This essay contains a systematic reinterpretation of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels’ writings on various kinds of crises that were common in the capitalism of the nineteenth century. In their writings, they set out both political commentary on contemporary upheavals and, over time, developed and offered various theories to explain both the possibilities of crisis and the forces generating them. In this prefatory note, I want to add to the essay, briefly, two sets of considerations that I think might be of interest to Polish readers. The first concerns what I have discovered about Marx and Engels’ thinking about the partitioned Poland of their time. The second concerns the relevance of these ancient texts to contemporary struggles in Poland. The analysis that follows, in both sections, is based on my reading of materials available in English – and to a lesser degree in French – but has been formulated without my being able to read materials in German and in Polish. Because some of the materials upon which I have drawn have made use of sources in those languages, I am aware of the limitations of my reading, and therefore, that my analysis might change with access to those sources. However, one does what one can and I offer my thoughts for your consideration, dissection, and critique.
Marx, Engels, and Poland: Then
… remained at the lowest stage of industrial development; they did not accumulate large capitals; they were neither able to set up large-scale industry nor control any extensive commercial networks …. The entire activity of the German Poles was restricted to retail trade, the handicrafts and at most the corn trade and manufacture (weaving, etc.) on the smallest scale.2
Years later, Rosa Luxemburg (1871–1919) concluded from her study of the industrial development of Poland that the first typical capitalist crisis in Poland didn’t occur until 1884.3 Therefore, for their studies of the kinds of periodic booms, busts, and associated upheavals characteristic of industrial capitalism, Britain, and to a lesser degree France and the United States, provided Marx and Engels with their main fields of research upon which to base their theories of crisis. In other words, the limited capitalist development in Poland, they perceived to be enclaves surrounded by a countryside organized in a feudal manner with the vast majority of the population being peasant serfs subordinated to big landowners – the szlachta, or traditional Polish nobility. In the period 1850–1870, grain produced by those peasants was being exported, but the proceeds only financed industry on a very small-scale.4
Therefore, Marx and Engels assessed crises in Poland to be primarily political ones involving two kinds of conflicts. First were the struggles of Poles for national independence from the Holy Alliance of Germany, Russia and Austria that had repeatedly seized their lands, ultimately obliterating their country as an independent nation with the Third Partition of 1794. Second, were struggles within Poland for democracy via agrarian reform against the country’s still dominant patriarchal feudalism. They saw these two kinds of struggles as closely connected. In 1848, Marx wrote: “The men who led the Kraców revolutionary movement were deeply convinced that only a democratic Poland could be independent, and a democratic Poland was impossible without the abolition of feudal rights, without the agrarian movement which would transform
But if the abolition of serfdom and of the rights of the szlachta were prerequisites for a broad-based democratic struggle for Polish independence, that objective was controversial among European revolutionaries who shared an internationalist perspective and opposed the way ruling elites used nationalism to divide and conquer. For example, in his 1861 book La Guerre et la Paix, Pierre J. Proudhon portrayed the demand for Polish independence as nothing more than the old nobility’s desire to take back their estates and their power from Holy Alliance interlopers.8 The restoration of Poland, he argued, would do nothing for the mass of the population who would find themselves saddled with and exploited by local rather than foreign masters. He argued that history had spoken, that the Holy Alliance’s partition of Poland had given Europe peace, that “the Poles have no right” to independence and sovereignty and that partition amounted to “deliverance for the working classes”; it was literally their “emancipation.”9 He was referring to how serfdom had been formally abolished in Prussia in 1807, in Austria in 1848 and in Russia in 1861.
Let us be clear, Marx and Engels had long denounced the reactionary character of the Polish nobility, as exemplified by their condemnation of the szlachta’s refusal to accept the social reforms put forward by Joachim Lelewel (1786–1861) during the “Cadet Revolution” in 1830.
What did the Polish aristocracy want in 1830? To safeguard its own acquired rights with regard to the Emperor [Nicholas I]. It limited the insurrection to the little country which the Congress of Vienna was pleased to call the Kingdom of
Poland;10 it restrained the uprising in the other Polish provinces; it left intact the degrading serfdom of the peasants and the infamous condition of the Jews… But within the conservative revolution, within the national government itself, there was one man who vigorously attacked the narrow views of the ruling class. He proposed really revolutionary measures before whose boldness the aristocrats of the Diet recoiled. By calling the whole of ancient Poland to arms, by thus making the war for Polish independence a European war, by emancipating the Jews and the peasants, by making the latter share in landed property, by reconstructing Poland on the basis of democracy and equality, he wanted to make the national cause the cause of freedom; he wanted to identify the interest of all peoples with that of the Polish people. Need I name the genius who conceived this plan, at once so vast and so simple? It was Lelewel.11
When, in 1866, Proudhon’s followers within the First International attacked support for Polish independence as being of no interest to the working class, Engels wrote a series of articles on “What have the working classes to do with Poland?”12 In those articles he made two arguments as to why workers elsewhere should support, not dismiss, Polish struggles for independence. His first was that workers in places such as Germany and Austria had an interest in limiting the expanding power of the Russian Czar – whose power he and Marx saw as the most powerful reactionary force on the continent. After sketching the history of Czarist annexations and efforts to subordinate various parts of central Europe, the “restoration of Poland,” he argued, would amount to the emancipation of not just Poles, but also Germans “from Russian vassalage.”13
His second argument was to remind the Proudhonists of the long history of workers’ support for the right of self-determination of people living within historically identifiable nations, i.e., large “bodies of undoubted vitality.”14 This he juxtaposed to the Czar’s “principle of nationalities” used to divide and conquer, used, for example, to
Yet, Engels’ manner of framing this argument was also dismissive of the rights of then sub-national, but culturally and linguistically coherent bodies of people to independent nation-state status, i.e., Laplanders in Scandinavia, or “Serbians, Croats, Ruthenes [Ukrainians], Slovaks, Czechs, and other remnants of bygone Slavonian peoples in Turkey, Hungary, and Germany.”16 This disdainful attitude toward those lacking “civilization” must appear retrograde today when many of those peoples have indeed achieved independent nationhood. Equally unappealing is his scornful mocking of Laplanders as “nomadic savages” and of their resistance to cultural assimilation and the loss of their “own barbaric, half Esquimaux idiom.”17 Today, not only have well-organized indigenous people all over the world been fighting for autonomous self-determination, but they have also inspired peoples of many nations to join together in precisely the kind of anti-capitalist, alter-globalization movement dreamed of in the First International.18
There is only one alternative left for Europe, Asiatic barbarism under Muscovite leadership will burst over her head like an avalanche, or she must restore Poland, thus placing between herself and Asia 20 millions of heroes, and gaining breathing time for the accomplishment of her social regeneration.”22
As long as a viable people is fettered by a foreign conqueror, it must necessarily apply all its strength, all its efforts, all its energy against the enemy from without; for this length of time, then, its inner life remains paralyzed, it remains unable to work for social emancipation. Ireland, Russia under Mongolian rule, etc., provide striking proof of this thesis.23
As for the Czarist emancipation of the serfs in Poland, celebrated by Proudhon and his followers, Marx and Engels argued that it had only been done with the objective of undermining the local nobility and making peasants available for Russia exploitation and for induction into the Czar’s armies.
