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Values as Empty Signifiers?

Three Case Studies of Discourses on (Christian) Values in the Documents of EU Christian Organizations

in Journal of Religion in Europe
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Marie Jäckel University of Zurich Department of Religious Studies & URPP Digital Religion(s) Zurich Switzerland

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https://orcid.org/0009-0000-7876-5239
Online-Publikationsdatum:
11 Dec 2025

Abstract

This study analyses discourses on values in the online publications of Christian organizations in the EU, focusing on the European People’s Party (EPP), European Christian Political Party (ECPP), and Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of the European Union (COMECE). Through a detailed content analysis, it identifies three main recurring themes: migration, biopolitics, and historical references connecting values to European identity and heritage. The findings show the use of references to “values,” which allow each organization to engage in meaning-making that aligns with their perspectives on contemporary issues. Using Laclau’s theory of the empty signifier, the study argues that references to “values” and “Christian values” act as empty signifiers and serve as unifying, hegemonic symbols of European political identity and action.

Schlüsselwörter:value politics; EU; Christian parties and organizations; content analysis; Laclau

1 Introduction

Right before the 2024 European Parliament elections, I conducted participant observation at an open online meeting of the Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of the European Union (COMECE). The participants emphasized the importance of Christian values in politics and society, advocating for the humane treatment of migrants and stricter rules on abortion. They expressed concern about the EU moving away from what they called its “Christian founding principles” and values.

Discourses on values, of which the above episode is an example, have become crucial in conveying positionality in political debates in the EU (see Mos 2020). “Values” and sometimes “Christian values” have been invoked to support opposing perspectives, for example, on migration, from welcoming refugees to rejecting them (Hidalgo 2019, 19). Conflicts of values and belonging exist at various levels in the EU. Especially right-wing populists target these conflicts and promote political divisions; however, conservative parties and movements also address them (Miliopoulos 2018, 211). Values play an important role in how Europe’s heritage, history, and identity are imagined and intertwined with institutions such as the European Parliament (Lähdesmäki 2014, 414). Yet, the interpretation of values in EU politics varies, highlighting their contested and “ambiguous” nature; in this regard, Mos speaks of the “crisis of European values” (2020, 281). Additionally, values often serve “as a proxy for European identity” (Oshri et al. 2016, 116), and they are used to legitimize or delegitimize political projects (Weymans 2023, 96).

Christian parties, churches, and Christian politicians contribute to shaping people’s views of values in the EU; they continue “to have … significant influence on political and politically relevant attitudes … Moreover, Christian churches play a historically relevant role in the genesis of the values of the European Union” (Polak 2023, 84). Additionally, actors, such as Viktor Orbán repeatedly reference “Christian values” and admonish the EU’s Christian Democrats to resist what Orbán calls left-wing policies (in reference to, for example, abortion, gender identity, and migration) (Lamour 2022, 335, 336). However, the reference to Christian values has also been used to oppose politicians such as Matteo Salvini and his use of such values from the right (Ozzano 2019). The intersections of religion, religious symbols, and value politics in populist and far-right movements have been widely studied (e.g., Diefenbach and Scheve 2021; Marchetti et al. 2022; Stoeckl 2016; Giorgi 2021). However, literature on more moderate actors and their use of value politics remains scarce (e.g., Handwerker 2019; Mondo and Close 2019; Weymans 2023). Some scholars have examined the population’s agreement on European values (EVS 2022; Schnabel and Grötsch 2015), but fewer have focused on how shared values are shaped in the European Parliament, and the role of Christian actors in this value formation. The present study uses content analysis to examine three case studies of how values are communicated at the EU level in the programs of Christian organizations and Christian-affiliated parties, as well as the commonalities of references to values in these programs.

This article opens with an introduction to the role of value discourses in the EU, followed by an overview of Laclau’s concept of the empty signifier as an analytical lens to understand these discourses (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Laclau 1996; 2005). It then presents three case studies examining publications from Christian-affiliated actors—a Christian party (ECPP), Christian Democrats (EPP), and directly religious actors in the form of delegates of a church (COMECE). These case studies investigate the structural composition of the documents’ value references, focusing on recurring themes, interactions, and the broader frameworks that inform the discourses in question. By identifying thematic clusters of value-related topics, they illustrate how values are variably interpreted to justify the positions of Christian parties and organizations. The article concludes with a discussion of the results based on Laclau’s concept of the empty signifier.

