1 Introduction
After several years cutting through hundreds of kilometres of Muli Countyâs virgin forest, in late 2009 âBoss Hoâ and his mining equipment arrived on the bank of the Longda River a few miles upstream of Eagleback Village in Eya
Since the 1980s, mining and the issues surrounding resource extraction have become an explicit focus of anthropological investigation (Godoy, 1985). In recent decades, as technological advancement intertwines with a rising global demand for precious metals, as Jacka (2018) states we have entered the mineral age of the Anthropocene, in which resource extraction has become an imperative of the global economy. Along with this imperative come the creation of new and the enhancement of old dimensions of stateâsociety relations, particularly in remote areas where state presence has historically been thin at times and non-existent at others. This has reopened questions about how to frame local agency (Lahiri-Dutt, 2018) in economically marginalised communities that are coming into contact with states in new ways.
In the Peopleâs Republic of China (prc), stateâsociety relations have been marked by both ruptures and consistencies as the context of these relations radically shifts as each generation comes of age. As Brandtstädter (2011) points out, since the 1980s the global neo-liberal agenda of the post-Maoist state and the countryâs increasing interaction with the global market have created an environment in which the parameters of legalâpolitical citizenship have been recast. Yet for rural residents (i.e. the peasants that constituted the heroes of Maoâs revolution) political citizenship remains ârooted in rights to collective resourcesâ (Brandtstädter, 2011, 266). This is perhaps even more true in areas where state rhetoric surrounding policies and promises of âethnic autonomyâ intersects with geographic divisions.
This chapter takes a historical approach to gold mining to explore shifting stateâsociety relations in one of Chinaâs borderlands and to examine how the process of domestic colonisation is less straightforward than other dimensions of Chinaâs authoritarian regime might lead one to believe. It reveals two things. The first is that while China may be characterised by a strong state and a weak
At the same time, the actions taken by Eagleback Naxi in response to âBoss Hoâ and his mining efforts are consistent with indigenous responses to mining documented elsewhere. As a community already vulnerable due to its reliance on existing natural resources and its remoteness from economic alternatives, it was mining-caused environmental degradation that inspired this locally unprecedented political action (MartÃnez-Alier, 2002). Damage done to the river solidified the boundary between villager and township government (which in the past had frequently blurred) and delineated both in opposition to a new entity, the intruding corporation, reflective of the common âthree-leggedâ model of mining stakeholders (Ballard and Banks, 2003; 289). The event lead the community to consolidate its expression of and leverage its indigeneity (Golub, 2014) as a means of justifying both its opposition and its claim. Finally, these events demonstrate the presence of a dialectical relationship (Kirsch, 2014), in this case between community and local government, between society and state.
2 Life on the Periphery of Chinaâs Development
After decades of policy-induced economic disasters during the Maoist era (Li and Tao Yang, 2005) and massive environmental destruction (Shapiro, 2001), in 1978 there were 250 million Chinese citizens living in abject poverty (Park and Wang, 2001). That year China instituted its âReform and Openingâ policy, carefully shifting the national economy away from the commune system and towards state run capitalism in an effort to deliver much needed development to its suffering population. However, Chinaâs subsequent efforts to economically rebuild itself were carefully rolled out in a piecemeal fashion, from tightly controlled Special Economic Zones, first opened in 1979, to the introduction of the Develop the West campaign of the 1990s. The goal was to introduce radical economic change while maintaining a firm grip on society, testing the waters in order to confirm that economic liberalisation could be achieved without leading to political liberalisation. As a result of geographically controlled reform, at the turn of the new millennium, while residents of the eastern seaboard had settled in to the xiaozi (petty bourgeoisie) indulgences that the new economy
Observers have had dualistic impressions of the impact of Chinaâs form of economic mobilisation. From the economistâs perspective, Chinaâs incredible growth has been nothing short of a âmiracleâ (Page, 1994) given its remarkable progress through economically unorthodox means (Sylvie, 2001; Riedel, Jin and Gao, 2007; Cai, 2010). From the perspective of environmentalists and human rights advocates, the Chinese state appears to have continued to pursue development at any cost, much of those costs being both human and environmental (Chunli, 2008; Zhang et al., 2012; Fu et al., 2013; Dzonzi-Undi and Li, 2015; Zhao et al., 2015). It also appears incongruous that at the same time China was setting its sights beyond existing borders the nation continued to struggle with a domestic income disparity gap of massive proportions (Li, 2016; Shi, Guo and Sun, 2017; Zhou and Song, 2017). While Chinaâs new rich do not seem to know what to do with their newfound wealth (Osburg, 2013), there is still a large populationâincluding a high percentage of the nationâs ethnic minority populationsâwho are struggling to gain access the economic opportunities available to their Han counterparts (Barabantseva, 2009; Bhalla and Luo, 2013).