the only European people that has fought and is fighting as the cosmopolitan soldier of the revolution. Poland shed its blood during the American War of Independence; its legions fought under the banner of the first French Republic; by its revolution of 1830 it prevented the invasion of France that had been decided by the partitioners of Poland; in 1846 in Kraców it was the first in Europe to plant the banner of social revolution; in 1848 it played an outstanding part in the revolutionary struggle in Hungary, Germany and Italy; finally, in 1871 it supplied the Paris Commune with its best generals and most heroic soldiers.25
For those unfamiliar with the history, these examples are worth explaining. The participation of Polish exiles in the American Revolutionary War included Tadeusz Kościuszko (1746–1817) and Kazimierz Pułaski (1745–1779). Kosciuszko, a skilled engineer, served as a colonel in the Continental Army, designed and oversaw the construction of various fortifications, including those at West Point – services for which he was
What Marx here calls “the Polish revolution” of 1830, was the Cadet Revolution referred to above, that blocked Russian plans to use Polish draftees against uprisings in France and Belgium. Besides the role of Józef Bem, Marx and Engels were, as previously noted, particularly impressed by the agrarian reform plans of the historian and politician Joachim Lelewel put forward in the midst of the uprising. When the uprising was crushed, Lelewel fled into exile in France and then Belgium. He continued to write and agitate for reform in Poland and collaborated with Marx and Engels in 1847 to found the Demokratische Gesellschaft zur Einigung und Verbrüderung aller Völker (Democratic Society for Unity and Brotherhood of All Peoples).28
The Kraców Uprising of 1846 only lasted nine days but its leaders not only fought for national liberation but also put forth the kinds of demands made by Lelewel sixteen years before.
The men at the head of the revolutionary movement in Krakow were most deeply convinced that only a democratic Poland could be independent, and that a Polish democracy was impossible without an abolition of feudal rights, without an agrarian movement that would transform the feudally obligated peasants into modern owners.29
That same year, in the wake of the economic crisis of 1847 that caused unemployment to soar, there were revolutionary uprisings in many countries of Europe. Marx and Engels returned to the continent, first to Paris during the February Revolution and then to Cologne in Germany where revolution began in March. There, Marx published the Neue Reinische Zeitung and Engels helped out on the barricades. Among the many
In 1871, when in response to Emperor Napoleon III surrendering to the Prussian Chancellor Bismarck, all of Paris rose and created the Paris Commune, Jarosław Żądło-Dąbrowski (1836–1871), who had fought in the 1863 Polish uprising against the Russian Empire, was elected to the Commune’s Council. As counterattack by the exiled French government and by Prussian troops that had surrounded and laid siege to the city loomed, Dąbrowski was appointed Commander-in-Chief and organized the defence of Paris. He was killed in the fighting, five days before the Commune was crushed and the massacres of the Communards began. Another Pole, Walery Wróblewski (1836–1908), who had commanded rebel detachments during the Polish Uprising of 1863–64, also joined the Parisian Communards as a general who organized the southern defence of the city. Unlike Dąbrowski, Wróblewski survived the defeat of the Commune and emigrated to London. In 1872 he became a member of the General Council of the First International supporting Marx and Engels in their conflicts with Bakunin. These are but a few of the Polish émigrés whose participation in uprisings at home and organizational work abroad inspired Marx and Engels’ solidarity with Polish revolutionaries.31
Between Then and Now
Between Marx and Engels’ writings and the present lay long and tumultuous decades. They include the years of the Second International (1889–1914), of World War I (1914–1918), of the Second Polish Republic (1918–1939), World War II (1939–1945), of the Polish People’s Republic (1945–1989) and of the Third Polish Republic (1989-present). During those years, capitalism continued to develop in Poland, and with it connections between crises within Poland and those unfolding in the wider capitalist world. The character and extent of those connections, of course, varied enormously, differing in periods of relative independence from those when Poland was subjected to foreign domination of one sort or another. From once-again-partitioned neo-colonial subordination during World War II, through domination by the Soviet Union in the post-WWII era, the development of capitalism within Poland took place within constraints imposed from without. Most obviously, perhaps, was the imposition of Soviet-style
Throughout those decades, a wide variety of Marxists, both Polish and foreign, have undertaken to analyze the development of capitalism in Poland, the struggles of Polish workers and episodes of crisis. However, the period is far too long and the number of such analyses far too great for us to even sketch an outline. Some such analyses, such as those of Rosa Luxemburg, probably Poland’s most famous Marxist, have been subjected to numerous close studies and critiques. Those studies have involved an assessment of both the similarities and differences between her analyses and Marx and Engels’ own work, e.g., her opposition to Polish independence or her use of Marx’s reproduction schemes to ground her theories of crisis and imperialism. Obviously, the reinterpretation offered here could provide one point of departure for studying her work – and I have had occasion to make some brief comments on her theory of crisis.32 I have not, however, undertaken re-evaluations of Marxist writings on Poland in any great depth. Therefore, I leave to others an assessment of the relevance of my work here to such efforts. What I do offer are a few reflections on that relevance in the present period – in the hope of provoking militant readings of my essay.
