1 Capitalist Despotism
When these creatures of my imagination, the Galactic Museum-Keepers, look back on our past, with the objectivity of a vantage point near the edge of the universe, ten thousand years in the future, they will centre their display on China and cram Western civilization into a corner in some small vitrine.1
It is clear that Fernández-Armesto has confused value with historical importance. One can, if one so chooses, deny the West any value whatever, and deem it inferior to China, or even to the other so-called “civilizations” that Fernández-Armesto studies, such as those of the Laplanders or Inuit in the far north or those of the Tuareg or long vanished Garamantes in the Saharan south. One could even adopt a thoroughly Rousseauist standpoint and argue that primitive or pre-historic society is superior to civilization. All this makes sense, even if one does not agree with any of it. What does not make sense is to deny the West its historical importance and treat it purely as a curiosity crammed into “a corner in some small vitrine” of a universal exhibition in the future.
The West might be of no value, but that does not mean that it is of no importance as a causative agent in human history. The influence it exerted on human affairs at least for the last few centuries is objectively irrefutable. Without the West as the active agent, Globalization could not have taken place, for all
At present there are many who wish to judge it badly and many more who desire to break away from it. There are Western historians who judge it as inferior to China but have no desire to break away from it and go to live in China, just as in the recent past there were many Communists who had no desire to emigrate to Russia. On the other hand, there are many Chinese Communists in China, above all in government circles, who do wish to break with the West and break up the global order created and until now managed by the West, so they can go their own way. Among these, as we shall see, are some Chinese intellectuals educated in Western ways. And China is not the only place where this kind of secession is taking place, it is happening in all the spheres of the old civilizations where until recently Modernity and Western civilization had seemed to triumph. It is taking place in Russia which used to be so close to Europe. It is occurring in the Muslim world where Western civilization never made all that much headway anyway; and there are stirrings of it in India where Western ways seemed to have been so successful under the British and even after independence as well. Opposition to the West has now become widespread, so much so that Samuel Huntington considered the world to be entering into a war of civilizations. One apparent instance of this, the looming contest between America and China, is what will concern us most in this chapter.
This is a shocking outcome for people brought up on Western values, regardless of their race or ethnic origins. Until as recently as half a century ago it was explicitly or implicitly assumed by all so-called secular enlightened people all over the world that there was but the one advanced civilization, more or less that of the Western nations. This was identified with Modernity and Progress to which all modern people aspired, both Western and Eastern, in so far as the latter sought to attain what the former had already acquired, namely, the trappings of civilized living. Among the latter, there were a few nations who sought to achieve this modernizing goal by means of democracy and capitalism, following along the lines of American ideology, but most went the other way and sought it along the lines of Socialist ideology, with greater or lesser reference
There was nothing new in this attitude. It was not usually imposed by colonialism or inspired by Western propaganda or exerted by force on people unwilling to accept it – though sometimes it was, with unfortunate consequences. The signs of Western superiority were evident to every clear-thinking ruler of every independent country starting with Peter the Great in Russia at the start of the eighteenth century. They all grasped sooner or later that they must imitate the West or perish. The Ottoman sultans were very reluctant to realize this truth and did indeed perish; it was the secularist Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who saved the rump of their empire in Turkey and began the process of Westernizing it as a secular nation-state.
According to Atatürk, there was only one civilization worthy of that name, the European, apart from which there was no other. This might have been an extreme response even at that time in the 1920s, but it was one more or less followed by all the other leaders for the liberation of their countries. They all thought that the benighted obscurantism of their native traditions was not civilization, a term they adopted from the European languages for none such existed in their own. The leaders of the Meiji Restoration sought for a better compromise between civilization and traditional Japan, but there were not many that followed their lead elsewhere. It was only partly so for Sun Yat-sen in China or for Reza Khan, the new Shah of Persia. After decolonization most of the leaders of the new nations mostly followed a Westernizing course with but few compromises with native traditions; this was certainly true of Nehru in India and Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, and only slightly less so for Soekarno in Indonesia and Nasser in Egypt. Whether or not one now thinks this was the right course to take is another matter. But at the time there seemed none other.
These attitudes began to change very slowly and at first very hesitantly in the 1980s, and have only begun to be widely abandoned during the new millennium. In the Islamic countries the change came much more abruptly in Iran with the Khomeini Islamic revolution in 1979. This brought about a virulent and violent rejection of Western ways, those that had been gingerly fostered by the Shah Reza Mohammed, such as the liberation of women, land reform at the expense of the Shia clergy, and cultural innovations. Once in power the ayatollahs only kept those aspects of Western modernity necessary to run a modern state and economy, while severely repressing all others, much to the chagrin of the educated and sophisticated upper strata in Iran. The fundamentalist revival among the Shia was matched by that of the Sunnis, initially
Apart from Islam, the assertion of pre-Western indigenous nativist tendencies was much slower in coming and did not take the form of direct aggression against the West. Nevertheless, even at the very height of globalization there was a slow and steady reversion to older traditions. Whether this in fact amounted to a revival and restoration of the old civilizations, as Huntington seems implicitly to maintain, we shall consider in due course. But what it did mean was that traditional cultural forms were once more brought back and their practices encouraged by the new regimes. People were allowed to take up the old religions in ex-Communist countries where religion had been formerly banned. The state agencies and public media gave themselves over to a replay of the glories of the historical past. The old arts and antiquated lore, frequently survivals from the old civilizations, were once more revived in the spirit of national heritage. As we shall see, this was not being done for the love of culture alone, it also has a legitimating role for the new regimes that are coming into being and surreptitiously establishing themselves.
As part of a revived traditionalism, the ruling parties in most of the old ex-Communist countries and in some of the ex-Colonialist ones, were reverting to older pre-Western forms of rule and types of law. This invariably meant a return to aspects of the imperial systems which had historically prevailed, especially those in Asia that used to be called Oriental Despotisms. This is now a much-disparaged term, as it seems to reflect badly on non-Western forms of government in contrast to Western ones, and has generally fallen out of favour. But there is no need to dispense with it for that reason alone, since keeping it in use will preserve much of the sound scholarship of the past. As recently as the 1950s Karl August Wittfogel wrote a masterful account of non-Western civilizations in these terms.3 As we have elsewhere argued, this needs correcting and updating in the light of more recent knowledge, but that is no reason to abandon it altogether.4 Unless one wishes to engage in an ideological
A recent exception to this practice is John Keane who has designated the current successors of the old imperial regimes as the “new despotisms”.5 Keane is well aware of the eighteenth-century origins of the term and its later uses down to Alexis de Tocqueville, though, regrettably he is unaware of Wittfogel. He provides cogent reasons as to why it is preferable to “authoritarianism”, which he calls a “glib and ethically questionable category”.6 We shall follow Keane’s lead and call the new anti-democratic regimes “despotic capitalist” forms of government. It is necessary to bring in the term “capitalist” in order to emphasize that, unlike the older empires which strove for economic self-sufficiency, these new neo-imperial states are part of a global system of trade and production arrangements which thus far has been managed by the Western powers and run along capitalist lines through international governing bodies such as the World Trade Organization. Economic globalization is something that the rulers of these regimes wish to maintain for it is clearly conducive to the trade that is providing rising standards of living for their people. For this purpose, they have been granted a limited degree of economic freedom so as to give their economies the semblance of capitalism.