Eya Naxi Autonomous Township is nestled in the convoluted mountain ranges that break the landscape between the Tibetan and Yun-Gui plateaus in southern Sichuan Province. The township makes up the south-western most corner of Muli County running along the YunnanâSichuan border. Eya Township is divided into six administrative villages with a range of settlements varying in size from the largest, Eaglebackâwith over 230 householdsâto single-household âvillagesâ (Chinese (hereafter, âChâ.): dujia cun). Most of the settlements are located at around 2,500 meters above sea level; too high for growing rice and too low for raising yaks. There are two agricultural seasons: corn is grown in the summer, wheat in the winter, making up the two main crops. Food is supplemented with vegetable gardens, which each household maintains. Each household also practices animal husbandry, raising chickens, pigs and goats. Horses and oxen are mainly used for labour.
In addition to being geographically peripheral, under the system of ethnic autonomy operated in the Peopleâs Republic of China (prc) Eya is also politically and administratively marginalised. Eya Naxi Autonomous Township is located within Muli Tibetan Autonomous County, which is in turn located within Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture. What autonomy means in this situation is that leadership positions in local governments need to be filled by
The Naxi population of Muli, around 4,000 people, makes up only 3.47 per cent of the total population of the county. In turn, the predominant population in Muli, Tibetans, only makes up 1.39 per cent of the population of Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture. While all of Liangshan Prefecture is struggling to pull its mountain populations out of poverty, this bureaucratic nesting of autonomy places Eya Naxi at the bottom of the list in terms of priority for receiving the benefits of government development policy. This makes a difference that can be demonstrated most starkly by comparing the Eya standard of living with that of the majority of those of Naxi nationality in China, who reside in and around the Lijiang basin, two days to the south in Yunnan Province. In Yunnan Province, Lijiang has long had the administrative level of âCityâ, placing Lijiang Naxi on the same level as Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture in terms of power and sway in provincial actions. There have been several important politicians in Yunnan that have hailed from Lijiang, and thus Lijiang Naxi have been successful in having their voices heard. In Yunnan Province, the Naxi nationality is considered a shining example of a minority that has successfully developed to become a part of the prcâs mainstream (Su, 2013), while Eya Naxi in Sichuan remain largely invisible, hidden beneath politics involving the political sensitivity regarding Tibetans.
Until 2013 there was no road connecting Eya to outside markets, or even to the county government; all journeys in or out were made by foot or by horse caravan. In 2002 when I made my first trip to Eagleback Village, it took two days on foot to reach from the nearest market town. Reaching the county capital to deal with any kind of bureaucratic or administrative issue, including completing compulsory education, involved a ten-day trek. This was shortened in 2010 to five days when the road connecting Wachang to the county capital was completed. Nowâand since 2013 when the road finally reached Eaglebackâthe county capital of Muli can be reached in a day as long as the roads are passable and not blocked by snow (in winter) or mudslides (in summer).
