Area of study: Lake Chad
SOURCE: DRAWN BY ETTORE MORELLI ON ARCGIS ONLINE.
1 Introduction
The border, a social, geographical, and political construction, is a condition for the existence and survival of all living organisms. It is to the State what keratin is to insects, bark to trees, endocarp to seeds, integument to eggs, and cuticle to stems.1 This construction, intended to cage populations in order to control, monitor, or at least influence them, was used by Europeans in the formerly colonized territories to clearly distinguish between those who had access to the rights and benefits from the State and those who could not due to their status as natives or non-natives of the concerned colonial empire.2 In Africa, international boundaries stem from explorations and approximate locations of territories. These rigid boundaries, with their profound impact on African communities, challenged the spatial logic that prevailed in the pre-colonial period when territories functioned through networks of alliances, belongings, allegiances, and concentric relationships.3 In the Lake Chad Basin, for example, these colonial borders bear the scars of European rivalries for access to the Lake Chad strategic position. The borders have partitioned many ethnic groups who live today, straddling the Lake Chad Basin dyads.4 The presence of these cross-border communities has long been analysed dramatically. This perception originates from the stereotype of a Balkanized Africa, divided between
Contrary to this perception, this paper draws on the example of the Lake Chad Basin to show that these borders are, on the opposite, places of continuous and diverse expression of multifaceted freedoms. What are the foundations, and how is the freedom of local populations at the margins and borders expressed in this space? This work’s vernacular approach analyses the boundaries through the prism of the daily life of individuals in the Lake Chad Basin.7 The dynamic examination of the ‘borderities’8 in this space shows that contrary to popular belief, the borders have always been a place of freedom and liberty for the local populations. While intellectuals and politicians perorate on putative borders’ harmful effects, these artifacts weakly disturb local people’s everyday border crossing. Even in the face of the Covid-19 pandemic, the various teichopolitics9 have been relatively effective because local populations created alternate routes and continued to exercise their liberty and freedom in the manner similar to the virus, which does not adhere to visa formalities when crossing from one country to another.
2 Geographical, Conceptual, and Theoretical Framework
This chapter is deeply influenced by transnational paradigms which offer a more comprehensive understanding of the relationships between different nationality’s social actors.10 These theories are particularly relevant in informal dynamics and multiple territorial and social affiliations. They view the border
Going beyond these theoretical choices, this work challenges the Pan-Africanist, victimized, and militant current in African borders historiography. This current emphasizes the separating function of borders, considering them an obstacle to the Pan-Africanist dream. In this framework, these political artifacts are studied only to be condemned.14 The Africanist literature insists on their ‘artificiality’ and denounces their multiple adverse effects (delay in development, population imbalances, migration, and conflicts). In this configuration, the concepts of ‘artificial borders’ and ‘African balkanization’ are part of those ‘venerable beliefs that one hardly dares to scratch for fear of committing sacrilege’.15 These pious dogmas had ended up imposing themselves on common sense. The militant approach to African borders is also part of a ‘liturgical mode of victimization’.16 Beyond its victim and militant posture, this paradigm is marked by a historicism which, like the economicism of liberal approaches, is not always relevant to analysing the dynamics on African borders.17
However, challenging this epistemological stance is a crucial step towards the ‘disarmament’ of African borders and their perception as stitches and welding. This shift in perspective, exemplified by the Pan-Africanist current of African borders historiography in the early 2000s,18 has led to a new
As part of Critical Border Studies (CBS), this research adopts a comprehensive approach, combinig two main methodological approaches: direct observation of border dynamics in the Lake Chad Basin, particularly in the Lake and around the Mandara Mountains and the banks of the Logone, and interviews with local actors. Over the period from 2004 and 2022, I conducted ethnographic research on the settlement of the border dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria in Lake Chad and the land border. I also researched the Boko Haram insurgency in the far northern region of Cameroon. My fieldwork involved observing border dynamics, tracking the activities of local actors, and deciphering the underlying logic and dynamics. The data for this chapter was also sourced from the security and administrative archives in Cameroon. To ensure a balanced perspective, I consulted regional newspapers, reports from local NGO s, and academic literature, thereby avoiding any biased generalizations related to the Cameroonian prism of the ethnographic survey. The cross-analysis of this comprehensive data gives set yields compelling insights into why the borders of the Lake Chad Basin are thresholds, how freedom and liberty for the local populations are expressed daily. Beyond these theoretical and epistemological considerations, the Lake Chad Basin serves as the geographical backdrop for this study.
