1 Introduction
In August 2017, the Confederation of Zimbabwe Small-Scale Chrome Miners (czsscm) submitted a position paper to the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development detailing the challenges its members were facing. These challenges included constant conflicts between small-scale chromite miners and large-scale mining companies over ore prices and the fact that about 90 per cent of small-scale chromite miners continue to operate under tribute mining contracts entered into with large-scale mining companies who own the claims (Mhaka, 2018). Such challenges, however, were not new. The sector had faced
This chapter uses chromite mining cooperatives as a lens through which to examine the effects of the liberalisation of mineral resource extraction in postcolonial Africa and the resultant contentious relationship between large-scale mining companies, on one hand, and small-scale and artisanal miners on the other. The liberalisation of the chromite mining sector in Zimbabwe soon after the attainment of independence in 1980 was largely informed by the newly installed governmentâs desire to use the cooperative movement in the mining sector to foster social and economic development. The chapter considers how the liberalisation of the chromite mining sector contributed to the broadening of rural livelihoods and the alleviation of poverty. In addition, it uses the case of mining cooperatives to examine the interface between large-scale operations, on one hand, and small-scale and artisanal mining on the other. In particular, the chapter focuses on the tribute mining contracts concluded between mining cooperatives and the large-scale chromite mining companies Zimalloys (formerly a subsidiary of Anglo American Corporation) and Zimasco (formerly a subsidiary of Union Carbide). Finally, the chapter discusses the effects of Zimbabweâs Fast Track Land Reform Programme on artisanal mining as well as how it opened space for the participation of Chinese companies in small-scale and artisanal chromite mining. The chapter argues that although the asymmetrical relations between large- and small-scale mining have continued to afflict the latter, the interface between the two and the development of mining cooperatives have contributed to this broadening of rural livelihoods and the alleviation of poverty.
The chapter places developments in Zimbabweâs artisanal and small-scale chromite mining sector within the broader context of debates about mining cooperatives, rural livelihoods and the liberalisation of resource extraction (Banda and Chanda, 2021; De Haan and Geenen, 2016; Francescone, 2015; Hilson, Hilson and Adu-Darko, 2014; Wanyama, Develtere and Pollet, 2009). It also engages with extant literature on the interface between large- and small-scale mining (Aubynn, 2009; Kemp and Owen, 2019; Verbrugge, 2017). It draws on Kemp and Owenâs (2019) deployment of the term âinterfaceâ to characterise the interactions between large- and small-scale mining. In some cases, scholars have distinguished this interaction as characterised by âgrievance and conflictâ (Carstens and Hilson, 2009), âcoexistenceâ (Hilson, Sauerwein and Owen,
The chapter is based on ethnographic research conducted in Mapanzure communal areas between 2019 and 2021. Oral interviews were conducted with traditional authorities, members of mining cooperatives, groups of artisanal miners, and some individuals working for Chinese companies. The majority of informants were interviewed more than once. In addition, several informants provided documents such as tribute contracts, records of their ore deliveries, constitutions of their cooperatives, and receipts. These documents proved very useful to an understanding of the nature of relationships between the large-scale mining companies and the mining cooperatives and of the importance of small-scale and artisanal mining as not just a rural livelihood option but one of the key rural livelihoods. The chapter also makes use of Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (zmdc) Annual Reports, Secretary of Mines Annual Reports, newspaper reports, parliamentary debates, and parliamentary portfolio committee reports as well as tribute mining agreements. Apart from providing general information on small-scale mining, the zmdc Annual Reports were particularly useful in providing annual statistics on the number of chromite mining cooperatives and their contribution to annual chromite production.