Despite these transportation difficulties, this does not mean that Eya has been so isolated as to be left unaware of the changes taking place in the world outside the Longda River valley, nor have Eya Naxi people been exempt from state policies since they were first incorporated into the prc polity in 1957. These include economic and land reform policies (the collectivisation of
Beginning in 1995 a variety of programmes were put in place, changing the population from taxpayers into recipients of various forms of welfare. Through the âReforestation of Fieldsâ policy (Ch. tuigeng huanlin), which began in 2002, people were given walnut seedlings to reforest land that had been opened for cultivation during the commune era, and now receive an annual stipend for not farming that land until these walnut trees have matured enough to provide an income. They also receive subsidies to purchase âimprovedâ seeds for three kinds of crops, even though only one of the three is grown in Eya. They also receive subsidies for raising sows, and the township government receives an annual welfare subsidy (Ch. dibao), which it can allot to a small number of households.
However, these programmes have not been able to keep up with the populationâs growing needs. As the rest of China develops, a variety of desirable things have become availableâthings that cannot be acquired through trade but only with cash. This is not just store-bought items such as clothing and shoes, pots, pans, washing machines and tvs, but also includes opportunities for education and receiving healthcare.
A school was built in Eagleback Village in the late 1950s shortly after Muli Tibetan Autonomous County was established by the prc. There is also a clinic that is able to treat minor illnesses and administer vaccines. Villagers are also active in their own attempts to improve their standard of living. Tired of waiting for the government to provide electricity, in the mid-1990s the residents of Eagleback Village all invested in purchasing and transporting the equipment necessary to build a small hydropower station, and since 1996 have had access (although minimal) to electricity.
Over the years that I had been visiting Eagleback, when I asked why no state project had had a noticeable impact on improving standards of living there the answer had always been the same: Eagleback Naxi had remained stuck in poverty because there was no road.
3 The History of Gold in Muli
Eyaâs history, for at least as long as the Naxi have been here, has been tied up in gold. Towards the end of the Ming dynasty, the power of the Naxi chieftains based in Lijiangâgranted the surname Mu by the Ming courtâwas expanding.
In his expansion north from Lijang to Shuiluo, Mu Yi built several encampments close to rivers, the remnants of many of which can still be seen today. Eagleback is one such encampment, a settlement of Naxi settler-soldiers left behind to guard the point where Jinsha River, the Chongtian River, and the Dongyi River approach one another (Wang, 2008). However, Naxi dominance over the territory lasted less than fifty years. In 1647 Lijiang was conquered, and native chieftains were replaced by circulatory government officials (Ch. gaituguiliu), Lijiang being incorporated into the Qing central bureaucracy (mzzx, 1995, 9). Then, in 1675 control of the territory of Eya was granted to the Buddhist Kingdom of Muli by Lhasa as a reward for faithful service (mzzzd, 2002). From the end of the seventeenth century until Eya was officially âliberatedâ by the Peopleâs Liberation Army (pla) in 1957, Eya was governed by Muli Monastery. This governance operated through a local Naxi headman, a position inherited by principle of primogeniture by males of the Mugua (æ¨ç) clan (no relation to the Mu native chieftain based in Lijiang).
3.1 Muli Kingdom Era, 1675â1957
While the Mugua clan was the highest authority in Eagleback, it was relatively weak in terms of authority in comparison to Muliâs monk officials. The Mugua
Under the Muli Kingdom, the local population was governed as a Tibetan style polity. Taxpayer houses were the lowest unit of the bureaucracy and the main unit of property ownership. Part of Muliâs taxation involved the number of days someone from each taxpayer household needed to spend digging for gold each year at various mines around Muli. The Mugua headman organised a rotation of responsibility through the different neighbourhoods so that every household was required to provide a labourer roughly once every three years. If a household had no men available, women would be assigned. Labourers were responsible for providing for all of their own needsâmost importantly their food and toolsâfor their term performing corveé service. A quota was set for how many ounces of gold each individual needed to provide, and when that quota was reached the individualâs service was deemed fulfilled for that occasion and he or she could return home. Often terms of service lasted for between three and six months. Occasionally people were able to steal gold. If caught, the punishment was death, but sometimes workers digging in the depths would find a solid nugget and swallow it before it could be seen by the foremen, recovering it later from their faeces. It could then be secretly sold to travelling tradesmen, who passed through the valley periodically.
