1 Introduction
Throughout its short history, Korean Christianity has seen a critical division between women and men. While some leaders view the polarization of women and men in Korea as a hidden legacy that fosters unintended divisions, others argue that it is still an intentional and lasting reality in Korea. The two phenomena of polarization, intentional and hidden, are by no means new here in the United States. For example, the Reformed Church of America has been ordaining women for decades. The intension to overcome the polarization was clearly pronounced, but some classes are still secretly and unofficially reluctant to have women ministers. The polarization between women and men is also theologically critical. It has influenced the discussion of Christ’s crucifixion as we can see, especially by feminist theologians, in harsh critiques of atonement theology and their ecclesial implications and social practices. This chapter will explore the Daoist view of woman and Western feminist theology of the atonement in order to advocate an alternative to polarization.
Many assume that the gender issue in the church is rooted in Confucian culture, where there is substantial discrimination against women in terms of the five principles of Confucian ethics.1 Nei Ze (內則) of Liji (禮記), one of the five Confucian scriptures, describes in various ways how to distinguish between women and men in their lifestyle and virtues: “The men should not speak of what belongs to the inside (of the house), nor the women of what belongs to the outside;” “On the road, a man should take the right side, and a woman the
Not many people (including Asians) are, however, aware of an aspect of the philosophical tradition of Daoism, in which a profound clue about feminism can be found. In Daoism, the female is the divine being of creation,3 and the revealed name of the Dao, the deity of Daoism, (which is apophatic in nature) is Mother.4 Furthermore, in Daoist political principles, the female is considered superior to the male.5 One may doubt if talk of the female and “Mother” signifies a genuine ontological superiority of female over male, or if they simply represent the Dao’s nature metaphorically—with the feebleness and passivity of women and children,6 along with the sacrifice of empty vessels,7 symbolizing the harmony and production of nature and human beings. What is clear, however, is that in Daoism passivity is viewed not only as passive stillness but also as an active power to produce and embrace all things, and it is women, not men, who represent this nature of the Dao. The Dao produces but does not possess; it advances but does not dominate.8 Thus, in Daoism, genuine power is viewed as the Dao’s “non-dominating/non-violent sacrificial” power, which is found in women, rather than the dominating violent power of men. Does this non-dominating feminine promote the passivity of women, or might it suggest a new perspective for Christian feminism?
One modern critique of Christianity is that the tradition values a passive endurance of pain and suffering and even glorifies violent abuse because of the patriarchal power structure of God’s demand of Christ’s sacrifice on the cross. Joanne Carlson Brown and Rebecca Parker are among those who radically relate the cross to violence and sexism. In their view, since the central image of the cross communicates the message that suffering is redemptive, self-sacrifice not only becomes a virtue, but is the definition of a faithful identity, and thus the cross glorifies suffering. Even liberation theology, with atonement at its center, is seen to encourage martyrdom and victimization. The critical problem these authors find is that the cross promotes and perpetuates abuse and violence, especially the abuse of women in the church. Through the cross, divine child abuse is paraded as salvific, the child who suffers without raising his voice is lauded as the hope of the world, and the
We confront polarized gender issues in Western and East Asian contexts, whether hidden or intentional, and highly polarized theological debates on the atonement with traditional theology pitted against feminist theology. This chapter will contribute to a deeper analysis of various important concepts of the atonement theology, through which we may be able to find a way to embrace both the ever-increasing value of feminist theology and the central message of Christianity in Christ’s crucifixion. We will first explore the nature of feminism in Daoism in order to show how the non-violent passivity and embrace of women reveals the sacrificial deity in Daoism. This may shed light on the fact that Christianity is not the only religion to value the sacrificial aspect of the Deity, and that sacrifice may not necessarily be violent. Next, since this non-violent, passive and embracing sacrifice could also be the source of the submissiveness of women in Asia, this chapter will analyze Brown and Parker’s view of Western feminism, focusing on their criticisms of the traditional and contemporary theology of the atonement and its relevance for feminism. The chapter will then move on to a critical dialogue with feminist views on (1) abuse and necessity, and (2) self-sacrifice and violence. Lastly, pointing out the complexity of the interwoven issues between the cross, atonement theology, and its implications and application, a revision of atonement theology is suggested that reflects a twofold aspect of the four acts of Christ.