Marx, Engels, and Poland: Now
Peter Bell and I have insisted, repeatedly, that our interest in Marx and Engels’ writings is not philological but political. We have not intended our reinterpretation to be just another contribution to the analysis of the history of thought, but rather one that uncovers how, and in what ways, these old ideas can help us cope with new problems, especially the constraints imposed on our lives by contemporary capitalism. Today, we are over a decade into the twenty-first century. Obviously, a lot has changed since our two authors wrote. Yet, despite many changes, crises of all sorts are still very much with us. Are Marx and Engels’ thoughts from so long ago still relevant? Are the sorts
When it comes to judging the relevance of these old writings to struggles in contemporary Poland, I am acutely aware of the limitations of my distance and knowledge. If, as I have maintained, the value of any socio-political theory depends upon its ability to provide weapons in the struggle against capitalism, then the evaluation of the practical usefulness of any theoretical understanding must be carried out in the light of, and with concrete knowledge of, particular real-world situations. Theory is always general; the world is always specific. So, I repeatedly query whether my theory draws my attention to phenomena that I think are important and whether it illuminates specific circumstances, particular concrete sets of relationships. Yet, I also recognize that what I have been able to study has been limited and my knowledge bounded. So, when an opportunity arises, such as this one, for my writing to be translated into another language and published in another country, I hope that you, my new readers, will do the same, i.e., carefully evaluate the contemporary relevance to your own circumstances of the interpretation I offer, as well as of the original writings that have been my object of study.
The obvious question is “What is involved in such an evaluation? How to proceed?” Useful answers to such questions do, I think, depend upon the theory in question. The abstract propositions theories set forth are usually framed, by their authors, with some real-world reference. Newton explained the inspiration for his theory of gravity with a story about a falling apple. In Marx and Engels’ case, as you will see in the body of our essay, their proposals of abstract generalizations about the nature of crises were usually offered with illustrations drawn from observations made during their own time. So, for example, when highlighting the way in which limitations on the demand for consumption goods (or means of subsistence) could cause a crisis in the realization of capitalist plans, they could point to examples both of capitalists doing their best to hold down wages and of recurrent situations in which such limitations on buying power forced capitalists to lower prices, undermining their profits. An evaluation of the relevance of that aspect of their theory of crisis to any given historical period would thus involve an examination of the effects of capitalist policies on wages, salaries and other forms of income on consumer demand and any evidence of those policies limiting demand to such a degree as to cause problems in sales and the realization of profits.
Our reinterpretation of Marx and Engels’ theory of crisis presented in this essay does not privilege, a priori, any particular moment of their theorization over others. Instead of joining one of the traditional Marxist schools of thought, such as that which has privileged underconsumption or that which has privileged the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, Peter and I sought out, in their writings, all the possibilities of crisis and all the forces at work tending to turn those possibilities into realities that
Importantly, the particular forms through which crises have played out have been shaped by local, national and international institutions, both those of capital and those created by those of us who resist. Those Marx called the functionaries of capital, with capital understood as a particular way of organizing social relationships, have always devised and sought to implement policies to promulgate their system and solve whatever problems that have arisen, including crises. Those of us who have resisted have also devised tactics and strategies, sometimes as individuals, more fruitfully in collaboration with one another, collectively. So, for example, the policies and associated institutions that capital developed and deployed for the use of commodity money (e.g., gold and silver) against us differed from those created and utilized for the management of paper and credit money. The former involved alchemy, coinage, recoinage, debasement, bank vaults and torture; the latter have involved a whole array of policies to control the quality and quantity of money that has mainly existed only as entries on balance sheets. Similarly, the tactics and strategies the rest of us have used in confronting money have varied according to the kind of money with which we have had to deal. Against commodity money, individuals used clipping, direct appropriation, and counterfeiting, while collective working-class efforts focused on the formation of unions and wage struggles, sometimes local, sometimes with international connections. But with the capitalist substitution of national fiat money and bank credit for commodity money, direct appropriation and counterfeiting have become more difficult and struggles have tended to focus more on efforts to increase income, to shape access to and terms of credit or to escape money altogether.33
Today, as I see it, if from afar, those of you in Poland find yourselves in a country whose capitalism, although bearing scars from its earlier subordination to Soviet-style state capitalism, has been forcefully integrated into the global capitalist system. Since rejoining the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 1986, since gaining national independence in 1989, since the imposition of “shock therapy” on Poland after 1989, since joining the OECD in 1996, NATO in 1999, the European Union in 2004, and Schengen in 2007, Polish capitalism and, perforce, all of you, have benefited or
That history of integration suggests to me that today a much more straightforward evaluation of the relevance of Marx and Engels’s theory of crisis to Poland is possible than they, or many of their followers, believed. As in the rest of our contemporary capitalist world, we need only examine the relevance of various aspects of their abstract analysis to the specifics of the situations in which Polish workers find themselves exploited, alienated and often in resistance. The systematic manner in which this essay lays out our study of Marx and Engels’ theory allows for an equally systematic examination of relevance. As you will find, we organized our study around their representation of the “circuit” that capital must complete in order to realize its self-reproduction. In other words, the sequential steps that it must successfully organize in order to be able, once again, in the next period, to impose its peculiar organization of society on an expanded scale. The relevance and character of the various steps of the circuit – that begins with the mobilization of resources, both human and material, through various markets, continues through the combining of those resources in the production of some commodity and ending (this round) with the sale of the commodity and the realization of enough profit to permit starting all over again on a larger scale – to particular, concrete moments of capitalism, e.g., in Poland and its connections with the rest of the world, can be examined one by one in sequential order and in relation to each other.
Before proceeding with some illustrations, I would like to point out that the above procedure reverses the more general method that I usually employ in examining the dynamics of social conflict within capitalism. I prefer to start with the struggles themselves, with our own self-activity, and then see how both our actions and capital’s reactions are shaping the present, or have shaped the past (if we are looking backward).34 When studying Marx and Engels’ writings, however, I recognize that the focal point of their theoretical work was capital, as is manifest in the title of Marx’s most complete theoretical work: Das Kapital.35 Yet, precisely because their theory was a socio-political one that understood capital as an antagonistic social relationship, they formulated it in terms of the labor theory of value, i.e., a theory of value of labor to capital, every aspect of which, from the beginning, was challenged, contested and often ruptured
As I explain in the essay, Marx and Engels’ circuit-of-capital has three steps; (1) the organization of what economists call input markets, symbolically M – C(LP, MP), where M = money for investment, LP = labor-power, MP = means of production, (2) the sphere of production … P … C′, where LP and MP are combined to produce a new commodity C′, and (3) the organization of the sale of the new commodity for money, C′ – M′. Already in Marx and Engels’ time, each of these steps were complicated affairs with many different actors and each of these three steps involved quite distinct operations, both within capitalist firms and among them. Today, they are even more complex and spread out over an even more diverse, often multinational, geography of markets and of production. Given that complexity, I want to do no more here than offer some suggestive examples of where and how their analysis may be applicable to social conflict in Poland.
