1 Introduction
We are living in a world which faces many fundamental threats and challenges. It distracts us from collective aspirations towards growing prosperity, creating more public goods, and reaching higher living standards. While international organizations (IO s) proudly announce ambitious Sustainable Development Goals, the overall picture of a global mosaic looks less optimistic, if not gloomy. In recent years, scholars, experts, civic activists, and politicians have been discussing and worrying about the rise of regional conflicts and threats of climate change, alongside efforts related to fighting poverty and unjust distribution of global wealth and resources. Then, in the last 2 years, humanity has been preoccupied with the pandemic of COVID-19, when both national and global communities were put in a very uncomfortable position of helplessness and frustration in the face of the massive spread of deadly viruses (Bengtsson & Rhinard, 2019, pp. 346–349).
Recently the global community has been confronted with kinetic security threats, and military conflicts, including full-scale wars. These make access to public goods (as they are described in the previous chapter) obstructed and constrained. As far as security and human rights are concerned, the activity of IO s, which were founded primarily to prevent conflicts and wars, should be the focus of academic scrutiny and critical analysis. The most evidence of a growing global insecurity is provided by a new stage of the Russo – Ukrainian War, launched by the Kremlin in Ukraine on February 24, 2022. It clearly means a new turn in the international order and relations. The biggest (mainly territorially) country in the world, a permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, a member of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and many other global and regional organizations, started an unprovoked full-scale war. This war threatens the very existence of Ukraine, which is a founding member of the UN and the biggest country in Europe. Russia is taking apart Kyiv’s control territories under a severe occupational regime, expanding its territories at the expense of Ukraine, and widely applying
In this chapter, the author applies theories and concepts which are mostly developed within the realm of political science and international relations. The chapter is written based on both primary and secondary sources, including fundamental documents, such as the UN Charter, the Universal Convention on Human Rights, and others.
Structurally, the chapter is divided into four sections. The first section deals with the international community’s determined search for peace and prosperity under growing tensions and confrontations. The second section of the chapter turns to the Euro-Atlantic dimension of international organizations: the first is the OSCE case, and the second one is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The last two sections are concerned with the European security situation. In the third section the author considers the role of the Council of Europe as a very important IO, regionally and globally. The last section examines the EU’s evolution as a geopolitical actor with a certain position and responsibilities as the most important provider of security and contributor to public goods in general. Some lessons which the EU has learned after the Yugoslav Wars and Russian aggression are outlined as the most relevant to the subject of the chapter (Olech, 2019, pp. 8–9). Thus, the chapter focuses on a wide spectrum of crucial challenges and threats, as well as provides a critical analysis of the reactions of the leading IO s to them.
2 The International Community’s Determined Search for Peace and Prosperity: the Question of the UN’s Ability to Meet Its Goals
2.1 Hopes and Failures of the UN
Although the purposes of sanctions vary, the Security Council remains focused on coercion, which was its primary purpose in 56% of the cases, compared to 41% for constraint and 3% for signaling. Sanctions achieved their principal purpose in 19% of the cases. Sanctions were effective in coercing 10% of the time and in constraining and signaling in 27% of the cases, suggesting that sanctions might be more effective if the Council designed and imposed them for purposes other than coercion. Weighing all three purposes equally, sanctions were effective in 22% of the cases. (Biersteker et al., 2018, p. 408)
Finally, the case of Russia’s war against Georgia in 2008 and the ongoing Russo – Ukrainian War since 2014 could be recalled also. These examples show the very limits of the UN’s effectiveness and role in preventing and settling those conflicts, avoiding the worst-case scenario in the latter. All those cases happened despite the sophisticated institutional structure and procedural mechanisms of the UN, e.g., the General Assembly resolutions, many sittings and talks in the Security Council, a few other discussions at auxiliary bodies of that IO, the wide range of authoritative experts engaged and many conferences/debates on different issues held. Some of them have not been successfully resolved up to now.