2 Liberalisation, Informalisation, and the Rise of Chromite Mining Cooperatives
There is extant literature on mining cooperatives in the global South, especially on their potential to foster social and economic development and alleviate poverty (Banda and Chanda, 2021; de Haan and Geenen, 2016; Francescone, 2015; Wanyama, Develtere and Pollet, 2009; de Haan and Geenen, 2015). According to Wanyama, Develtere and Pollet (2009, 362), âcooperative development in Africa can generally be said to have traversed two main eras: the era of state control and that of liberalisation. The first era that lasted up to the
It is important to highlight that scholarship on the interaction between large- and small-scale mining has largely focussed on the acrimonious relationship between the two. This has largely been a result of the framing of artisanal and small-scale miners as âillegalâ or as operating clandestinely (Bolay, 2014; Katz-Lavigne, 2020; Hilson and Potter, 2005). However, while the majority of artisanal and small-scale mining is informal and clandestine, mining cooperatives in several countries have tended to establish formal relationships with large-scale mining companies to gain access to mine claims and to the market (Banda and Chanda, 2021; de Haan and Geenen, 2016; Francescone, 2015). As will be demonstrated below, chromite mining cooperatives entered into mining contracts with transnational corporations (tncs) that owned mining claims and had a monopoly in the market.
When Zimbabwe gained its independence from colonial rule in 1980, chromite mining was dominated by two large-scale mining companies: Anglo American Corporation (later Zimalloys) and Union Carbide (later Zimasco). However, as the companies struggled to deal with the slump in global base metals prices they were forced to scale down operations and retrench1 surplus labour. Mining companies also argued that the low prices of chromite on the international market meant that they could not pay minimum wages without such retrenchment. This created an impasse between the government and tncs as the government could not allow the companies to retrench workers without being seen as having abandoned its socialist experiment.
In addition to its reluctance to allow chromite mining companies to retrench workers, the newly installed Zimbabwean government outlawed the colonial contract labour system that was colloquially referred to as âmadobadobaâ in its bid to dismantle the colonial labour system. Under this contract mining labour system, âworkers would produce chrome ore individually, on a contract basis, and then sell the ore to the mining companies at largely the buyersâ pricesâ
In 1985, after a series of consultative meetings between the government, mining companies, workersâ unions, the Chamber of Mines, and zmdc, among other interested parties, it was finally resolved that mining companies could phase out the contract labour system and could retrench their workers under specific conditions agreed with the government. The most enduring legacy of this compromise between mining capital and the government was the condition that retrenched workers and former contract workers would be assisted by the government through zmdc to establish and run mining cooperatives to mine on claims owned by the companies (Ministry of Information, 1985). Established through an Act of Parliament in 1982 (zmdc Act No. 31 of 1982), zmdcâs mandate included fostering mining development projects, investing in mining on behalf of the government, and assisting in the establishment of mining cooperatives as well as providing them with technical assistance (Maponga, 1993, 16; Chiwawa, 1990, 21). Furthermore, zmdc assisted mining cooperatives in acquiring mining equipment and training, and with regard to logistics and accessing loans (Chiwawa, 1990, 20). According to Ndakaripa (2017, 105), zmdc was also supposed to ensure âequitable distribution of wealth and increased local participation in the economyâ.
Mining cooperatives, whose membership was supposed to be not fewer than ten individuals, were expected to work on a self-help basis, to pool their resources, and share the proceeds of their work. Writing about the organisation of artisanal gold miners and the importance of working as syndicates and cooperatives, Mkodzongi and Spiegel (2019, 2155) assert that âworking as a team enables the cooperative to tap and leverage on the varied skills and experiences of the miners to enhance their success. These skills range from administrative skills in organising and executing work and negotiating with âsponsorsâ and buyers to technical skills such as surveying and prospectingâ. This also informed the organisation of chromite cooperatives, which usually require members with skills in geology, blasting, and accounting, as well as individuals with legal knowledge.