The Lake Chad Basin, a region of complex geographical and political dynamics, is subject of debate in the existing literature.20 Geographically, it encompasses the eponymous watershed whose extent is estimated at 2,382,000 km2 and which integrates the Sahelian shores of Algeria, Libya, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, and the Central African Republic (CAR).21 Its network primarily consists of the Chari-Logone-El Beid river system and the Komadugu-Yobé ensemble. Politically, the Lake Chad Basin refers to the space managed
The Lake Chad Basin, a region that bears the historical weight of being a crossroads of colonial ambitions, roughly corresponds to the territory of the former kingdom of Kanem-Bornu and its margins. This kingdom, founded in the eighth century, reached its peak between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.22 The early eighteenth century saw the destruction of Kanem-Bornu by Rabbah, who invaded Darfur in 1887 and extended his authority to the Ubangi-Chari, where he clashed with France. His victories included the conquest of Baguirmi in 1892, the defeat of the army of the Shehu of Borno, and the establishment of his palace at Dikwa in 1893.23 The British took control of part of Borno as early as 1902, while the other part, including the former Capital of Rabah, Dikwa, came under German control. The French settled in Fort-Lamy after defeating Rabbah.24 The study of horogenesis in the Lake Chad Basin reveals that this space was a focal point of Anglo-Franco-German colonial ambitions, each of which believed Lake Chad was navigable and insisted on having access to it.25
Beside Lake Chad, the Mandara Mountains and rivers Logone, Chari, and El Beïd are the main physical border in the Lake Chad Basin. The flow of these rivers varies with the seasons and dries up completely during the dry season. It causes border conflicts in Lake Chad, which generally focus on water and land. Indeed, in this half-desert Sahelo-Sudanese zone, this reserve of fresh water is vital for local populations, animals, and even nature through infiltration and evaporation. The area is also the scene of political, ecological, economic, and security issues. In recent years, population pressure, climate warming, and desertification have threatened Lake Chad’s existence.26 This situation has pushed people to flee to the Lake deep areas. The resulting population concentration has degraded the environment and available natural resources. The problem has become even more complex since the discovery
The territory of the former kingdom of Kanem-Bornu is therefore shared between the Nigerian Borno state, the Cameroonian administrative Divisions of Logone-et-Chari (Kousseri), Mayo-Sava (Mora), the district of Maga in the north of the Mayo-Danay Division (Yagoua), and the Chadian ‘prefectures’ of Lac (Bol), Kanem (Maio) Chari-Baguirmi (N’Djamena) Bata (Ati) and southeastern Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET). The Lake Chad28 itself is shared between Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria, and Chad. Its borders were the subject of intense negotiations between the French, British, and German colonizers, notably over the city of Yola, the political and religious capital of the Emirate of Sokoto, a large commercial centre, and the terminus of ivory and kola caravan tracks from the south of the country.29 The British had mandated the Royal Niger Company to sign a protectorate treaty with the indigenous rulers of the Yola region. The intervention of France, on whose behalf the explorer Mizon had obtained an agreement from the Emir of Yola, has precipitated negotiations between Britain and Germany.30 The various international borders in the Lake Chad Basin were demarcated during the colonial period. However, after incidents between Nigeria and Chad between April and June 1983, the borders were more precisely demarcated in Lake Chad under the auspices of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), a reassuring sign of the region’s commitment to peaceful coexistence and cooperation.31
Borders problems have long been an issue in the relations between Nigeria and its francophone neighbors. Vogt and Ate have emphasized the ‘French
Lake Chad
Legend: dotted line = shoreline of Lake Chad in 1972; grey area = Lake Chad in 2024.