With the arrival of the pla, ownership of all of the gold yet to be mined in Eya shifted from the Muli Kingdom to the prc.3
3.2 Cooperative Era, 1957â84
By the time the pla arrived in Eya, the prc had already begun carrying out economic reforms in Muliâs Tibetan areas, so Eya was almost immediately collectivised. At the time, there were several communities in the Muli area that rebelled, leading to a series of temple bombings in order to pacify the region (Shakya, 1999). When the Muli Kingdom was overturned and Muli Tibetan Autonomous County was established by the prc in 1955, the Mugua headman had already been taken to the prefectural capital for âre-educationâ. All
This involved the collectivisation of all property into cooperatives. As was the practice throughout the rest of rural China, Eya was organised into production teams, each team led by a team head who had the job of assigning labourers to different tasks. As elsewhere, this move to collectivisation involved a massive change to family structure. During the Muli Kingdom era, taxpayer households were subject to a monk levy that limited the number of sons at home to two per generation (see Bingaman, 2021), keeping birth rates low and families relatively small. The abolition of Muli Monasteryâs monk levy combined with Maoist era policies encouraging births led family size to explode during this era as women had six, seven, even ten children.
Gold continued to be mined through the cooperative era. The labour for mining was organised by production team heads and overseen by the townshipâs government. All gold recovered went to the collectiveâthat is, to the state. According to local accounts, the collective essentially maintained the same method of recruiting labour as that used in the Muli Kingdom eraâindividuals were sent to dig in the mines on a rotation basis for periods of three to six months.
3.3 âHousehold Responsibilityâ Policy, 1984âPresent
Beginning in 1982, policies allowing for the disbanding of the cooperatives began to be put in place in Muli and by 1984 the land in Eya had been redistributed and allotted to individual households. Under this new system, the household once again became the most basic production unit of a familyâs needs and households were encouraged to make efforts to maximise their economies.4 Historically the main commodities that needed to be acquired from outside the valley through trade were tea, salt and cloth. By the 1980s, other products became available at the government-run storeâcloth and yarn for making clothes and weaving, pots, pans, bowls, and blankets. Then, after
Under the household responsibility system, mining on behalf of the state ceased and individual mining for gold became a grey area of economic opportunity. Technically, all the gold in the ground belonged to the state. Also technically, under the prcâs system of ethnic autonomy it belonged to the Naxi people of Eya Naxi Autonomous Township. Periodically township governments would get orders to tighten up on âillegalâ gold mining, and they would carry out surveys, dropping dynamite down mining pits to close them when they found them. But for the most part it was a free-for-all for whoever had the time and the ability to invest, and a miniature gold rush occurred. As with gold rushes everywhere, more people went bankrupt than actually turned a profit, but ongoing poverty and desperation kept hope in place and kept people heading out to the riverbed.
As described in detail below, by the late 2000s every household that had labourers to spare was involved in gold prospecting throughout the winter months. Men would get together in teams of three or four to invest in the equipment that was needed, and try their luck, sharing any profits between them. Some years some would be lucky, making a big enough return on their investment to buy some items for their households; other years they would suffer a loss. Even township officials and teachers who had been assigned to serve in Eagleback were involved in investing and digging for gold as a means of supplementing their meagre salaries. The promise that they might find gold was informally considered as compensation for officials from more connected areas being assigned to such a poor and remote place.