The majority of chromite mining cooperatives mined under contract from the two large-scale chromite mining companies, Zimasco and Zimalloys. Cooperatives would enter into tribute mining contracts under which they would be allocated claims to mine under contract. Tribute mining contracts have been at the core of small-scale and artisanal chromite mining in Zimbabwe since 1985 when Zimalloys and Zimasco agreed to lease some of their mine claims as well as loss-making mines to chromite mining cooperatives
Tribute mining contracts thus created an asymmetrical relationship between grantors (large-scale chromite mining companies that owned claims and bought the ore), on one side, and individual contractors and cooperatives mining under tribute arrangements, on the other. Despite this, however, in some instances tributors violated the terms of the tribute mining contracts by failing to meet set production targets, delivering poor quality ore, selling their ore to other merchants, or failing to rehabilitate he environment after mining, among other contractual breaches. The punishment for such violations is usually the termination of the contract.
Zimalloys let all of their Vanad Mine be taken over by five cooperatives, all of their Sutton Mine by another five cooperatives, all but Four Seam of their Caesar Mine by the cooperatives. This means that 13 of their total 15 tributing cooperatives (901 workers) took over existing (loss-making) mining operations.
Thus, alongside assisting their retrenched workers who were establishing mining cooperatives, large-scale mining companies were also using tribute mining arrangements to dispose of their loss-making mines. As Francescone (2015) observed in the case of mining cooperatives in Bolivia, once production becomes less profitable, large-scale mining companies lease out some of their claims to cooperatives whilst maintaining their control over marketing.
It is interesting to note that when zmdc was established in 1982, Ingezi Chrome Mining Cooperative was the only registered cooperative in the country mining chromite. However, the number of registered chromite mining cooperatives rapidly increased after 1985. Among the factors that contributed to this rapid increase in and growth of chromite mining cooperatives are the tribute mining arrangements extended to cooperatives by large-scale chromite mining companies, abundant chromite deposits, and the availability of markets in the form of ferrochrome smelters operated by Zimalloys and Zimasco (zmdc, 1985). zmdc also contributed to this phenomenal growth in mining cooperatives by assisting several retrenched former mineworkers to establish and register cooperatives. In its 1986 Annual Report, zmdc described how it had assisted 1,200 retrenched mineworkers and former contract workers to establish and run chromite mining cooperatives in the North Dyke (zmdc, 1986, 15). The majority of members of chromite mining cooperatives in the 1980s were thus former mineworkers who had some mining experience.
In addition to helping former mineworkers to establish mining cooperatives, zmdc also provided cooperatives with technical assistance in accessing mine claims, mining, and finding a market for their ore. zmdc also deployed resident advisors to provide technical assistance for cooperatives seeking blasting licenses (zmdc, 1990, 12). The government, meanwhile, provided mining cooperatives with loan facilities to help them set up their operations. In 1990, for instance, the Secretary of Mines reported that âsmall-scale mines continued to receive financial assistance in terms of loans to develop mines, to establish beneficiation2 plants, to connect power and water, and diamond-drilling services on a simple hire basisâ (The Secretary of Mines 1990, 7).
Chromite mining cooperatives continued to dominate the mining cooperatives landscape in terms of their numbers and production throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In 1986 for example, out of the 38 registered mining cooperatives 23 were mining chromite, while in 1988 this number was 28 out of 44 (zmdc, 1986; zmdc, 1988; zmdc, 1990). Apart from their sheer numbers, the annual chromite production of cooperatives bore testimony to their success and to how they were alleviating poverty among their members. Cooperatives continued to increase in number and contribution to the annual chromite production.
Although small-scale chromite mining in Zimbabwe has been viewed as a success story, especially given the flourishing of chromite mining cooperatives, the sector also faced several challenges. Most stemmed from the tribute mining contracts that the cooperatives entered into with the large-scale mining companies Zimasco and Zimalloys. Chiwawa (1990, 4) identifies a âlack of autonomyâ and âexcessive technological dependencyâ as the key factors contributing to the vulnerability of chromite mining cooperatives.