SOURCE: DRAWN BY ETTORE MORELLI FROM DATA PROVIDED BY AIMÉ RAOUL SUMO TAYO, AND CHRISTIAN SEIGNOBOS, ‘LA RÉGION DU LAC TCHAD SOUS L’HYPOTHÈQUE BOKO HARAM’, HÉRODOTE, 172, 1, 2019, 63–86
The International Court of Justice in The Hague settled the border dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria on 10 October 2002. Subsequently, new border pillars were installed under the auspices of a sub-commission of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, assisted by United Nations experts.36 Currently, bilateral relations between the States of the Lake Chad Basin are relatively peaceful. The LCBC, serving as an interface for the joint management of environmental and safety issues, plays a crucial role in maintaining the region’s stability. However, at the organizational level, the functioning of this organization is hampered by the sovereigntist claims or fears of States. The crisis linked to the jihadist group Boko Haram recently led to the establishment of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). However, besides problems with funding, MNJTF’s main problem is mistrust. Also, there are mutual complaints, countries blaming neighbours for internal problems. There is also a low military and national pride problem as Nigeria has shown reluctance to accept foreign military force on its territory several times.37
This chapter frames the threshold in terms of a line to be crossed, in terms of freedom broadly, including related concepts such as independence, autonomy,
In the same vein, defunctionalization is considered here as the process during which classic functions of borders (military, identity, competence, fiscal, screening, shell, filter, panopticon, and fulcrum functions) are attenuated or eliminated to make them more flexible and as instruments of cooperation. This process also refers to debordering and ‘deterritorialization’.41 In fact, borders are not playing their traditional differentiation function in the Lake Chad Basin. Indeed, the border is theoretically an essential element in producing identities and a ‘support for the consolidation of belongings’.42 As the philosopher Étienne Balibar points out, borders constitute the ‘institutional fixation point of political identities and the point where these identities become uncertain again’.43 At least, the differentiation function may have been induced by adopting the official colonial language, English (Nigeria) or French (Cameroon, Chad, Niger). Instead, vehicular languages serve as hyphens for cross-border communities.
3 The Configuration of Borderlands as a Factor of Freedom and Liberty for Local Populations
The movements of people and goods in the Lake Chad Basin are influenced by a set of factors, including the geographical configuration of border areas, the porosity of borders, a lack of territorial control, and the presence of cross-border communities. However, what truly sets this region apart is the unique freedom of local borderlanders, a freedom that is linked with blurred citizenship and specific social perceptions of international borders.
3.1 The Lack of Territorial Control
The borderlands in the Lake Chad Basin have long been socio-economic grey zones due to the weak presence of the State and the prevalence of criminal activities. Lake Chad, in particular, has been, since at least the fifteenth century, a grey zone, that is to say, a lawless, deregulated, abandoned, and decaying area. Surrogate authorities have been vying with the state for a monopoly on legitimate violence and a fiscal monopoly.44 In some border areas, ‘the informal economy and armed factions compete with the nation-state for undisputed control of regulatory authority and financial power’.45 Local entrepreneurs of violence have long constituted themselves as surrogate authorities. Since the pre-colonial period, Lake Chad has been a refuge for rebel populations. Over the centuries, this space has been a place for ‘societies of refusal’, counter-societies of ‘bandits’, traffickers, or jihadists, all forming the ‘collective of refusal’.46 During the 1990s, the Lake had been one area of refuge for the Chadian Movement for Democracy and Justice (MDJT) rebel group.47 An endemic
Lake Chad basin borderlands are far from the countries’ capitals except for Chad. For example, the Cameroonian locality of Fotokol is 305 km from Maroua, the regional capital, and more than 1500 km from Yaoundé, the country’s capital. Nevertheless, Fotokol is near the Nigerian city of Gambaru-Ngala, separated only by the bridge over the El Beïd River. This Cameroonian town is very landlocked because of the poor state roads. The remoteness of the borderlands from the capitals has thus created a weakness in territorial control.