However, speaking of economic freedom in this context does not mean that in capitalist despotism there is any fundamental right to private property, that is, to own assets and dispose of them as one sees fit. Security of ownership and other such legal guarantees do not exist since the ruling power can always find a way of dispossessing anyone and expropriating their wealth; or alternatively, the government can determine how that wealth is to be deployed or used and what obligations its owners must fulfil. Thus, for example, in China all citizens, companies and organizations are formally obliged to cooperate in “intelligence work”. This is not so clearly spelled out in other despotic capitalist states, but such implied conditions are still there especially for companies that trade abroad. Thus, the term “capitalist” in the expression despotic capitalism must be heavily qualified by the term “despotic”, in fact, the two terms function as a compound in which neither is fully independent of the other.
… today’s despotism is a new type of pseudo-democratic government led by rulers skilled in the arts of manipulating and meddling with people’s lives, marshalling their support, and winning their conformity … Despotisms are top-down pyramids of power that defy political gravity by nurturing the willing subservience and docility of their subjects.7
Keane provided ample material in support of his thesis that the new despotisms are becoming pervasive throughout the world and constitute the major challenge to Western democracy. He casts his net very wide, perhaps too wide for our purpose, for he brings in failing democracies such as Hungary together with traditional kingdoms such as Saudi Arabia. We shall seek to limit our treatment of despotic capitalism just to those regimes that had an imperial historical past, namely, those that once were Oriental Despotisms, and this means principally those located in Eurasia, above all China, Russia, Iran and Turkey.
It has become evident that in all of these countries new “emperors” have been enthroned, that is, their leaders have become rulers for life. This has happened in China with the accession of Xi Jinping, who has abandoned the older system of collegiate rule and leadership rotation introduced by Deng Xiaoping and maintained by his successors. The norms of legality brought in at that time are also being jettisoned, and a new surveillance apparatus based on information technology has been introduced to supplement and tighten the traditional ways of oversight and control. The hereditary principle of succession has not yet come into effect, except that the children of high Party cadres, the so-called princelings, are accorded extraordinary opportunities for enrichment and advancement, and to some extent granted privileges and immunities as a kind of aristocracy. Many in the ruling elite and Xi Jinping himself are the children of revolutionary leaders. In North Korea, however, hereditary succession at the top has always been in force and an elite Party aristocracy has come into being as well. In both these countries one might take this as a reversion to traditional forms of rule.
Similar developments are taking place elsewhere. In Russia Putin has declared himself ruler for life through a recent referendum and he is bringing back some of the trappings of old Czarism. To bolster his legitimacy, he has overseen a revival of the Russian Orthodox Church, whose hierarchy is unequivocally behind him, as they always were supportive of the Czars of old. He has surrounded himself with a court of cronies, known as oligarchs, who
Throughout the Muslim ecumene new sultans are springing up. Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey is establishing himself as a modern successor to the Caliphs, and actively promoting the old Ottoman imperial traditions as well as a still moderate religious Islamization. He is doing as much as he can to undo Atatürk’s Westernizing legacy, particularly in respect of culture. There are similar developments in other Islamic lands, such as in Egypt where Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is establishing himself as the new Pharaoh; though in this case, Islamization cannot proceed very far since the Muslim Brotherhood are his deadly enemies, and any resurgence of religion would redound in their favour. In Saudi Arabia a single power-holder is emerging in the figure of Prince Mohammed bin Salman who has consolidated his hold over the old royal family power-sharing arrangements. Since the Islamic revolution in 1979 Iran has remained a clerical theocracy under Khamenei with a praetorian force, the Revolutionary Guard, to keep him in power, despite popular opposition that sporadically breaks out in futile demonstrations.
Countries that are still democratic are also evincing similar tendencies towards traditionalism. The key case is India where the Westernizing tendencies of the Congress Party and Nehru socialism have been decisively rejected and defeated by the bjp, which resorts to Hindutva, or aggressive religious Hinduism, to pre-empt Congress Party opposition and ensure re-election; and at the same time, it is used to repress the Muslim minority. This new spirit of religious revival, bordering on fanaticism, is being stirred up among the masses through symbolic gestures, such as the conversion of mosques into temples. The previously pursued secularizing battle against the caste system is most probably being surreptitiously abandoned though the evidence is still too scanty for a definite conclusion.
This general reassertion of local particularism in Asia by no means amounts to a restoration of the old civilizations; as Robert Kaplan puts it, “it isn’t the so-called clash of civilizations that is taking place, but the clash of artificially reconstructed civilizations.”8 The old pre-colonial and pre-Modern civilizations had decayed or been destroyed beyond any revival or resurrection as civilizations. What is now being brought back into currency are their moribund
While the non-Western world is undergoing its own cultural reconstitution following the ravages of colonialism, accompanied by a degree of nationalistic fervour, there are those in the West who are undertaking the opposite reactive process and turning against their own civilization or what is still left of it. Guilt over Colonialism, and its usually accompanying racism, has prompted a sense of shame and remorse among faculty and students in Western universities, especially those who are professionally concerned with the study of non-Western countries. These feelings were taken up and amplified by ideological radicals to whom any whiff of racial superiority was the ultimate sin worthy of total damnation. According to them, there could be nothing good about colonialism. Such views are readily taken up by students coming from the ex-colonial and other non-Western countries who now take a very different attitude to Western culture to that of their predecessors a century ago; these went to Western universities precisely to acquire this culture. Their descendants – who come in far larger numbers and are much more assertive – take a hostile and aggrieved attitude to the West even while they are immersed in Western popular culture and practice Western styles of living. Consequently, they promote such subjects as post-colonial studies which are endemically biased against Western civilization.
To oppose and counter such biases is now no easy matter for one has to confront views and values voiced by people, among them many highly placed academics, who have little idea of what civilization is and the role that culture plays in it. There is now a general acknowledgement that there were various civilizations in the past and that the West was only one among many others. The work of Spengler, Toynbee, McNeil and many others has now been widely absorbed, even though in a much simplified and clichéd form. However, it is precisely the same theories of civilizational multiplicity which have concealed and obscured the crucial differences between civilizations. Not all civilizations are developmentally alike, there are various types, some earlier and cruder and others higher and more sophisticated; the latter kind are those that emerged out of the Axial Age due to the promotion of literacy and ethics, as we explained in the previous chapter. Among all the post Axial Age civilizations that of Europe played a unique and special role in that it was the sole source of Modernity, despite earlier contributions from some of the others. In particular, from it originated the Forces of Modernity, viz. capitalism, the rational-legal
In short, most of what the non-Western world has acquired from the West pertains to these material, organizational and rationalizing forces and forms. As far as the values and norms of culture are concerned, those which used to be considered the hallmarks of civilization, it was much more a selective matter of choice to what extent a non-Western country tried to take these up as well. Europeanization was the term for this cultural side of Modernity that was adopted by other societies. To what extent a society chose to Europeanize in this cultural sense varied extensively depending on numerous factors, such as its own culture and its past historical experience with the West. In general, Islamic societies, which have long been in a hostile relation with Western Christianity, have tended to shun European culture, whereas Far Eastern societies have been much more amenable to it. Hence, the extreme contrast in this respect between the Arab countries and Japan. A somewhat lesser contrast is that between Taiwan and mainland China at present, though there were periods when China was much more susceptible to European culture than it has become since the Communist takeover.
China has been Europeanized in cultural respects only to a very limited degree, mostly so in coastal enclaves like Hong Kong and Shanghai but far less so the further one moved into the interior. The long reign of Communism, despite its Western derived Marxist ideology, has basically not altered this cultural incompatibility. It partly explains the reluctance of the Chinese political elite to take up liberal democracy and Western notions of law or individual rights. India is the opposite case in this respect; promoted by nearly two centuries of colonialism and the close interaction between the British administrators and the Brahmins, Western education and culture is still sought after. Nothing like that occurred in China, except briefly in a few cities where there were European extra-territorial concessions.