2 Values in EU Politics

The EU sees itself not only as a union of different states with common political, legal, and economic conditions but also as an association of shared values. Values can function “as cultural representations and points of reference about what is good or bad” (Calligaro and Foret 2018, 4); by helping to position oneself normatively, the use of values can create alliances as well as demarcations (4).1 Furthermore, values fabricate “meaning” and frames of reference (Polak 2023, 80). However, the meaning is not fixed; it changes according to the speaker and time (Calligaro and Foret 2018, 6). In that regard, Kenter et al. highlight that values are “lenses” (2019, 1440) of what is seen as important in a society. In European politics, for example, references to values can include human rights, freedom, a “European way of life,” but also Christian traditions, the Enlightenment and secularization (Polak 2023, 55).

This article focuses on how EU organizations define and mobilize the term “values” in their discourse. Accordingly, “values” are treated as an emic concept—understood and analyzed based on how actors themselves use the term. Importantly, actors themselves often do not clearly distinguish between general “values” and “Christian values,” a blurring that this article argues is itself significant. Rather than presupposing a fixed meaning, I trace how “(Christian) values” are framed and what normative references they imply.

Comprehending EU parties’ and organizations’ discourses on values requires examining the history of the discourses on European values (Weymans 2023). Specific values were not explicitly mentioned in the EU’s founding treaties of the 1950s, which focused on economic integration and technocratic cooperation. However, in the same postwar context, the European Convention on Human Rights—established by the Council of Europe—set out a shared framework for fundamental rights and freedoms. The European Court of Human Rights, established to enforce the Convention, invoked “European values”—which, during the Cold War, the EU frequently framed in opposition to communism (Weymans 2023). The EU began to frame itself as grounded in democracy and human rights. Additionally, this narrative emphasized Europe’s Christian heritage as the foundation of a European “civilization” (99) and portrayed European values as part of Europe’s “gift” to the world (100). In this regard, it should be noted that notions of European values often carried and carry colonial and racial legacies (see Jones and Subotic 2011, 545).

After the Cold War, the discourse concerning European values moved beyond religious and civilisation references and culminated in the Maastricht Treaty (1992), where it became a “unifying principle” (Weymans 2023, 108). In the 1990s the term “European values” was increasingly evoked as more suitable to create consensus than emphasizing religious or cultural roots (109). Between 2000 and 2004 debates about mentioning religion in the preamble of the EU’s central documents led to the view of the union as a “community of values” (Mandry 2009, 258). The European People’s Party (EPP) played the leading role in this process, while others opposed religious references in the EU’s official documents (262–267). Today, the reference to values is found in the Treaty on European Union (TEU): Article 2 of the TEU specifies several “values” as cornerstones of the union. Including “human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights” (EU 2012).

According to Mandry, the reference to shared values as the basis of the EU represents a “discursive bridge”—enabling shared identity without explicitly invoking religion (2009, 277; Foret 2021, 327–328).

3 Analytical Lens: Empty Signifier

If values can serve as a “discursive bridge” (Mandry 2009, 277) in discourses, this could arguably be understood through Laclau’s analytical concept of the empty signifier (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Laclau 1996; 2005). According to Laclau, terms such as “the people” and “the elite” can be used by different groups to construct their policies through being inherently vague, serving as empty signifiers (1996, 2005; Laclau and Mouffe 1985). The function of the empty signifier is to represent and constitute. The “operation of naming” (Laclau 2005, 104) is only possible if the naming is secondary neither to the description nor to a previous label. To perform this function, the empty signifier must “not only be contingent, but also empty” (104). If the signifier is to identify all the links in the “chain of equivalences” (171), it cannot become totally independent of them because it must be able to “represent them” (162)—that is, to become empty (162). However, an empty signifier does not entail total emptiness of meaning (e.g., like a catchword or an empty phrase). For Laclau, “empty” means something that cannot be fully reached; he writes: “there is a place, within the system of signification, which is constitutively irrepresentable; in that sense it remains empty, but this is an emptiness which one can signify, because we are dealing with a void within signification” (105). Laclau also uses the term “empty fullness” (106) to indicate a point of reference in the discourse that structures the latter by being in “between particular content and universal function” (106). Empty signifiers, in this sense, structure discourses by hovering between specific content and rhetorical flexibility.

Zicman De Barros distinguishes ways to conceptualize the empty signifier, which overlap both in terms of how it is used by those who employ it and how Laclau himself developed the concept (Zicman De Barros 2023). In the context of this article, empty signifiers are understood as a blend: as a collection of “political struggles” (6), and as symbols with partially open, or lacking, definitions that serve to unify diverse political demands and positions.