Why did it happen? Why, given the recent very pro-Ukrainian resolutions of the General Assembly, did the Russo – Ukrainian War, which started in 2014, move to a more dangerous stage after February 24, 2022? It seems that those cases take place because the UN itself has some principal distortions and loopholes. The organization’s institutes and functions are disproportionately affected by the influence of the great powers. One of the key reasons is the founding consensus of 1945, when five countries were appointed as the permanent members of the Security Council. They agreed to be a core body of the UN. That made this IO a kind of international trust, which is controlled by those principal stakeholders, namely the USA, Great Britain, France, China, and the USSR. Ironically, Russia is a self-proclaimed chief successor of the USSR. These five countries made a consensus that they have a right to be permanent members of the Security Council of the UN, and their exclusive authority, influence, and strength are legally supported and guaranteed by
2.2 Possible UN Reforms
These cases explain why the UN needs thorough and comprehensive reforms, which should be centered on the role of the Security Council (Binder & Heupel, 2015, pp. 247–248). If an organization is grounded on the principle of all countries’ equality, parity, and respect for any independent state as a member of the UN, the member states must exercise an equal voice and influence. In addition to the drastic division between the small and big countries, and the developed and developing countries, one has to admit evident disparity between the group of permanent member countries and the non-permanent members in the UN Security Council. For instance, Latin America and Africa are not represented in the Security Council with a decisive power or blocking power of a veto. Out of many Asian countries, only China is a permanent member of the Security Council of the UN. This corresponds to neither the economic contribution of countries to the UN budget (it ensures the material grounds for effective functioning and actions of the IO) nor to the countries’ individual contribution to resolving the security, social-economic, educational, and other important problems of human existence. Undeniably, it also makes accessibility of public goods uneven. The author agrees with the following statement: “An expansion of the Security Council or the revoking of veto powers will not […] equip the UN system to fight a ‘soft war.’ It requires new tools and new strategies. The reforms should go beyond cosmetic changes and include all agencies and organisations working with [the] UN” (Thomas & Kumar, 2021, p. 95).
It is incompatible with the logic and spirit of the UN’s mission and legal foundations that its most representative and authoritative body, the General Assembly, lacks the power to make the final decision. It does not control budgetary processes and the functioning of UN agencies, either (Janev, 2020, pp. 121–123). The General Assembly merely issues recommendations that
That is why there has been a growing anticipation and need for UN structural reforms, from the 1960s onwards (Ade-Ibijola, 2015). Different projects of reforming the UN were drafted and proposed. Key changes suggest increasing the power of the General Assembly, which is the true representative body of all the member states, and which reflects the position of the global community. The General Assembly should be the real power and ultimate body to resolve any conflict or war and to put in motion the decisive power of the UN, including the right of intervention, economic sanctions, and other measures needed to stop aggression and restore regional or global security.
Another direction of reforms is the composition and power of the Security Council. Some drafts attempt to include the representation of countries like India (Dabhade, 2022, pp. 50–68) Japan, and Germany as new permanent members. From the point of view of demography and the growing importance of India, this was a well-grounded proposal. However, that attempt failed, arousing no enthusiasm from the five principal UN stakeholders (Ade-Ibijola, 2015, pp. 138–139). It might be mentioned there was an attempt to include Japan as a new permanent member of the Security Council. As far as continental Europe is concerned, Germany is a very important stakeholder of the European order and its social and economic development. It is also an influential contributor to regional and global public goods. Yet proposals to increase its role have received the cold shoulder instead of support. Should those motions be realized, it would not resolve the problem of the exclusive privileges of the permanent members of the Security Council. Even if the countries and their representatives had supported the move to make India, Japan, and/or Germany permanent members, it would not have helped to resolve the issue of the permanent members’ veto. Should the veto right be expanded to the new permanent members, it would further complicate the process of making the Security Council more democratic.
Regarding the UN Charter provision, one must accept complications of those motions being realized. This precondition influences the perspective of reforming the whole policymaking process in the UN. The veto right should be totally excluded as an instrument of the so-called “permanent members’ superiority” over the Security Council and consequently the UN in general (Dadashova, 2019, p. 100). Otherwise, the international community could
UN reforms are inevitable and of crucial importance. They should be carried out as soon as possible. The reform agenda should have a high priority and be considered with no delay. Otherwise, the lack of timely reaction to the global challenges, including pandemics, military threats from Russia, and some alarming moves from China to establish control over Taiwan by military means, could result in a full-fledged global war with all the imaginable and predictable consequences to follow. The UN, as the most important and comprehensive global international organization, needs urgent but well-thought-out reorganization. It’s the right response to the new challenging situation concerning regional and global issues. The reforms should be democratic both in the content and procedures for discussing and resolving conflictual issues. Ultimately, no state can possess privileges instead of equal rights and duties. These are the most urgent direction of changes and reforms in the UN.