Such factors of culture also underlie Huntington’s thesis of a clash of civilizations, even if civilizations in the old sense are no longer present.9 China interacts closely with America as far as the Forces of Modernity are concerned: there is still a continuous and sustained economic partnership, in education, science and technology there is extensive interaction; and until recently there was considerable political cooperation on the international stage. Nevertheless, the basic attitudes to culture and consequently their mentalities are totally at
Since the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, starting with the Iranian revolution, a veritable cultural chasm has been opened up between the West and these radical religious movements throughout the Islamic world. This is a cultural battle taking the form of religious war much more than it is anything else. Something similar has been taking place in Russia where old Slavophil tendencies have been stirred up by Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church that he favours. As in China, the long reign of Communism has not moderated these traditional anti-Western attitudes.
Many of the major tensions in the world are owing to such cultural factors, which feed into other rivalries in the geo-political and economic spheres. Huntington was certainly correct and far-seeing in predicting that clashes would occur in border areas. The most obvious case he noted is the Ukraine, historically a border region where cultures and religions clashed. Its population is split between those in the Western part who tend towards Europe and those on the Eastern part who side with Russia. This opposition has led to civil war, stoked by Russia, and to a major falling out between Russia and Europe. The extension of nato into Poland and the Baltic states had already aggravated this relation by arousing Russian traditional fears of European invasion going back many centuries. Huntington was certainly prescient from a geo-political Realist point of view in anticipating this and other such contentious situations all over the world.
However, does this amount to a war of civilizations? How can it be a war of civilizations when civilizations barely exist anymore? What can it now mean to speak of China or Russia or Iran or India or Japan or even of America itself as a civilization when they are all parts of an integrated global world economy and all share similar Forces of Modernity? All serve diversified economic functions in a global chain of production: some provide the raw materials and energy resources, others carry out processes of production, still others constitute the main financial and design centres, these are usually also the main markets. The science and technology they utilize and develop are everywhere the same and shared globally through a system of open publication, patenting and intellectual property rights arrangements; they are all linked by global institutions of education, such as major universities to which students from all over the world are drawn. The various states might be governed differently, but they all feature organizational bureaucratic arrangements, international exchanges, diplomatic communication and membership of international organizations,
Undeniably there is fierce competition between these states in all the major dimensions. There is economic competition for markets and favourable terms of trade. There is political competition for spheres of influence and international prestige. There are even military confrontations, arms races and minor wars in disputed areas, though the fear of nuclear holocaust keeps these down to manageable proportions. There is also cultural competition in promoting the local popular cultures internally and keeping at bay the cultural commodities of others, but at the same time exporting one’s own to others. Cultural competition of this kind is generally closely tied in with economic competition and is part of an economy of cultural capitalism that operates throughout the world. Bollywood now competes with Hollywood, and Mickey Mouse with Asterix.
This competitive activity is becoming aggravated because of the stance of national self-assertion that each of the major powers is now adopting. Largely this is because the non-Western nations are becoming ever so much stronger and more confident, and now feel capable of taking on the Western nations in all major spheres of competition. The growing clash between China and America is a key instance of this, and it demonstrates that the previous situation of a unipolar world in which America ruled supreme is no longer warranted as America grows relatively weaker and China stronger. These clashes are also promoted by an invigorated nationalistic sense of cultural difference and uniqueness that makes it no longer possible for non-Western nations to subscribe to the cultural values of foreign powers, especially Western ones. This is further aggravated by current internal policies of reviving the old cultural beliefs and practices, which were previously repressed by colonial rulers or downplayed by a surviving sense of Western superiority still held by previous generations of native leaders who undertook the struggle for liberation, and who were generally schooled in Western universities.
Thus, in conclusion we can assess that Huntington was partly right from the geopolitical point of view in foreseeing rising tensions between the major powers of the world as they gained increasing strength and self-confidence and felt able to challenge the Western powers, especially America. This certainly fits the bill as far as China is concerned; but with Russia, Iran and Turkey there are other issues as well to be considered. There is Putin’s intense resentment against the West coming from what he believes is the role it played in the break-up of the Soviet Union; according to him, the greatest tragedy of the twentieth century. The developments in the Ukraine have also stirred up in him traditional Russian xenophobia and paranoia about foreign invasions. In
2 The Eurasian Axis
In the past, Eurasia was simply too vast to work to the advantage of any one power. The Mongol empire from Genghis Khan to Tamerlane (and including Kublai Khan) was the singular, stunning exception. But as technology has collapsed distance, advancing the possibility of trade and supply chains, there is now the possibility of some semblance of Eurasian unity among China, Russia, and Iran, with China as the first among equals, just as in Marco Polo’s day.11
All this is very far removed from Huntington’s now dated prognostications of a clash of civilizations in a multipolar world of powers. The world seems to be once more shaping up into a contest between two power blocs, those of West and East. The latter we have already identified as Eurasia, the continental alliance, the former is the old familiar Western alliance of America, Europe, Japan Australia and a few others. These are all oceanic powers protected by the US Navy; hence we might designate them together as Oceania, using the term coined by George Orwell in his novel 1984. The battle for influence over the globe is rapidly shaping itself as that between Oceania and Eurasia. It has not yet reached the level of a Cold War but might well do so in the near future. It need not necessarily reach that degree of intensity; it could taper off into intense economic competition compatible with cooperation in other respects. But it will take far-seeing and able statesmanship to keep the conflict from degenerating further.
The four powers we have highlighted, China, Russia, Iran and Turkey, are developing in a way contrary to Western expectations of the prevalence of a liberal democratic global order throughout the world. They are moving ever further in the direction of capitalist despotism, incorporating advanced science and technology and most of the structural features of the bureaucratic State. In other words, they are maintaining the Forces of Modernity but at the same time pivoting back to their own traditional forms of governance, which in all four cases happen to have been Oriental Despotisms.
Capitalist despotism is becoming a well-established amalgam of the modern and the traditional; it is modern and Western in so far as it is capitalist and part of a global economy, but it is also traditionalist and Eastern in so far as it is a despotism and based on old imperial models of rule. All of the Asian powers were once great empires, memories of which persist to this day and shape their aspirations, despite the modernizing developments they have undergone, mostly in the course of the twentieth century. In some respects, this process had already started during the previous centuries, as in the case of Russia where it dates from the early eighteenth century. Undoubtedly the Forces of Modernity are by now everywhere firmly in place and cannot be abrogated short of withdrawing from the international system, which is currently suicidal. Theocratic Iran under Khomeini came close to that in the first
Russia under Peter the Great was the first example of a policy that deliberately imposed Westernization on a non-Western civilization. In this case, however, the disparity was not all that great since Russian traditional culture was based on a Byzantine-inspired Orthodox Christianity not all that far removed from Western Christianity. Both geographically and historically, Russia was never completely cut off from Europe but always engaged with it both in war and peace, particularly with the neighbouring Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth. Thus, the Petrine reforms did not have to start off by confronting a completely foreign civilization. Hence Russia could begin a rapid process of Europeanization, beginning with its military and land-holding aristocracy; and it soon emerged as a European power, becoming well-integrated politically, culturally and economically with Europe. However, there was always a strong traditionalist, despotic streak in place, that of Czarism and the Russian Orthodox Church. If anything, Communist rule, especially under Stalin, strengthened this aspect rather than weakening it, by contrast with what was starting to happen before the Revolution.