There are other comparable theories, such as “essentially contested concepts” (Gallie 1956) and “boundary objects” (Star and Griesemer 1989). However, for the purposes of this analysis, I argue that the concept of the empty signifier is more appropriate, as it was specifically developed with political discourse and the dynamics of discursive hegemony in mind—both of which align closely with the material examined in this article.

Hence, this article examines whether values and Christian values within the discourses of EU actors can be understood through the lens of the empty signifier, structuring the discourse on different topics within the EU.

4 Methodology

This research comprises three case studies based on publicly available publications from EU-affiliated organizations, published around the 2024 European Parliament elections (years 2022–2024). Case study one focuses on the Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of the European Union (COMECE), case study two on the European Christian Political Party (ECPP), and case study three on the European People’s Party (EPP). Following an initial screening of 137 documents—ranging from brief statements to detailed reports—two key texts per organization were selected for close analysis. These were chosen to best illustrate each actor’s approach to value discourses: typically, one manifesto or report and a second—often shorter—document more explicitly on values. While these texts represent only a fraction of the wider European discourse on values, they offer illustrative insights into the communicative strategies of Christian-affiliated or explicitly Christian political organizations in the EU. Analytical saturation (Saunders et al. 2018) within the sampled material also informed the decision not to include additional documents.

Rather than aiming for generalization, the study offers illustrative snapshots of how Christian and Christian-aligned actors construct value-based narratives in the EU. These organizations represent varied types of influence, ranging from institutional power (EPP), to nonlegislative but symbolic authority (COMECE). Moreover, these organizations do not operate in isolation but engage within an interconnected discursive field; for instance, COMECE regularly facilitates exchanges between the pope and the EPP (Foret 2021, 331; Zanon and Sciortino 2014, 509).

4.1 Case Study 1

The first case study is based on documents published by COMECE. Founded in 1980, COMECE represents the Catholic Church at the EU level and brings together Bishops’ Conference delegates from member states. It advocates based on Catholic social thought, in line with the Lisbon Treaty’s provision for regular dialogue between religious and EU institutions (see Zanon and Sciortino 2014; Turner 2021). It contributes to EU debates via consultations and forums. Hence, COMECE is not a party and does not have a party program, but it issues an annual report with its objectives. It includes both priority topics and activities undertaken. The report (COMECE 2024a) is a sixty-page report of the work conducted in 2023. The additional document consists of a position paper on “Strengthening the Culture of Democracy Through Values” (COMECE 2024b).

4.2 Case Study 2

The second case study focuses on the ECPP’s program for the 2024 elections. The European Christian Political Party (ECPP)—prior to May 2025, known as the European Christian Political Movement (ECPM)—is a small party in the European Parliament, founded in 2002, with seven members in the European Parliament from Eastern, Central, and Western Europe. On its website, it states that it is “the only European political party committed to promoting Christian values in the political sphere” (ECPP 2025). The analyzed material consists of its political manifesto (ECPM 2024a), a twenty-seven-page document on its political ideas and plans and an additional publication being a short report on an ECPP presentation on Christian roots and values (ECPM 2024b).

4.3 Case Study 3

The third case study examines the EPP, consisting of Christian Democrats and conservative national parties. The EPP sees itself as a “nonconfessional force with Christian roots” (Foret 2021, 332), therefore associating itself with Christianity without being an explicitly religious party. On its website the party states that it is “the biggest and most influential European political family” (EPP 2025). Among other things, its focus is on promoting “European values to have an impact in a rapidly changing world” (EPP 2025). The material analyzed consists of the organization’s twenty-five-page manifesto (EPP 2024), which discusses different aims and what the party wants to do to achieve them. The second document is a congress report of the 2022 EPP Congress on Europe and its values (EPP 2022).

4.4 The Analysis

Content analysis is used to investigate the structural composition of the documents’ value references, paying special attention to recurring themes, interactions, and the broader frameworks that inform each document’s discourse.

The aim of this research project was not initially to examine the discourse on “values.” However, during the first review of the sample material, the frequent references to “values” became apparent. As a result, the category of “values” emerged inductively, and the focus on value discourse developed in response to the material itself.

Using the data analysis software MAXQDA, a qualitative content analysis was conducted on six documents out of the sample to code and categorize value-related content. The process began exploratively and was iteratively refined to enable thematic comparison and interpretation. By identifying the frequency and thematic clustering of value-related topics, the analysis revealed how values are interpreted differently across similar themes.

5 Results

Each case study exhibits a distinct approach to values. COMECE’s report mentions “values” in connection with, for example, human dignity, migration politics, and a rediscovery of “Christian values.” The ECPP’s manifesto centers on family politics, biopolitics, and subsidiarity. The program of the EPP combines “values” with economic stability, “Christian roots,” and belonging.