3 The Euro-Atlantic International Organizations: Stormy Winds of Change
Europe and the Euro-Atlantic area are distinguished by having the dubious honor of being the starting locations for two world wars. They have shaken those regions, left behind millions of dead and wounded people, as well as ruined settlements. Furthermore, they resulted in a contradictory legacy in the collective memories of many nations there. For that reason, it is very important to analyze the Euro-Atlantic international organizations’ activities and to consider to what extent those organizations are effective in preventing conflicts, resolving them, and paving a way to a stable and secure peace.
3.1 The Origin and Development of the OSCE
First, it is essential to touch upon the origin and evolution of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The process of its establishment could be observed as early as the 1970s in Détente and the Helsinki Process. The US and the USSR, the leaders of two confronting blocks, mutually recognized the importance of peaceful coexistence and the need for reduced tensions in Europe and the Euro-Atlantic space. They tried to find political solutions which would be acceptable to both camps in the framework of the Cold War era and the bipolar system of international relations (Koja et al., 2020, pp. 1–3). In some respects, the new format of Euro-Atlantic interstate
However, after the formative years the OSCE hardly succeeded in those tasks. It did not play an important role in the prevention and resolution of conflicts in the scope of the organization’s responsibility (Debuysere, 2019, pp. 250–251). The first litmus test was the context of the post-Yugoslav Wars period, where the OSCE tried its best to be as helpful as possible (Đorđević et al., 2018). Yet until the intervention of NATO, the OSCE was able to perform only a secondary role there (Simonet, 2018, pp. 284–285). It did not find a way to serve as the main platform of making peace, preventing, or managing conflict, and finding solutions for post-conflict regulation (Friesendorf, 2020).
Other conflicts where the OSCE was engaged concerned mainly the post-Soviet space. First, one has to consider the Nagorno-Karabakh case, the oldest open armed conflict in the post-Soviet space, which has been going on until now (with some aggravations in 2015 and 2020) (Guliyev & Gawrich, 2021). The role of the OSCE appeared as weak and indecisive there (Shelest, 2022, p. 14). It is also essential to recall the Moldova and Georgia cases regarding the conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia respectfully.Again, the author does not discover proof that the OSCE is the main actor in negotiating the acceptable approach among all the parties concerned with ending these conflicts (Mihr, 2021, pp. 8–11). Certainly, not all parties are equally concerned with productive negotiations in those conflicts. Not every one of them is interested in a fair solution to these conflicts as well. Both in the cases of Georgia and Moldova, the OSCE founded a platform for negotiation, a framework for diplomatic talks, organized different meetings, and sent monitoring missions to the regions. It has made a strenuous effort to elaborate practical recommendations for the conflicted parties for years of those protracted conflicts. Despite those efforts, regional conflicts have been unsolved until now. The position of the OSCE seems to be very low profile with no considerable outcomes achieved.
The driving force of the OSCE is a gradual but steady evolution from an international organization, which has been based on the idea of a peaceful coexistence of different, sometimes adversary countries with different economic systems, political regimes, and ideologies. The standards of mutual trust applied to confidence measures and cooperative approaches were advocated and supported by the organization. However, this is not satisfactory to provide peace and strengthen security in Europe and Eurasia. This became clear when the OSCE tried to interfere in the conflict in Ukraine after the illegal annexation of Crimea and the beginning of war in Donbas, both launched by Putin’s Russia. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Donbas seemed to be the only IO mission that tried to observe and describe what was happening there in reality (Mihr, 2021, pp. 54–75). Because of the paradoxical situation – the offender, Russia, was an influential member of the OSCE together, with its allies, such as Belarus and Kazakhstan (at that time) – it seemed that the authority and reputation of the OSCE was compromised, resulting in lower efficacy. Not surprisingly, the IO did not achieve considerable results with its monitoring missions in Donbas (Giardullo et al., 2019, pp. 135–137). It did not make the “Minsk process” a road that led to the resolution of the conflict in Ukraine. The negotiations continued for 8 years with the assumption that they would result in positive results for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and regional security. What happened instead is the opposite of those expectations. Finally, the OSCE mediation and the Minsk process were broken down by the Kremlin with the full-scale intervention in Ukraine and the launch of a new stage of the Russo – Ukrainian War on February 24, 2022. Even the staff of the OSCE SMM has suffered from the actions of the Russian occupational forces in the region under Russia’s attacks, as they were not spared from violence.