Even though zmdc was mandated to bargain for prices on behalf of cooperatives, prices were largely determined by the grantor (large-scale mining companies that owned the claims). In addition, penalties were imposed on tributors for subletting claims without the consent of the grantor, and for failure to meet the agreed monthly production targets, oversupply of ore, and failure to meet the specified quality of ore, among other conditions. An extract from one tribute agreement reveals a clause stating that âthe company also retains the right to terminate this contract if the supplier fails to supply the agreed tonnage and ore quality as set out in this agreement for a period of two or more consecutive months in any calendar yearâ (Kushanduka Mining Syndicate, 2011). Moreover, tributors were supposed to pay a 5 per cent royalty to the grantor, calculated based on the ore delivered. In some instances, the grantor would provide fuel, personal protective equipment, and machinery at set prices, and recover the costs of these from the amount due to the tributor after the delivery of the ore.
Despite the intermediary role played by zmdc, tribute agreements between chromite mining cooperatives and grantors were largely skewed in favour of
Mining cooperatives were also greatly affected by the governmentâs fluctuating chromite mining and export policies. In particular, the government intermittently banned the export of chromite to support local beneficiation. It was in this context that in 2007 the government banned raw chromite exports, citing the need to promote value addition through ferrochrome production. The ban was lifted in 2009, but another was imposed in 2011. The government resumed exports in 2015, only to impose another ban in 2017 (Makichi, 2017). While placing a moratorium on the export of unprocessed ore can potentially promote local beneficiation, export bans negatively affect artisanal and small-scale miners. The 2013 Parliamentary Portfolio Committee Report on Mines and Energy revealed that
following the ban, small-scale producers were left with no option but to sell to the local smelters who were offering an average price of usd 60 compared to average international prices of between usd 110 and usd 235 prevailing at that time. In the process, this created a standoff between the small-scale producers and the local smelters.
Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2013
3 Chromite Mining Cooperatives and Rural Livelihoods in Mapanzure Communal Areas
In the 1980s and 1990s the majority of chromite mining cooperatives in Zimbabwe operated in the North Dyke, stretching from Lalapanzi to Mutorashanga, very few cooperatives operating in the South Dyke, in areas such as Shurugwi, Zvishavane, and Mberengwa. This was a result of the fact that the North Dyke chromite claims had thin seams that were increasingly becoming
Initially, small-scale chromite mining in Mapanzure was dominated by cooperatives that had been established in the 1980s and had gained a lot of chromite mining experience in the North Dyke. Because of this prior experience, it was these cooperatives that initially entered into tribute agreements with Zimasco and Zimalloys to mine marginal claims in the area. Locals in Mapanzure communal areas remember the Ingezi Chrome Mining Cooperative, the oldest such cooperative, as having been the first to operate in the area. Other cooperatives that engaged in small-scale chromite mining in Mapanzure communal areas during this early period include the Makomborero Mining Cooperative and Tangawaedza Mining Cooperative, which had been established in Lalapanzi and had acquired tribute claims in Mapanzure communal areas.
The Ingezi cooperative started its mining activities in Mapanzure around 1988. During this period most of the local people were not interested in artisanal chromite mining. We were mostly farming as we considered chromite mining an activity done by outsiders. Ingezi cooperative started operating in Shauke Ward 3. The cooperative largely employed local labour and constructed compounds for the workers who could not work from home.
Interview with Julia Chatira, Kudyakushanda Cooperative, Mapanzure, 15 December 2019
Gradually, however, locals began to appreciate small-scale chromite mining as they noticed how members of the cooperatives were making a living out of mining and also how they even managed to employ local labour. Local unemployed youths were also attracted by the flashy spending habits of contract workers working for mining contractors such as jr Goddard Contracting (Private) Limited and Madhatter (Private) Limited, which were contracted by Zimasco to mine some of its claims in the Torwood Block in Mapanzure
Mining cooperatives and syndicates established by local artisanal and small-scale miners in Mapanzure communal areas thus took inspiration from older chromite mining cooperatives operating in their area. The mining cooperatives and syndicates established in Mapanzure communal areas include the Kudyakushanda Mining Cooperative, Kushanduka Mining Syndicate and Upile Mining Syndicate. These cooperatives and syndicates also entered into tribute agreements with Zimalloys and Zimasco both in Mapanzure communal areas and in other areas such as Shurugwi, Mashava, and Mberengwa. In the following, I examine in some detail the establishment and operation of the Kudyakushanda Mining Collective Cooperative Society, one of the first local mining cooperatives to be established in Mapanzure.