2 Feminism in Daoism
A great state [country] should flow downward. This is the [political] principle of intersection, and this is the nature of female. The female always overcomes the male by her stillness. She lowers herself in her stillness. Thus, if the great state condescends to the small states, it gains them; if the small states condescend to the great state, they can gain it.10
The female here is analogous to the great state, winning males through her stillness and humility. The idea that “she lowers herself in her stillness,” however, seems to be problematic for Western feminism. Does this indicate submissiveness and passivity of women in Daoism? Or is it closer to the nature of the Dao?
The sacrificial stillness of Daoism must not be interpreted through the Western dualistic criterion of doing and non-doing, because on the one hand it is linked to wuwei (無爲, non-action), which in its receptivity leads to the Dao, while on the other hand it actively creates all, as we can see in the concept of “produces but does not possess (生而不有)”: “A holy one manages affairs without doing anything (wuwei, 無爲), and conveys his instructions without the use of speech. All things spring up in themselves but the holy one does not ignore [anything]; the holy one produces but does not possess.”11 Thus, the stillness in which the female always wins is not so much unconsciously forcing the nature of women to submit themselves to men, but is the essence of the very Dao, the Deity of Daoism, who sacrificially creates all, surpassing the boundary between non-doing and doing.
The Dao produces and nourishes [all things]. They receive their forms according to the nature of each and are completed according to the circumstances of their condition. Therefore, all things without exception honor the Dao, and exalt its outflowing operation. This honoring of the Dao and exalting of its operation is not the result of any ordination, but always a spontaneous tribute. Thus, the Dao produces [all things],
nourishes them, brings them to their full growth, nurses them, completes them, matures them, maintains them, and overspreads them. It produces but does not possess them; it acts but does not expect; it advances but does not dominate. This is called its mysterious virtue (emphasis mine).13
The Dao creates, nourishes, grows, matures, maintains, and overspreads all things. The deity in Daoism is both the creator and the sustainer of creation. Yet the way the Dao engages in the cosmos and with human beings is striking: it is a gentle and sacrificial caring, not a dominating and forcing power.
There was something in chaos and complete before Heaven and Earth were born. It is silent, formless, independent, and unchanging, reaching everywhere but in no danger. It may be regarded as the Mother of all things. I do not know its name, and the word I can say is the Dao. Making an effort further to give it a name, I call it the Great.17
Mu (母), Mother, is the only being or existence to portray the Dao, while the deity is formless, unknown, unchanging, and omnipresent. Two points are worth noting here: (1) the Mother is the revealed name of the Dao and (2) greatness has a female nature, not male strength. The Mother is the revelation of the Dao in the very first chapter of Dao De Jing: Having no name is the origin of all things, but having their names is the Mother.18
While the multitude of the ordinary people look satisfied and pleased as if enjoying a great banquet and as if ascending a tower, I alone seem to be frugal and still … Secular people seem to be bright and discerning but I alone dark, dull, and confused … I alone am different from all others, but I value the nursing mother.19
The essential contrast here is between the active, flourishing, bright, and extending ordinary people and the author, who is in darkness, dullness, and confusion, and who does not value anything but the nursing mother. The reason that the author respects the mother is because the Dao, like the mother, embraces and cares for all, not forcing or manipulating them: “The Great Dao extends everywhere … clothes and feeds all, but does not act as master.”20
The fact that respect for the caring role of a mother can be found in any culture may cause us to think that feminism would be peripheral in Daoism. It should be noted, however, that “having space for all as an empty vessel”21 and “being foreign to self”22 are the actual contents of the Daoistic non-violent sacrifice. In this Daoistic context, women in their creating, embracing, and caring power are viewed as superior to men, who are attracted by dominating and forcing power. In light of the concepts of Daoist act and sacrifice, the feminine in Daoism must be understood in terms of the twofold nature of the Dao: (1) passive sacrifice, represented visually so we can grasp it in the images of the valley, the empty vessel, and women and (2) active creation and care for all things, not by forcing and dominating, but by embracing them. What is at stake here is that the two dimensions in Daoism are simultaneous and interconnected: Precisely because of its passive and non-violent sacrifice, the Dao creates and cares for all things, or, as the Dao actively creates and cares for all, it does not forcefully dominate, but passively sacrifices itself for all. Non-violent sacrifice is the very nature of the Dao’s creation and caring and is most manifestly represented by the feminine. Can this non-violent sacrifice provide a clue to the issues of Western feminism?
