the ransom the Order paid for their captives strained its treasury (Munro, 2009, 16; Kowalska-Pietrzak, 2015, 81-82). Yet, in the political and geopolitical sense the Battle of Grunwald did not bring about decisive solutions. The Polish-Lithuanian troopsâ attempts to capture the Orderâs capital, Marienburg, were sluggish and ineffective with Jagiello lacking (new) resources and additional funds (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 45; Munro, 2009, 16). Hence, the Treaty of Torun in 1411 did not radically change the Polish political position. The Treaty settled the high financial compensation to be paid by the Teutonic Order and a return to Lithuania of the disputed lands of Samogitia (Hay, 2014, 245; Munro, 2009, 16). In the case of the Kingdom of Poland, however, the territorial gains were minor. Above all, Pomerania, fundamental for the Polish geopolitical interest and its connections with the Baltic Sea, remained in the Orderâs hands (Kowalska-Pietrzak, 2015, 81-82). Considering the significance of the Polish-Teutonic rivalry for the Kingdom of Polandâs principal interests and the spectacular Grunwald victory the shape of the Treaty of Torun seemed surprising if not disappointing and â[â¦] the war ended in a rather advantageous peace for the Knights [â¦]â (Hay, 2014, 245).
Further, seen from the realist perspective, the Treaty of Torun in 1411 did not finish the Polish-Teutonic competition and the struggle for power in the region. Both sides engaged in a series of wars in the first half of the fifteenth century yet none of them becoming decisive (Kowalska-Pietrzak, 2015, 81-82). Furthermore, the Polish-Lithuanian alliance faced some tensions and obvious divergences of interests. They reflected different attitudes to the Polish-Lithuania Union, as well. Hence, the Lithuanian determination to share the burden of new wars with the Order weakened and the concept of the Union with Poland faced some serious objection (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 44, 48; Kowalska-Pietrzak, 2015, 83). The personal union of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania survived, but in line with Lukowski and Zawadzki, âAfter 1422, Poland and Lithuania pursued different, if ever complementary, foreign policies, with Poland looking to the north and south and Lithuania to the eastâ (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 44). In the same vein, the wars with the Teutonic Order at the beginning of the fifteenth century âgave the Crown almost nothing in the territorial termsâ (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 45-48).
The chance for a more decisive solution in the Polish-Teutonic struggle appeared in the middle of the century and with regard to domestic problems in the Teutonic Orderâs state. The defeat in the Battle of Grunwald and further periodic fighting with Poland caused the devastation of the Orderâs borderlands and a financial crisis. The shortages translated into the Orderâs brutal fiscal policy increasing tensions with its Prussian subjects (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 48; Friedrich 2000, 20-21). Following Karin Friedrich, âthe Knightsâ increasingly arbitrary style of government triggered a new sense of political, economic and cultural solidarity among the Prussian townsmen and landed Freemenâ (Friedrich, 2000, 20). The latter meant the growing political aspirations of Prussian burghers and nobles and the creation of the âPrussian Leagueâ (1440) â aimed at defending the rights of the Prussian estates and developing their independent institutions (MaÅÅek, 2012, 170-172; Friedrich, 2000, 21-22). Finally, the resistance against the Orderâs repressions and new fiscal burdens resulted in the open rebellion in 1454 and the Prussian estatesâ âturning to the Polish King for political and military protectionâ (Friedrich, 2001, 95-96). The estates accused the Teutonic Order of tyranny and violation of their rights and offered the Polish King the incorporation of the Prussian lands into the Polish Crown âin exchange forâ privileges, freedoms and liberties (Friedrich, 2001, 95-96; Friedrich, 2000, 21-23).
King Casimir IV of Poland responded with the Incorporation Act of 6th March 1454, which granted the Prussian estates the rights of citizens of the Polish Crown. It offered an extensive catalogue of economic and social privileges â which in the case of some economic rights of burghers and cities reached beyond the parliamentary model taking shape in the Kingdom of Poland in the middle of the century (Friedrich, 2000, 23; Hay, 2014, 257-258). The incorporation, however, meant the new war with the Teutonic Order in which both sides used mercenary forces but lacked funds for continued fighting. It was in fact the financial assistance of the Prussian estates for the Polish King and the empty treasury of the Order, which decided about the ultimate victory of the Polish party (Munro, 2009, 18; Hay, 2014, 257-258).
Nevertheless, the new Treaty of Torun in 1466 was surprising again. The obvious expectation of the Prussian estates, which had revolted against the Teutonic Order and covered the costs of the war, was the Polish incorporation of the entire Prussian territories belonging to the Order (MaÅÅek, 2012, 167). In line with the Treaty, however, the Kingdom of Poland seized their western part, considered now as Royal (Polish) Prussia, which in practice meant regaining Pomerania (with GdaÅsk) occupied by the Order since 1308. Further, the Polish Kingdom took the province of Warmia [Ermland] and some of the earlier Order cities along the Vistula river, including Marienburg (now Malbork) itself. Yet the eastern part of the Prussian territories, with the new capital city of Königsberg, remained in the Orderâs hands. Finally, the reduced Teutonic Order in (eastern) Prussia became a fief of the King of Poland, and the Treaty obliged the Orderâs subsequent Grand Masters âto perform homage to the Kings of Polandâ (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 48; Munro, 2009, 18). The feudal dependence meant some control over the Orderâs political affairs yet the state did not become a part of the Polish Kingdom, retained the Orderâs administration and the Orderâs rules. In line with Friedrich, the Polish King declared some compensation for the Prussian nobles who âfled their lands in eastern Prussiaâ yet âeven this could not completely eradicate their lingering resentment against the Polish monarchy for letting slip the opportunity of destroying the Teutonic state once and for allâ (Friedrich, 2000, 24).
Indeed, in the realist perspective, the Treaty of Torun in 1466 meant that the Polish (Polish-Lithuanian) conflict with the Teutonic Order was solved halfway. The Kingdom of Poland restored its accesses to the Baltic Sea yet it did not take the opportunity to seize Prussiaâs territory in its entirety, to consolidate its Baltic presence and to remove any further problems from the Orderâs neighbourhood. Allied with the Prussian nobles and burghers, the Polish Kingdom did not risk any opposition of local population while the resistance of a small group of the Knights, the Orderâs elite, did not seem to be a significant obstacle for the annexation. In the same vein, the Kingdom of Poland could have marked its presence on the Baltic Sea coast much wider and firmer. It regained its access to the sea yet in practice it was reduced to the single port of Gdansk with an auxiliary role played by the port of ElblÄ g [Elbing]. Considering the privileges granted by the Polish King to the Prussian burghers, the existence of a single port only could reduce the Kingâs role in shaping the stateâs maritime strategy and provoke tensions with the burghers of GdaÅsk over trade benefits and self-government rights. It actually raised the aspirations of GdaÅsk to create its own maritime policy quite soon (MaÅÅek, 2012, 173-174).
Furthermore, the shape of the border between the Order in (eastern) Prussia and Polish Warmia remained highly irregular. Warmia drove a deep wedge into the Orderâs territory and remained isolated from the main body of the Polish Kingdom. This left the new Polish province and its communication routes with other lands of the Crown difficult to defend. In the geopolitical context, finally the Orderâs state in (eastern) Prussia remained a territory that isolated Polish Pomerania and the lands of Lithuania (Samogitia). At the same time however, the relatively narrow Polish access to the Baltic Sea (Polish Prussia) separated the (reduced) Teutonic Order in Prussia and the lands of the Elector of Brandenburg and the Holy Roman Empire. The obvious political links between the Knights and the Emperor could not initially be decisive in the political calculations yet their role grew in the context of the dynastic rivalry of the Jagiellons and the Habsburgs in the late fifteenth century.
Thus, considering the political significance of the struggle with the Teutonic Order, the Treaty of Torun in 1466 meant a limited success for the Kingdom of Polandâs foreign policy and confirmed some problems with the stateâs political determination. This lack of determination was a reflection of the stateâs financial problems, the pressure of the Polish nobles (the szlachta) for new privileges and a weakening position of the King in the Polish parliamentary system taking shape in the middle of the fifteenth century (Butterwick 2001, 1-4, 7; Hay 2014, 257-258). Yet, more importantly, the lack of determination in the Prussian case was a reflection of the Kingdomâs changing geopolitical choices and the Jagiellonsâ dynastic policy. In fact, in line with Lukowski and Zawadzki, âThe difficulties in the north seemed to be counterbalanced by advances in the southâ (Lukowski, Zawadzki; 50). The Union with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania offered a new impulse for the economic expansion of the Polish nobles into the lands of the Rusâ (Ruthenia) on the south-eastern borders of the Polish Kingdom (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 41, 53; Kowalska-Pietrzak, 2015, 78). In the same vein, the political ambitions of the ruling Jagiellons focused on the lands of Muscovy in the east or Moldova in the south. The final reach for the thrones of Bohemia and Hungary for the dynasty members made the Polish-Lithuanian rulers engaged in âall European tendenciesâ (Bues, 2001, 59; Hay 2014, 245-246, 258-259). Finally, in line with Bues, âAt the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Jagiellon dynasty dominated most of Central and Eastern Europe, ruling territories greater than those of any other European powerâ (Bues, 2001, 60).