The cooperative was established in 1993 by members of the local community. It began as an informal group of local artisanal chromite miners, who would illegally mine on Zimascoâs claims and used registered tributors as middlemen to sell their chromite (group interview, Kudyakushanda Cooperative, 5 December 2019). The membership of the group rapidly grew to over 200, and members decided to formalise their operations by registering a mining cooperative, which they named the Kudyakushanda (meaning to be self-reliant) Mining Collective Cooperative Society. The name encapsulated the cooperativeâs desire to eke a living out of chromite mining through hard work and self-reliance. Zimasco encouraged the locals to establish cooperatives and enter into tribute arrangements to dissuade them from engaging in illegal artisanal chromite mining activities on its claims. The Kudyakushanda Mining Collective Cooperative Society grew, and became one of the biggest chromite mining cooperatives in Mapanzure communal areas. It also managed to enter into multiple and recurring tribute mining contracts with Zimasco.
The cooperative drafted a constitution, in which its objectives and structure were outlined. The constitutionâs preamble describes it as a âgrouping of artisanal miners with the common purpose of chrome mining to promote development, building individuals for a competitive, self-reliant and community development as well as alleviate povertyâ (Kudyakushanda Mining Collective Cooperative Society Limited, n.d.). The cooperative was therefore set up following the basic principles of cooperative societies, especially the idea of self-reliance and community development.
Like other cooperatives, Kudyakushanda required new members to pay joining fees, and those who left and wished to rejoin were required to pay an agreed rejoining fee. The joining fee for new members was stipulated as the âequivalent to the prevailing market value of ten tonnes of chrome ore
The members of the Kudyakushanda Mining Collective Cooperative Society had an arrangement that individuals mined portions of the claims leased to the cooperative using family or hired labour. They would combine their ore when transporting to Zimasco after taking note of each individualâs tonnage. The cooperative would apportion the proceeds of the sale among the individuals according to individual tonnage. Thus, the cooperative arrangement was largely used to gain access to chromite claims and to enter into tribute arrangements; individualsâ shares, meanwhile, were based on individual production.
We were supposed to produce 5,000 tonnes per month but because we were operating without machinery it was difficult for us to raise that amount of ore. [â¦] with picks and shovels, we were only able to produce slightly above 2,000 tonnes of chromite per month. This was because, during the early days of our cooperative, chromite belts (seams) were found closer to the [â¦] surface. We could mine from depths of 50 centimetres to around five meters without machinery. With time we began to face many challenges. One of the challenges we faced was delays in receiving our payments from Zimasco. In some cases, it took us more than two months before we received payments on our deliveries. In some cases, we were
Group Interview, Kudyakushanda Cooperative, 5 December 2019paid far less than we were expecting to receive. Because of this, there have been many conflicts between our cooperative and Zimsaco.
As a result of constant pressure, Zimasco gradually ceded some of its claims to the government, which allowed sitting tenants to register them as independent claims.
Kudyakushanda was one of the cooperatives in Mapanzure communal areas that benefitted from this arrangement, managing to register several claims in its name. This meant that the cooperative could now operate independently of its former grantor and could sell its chromite to any licensed buyer. In addition, the cooperative was free to enter into mining or equipment rental agreements with Chinese investors without the encumbrance of tribute agreements.
From the narratives of members of cooperatives, it is evident that cooperatives in Mapanzure faced similar challenges to those faced by other mining cooperatives across the country. These include financial challenges, a lack of machinery, technical challenges, and exploitative tribute mining arrangements. Furthermore, cooperatives were also affected by internal squabbles, especially over financial mismanagement and the distribution of profits.