One of the most significant consequences of the Lake Chad Basin remoteness is the absence of basic social infrastructure for local populations.49 These spaces are not permanently endowed with state services. A report from the Cameroonian Ministry of Territorial Administration highlighted the difficulty of controlling Lake Chad’s islands due to the absence of a permanent local administration or unit of law enforcement and defense units, as well as the lack of social infrastructure such as schools, roads, health centres.50 In the same vein, the Boudouma people, some of whom have pledged allegiance to Boko Haram, have expressed dissatisfaction with the absence of the State. Some were not even aware of the colors of the Chadian flag before 2015.51 The lack of public investment and territorial control has turned the borderlands in the Lake Chad Basin into lands of disobedience.52 The lack of regular contact with the administrative authorities, marginalization from other parts of the national territory, and problematic access to social services can lead to
The poor territorial distribution of control structures also explains the porosity of the borders around Lake Chad. Some border sections of the various dyads lack substantive border control. In some Cameroon-Nigeria border sections, Cameroonian authorities have set up police and customs services at least 10 km from the border, presumably to avoid friction with Nigeria.54 Until the early 2000s, even patrols by Cameroon’s security services were rare on the Lake Chad islands. The most advanced force was a small section of seven gendarmes at Blangoua.55 Moreover, the states on the shores of Lake Chad have minimal human and material resources for border control. Between 2014 and 2016, Niger, Nigeria, and Cameroon were overwhelmed by the capabilities of the paramilitary threats they were facing.56
One of the common characteristics of borderlands in the Lake Chad Basin is the virtual absence of states. As a result, Cameroonian people, for example, who thought they were neglected, quickly bowed to Nigerian traditional authorities or customs and tax officials. In the few places where state actors are present, border governance is marked by corruption and bad governance, perpetuating the belief among the local populations that the state is there only to exploit them. This perception not only weakens allegiances to the state but also fosters a deaf opposition. Moreover, in 2017, three of the four countries concerned occupied the leading group of the most corrupt countries in the world, according to the ranking published by the NGO Transparency International.57 The situation is even more dramatic at the borders, where all public services constitute nests of institutionalized corruption. The assignment of a civil servant to the margins is usually a means for the
3.2 The Presence of Cross-Border Communities
Beyond the lack of territorial control, the freedom and liberty of local populations in the Lake Chad Basin can be explained by the presence of cross-border communities. Indeed, in this area, many homogeneous ethnic groups have been partitioned by the international border, constituting ‘hyphen communities’.58 This situation challenges the perception of linear borders and creates a continuum. For example, the Kanuri (also called Bornouans in Cameroun) live between Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria, and Chad. These founders of the Bornu Empire were with the Mandara the most significant slave raiders in the Lake Chad Basin.59 The Mandaras are also found in Cameroon and Nigeria. Their former capital was Kerawa in Nigeria. Today, it is in Mora in Cameroon.60 They are found in Cameroon in Kousseri and Logone Birni sultanates.61
Alongside the Kanuri, the Shuwa Arabs, whom Brann calls the Sudanese Arabs, are the second people straddling the borders. They are mainly found in the areas of Dikwa (Nigeria), N’Djamena (Chad), and Kousseri (Cameroon).62 Other ‘hyphen communities’ belong to the neo-Sudanese ensemble, such as the Kotoko, the Mousgoum, and the Massa. They settled near Logone and the Chari.63 The Toupouri, the Massa, and the Mundang are the main cross-border communities on the Chadian-Cameroonian border. Boulet and Podlewski locate their origin in the Bornu Empire. Mokam distinguishes the Mundang Za-sin (that is to say, ‘from above’), from the Diamaré plain in Cameroon and north of Pala in Chad, and the Mundang Kabi (literally, ‘those of water’), mainly in Chad. In the latter country, the Mundang are found primarily in the ‘prefecture’ of Mayo-Kebbi. In Cameroon, they are scattered in the Divisions
In the Lake Chad Basin, cross-border communities also belong to the so-called ‘Chadic’ ensemble, with Paleo-Sudanese peoples such as the Mafa, the Mafou, the Daba, the Kapsiki (called Highi in Nigeria), the Guidar, the Guiziga, and the Mandara. Many other micro-ethnic groups are found on the massifs, plateaus, and foothills of the Mandara Mountains south of Mora.66 There are also the Sukur, from the locality of Psakali, next to Mokolo in Cameroon, and the Fali, found in Cameroon and Nigeria, near Mubi. There are also the Bachama-bata called Bwatiye nowadays, living as well in Nigeria as in the Benue Valley in Cameroon and the Kotoko. The latter are found in Cameroon, Nigeria, and Chad.67 The Kotoko are the oldest occupants of the shores of Lake Chad. They built principalities, the most important of which are the current sultanates of Goulfey, Kousseri, Makari, Logone-Birni, Afadé, Bodo, and Woulki. Traditionally Muslim, they are mainly fishermen, although they increasingly engage in trade and agriculture.68 In Lake Chad, the Buduma are one of the leading cross-border communities. They refer to themselves as ‘Yidena’. The Kanuri call them ‘Buduma’, and the Kanembou call them ‘Kuri’.69
Physically, it is challenging to differentiate the citizens of one country.70 As elsewhere in Africa, communities, by straddling borders, have avoided the creation of deserts as buffer zones and created opportunities for cooperation. The community of networks of exchange between several ethnic groups has superposed networks of relations, the boundaries of which do not coincide.