This new (eastern and southern) direction of the Polish-Lithuanian expansion made the previous competition with the Teutonic Order a case of âsecondary importanceâ (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 41). The perception of the Polish preponderance of power over the Order in Prussia and its formal feudal dependence made the status quo in the relations with the Teutonic Order acceptable for the Polish kings. It did not contribute to a new and consistent concept of the Polish Baltic policy, either. Yet, in the realist perspective, the feudal suzerainty could guarantee the subordination of the fief only if accompanied by the effective power in the Kingâs hands and his determination to execute his rights. Otherwise, the feudal dependence would become an empty symbol. The Polish-Teutonic relations went exactly that way since the shifts in the Polish-Lithuanian policy in the late fifteenth century made the Polish determination problematic and translated into attempts of the subsequent Grand Masters to ignore their subordination and reject their vassal status (Hay, 2014, 257-258).
The continuing refusal to pay homage to the Polish King resulted in the Polish intervention and a new war with the Teutonic Order in 1519-21. The new conflict, however, ended with an âinconclusive truceâ again (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 48-50) and meant a return to the status quo. Preoccupied with the dynastic rivalry with the Habsburgs over Bohemia and Hungary and a threat of the Turkish invasion in southeastern Europe, the Jagiellons faced a crisis and overextension of their dynastic policy (Hay, 2014, 258-259; Bues, 2001, 61). The Baltic issues became âsecondaryâ again. It was in fact the Reformation and its impact on the religious relations on the continent, which contributed to further changes in the Teutonic Orderâs state in Prussia. Under Martin Lutherâs influence, Grand Master Albrecht of Hohenzollern, converted to Lutheranism. Upon the consent of the Polish King Sigismund I, he secularised the Order in Prussia and became the King of Polandâs vassal in the new secularised Duchy of Prussia (Friedrich, 2000, 23; Munro, 2009, 18-19). Thus, according to the Treaty of Cracow in 1525, the Teutonic Orderâs state ceased to exist. Albrecht of Hohenzollern paid homage to King Sigismund I and received the Duchy of Prussia âas his hereditary possession and a fief of the Polish Crownâ (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 50). The Treaty confirmed the previous territorial decision taken in Torun in 1466, as well.
The âPrussian Homageâ was symbolic. The new Lutheran prince in the Duchy of Prussia was in the Polish interest in the context of the Jagiellonsâ rivalry with the Habsburgs and the Emperor. Yet, in practice, the Treaty of Cracow retained the status quo and left the Prussian case solved halfway again. In line with Lukowski and Zawadzki
[â¦] contemporaries criticised Sigismund for not embarking on the outright annexation. Experience showed, however, that a course might well have led to more prolonged warfare and Poland and Lithuania had to face up to the constant prospect of fighting elsewhere on their far-flung borders (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 50).
It was indeed the context of the Jagiellonsâ overstretch and the gradual fall of their dynastic policy in south-eastern Europe, which engaged most of the Jagiellonsâ attention. The defeat of King Louis II of Hungary (the Jagiellonian dynasty) in the Battle of Mohacs, against the Ottoman Empire in 1526, marked the partition of Hungary and the collapse of the Jagiellonsâ political ambitions in the region (Bues, 2001, 61). They finally lost Bohemia and Hungary and their status in the region in favour of the Habsburgs (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 55; Bues, 2001, 61). The Prussian problems could only be of the âsecondaryâ importance in this context again.
Finally, âSecularised, Lutheran Ducal Prussia would be utterly reliant on the Crown and might yet revert to itâ (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 50). In the realist perspective, this calculation could be right as long as the power preponderance of Poland-Lithuania over Ducal Prussia (and its potential allies in the Holly Roman Empire) remained stable. Yet the engagement of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in a number of conflicts in the late sixteenth century proved its tendency to overextension and consumed enormous resources, which the state chronically lacked (Bues, 2001, 61; Hay, 2014, 258-259). This opened some space for the resistance of the rulers of Prussia or at least some political manoeuvres to strengthen their position vis a vis the kings of Poland. The conclusion that both the first Duke of Prussia Albrecht and the Electors of Brandenburg belonged to the Hohenzollern dynasty seems obvious in hindsight. Yet, even for some observers, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Hohenzollernsâ attempts to unify two domains ruled by the same dynasty could easily be predicted. For the powerful Polish-Lithuanian State this question was marginal yet it could potentially cause problems for the overextended and weakening Commonwealth. Thus, in line with Lukowski and Zawadzki again, the long Polish-Lithuanian conflict with the Teutonic Order was eventually won âbut never truly resolvedâ (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 45).
3. Opportunism, Integration and Geopolitical Challenges. Ducal Prussia and the Rise of Brandenburg-Prussia
The Hohenzollerns had ruled the Electorate of Brandenburg since 1415. The limited resources of the Electorate made them the second tier political actor in the Holy Roman Empire. This translated into cautiousness in the Hohenzollernsâ foreign policy and prudence in their relations with the Emperor. Hence, they joined the protestant camp, yet kept distance from the radical protestant claims and strove not to alienate the position of the Emperor. They remained for a long time âa loyal supporter of the Habsburg courtâ (Clark, 2007, 31-36). The need for moderation reflected limited economic and demographical capabilities of Brandenburg and nuances of power relations inside the Holy Roman Empire. Yet, it did not reduce the Hohenzollernsâ political ambitions and the âlustâ for their own power. The obvious material constraints limited the Hohenzollernsâ political flexibility, yet did not prevent them from seeking any political gains available in the course of international affairs and relations inside the Empire. This translated into the Hohenzollernsâ principle âto secure the maximum advantage from the situationâ and the policy focused on dynastic interests (Shennan, 2004, 3-5, 18-20).
One of the instruments in this regard was, in line with Clark, the âmarriage policyâ and a new area of the dynastic calculations became apparent in the Duchy of Prussia. In fact, Albrecht of Hohenzollern, the Duke of Prussia and the fief of the King of Poland, was the Electorâs of Brandenburg cousin. This made Ducal Prussia a natural direction for the Brandenburgâs interests and political expansion. The Electorâs Joachim II marriage with the Polish princess Hedwig in 1535 strengthened his access to the Ducal Prussiaâs affairs. Yet, the main aim became the succession of the Brandenburg line of the Hohenzollerns in the Duchy of Prussia and the future âunion of the two Hohenzollern principalitiesâ (Clark, 2007, 36; Shennan, 2004, 4). The death of Duke Albrecht in 1568 meant taking power by his son Albrecht Frederick. However, the symptoms of mental illness of the new Duke several years later opened the question of who ruled in the Duchy of Prussia and gave an opportunity for the Brandenburg Hohenzollerns to claim regency. Following the strategy of âmaximum benefitsâ from the course of international affairs they took advantage of the Polish-Lithuanian conflict with Muscovy in Livonia (northeastern Baltic coast) in the late 1570s and the Polish Kingâs, Stephen Bathory, preparing for the new and costly campaign against Ivan IV. The engagement in the Livonian war made the Polish-Lithuanian interests in the problems of mentally ill Duke of Prussia limited and âsecondaryâ again. This translated in 1578 into the King of Poland giving consent to the formal care over Albrecht Frederick and the regency in Ducal Prussia by the latterâs cousin George Frederick, Margrave of Ansbach, and the Brandenburg line of the Hohenzollerns (KÄ kolewski, 2009, 280).