Westernization was a much more severe wrench in the case of Japan, the first Asian power to modernize. It took a forcible American intrusion to begin the process, but once it was under way it became self-generating after the Meiji Restoration in 1868. As the term suggests, this had both traditionalist and modernizing aspects to it, for paradoxically in the name of a restored tradition a new modernity was introduced which would undo that tradition. But at the same time, the new modern institutions were so designed as to preserve much of traditional culture within a modern setting. The position of the Emperor was central to this balancing act.
At first Japan seemed to be developing along liberal democratic European lines, but from the late 1920s onwards it soon followed the worst extremes of European nationalism. The army took command of foreign policy and began a campaign of conquest which only ended with total defeat. Under American occupation and an American inspired constitution, Japan became firmly democratic and pro-Western, with the emperor assuming a purely titular role. A large part of that role is to maintain some of the traditions of Japanese culture. Thus, the traditional script has been preserved and writing has not been rendered alphabetic, as happened in Turkey. This ensures the survival of much of traditional culture even while Western culture is saturating the country, especially in popular American commercial fashions.
After the fall of Communism, it was generally believed that all the former totalitarian regimes would become liberal even if not fully democratic, particularly so those of China and Russia. But since the start of the new millennium this became less likely, and since the accession of Xi Jinping and Putin it is now apparent that it is most unlikely, for they have reinstituted a form of despotism. The reasons for this outcome have obviously something to do with the personality of these two strong leaders, but much more so with historical realities, though these leaders have been responsible for translating national predispositions and aspirations into policies. There are two crucial factors behind these policies: the determination of the Communist Party in China to maintain power, now through the agency of Xi Jinping one of its own sons, and the fact that in Russia the secret police, the fsr, the successor of the dreaded kgb, has grasped hold of the levers of power, through the agency of Putin, one of its own alumni. But these two political organizations would not have been able to achieve such a secure hold on power were it not for strong tendencies favouring firm rule in these societies, encouraging the population to support them or at least acquiesce in their machinations. These are tendencies towards despotism that go back long into their historic past and manifest themselves as a general longing for strong rulers with undisputed authority. Such rulers are believed necessary to maintain unity and law and order, since there has been no experience of any other way of doing so, and there is an ingrained fear of social disorder and chaos, born of memories of periods in history of such “times of trouble”, some as recent as the civil wars in China and Russia.
Both China and Russia were great empires with a glorious past, but both suffered extended periods of turmoil and great instability when centralized rule failed and sheer anarchy prevailed. Only a few generations ago China went through more than half a century of constant upheaval and civil strife, following
The Russians went through equally traumatic experiences during the twentieth century. Russia’s time of troubles began with the First World War, followed by the Revolution and the extended Civil War during which the Czarist Empire briefly split up into its constituent ethnic nationalities. Only strong and highly authoritarian Bolshevik rule kept the Russian empire together. This was followed by Stalin’s totalitarianism and its collectivization and industrialization programs which was interrupted by the Second World War with its huge loss of life and destruction of industry. When Communism fell, there was another bout of chaos as the Soviet Empire belatedly broke up into its constituent ethnic entities and as economic breakdown ensued because of the precipitate and ill-thought through policies of privatisation and the lurch to rapacious “cowboy” capitalism under the presidency of Yeltsin. The overwhelming majority of Russians now desire nothing more than social order and the security of their livelihood on the level to which they are traditionally accustomed. A small minority of the educated city dwellers, might have a yen for freedom and liberal democracy, but most are content with Putin and his frs cronies and oligarchs, who provide stability and a modicum of prosperity, at least enough to meet the very modest Russian needs. At the same time, by building up a powerful army, Putin seems to be restoring something of the prestige and influence that Russia had always had in the surrounding regions and as a global power since the Second World War. Thus, his incursion into Crimea and the Ukraine was generally approved by Russians and won him increased support.
There are strong reasons, both contemporary political and nationalistic reasons, drawing on a long imperial past, for why China and Russia have turned to capitalist despotism as their national destinies. It is similarly the case in
The secularization and Westernizing policies of the governments in Iran and Turkey provoked strong negative reactions from the Muslim clergy and great dissatisfaction among the more traditionalist minded classes, such as the rural peasantry and the lower middle class, such as the bazaar merchants in the cities. The key issues for them are Sharia law and opposition to any liberalization that would infringe on the traditional repressed status of women. The more that Westernizing rulers sought to promote rational-legal institutions of justice and to emancipate women, the more they stoked the fires of Islamic discontent. In Iran this broke out in outright revolution that brought to power a theocratic despotism not seen since the Safavid dynasty. And like the Safavid shahs, the new clerical rulers are pursuing traditional Persian policies of aggrandizement in the Middle East and throughout the Muslim ecumene. In Turkey a much more orderly process ensued, ironically made possible by the very success of democracy that Muslim clerics have always detested and shunned, for the ballot-box brought the traditionalist ak party into power under Erdogan. It has been consolidating its hold over all the major institutions of society, especially over the courts, and is now transforming Turkey into a capitalist despotism. At the same time, it has also been reviving memories of the Ottoman imperial past and undertaking a foreign policy to restore something of the Ottoman influence throughout the Arab Middle East and Mediterranean regions where formerly the Ottomans ruled.
There is much commonality between the four major powers that have turned to capitalist despotism. As such, their relation to the Western powers and all other liberal democratic states is ambivalent and very fraught. In so far as they are capitalist and still governed by the Forces of Modernity and dependent on a global market, they need to maintain close relations with the West, with both Europe and America, as well as with the international order in general, which was instituted and is still dominated by the West. Being deprived of those relations, as the sanctions against Iran and Russia have shown however,
However, as the exponents of a new form of despotism, as Keane maintains, these powers are hostile to the West on ideological and political grounds. They fear liberal democracy which some of their more educated and culturally Westernized people espouse, such as the students who launched the Tiananmen Square demonstrations in Beijing in 1989, and as analogous demonstrations by students and other more enlightened elements in Russia, Iran and Turkey have shown. The current regimes seek to counter such opposition by espousing capitalist despotism and an ideology of good government more in line with their people’s native traditions and religions. But at the same time, they appeal to the general international principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. By this means, they can support despotic rulers in many other countries and blunt the attempts by the West to extend liberal democracy or invoke human rights principles or attempt to impose sanctions for any such breaches. They thus gain allies among many would-be dictators throughout the world. Traditionalist despotism has great appeal for all such rulers.
Traditionalist rule is an ideological component of capitalist despotism, and it now acts first and foremost as a legitimating device. It is the means by which despotic parties and leaders can maintain their authority when previous forms of legitimation have been discredited. Thus, with the fall of doctrinaire Communism in both Russia and China, though not so spectacularly in the latter, it was no longer possible to appeal to Marxism or the Revolution or even to the old charismatic leaders, such as Lenin and Stalin or even Mao. In China, the Communist Party – which is Communist in name only since the time Deng espoused capitalism – had to develop a new way of legitimating its continuing hold on power. In Russia, since the old Communist Party was dissolved, the new despotic power holder, Putin, has similarly to justify his rule and command obedience, quite apart from the formalities of elections, which everyone in Russia knows are rigged but out of habit people still go along and vote. There are analogous problems of legitimacy to be faced by the regimes in Iran and Turkey, which, as we shall see, can only be met by recourse to traditionalist
The issue of legitimate authority is crucial to the holding of political power in all societies throughout history, as Weber famously declared. The question which is of crucial concern to us now is this: what is the legitimacy basis that obtains in the case of the four despotic capitalist regimes? According to Weber, there are but three ideal-type forms of legitimacy: rational-legal, charismatic and traditional. Which one or which combinations of these are current in the four countries we have been considering? They are clearly not the same ones as those which obtain in the liberal democratic West.