We must do away with the atonement, this idea of a blood sin upon the whole human race which can be washed away only by the blood of the lamb. This bloodthirsty God is the God of the patriarchy who at the moment controls the whole Christian tradition. This raises the key question for oppressed people seeking liberation within this tradition: If we throw out the atonement is Christianity left?23
Because of this bloody, violent, and abusive atonement, they define Christianity as having an abusive theology that glorifies suffering.24 Their criticism includes both traditional and contemporary views of the atonement. Unfortunately, their understanding of traditional atonement theology is based solely on Gustaf Aulén’s three models from Christus Victor: A Historical Study of the Three Main Types of the Idea of Atonement, which are the victory model, the objective/Anselmian model, and the subjective/Aberlardian model. They interpret the victory model as a journey of suffering toward victory and comment critically that “suffering is a prelude to triumph and is in itself an illusion” and that “Jesus’ death becomes a paradigm for a stage in a psychological process to be patiently endured.”25 They point out the problem with the mechanism of the model of salvation—which is not salvation from pain but through pain—is that believers are persuaded to endure suffering as a prelude to new life.26 They then conclude that victimization never leads to triumph and that the victory theory of the atonement defames all those who suffer and trivializes tragedy.27 Although we must remember that the church has often emphasized victory through pain and forcefully applied it to women, it is unclear from scripture if Christ’s victory is depicted as one from pain or through pain. Several biblical texts highlight victory over death and evil, rather than its process.28
The moral example theory of the atonement in which Christ’s willingness to die is set up as an example for us to follow is also problematic for Brown and Parker. They hold that, in theory, Christ’s victimization should suffice for our moral edification, but in reality, races, classes, and women have been victimized, while at the same time their victimization has been heralded as a persuasive reason for inherently sinful men to become more righteous.34 Their criticism unveils the logical problem of the moral example theory: Christ’s death as a moral value must have a prior value to that of morality, for example, sacrifice, because death as such cannot be a moral value. The hidden connection between moral example and sacrifice could cause the problem of victimization. It is, however, to be noted that the moral example theory emphasizes love as a moral value rather than victimization and that Brown and Parker’s criticism is not as much about atonement theology as about its application.
Was God not with us in our suffering before the death of Jesus? Did the death really initiate something that did not exist before? It is true that … fullness of life involved feeling the pain of the world. But it is not true that being open to all of life is the equivalent of choosing to suffer. Nor is it right to see the death of Jesus as a symbol for the life-giving power of receptivity to reality. It is not acceptance of suffering that gives life; it is commitment to life that gives life. The question … is not, Am I willing to suffer? but Do I desire fully to live? This distinction is subtle and, to some, specious but in the end it makes a great difference in how people interpret and respond to suffering. If you believe that acceptance of suffering gives life, then your resources for confronting perpetrators of violence and abuse will be numbered.37
What is the difference between acceptance of suffering and commitment to life here? It seems that Brown and Parker put both “choosing suffering” and “receptivity to reality” in the same category as “acceptance of suffering,” in opposition to “commitment to life.” Certainly, we should not choose or accept suffering simply for the sake of suffering. Yet, what if we are already living under critical suffering and pain—and of course we are—and how can we simply commit to “life” only, without encountering suffering? Is “encountering suffering” a type of “accepting” or “choosing”? These questions lead us to the second trend Brown and Parker discuss, the necessity of suffering. Is Christ’s suffering caused by human reality or by divine necessity?
The third trend, according to Brown and Parker, is perhaps the most radical, in that it rejects the concept that human suffering can have positive or redemptive aspects.43 The focal theme can be understood with the concepts of “a Racist God” or “a Sadistic God,” both of which reject the suffering servant motif.44 William Jones, for example, argues that all suffering is negative, based on the fact that even after the event of the cross, the oppression and suffering continue, and that as the oppressors justify their position, the oppressed are persuaded to endure.45 Jones suggests a humanocentric theism in which God acts a persuader rather than a coercer, and in which human activity is decisive for salvation and liberation.46 In labeling all suffering as negative, Jones suggests that our traditional faith is part of what oppresses us. According to Brown and Parker, Jones does not go far enough, in that he fails to raise the question of a sadist God: Why was the crucifixion necessary? Did God demand it and
Certainly, suffering must not be justified. We constantly kill Christ if we wrongly interpret his death to justify our own violence and abuse. Women’s experience is one of the most valuable reflections on Christ’s crucifixion. Yet, the problems in Brown and Parker’s argument related to their theology of atonement are not trivial. In what follows, I will discuss the issues raised above before briefly suggesting my own theology of the atonement as a clue to how we might revisit the reality and meaning of Christ’s crucifixion.