The regency did not yet guarantee the formal succession for the Brandenburg line of the family after Albrecht Frederickâs death and the next step in the Hohenzollerns strategy was the marriage of Albrecht Frederickâs daughter, Anna of Prussia, with the Brandenburg Elector John Sigismund in 1594. Considering Albrecht Frederickâs lack of a male descendant, this became a serious argument for the succession and the ultimate union of the two Hohenzollernsâ principalities (Clark, 2007, 36-37; Shennan, 2004, 4). The final decision was still in the hands of the King of Poland as the Duchy of Prussiaâs feudal superior. Yet, the course of international relations in Central and Eastern Europe and the Polish-Lithuanian engagement in the simultaneous wars with Sweden and the Grand Duchy of Moscow at the beginning of the seventeenth century helped the Hohenzollerns to capitalise on the political opportunity, as well. The permanent need of new resources for costly military campaigns and the Hohenzollernsâ offer of generous financial support translated in 1611 into the Polish King Sigismund III, consenting on the Brandenburg line of the Hohenzollernsâ succession in the Duchy of Prussia and the recognition of Elector John Sigismund as âheir to Anneâs deranged father, Duke Albert Frederickâ (Shennan, 2004, 4; KÄ kolewski, 2009, 280-281). Ultimately, the âmarriage strategyâ became successful in 1618 â after Albrecht Frederickâs death (with no male descendant) and John Sigismundâs formal emergence as the Duke of Prussia (Clark, 2007, 36-37; Shennan, 2004, 4). The Brandenburg Hohenzollern rulers in Ducal Prussia remained the fiefs of the King of Poland but their succession was secured and changed their political perspective from the Electorate of Brandenburg alone to a broader domain of the whole of Brandenburg-Prussia.
The dynastic unification made the new Brandenburg-Prussian state potentially stronger in the regional relations and inside the Holy Roman Empire. In practice, however, its power was still limited since the territory of the state stretched along several hundred kilometres and was separated by lands of other German rulers or by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Royal (Polish) Prussia). It was not, in line with Clark âunusual in Early Modern Europe for geographically scattered territories to fall under the authority of a single sovereign, but the distances involved in this case were unusually greatâ (Clark, 2007, 37, 40-43). On one hand, this made the geopolitical position of Brandenburg-Prussia a serious problem for the Hohenzollerns for a long distance between two ends of the state, and (potentially) limited access to different parts of its territory, made the effective defence of Brandenburg-Prussia a challenge (Dwyer, 2013, 4). What is more, Brandenburg-Prussia bordered areas of increased political tensions. The possession of Kleve and Berg (in the west) exposed it to the competing interests of the Netherlands, Spain and France while the rule in Ducal Prussia introduced the Hohenzollerns to the competition over the domination in the Baltic Sea region. The limited power (including no standing army at the beginning of the seventeenth century) and limited resources in the Hohenzollernsâ hands made the state vulnerable to all these geopolitical threats (Clark, 2007, 40, 44).
On the other hand, the emergence of the Brandenburg-Prussia entity made Royal Prussia, the Polish province on the Baltic coast, an obvious aim of the future Hohenzollernsâ expansion. Royal Prussia separated the territory of the Duchy of Prussia and the lands of Brandenburg and any adherents to the idea of territorial unification of the Brandenburg-Prussian state had to consider the Hohenzollernsâ domination over that area. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, this scenario was impossible since the power of Poland-Lithuania reached its peak and the Duchy of Prussia, even if ruled by the Hohenzollerns, was still Kings of Polandâs fiefdom. (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 91-92). Besides, the Thirty Yearsâ War confirmed the limited capabilities of Brandenburg-Prussia to act independently on the international scene. The course of the war resulted in massive damages and the state was devastated by both imperial and protestant forces (Shennan, 2004, 9-10, 13).
Nevertheless, the taking of power by the âGreat Electorâ Frederick William (1640-88) marked a more pro-active Hohenzollernsâ foreign policy. The Thirty Yearsâ War revealed the limited power of Brandenburg-Prussia and reaffirmed its secondary role in political relations inside the Holy Roman Empire. The state lacked both human and material resources, effective political structures and an army able to defend its isolated territories. Thus, the obvious conclusion for the Elector was to build a more numerous military force, as well as strengthen his position vis a vis the Estates in the Brandenburg-Prussiaâs domestic affairs. Besides, Frederick William became confident that âa princeâs independence was proportionate to his military mightâ even if this might was hardly achievable in the short-term perspective (Shennan, 2004, 16-18; Dwyer 2013, 2-5). Further, the experience gained from the Thirty Yearsâ War strengthened Frederick Williamâs tendency to political opportunism, securing âmaximum advantageâ from the course of international affairs and a foreign policy aimed at âsellingâ his political support âto the highest bidderâ (Shennan, 2004, 19-20). The relations with the Polish neighbour became crucial in this regard since a deep crisis in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the middle of the seventeenth century, after a series of costly wars and a devastating Cossack uprising in 1648, encouraged the âGreat Electorâ to think about the final breaking of the Hohenzollernsâ feudal dependence in the Duchy of Prussia.
This was in fact the Brandenburg-Prussiaâs attitude to the new war between Sweden and Poland-Lithuania in 1655-1660. To be sure, Frederick Williamâs political calculations failed at the initial stage of this conflict. He underestimated the Swedenâs determination to control the Baltic Sea region and was unable to prevent the Swedish forces from entering the Ducal Prussiaâs territory. Hence, in line with the Treaty of Königsberg (1656) and in consequence of Charles X Gustav military successes in Poland, the Duchy of Prussia became a Swedish fiefdom and Frederick William was obliged to assist his new Swedish overlord militarily and financially (Shennan, 2004, 23). The Treaty was a reflection of the Swedish arrogance of power and the difficulties in the Brandenburg-Prussiaâs political flexibility in the conflict. As a result, the Electorâs army (about 8,500 troops) joined Carl X Gustavâs forces in the Battle of Warsaw (1656) against the Polish-Lithuanian troops. The Swedish-Brandenburg victory did not fundamentally change the course of the war but the victorious battle contributed to Frederick Williamâs personal legend (Shennan, 2004, 18-22; Clark, 2007, 67).
Nevertheless, a weakening position of Sweden, overextended in the long campaign in Poland-Lithuania, and the emergence of the opposite coalition (including the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Denmark and the Holy Roman Emperor) encouraged Frederick William to carry out a political volte. He finally left Carl X Gustavâs camp and joined the anti-Swedish coalition at the final stage of the war (Shennan, 2004, 18-22; Clark, 2007, 68-69). Hence, the dynamics of the political military situation helped Frederick William to take advantage of both the crisis of Poland-Lithuania and the overextension of Sweden. The change of alliance was risky, yet the international environment became favourable and Frederick William was aware that both conflicted powers were interested in the Brandenburg-Prussiaâs support. This helped the âGreat Electorâ to raise the question of the Hohenzollernsâ unconditional sovereignty in Ducal Prussia and breaking the Provincesâ feudal ties with the Kingdom of Poland (Shennan, 2004, 21).
The decision remained in the hands of John II Casimir, King of Poland. It was of the utmost importance since even if the Polish Kingâs control of the fiefs in the Duchy of Prussia had so far been inconsequent and selective (if not illusory) thus the formal resignation from the feudal rights meant there was no legal authority to intervene in the Ducal Prussiaâs affairs. Poland-Lithuaniaâs simultaneous wars with Sweden, Khmelnytsky Uprising and the Tsardom of Muscovy supporting the Cossacksâ rebellion made the Ducal Prussiaâs case secondary again in the political situation of the Commonwealth at the end of the 1650s (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 96-98; KÄ kolewski, 2009, 283-284). The weakness of his Polish overlord benefited the âGreat Electorâ. Besides, Frederick William capitalised on the Holy Roman Emperorâs interests in steering the Brandenburg-Prussia away from a potential alliance with Sweden, which resulted in the Emperor pressuring the Polish King to meet the Electorâs request. In consequence, John II Casimir made concessions to Frederick William in the Treaty of Wehlau in 1657 and recognised the rights of the House of the Hohenzollerns as the sovereign rulers in the Duchy of Prussia (Shennan, 2004, 21-22; KÄ kolewski, 2009, 283-284). The legacy of the Prussian Homage became a thing of the past.
Nevertheless, the Treaty of Oliva in 1660, which ended the war between Charles Gustav X and the anti-Swedish coalition, ignored the âGreat Electorâsâ wishes of territorial gains in Swedish Pomerania and âFrederick William learned again the harsh reality of politics, that a second-rate power is unwise to abandon neutrality and fight aloneâ (Shennan, 2004, 22). This shows furthermore that the Hohenzollernsâ political opportunism could not work if conflicting with the interests of the system leaders and, in line with Waltz, the international system could âpunishâ the stateâs policy that exceeded its actual power (Waltz, 1979, 73-74). Yet, the Treaty confirmed the Hohenzollernsâ unconditional sovereignty over the Duchy of Prussia and, in the context of the Brandenburg-Prussiaâs relations with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, marked Frederick Williamâs obvious political success.