Beyond the ethnic question, transnational vehicular languages in the Lake Chad Basin allow the fluidity of international exchanges. Hausa serves as a lingua franca on the shores of Lake Chad, especially on the Nigerien-Nigerian and Cameroonian-Nigerian dyads. On the border with Chad, this language is strongly challenged by Arabic. Standard communication systems create continuities in space, especially since these people speak the language of kinship, descent, and alliance. In this context, the boundaries are blurred because they encompass all individuals with whom it is usually possible to maintain relationships, creating discontinuities in social relations.72
3.3 Afuctional Borders
The borders in the Lake Chad Basin do not fully play their classic differentiation, allocation of competencies, fiscal, customs, and control functions. The border disputes recorded in the Lake Chad Basin originate in the massive settlement of peasants and pastoralists, who were victims of the droughts of 1972–1973 and 1983–1985. These populations, primarily Nigerian, settled massively in the Cameroonian part of the Lake because, in their country, large arable and grazing areas had been confiscated by the authorities as part of the Chad Basin Development Authority (CBDA) project.73 This project, while aiming for development, has had profound social and economic consequences, leading to tensions and disputes over the demarcation of international borders are thus linked to the land question. Traditional leaders often challenge international boundaries to compensate for insufficient arable land.74 Depending on their interests, populations invoke ancestral and pre-colonial rights or property rights based on nationality to support their claims. Challenges to international boundaries by populations are recurrent at Lake Chad. Until the 2000s, the people of Boumgour Makary, for example, disputed the arable land of the Lake with the Nigerians of Ngala. The gradual withdrawal of the waters of the Lake during the dry season advanced Nigerian herders in transhumance towards Cameroonian lands, which, in the same period, were occupied by Cameroonian fishermen.75 Nigerian herders and farmers particularly coveted
Historically, the Cameroonian islands of Lake Chad have been predominantly inhabited by Nigerians. In the Darak sub-division, for instance, during the 2000s, foreign populations, primarily Nigerians, made up 90% of the total population.77 This demographic reality has often led to tensions, as many migrants tend to question the authority of local chiefs and prefer to seek assistance from the authorities and police forces of their countries of origin. According to Cameroonian administrative reports, the Nigerian people of Lake Chad have long been cultivating Cameroonian land and, over time, not only refused to pay traditional taxes but, eventually, claimed the land as Nigerian territory.78 Nigerian traditional chiefs have even established representatives in Cameroon, with the Lawan (traditional ruler) of Wulgo going as far as planting the Nigerian flag and renaming Cameroonian islands in the late 1980s.79
Undoubtedly, the presence of cross-border communities is a significant factor for open borders in the Lake Chad Basin. This is also true for the afunctional nature of international borders. Like most African borders, the dyads of the Lake Chad Basin are porous. It’s important to note that emphasizing the porous nature of these borders is not pejorative. Just as pores allow the skin to breathe, ports, bridges, and other border crossing points are the routes of exchange with the outside. To describe a border as a sieve is to acknowledge its true function, which is to filter. As the saying goes, ‘a living system is a thermodynamic system of exchanges with the terrestrial, maritime, social environment’.80
It is not the porous nature of borders that is the issue, but their afunctionality. Due to their configuration, government policies, and local dynamics, these borders do not fulfil their screening, filter, or panopticon functions. The absence of significant obstacles to the movement of people and goods, coupled with the weakness of control structures, exacerbates the problem. The personnel dedicated to border control are often poorly equipped, complacent, and corrupted. Border control, management, monitoring, and protection are
Globally, the Lake Chad Basin borders are easy to cross for local populations. It is why this space has maintained its specific identity despite colonial borders. The various borders in the Lake Chad Basin are thus kinds of weld points for local populations. This transparency of borders is also due to the configuration of borderlands and the resulting polarisation effect. In many cases, the border puts face-to-face two adjoining cities where the distinction of the international boundary is tricky. It is the case between the Nigerian locality of Banki and Amchidé in Cameroon. Both towns have a common market on the international border, which a simple bamboo has long materialized. However, a boundary pillar was built between the two border towns in 2004.
This porosity is also linked to the nature of the border elements in the Lake Chad Basin. The border flow of rivers Logone, Chari, and El Beïd varies with the seasons and dries up completely during the dry season. For example, the El-Beïd River, between Cameroon and Nigeria, changes course and dries up during the summer, making the border extremely porous and multiplying infiltration routes and smuggling tracks. It is generally admitted that where the border is easy to cross, we often witness the creation of border territories-areas where the border is not a barrier but a meeting point, contributing to the formation of a specific identity spaces.82 This situation explains the freedom and liberty local populations enjoy in the Lake Chad Basin, as with the demographic, economic, social, and cultural polarization toward Nigeria.