5.1 Findings of Case Study 1: COMECE

Three aspects stand out in COMECE’s report and statement: (1) “Values,” particularly “Christian values,” are foundational to Europe; (2) these values are sometimes vague, framed as “Christian values” or in other cases directly named as “justice,” “ethics,” and “human dignity”; (3) the values in question are under threat and require preservation from political and Christian actors.

The documents show that COMECE repeatedly presents its work as “value-based” (directly mentioned five times in the report and two times in the statement) (COMECE 2024a, 41), with Christian values seen as the foundation of sociopolitical engagement. Although not always specified, certain principles such as “solidarity” (26), “human dignity” (12), “subsidiarity” (2024b, 2), and “rights” (2024a, 16) are explicitly mentioned. Ethical considerations appear in discussions about end-of-life issues, child protection, and COMECE’s criticism of the right to abortion. The frequent pairing of “democracy, values and fundamental freedoms” (41) suggests that values serve to link democratic ideals with specific rights.

Another noticeable aspect of COMECE is the connection between past, present, and future in creating a value basis for the EU. Values are referenced as the unifying element in the founding of the union, which COMECE sees as endangered. Christianity’s role in the early days of the EU, and more broadly in European countries and alliances, is a key aspect of COMECE’s discourse on values. For COMECE, Christian philosophy formed the foundation of European values, and the Catholic Church views its role in the EU as that of an actor upholding these values:

The values which underpin the principle of democracy of the European Union are rooted in the philosophical thought nurtured by Christianity. The Catholic Church, as an important stakeholder in the European society, cannot remain indifferent to democratic processes since the dignity of every resident in Europe, human rights, the values of justice, solidarity and subsidiarity are intertwined with democracy.

COMECE 2024b, 1

This value foundation shapes COMECE’s understanding of EU membership today, particularly regarding future enlargement. The organization stresses the importance of preserving shared values, citing its president’s call to “rediscover our common value basis and the special bonds that unite us as a European family” (COMECE 2024a, 31). Terms like “preserving” (43) and “rediscovering” (42) suggest that core values are perceived as threatened or fading. Challenges include the EU’s asylum policies (viewed as inhumane), the war in Ukraine, gaps in prosecuting online child abuse, and the union’s stance on abortion. Symbolic references to the “horizon” (3) evoke both reflection and forward-looking hope. Pope Francis, for example, urges a focus on the values behind Europe’s founding (3). For COMECE, envisioning a hopeful future requires reaffirming these values—a theme echoed throughout the report.

5.2 Findings of Case Study 2: The ECPP

The ECPP (formerly ECPM) documents highlight shared European values rooted in history, emphasizing unity despite differences on specific issues. The following quote is illustrative of this: “This is our strength that we are united and can work together on the fundamental values we share, regardless of differences on smaller, singular issues” (ECPM 2024a, 4). These “values” have three main features: (1) a focus on human dignity in EU internal and foreign politics; (2) the foundational role of “Christian values,” justified by Jesus’s teachings; and (3) an emphasis on family policies, reproductive rights, and subsidiarity, particularly in support of the heterosexual family.

The ECPP’s meta-narrative is grounded in a unifying value framework rooted in Europe’s Christian heritage. Its documents refer to the EU’s “founding fathers” (ECPM 2024a, 25) and describe Christian values—such as “freedom,” “truth,” “solidarity,” and “human dignity”—as foundational to the union and “still relevant today” (25). These values are also linked to the teachings of Jesus, providing religious justification for the party’s positions. Describing Christianity as the “soul of Europe” (ECPM 2024b, 2), the ECPP argues that Christian “faith” (ECPM 2024a, 25) guides its political direction and should be recognized as an essential part of the EU’s legacy.

The ECPP affirms “the intrinsic value of the human being” from an unborn to elderly people (ECPM 2024a, 5), addressing not only biomedical research but also abortion, surrogacy, reproductive rights, disabilities, and family support. It promotes subsidiarity, opposing EU-wide legalization of abortion, and supports parental authority over school curricula as part of its family policy. The party upholds heterosexual marriage and family as societal cornerstones, asserting: “Healthy families lead to a healthy society” (8). Values such as “love, solidarity, altruism, and faithfulness,” they argue, should be promoted publicly. “Faithfulness” (8) is linked to religion and social engagement, and families should choose which “values and beliefs” (10) their children learn. However, the program does not clearly explain why specific values like “faithfulness” are central or how families should promote them.