4 The Promise of Gold
As already stated, after the household responsibility system was put in place in 1984 giving individual households permission to do what they could to maximise their household economic holdings, opportunities to earn cash income were few and far between. The obvious first optionâto invest in some kind of cash crop that would turn traditional agriculture into a profit-making activityâwas impractical. The main obstacle remained transportation. Nothing that could be produced in the valley carried a market value high enough to offset the price of transporting it via horseback to distant markets. Additionally, during the collective era households had become accustomed to the white rice that had
The Longda River, which runs through the township and the surrounding mountains, did, however, offer two things that could be used to generate cash for households that were able to spare labour from normal agricultural activities: gold mining and matsutake mushrooms.5
4.1 Eyaâs Gold Industry
The Longda River Valley runs west to east through Eya Township. The largest settlement is Eagleback, located along the river at its eastern end. The settlement directly upstream is known as Suda Village. It is in the section of the Longda River that flows through Suda that Eya Townshipâs richest gold reserves are found.
The relationship between Suda Village and Eagleback is one of convivial rivalry. The two villages have kinship ties between them, but in terms of economic development, Suda Village has been much more fortunate than Eagleback, leading to what is perhaps a reversal of historical relations (in the past the headman of Suda was subordinate to the headman of Eagleback in the Muli Kingdomâs bureaucracy). To begin with, Sudaâs population is much smaller, and the majority of each houseâs fields are all close by, making agricultural work much easier. The villagesâ topographies also grant Sudaâs fields two hours more sunlight per day than those of Eagleback, resulting in higher yields. Also, considerably more forest land belongs to Suda Village, which means more reforested land, which brings in government subsidies per household. Lastly, Suda is a full day closer to the market town of Luoji, which was particularly fortuitous at the height of the matsutake mushroom trade. In the Reform era, all these elements have combined to offer the villagers of Suda many more
When the collectives were disbanded and land redistributed in Suda, the riverbed, and thus gold mining areas, was not included in the redistribution. Still, the community had its own way of staking claims to areas and negotiating for mining rights. People would use paint to mark off the territory they wanted to claim, and such claims were respected by all, including the township government, a few members of which were eager to invest in the claims. Households that did not have the spare labour required to mine sought to attract speculators from outside the valley who would invest in the equipment needed and share in the wealth if any were found.
Bendi from Eagleback was one such ambitious investor, and he was intent on making a living from means other than agriculture once the household responsibility system had been put in place. Coming from a large family there were already two brothers capable of handling the farm work, releasing Bendi to try to âfind moneyâ by whatever means possible. Immediately following de-collectivisation, Bendi borrowed the funds to buy a few horses and started earning money as a transporter in the caravan trade. Then, later in 2003 he got his first job working as a labourer on a small-scale gold mining operation in a neighbouring township. Three years later, in 2006 he recruited three others from Eagleback to invest with him in buying the equipment necessary to set up a mining operation with a friend from Suda who had a claim ready for prospecting.
The initial investment in equipment was about usd 7,800 (cny 50,000 by 2022âs exchange rate). The main elements required were a water pump, motors, and diesel to run them. Once the operation was set up, labourers were hiredâmostly from Eaglebackâat a daily rate, and were paid at the end of the digging season from the profits made from any gold recovered. By 2009 there were three or four such operations going on during the winter months, providing sufficient labouring opportunities for every household in Eagleback that had labourers to spare to get involved.
Every local working as a labourer knew that this was no means to get rich. For local investors, labourers were contracted on the promise they would be paid at the end of the season when the yearâs take was sold, usually to travelling buyers who would visit each year at the end of the dry season. For village investors, every year was a gamble: some years would see a profit, others losses or break-even. For labourers, wages began at around usd 1.50 (cny 10) per day, and had risen to around usd 7.50 (cny 50) per day by the time mining operations were closed down in 2010. The best hope for day labourers was that they
5 The Three Connects Policy and the Arrival of âBoss Hoâ
In November of 2009 the first road reached Eya Naxi Autonomous Township, but this road did not go to any of the villages, or even lead to the townshipâs government offices. Rather, it led straight to the riverbed in Suda, just upstream of Eaglebackâs power station. Soon, heavy earth-moving equipment arrived along with âBoss Hoâ, who confronted the heads of the local mining operations announcing that the entire riverbed had been purchased by him and that all local small-scale operations were to stop immediately.