4 Abuse and Necessity
The critical challenge of feminism for abuse is relevant (1) for seeing the cross between Jesus’s Godward action and God’s action in Christ on behalf of humans, (2) for understanding Christ’s own will, and (3) for defining necessity. Apparently, these three matters are interrelated. If we see the cross only through the framework of Christ’s Godward action, there is no way to avoid the problem of divine abuse.48 God is the violent and sadistic God who demands the blood of God’s own monogenes. Various concepts in the theological tradition, such as “appeasement,” “propitiation,” “satisfaction,” and even “obedience,” can promote this image of God if we limit them to “Christ’s action toward God” only. Yet it is hard to believe that there has been anyone in theological history who has not included the aspect of “God’s work for human beings” in their atonement theology. The challenge from feminism is, of course, more critical. Even in this aspect of “God’s action in Christ toward humans,” it is possible to perceive the same problem of violence and abuse, if God demanded the blood of Jesus “without Jesus’ voluntary will” and “by necessity.”
Yet, in reply, Jesus’ action on the cross is twofold. On the one hand, Jesus obeys God, as we find in his prayer at Gethsemane: “Abba, Father, for you all things are possible; remove this cup from me; yet, not what I want, but what you want.”49 God appears to be the primary subject who activates the Son’s
Another issue related to abuse concerns whether God demands Christ’s death by divine necessity. I have already raised the question of the difference between reality and necessity, and so the undergirding issue here is how to understand the human situation and the action of the personal God. What is the primary cause of the necessity of Christ’s crucifixion between God and humans? This question is crucially relevant to the feminist view of sin.55 Joy Ann McDougall argues that Kathryn Tanner’s concept of sin as a “refusal” or “blockage” of “God’s gift-giving” responds well to feminist critiques of the root paradigm of sin as pride.56 Without ignoring the critical point that humankind is wholly trapped in the bondage of sin, McDougall avoids the forensic framework of sin in two ways: (1) there is no legal court established to decide humanity’s case and (2) the radically transcendent and beneficent God keeps
What these theologians do not fully discuss in their arguments, however, is the profundity of the divine relationship with humans and the crucial nature of the human condition. Nicholas Wolterstorff defines justice, not in terms of Aristotle’s view that justice consists in a person’s receiving what is due to him or her, but from the biblical writers’ perspective, who assert that God loves justice, not as retributive punishment, but as a social action for the oppressed.58 God punishes wrong-doers, even with various types of death, not for the sake of “justice as such” but to transform them and lead them to God: “My child, do not despise the LORD’s discipline or be weary of his reproof, for the LORD reproves the one he loves, as a father the son in whom he delights.”59 God is not a human being, but the Holy One, coming not in wrath not because God does not heal evil-doers, but because God loves and leads them to Godself with bands of a transformative cord.60 “Love only by a constant blessing of gifts,” as implied in McDougal’s view, is a human illusion and is itself abusive because it could constantly spoil wrong-doers. Goodness and mercy follow us by way of the path of righteousness.61 Justice is not negated, but embraced by God, neither for the sake of justice itself nor by following an impersonal legal system, but from the love of the personal God who interacts with and restores sinners, victims, and oppressors. Thus, the divine justice and punishment of the personal God is not retributive but transformative and restorative. This is a substantial difference between Christianity and Daoism, for in the latter there is no personal interaction of the Dao for building up justice.
The human condition is much more acute than a legal status. We are broken in our relationship with others, abandoned by and abandoning ourselves, our neighbors, and our social and political systems, killed by and killing others, and living in violence, suffering and pain, absurdity, meaninglessness, and nothingness. The “necessity” of the cross lies neither in God’s demand nor in a forensic system, but in the miserable human beings whom Christ has come to
5 Self-Sacrifice and Violence
Another issue raised by feminists is whether Christ’s death as self-sacrifice glorifies suffering, which then promotes human violence, including patriarchal oppression. Some are so critical of the cross as the root source of human oppression and violence that they seek to do away with Christianity and find liberation in Eastern religions.64 What a challenge!
Christ’s death is radically violent, as reflected in atonement language, with words such as “blood,” “wrath,” “sacrifice,” “propitiation and expiation,” “retribution,” and most critically, “crucifixion.” The traumatic impact of language must not be ignored. Yet the feminists’ critique concerns more than the psychological impact of atonement theology, because it touches on the actual content: Is Christ’ sacrifice on the cross Christ’s choice, and does it thus promote and glorify suffering?65 What is the nature of Christ’s suffering on the cross?