The ECPP links global and European issues to core values. Climate action is seen as a “biblical assignment” (14), and Christians are called to political engagement (ECPM 2024b, 2). Regarding migration, the party emphasizes respect for refugees’ “dignity” (ECPM 2024a, 18) but also highlights security concerns (17). Europe’s common values risk being undermined from two sides: liberal policies regarding the family and abortion, as previously mentioned, as well as “modern slavery” (20) and practices such as child marriages, the circumcision of girls,2 and what they call “Sharia Law”: “We find practices like forced or underage marriage, female genital mutilation, shunning, etc. reprehensible, and Sharia law deeply incompatible with European life and society” (18). The ECPP highlights “Sharia Law” (18) as being foreign to Europe’s values, framing it as one of Europe’s current important threats to values. Incomplete “freedom of religion” (26) is also presented as a threat to values, specifically in reference to Christians in the EU being “harassed” (27) when they cannot fully live their family lives according to their beliefs, for example.

5.3 Findings of Case Study 3: The EPP

The EPP emphasizes shared “EU values” and leadership to maintain “unity, security, and prosperity” (EPP 2024, 2, 23). The party’s documents highlight three key ideas: (1) the need to defend these values from external threats; (2) the link between these values and the economy; and (3) the centrality of such values in European citizens’ feelings of identity and belonging in connection with heritage.

The EPP highlights specific challenges and antagonisms and focuses on defending “European values.” While for the ECPP, the threats to these values are primarily liberal policies concerning family and gender issues, in particular abortion, and for COMECE the inhumane treatment of migrants, for the EPP, the main problems are Russia and China as well as “right-wing populists” (12) or “right-wing and left-wing extremism” (2022, 6) within the EU. The party’s manifesto identifies Ukraine as a defender of “shared European values” (2024, 3), though these values remain vague. Later in the document, specific values, such as “human rights, freedom, and democracy” (7) are listed as under threat from “ideologies running counter to EU values” (7). Here, “radical Islamism” (8) is mentioned in one paragraph with terrorism and antisemitism (7).

The EPP’s documents link economic matters to values when they mention a “value-led economy” (12) that goes “hand in hand” with “climate policy” (14). Trade is framed as integral to European values, with the EU’s economic competition with China and the USA, highlighting these “common values” (16). For the EPP, a value-based economy is an important part of the “European way of life” (2) and is a prerequisite for the union’s future. This prerequisite is emphasized in several other parts of the document, where the common values are sometimes specified as “democratic values” (18) other times “Christian values” or “principles” (19) that form the basis of a successful future.

The EPP ties values to European identity and “civilisation” (19), framing national identity as “open but not for sale” (20). “Legal” migrants are invited to integrate by adopting European languages and values (19), yet the wording suggests they are not yet part of the community; it also presupposes the existence of this community. This creates a sense of in-group vs. out-group and implies conditions for belonging. The EPP focuses on “irregular migration” (EPP 2022, 11) and presents values as a framework for integration, often referring to the “European way of life” (nine times in the manifesto and six times in the congress paper) as a shared internal norm that newcomers must adopt. This is especially evident in the following:

We must protect our European way of life by preserving our Christian values and our fundamental principles. Democracy, human dignity, fundamental rights, including rights of minorities and of the most vulnerable, freedom, equality, equal rights for women and men, solidarity, the rule of law, justice, pluralism and tolerance towards those who live a different way: these are the principles at the core of European civilisation.

EPP 2024, 19

The EPP rarely refers to “values” being “Christian,” but it does so here. These values are linked to “fundamental principles” (19) such as democracy and minority rights. Here, too, it is evident that the EPP paints a picture of a “crisis” (2022, 2) in which these values must be protected. There is also a reference to the “European civilisation” that is built on these values. Europe’s “Judeo-Christian roots” (EPP 2024, 2) are a core aspect of its identity: “Our history, our heritage, our Judeo-Christian roots and our cultural diversity define us” (2). The basis for a European identity is seen in “Hebrew prophecy, Greek philosophy and Roman law, harmonised and enriched by the Christian message and Judeo-Christian values” (2). However, these roots are not explained or historically substantiated. Rather, they are connected to a view of European civilisation as originating from Christian “culture and heritage” (2024, 19). Finally, this view is linked to the Enlightenment and humanism (19; 2022, 2).

5.4 Thematic Patterns across Cases

The analysis of COMECE, ECPP, and EPP reveals that values are invoked frequently but are not always clearly defined, sometimes framed as universal, and other times tied to Christian traditions. However, in addition to the direct quotes of values, thematic clusters emerging from the case studies—(A) bio- and family politics, (B) migration, and (C) Christian roots and heritage—highlight how values are framed and operationalized with specific topics. In the following, the findings are embedded in the context of existing research.