As surprising as his appearance was, Boss Ho and his mining equipment had not arrived on the banks of the Longda River out of nowhere. His company, a Hunan-based mnc, had been involved in gold mining all across China and as far away as Africa. Several years earlier it had won a contract with Muli County as part of the âConnecting Villagesâ (Ch. tongcun gonglu) policy. Although unconfirmed, it appears that his ability to underbid his competitors centred on agreements made with the county government that part of the compensation would come from mining rights. By the time he arrived in Eya he already had several mining operations in progress across Muli County.
When the first confrontation between Boss Ho and villagers occurred, the heads of the local mining operations appealed to the township government. They were told that the governmentâs hands were tied; this was part of a larger project to bring development to Eya that had begun at the county level, and the township had to cooperate. Still the villagers stood their ground. It is unclear who made initial moves to escalate the dispute, but efforts were made to disable Boss Hoâs equipment, and dynamite was dropped down the pits of each of the local mining operations, damaging the villagersâ equipment beyond repair. The culprits in both of these acts remain âunknownâ, as no one has claimed responsibility and anyone who knew the truth has remained resolutely tight-lipped. Regarding the dynamite that destroyed the localsâ mining equipment the township office appears to have made no efforts to investigate, which some have taken as an indication of its involvement, or at least its consent.
It was not, however, until Boss Hoâs digging began in earnest that the conflict transformed from the relatively contained anger of local operators over the loss of their investments into a civil uprising involving the entire community of Eagleback. In comparison with the methods utilised by local mining operations, which left little visible surface impact and did not disturb the river,
Boss Hoâs mining operation
source: author, january 2010
6 Collective Action
We, the Naxi people of Eagleback, Eya Township, wish to sue Muli County for allowing the mining of gold in the Longda River because of the destruction to forest resources and the erosion it has caused, which has severely polluted the Longda River, which we rely on for our livelihood, and for the severe economic losses and destruction to the environment it has brought upon the Naxi people of Eagleback, which has made it impossible for the people to survive.
The mining resources of the Longda River should belong to the state, and be a part of the wealth of the people of Eya Township. If outside prospectors take all of it without compensation, what will we the people of Eya Township use to develop our economy?
We, the Naxi people of Eagleback are grateful to the central party and the government for the âThree Connectionsâ preferential policy (connecting transportation, connecting water, connecting electricity) given to national minorities in the poor mountain areas; however the Naxi people of Eagleback have not only not enjoyed the benefits of these preferential policies, it has made it possible for outside gold miners to steal and destroy national resources.
Authorâs field notes, August 2015
It was also decided to set up a roadblock on the mountaintop where Boss Hoâs road entered the township and to not allow him or any more of his personnel or equipment entry. Every household in Eagleback sent people to camp on the mountain in rotation to guard the barricade; both young and old took their turns over a two-month period. The township government was unable to come to an agreement on how to proceed.
Finally, county level officials were sent in to resolve the problem. It is unclear which officials from which departments and which authorities were present, but it is clear that both township and county officials were split, some standing with Boss Ho, others in support of the villagers. Finally, the county and township governments decided to withdraw, removing themselves from the negotiating process. Boss Ho was told that to continue his mining, he would need to come to an agreement with the villagers of Eagleback regarding compensation for damage done to the river.