Ideally, with its commitment to comprehensive, cooperative, equal, and indivisible security, it is well suited to addressing security questions of all kinds. However, the Organization has been politically sidelined and neglected to such a degree that the greater part of its agenda concerns peripheral issues, with delegations devoting most of their energy to minor battles among themselves. (Zellner, 2020, p. 33)
In general, despite the very important role the OSCE plays in dialogues involving human rights, media freedom, the development of education, gender equality, monitoring elections, etc., it failed to be an effective international
3.3 NATO: a Successful Survivor Despite Doubts
Another type of international organization with authority in the Euro-Atlantic space is NATO. From the perspective of its development, NATO is much luckier compared to the OSCE. NATO came into existence as the Western countries’ collective response to the Soviet and communist threat. One must keep in mind that NATO was a kind of international alliance and military block that originated in the Cold War era and was conceived within a bipolar system. Subsequently, NATO served as a counterbalance to the USSR’s global domination claims with the core idea of disseminating the socialist revolution worldwide. NATO played a very important role in the Cold War era. Together with the Warsaw Pact, they were polarized balancers of the very delicate equilibrium of the two superpowers, the USA and the USSR, as well as their allies at that time. A turning point for NATO came after the collapse of the Communist Bloc, when Central Europe was undergoing a series of “velvet” revolutions, which liberated the region from communist regimes (Oztig, 2020, p. 2). When the USSR collapsed as well, the discussion about NATO’s mission and the sense of its very existence reached its momentum.
The debates revolve around the key issue: Are there rational reasons for keeping up NATO’s existence anymore? (Shifrinson, 2020, pp. 344–345). The assumption that those reasons are no longer valid has been swept away with the stormy waves of the Yugoslavian crisis (Ejdus & Kovačević, 2019). Soon after this, any remaining doubts were quashed by open regional conflicts in the post-Soviet space. Finally, they were destroyed by the September 11th terrorist attacks against the USA and others in some European states at the very beginning of the new millennium. These threats proved that proposals to dismiss NATO are premature and rather dangerous, both for the member states of the alliance as well as for the security system of the Euro-Atlantic area (Spohr & Hamilton, 2019, pp. 3–7).
From that moment on, NATO evolved from a military block to a political alliance with new functions and competences. The alliance has undertaken a lot of effort to cooperate with former rivals and foes, for example, establishing the Partnership for Peace program. Despite some positive steps in the early 1990s, NATO enlargement to the east of Europe was soon perceived by the Kremlin as a direct threat to Russia’s national interests, security, and defense concerns (Kucharski, 2019, p. 2).
Debates originated because of NATO attempts to go out of the natural geographical area of its responsibility. They concern not only NATO operations and missions to Yugoslavia, especially to Kosovo (Krivokapić, 2019). They also cover NATO missions to Libya. Operations against piracy also took place on the Indian Ocean near Somalia, and the long-standing mission of the alliance to Afghanistan. The Libyan mission was rather a failure after the dismissal and death of Qaddafi (Staack, 2018, pp. 11–12). NATO’s operation against piracy (Operation Ocean Shield) involved a coalition of partners and can be evaluated as more or less effective and timely.
The most distanced NATO mission from the natural geographic area of its responsibility was its mission to Afghanistan. Obviously, despite all the efforts (Berdal, 2019), human lives, money, and other resources invested, that mission was a complete failure. One can speculate that the NATO mission to Afghanistan enforced the cooperation of member states, making it more animated and effective. The mechanism evoked because of that mission promoted solidarity and closer cooperation between NATO countries (Johnston, 2019, p. 12).