3.4 Border and Polarization Effects in the Lake Chad Basin
The Lake Chad Basin borderlands are unique in their territorial, cultural, and economic transitional nature. They fall under the category of ‘maximum borders’, a term used to describe borders with significant cultural, linguistic, and
The area is also experiencing a significant polarization effect due to the strong dependence on borderlands on the Nigerian side. This polarization is linked with ecological differentials and the resulting trading systems.85 The entire Lake Chad Basin’s economy is heavily reliant on Maiduguri, Nigeria, following a pre-colonial territorial logic.86 The economy of the Lake is extroverted, with trade conducted only in Naïra, and the entire fish production is sold in Nigeria,87 controlled by Nigerian traders. For instance, the Cameroonian island of Darak exports 80% of its 1,400,000 tons of fish to Maiduguri in Nigeria.88 This significant interaction is also evident in the shared use of land for cultural and pastoral activities, shared markets, and participation in the same social activities.
There is also a religious polarization with the movements of itinerant students to imams of great renown, especially in Nigeria and Chad. This mobility has favoured the expansion of Islamic reformist movements.89 The extension of the operational area of Boko Haram, a Nigerian jihadist group, cannot be understood without considering this polarization effect, which is particularly pronounced in the Lake Chad Basin. Indeed, the Islamist sect has taken advantage of the borderland’s geopolitical, anthropo-sociological, and socio-economic configuration to expand to Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Ultimately, the configuration of the borderlands in the Lake Chad Basin favours the
4 Border Dynamics, Liberty, and Freedom for Local Populations
The geographical and sociological layout of border areas in the Lake Chad Basin favors plural expressions of local populations’ liberty and freedom. This chapter focuses on the persistence of cross-border ethnic solidarity, blued citizenship, and an intense movement of people and goods that make the Lake Chad Basin an integrated space, with its borders serving as thresholds.
4.1 The Persistence of Secular Ethnic Solidarities
The international borders in the Lake Chad Basin have not overcome pre-colonial ethnic solidarity as cross-border communities continue to maintain close relations. The symbiosis is so intense that the slightest intercommunal conflict in one country has repercussions in another. For example, during the Arab insurrection of 1919 in Cameroon, the Shuwa received support from their brothers in Chad and Nigeria. Also, during the January 1992 clashes between the Kotoko and the Shuwa Arabs, there was a cross-border mobilization as relatives of both sides reportedly flocked from neighbouring villages and countries armed with knives and firearms.90 It was also the case recently in 2021. Saïbou Issa’s observation that ‘gravitating in the orbit of the [neighbouring] territory, the populations tend to lose the reflex of national feeling, ethnic solidarity then prevailing over national solidarity’,91 provides a theoretical framework for understanding the issue. Therefore, the borders on Lake Chad’s shores do not play their function of differentiation. They do not even make it possible to determine what is national and what is not. Similarly, this persistence of cross-border ethnic solidarity generates security and law enforcement problems.
These populations participate in activities on both sides of the border and are similarly engaged in agricultural activities.92 Even after independence, cross-border dynamics allowed foreign populations to have farms in the
On the border between Niger and Nigeria, there is a real economic integration from below, which revolves around official and especially clandestine exchanges. Cross-border ethnic similarities play an essential role. There is a close symbiosis Among the Hausa on both sides of the border because of their culture, language, frameworks of thought, and social and religious values.96 On this last aspect, the mobility of Quranic teachers and Nigerien students to Quranic centres renowned for perfecting their education creates a certain homogeneity of Islam and its currents of thought in the region.97 Generally, cross-bordalities in the Lake Chad Basin are beneficial or problematic.98 In the present case, the Boko Haram crisis is one of the problems that cross-bordality can pose, particularly the presence of people living straddling the various dyads. Indeed, despite officials’ denials, Cameroon, for example, has long
4.2 Lake Chad Basin as an Integrated Space: the Movement of People and Goods
The persistence of cross-border ethnic dynamics manifests local populations’ liberty and freedom in the Lake Chad Basin, the same as the intense movement of people and goods. In this space, exchanges from below are ancient. In many ways, this space has always been an ‘African crossroads’.99 Lake Chad basin’s borders have never been barriers for local populations, as shown by archives and even colonial and post-colonial legislation. Therefore, they have never prevented the movement of border populations. Since the colonial period, deterritorialized practices have created a floating population.