Let’s start with just one part of step #1: M – C(LP). The labor market has always been a terrain of conflict, both for those trying to hire labor and for those who might be hired. As much as capitalists might desire it, individuals do not enter the labor market automatically. Throughout the history of capitalism many have resisted prostituting themselves in labor markets. As Marx showed in his analysis of “primitive” accumulation, capital has had to use considerable force and violence merely to create labor markets.37 We also know that the obstacles that capitalists had to overcome in those days have continued ever since. Time and again, across the globe people have found ways to survive without entering the labor market. From hanging on to land affording subsistence, through direct appropriation and emigration, millions have done their best to avoid being pushed through this doorway to exploitation and alienation.
For many years in the nineteenth century, Marx and Engels saw the attachment to land in places such as Poland as something forced, through laws and practices of serfdom. Later, study of the Russian mir and other agrarian peoples revealed to them how attachment could be a source not only of resistance to the depredations of capitalism but of alternatives to it.38 Such was the resistance faced by Soviet state-capitalist planners who, when they were able, imposed collectivization to maximize the imposition
This continues to be the case in Poland, to some degree, as evidenced by two phenomena. The first is the difficulty some employers have in recruiting workers from the countryside. During a visit to Poznań in 2012, I heard stories about how employers had to provide daily bus service to distant villages to obtain workers. The stories reminded me of the situation in Detroit after the uprisings in 1967 and 1968 when the auto companies of that Motor City sent out buses each morning to make sure rebellious young workers actually showed up for their jobs. (They did, but they carried their struggles with them from the streets to become the cutting edge of resistance inside the factories.)39 The second phenomenon is the effort to get farmers to leave the land, especially in Eastern Poland, what capitalist policy makers like to call “structural reform.” There, where the concentration of land holding and the conversion of family farming to capitalist agribusiness is less advanced than in the Western part of the country, policy makers both within Poland and those associated with organizations such as the European Union, the OECD and IMF lament Polish government policies that facilitate staying on the land and call for them to be changed. In a recent interview, for example, Daria Zakharova, IMF mission chief for Poland, argued that the Polish government should “phase out taxation incentives and retirement privileges that encourage people to continue small-scale farming.” Such policies, he argued in IMF-speak would “help workers’ transition out of agriculture and into higher productivity sectors, such as manufacturing and services.”40
Resistance to labor markets, as the example of Detroit makes clear, has continued even among people successfully forced off their land. One form of resistance was emigration from available rural and urban jobs to new lands open to settlement. Such emigration from Europe, including Poland, constituted much of the history of the American frontiers, from Canada, through the United States to the Pampas of Argentina. But also, constituting less of an escape, has been emigration from one labor market to another. Just as capitalists have long sought to play emigrating workers against local workers, e.g., Germans against Poles in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Poles against Germans today, so have workers used mobility to resist bad labor market conditions, e.g., low wages, scanty benefits, and dangerous working conditions, to take advantage of better ones, with higher compensation, better benefits, and less danger.
Within cities, amongst diverse markets for many different kinds of labor, resistance to labor markets has continued. This has been obvious in the so-called labor movement, where workers have organized unions to fight for recognition, collective bargaining, and then better contracts. Resistance has been less obvious, but no less persistent in such phenomena as individual young people dropping out of schools – organized mainly to prepare them for the labor market – and into the streets and by squatters who have seized abandoned buildings and organized their living arrangements so only some hold waged jobs while others arrange their collective lives outside the labor market. Such struggles are widespread and have formed an important tactic among the young (and sometimes among the old) in resisting labor markets and other aspects of contemporary capitalism. In Italy they are known as “social centers,” and where the squatters have been numerous enough and well enough organized to hold on to properties they have seized, they have created pirate radio stations, e.g., Radio Alicia, and computer networks, e.g., the European Counter-Network, linking such efforts across the country and to the wider world. During the previously mentioned visit to Poland in 2012, I visited such “squats” in both Warsaw and Poznań. In many cases, various forms of government-provided income have been used to support such resistance, e.g., student stipends, social security, unemployment compensation or welfare payments.
This kind of resistance has forced capital, again and again, to make such modes of living outside the labor market difficult. Misrepresented as delinquency or criminal trespass, such refusals have been outlawed by the state via laws against truancy, vagabondage, and squatting. The state has also withheld or reduced sources of unwaged income such as unemployment compensation or welfare. Marx and Engels’ analysis suggests that such contemporary reductions, just like attacks on the Poor Laws in England in the nineteenth century are aimed, like the anti-farmer policy changes called for by Zakharova, at increasing pressure on people to enter the labor market. In recent years, according to IndexMundi, such has been the case in Poland where “the total transfer amount received by the population participating in unemployment benefits and active labor market programs” as a share of their total income was lowered from 2005 to 2007 and has been kept low ever since.42 This has been particularly true for young workers, where the already low percentage of those eligible for unemployment
With the imposition of work being the most basic vehicle for organizing capitalist society, policy makers have a difficult task balancing their need to impose work versus the need for a sufficient number of unemployed workers to keep the employed in line with the threat of job loss and poverty. Thus, in Poland, we find the usual careful measuring of the “unemployment rate” and “labor force participation” by government agencies and the same, equally careful, assessment of the relationship between those numbers and changes in wages and degrees of unrest, both on the job and off. Capitalist policy makers must constantly adjust policies in response to challenges from both employed and unemployed that disrupt their planned modes of expanded reproduction. At times, for example, they pursue policies that increase unemployment. Before learning from John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946) how to use state fiscal and monetary policies to manipulate the demand for labor, individual capitalists responded to worker threats to their profits and control by cutting back existing operations, by laying off workers, and by refusing to invest – all of which raised unemployment. They responded to more profitable conditions by expanding investment and expanding employment. Since grasping Keynesian methods, the state has acted at all levels, from the local to the supranational, to “fine tune” the demand for labor and to manipulate levels of employment and unemployment and with them the growth of wages. We can call the active pursuit of higher levels of employment a “development” strategy, and one that fosters more unemployment an “underdevelopment” strategy. In the current neoliberal period, underdevelopment-as-strategy has been deployed not only in so-called “underdeveloped” capitalist countries, but also in so-called “developed” ones, such as the United States and Europe. In country after country in recent years, policy makers have seized upon crises in debt to impose austerity, high unemployment, and falling living standards as punitive measures against workers, seeking to force them to accept ever lower wages and ever more onerous working conditions.