Comparing the benefits of membership for allied states, NATO is an overtly beneficial IO and military-political alliance for them. One example is the case of Turkey – Greece relations. It is evident that because of their NATO membership, both countries have (to this point) avoided engaging in a direct confrontation. Their interrelations remain tense, due to their disagreement on Cyprus and their dispute over territorial claims to some islands between them. Relations between Turkey and Greece today are closer to hostility rather than true partnership. Still, being loyal members of NATO, both countries understand their responsibilities and appreciate the benefits they receive from their membership in the alliance. Being responsible and loyal members of NATO is important to them both (despite some recent criticisms of the behavior of Turkey) (Goren, 2018).
NATO acknowledges that Russia is a direct threat, with China as a second challenge. These realities mean the NATO reinforcement of vision on global security and threats originated as a reaction to other countries. The most dangerous one is Russia (Connable et al., 2020). Still, the rise of China as a geopolitical actor may not be a direct threat (Nye, 2017), but rather a challenge for NATO solidarity and efficiency in the short term and for the foreseeable future.
NATO has witnessed some internal tensions. Old problems with the USA’s centrality and tricky avoidance of military expenditure growth by other European members (Koivula, 2021, pp. 145–147) led to the progressive weakness of those countries’ defensive capabilities, including the highly developed ones like France and Germany.
Regarding the Russian political threat and the growing military pressure presently approaching the eastern and southern borders of NATO, the alliance has to be more active and consolidated. It needs to move forward with reform of the organization and attract new members.
It would be reasonable to recall here the lesson of NATO’s Bucharest summit in 2008 (Staack, 2018, p. 7), where the leaders of France and Germany (Olech, 2019, p. 4) – Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel, respectively – blocked the appeal of Georgia and Ukraine to enter NATO and to set up instead an action plan to eventually give them NATO membership. They argued that they did not want to see Georgia and Ukraine as new NATO members because they did not want to irritate Vladimir Putin, the leader of Russia. What followed that public statement? Russia’s invasion of Georgia started the same year. Russia, for the first time in its modern history, openly used its military forces against an independent state, which was Russia’s partner not only in the UN and in the OSCE, but also in the Commonwealth of Independent States (Georgia quit the organization in 2009). This example also presents an unwise solution against the necessity of fortifying NATO solidarity. To some extent, this was the move that inspired some to suspect these leaders of pro-Russian feelings or, even
After the new stage of the Russo – Ukrainian War in 2022, NATO must reconsider its strategy regarding Russia and new prospective members from the former USSR. It is very positive that NATO promptly reacted to the appeal for membership from Finland and Sweden. This was a right and timely move which makes NATO stronger. Both countries, with their long histories of neutrality, will be protected by the alliance’s collective force when their applications are accepted. NATO solidarity has in any case been confirmed. The new members could join soon, despite reservations expressed by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey (another NATO member) against the membership of these two countries because of their political backing of Turkish dissidents (Kurds, etc.). Notwithstanding that diplomatic turmoil, NATO found a way for a principal solution and both countries were accepted as new members unanimously. The only problem that remains is the ratification of the protocols by all the NATO member states, although hopes exist that the necessary steps can be completed without delay.
Regarding the conditions of the ongoing Russo – Ukrainian War, some priorities of NATO are visible, namely the containment and clear-cut repulsion of Russian aggression, revisionism, and retro-imperial policy. NATO needs to elaborate a new affirmative strategy and implement it as soon as possible. It should be a new efficient policy, enhancing its military and administrative capacity to act faster and stronger and to be as united as ever, securing their borders against existing and potentially emerging threats.
4 The Council of Europe’s Role in Dealing with Instability
The Council of Europe (CoE) is one of the oldest post-Yalta European organizations. It became an active promoter of closer cooperation and a generator of solidarity among the European states by sharing the same values of democracy, rule of law, human rights, and respect for other principles of modern democratic lawful states (Brummer, 2012). The 1990s were a successful period for the CoE’s ideals as many post-communist countries in Europe strived for membership. Practically all the countries of the former Communist bloc, including new independent European countries of the former USSR, applied for CoE membership. The inclusion of, for example, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and the Baltic states into the framework of the CoE promised a new era of peaceful and democratic Europe.
Still the first abruption of this promising trend happened in Belarus with the election to the presidency of Alexander Lukashenko, when a rapid transformation took place from a very fragile and weak democratic institution to an authoritarian regime (Sahm, 2010). The process of acquiring membership to the CoE for Belarus was discontinued. It was a failure on the way towards the pan-European political homogeneity of a democratic transition.