4 Land Reform, Chromite Mining Cooperatives, and Chinese Companies
Zimbabweâs Fast Track Land Reform Programme (ftlrp), which started in 2000, had a far-reaching impact on the rural populaceâs livelihoods and access to mineral resources. The interface between mining and farming, both rural livelihoods, is nothing new and peasants are known to oscillate between the two (Hilson, 2011; Hilson, 2016; Hilson, Hilson and Adu-Darko, 2014; Pijpers, 2014). The symbiotic relationship between the two means that developments in agriculture can easily affect artisanal mining, and vice versa. According to Pijpers (2014, 34), it is important to go beyond the perception of the relationship between farming and artisanal mining as being one purely based on competition, and to view the two livelihoods as cohabiting. The interconnectedness of the two can be observed in how peasants either seasonally shift between them or engage in both concurrently. The financial flows between the two livelihoods are a further demonstration of this symbiosis.
The ftlrp, with its focus on the redistribution of resources and on indigenisation, provided a new impetus for an upsurge in artisanal and small-scale mining, as villagers took the opportunity to âinvadeâ claims owned by large-scale
As Mkodzongi and Spiegel (2020, 995) have observed, âone of the major outcomes of ftlrp implemented in 2000 is the way it allowed resettled farmers to use the formerly inaccessible natural resources under a dualistic agrarian structure inherited at independenceâ. The aforementioned âinvasionâ of mining claims owned by large-scale mining companies, encouraged by the land reform, took place without recourse to any legal document, and was referred to locally as kubhomba (literally, bombing). Further, it was part of the land invasion fervour led by Liberation War veterans and landless peasants and popularly referred to as jambanja (chaos), which gripped the country starting in 2000. Kubhomba was therefore the mining-claims-invasion equivalent of jambanja in land redistribution, land redistribution and mineral resource redistribution being interconnected processes with similar practices and discourses.
The leader would normally identify a claim and organise a team of artisanal miners to invade it (kubhomba), the leaderâs role being to provide team members with food, and the tools necessary to quickly mine and transport the ore to a safe place. Then the leader would contact a middleman, who would clandestinely buy the ore. These middlemen were usually local entrepreneurs who were already involved in chromite mining or were involved in tribute agreements. Thus, they could easily pass off illegally mined chromite as ore that they had mined at their own claims. Because this practice was illegal, artisanal miners involved in kubhomba usually sold their ore to middlemen at very low prices.
The post-2000 period saw the increased involvement of Chinese companies in buying chromite, engaging in contract mining, and hiring out mining equipment. A similar rise in the involvement of the Chinese in artisanal and small-scale mining has been observed in several countries in Africa (Hilson, Hilson, and Adu-Darko, 2014; Spiegel, 2015). The Chinese are introducing new types of mining contracts characterised by verbal agreements as well as introducing heavy mining machinery that contributes to rapid, mining-induced environmental degradation. The upsurge in the number of Chinese companies operating in Zimbabwe was largely a result of the governmentâs response to sanctions imposed by the EU, the United Kingdom, and the United States following violent land redistributions. The government began to follow a new foreign policy,
The Chinese companies operating in Mapanzure include Bunday, Afrochine, Asia Ferry, and several smaller companies and individuals. Although Chinese investors are widely thought to be exploiting local artisanal miners, the latterâalong with cooperativesâare forced to enter into mining and equipment hire agreements because of their own lack of equipment. The most common mining contract between Chinese investors and cooperatives is one in which the Chinese company would provide mining equipment and fuel and mine on behalf of a claim owner. The company would recoup its costs by claiming 80 per cent of the total tonnage, while paying the client 20 per cent of its total value. Generally, cooperatives and other artisanal miners find these agreements to be exploitative, and argue that the claim holder should get a much higher percentage.