5.4.1 Cluster A: Biopolitics and Family Politics

Biopolitics, body-politics, and family politics are prominent topics in connection to value-mentioning, particularly in the documents of COMECE and the ECPP. These organizations emphasize traditional family structures, with the ECPP advocating for the heterosexual family as a foundational societal value. In this context, discussions about reproductive rights, child protection, and human dignity intersect with ethical concerns, reinforcing a conservative stance on policies about the family and gender. The findings of the present study align with broader research on value politics in conservative circles (Ahrens and Kantola 2023; Berthet 2022; Mondo and Close 2019). Abortion is a highly contested issue in EU politics, often interpreted through the lens of values (Berthet 2022). It is also a topic that can be understood through Foucault’s discussions on biopolitics, body-politics, and power over bodies (Foucault 1978; 1995). Polak (2023, 85) has noted that “Christian values” are associated with traditional gender roles and opposition to same-sex relationships, which reinforces conservative agendas. Datta and Paternotte (2023) have also found that EU actors uphold “Christian values” against liberal gender politics and abortion rights. However, some Christian actors can be rather pro-choice (EKD 2024). That this is not the case in the present study may be due to the examples selected.

The EPP has struggled to establish a unified position on abortion, which may explain the absence of this issue from their manifesto. In contrast, COMECE and the ECPP address this topic more explicitly. Furthermore, the invocation of “subsidiarity” and “freedom of religion” in connection with the discourse on abortion is noticeable. Other gender-related and biopolitical topics linked to values are human trafficking and violence against women and children. In this case, references to subsidiarity and “freedom of religion” reflect the emphasis placed by center-right parties on national-level decision-making for issues such as abortion and biopolitics (Berthet 2022, 1809).

5.4.2 Cluster B: Migration

Migration constitutes another important cluster in the organizations’ discourses on values, encompassing themes such as integration, legal and illegal migration, and cultural identity. The EPP frames values as the foundation of the integration of migrants, linking them to the preservation of a distinctly “European way of life.” Islam is rarely mentioned explicitly but is invoked indirectly with negative associations. The EPP references Islam once in connection to terrorism, while the ECPP relates it to “Sharia law” (ECPM 2024a, 18), which it considers a threat to European society. Islam is therefore only mentioned in reference to securitization debates (see Baele and Thomson 2017). Notably, while the EPP frequently (seven times in the manifesto) uses the term “illegal migration” (EPP 2024, 2), COMECE and to some extent the ECPP emphasize asylum rights and human dignity, partly framing migration policies within a humanitarian value discourse. COMECE’s advocacy for migrants is not surprising and Turner argues that COMECE is able to more forcefully and consistently advocate for migration and asylum than party politicians, who are bound by electoral concerns (Turner 2021, 378–379).

The EPP’s and ECPP’s narratives partly contrast European values with Islam, depicting “Islamism” as a threat to religious freedom and cultural cohesion, echoing Hidalgo’s observations (2019, 41). This article groups such themes together based on their recurring connection in the analysis. In political discourse, Muslims and migration are frequently conflated, overlooking “(lived) religiosity or the respective personal relationship with Islam” (Thielmann 2013, 204). Integration is framed as a prerequisite for belonging to a value-based “community.” This is especially clear in the EPP’s positive portrayal of migration only in the case of Ukrainian refugees. Migrants from other backgrounds are subject to othering, suggesting a hierarchy of minorities based on attributed values (Amir-Moazami 2025, 124).

The debate on whether to restrict migration has been a priority for the EPP since 2015 (Handwerker 2019). However, as shown by the analysis of COMECE and the ECPP, values are also used to argue for migrant-friendly policies. As Hildago has explained, “Christian values” are a factor in such policies (2019, 34). Additionally, migration and Islam are closely connected to the third main topic.

5.4.3 Cluster C: Christian Roots, Identity, and Heritage

Historical narratives play a significant role in grounding values for Christian political parties. The EPP frequently invokes Europe’s “Judeo-Christian roots” (EPP 2024, 2) to reinforce historical continuity of a specific European identity and a European “civilization.” The ECPP connects its values to Christian roots, while COMECE focuses on restoring old churches to preserve the continent’s cultural heritage. The rhetoric of the EPP and ECPP highlights selective remembering of heritage, where references to “Christian roots” function as exclusivist markers of identity (Lähdesmäki 2014). This use of “cultural Christianity” mobilizes identity politics by portraying heritage as fixed, framing in-groups and out-groups (Hennig and Hidalgo 2021), and legitimizing current value-driven policies (De Cesari et al. 2019; Topolski 2016).