The experience gained from the Oliva Treaty led to the âGreat Electorâsâ attempts to strengthen the stateâs regular army, which in 1688 reached the level of 30,000 soldiers. The real military capabilities became âa symbol of power and prestigeâ in the Electorâs political calculations and the role of the military officials grew in Brandenburg-Prussiaâs administration. The army helped Frederick William to strengthen his position against the Estates and introduce some forms of centralisation in the stateâs domestic affairs, as well (Shennan, 2004, 28-30, 33-35; Dwyer, 2013, 2-5). The disputes with the Estates reached the level of open conflict in the Duchy of Prussia since the formal sovereignty of Frederick William over the Province was opposed by its towns (especially Königsberg) and its nobility. The latter claimed the liberties and rights the Polish nobility had been accorded â something that the Elector vigorously rejected (Shennan, 2004, 33-34; Friedrich, 2000, 155-157). After some tactical concessions, Frederick William responded with force. The escape of Christian von Kalckstein (one of the resistanceâs leader) to Warsaw and his complaints to the Polish King failed since the King had no formal right to intervene, his political position was weak and the Ottoman Empireâs invasion in 1672 faced the Commonwealth with a new threat. The resistance in Ducal Prussia was suppressed, with Kalcksteinâs kidnapping and execution for treason in 1672 (Shennan, 2003, 33-34, 39; Friedrich, 2000, 155-157).
In fact, the later period of the rule of Frederick William saw the strengthening of power of Brandenburg-Prussia, especially against the backdrop of a crisis of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and a gradual decline of the Polish-Lithuanian state in the hierarchy of power in the international system (Shennan, 2004, 31, 36-38; Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 104). In the European affairs, however, Brandenburg-Prussia was still a secondary political actor, especially in the context of the competing interests of the systemâs leaders. The course of the Franco-Dutch War in the 1670âs proved that neither the âGreat Electorâsâ strategy of âcynical opportunismâ, effective in relations with Poland-Lithuania, or a policy of volte-faces and switching alliances between France and the anti-French coalition guaranteed the political gains for Brandenburg-Prussia in the final placement among the great European powers (Shennan, 2004, 24-26; Clark, 2007, 73-74).
4. The Kingdom of Prussia, Expansion and Geopolitical Significance of the Royal Prussiaâs Territory. The Hohenzollernsâ Policy in the Realist Perspective
The rule of Frederic Williamâs son, the Elector Frederick III, became less vigorous in comparison to that of the âGreat Electorâ and marked those ambiguities typical of the previous Brandenburg-Prussiaâs foreign policy, especially in the context of great powersâ competition during the Nine Yearsâ War and the struggle for the Spanish succession. Yet, in the symbolic sense, Frederick III achieved his principal aim to receive the royal title and his coronation as Frederick I, the King of Prussia, in 1701 meant a symbolic rise of the House of the Hohenzollerns to the royal ranks.
Nevertheless, the expectations that the royal title would introduce the new Kingdom of Prussia into the camp of great European powers were premature (Shennan, 2004, 42-43). Besides, the new Prussian kingâs ambitions to play a more important role in the Holy Roman Empire were reduced as well once Augustus II of Saxony was elected King of Poland. Frustrated Frederick I responded by increasing the Prussian army to the level of 40,000 soldiers, yet it was still not decisive for the Prussian great power status (Shennan, 2004, 44-45; Dwyer, 2013, 1). Further, the course of the Great Northern War (1700-1721) affected both the policies of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Kingdom of Prussia. It devastated and further weakened the Polish-Lithuanian state, engaged in the conflict by its Saxon king, and in the case of Frederick I contributed to his political neutrality aimed at protecting the new Prussian kingdom from a similar devastation (Shennan, 2004, 44-45; Dwyer, 2013, 15). Yet, the rise of Russia and its victory over Sweden in 1709 changed the regional balance of power and marked a considerable shift in the hierarchy of power, at least in Eastern and Northern Europe. It introduced the Russian factor to both the Polish-Lithuanian and the Prussian foreign policy calculations (Shennan, 2004, 46; Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 107-109).
The rule of King Frederick William I (1713-1740) meant a more pro-active Prussian policy and a return to the previous principle of âmaximum advantageâ from the course of international affairs. The weakness of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth offered an opportunity for the Prussian territorial expansion and the obvious area of this expansion was Royal Prussia again. The control over this territory, which separated Brandenburg and former Ducal Prussia, became of the utmost importance for the new Kingdom of Prussia since it would resolve many of its geopolitical dilemmas. It would considerably strengthen the Kingdomâs capabilities in political, demographic and economic terms, as well. Nevertheless, the new distribution of power in the international system, and especially the spectacular rise of Russia, worked against the Prussian plans. Frederick William I did not risk a confrontation with the ambitious Peter I and accepted the role of the Russian Tsar as the warrantor of the ârights and libertiesâ of the Polish-Lithuanian nobility. In practice, it was the acceptance of Russiaâs increasing control over the Commonwealthâs foreign and domestic affairs (Shennan, 2004, 47-48).
Thus, the military capabilities of the Kingdom of Prussia increased during the Frederick William Iâs rule considerably and exceeded the military power of Poland-Lithuania by far. The army reached the level of about 80 000 men which, in light of the stateâs limited demographic and economic resources, was a spectacular achievement. It was accompanied by a reform in the recruitment system, the incorporation of nobility into the officer class and the growing impact of the army on the stateâs administrative structures (Dwyer, 2013, 12-13). The army consumed more than 70 per cent of the national revenue and, in line with Shennan, âmilitary needs came to dictate the social structure of the countryâ (Shennan, 2004, 53-55, 59-60). Yet again, the military capabilities of the Kingdom of Prussia did not guarantee its promotion into the ranks of European great powers and Prussian ability to shape the course of international affairs remained limited (Dwyer, 2013, 2). The rivalry between the Holy Roman Emperor and France encouraged cautiousness and reduced Prussiaâs chance for new territorial gains in the west while the rise of the Russian Empire and its factual protectorate over Poland-Lithuania encouraged Frederick William I to postpone his plans of the expansion in Royal (Polish) Prussia. Seen from the realist perspective, the constraints imposed by the international order during the reign of Frederick I and Frederick William I, imposed limits on both monarchsâ political calculations. They made the Prussian foreign policy cautious and conservative â even for Frederick William I â and, in line with Shennan, âIt was a paradox in a king who possessed such an impressive army that he treated it as a deterrent, rather than a tool of warâ (Shennan, 2004, 50-51; Dwyer, 2013, 15).
The political strategy of the next Prussian King Frederick II (1740-1786), departed from the ambiguities and cautiousness of his predecessors. All the Brandenburg-Prussian rulers and then the kings in Prussia remained âopportunistsâ looking for territorial gain and political benefits from the course of international affairs. Yet, they understood the limitations from their second tier position in the European hierarchy of power. Frederick II decided to exploit these opportunities more actively and, in line with Scott, acted like the ruler of a first-class power (Scott, 2013, 157-158). He was aware of the limited material resources, which the Kingdom of Prussia was able to mobilise but remained confident in his ability to rightly assess the course of international affairs and use the Prussian army at the right moments (Scott, 2013, 157-158). Hence, in the realist perspective, the rule of Frederick II meant pursuit of power politics at higher risks but with more focus on Prussian interests. The stateâs policy was dictated by the Monarchâs personal traits, his political ideas and his perception of power relations in Europe (Scott, 2013, 153, 158-159; Dwyer, 2013, 20-21).
In fact, foreign policy of Frederick II became more risky but potentially more beneficial for the Prussian interests. They led in 1740 to an unexpected Prussian invasion of Silesia, a wealthy Habsburg province, and a confrontation with the interests of the Holy Roman Emperor. Frederick II was determined to take advantage of the Habsburgsâ weakness, to exploit the death of Emperor Charles VI and the resulting problems with succession for his daughter, Maria Teresa (Scott, 2013, 160). It was risky but it was a case of opportunities âto be seizedâ (Scott, 2013, 159-161; Dwyer, 2013, 15-16).
Further, Frederick IIâs policy became even more risky during the Seven Yearsâ War and together with his decision to confront much wider coalitions of the Prussian opponents (Austria, France, Russia, Sweden and Saxony). The Kingdom of Prussiaâs ability to retain its territorial integrity and to resist the allied forces of the leading states in the international system was a spectacular success of Frederick II. It revealed the efficiency in combat of the Prussian army and the Kingâs ability to exploit a lack of coordination in the enemiesâ camp (Scott, 2013, 170-173; Dwyer, 2013, 2). Nevertheless, the course of the War, including the Prussian defeat in the Battle of Kunersdorf (1759), illustrated that Prussiaâs power was not unlimited and even its spectacular military capabilities faced systemic constraints. Frederick IIâs policy of testing the systemic limitations of the Prussian foreign policy reflected his faith in the army and his personal skills, yet risked a painful punishment by the international system once his calculations failed. This meant that Prussiaâs military power was spectacular but the fate of the entire state could be decided by a single lost battle. Hence, despite Prussiaâs military capabilities, it was actually Russiaâs withdrawal from the anti-Prussian coalition in 1762 (the âMiracle of the House of Brandenburgâ) which saved the Prussian state from possible painful territorial loses (Scott, 2013, 175; Clark, 2007, 209).