Rational-legal legitimation is that which is current in the West. It generally takes a constitutionalist form whereby the right to rule and the various powers and limits of the ruling authority are prescribed by written constitutional laws and unwritten conventions. Generally, the right to hold office is established by democratic means of one kind or another, particularly so when the rulers are taken to be representatives of the people and govern in their name. Such liberal-democratic constitutional arrangements, when they have the force of fundamental laws, further specify the prerogatives, divisions of power, limits to power and all kinds of other arrangements incumbent upon those who hold authority and govern on the basis of rational-legal legitimation. The American Constitution is one such paradigmatic case of this formal specification of legitimate rule and the Westminster informal parliamentary variant is another. All other democratic states combine features drawn from either or both of these, and some constitutions have extra plebiscitary features of direct democracy.
Obviously, the new despotic regimes do not gain their primary legitimacy through any such rational-legal arrangements. However, they are not bereft of some of these constitutional trappings of rational legitimacy. They generally have constitutions, no matter to what slight degree these are relevant or binding in effect, for they are mainly intended for show. They have parliaments chosen by election, no matter how rigged or restricted these are in practice. Even where there are no parliamentary elections, as in China, there is still the pretence of consensus by means of congresses of regional representatives and Party delegates, as in the former Peoples Democracies. But this is not where the main means of legitimacy are derived.
The old Communist regimes obtained their legitimacy primarily by charismatic means, even though they, too, had constitutions and a sham democracy. The right to rule was established by revolution and by the undertaking to carry out an ideological program, such as Marxist socialism, which was accepted as an article of faith. The success of the leaders in carrying out the revolution was their guarantee of the right to rule; and their successors inherit
The inheritance of the charisma of office is still a factor of legitimacy in China, which is the main reason that Mao cannot be denounced or renounced and why his portrait still hangs over Tiananmen Square. But this is now a diminishing factor for the paramount ruler and the ruling elite. In Russia it has been relegated to a great extent to a still more subsidiary role, for Putin does not consider himself, nor is he taken by the people, as a direct successor to Stalin, as the former Communist rulers did. Nevertheless, Putin has not completely abandoned recourse to Stalin, for he has placed him among the pantheon of great Russian rulers starting with Ivan the Terrible. But to do so he has had to absolve him at least to some extent of his heinous crimes against the Russian people. In China Mao’s crimes are now unmentionable in public.
Only in the more recently revolutionary regime of Iran is the attempt still being made to uphold revolutionary charisma in earnest, and Khamenei is taken as the direct successor to the great leader Khomeini. But this is beginning to wear thin with most Iranians. In Turkey Erdogan distances himself as much as possible from Atatürk, the revolutionary charismatic founder of their secular republic. He is beginning to craft a different kind of legitimating role for himself. Nevertheless, Atatürk’s stature as founder of the Turkish state is still upheld.
Given that rational-legitimacy has never played much of a role in these countries and that revolutionary charisma has waned, a different basis of legitimacy must now be invoked by their rulers. For this purpose, they are now turning to tradition, the third of Weber’s ideal-type legitimations. Traditional legitimation in its pre-modern forms meant rule according to established procedures and ancient forms. In most cases this meant Patrimonial monarchical rule with rules of succession based on hereditary principles, such as primogeniture, or election among the members of a royal family, or victory in a battle for succession fought between eligible contenders or powerful outsiders. It was frequently a case of the king is dead, long live the king. Frequently, too, the priests were there to lend their blessing, by some kind of anointment or coronation ceremony. The people were not consulted in any way, but they duly acquiesced and obeyed provided the ruler acceded by right of tradition. The ruler who did not have such traditional sanctions behind him was considered
This is not less true at present than it was in the past. The rulers of capitalist despotism regimes are no less intent on shoring up their authority by recovering or reinventing traditional forms of legitimation than were their ancient precursors. Xi Jinping casts himself in the traditional role of a beneficent emperor and Putin adopts some of the trappings of a Czar. They call on traditional religious beliefs to uphold their positions. In China, Confucian norms of deference to superiors are being invoked, and all other religious beliefs are tolerated provided they oblige the faithful to be obedient to the current ruler. In Russia, the Russian Orthodox Church has been enlisted to give its unstinting blessings to the ruler, just as it was wont to do in Czarist times. In Iran’s theocracy state and religion have become one, since the traditional ruler, the Shah, has been dethroned. It remains to be seen whether the Shia clerics, the ayatollahs, can perpetuate their own rule, or whether they will be compelled to restore some kind of royal figurehead. In any case, no matter what ensues, legitimacy will be based on tradition. In Turkey, Erdogan does not figure himself as successor to the Caliph, but he, too, claims legitimacy for himself and his Party on traditional grounds as the upholders and saviours of Islam from the ravages of Western secularism.
Both China and Russia have exerted influence of increasing imperial dimensions, even as they weaken internally from economic stress of a profound and structural kind. The very fragility of these highly centralized, Politburo-style regimes inside their own countries makes them increasingly aggressive beyond their borders since nationalism can serve as a unifying element in times of social stress.12
However, thus far there has been little evidence of any such economic or social stress in either China or Russia. But even if there are strains these might prove
If such problems did arise, as Kaplan argues, this could lead to “future palace coups and intrigues in Beijing and Moscow, [which] could trigger fires throughout the Eastern hemisphere” as “China and Russia are the hinge states on which the organization of this entire conflict system depends, given the constricted and copious interactions from one end of the supercontinent to the other …”13 This is what the current rulers wish to secure themselves against by turning to tradition. If Xi Jinping can assume the status of a secular emperor in China then this will make him proof against the vagaries of the economy or even foreign policy by holding the traditional mandate of heaven. Only a near total collapse would show him unfit to rule. Something similar holds for Putin in Russia, and for the ayatollahs in Iran; and Erdogan is also aiming for some such fail-proof position in Turkey.
In all these countries, the present rulers have a rich trove of tradition and history to draw on. This is in fact what they are doing in reminding their subjects of their heritage from a glorious imperial past through all the means at their disposal; propaganda in the media, rewriting history, new educational syllabuses, sacred sites, archaeological discoveries and so on. No technique of aggrandizement is left unused. All critiques that cast a negative light on the past are suppressed. As far as it is at all historically plausible, the present regimes identify themselves with those of the past.
3 Leviathan versus Behemoth
In order to understand how these traditionalist revivals operate, and what traditional sentiments they draw on, we must turn to the history of the ancient civilizations on which they are based. These civilizations are now defunct, but they have left indelible marks on present societies in the form of historical memories of an imperial past, customs, religions and cultural attitudes, as well as cultural practices in the form of art, myth, folk lore, and countless
The old regimes of the four great Asian empires have ever since the eighteenth century received the designation of Oriental Despotism. This was by no means a derogatory term at that time when the Enlightenment philosophes were appealing for benevolent despots in Europe and pointing to the Chinese emperors and their system of mandarin administrators selected through examinations, rather than through sale of offices, as examples to be followed by their own bureaucracies. However, no matter how despotic these Western benevolent despots proved to be in practice, as was clearly the case with the two leading ones, Frederick of Prussia and Catherine of Russia, their rule still differed from those of the Eastern despots. In the West a rule of law obtained which was absent in the East, which does not mean that there was no law in the East, only that the nature of law and the attitude to law was very different in these two civilizational spheres. These differences are still evident at present as the Eastern approach to law has been inherited by the current capitalist despotism regimes in Eurasia. We must, therefore, devote some attention to law as this marks a fundamental divergence that still separates East from West at present.