However, keeping in mind that those policy makers usually restrict their definition of the “unemployed” to those actively looking for jobs, Marx and Engels provided us with a more accurate characterization of all of those not currently employed for wages (or salaries) in their definition of “the reserve army of labor.” That definition included those looking for jobs (the “floating” part of the reserve), but also those who might look (the “latent,” e.g., subsistence peasants, housewives, children) and those who would probably never look (“stagnant” and “lumpen” parts, e.g., the crippled, the
The unwaged, just like the waged, have always had to be managed. Why? Not only because they could be troublesome – protesting their poverty – but to make sure of their availability, either immediately or at some future date when they were needed. In other words, capital has tried to ensure that their various methods of unwaged survival produce and reproduce labor-power, i.e., their ability and willingness to work. In the nineteenth century, besides the kind of anti-vagabondage laws mentioned above, such management was accomplished with a modicum of poor laws (parish relief) complemented, when necessary, by force. In boom times, Marx argued that for the most part capital left the reproduction of labor-power to the workers themselves.45 In periods of crisis, however, in an era in which rising unemployment often meant starvation or death by untreated illness, guns and the gibbet were required to contain working class uprisings.
In years since their writings, when and where workers have succeeded in freeing children and many women from dangerous waged labor, capital has been forced to intervene more systematically. Capitalists have sought to retain control over unwaged workers through mass schooling, the family, and the welfare state – all of which provide the means of “management” primarily through the structuring of schools, homes and access to unwaged income in ways designed to turn daily activities into the unwaged work of producing labor-power – thus paralleling the production of other commodities.
Although methods have changed and new institutions have been built, resistance has persisted. When students have been able to organize effectively, they have been able to change the school curriculum from job training to better meet their own needs instead of those of future employers. When women have been able to organize effectively, they have achieved greater independence, more control over their work and less of it. They have, for example, been able to reduce their workload by gaining access to contraception and to compensation for childbearing and child rearing. For example, in Poland, despite bans on some kinds of abortion, women have been successful in reducing the fertility rate from roughly 2 in 1989 to 1.29 in 2014. Those gains have been won against capitalist-imposed restriction of access to contraception (often backed by the church – ever greedy to add to its tithable flocks) and in making use of pro-natalist laws designed to induce women to have more children, with all the work that entails. In the case of welfare recipients, localized high levels of chronic unemployment and poverty have resulted in collective urban rebellions that capital has only been able to
But, over time, where gains have been won, capitalist counterattacks to re-impose more work have not been long in coming. Where students won changes in curriculum, academic structures of rewards worked to turn once radical courses into tame, tolerable and optional elements of degree programs. In the US, although the central city risings of the 1960s won a vast expansion in food stamps that fed millions, the decades since have witnessed recurrent efforts, often barely fended off by renewed protest, to cut back those subsidies to the consumption and well-being of their recipients. Where women in the US won access to contraception, social conservative “pro-life” groups (often rooted in some church) immediately launched counterattacks to reverse those gains. In the United States struggles around these issues continue to be waged in state after state. As I am writing these lines, I am reading reports of a church-backed Polish government plan to extend its bans on abortion to almost all cases of unwanted pregnancy, including incest and rape. Fortunately, I am also reading of the “Black Monday” protests by tens of thousands of Polish women dressed in black, boycotting work, shutting down offices, universities, and schools in 90 cities and taking to the street in protest to block that plan. (At last report, the protests were successful in forcing the Polish government to set aside its plan. One can only hope that the momentum of protest will succeed in eliminating existing bans.)46
I have also noted contradictions in capitalist policies being put forward for Poland. From the point of view of capitalist policy makers, there is a serious long run “demographic” problem haunting the Polish labor market: a below-replacement fertility rate combined with outmigration means a shrinking labor force and an aging population. Labor supply growing more slowly than the demand puts upward pressure on wages and downward pressure on profits, strengthens labor and undermines capital. Within this context, banning abortions might be rationalized as an encouragement to increased fertility and increased labor supply. But while bans certainly result in more work for women outside the waged labor force – either it increases the costs, time and risks involved in getting an illegal abortion or travel for a foreign one, or, if it results in more children, it makes for more work in the home – it also makes women less able to participate in the labor market. Dropping unemployment in recent years has already
A more general assessment of contestation of these kinds of relationships in Poland I leave to you, my readers. Just scanning the European Union’s 2013 document on Your social security rights in Poland, suggests that the terrains of likely conflict over the imposition and conditions of unwaged work are multiple. I do note that there is no mention, whatsoever, of access to contraception and abortion – an obvious, present terrain of struggle. At any rate, it seems clear to me that not only are the possibilities of crisis in M – C(LP) and the forces that tended to bring on such crises that Marx and Engels identified still with us, but with the growth in the strength and organizational abilities of workers, with the concessions won from capital – both in the private sector and from the state – those possibilities and forces have multiplied, making crisis even more likely than before.
Turning now to step #2, … P … C′, let us evaluate, once again, the possible usefulness of one aspect of Marx and Engels’ theory of crises – this time in production – and my reinterpretation of it: the struggle against work. I see the avoidance of the labor market discussed above as one form of the refusal of work, of waged work anyway. But there are two other great domains where this is a recurrent issue: (1) Marx and Engels’ primary concern: points of production (P) of saleable, and potentially profitable, commodities (C′), which capital has multiplied far beyond the factories, mines, fields and sailing vessels of the nineteenth century to include all of those places employing workers who provide services to both businesses and consumers, and (2) a set of work places they largely ignored, namely all of those where people’s activities were organized to produce the singular commodity labor-power.