However, this is not the only exception, as other setbacks in post-Yugoslavian countries emerged. The authoritarianism of President Franjo Tuđman in Croatia or problems with democracy in Bulgaria were obstacles as well. Even the recent spread of populism over Europe also shook and challenged democracy globally (Acharya, 2017, pp. 274–275). Again, the very concept of “illiberal democracy,” which has been shared and propagated by the leading political forces in Hungary and Poland, emerged as a new challenge. All these events bring in political instability and threat cohesion inside the CoE.
The most significant impact on the CoE’s efficiency and legitimacy was Putin’s Russia’s revisionism and expansionism. The need for a solution to the conflicts in the post-Soviet territory (wars in Georgia and in Ukraine) has complicated the organization’s mission. The member states’ positions were divided by their stances regarding Russia’s behavior in the post-Soviet space. The outlook on all-European security issues and responsibility for maintaining peace were different too (Gawrich, 2017). While hard security issues are not the direct responsibility of the CoE, soft security is part of the organizations’ responsibility.
Moreover, when the organization had been established, it neglected the issue of any means of war being acceptable and tolerated. The IO itself is rather a consequence, the instrument of preventing and resolving conflicts
On the contrary, the members of the CoE have been disoriented and divided regarding Russia’s aggressive actions. A particularly dangerous fact is that Russia tried to corrupt the CoE by blackmailing it with its financial contribution and by seducing some member states with different manipulations in recent years. The fact that some politicians in the CoE and some of the member states’ leaders tacitly accepted Russia’s offer, turning blind eye to reality, deserves public criticism. In principle, these actions come close to agreeing with Russia’s annexation of Crimea and with its role in the conflict in Donbas. Russia’s propagandistic rhetoric and arguments that there is a civil war in Ukraine and Russia was not a part of the conflict (Mälksoo, 2018, p. 7) were tolerated by the leadership of the CoE institutions (Committee of Ministers, Parliament, Assembly and to a lesser extent by the Council of Local and Regional Authorities). This fact makes that situation alarming. This indispensable IO, which oversees security and promotion of the high standards of democracy, rule of law, and peaceful cooperation in Europe, tacitly operated in an informal agreement with Russia, an offender, and an aggressive state. Russian policies made the situation all around the post-Soviet space dangerous and moved toward full war escalation in Ukraine. Simultaneously, the Kremlin continues its intent to make Europe disunited and weak (Karlsen, 2019, pp. 7–12).
The CoE overtly failed at preventing the aggravation of the war in Ukraine and changing Russia’s political behavior. Finally, right after February 24, 2022, the CoE unanimously expelled Russia from the organization. At the same time, Russia tried to “save face” by making a gesture of withdrawing from the IO by its own choice. First, that break is pitiful for ordinary Russians. For instance, membership in the CoE excluded the use of the death penalty in its member states. It also ensured certain control over elections and the applicability of the Human Rights Court. All of that now seemed to be out in Russia’s case, with long-lasting negative consequences for the prospect of democracy and the rule of law in Russia the future (Oxford Analytica, 2022). At the same time, Russia’s membership is incompatible with the foundations of the CoE. The membership of the country that openly undermines the basic principles of the CoE, such as European tolerance, responsibility, cooperation, and solidarity, is not acceptable. So far, it is a timely (or maybe belated) and right decision to expel Russia from the CoE (Leach, 2022).
5 The EU’s Evolution from an Ever-Closer Union to an Influential Geopolitical Actor
On the European Communities’ way to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and ratification by European leaders, there were continuous discussions centered on security issues. They included an increase of the EU’s role and position toward regional and global security and its responsibility before the member states. The EU promoted the idea of a political union in charge of the common foreign and defense policy of the member states. These ideas were laid down as one of the three new pillars built up in the Maastricht Treaty. At the same time, that pillar comprised the idea and mechanism of intergovernmentalism rather than supranationalism regarding security and foreign policymaking. Therefore, these innovations spark further discussions about some issues, including the extent to which the EU has to develop a capacity to be an international actor in the field of foreign and security policy. What kind of guarantees and obligations should it undertake regarding member states? To what extent should it provide an elaborated institutional and legal mechanism of their interaction in those affairs? The willingness and readiness of the EU members to share out those most sensible and considerable responsibilities and delegate their sovereign rights to the supranational level of governance have been very limited. So far, the dominant role of intergovernmentalism and the exclusive position of the European Council in its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) emerged as a kind of compromise. It combines the necessity to back up the political union with some new responsibilities and competencies in the sphere of international policies and politics, and to fully secure the sovereign rights of the member states to define and to run those policies in the future.