Hence, the end of the Seven Yearsâ War promoted the Kingdom of Prussia to the rank of a European leader turning it into âone of the five great powers, which individually and collectively dominated the European states-systemâ (Scott, 2013, 153-154, 175; Dwyer, 2013, 2). Yet, the precarious periods of territorial expansions intertwined in the Frederick IIâs policy with periods of retrenchment, moderation and domestic consolidation (Scott, 2013, 165; Dwyer, 2013, 17, 19-20). It was necessary since Prussiaâs great power status was still flawed and ârested upon insufficient demographic and economic resources to support the obligations of its enhanced political stature, while its widely scattered territories made it more vulnerable than any other major stateâ (Scott, 2013, 176). Besides, the experiences of the Seven Yearâs War suggested Frederick IIâs respect for the growing power of the Russian Empire (Scott, 2013, 175-176).
Consequently, the plans of the expansion in Royal Prussia returned to the forefront in Frederick IIâs foreign policy and became one of its principal aims. It could both strengthen the economic and demographic basis of the Prussian power and solve the clear geopolitical problem of the Prussian Kingdom separated by the Polish territory (Scott, 2013, 155; Dwyer, 2013, 4). Expansion into Royal Prussia was a major part of Frederick IIâs political intentions from the beginning of his reign. Yet, he faced both Russiaâs interest in the Polish affairs since the Great Northern War and the rise of Russiaâs power after the Seven Yearâs War that had promoted the Russian Empire to the ranks of the European leadership. This made Catherine IIâs Russia a potential rival to any of Prussiaâs political vantage points in Northern and Eastern Europe, including those regarding the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Scott, 2013, 154, 175-176; Scott, 2013a, 186,190-191). In fact, Frederick II was afraid of Russia and its westward expansion. He was impressed by potential capabilities of the Russian Empire to be able to support its foreign policy aims, as well as an âability to win victories by accepting losses on a scale that no other army could tolerateâ (Scott, 2013a, 190-191), Hence, the annexation of Royal Prussia became fundamental in Frederick IIâs political ambitions, however, it was impossible without either Russiaâs consent or a direct confrontation with the Russian interests (Scott, 2013a, 186,190-191).
The new war with the Russian Empire was not in Frederick IIâs plans since it risked the forming of a new Russian-Austrian alliance thus threatening the very existence of the exhausted Prussian state (Scott, 2013a, 189). Yet the political opportunity emerged after the death of Augustus III, the King of Poland, with the upcoming election of the Polish-Lithuanian ruler. Frederick II exploited Catherine IIâs interest in the election of her favourite, Stanislaw Poniatowski, supporting the Russian plans for Poniatowskiâs coronation (Kordel, 2017, 233). The support led to Prussiaâs defensive alliance with Russia signed in 1764, which, in the Prussian political calculations, neutralised potential Russian-Austrian rapprochement and allowed Frederick II to have at least some influence on the Russian foreign policy (Scott, 2013a, 191; Kordel, 2017, 233). Furthermore, Russiaâs successful war with the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 1760s, Austriaâs fears of Russian expansion in the Balkans and tensions among the leading powers in East and Central Europe encouraged Frederick II to suggest a partition of some of the Polish-Lithuanian territories. Formally to keep the balance of power, the partition by Russia, Prussia and Austria served mainly the Prussian interests. The proposal faced Russiaâs reluctance, yet the Bar Confederation in Poland-Lithuania plotted against Russiaâs âprotectorateâ and a growing Petersburgâs dissatisfaction with King Poniatowski (as the guarantor of the Russian interests) persuaded the Russian Empire to accept the Prussian suggestions (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 116-120; Kordel, 2017, 238-239).
The first partition of Poland in 1772 marked significant territorial gains for the Kingdom of Prussia. The seizure of the Polish area of Royal Prussia allowed the unification of formerly separated parts of the Prussian state and, in line with Scott, created âa solid wedge of Prussian territory stretching across central and northeastern Germanyâ (Scott, 2013a, 191-192). It solved, after three centuries, the initial geopolitical dilemmas emerging with the fall of the Teutonic Order to the Kingdom of Prussiaâs benefit.
Thus, the rise of the Hohenzollernsâ state (Ducal Prussia, Brandenburg-Prussia and finally, the Kingdom of Prussia), its foreign policies and its relations with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth became an interesting case from the realist perspective of international relations. It is inspiring because it combines structural realist considerations, focusing on the hierarchy of power and consequences of a stateâs place in the international system as well as some classical and neoclassical realist considerations, which paid more attention to the leadersâ political decisions, their perception of power and their political calculations. The policy of the âGreat Electorâ, Frederick William and especially King Frederick II, seemed to be the best illustration of how both structural and domestic determinants were able to shape the final form of a stateâs foreign policy.
The Hohenzollernsâ attempts to secure their succession in Ducal Prussia and then, the foreign policy of Brandenburg-Prussia (including Hohenzollernsâ final sovereignty in the Duchy of Prussia) were in fact a policy of a second tier unit in the international system and a state much less powerful than its Polish-Lithuanian neighbour. It was an opportunistic (if not cynical) and a relatively passive strategy aimed at securing âmaximum advantageâ from the international situation and the course of international affairs (Shennan, 2004, 18-20). In the realist perspective, it was the policy that respected the systemic constraints but intended to take as much political benefit as possible in the existing systemic frames. It was an opportunistic but relatively coherent and continuous policy defined in terms of the stateâs (dynastic) interests, including political and territorial gains (Dwyer, 2013, 15-19). Its aim was to take any advantages available to increase the stateâs power and its international position while not risking a confrontation with its more powerful neighbours.
Thus, in order to be effective, this policy must have been conscious of the stateâs place in the hierarchy of power and its actual power. It had to be aware of material resources at the stateâs disposal, the scarcity of which reduced the Kingdom of Prussiaâs political and military capabilities even during the Frederick IIâs period. It had to be able to identify the stateâs principal interests and all instruments available to achieve them. For the subsequent kings of Prussia this could increasingly be the military force, (Dwyer, 2013, 13-15) yet for Brandenburg-Prussia it was often political manoeuvring inside the frames imposed by the policy of more powerful neighbours and system-based constraints in general. It was the policy of joining and leaving alliances, in line with deliberations of the stateâs interest, which often failed when confronted with the game of interests of the systemâs leaders (Shennan, 2004, 27-29; Clark, 2007, 73-74).
The rule of Frederick II had somewhat changed this perspective together with the Kingdom of Prussiaâs rise to the status of a great European power. But even for Frederick II, the Prussian power was limited by the stateâs scarce material resources. The King followed the risky policy, which constantly tested the limits imposed on it by the international system but, again, the periods of expansion intertwined during his rules with the periods of retrenchment (Scott, 2013, 165; Dwyer, 2013, 17, 19-20). Besides, the policy of Frederick II revealed his prudence and awareness of limitations imposed by the system. Hence, in many cases, as the partition of Poland-Lithuania in 1772 illustrates, it was still the initial Prussian strategy of taking as many opportunities available in the course of international affairs as possible. Yet, in line with the classical and neoclassical realist perspective, the example of Frederick II illustrated that some personal features of the rulers could affect the determination with which this general strategy was implemented (Dwyer, 2013, 20-21).
The opportunist policy of taking âmaximum advantageâ from the international situation became effective in the Brandenburg-Prussiaâs (the Kingdom of Prussiaâs) relations with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, including the succession and annexation of Ducal Prussia and Royal Prussia. Its effectiveness with regard to other powers in the seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe, however, is more disputable. Besides, the effectiveness of the Prussian opportunism provokes a question of the international environment. It seems that two specific âcomposite statesâ in the vicinity â the Habsburg monarchy and the Polish-Lithuania Commonwealth (Koyama, 2007, 138-141; Evans, 2001, 28) â made this environment more favourable for the Brandenburg-Prussiaâs political manoeuvers than any other area. The gradual weakening of the Polish-Lithuanian state, its overextension and engagement in a number of costly wars was obvious in this regard and reduced the Polish-Lithuanian interest in the problems of Ducal Prussia. Yet, even the frames of the Holy Roman Empire and the context of the Hohenzollernsâ relations with the Emperor introduced some sense of community and respect for the Empireâs traditions. It was less important for Frederic II, who challenged the Emperorâs interests directly, but it had played a role in the policy of his predecessors (Scott, 2013, 159-160). Yet, more importantly, it means that the Hohenzollernsâ relations with the Habsburgs could often result in the Emperorâs disregard for the former interests but they did not threaten the very existence of the Brandenburg-Prussian state.