God bears the burdens of others in ways that transcend our powers, and I have already admitted that in Christ’s being at once innocent and the bearer of our sin there is mystery beyond explaining. Still, we experience analogies to such vicarious burden bearing, and it seems odd to react in moral horror to the theological claim when we find its human analogies so generally natural and admirable.66
If we experience a variety of vicarious burden bearings, why should God not bear human limitations? It seems illogical to interpret Christ’s sacrifice as the root cause of human oppression and a “glorification of suffering” when we praise and “glorify” those who sacrifice their lives for the sake of others.
We thus need further clarification of the idea that sacrifice is violent. Following feminist views, “a coerced suffering and sacrifice” must be violent and, thus, passively enduring a coerced suffering promotes violence. Such suffering could be either individual or collective/systematic, conscious or unconscious. “Self” in this type of self-sacrifice turns out to be a “sacrificing self, forced by others or systems,” which suggests violence. There are two dimensions to the question of coercion in feminist critiques: (1) Is Christ’s self-sacrifice a type of “sacrificing self, coerced by others”? and (2) Are women coerced to follow Christ’s self-sacrifice? The former is closer to a theology of the cross while the latter to its implication and application.
One of the great contributions of feminist theology is to expose the critical reality that the church and theology have promoted the oppression of women, by emphasizing the “voluntary” sacrifice of Christ on the cross. Previously, the non-voluntary nature of the Son’s death by necessity was the major issue for
6 Revision of Atonement Theology
Many theologians attempt to reshape their theology of the atonement by making a shift from negative connotations of punishment and sacrifice to positive ones, such as love and gifts. Non-violent atonement views have become a dominating trend in atonement theologies. We may also learn from the gentle, embracing, and non-violent way of sacrifice of the Dao in Daoism.
Yet the bare reality of Christ’s crucifixion is that it is a harsh type of violent death. If it is a gift, we must explain in what way a gift can be given via this violent death. Treasuring a constructive value of the cross without grounding it in the destructive reality of death would be a naïve and superficial interpretation of the cross. In response, biblical authors witness two dimensions of Christ’s sacrifice: (1) it is passive, destructive, and retrospective on the one hand, and (2) it is active, constructive, and prospective on the other. Christ on the cross becomes sin, gives himself as ransom for many, cleanses and purifies sins, destroys evil, and dies for all that all may die in him.67 The world is under the power of sin, death and injustice, and Christ’s death is the death of sin, death and injustice, retrospectively for the past and present reality of the
What happens on the cross is the comprehensive act of God in Christ: exposing, sharing, bearing, and drawing. Christ’s death holistically exposes the violent world—Roman political power, the Jewish religious conspiracy, the intensified violence of social gatherings, and betrayal by ambitious followers. Christ shares himself, his body and blood, with us,72 shares human suffering and abandonment,73 bears sins, diseases and pains,74 and draws all people to God, reconciling them to Godself and each other.75 Rather than working for a legal solution, this comprehensive work of Christ on the cross is the way a loving and compassionate God deals with the critical human condition. Our atonement theology, therefore, must not be overwhelmed by a single layer of interpretation, but instead needs to embrace the holistic and comprehensive reality of the cross, as the two aspects and the four acts suggest. Exposing, sharing, bearing, and drawing are not at all close to “glorifying suffering.” It is
7 Conclusion
Polarization between women and men is one of the most critical issues both in the Western and non-Western world, whether that polarization is intentional or hidden. It is more crucial in the theological discussion of the atonement, as we can see in the feminist theologians’ critical analyses of it. Daoism is the oldest philosophy and religion of feminism: Female represents the Dao which sacrificially creates and nourishes all, but never dominates. This non-violent sacrifice challenges Christian faith and the theology of Christ’s crucifixion in which feminists find the root cause of abuse and violence against women. The non-violent sacrifice of Daoist feminism implies two things: (1) not all sacrifice is violent and (2) the embrace and care of the feminine in non-violent sacrifice can promote passive endurance of suffering.76