In such circumstances, Marx and Engels supported workers’ demands for access to the vote, through the People’s Charter, which would help them get laws passed limiting work, such as the Factory Acts, and for the recognition of unions through which they could negotiate hours and conditions of work directly with their employers. The battle for the Charter (1838–1858) failed and for a long time unions were outlawed. Eventually, through the Reform Act of 1867, some British workers did obtain suffrage and in 1871 unions were decriminalized. Faced with unions – first mostly craft unions, later industrial unions acting as a collective force demanding, among other things, less work – the functionaries of capital developed several ways to neutralize them. First, despite legal recognition, they often deployed paramilitary, police and military forces to crush strikes and protests. Second, they sought to instrumentalize them through legal contracts. Third, they used the government to directly take over and control a union’s organizational apparatus, turning it into an arm of the state. This last was the dominant mode of control deployed by Soviet-style state capitalist regimes such as the Polish People’s Republic and has been widely used in other kinds of dictatorial regimes that have severely punished overt worker protests.
In the wake of 1989 despite such attacks, Polish workers retained enough power of resistance to force capitalists and the state to concede some protections and put some limits on exploitation. Three places where this would seem to have been the case are (1) the enactment of a Polish Labor Code in 1974, (2) union recognition and collective bargaining for about 20% of the waged labor force and (3) the creation at the national level of the Tripartite Commission for Social and Economic Affairs in 1994 and at the voivodship level of “social dialogue commissions” created in 2002, where employers are forced to sit down with union leaders and government officials to negotiate capital/labor relations. Let’s look briefly at these three phenomena.
1) The Labor Code, despite repeated amendments, has been a continuing source of irritation for capitalists, both domestic and foreign, who find labor and employment
2) The trade union “connivance” mentioned in the last paragraph refers to the flip side of recognition. On the one hand, the legal recognition of trade unions and trade union alliances, and their presence in negotiations over employment and social issues is a measure of workers’ power. On the other hand, they function like formal political parties that limit their partisans’ activities to periodic voting, sapping energy from more direct action. Both provide means for taming, even harnessing working-class struggles. Such means have been widely deployed in the United States and Western Europe. For example, although arrangements vary from country to country, carefully structured labor contracts between employers and unions limit legal worker struggles to periods of contract negotiations. The rest of the time, under the terms of the contract, trade union bureaucrats are obligated to help managers impose the terms of the contract on their own members – even as employers are doing their best to renege on their own contractual obligations.53 (It was no surprise that the Nobel Prize in Economics in
3) The thing that has struck me most in official representations of the purposes of the Tripartite Commission (TC) and the voivodship social dialogue commissions (VSDC) has been the way in which they have been explicitly given the mandate to limit social conflict. In the case of the TC, I find it stated that the forum was created “in order to conciliate the interests of employees, the interests of employers and public welfare. The aim of the Commission’s activity is to achieve and maintain social peace.” In the case of the VSDC, I find that they are intended to help “to solve many problems on the territorial level in the situation of threats connected with existence of possible socio-economic conflicts in the region.”55 Agreement with these motivations among trade union members has been manifested not only by continued participation but by judgements on the organizations’ effectiveness. In one report, NSZZ Solidarność judged only the work teams of the TC to have been useful. Useful at doing what? In “defusing tensions within specific industries.”56 In principle, the trade unions whose representatives sit on these forums, are not only “obliged to communicate agreed regulations to [their] members … but also to guarantee their support”57 Such a structure parallels the kind of co-optation of trade unions as contract enforcers cited above. At least one analysis of the actual functioning of the TC – its role in the creation of the “Anti-Crisis Package” – suggests that because there is nothing in the acts creating the TC that compels the government to follow its suggestions, the “social dialogue” organized by these institutions is an illusion hiding actual government monopoly over decision making.58
Finally, let us examine step #3: C′ – M′. In the body of my text, I examine the array of possibilities, identified by Marx and Engels, that capitalist attempts to sell their commodities might fail, and then those forces tending to turn potential failure into reality. The possibilities and forces were many in the nineteenth century and continue to be numerous in our twenty-first century. Which, I ask myself, and to what degree, have the many possible sources of failure-to-sell been a source of crisis for Polish capitalism in recent years? I want to differentiate here between chronic problems, such as limited
On the whole, by all reports, Polish capitalists were more successful than most other parts of Europe in fending off crisis, keeping output and employment growing. Despite a brief slowdown in 2012–2014, GDP growth has averaged about 3% since 2008 reaching 3.6 in 2015.59 The obvious question about sales is “for what markets?” The main answers are (1) domestic investment and consumption markets whose growth offset declining foreign demand due to the wider economic crisis in Europe and (2) monetary policies that offset financial instability in the EU and allowed a continued expansion of credit that supported the expansion of both investment and consumption demand.
Investment demand continued to grow because of accommodating monetary policies, credit expansion and an inflow of funds from the European Union, the IMF and private investment. Domestic consumption demand grew because of expanded hiring (even if much of that hiring involved low-paid workers in temporary, low- or no-benefit jobs), increases in government transfer and subsidy programs (such as the “Family 500+” and “Home for the Young” programs), and minimum wage hikes.60 (Average real wages and real consumption grew even faster because of deflation.) So, although more full-time, higher wage employment would have benefited the working class more, there was enough improvement to overall income to keep up consumption demand, i.e., the market for C(MS)’.
With respect to monetary policy, the Polish government, with support from the EU and the IMF, took steps to insulate financial markets in Poland from instability in the rest of Europe. Domestically, the Polish government held down inflation then moved against deflation, imposed increased supervision on banks, floated the zloty, implemented counter-cyclically, stimulating monetary policy in response to slowdowns in exports due to the crises of its trading partners, and started cutting back expenditures to limit public debt while taking steps to increase tax receipts.61 It also acted as lender-of-last-resort to banks, e.g., rescuing the SK Bank in 2015.62
Membership in the EU has resulted in substantial net capital flows into the country. In 2014, for example, EU spending in Poland amounted to €17.436 billion whereas Poland’s contribution to the EU budget was only € 3,526 billion. The net inflow of
The IMF’s support primarily took the form of a series of loans (2009, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2015) under its new Flexible Credit Line (FCL) created in response to the international financial crisis and intended primarily to provide an emergency source of financing if needed. Although the IMF touts FCL loans as being free of the usual conditionality clauses with which it has battered governments to make policy changes that impose the costs of crisis on workers, FCL loans must be applied for and are only granted if the applying governments “qualify,” i.e., already manage class relations using methods of which the IMF approves. That the Polish government has qualified five times shows that the IMF finds its managerial methods quite acceptable.