In this regard, Lähdesmäki (2014) notes that discourses on heritage and values are not neutral depictions of history but narrative recollections that shape present conflicts and future perceptions. The past is thus characterized and evaluated based on today’s conflicts, which determine the present and future (Lähdesmäki 2014). The power of the discursive actors of the present also plays a decisive role in what is and is not considered heritage (405), as well as what is labeled worthy of protection. Similarly, the framing of Christianity as both threatened and foundational to Europe’s future is central to contemporary value discourses in the EU (Valaskivi et al. 2023).

The EPP in particular draws a strong link between European values, rationality, and the Enlightenment, framing them as connected to Christianity. This connection implicitly contrasts with Islam, which is often portrayed as lacking these traits. As Amir-Moazami (2025, 125) notes, Enlightenment is often attributed to Christianity, reinforcing a civilizational narrative that others Muslim identities. In this context, migrants—especially those from Muslim-majority countries—are not automatically seen as carriers of these values, unlike Ukrainian refugees, who are less problematized. This selective inclusion contributes to a broader discursive dynamic of cultural othering. The case studies emphasize the “European way of life” as rooted in Christian values under threat—from liberal family policies, the migration crisis, and “Sharia law.” Hence, Orbán’s rhetoric is echoed by others (Lamour 2022), using the “European way of life” to oppose migrant and often Muslim identities (Marchetti et al. 2022). This discursive framing presents a hegemonic European-Christian cultural sphere that delineates who belongs within the EU’s moral and cultural boundaries (Bettiza et al. 2023; Weymans 2023).

6 Discussion

The discourses on values found in the documents investigated in this article can be examined through the theoretical lens of the empty signifier (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Laclau 1996; 2005). In the following, this should be discussed as well as the limitations of this study.

6.1 Values as Empty Signifiers

In the present study, the term “values” is treated as an empty signifier in the sense described by Laclau: flexible enough to accommodate multiple interpretations while retaining positionality in the organizations’ discourses. The empty signifier expresses various claims and endeavors, thus determining values. Laclau also uses the term “empty fullness” (2005, 106) to indicate a point of reference in the discourse that structures the latter by being in “between particular content and universal function” (106). As meaning is fluid, the definition of “values” remains deliberately open in this article. On the one hand, the word reflects a hegemonic understanding of values as the cornerstone of the EU, and it specifies what they entail. On the other hand, it is still ambiguous because different meanings can be assigned to it (171). Values appear to unify diverse topics—migration, family, heritage—while remaining conceptually rather vague, a vagueness that is typical for “proto-values” that range between broadness and specificness (Kenter et al. 2019, 1450). This vagueness allows different actors to project their own meanings onto it, making it a powerful rhetorical tool.

The (Christian) values mentioned in the documents analyzed in this study function as empty signifiers. This applies not only to the term “values”—whether accompanied by “European” or “Christian”—but also to specifications presented by the organizations as core values, such as “freedom” or “dignity.” These values can have specific content, but they also preserve the term’s overarching appeal. Antagonism and threats further structure the discourses in the documents (e.g., liberal family and gender policies, Russia, Islamism, etc.) and different meanings appear. It is likely part of the nature of values that they remain rather vague, and it is not very surprising that Christian actors participate in the discourse on values and Christian values. Additionally, because these organizations must appeal to diverse audiences transnationally, the vagueness of their value language may reflect this attempt to include these backgrounds. Nevertheless, this study demonstrates how values are used by the three actors to structure the discourse.

The study’s findings echo those of Weymans (2023, 109), who argues that within the EU, discourse on specific and unspecific “values” has been adapted for wider audiences, leading to flexibility and ambiguity. However, the case studies examined here do not entirely support Weymans’s claim: There is no indication of a departure from “religious and civilizational references or argumentations” (108). On the contrary, such arguments are employed by all three organizations—particularly by the ECPP (religious references) and the EPP (civilizational references)—to reinforce their discourses on values. As Foret similarly concludes regarding religion in the European Parliament, this study also shows how religious references through values are “mobilized to harden the boundaries between ‘us’ (‘Christian Europe’ or ‘secular enlightened Europe’) and ‘them’ (‘the Muslims’ or ‘the obscurantist religionists’)” (2021, 334). This demarcation is visible in the analyzed case studies.

6.2 Limitations

This study’s database consists of a range of publications—election manifestos, statements, and reports. The focus is on public discourse, and the documents analyzed are those the organizations themselves chose to publish—material possibly aimed at shaping public and political debate.