Moreover, the colonial powers abhorred this situation because of its effects on taxation and labour. Indeed, by losing its ability to control local populations, the state sees its ability to control its territory diminish.100 In British Cameroon, for example, the border regime was weak. The colonial authorities explained this situation with the costs of monitoring the border, which could not be compensated by the results to be expected. They also raised the problem of indigenous citizenship. On this point, the British questioned whether citizenship should be considered in terms of place of residence or territory of origin. They believed it was necessary to consider Cameroonians forced by the Germans to settle on the other side of the border. For the English, citizenship was a function of residence, while for the French, it was a function of place of origin.101 As for the French, the decree of 19 October 1937 regulating the emigration and immigration of indigenous people in Cameroon offered a derogation regime for the populations of neighbouring border areas. Herders and
After independence, states’ legislations and daily practices promoted the mobility of border populations. For example, the Convention of 6 February 1963 between Nigeria and Cameroon states that between the two countries, ‘entry is free for three months, after which the immigrant must be asked to prove his means of subsistence’. Moreover, the mobility of people in this geographical space is a fundamental element of identity and trade, in short, an element of survival through the activities of transhumance, business, and episodic migration for agro-pastoral reasons, for example. The stability of the Lake Chad Basin depends on seasonal migration and trade relations to ancient settlement areas, including those of Diamaré, Komadougou Yobé, Mundang, and Toupouri.102 Finally, the colonial border has not successfully imposed the ‘territorial space’ over the ‘social space’. In such a context, local populations have various belongings that go beyond the framework of the State.103 They use borders as a resource and as a source of opportunities. The freedom and liberty of populations create a form of integration from below, a concept that refers to the grassroots level of integration driven by historical, economic, and cultural solidarity within the Lake Chad Basin, in a context where institutional integration initiatives from above are stalling, and official trade is meagre.
One of the commonplaces about African border dynamics is the supposed weakness of intra-community trade. Michel Foucher noted a policy of ‘defragmentation’ and the weakness of intra-community trade on the African continent: ‘Africa, mostly extroverted, trades more easily with the rest of the world than with itself’.104 The fragmentation of the continent would thus be an obstacle to intra-regional development, mainly because of its effects, significant transaction costs, non-tariff barriers, immigration procedures, the scale of informal cross-border trade, and the thickness of borders, which is illustrated by the weakness of logistical performance (networks, customs, procedures).105
Similarly, the Lake Chad Basin has almost no border effects, particularly on costs, trade volumes, and national preferences and tastes. On this last aspect, the border does not affect consumers’ economic preferences, which is called ‘domestic consumer bias.’110 For example, the Cameroonian populations of the Lake Chad Basin prefer to trade with the neighbouring country than with
This situation shows that life in the Lake Chad Basin depends on cross-border mobility. In normal conditions, the Lake Chad basin is an integrated space where the border does not affect the mobility of people, goods, and services. The signal of the mobile telephone companies crosses boundaries, allowing better communication between borderlanders. Even for the military, borders have become more fluid. A mechanism set up by the LCBC enables the Cameroonian and Chadian armies to conduct operations as far as Nigerian territory. This regional cooperation is crucial in the fight against Boko Haram. Also, Nigerian soldiers and police have regularly crossed the border into Cameroon under pressure from Boko Haram jihadists. For example, it was the case on 24 August 2014, when 670 Nigerian soldiers with their full armament and seven armoured infantry vehicles had decided to retreat via Cameroonian territory.
Ultimately, faced with the jihadist threat, the principle of the impenetrability of the border and its corollary, territorial exclusivity, is contested in the Lake Chad Basin. The armed forces of Cameroon, Niger, and Chad regularly conduct operations on Nigerian territory against Boko Haram sanctuaries. This situation underscore the interconnectedness of the Lake Chad Basin where troubles in one country have an impact on the others. Cameroon, Niger, and Chad regularly host refugees, highlighting the urgent need for a collective response. Between 1979 and the early 2000s, the northern part of Cameroon hosted more than 100,000 Chadian refugees fleeing the country’s civil war. Following the coup attempt in Chad in 2008, 17,000 Chadian refugees found refuge in Cameroon.