Thus, a less favourable international environment could face Brandenburg- Prussia with serious challenges. More decisive, powerful and aggressive neighbours could threaten the stateâs interests, its territorial integrity and even its sovereign existence. The history of Central and Eastern Europe could have looked quite differently if for example, instead of the Emperor and Poland-Lithuania, Brandenburg-Prussia engaged French and Russian power much earlier and more directly. This counterfactual conclusion may be disputable but, in the realist perspective, it still seems that the favourable environment made structural constraints of the Prussian foreign policy less pressing and Prussian political opportunism more applicable.
5. Ducal Prussia and the Political Interests of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth
The Treaty of Cracow and Albrecht of Hohenzollernâs feudal homage to the King of Poland, Sigismund I in 1525 formally solved the problem of the secularised Teutonic Order in Prussia. In a geopolitical context, however, it was a halfway solution, which made the political status of Ducal Prussia returning in different and usually critical moments in the Polish-Lithuanian history. The âPrussian Homageâ seemed to satisfy the Polish political elites and some postulates of annexation faced the counterarguments of excessive costs, which the prolonged warfare could cause (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 50). Besides, the King of Poland as the feudal superior, retained some instruments of interference in the Ducal Prussiaâs affairs, in the form of royal commissioners, exerting some control at the final stage of Albrecht of Hohenzollernâs rule (KÄ kolewski, 2009, 269, 276, 280). Yet, King Bathoryâs consent on George Frederickâs regency reduced the effectiveness of the royal supervision. Finally, as Igor KÄ kolewski indicates, the Polish elites were convinced of the George Frederickâs political weakness and the szlachta believed that the Hohenzollernsâ rules in the Duchy in Prussia could easily be disciplined by royal commissioners (KÄ kolewski, 2009, 277-278, 281). In a sense, they relied more on feudal symbols and ceremonies than the calculation of power and interests.
Nevertheless, power competition had not for a long time been a principal problem of Poland-Lithuaniaâs relations with the Duchy of Prussia or the Electorate of Brandenburg. The power preponderance of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth over the Hohenzollerns was undisputable in the late sixteenth century. In 1525, Sigismund I and the Polish-Lithuanian elites rejected the Ducal Prussiaâs annexation prospect and were afraid of excessive costs of further war with the Teutonic Order. But fifty years later, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth engaged in a more costly (geopolitical) confrontation with Muscovy over Livonia on the northeastern coast of the Baltic Sea (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 91; Bues 2001, 75) It became paradoxical that the subsequent Polish kings left the case of Ducal Prussia to be solved in a symbolic (but ineffective) way of feudal dependence and they engaged in a costly geopolitical competition with more powerful neighbours in the periphery of the Polish-Lithuania state (Livonia, Moldova). The distance between the lands of Livonia and the new Polish capital, Warsaw, reached a thousand kilometres while the Duchy of Prussia bordered the heartland of the Polish Kingdom and was only about a hundred kilometres away. Finally, Poland-Lithuania reached the peak of its power at the beginning of the seventeenth century together with the intervention in Muscovy during the âTime of Troublesâ. The latter resulted in the capture of Moscowâs Kremlin and a short episode of King Sigismund IIIâs son, Wladyslaw, as Tsar (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 92; Sturdy, 2002, 220-221). The intervention ultimately failed yet again, no restraints or arguments of excessive costs (similar to those regarding Ducal Prussia) prevented the Polish-Lithuanian state from another costly and risky campaign.
Thus, the real problem in the Polish-Lithuanian attitude towards the Duchy of Prussia (and the House of the Hohenzollerns) was a clear shift in the interests of the Polish-Lithuanian nobility, as well as different geopolitical calculations and political concepts of the subsequent (elective) kings (KÄ kolewski, 2009, 278). The Union of Lublin in 1569, which replaced the previous personal union and created a single Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, opened a way for the noblesâ economic expansion into the fertile lands in the southeastern part of the state (Rusâ and Ukraine), far away from the coast of the Baltic Sea (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 91; Kowalska-Pietrzak, 2015, 78). This made the problems of Prussia marginal in the szlachtaâs interests and their perception of the state affairs (KÄ kolewski, 2009, 278).
At the same time, the case of Ducal Prussia and relations with the Hohenzollerns became secondary in the subsequent kingsâ political considerations. The Prussian issue returned in the policy of the Polish-Lithuanian rulers several times but it was usually a case of an ad hoc bargaining reflecting on much broader and more serious problems (KÄ kolewski, 2009, 278-281). Besides, the political concepts or personal and dynastic ambitions of different kings elected by the szlachta to the Polish throne differed and did not provide for a consistent direction of the stateâs foreign policy (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 93). They strengthened the ad hoc bargaining nature of the Polish-Lithuanian interests against Ducal Prussia. Hence, Sigismund Augustus IIâs engagement in the competition with Muscovy over Livonia (Bues, 2001, 61, 64), and the growing costs of the campaign, resulted in the Kingâs more favourable approach to the Brandenburg Hohenzollernsâ succession in Ducal Prussia and some initial promises in this regard. King Stephen Bathoryâs preparation to the new and costly campaign in Livonia several years later, and the empty royal treasure, made his attitude to the Hohenzollerns (and their offer of a financial support) even more favourable. It resulted in Bathoryâs consent on George Frederickâs of Ansbach regency in Ducal Prussia (KÄ kolewski, 2009, 280; Bues, 2001, 75). Finally, King Sigismund IIIâs engagement in war with Moscow and ambitious plans of the tsardom for his son made the Duchy of Prussia a case of an ad hoc bargaining again and, in line with Lukowski and Zawadzki
the Vasas followed Bathory in making concessions to the Hohenzollerns over Ducal Prussia, until in 1618 Sigismundus III assigned the Duchyâs reversion to the collateral Brandenburg line (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 93).
Nevertheless, the middle of the seventeenth century marked an obvious overexpansion in Polish-Lithuania foreign policy and a deep internal crisis of the state. In the realist perspective, the rise of the Polish-Lithuanian power faced a clear limitation. The state faced symptoms of overextension together with a number of wars waged with different enemies simultaneously as well as shortages of financial resources to cover political ambitions of the subsequent kings (Sturdy, 2002, 241-245; Butterwick, 2001, 16-17). The expansion into Moldova and Wallachia, formally fiefs of the Ottoman Empire, resulted in a significant defeat of the Polish-Lithuanian forces in the Battle of Cecora in 1620 and a Turkish invasion in 1621. The latter was finally repelled in the Battle of Chocim (1621), yet reduced the Polish-Lithuanian political initiative in this region. Besides, the southeastern provinces of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth faced regular and devastating raids of the Crimean Tatars, which proved the limited ability of the Polish-Lithuanian state to cope with this problem (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 92-93).
The Polish-Lithuanian expansion into the lands of Livonia put the state up against Muscovy but at the same time got exposed to the growing power of Sweden with its ambitions in the Baltic region. The policy of Sigismund III and his pretensions to the Swedish throne made the confrontation of the Polish and Swedish interests inevitable and engaged the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the costly competition for the domination over the Baltic Sea region (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 93; Frost, 2001, 152, 160). It translated into a series of wars in the first half of the seventeenth century, which devastated the northern and northeastern part of the Commonwealth and brought about a loss of control over some Polish-Lithuanian territories (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 93). The Polish-Lithuanian engagement in the geopolitical struggle in the Baltic region was a response to the rising power of Sweden, yet it was still a bit confusing since the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had never actually developed a consistent maritime policy of its own nor did it establish a merchant fleet to promote its trade interests.
Furthermore, the Polish-Lithuanian state faced a domestic crisis. The model of the parliamentary rule of nobility, established in the late fifteenth century, became dysfunctional in the middle of the seventeenth century and could provide neither for effective administration nor resources for further military campaigns (Evans, 2001, 25, 31; Butterwick, 2001, 16-17). A series of privileges for the szlachta weakened the royal power and increased the political role of the nobles in the Parliament (Sejm). It introduced a number of formal checks on the Kingâs power to protect the szlachta against the royal absolutism (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 84-85; Butterwick, 2001, 1-4, 7). Unfortunately, it did not provide for effective mechanisms of taxation, treasury keeping and a permanent military force. In line with Lukowski, Zawadzki, the nobles developed an extensive system of local diets and institutions which dealt with public affairs. Yet the szlachta were less interested âin building up the elaborate, centralised bureaucracies developing elsewhere in Europeâ (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 85). Finally, in line with Butterwick, âFearing absolutum dominium the szlachta deprived the monarch of the ability to defend the Commonwealth, but only intermittently did it assume the responsibility itselfâ (Butterwick, 2001, 16).