In the end it was Bendi who was chosen to represent Eagleback in the negotiations with Boss Ho. The villagers demanded an exorbitant amount in
7 Discussion
Unlike the âresigned activismâ observed by Lora-Wainwright (2017), the successful shutting down of Boss Hoâs mining operations on the Longda River through village protests can be considered an example of what OâBrien (1996) and OâBrien and Li (2006) have termed ârightful resistanceâ. Building on prior works by Herbst (1989) and Scott (1990) exploring various forms of popular resistance, OâBrien uses the term ârightful resistanceâ to describe forms of protest in which groups âdispute the legitimacy of certain political authorities and their actions while affirming (indeed relying upon) other authorities and established values to pursue their endsâ (1996, 32). In other words, rightful resisters seek to use the state against the state by âus[ing] a regimeâs policies and legitimizing myths to justify their defianceâ (1996, 33).
In their study of rightful resistance in rural China, OâBrien and Li (2006) show that the rise of instances of this form of resistance indicate a growing fluency in the language of âlaws, regulations and other authoritative communicationsâ (2006, 6) and of âcontractual ways of thinkingâ about stateâsociety relations. OâBrien identifies three characteristics of ârightful resistanceâ: it â(1) operates near the boundary of an authorized channel, (2) employs rhetoric and commitments of the powerful to curb political or economic power, [and] (3) hinges on locating and exploiting divisions among the powerfulâ (OâBrien, 1996, 33).
In the debates going back and forth between villagers and township officials regarding the actual legality of Boss Hoâs digging, the âgrey areaâ in policy that had previously given villagers and township officials alike the space to seek to create or supplement incomes with gold prospecting became a problem. Villagers cited policy that all natural resources belonged to the state, therefore arguing that the county had no right to sell mining rights to an outsider (and
None of these arguments ended up being particularly persuasive, and the final solution, which followed the county governmentâs attempts at intervention, was the imposition of a county-wide ban on all gold mining in Muli, whether carried out by locals or by outside prospectors. The idea is that this ban will stay in effect until such a time that the county government is able to oversee environmentally friendly means of extraction and the âfairâ distribution of benefit, however that is to be calculated. The ban came into effect almost immediately following the Eagleback incident in 2010, but was not effectively enforced until 2012.
Connecting transportation: Eagleback is the largest settlement of Eya Township and is still not connected to a road, but in order to mine for gold the road has already been built through the virgin forest. The gold miners have done this for their own profit, causing major destruction to the virgin forest resources and massive erosion, which has led to the loss of the beautiful scenery on both banks of the Longda River.
Connecting water: The Longda River has always been the mother river that the Naxi people of Eagleback rely on for their livelihood; the river water was originally clear and transparent, and is the water the Naxi people of the whole village use for their daily needs. But because of the pollution caused by gold mining, it is impossible for the Naxi people of Dacun to live.
Connecting electricity: not only do the Naxi people of Eagleback not enjoy the benefits of the national preferential policies for the connecting
Authorâs field notes, August 2015of electricity, [â¦] because of the erosion caused by gold digging the small electricity station we build ourselves has been severely damaged.
Finally, there is no doubt that the villagers made full use of the divide between local township officials to build sympathy for their cause. After all, several officials were partner investors in the local mining operations and thus had also had their equipment destroyed. But ethnic divisions also undoubtedly played a role in alliance building. As already mentioned, although Eya is a Naxi autonomous township, the majority of the representatives of the township government, like those of the county government, are Tibetan. However, many Tibetan officials, particularly those who have/had been placed in Eya Township for a number of years, develop deep affections and commitments with regard to their Eagleback Naxi friends, putting them in a position to advocate on behalf of Eagleback Naxi across the ethnicâand particularly the linguisticâdivide.