4.3 Blurred Citizenship
Beyond their liberty, the freedom of the Lake Chad Basin border populations is manifested by possessing multiple national identity documents, creating de facto blurred citizenship. This freedom is marked by borderlanders’ mental
Also, Cameroon’s National identity Card system is not just a simple administrative process, but a complex system plagued by significant documentary fraud.117 The legislation on national identity cards, while well-intentioned, has provision that allow the issuance of this document to citizens of neighbouring countries. This practice, which is not even provided for by Lake Chad Basin’s national laws, has led to de facto quadri-nationalities that blur the national identities in the region. The challenge of determining who is Cameroonian, Chadian, Nigerian, or Nigerien is significant and the populations concerned have several authentic identity documents that they use according to their situation and projects. The system’s complexity is further highlighted by a Presidential Decree in Cameroon, which allows the applicant for a national identity card who cannot produce a birth certificate to use a document based on a report of the traditional ruler of the locality and two witnesses of the applicant’s family.118
The corruption of corrupt officials is a significant factor that blur the citizenship in the Lake Chad Basin. The populations in the area mostly have identity documents from the four countries, and the actions of corrupt officials further complicate the situation. For example, on the eve of the 2013 municipal and legislative elections and in the wake of the operation of the free issuance of the national identity card that the Cameroonian authorities had triggered, police officers in Petté, Far North Region, had been accused, in anonymous leaflets, of having sold Cameroonian nationality to foreigners.119 Boko Haram has thus taken advantage of the greed of police and gendarmerie officers responsible for issuing some of these documents. The urgent need for reform is evident in the fact that crooked officials have given identity documents to Boko Haram members who have found refuge in Cameroon.120 As early as 2015, many jihadist leaders were arrested with Cameroonian birth certificates and passports. In September 2014, a prominent Boko Haram leader was arrested in Kousseri, a Cameroonian town near the Chadian capital. The Jihadi leader had a Cameroonian identity card in the name of Abakar Ali and an official Nigerian document in the name of Moustapha Oumar.121
His career suggests the possibility for a Chadian student to settle permanently in Cameroon and complete a professional project in this country. Such a person could offer a promising future to his offspring, who will enjoy the status of a Cameroonian citizen like other Cameroonians. We thus have Chadian families who look like Cameroonian families today and whose members are Cameroonian civil servants.125
The freedom of the populations bordering the Lake Chad Basin is evident in their possession of multiple identity documents and their refusal to be
5 Conclusion
The study of border dynamics in the Lake Chad Basin makes it possible to challenge or at least relativize the Pan-Africanist, victimized, and militant approaches in African borders historiography, emphasizing the separating function of borders and considering these artifacts as obstacles to the Pan-Africanist dream. This work’s vernacular approach, which considers the individualized dimension of the relationship to the border, establishes that contrary to popular belief, the borders in the Lake Chad Basin, which serve as thresholds, have always been a place of liberty and freedom for the local populations. While intellectuals and politicians perorate on borders, this has not disturbed everyday border crossing for local populations. The configuration of the borderlands and the resulting cross-border dynamics allow for proper regional integration from below. As Stéphane Paquin rightly points out, ‘the challenge of the coming years is to institutionalize a true multi-level diplomacy where sub-state entities are given a sufficiently important role to benefit from globalization’.126 A step has been taken with a paradigm change in border perception at the African Union, where former barriers are now seen as bridges.127 The same is true with the adoption by the African Union of a Convention on cross-border cooperation on 14 June 2014 to promote local, sub-regional, and regional cooperation. However, this agreement has not yet entered into force. Instead of a top-down approach, existing cross-border and informal cooperative dynamics should have been institutionalized. Indeed, the external action of the local authorities dates from the colonial period. It then took on an inter-and intra-imperial dimension. Half a century later, the new states’ leaders took up this sub-state diplomacy, also called para-diplomacy, proto-diplomacy, or multi-level diplomacy. However, it remains in the field of the informal. Nevertheless, any border governance that does not consider the intense existing cross-border cooperative dynamic and does not involve local populations and actors would be doomed to failure.
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The breaking point could be the Symposium of Historians of Africa held in Bamako (Mali), from 15 to 19 March 1999 or the Symposium on the Dynamics of Regional Integration in Central Africa, organized by the Department of History of the University of Yaoundé (Cameroon), from 26 to 28 April 2000.
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The geopolitics of the lake result in unbalanced relations. Half of the lake belongs to Chad, 1/4 goes to Nigeria, 1/6 for Niger and 1/12 for Cameroon.
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This intergovernmental organization was created by the Fort Lamy Convention of 22 May 1964. It initially included Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria, and Chad, then, from March 1994, the CAR. Its main objective is coordinating and intensifying cooperation and efforts to develop the Lake Chad Basin.
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At Fotokol, the public services were operating at a slow due to a lack of staff. At the local high school, for example, in 2010, there were only three full teachers, including the headmaster. However, the city had a district hospital where Nigerians came for treatment.
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