According to Weber, the Eastern approach to law is based on what he calls “khadi justice”, a substantively rational mode of adjudication, whereas the Western approach is based on formal legality, a formally rational mode. According to Max Rheinstein, the editor of Weber’s work on law, “Khadi justice [is] used by Weber as a term … to describe the administration of justice which is oriented not to fixed rules of a formally rational law but to the ethical, religious, political or otherwise experiential postulates of a substantively rational law.”14 Thus when Weber states that “in khadi justice” there are no “rational” bases of judgement at all, he is using the term “rational” in a purely formal sense. In a contemporary context it is politics and ideology that constitute the substantively rational basis of khadi justice.
This is particularly true of Muslim societies from which the term originates, but no less so of contemporary Chinese legal practices. For though Chinese law is cast in a Western-style formalistic manner, its adjudication is far closer to khadi justice than to Western legal procedure. This is so because an independent judiciary does not exist since there is no formal separation
The Chinese imperial legal tradition was from its very inception dominated by the autocratic principle of the legalists. The emperor, as the embodiment of the highest legal authority, was above and beyond the law. All legislative, judicial and executive powers were concentrated in his hands. The emperor was the sole law giver, and he alone could make or disclaim any law arbitrarily. He was also the supreme judge whose decision was the ultimate court ruling; in fact, his ruling could override the existing law. He could at will create, change, override, abolish, suspend and interpret the law.15
It cannot be stressed enough that there is no rule of law in China. What the country has is rule by law; that is the use of law as an instrument to govern. The Party is quite clear about that: it’s the Party that decides
on the laws, and the interests of the Party trump all interests that are in conflict with it.16
Now it can be more or less assumed that in any serious case whoever is arrested will be pronounced guilty and usually forced to confess to the alleged crime. Lawyers arguing human rights cases have been disbarred. Now that Xi Jinping has declared himself tantamount to ruler for life, his position as “emperor” has been consolidated; and, so, too, has his sway over the law in the name of the Party. It is only his circumspection and continuing need to exercise discretion in relation to the Westerners that inhibits him from exercising his full legal powers in the old imperial way.
Whether a Chinese version of “khadi justice” can be made compatible with capitalism in any shape or form is the historical experiment being played out in China at present. In the West capitalism could only function on the basis of a rule of law safeguarding property, profits, commercial contracts and every other consideration that governs market transactions and investments. It is a system of rights and regulations that has been gradually built up largely on the basis of Roman law, which first specified the conditions governing contractual arrangements. To these were added over the centuries all the other legal provisions – banking law, company law, labour law, and many more – that make capitalism workable. Where these are absent, as under Oriental Despotism, then capitalism can obviously not exist.
The interesting case is that of China at present where Socialism has not been reinstated but the legal requirements necessary for capitalism to function are being gradually whittled away. This is what is officially called “Socialism with Chinese characteristics.” As we know, Socialism whether under Stalin in Russia or Mao in China, proved economically disastrous, because such a command economy can work in war time or periods of emergency, but it cannot be successfully sustained as the normal form of economic life. Its shortcomings have been made clearly evident by what ensued in Russia after Stalin and by the fact that in China Deng Xiaoping turned gradually to capitalism after Mao. What then arose, and proved highly successful under Deng and his successors was in fact “Capitalism with Chinese characteristics”. It was generally assumed in the West that the system would evolve into a full and proper capitalism and that Chinese law would be transformed accordingly into a Western type rational-legal system. It was on this assumption of a rule of law that Westerners were
However, if the steps made towards this kind of rule of law are now being rescinded in line with khadi justice, then any Western commercial engagement with China will eventually cease, and the Chinese economy will have to proceed on its own. This is bound to have internal repercussions among capitalists in China itself. Will entrepreneurs be willing to risk their capital on the uncertain prospects of being able to export their products to the West or being able to retain the control and ownership of their companies in China itself? If the entrepreneurial spirit in China falters, then it is likely that the Chinese economy will become stagnant and high levels of growth will cease. China will be caught in what is known among economists as the “middle income trap.” There might be a way out of this, but so far none is clearly in sight except for the Belt and Road initiative launched by Xi Jinping.
The Belt and Road initiative is designed to create a sphere of Chinese economic influence which will in time rival that of the West. If successful it will mean that China will secure its basic needs for raw materials, fuel and food, free of the threat of boycotts and at the same time find markets for its products and excess building capacities. In other words, it would re-establish something like the old tribute arrangements that the Chinese emperors exercised over the countries surrounding the South China Sea and other adjacent territories, but on a far larger scale. But would that be enough to give China the technological advantage it needs to surpass that of America? For as long as it is technologically inferior it is bound to remain politically inferior as well. We cannot predict the answer to this question.
There is, however, a political dimension to the Belt and Road project as well. It follows the old Mongol Silk Road route that Marco Polo traversed in the thirteenth century, setting off from Venice across the Eurasian heartland to Beijing; and coming back from Beijing to Venice along the alternative sea passage through the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. This is a bold and daring foreign policy démarche that openly reveals China’s global ambition to challenge America. It relies on those countries where American influence is at its weakest, Russia and Iran, and includes Turkey where it is weakening. This matches historically the Eurasian extent of the Mongol empires under Kublai Khan whom Marco Polo served. It does not include those areas where their conquering expeditions failed, principally Japan, Vietnam and Java or what is now Indonesia, which are now also outside the ambit of China’s reach.
It is not that China now has any imperialist aims to recreate the Mongol empire or to embark on any overt campaigns of military conquest. Rather
Following the disaster of Mao’s regime in China, and subsequently the fall of the Soviet Union and of Communism throughout the world, China chose to play a subservient waiting role in relation to America. It abided by Den Xiaoping’s dictum “hide your strength, bide your time”. In this period China became America’s and eventually the West’s small goods supplier; but with the trading surpluses it accrued, and given America’s insatiable need for finance, it also became America’s creditor. Under the leaders following Deng Xiaoping China meekly stood aside while America dominated the globe and expended its resources fighting terrorists and dictators in the Middle East. Despite its own problem with Muslims in Xinjiang province, China was happy to see America deal with this menace globally. But slowly and surely, China built up its military strength and its cash reserves and gradually began to assert itself, first in the South China sea and then further afield. Finally, when Xi Jinping became leader, he realized that China did not need to hide its strength any longer, for the power differential had been narrowed, and he decided that the time had come to turn the tables and mount an open challenge to America. Hence, the Belt and Road initiative was announced in 2013, a wide-ranging and a daring plan of great geopolitical significance.
Xi was doubtless encouraged by the fact that so many other major powers were dispensing with American inspired liberal democracy and moving towards a version of capitalist despotism much like that of China. Its close neighbour, Russia under Putin, began to fall out with America and the European Union when nato was pushing up to Russia’s borders, and when the Ukraine began to slip from its grasp, through Western interference, as Putin believed. Iran remained America’s sworn enemy. Under Erdogan, Turkey began drifting towards despotism and away from liberal democracy and from America, which he accused of harbouring his enemies. The stage was thus set for a realignment of these four major Eurasian powers. A potential Eurasian league was gradually shaping itself with many lesser states as its satellites.
There are many commonalities of interest working towards the integration of these countries. For China they constitute a land route for its exports
China and the Eurasian participants in the Belt and Road scheme also gain by developing their own markets and supplies of resources that are totally independent of the West, and therefore free from American sanctions or interference. China is looking for alternative supplies of its need for new materials, energy supplies and food which its large and increasingly more affluent population requires. And the Eurasian powers, especially Russia and Iran, are seeking a market that is not threated by sanctions; whilst in turn providing markets for Chinese goods. The partners of this growing Eurasian league are almost made for each other, as they were when the Silk Road was operating during the Mongol times.