Much has been made of the resilience of the Chinese state, and particularly of how solidly the Chinese Communist Party (ccp) has managed to maintain its authority throughout periods of such incredible social and economic change (Nathan, 2003). The secret to this resilience seems to lie in the particularity of Chinese statecraft, and the character of that statecraft. One common feature of peasant protests in China is that they seem to always be directed at lower levels of bureaucracy, never at the system itself and never at the ccp. The key to understanding this perhaps lies in the institutionalised vagueness of prc policy, in which âpolicyâ often takes the form of vague slogans such as âHarmonious Societyâ or âChinese Dreamâ or in this case, the âThree Connectsâ. The incident involving large-scale gold mining in Eya Township can be considered to be a result of the âDevelop the Westâ policy, which was launched in 2000 in an attempt to bring economic reforms to Chinaâs interior and particularly to its ethnic minority populations. Holbig (2004) refers to Develop the West as a âsoft policyâ, emphasising the diffused nature of decision-making with regard to how economic reform is to be carried out. Under this policy, local leaders are under huge pressure to bring about economic growth, with very little guidance as to how this should be done. In this way, it is the lower levels of the prc bureaucracy (in this case, township and county level governments) that are left making the hard decisions and taking all the risks in their efforts to bring about change. If successful, the individuals involved may enjoy long and illustrious careers. If unsuccessful, they will be the ones to take the fall. What this demonstrates is that the Chinese state is not as âauthoritarianâ as it seems, or at least not in the top-down manner that is usually imagined.
8
Looking back today on the incident at Eagleback, although the villagers were not happy to lose their means of scratching out a meagre income from gold mining, all agreed that a ban on any digging in the valley was a fair compromise. In recalling stories of the conflict, particularly the two months of camping on the mountain pass to barricade the road, villagers relived their anger and expressed their pride in their success in standing up for their villageâs welfare.
Although Boss Hoâs digging had taken place on Suda Villageâs territory, the location was downriver from Sudaâs water supply, and thus Sudaâs villagers were not negatively impacted by the mining. They therefore did not actively take part in the protests or in mounting the barricade. It also appears that some from Suda continued to mine after the county-wide ban was put in place, which remains an issued of unsettled tension between Eagleback and Suda Village.
Not long after the incident, there was a reshuffling of officials at the township government, and the majority of those who were present at the time of the incident were replaced, being promoted to the county level or reassigned to other townships, or retiring. Current township officials have maintained a stricter distance from the villagers than had previously been the practice.
By 2013, a road suitable for passenger vehicles had finally reached Eagleback, with motorcycle paths connecting most other villages in the township. Since thenâlike in so many other rural areas Chinaâseeking work outside the village and sending remittances has emerged as the preferred method of diversifying a householdâs economic holdings. As far as paid labour within the village goes, more and more opportunities are arising, usually related to state development projects, which are now in progress, fulfilling the promise of the âThree Connectsâ policy to bring a reliable electricity supply to all communities.
All personal names are pseudonyms.
During the Ming dynasty, silver became the main currency, especially when the âsingle whipâ tax system (yitiao bianfaä¸æ¢éæ³) came into effect and taxes were to be paid in silver rather than in grain. This had a number of effects, including commercialisation of property, among other things. For more information, see Liu (2010).
In the interim, there was a short period during which the Republican Army (1911â49) was present in Muli mining for metals to support the war effort. The presence of the Republic of China did not, however, mark a change in governance in this territory ruled by the Muli theocracy, and all the mining that was carried out by the Republic took place with the permission of, and was also taxed by, Muli.
Previously, equality was emphasized, so families were discouraged from economic action that would only benefit their own household and not the whole community. For example, people were not allowed to have household gardens to supplement their familyâs diets. But after reform, there was no more fear of doing whatever you could to raise your own houseâs production. People were no longer accused of creating inequality if they produced more than other households.
The matsutake mushroom market was a very important part of local economies throughout this mountainous region in the early reform period. Matsutake mushrooms grow wild in only a few places, and for about two decades they fetched an extremely high price in Japan, a phenomenon that connected some of Chinaâs most remote communities to an international market. The Japanese market has since dissipated, and matsutake mushrooms no longer represent the opportunities they once did. For more information on the areaâs mushroom industry, see Yeh (2000), Yang et al. (2008) and Arora (2008), and for a global scale view of the mushroom economy, see Tsing (2015).
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