Among policy makers, their greatest worries about potential crisis in Poland appear to be focused on continued economic and political instability in the EU and on their Eastern borders, e.g., conflict in the Ukraine and recession in Russia. Because Polish policy has been ever more closely tied to the EU, with the objective of fulfilling sufficient preparatory criteria to permit abandoning the zloty and joining the Eurozone, past success in avoiding the circulation of crisis is not assumed for the future. The perceived risks of crisis are thus the same as those of their European partners: financial instability and stagnation in the growth of industry and trade.63 In class terms, which policy makers rarely use, the potential for crisis in Poland is closely tied to prospects for those class struggles elsewhere in Europe to circulate to Poland, as they have from Greece to Spain and Portugal. As I discuss in Chapter 5, Section 4 of my essay, Marx and Engels highlighted how crisis and class struggle could circulate through and across the circuits of capital. This was something they not only analyzed but participated in. The greatest potential threat to Polish capitalism, and to the circuits of capital in Europe more generally, would be a perfect storm of resistance and demands for alternatives
The storm has been gathering for a long time. From the point of view of Polish capital, they were, at first, dark clouds over the horizon. Anti-IMF/World-Bank demonstrations in Berlin in 1988 and the first counter-summit against the G7 in Paris in 1989 took place just as Poland was gaining independence from Soviet domination. In 1990, I participated in a massive gathering in Venice of young activists from all over Europe titled Europe Against the Bosses, another counter-summit to a meeting of the G7 in that city. In the wake of the Zapatista organized Continental and then Intercontinental Encounters in 1996, People’s Global Action was formed and moved against the WTO in Geneva. Following that effort, a whole series of massive collective actions were undertaken beginning in 1999 with the June eighteenth Carnival against Capital (J18) organized in dozens of cities around Europe, as far East as Minsk and Prague, and the Battle of Seattle (N30) on November 30th in the US. The J18 slogan “Our Resistance is as Transnational as Capital” expressed not anti-globalization – as the movement was sometimes called – but alter-globalization, dedication to building a non-capitalist global community. For several years, the alter-globalization movement organized protest demonstrations against the meetings of capital’s supranational coordinating bodies, especially the IMF, the World Bank, and the G7/8. The apex of those efforts were the demonstrations of over 100,000 against the G8 in Genoa, Italy in 2001. But two factors meant that apex also turned out to be the beginning of the end of that kind of transnational protest. The first factor was the violent police repression of the demonstration that led to two days of bloody confrontation and the killing of one protestor. The second was the realization that while the years of protest had built international networks of solidarity and cooperation, they had failed to change the neoliberal policies being foisted on the world’s working class.
Although there have been scattered protests, gathering activists from many nations, in the years since 2001, both capital’s tactics and workers’ reactions have shifted. The widespread financial crisis of 2007–2009, subsequent general crisis throughout the circuit of capital, especially in many OECD countries, and the resultant crisis of debt repayment in Greece, Spain and Portugal, provided capital with an opportunity to impose on those in the Global North the same neoliberal austerity methods it had deployed against workers in the Global South during the international debt crisis of the 1980s and 1990s. Differential degrees of imposition have allowed capitalist policy makers to divide and, so far, to undermine the development of transnational resistance. While Occupy Wall Street burned brightly for a while – igniting other fires in other places – its fires have dimmed and the embers smolder. Workers hardest hit in places such as Greece have fought back fiercely, from the streets to the ballot box (SYRIZA), elsewhere less austere methods and anti-Greek propaganda have been
Harry Cleaver
Austin, Texas
October 2016
Frederick Engels, “The Frankfort Assembly Debates the Polish Question,” MECW, Vol. 7, p. 339. For inclusion in this book, I have converted what were Endnotes in the Polish original into footnotes – the same format employed elsewhere in this book. In a few cases, I have amplified the footnotes, providing a bit more information.
Ibid., p. 340.
Rosa Luxemburg, “The Industrial Development of Poland,” The Complete Works of Rosa Luxemburg, Volume I: Economic Writings I, Peter Hudis (ed.), (London: Verso, 2013) 32.
Jean Batou, Between Development and Underdevelopment: the precocious attempts at industrialization of the periphery, 1800–1870 (Genève: Librairie Droz, 1991), 130.
“Speech by Mr. Karl Marx” [On the Polish Question] MECW, Vol. 6, p. 549.
MECW, Vol. 6, pp. 477–519.
Ibid., p. 518.
Pierre J. Proudhon, La Guerre et la Paix, Recherches sur le principe et la constitution du droit des gens, (Paris: Michel Lévy Frères Libraires, Tome II, 1861) 228–9. The question of Polish nationalism, he argued, was only « une question d’aristocratie polonaise » and therefore of no revolutionary interest to the French people. « Existe-t-il une idée polonaise ? La Pologne n’a toujours à offrir au monde que son catholicisme et sa noblesse. » Eventually, perhaps, « la Pologne entrerait dans la phase revolutionnaire ; elle proclamerait, comme la France de 1789, le droit de l’homme et du citoyen ; elle reconnaitrait, comme la France de 1848, le droit au travail. » Until then « Qu’est-ce que le monde a perdu, en laissant perir la Pologne ? »
Pierre J. Proudhon, Si les traités de 1815 ont cessé d’exister? Actes du future congrès, 3rd ed., (Paris: E. Dentu, Libraire-Editeur, 1864) 68. « Non, les Polonais ne sont pas en droit. » 86. “Le partage, pour la plebe polonaise, ç’a été l’émancipation.”
The Congress of Vienna in 1814–15 liquidated the so-called duchy of Warsaw which depended on Napoleonic France. It was formed by Napoleon in 1807, after the defeat of Prussia, on the Polish territory seized by Prussia as a result of the three partitions of Poland. The Congress repartitioned the duchy between Prussia, Austria, and Russia with the exception of the free city of Kraców, which was under the joint protection of the three powers up to 1846. The part incorporated into Russia was called the Kingdom of Poland with Warsaw as its capital.
“The Frankfort Assembly Debates the Polish Question,” MECW, Vol. 7, pp. 550–551.
The Commonwealth, Nos. 159 (March 24), 160 March 31) and 165 (May 5) in MECW, Vol. 20, pp. 152–54, 155–58, 158–61.
Ibid., p. 154, “Restoration of Poland, to them, is emancipation of their own country from Russian vassalage.”
Ibid., p. 156.
Ibid., p. 157, “The principle of nationalities … is nothing but a Russian invention concocted to destroy Poland.”
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 157–158.