Additionally, this study does not aim to establish strict definitions of “(European/Christian) values,” but to examine how different actors mobilize these terms. Emphasis is placed on emic understandings: how organizations define, blur, or contrast these concepts for strategic or rhetorical purposes. Actors sometimes use “Christian values” and “European values” interchangeably. Rather than treating this ambiguity as a limitation, it is understood as a defining feature of value-based discourse in the EU.

Moreover, the different types of organizations studied—COMECE, the ECPP, and the EPP—result in different available materials. This must be considered in interpreting and comparing their roles. The three cases represent actors with different levels of influence, from a religious group to the EU’s largest political party. Thus, rather than being directly comparable, they are distinct but interconnected contributors to the discourse. Although the examples discussed are not exhaustive, they demonstrate how these Christian organizations engage in shaping EU debates on (Christian) values and the topics they connect with it.

7 Conclusion

This study investigated the discourses on Christian values of three European political parties and organizations. The results highlight certain differences of note. In its report, COMECE focuses primarily on human dignity in migration politics, peace, and abortion; it also stresses the need to rediscover the Christian roots of the EU, which unite it. The topic of abortion is also important for the ECPP. In its discourse on values, the party argues in favor of conservative family policies and biopolitics, and it grounds its value discourse on theological principles, which represent a meta-narrative for political action. In the EPP’s discourse on values, the emphasis is on the economy, restrictive migration and integration policies, belonging, and external and internal threats (e.g., terrorism and Russia). For the EPP, values are also the historical foundation of the EU; in addition, they are decisive in achieving a sense of belonging in contemporary times. For all three organizations, the politics of belonging frame conservative biopolitics as well as references to “Christian roots” and living according to the “European way of life” as part of the in-group of the European community. The findings also underscore the significance of linking discourses on values to notions of European heritage. Although the three organizations have established relationships with one another (e.g., COMECE and EPP) (Foret 2021, 331; Zanon and Sciortino 2014, 509), their foci slightly differ, but they also show similarities.

By using Laclau’s concept of the empty signifier, this study demonstrated that the term “values” serves as a symbol that different groups can fill with meanings, thus unifying a range of topics under the hegemonic power of this term. Consequently, for the three organizations in question, references to “values” and “Christian values” suggest that values are the cornerstone of the EU, and they reinforce their visions of Europe’s past, present, and future. However, despite this fixation on values, there is uncertainty because other meanings can be attributed to “values,” making this term an empty signifier that has a universal purchase on the hegemonic discourse of European identity and its boundary-drawing ability. By treating “values” as an empty signifier, the study highlights how its strategic ambiguity enables actors to project their own meanings onto the term—whether framed as “Christian values,” “European values,” or both.

Through highlighting the adaptability of values in European political discourse, this article contributes to a deeper understanding of how these constructs are mobilized to shape notions of the EU’s past, present, and future. Although the examples discussed here are not conclusive, they illustrate the significant role that values and Christian values play in forming political and cultural narratives that reinforce Europe’s heritage, self-understanding, and political frameworks.

Acknowledgments

I express my gratitude to Dorothea Lüddeckens and Mira Menzfeld, as well as the two anonymous reviewers, for their constructive feedback and support. I would also like to thank Rafael Walthert and Andrea Rota for their helpful ideas during the early stages of this research project.
1

It is important to differentiate between attitudes, norms and values: Attitudes are individual views without normative force; they express personal convictions. Norms are rules laid down directly or indirectly by society, which prescribe specific actions and entail sanctions. Values are fundamental convictions about what is good; they do not require direct instructions to be implemented and provide a framework for norms and attitudes (for the differentiation see Polak 2023, 74).

2

In this context, in contrast to ECPP, the present article adopts a neutral term in place of “female genital mutilation” (FGM). For discussions on the research discourse surrounding FGM, which includes elements of othering, see Bosshart and Marxer 2023.

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Titel:
Values as Empty Signifiers?
Artikelkategorie:
Research Article
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1163/18748929-bja10142
Sprache:
Englisch
Seiten:
1–21
Keywords:
value politics; EU; Christian parties and organizations; content analysis; Laclau
Quelltitel:
Journal of Religion in Europe
Band/Ausgabe:
Artikelvorabzugriff
Received:
10 Feb 2025
Accepted:
29 Jul 2025
Verleger:
Brill
eISSN:
1874-8929
Print ISSN:
1874-8910
Fachgebiete:
Religionsgeschichte, Religionswissenschaften, Religion & Gesellschaft, Sozialwissenschaften, Religion, Nahost- und Islamwissenschaften, Religionsanthropologie, Vergleichende Religionswissenschaft & Religionswissenschaft

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