Similar considerations of securing resources and markets apply to China’s other ventures into parts of Asia and Africa. Pakistan, Myanmar and other countries bordering on China provide alternate routes to the world’s ocean; control over these routes would forestall any possibility of blockade by the US Navy through the closure of the narrow South East Asian straits. This would also provide an alternative access to Middle East oil on which China still depends. Africa, where China is also very active, provides agricultural development possibilities to lessen China’s dependence on Western countries, America, Canada and Australia in particular, for food supplies and raw materials. Thus, China intends to detach itself as far as possible from undue reliance on the West, and this might permit it eventually to isolate itself and its allies from the West if the struggle for global supremacy reaches that point.
Thus, if the Belt and Road initiative were to succeed then this Eurasian axis would once again become the hub of world trade, as it had once been during the Silk Road period when it was first opened up to link the Han Empire and the Roman Empire and later during the Mongol Empire. The Silk Road ceased to matter when America was discovered and the Far East could be reached directly by sea. Gradually world trade at the hands of the intrepid Europeans took to the oceans and the long-distance inland land-routes were abandoned.
What now ensues is a struggle between Behemoth and Leviathan or the land monster versus the sea monster. We shall refer to the two sides of this contest using the Orwellian terms Eurasia and Oceania. This is a multi-faceted and complex competition, engaged in by two powers that are still in very close interaction with each other; China and America, the two leading protagonists, are still locked together in trade and finance, in science and technology, in education and to some extent in cultural exchanges. Nothing like the old Cold War total hostility is now at work, though it could come to that if the competition turned into overt conflict. But at present this still seems unlikely.
Long seen by the Chinese Communist Party as the largely irrelevant junior partner of the United States, Europe is now viewed as the great prize. By winning over Europe, the ccp hopes to convince the world that China is the ‘champion of multilateralism’ and a much-needed counterweight to US hegemony and unilateralism. Beijing wants to mobilize European support for its initiative in the developing world.17
If China does succeed in weaning Europe away from America, then it will have split the West beyond recovery. Its Belt and Road project has that as its ultimate aim for all its routes debouch in Europe at the two strategic points in regions where the EU is at its weakest and most brittle, in Eastern Europe and in the Mediterranean. These are the two hinges on the gateway to Europe and if they were to snap it would leave the door to Europe wide open. The Chinese are already infiltrating into Greece and Italy at one end and into Hungary and Poland at the other. In the latter two countries there has been a decisive turning to a mild form of authoritarianism which makes Chinese inroads all the easier to accommodate, especially as Beijing “presents itself as an alternative
Eastern Europe is a weak point because there the ex-Communist countries are not yet securely liberal democratic and are still economically backward. They are also subject to Russian influence and pressure due to long-standing relations stemming from Communist times. This is particularly true of Hungary under Orban, who is the unruliest of all EU members and is inclined to flout its liberal democratic norms. Poland is driving in the same direction under the leadership of the Law and Justice Party, and it, too, is slowly and stealthily moving towards authoritarian forms of rule. However, atavistic fear and loathing of Russia will give it pause from breaking completely with the EU and America. Bulgaria is another East European country where Russia and China are gaining sway; Romania is bound to follow suit for it, too, is very weak economically and internally unstable. Thus, Eastern Europe as a whole is wide open to combined Russian and Chinese intrusion and suasion.
The Mediterranean is the other region where Chinese influence is making itself felt. Whereas once Marco Polo went from Venice to China, it is now the Chinese who are coming in large numbers to Venice, and without them and other tourists Venice would not survive. At its old rival Genoa, where Marco Polo in captivity told his tale, port facilities are being acquired by a Chinese company, and Italy has joined the Belt and Road initiative. In Greece, the Piraeus has already been bought as a stopping-off port for Chinese exports. Right throughout the Mediterranean this pattern of trade and investment will repeat itself in all the economically weak countries, including Spain, Portugal, Egypt and many others, where China is also seeking to secure ownership of port facilities.
Europe as a whole is becoming increasingly economically dependent on exports to China. For example, Daimler, partly Chinese owned, exports more of its luxury brand cars to China than to the rest of Europe and America combined. Germany has become China’s largest trading partner; in 2018 it exported €93 billion worth of goods. This makes Germany very dependent on China and exposes it to Chinese pressure for political ends. At the same time, it is seeking to meet its energy needs by importing Russian oil and gas. Whether America will be able to depend on it as a political ally is starting to become doubtful. And the same is true of France, which has always followed an independent foreign policy from de Gaulle onwards. France, too, finds the biggest foreign market for its luxury brand goods in China. Britain, despite its strong pro-China
Europe is not an altogether secure partner for America for anti-American feelings of resentment are simmering just below the surface in many sectors of the European population, including Britain. The huge protest demonstrations against the Iraq war showed how easily such sentiments could be aroused to give rise to anti-American action. What motivated them was not so much love of Saddam Hussein as hatred for President Bush. France’s stand in the UN in blocking international legitimation of the invasion of Iraq revealed that anti-American Gaullist tendencies were still very much alive and that Chirac shared them. The blame and obloquy heaped on Blair for supporting Bush within his own Labour Party and the resentment this still arouses was clearly in evidence during the time of Corbyn’s leadership in the Labour Party. In Germany, too, anti-American resentment is coming to the fore on both the Left and Right, as well as among the Greens. Gratitude for American aid and protection of Europe after the Second World War has long since waned and is giving way to resentment of America’s display of superior attitudes, especially under President Trump.
Europe might detach itself from the Western alliance and move in the direction of China, resulting in the so-called “Finlandization” of Europe, which was so feared during the Cold War. The more dependent Europe becomes on China, the more likely this is to eventuate. American policy under both Obama and Trump has, if anything, helped to bring this about by the weak response to China’s challenge under Obama and by Trump’s blustering which furthered isolationist tendencies in America. The Europeans are beginning to sense that America cannot be trusted as an ally. The new Biden administration and subsequent administrations will have to work hard to correct such perceptions.
At present the West embraces not only America and Europe but also all their other liberal democratic partners throughout the globe. In Asia the most important ones are Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, with Vietnam a more distant ally. But it is still not clear where some of the others would stand if there were a showdown with China; of these the most important is India, but Indonesia is also a major country whose stance is uncertain. In the Middle East America has close allies in Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. South America is still largely in America’s sphere of influence, though there, too, China is moving in economically at a rapid rate. All in all, it is mainly sea-going littoral countries that
The world seems to be shaping up for a global contest between Oceania and Eurasia, Leviathan and Behemoth. But this will not be an Orwellian protracted war carried out by proxies or a Cold War between the major antagonists. Neither of these possibilities is likely, since the former could lead to all-out war and result in global catastrophe; and the latter is most unlikely due to the interdependence of all the major countries of the world in so many respects, economic, scientific, technological, academic, educational and cultural. The very same Forces of Modernity, namely, capitalism, the State, science and technology, are at work throughout the world, and these can only operate at their most effective on a global cooperative basis. Both America and China benefit most from present arrangements of globalization. They are still entangled in a mutual embrace, which now might be turning to wrestling rather than making love as before, but they are still firmly locked together. Over-ambition and unwise statesmanship could lead them both into the Thucydidean trap, and one can only hope that wiser heads among their leaders will prevail.