Harry Cleaver, “Trayectorias de autonomía,” in Claudio Albertani, et al., eds., La autonomía possible: Reinvención de la política y emancipación (México: Universidad Autónoma de la Ciudad de México, 2009), 25–65. (In English.) (Accessed 7/18/2024.)
“Speech at the Polish Meeting in London” (1857), MECW, Vol. 20, pp. 196–201.
Ibid., p. 196.
Ibid., p. 197.
Ibid., p. 201.
“For Poland” (1875), MECW, Vol. 24, p. 57.
“BEM” (1857), MECW, Vol. 18, pp. 130–133.
“For Poland” (1875), MECW, Vol. 24, p. 57–58.
Monica Gardiner, Kościuszko: A Biography (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1920). (Online by Project Gutenberg)
Douglas Shores, Kazimierz Pułaski: General of Two Nations (San Diego: Create Space, 2014).
Monika Barr, Historians and Nationalism: East-Central Europe in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). Joan Skurnowicz, “Lelewel in Polish Historiography in People’s Poland,” The Polish Review XXXVI, no. 3, (1991): 269–82.
Karl Marx, “On the Polish Question,” MECW, Vol. 6, p. 549, or, Karl Marx, The Revolutions of 1848, Political Writings: Volume I (London: Penguin Classics, 1973), 104.
Frederick Engels, “Democratic Pan-Slavism,” MECW, Vol. 8, p. 375.
Adam Ciołkosz, “Karl Marx and the Polish Insurrection of 1863,” The Polish Review 10, no. 4 (Autumn, 1965): 8–51.
Harry Cleaver, “Karl Marx: Economist or Revolutionary?” in Suzanne W. Helburn and David F. Bramhall, eds., Marx, Schumpeter & Keynes (M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 1986), 124–26.
Wennerlind, Casualties of Credit. Caffentzis, Clipped Coins, Abused Words and Civil Government. Anitra Nelson and Frans Timmerman, eds., Life without Money: Building Fair and Sustainable Economies (London: Pluto Press, 2011). “Potential Strategies and Tactics for Rupturing the Dialectics of Money” in Cleaver, Rupturing the Dialectic, 235–64.
Mario Tronti, “Lenin in England” in Working Class Autonomy and the Crisis (London: Red Notes and CSE, 1979), 1–6. Originally in Classe Operaio 1 (January 1964): 18–20. Republished in Mario Tronti, Operai e Capitale (Torino: Einaudi Editore, 1966) as “Lenin in Inghilterra,” 89–95 and “A New Type of Political Experiment: Lenin in England” in Mario Tronti, Workers and Capital (New York: Verso, 2019), 65–72. “Introduction,” Zerowork: Political Materials 1, 1975, pp. 1–6.
Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Pelican Books, 1976, London: Penguin Classics, 1990)
Harry Cleaver, Polityczne czytanie Kapitału (Posnań: Oficyna Bractwa Trojka, 2011). Originally, Reading Capital Politically.
Capital, Vol. 1, Chapters 27–28.
Theodore Shanin, ed., Late Marx and the Russian Road: Marx and the Peripheries of Capitalism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983).
Dan Georgakas and Marvin Surkin, Detroit, I do Mind Dying: A Study in Urban Revolution (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1975).
“Poland Strong Institutions a Must for Steady Growth,” IMF Survey interview with Zakharova, July 5, 2016.
Pawel Gajewski, Labour Market Measures in Poland 2008–13: The Crisis and Beyond (Geneva: International Labor Office, 2015) 6.
IndexMundi, online.
Gajewski, Labour Market Measures in Poland 2008–13, p. 16.
Capital, Vol. 1, Chapter 25.
Capital, Vol. 1, Chapter 24.
Joanna Berendt, “Protestors in Poland Rally against Proposal for Total Abortion Ban,” New York Times, October 3, 2016. Rick Lyman and Joanna Berendt, “Poland Steps Back from Stricter Anti-Abortion Law,” New York Times, October 6, 2016.
OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: Poland (March 2016): 17–20. IMF, Republic of Poland, Selected Issues, IMF Country Report No. 16/211, (July 10, 2016). IMF, “IMF Executive Board Concludes Article IV Consultation with the Republic of Poland,” July 5, 2016.
IMF, Republic of Poland, Selected Issues, IMF Country Report No. 16/211 (July 10, 2016): 21–36.
See, Cleaver, “Food, Famine and the International Crisis,” Zerowork, no. 2, (Fall 1977): 29–32.
Miklós Haraszti, A Worker in a Worker’s State, London, Penguin 1977,
Gajewski, Labour Market Measures in Poland 2008–13, 2015, pp. 33–34.
Piotr Arak, Piotr Lewandowski, and Piotr Zakowiecki, “Dual Labor Market in Poland – Proposals for Overcoming the Deadlock,” Instytut Badań Strukturalnych Policy Paper 01, 2014, p. 4.
Martin Glaberman, Punching Out (Detroit: Correspondence Publishing Committee, 1952). Martin Glaberman, Union Committeemen and Wildcat Strikes (Detroit: Correspondence Publishing Committee, 1955).
Tore Ellingsen, et. al., “Contract Theory: The Prize in Economic Theory 2016,” Popular Science Background, (The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, 2016).
Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, n.d.
Jan Czarzasty, Capacity building for social dialogue in Poland, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2006, p. 16.
Piotr Sula, “Role of social dialogue institution in the time of crisis. The case of Poland,” Research Papers of Wroclaw University of Economics, 136, no. 9 (January 2010): 211.
Ibid., p. 218.
IMF, “Poland: Staff Concluding Statement of 2016 Article IV Mission, International Monetary Fund, (May 16, 2016)
IMF, Cross-Country Report on Minimum Wages: Selected Issues, IMF Country Report 16/151, (June 2016). Katarzina Kuniewicz, “Home for the Young scheme affects prices of dwellings and sales volumes,” REAS, February 5, 2015. (No longer online)
IMF, Press release: IMF Executive Board Approves US$20.58 Billion Arrangement for Poland Under the Flexible Credit Line, (May 6, 2009).
Narodowy Bank Polski, Financial Stability Report, February 2016, pp. 51–52.
IMF, “Poland: Staff Concluding Statement” op. cit. IMF, “IMF Executive Board Concludes Article IV Consultation with the Republic of Poland,” July 5, 2016, OECD Economic Surveys: Poland (March 2016).