The Chinese companies are exploiting us. Can you imagine that we own these chromite claims, but in the end we only get 20 per cent of the proceeds from selling the ore while Chinese companies take 80 per cent for just mining? If you refuse to accept that arrangement, they demand five tonnes per hour for hiring their excavator. This is unfair. I wonder what the government is thinking about this exploitation of citizens by Chinese companies.
Interview with John Phiri, 16 November 2020
It can be argued that although cooperatives and some individual chromite miners had been freed from the fetters of tribute mining contracts when they registered claims ceded to the government by both Zimalloys and Zimasco,
Chinese companies are also accused of not initiating any meaningful corporate social responsibility programmes to help develop the communities in which they are doing business (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2013). This has caused tensions between the companies and local communities. In 2018, a reporter for The Standard newspaper reported on how chromite mining operations damage the infrastructure and environment of Mapanzure communal areas, writing, âThe small-scale miners use heavy-duty equipment to extract chrome with little regard to infrastructures such as roads and schools. On the Zvishavane-Gweru highway, the miners are excavating land only a few metres from the roadâ (Mhlanga, 2018).
Despite the negative image Chinese companies have in chromite mining communities, some artisanal and small-scale miners see them as playing a positive role and plugging the gap left by tncs. Cooperatives appreciated that while large-scale chromite mining companies such as Zimasco and Zimalloys only bought high-grade lumpy chromite, Chinese companies bought even low-grade ores and chromite âfinesâ.3 Furthermore, some miners argued that the 80 per cent to 20 per cent ratio chromite ore sharing arrangement with Chinese companies was justifiable based on the depth of the pits. One research participant highlighted that although previously Chinese companies had retained 70 per cent of the delivered chromite ore to cover their mining expenses when they mined on an individual or cooperativeâs claim, they increased the percentage to 80 per cent because near-surface chromite resources had been depleted and they were now mining at depths of up to 22 metres (interview with Shumirai Sibanda, 22 September 2020). It should also be highlighted that in the absence of government assistance with regard to mining equipment, cooperatives and artisanal miners depend on Chinese companies for that equipment, and for markets for their chrome ore (Chinembiri, 2020).
5 Conclusion
The relationship between large- and small-scale mining is a subject that has animated debates about mining in the global South. This interface has largely been engendered by the liberalisation of the mining sector and the increased informalisation that spawned widespread small-scale and artisanal mining.
This chapter has demonstrated both how mining cooperatives encapsulate the relationship between large- and small-scale mining in Zimbabwe and such cooperativesâ potential for creating rural livelihoods and alleviating poverty. Mining cooperatives have dominated artisanal and small-scale chromite mining in Zimbabwe since the early 1980s, when the government put pressure on the tncs who controlled the chromite mining industry to lease out some of their claims to such cooperatives. Chromite mining cooperatives in particular were generally viewed as a success story because they were the most prevalent type in the mining sector and also because they contributed significantly to annual chromite production figures and offered a viable livelihood option to peasants. These cooperatives largely relied on tribute mining arrangements with Zimalloys and Zimasco, the two tncs that dominated the chromite mining sector. The forgoing discussion has also revealed the interface between mining cooperatives, large-scale chromite mining companies, the Ministry of Mines and Energy, and various government departments.
The chapter has also examined how the Fast Track Land Reform Programme and its discourse and practice of redistribution have impacted artisanal and small-scale chromite mining by generating new discourses of resource redistribution and the dismantlement of the monopoly that large-scale mining companies (mostly tncs) held over mineral resource extraction and marketing. Chromite mining cooperatives took advantage of the land reform to get access to chromite claims and to unshackle themselves from tribute mining arrangements. The period also witnessed the increased involvement of Chinese companies and middlemen in artisanal and small-scale chromite mining. The relationship between Chinese companies and chromite mining cooperatives is particularly interesting in that while it led to increased production and provided a large number of peasants with an opportunity to eke out a living
Retrench in the sense of make redundant.
Beneficiation: the treatment of a raw material to improve its properties.
Fines in the sense of small particulate matter.
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