5.1 The EU as a Global Actor: Its Strengths and Weaknesses
The Lisbon Treaty brought about important and beneficial legal institutional changes, thus enhancing the very capacity of the EU to act in a more consolidated way and be united in the face of various tasks of international policy and politics. The intergovernmental mechanism of decision-making prevails in the CFSP, and it limits the ability of the EU to advance as an important
However, while dealing with some hard military and security threats, the EU is less successful. Sometimes it has failed to find an appropriate solution and adequate compromise among the member states. For instance, wars in former Yugoslavia seemed to be a certain failure of Brussels regarding the breakdown of that country. The key reason is in the different positions of the member states in search of a better way to resolve those conflicts. The decisive role was given away by the EU in favor of the USA and some other international organizations, while it was primarily the EU whose member states (including Italy, Austria, and Germany) were the most affected by the consequences of those conflicts. They had to deal with flows of refugees, criminals, and other complications at the time and after the Yugoslav Wars. The EU did not face those challenges successfully.
Some other attempts at making the EU more consolidated regarding security issues appear to have finally failed. The EU hesitates a lot at times when discussing the USA’s leadership in the areas of responsibility of the two important international organizations: NATO and the EU in Europe. Finally, the discussions have been closed with a compromise. Overlapping membership in organizations as well as the different concerns and visions of the European security and global agenda of conflict prevention contributed to a certain kind of redistribution of powers and competencies among NATO and the EU. So far, NATO remains the most important contributor to the hard security issues, but the EU concentrates mainly on the soft security agenda, including fighting against terrorism (Efrat et al., 2021), the illegal trade of weaponry, the prevention and resolution of regional and subregional conflicts, etc. (Bartnik, 2021,
In the end, it makes sense to touch upon the problems of the EU aiming to reform itself. The debates are also framed with the most difficult dilemma: the choice in favor of its further enlargement or preference to solidify cohesion inside the EU. Both options are related to the EU prospect to be stronger and expansive in its activities. The failure of the constitutional process in the EU undermined the capacity of the Union to transform the integrational community into a more effective and well managed one. The proverbial characteristic of the EU as “an economic giant and political dwarf” reflects a widespread reaction to that paradox. The EU is acquiring more prominence, importance, and influence as an economic power. Still, it remains incompatible, less visible and prominent as a global political power. That situation raises a legitimate question about its governability, especially on security issues (Sperling & Webber, 2019).
A series of consecutive crises that affected the EU and the member states in recent decades was a test to the EU’s powerfulness and proactive policy (Kinnvall et al., 2018, pp. 249–250). The economic crisis in 2008, the refugee crisis in 2011, the Ukrainian crisis since 2014, and Brexit after that. Optimistically, these challenges did not signify the end of the EU, of the European integration process, nor of the political union perspective. However, they have uncovered too many loopholes and weaknesses in the organization up to now (Kalniete & Pildegovičs, 2021, pp. 23–25).