In the same vein, the Parliament could serve the stateâs political interests, yet âThe primary role of the Sejm was not necessarily to pass laws at all. It was to protect noble freedoms and to restore them where they had been infringedâ (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 90). This made any changes in the taxation or increase in the number of armed forces dependent on the Sejmâs random decisions and left the state with a small regular army paid from the treasury. The main military power of Poland-Lithuania in the periods of crisis remained the feudal levy of the nobility, which were mobilised at the kingâs call (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 85; Butterwick, 2001, 16-17). Further, the system was able to work more effectively at the beginning of the sixteenth century to protect the rights and interests of lower and middle nobles. Yet a century later, it was dominated by the competing interests of magnates, the wealthiest nobles and the great landowners who benefited from the expansion into the fertile lands on the south-eastern borders of the state. Finally, the emergence of liberum veto, the right of an individual noble âto break the parliamentary sessionâ (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 90), marked a growing paralysis of the Sejmâs proceedings and a demise of its political role in the state.
As a result, in the middle of the seventeenth century, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth faced three considerable and simultaneous threats. They decisively undermined the stateâs power, revealed its domestic and international weakness and confirmed the status of the Duchy of Prussia, as well. It was the Cossacksâ uprising, under the command of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, which broke out in 1648 that added to the peril. The Cossacks were the troops established to counter the Tatar raids, yet a permanent lack of resources made it difficult for Poland-Lithuania to control this formation and âregisterâ Cossacks as regular soldiers. This provoked tensions and frustration of those excluded from the paid service (Butterwick, 2001, 11; Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 94). Moreover, the magnatesâ exploitation of the lands on the south-eastern borders of the state contributed to tensions with the local orthodox population and resulted in the Cossacksâ rebellions. The Khmelnytskyâs uprising was the largest among them. It revealed a deep weakness of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and its institutions, devastated the south-eastern provinces of the Commonwealth and deprived the state of control over a part of its territory (Sturdy 2002, 237, 242-243).
Further, the intervention of the Tsardom of Russia supported the Khmelnytskyâs uprising, introducing Moscow as overlord over the rebellious territories. The advances of Muscovy army, which captured the Lithuanian capital Vilnius, brought about massive territorial and material losses (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 95-98; Sturdy, 2002, 214-216). Finally, âThe Russian advance precipitated an invasion by Charles X of Swedenâ (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 98) and faced Poland-Lithuania with the war with three powerful enemies simultaneously. It resulted in the fall of Warsaw and King John IIâs escape to Silesia. The Swedish âDelugeâ and the Russian invasion threatened the existence of the Polish-Lithuanian state and marked the first plans of the partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Lukowski, Zawadzkid 2006, 96; Sturdyd, 2002, 214-216). Yet the brutal intervention of the Swedish and Muscovy forces provoked a massive national resistance. The fortune of Charles X reversed along with growing costs of the war in Poland-Lithuania and the emergence of an anti-Swedish coalition, including Denmark and the Emperor. The Polish-Lithuanian state survived and the Treaty of Oliva in 1660 confirmed the status quo ante bellum (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 98-99; Shennan, 2004, 18-22). Yet, the period of 1648-1660 was devastating and disastrous for the Polish-Lithuanian state and the number of casualties and damages weakened its previous power considerably.
Thus, the problem of the Duchy of Prussia returned during the Swedish âDelugeâ but in quite different circumstances. It was less the previous pattern of an ad hoc bargaining and generous concessions of the powerful Polish kings, the feudal superiors, to their Prussian fiefs. This time, the weakness of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth offered Frederick William a much better bargaining position, which the Elector used for his own political interests. Hence, in the realist perspective, the Polish Kingâs abandonment of his feudal suzerainty over Ducal Prussia became an obvious price to pay for the Electorâs change of political sides and joining the anti-Swedish coalition (MakiÅÅa, 2017, 106-108; Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 98). This was a harsh reality of the considerable drop in the Polish-Lithuanian power, its previous overextension and its lack of domestic reforms.
In consequence, in line with Bues, the feudal relationship of the Duchy of Prussia with the King of Poland âdid not bring any increase of political power for the monarchyâ (Bues, 2001, 67). The Treaty of Wehlau in 1657 and the Oliva Treaty three years later, dissolved and symbolically closed the period of the Ducal Prussiaâs feudal dependence and the Polish kingsâ undisputable power preponderance over their Hohenzollern fiefs (MakiÅÅa, 2017, 102-104). From the realist perspective, the loss of formal control over Ducal Prussia could be temporary and reversible if accompanied by successful retrenchment, reforms and the Commonwealth return to more active and consistent foreign policy. This, however, was not the Polish-Lithuanian case. John II Casimir Vasaâs attempts to strengthen royal power in the Commonwealth and reform the stateâs political system failed, brought about the szlachtaâs resistance and a brutal civil war in 1666. The defeat of the royal army in the battle of MÄ twy (1666) meant the collapse of his plans to strengthen the stateâs power against the ânoble freedoms and libertiesâ and resulted in John II Casimirâs abdication in 1668 (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 100-101; Frost, 2001, 150-151, 164).
The last accord of the independent Polish policy in regard to the Duchy of Prussia was John III Sobieskiâs reluctance to accept the Hohenzollernsâ sovereignty in the former Prussian fiefdom and the Kingâs attempts to receive political support of France for his plans to restore Polish control there. Further, Sobieski thought of establishing Ducal Prussia as a hereditary possession for his own family and dynastic plans (Bues, 2001, 67). Yet, considering the power relations in the region in the late seventeenth century, the concepts were hardly (if in any way) achievable. Besides, the Kingâs plans met domestic opposition, the szlachtaâs general resistance to any dynastic concepts, and disrespect for Sobieski himself â as the âcrowned magnateâ, the king out of the royal family and one of the szlachtaâs fellows âelevated above the restâ (Butterwick, 2001, 8; Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 84).
The beginning of the eighteenth century, the personal union with Saxony and Augustus II on the Polish throne marked the fall of the Commonwealth to the rank of a secondary regional actor dependent on the will of its more powerful neighbours. The Polish-Lithuanian participation in the Great Northern War, forced by the Kingâs risky policy, resulted in the new invasion of the Swedish army and the devastation of the Commonwealthâs territory. Further, the change in the regional balance of power and the rise of Russia after its victory over Sweden in the Battle of Poltava (1709) marked growing ambitions of Peter I â[â¦] to impose his protectorate over Poland, which was to remain a liberty addicted, unreformed Commonwealth, a massive security buffer along Russiaâs western borderâ (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 107). Finally, in line with Kordel, Augustus IIâs attempts at âemancipating himselfâ from the influence of the Russian emperor failed and translated to the Russian Emperor and the King of Prussia declaring to protect the nobilityâs âfreedoms and privilegesâ in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Kordel, 2017, 211-214)
Consequently, the rise of the Kingdom of Prussia in the middle of the eighteenth century completely changed the previous geopolitical considerations and power calculations in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealthâs relations with the Hohenzollerns. It was now Royal Prussia, the Polish province, which separated two parts of the Prussian Kingdom, which became an obvious objective of the Prussian expansion (Kordel, 2017, 213-214). The Russians protecting the âfreedoms and privilegesâ of the Polish nobility and the role of the Commonwealth as the geopolitical âbufferâ for the Russian Empire moderated Frederick IIâs foreign policy and delayed the Kingdom of Prussiaâs annexation of the Polish coast of the Baltic Sea (Scott, 2013a, 186,190-191). The way international relations played out at the end of the 1760s, however, helped Frederick II to implement his plans. The Polish-Lithuanian State, which had lost its power a century earlier, remained a passive observer and had no credible capabilities to prevent the loss of their Royal Prussia.
Thus, seen from the realist perspective, the example of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and its relations with the Duchy of Prussia is an interesting case of a state which retained (for a long time) a clear preponderance of power but remained unable to develop a coherent attitude to its Prussian fiefdom. It is the case of an ad hoc and inconsistent policy of subsequent Polish kings and the lack of a more general strategy for the Stateâs presence on the Baltic coast. It is the szlachtaâs misperception of power, faith in feudal symbols and limited understanding of consequences of the gradual emancipation of the Hohenzollerns in Ducal Prussia that accounted for the failure.