In any coming confrontation between Oceania and Eurasia a crucial determinant will be the role of South Asia, namely India. India is a rising superpower, though rising very slowly, but even so it will eventually reach comparable levels with those of the other two superpowers. With which of these will India ally itself? Will it join Oceania as a liberal democracy or Eurasia as a traditional Oriental culture? It could go either way, though at present proximity to China makes it edge ever closer to America. Perhaps a glimpse into India’s history will provide a sounder basis for an answer to this question.
India is based on an ancient Hindu civilization now largely defunct. Through its numerous Muslim conquerors, it was drawn into much of the culture and history of the rest of Muslim Asia. First the Arabs conquered the Indus River region and converted it into the Muslim area that has now become Pakistan. Then various Turkic people from Central Asia established sultanates across the Ganges River region. And eventually one of these, the Mughals established an empire by successively occupying nearly all of India in stages. This is a legacy that the present Indian Government wishes mostly to forget and to erase. Instead, it speaks of a colonial period that only began with the British East India Company in the eighteenth century and culminated with the British Empire in India in the nineteenth century, whereas in reality it has been colonized for much longer, as numerous conquerors ruled it.
The British colonialists endowed India with its major institutions, economic, administrative and cultural, as well as its liberal democracy. In that respect India belongs firmly with the West. Even its Socialism, espoused by Nehru
There is, thus, good reason for supposing India will remain liberal democratic and will side with the Oceanic powers against the Eurasian ones. But there are also grounds for fearing the possibility that it might return to its Asian roots and embark on its own version of despotic capitalism. Modi and the bjp have embarked on a Hindutva project which might be designed to keep them permanently in power. If this were to happen, then India might find that it has more in common with Eurasia than with Oceania. The integration of the Indian economy with that of China, at present still resisted, would lead it in the same direction.
Japan is much more firmly anchored in the Oceanic axis, despite its Asian past. It was one of the few countries in Asia to be spared the Mongol conquest, Vietnam was another, so it did not experience a Mongol-style Oriental Despotism. The Tokugawa shogunate had more of a feudal character which paralleled in some ways European feudalism. This meant that it was easier for it to Westernize than for China or for most other Asian powers. From start to finish of this process Japan had close relations to America, both in peace and in war. It is thus most likely that it will maintain these ties for the foreseeable future.
Indonesia is another country that the Mongols sought to conquer and failed. Eventually the island archipelago was taken over by the Dutch colonialists and unified into the country that became Indonesia. Under its first president Sukarno, Indonesia adopted a hostile stance to the West, but that changed abruptly under Suharto. Since then, Indonesia has played a constructive role in furthering the asean group of states. It is now subject to China’s economic inroads as part of the whole region that is so crucial to China’s sea-going trade, being the route of the Belt and Road project. These peaceful incursions are matched by military ones into the South China sea. How Indonesia will react to this double pressure is still uncertain.
Indonesia is also a Muslim country that has much in common with its close neighbour Malaysia and the rest of the Islamic world. It therefore also suffers from the fanatical terrorism to which the whole Muslim ecumene is now subject. This is in no sense a revival of Islamic civilization, as Huntington assumed. It is much more a deeply reactionary, religiously motivated grab for power such as succeeded in Iran and now in Afghanistan. Elsewhere it has generally failed. Muslim civilization is beyond recall. It was first shattered by the Mongols when they devastated Baghdad and brought the Abbasid Caliphate to
Their two modern successor regimes, Turkey and Iran, though subject to religious rivalries, are making common cause with China and Russia against the West. Both are crucial for the Belt part of the Belt and Road project and so are being assiduously wooed by China. Turkey, though still a member of nato, is responding positively to these overtures. As early as 2013 Erdogan declared in a television interview that joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization consisting of China, Russia and the Central Asian republics is his preferred option because “it is better and more powerful and we have values in common”.19 The values in common are clearly related to despotic capitalism rather than any Turkish commonality with Central Asia or the Uighurs in China.
The battle lines seem to be drawn as the rivalry between Eurasia and Oceania becomes more intense and is likely to run for the rest of this century. Superficially it seems to be once more a reprise of the age-old competition between land power and sea power, or Behemoth and Leviathan in biblical terms. Hence, as Kaplan intimates, the old theories of Mahan and Mackinder are once more in vogue.20 America, a naval power, has control of the oceans and seas and has allies right across the shores of all the continents. China, a military power, is establishing control of the heartland of Eurasia.
However, what is happening now is no longer the old-style military confrontation between two distinct and separate warring powers as in the past. In a globalized world there is now a much greater level of interdependence, so that a resolution of differences using purely military means is no longer possible. But it is precisely this interpretation that opens up avenues for other forms of competition and rivalry. A much greater role is now played by ideology and cultural subversion; soft power is now of equal importance to hard power. The West had assumed that with the fall of Communism in Russia and China’s move to capitalism they would follow a steady course to liberal democracy. But that did not turn out to be the case for, among other reasons, there are deep-seated historical precedents and predispositions.
Instead, what has ensued and become gradually apparent since the accession of Putin and Xi Jinping is that the West finds itself on the defensive, under
In a sense, this is a battle for hearts and minds on the largest possible scale. The aim of the Eurasian powers is to dishearten and discomfit the Westerners, to make them doubt and despair of their values, institutions and ultimately themselves. In the first place, it is intended to foster the belief that despotic capitalist systems are the equal if not better than liberal democratic ones. In the second place, it is designed to convince the West that Oceania represents the past and that the future belongs to Eurasia. Hence the confident assertions made by the Chinese and those arguing on their behalf to the effect that China will overtake and surpass America in every respect that matters. They operate on the adage that to persuade one’s opponent that the battle is lost is halfway to winning the war.
In refuting such views, one must not overlook the fact that there are undoubted advantages that a capitalist despotic system has over a liberal democratic one. Some of these superior features were already obvious to many thinkers throughout the history of Oriental and Occidental forms of government. Machiavelli was aware that the Ottoman Sultan had a far surer grip on power and larger sway and scope for decision and action than the King of France, and he thought this to be an advantage.21 For these reasons, Eastern rule of undivided and unbridled despotism seemed superior to Western forms of divided and qualified power.
To understand what this amounts to and what it really means we need to explore the fundamental differences between Eastern and Western systems of
Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, Civilization, op. cit, 22.
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1996).
Karl August Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957).
Harry Redner, Totalitarianism, Globalization, Colonialism: The Destruction of Civilization since 1914 (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2014).
John Keane, The New Despotism (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2020).
Ibid, 212.
Ibid, 14.
Robert D. Kaplan, The Return of Marco Polo’s World: War, Strategy and American Interests in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Random House, 2018), 7.
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, op. cit.
Ibid, 35.
Robert Kaplan, The Return of Marco Polo’s World, op. cit. 32.
Ibid, 33.
Max Weber, On Law in Economy and Society, ed. and trans. Max Rheinstein and trans. Edward A. Shils (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), 213.
Ibid, 351.
Zhengyuan Fu, Autocratic Tradition and Chinese politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 119.
Clive Hamilton and Marieke Ohlberg, Hidden Hand: Exposing How the Chinese Communist Party is Reshaping the World, (Melbourne: Hardie Grant, 2020), 96.
Clive Hamilton and Marieke Ohlberg, Hidden Hand: Exposing How the Chinese Communist Party is Reshaping the World (Melbourne: Hardie Grant, 2020), 5.
Ibid, 68.
Quoted in Peter Frankopan, op. cit, 520.
Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (New York: Little, Brown and Co. 1890).Halford. J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality (Washington DC: National Defence University Press, 1942).
Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince and The Discourses, ed. Max Lerner (New York: The Modern Library, 1980), 15.