5.2 The Eastern Partnership as a Test for the EU Actors
The very complicated nature of the European Union as a unique combination of an international organization, a confederation, and a federation, but not a state per se, makes the analysis of the EU’s capacity to be a geopolitical actor a very difficult task. The external environment for the EU is growing more complicated. Since 2014, the EU has faced growing tensions with Russia. To its own surprise, it also discovered Russia’s foreign policy on the eve of the Vilnius summit of the Eastern Partnership (EaP). Russia’s perception of the Eastern Partnership, inaugurated in Prague in 2008 as a new program of the EU, made the Union optimistic before that time. EaP corresponds not only to the Union’s vision on the Eastern European dimension of the EU’s foreign and security policy. It also answers the appeals of European countries of the post-Soviet region (Crombois, 2019, pp. 90–91). This initiative was modest as to goal setting and limited with incentives and resources attained (Latoszek & Kłos, 2016). It did not correspond fully with the initial, much more ambitious ideals of the
The Eastern Partnership did not threaten Russia’s security. Nonetheless, the Kremlin reacted as though it perceived these steps as a competition and an unacceptable challenge for Russia. Moscow initiated a full-fledged operation of threatening these countries with growing economic pressure, political intimidation, and, finally, open military attack. Before the Vilnius summit of 2013, it was expected that Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova would likely sign association agreements with the EU. However, drawbacks to this prospect emerged quickly. First, Armenia deserted the camp of the pro-European countries of the Eastern Partnership in favor of the Customs Union (nowadays, the Euro-Asian Union, led by Russia). Next, Ukraine faced the attempt of the government of President Viktor Yanukovych to block the European integration course of the country, withdrawing the obligation to sign the Association Agreement. Finally, only Georgia and Moldova signed the Agreement in 2013. All of this meant that it was a turning point for the geopolitical situation in the post-Soviet region (Kruglashov, 2020). Later on, the annexation of the Crimea by Russia, the war in Donbas, and the current so-called Ukrainian crisis have made Russia and the EU no longer strategic partners, as they had officially declared themselves years before. Instead, they are increasingly competitors in the geopolitical arena, full of suspicions and distrust. From February 24, 2022, onwards, almost nobody in the EU treats Russia as a reliable partner or even as a partner at all. Russia is now a principal challenger to the European order, European law, and the European value system. On the one hand, the EU is helping Ukraine in sustaining its statehood and defending its sovereignty in the face of the Russian aggression. This position and actions of the EU are very important and should be appreciated. On the other hand, the latest events of 2022 have illustrated major systemic problems in the EU. For example, the problem of the very slow policymaking process and the deficit of its internal cohesion (Juncos & Blockmans, 2018, pp. 136–138).
Furthermore, a group of so-called “Putin friends” remain a true obstacle to recognizing what the Russian regime in fact is, and what authoritarianism and neototalitarianism in Russia, Belarus, and some other post-Soviet countries means for the EU countries.
Under these circumstances, today the EU must reconsider its strategies and policymaking procedures to reinforce institutional capacity and the role
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine applied for EU candidate status, which two of them were granted on 23 June, 2023, with the prospect of future membership. Certainly, this political solution has been colored with a lot of reservations and discussions. Still, it is very important that the EU recognizes both countries as their prospective members. That decision opens a new stage of their relations with the EU and ensures another vision of the EU regarding the Eastern European flank and the dimension of the EU’s foreign and security policy.
Hopefully, the tough lessons learned in 2008, 2014, and especially in 2022 will be very carefully analyzed by the EU and the member states’ leaders. The EU must be much more engaged in the resolution of existing and predictable conflicts, stimulating the member states’ preparedness toward any aggressive action. It also has to strengthen the ability of the EU to be proactive and to guarantee all member states due protection in the sense of common security. Together they must be vigorous promoters of peace deals in the agenda of cooperation, prevention, and resolution of conflicts. Their responsibility in Europe and worldwide will grow substantially because all currents of global politics are of an urgent character. They should not be left unattended and postponed for further hesitation and political procrastination.
6 Conclusions
The global community is facing a situation of fearsome uncertainty, with real possibilities that the Yalta system (as a modernized continuation of the post-Westphalia system) may finally break down and fall apart. The international relations system is much closer to anarchy, rude competition, and war than ever in recent decades – it might even be defined as a “Hobbesian world” (Keohane, 2003 pp. 65–69). It can be observed that many of the international organizations are founded and claim to be proper instruments or mechanisms for securing peaceful conditions of member states’ existence and perspectives. They are critically important for securing peace and cooperation, thus
For various reasons, the EU and NATO are the leaders and proposers of advocating such reforms. Those reforms require some sacrifices for the self-interest of their member states to reach stable, predictable, and guaranteed peaceful conditions and resolution of conflicts in the European, Euro-Atlantic, and Euro-Asian spaces. They should lead the international community towards restoring the rule of law for all global actors worldwide.
Globally, the UN must be reformed to be unquestionably and effectively democratic, open to the member states’ legitimate requests, and equitable regarding the member states’ security, development, and concerns. This is a big problem and a true challenge. Yet, this is the best way to be an effective convener of the international organizations, political leaders, and the global community in general.
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