Further, the case of Poland-Lithuania is an interesting example of the powerful international actors dynamically losing their power but remaining unable to implement the effective strategy to stop this decrease. It is the case of the obvious Polish-Lithuanian overextension and a growing ineffectiveness of its political system, which made an effective revision of the Stateâs foreign policy difficult. Finally, it is an illustration of the consequences, which the Stateâs fall in the hierarchy of power in the international system could eventually bring about. The gradual emancipation of the Duchy of Prussia ruled by the Brandenburg Hohenzollerns was obvious in this regard and the final reversion of the power relations between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Kingdom of Prussia, symbolised by the latterâs annexation of the Polish coast on the Baltic Sea (Royal Prussia), illustrated the scale of the fall of the Polish-Lithuanian power.
6. Conclusion: the Duchy of Prussia â a Geopolitical Mistake in the Policy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth?
The conflict of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania with the Teutonic Order became a fundamental political question for both states in the late fourteenth century and was a serious argument for their personal union. Yet, despite a spectacular victory over the Orderâs army in the Battle of Grunwald (1410), it was, in line with Lukowski and Zawadzki again, won âbut never truly resolvedâ (Lukowski, Zawadzki, 2006, 45). The inconclusive war a century later, the impact of the Reformation and the ultimate secularisation of the Teutonic Order in 1525 meant a practical annexation of a part of its territory (Polish Prussia) and the emergence of the Duchy of Prussia as the fiefdom of the Polish kings. The latter remained in the hands of the Orderâs last Grand Master, Albrecht of Hohenzollern, but this became acceptable for the Polish szlachta interested in political and economic expansion into the eastern and south-eastern areas of the Polish-Lithuanian State.
Yet, if seen from the realist perspective, the Prussian case was solved halfway. The ad hoc and inconsistent attitude of the subsequent Polish kings towards their Prussian fiefdom made the Brandenburg Hohenzollernsâ attempts to take control over Ducal Prussia unavoidable. Their political strategy of opportunism and taking âmaximum advantageâ of the course of international affairs (Shennan, 2004, 3-5, 18-20) was not surprising, either. The preponderance of the Polish power over the Prussian fiefs had been obvious for more than a century and the fate of the Duchy of Prussia was in the Polish kingsâ hands. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, however, was unable to develop a clear policy towards the Duchy of Prussia and the Hohenzollernsâ opportunism in general (KÄ kolewski, 2009, 277). The Prussian case became secondary in the Polish-Lithuanian political concepts. The Polish szlachta believed in the power of feudal symbols, misunderstood the potential consequences of Prussian emancipation and overlooked the changing power relations in East-Central Europe. This, in the realist perspective, was a clear political mistake. The obvious overextension of the Polish-Lithuanian State in the middle of the seventeenth century made the Prussian case returning in much worse political and international circumstances while the dynamic rise of the Kingdom of Prussiaâs power a century later, changed the power relations in the region considerably and resulted ultimately in Poland-Lithuaniaâs fall.
Hence, even if it is difficult to avoid a âhindsight biasâ when considering the historical processes, the lack of consequent and consistent policy towards Ducal Prussia, limited interest and a general misunderstanding of the Prussian problems became obvious political mistakes in the Polish-Lithuanian policy. It proves the general realist conclusion that a state unable to define its fundamental interests and adjust its policy to changes in the international system accordingly risks a loss of its power and control over problems considered initially as secondary and marginal.
Further, the mistakes in the Polish-Lithuanian policy in regard to Ducal Prussia had some obvious geopolitical consequences. The case of the Duchy of Prussia had become secondary and peripheral in the political considerations of the szlachta. It was accompanied by random and inconsistent (if not lacking) maritime policy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Yet, for Brandenburg-Prussia the problem of its territory separated by the Polish lands (Royal Prussia) became fundamental. This made the Hohenzollernsâ expansion into Polish Royal Prussia inevitable, irrespective of the actual role played by the Baltic Sea coast in the Polish foreign policy. The expansion was limited as long as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth retained its power preponderance over the Brandenburg-Prussian neighbour. Yet, again, the rise of the Kingdom of Prussia in the middle of the eighteenth century made the seizure of Royal Prussia its obvious political aim and left the weakened Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth unable to prevent it. It proves that some regions may be considered by a stateâs elite as secondary and peripheral, yet it is not the elitesâ perception, which decides about the regionâs actual geopolitical significance. Finally, it confirms that a powerful state, which loses its power and is unable to offer a concise strategy of retrenchment makes its fall even more painful.
Works Cited
Bues, Almut (2001). âThe Formation of the Polish-Lithuanian Monarchy in the Sixteenth Century.â Richard Butterwick, ed. The Polish-Lithuanian Monarchy in European Context, c. 1500-1795. New York: Palgrave, 58-81.
Butterwick, Richard (2001). âIntroduction.â The Polish-Lithuanian Monarchy in European Context, c. 1500-1795. New York: Palgrave, 1-23.
Clark, Christopher (2007). Iron Kingdom. The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947. London: Penguin Books (e-book edition).
Dwyer, Philip G. (2013). âIntroduction: The rise of Prussia.â The Rise of Prussia 1700-1830. London-New York: Routledge (e-book edition), 1-26.
Evans, Robert J.W. (2001). âThe Polish-Lithuanian Monarchy in International Context.â Richard Butterwick, ed. The Polish-Lithuanian Monarchy in European Context, c. 1500-1795. New York: Palgrave, 25-38.
Friedrich, Karin (2000). The Other Prussia. Royal Prussia, Poland and Liberty, 1569-1772. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Friedrich, Karin (2001). âNobles, Burghers, and the Monarchy in Poland-Lithuania: the Case of Royal Prussia, 1454-1772/93.â Richard Butterwick, ed. The Polish-Lithuanian Monarchy in European Context, c. 1500-1795. New York: Palgrave, 93-115.
Frost, Robert I. (2001). Obsequious Disrespect: the Problem of the Royal Power in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth under the Vasas, 1587-1668.â Richard Butterwick, ed. The Polish-Lithuanian Monarchy in European Context, c. 1500-1795. New York: Palgrave, 150-171.
Hawkins, Scott A. and Reid, Hastie (1990). âHindsight: Biased Judgments of Past Events after the Outcomes are Known.â Psychological Bulletin 107, 311-327.
Hay, Denys (2014). Europe in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries. London â New York: Routledge (second edition).
KÄ kolewski, Igor (2009). âRelacje polityczne miÄdzy RzeczÄ pospolitÄ a Prusami KsiÄ Å¼Äcymi w latach 1525-1701.â Komunikaty Mazursko-WarmiÅskie 2, 267-286.
Kordel, Jacek (2017). âThe Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in Eighteen-Century Alliance Treaties of the Neighbouring Countries, 1720-72.â Acta Poloniae Historica 116, 209-248.
Kowalska-Pietrzak, Anna (2015). âHistory of Poland During the Middle Ages.â Eleonora Bielawska-Batorowicz, ed. Poland. History, Culture and Society. Selected Readings. Lodz: University of Lodz, 61-93.
Koyama, Satoshi (2007). âThe Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as a Political Space: Its Unity and Complexity.â Hayashi, Tadayuki and Hiroshi, Fukuda, eds. Regions in Central and Eastern Europe: Past and Present. Sapporo: Hokkaido University, 137-153.
Lukowski, Jerzy and Hubert, Zawadzki (2006). A Concise History of Poland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
MakiÅÅa, Dariusz (2017). âKról Rzeczypospolitej jak zwierzchnik lenny.â Studia ElblÄ skie XVIII, 101-112.
MaÅÅek, Janusz (2012). âPrusy Polskie w XV-XVIII w. DÄ Å¼enia unifikacyjne a partykularyzm pruski.â Studia Iuridica Toruniensia 10, 167-183.
Morgenthau, Hans J. (1948). Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Munro, Dane (2009). âThe Teutonic Order.â Journal of the Monastic Military Orders 2, 1-24.
Roberts, Clayton (1995). The Logic of Historical Explanation. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Scott, Hamish M. (2013). âPrussiaâs emergence as a European great power, 1740-1763.â Philip G. Dwyer, ed. The Rise of Prussia 1700-1830. London-New York: Routledge (e-book edition), 153-176.
Scott Hamish M. (2013a). â1763-1786: The Second Reign of Frederick the Great?â Philip G. Dwyer, ed. The Rise of Prussia 1700-1830. London-New York: Routledge (e-book edition), 177-200.
Shennan, Margaret (2004). The Rise of Brandenburg-Prussia. London-New York: Routledge (e-book edition).
Sturdy, David J. (2002). Fractured Europe: 1600-1721. Oxford-Malden: Blackwell Publishers.
Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
Wohlforth, William C. (2011). âNo one loves a realist explanation.â International Politics 48, 441-459.