Brown and Parker argue that the Christian God is abusive and violent because God demands the necessary bloody death of the Son, who passively accepts it (as abuse) on the one hand, and who sacrifices himself on the other, which could promote Christian violence against and oppression of women. Three issues they see as crucial are that (1) God demands the Son’s death by
Does the Daoist sacrifice of non-violence provide us with a better format for feminism than the radical death of Christ on the cross? Lessons we learn from a comparison between Daoist feminism and Christian theology of the atonement are not trivial. The personal God in Christ radically and sacrificially engages in the suffering of human beings and the injustice of the world, whereas the sacrifice of the impersonal Dao is close to our perception of human reality: The empty space of a container and the weakness of women and children produce and nourish creation. On the one hand, church and society must remember that the radical sacrifice of Christ can be easily twisted into the practice of imperialistic and sexist oppression. A non-violent embrace and a gentle space for others in Daoism could offer a profound lesson for radical Christianity, especially at the level of theological implication and ecclesial application. It teaches us all not to promote any type of coerced endurance of suffering and reveals the deceptive activeness of self-destruction. On the other hand, we must not forget that the radical sacrifice of Christ is the very heart of the Gospel: God is not idly remote from our pain and suffering, but is critically present in us by exposing the violence of the world, sharing and bearing
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“There should be affection between father and son; righteousness between sovereign and minister; difference between husband and wife; order between old and young; and fidelity between friends (父子有親 君臣有義 夫婦有別 長幼有序 朋友有信),” Mengzi, Teng Wen Gong I. Difference (別) is often interpreted as mutual respect between husband and wife in their respective roles, but it has impacted Asian society not only as a functional difference, but also as a substantial limitation of women in relation to men.
“男不言內 女不言外,” “道路 男子由右 女子由左,” and “七年男女不同席.”
“谷神不死 是謂玄牝 玄牝之門 是謂天地根,” Dao De Jing 6.
“無名天地之始 有名萬物之母,” Dao De Jing 1.
“牝常以靜勝牡,” Dao De Jing 61.
“知其雄 守其雌 為天下谿 為天下谿 常德不離 復歸於嬰兒,” Dao De Jing 28.
“道沖而用之或不盈,” Dao De Jing 4.
“生而不有… 長而不宰,” Dao De Jing 51.
Catherine Despeux and Livia Kohn, Women in Daoism (Cambridge: Three Pines Press, 2003), 1.
“大國者下流 天下之交 天下之牝 牝常以靜勝牡 以靜為下 故大國以下小國 則取小國 小國以下大國 則取大國.”
“聖人處無為之事 行不言之教 萬物作焉而不辭 生而不有,” Dao De Jing 2.
“生之 畜之 生而不有,” Dao De Jing 10.
“道生之 德畜之 物形之 勢成之 是以萬物莫不尊道而貴德 道之尊 德之貴 夫莫之命常自然 故道生之 德畜之 長之育之 亭之毒之 養之覆之 生而不有 為而不恃 長而不宰 是謂玄德,” Dao De Jing 51.
“是謂玄牝 玄牝之門 是謂天地根,” Dao De Jing 6.
“玄之又玄,” Dao De Jing 1.
“同其塵,” Dao De Jing 4, 56.
“有物混成 先天地生 寂兮寥兮 獨立不改 周行而不殆 可以為天下母 吾不知其名 字之曰道 強為之名曰大,” Dao De Jing 25.
“無名天地之始 有名萬物之母.”
“衆人熙熙 如享太牢 如春登臺 我獨怕兮其未兆…. 俗人昭昭 我獨若昏 俗人察察 我獨悶悶…. 我獨異於人 而貴食母,” Dao De Jing 20.
“大道汎兮… 衣養萬物而不為主,” Dao De Jing, 34.
“The Dao is an empty vessel. However often we use it, it cannot be used up, 道沖而用之或不盈,” Dao De Jing 4.
The holy one treats self as if it were foreign to self, and yet that person is preserved, 外其身而身存,” Dao De Jing 7.
Joanne Carlson Brown and Rebecca Parker, “For God So Loved the World?” In Violence against Women and Children: A Christian Theological Sourcebook, eds. Carol J. Adams and Marie M. Fortune (New York: Continuum, 1995), 36–59, 56.
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Brown and Parker, “For God So Loved the World?” 44.
Brown and Parker, “For God So Loved the World?” 48–49.
Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 51, quoted by Brown and Parker, “For God So Loved the World?” 49.
Brown and Parker, “For God So Loved the World?” 49.
Brown and Parker, “For God So Loved the World?” 50.
Martin Luther King Jr. quoted in A Testament of Hope, ed. James Washington (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 47, Brown and Parker, “For God So Loved the World?” 51.
Martin Luther King Jr. quoted in The Church is All of You, ed. James Brockman (Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1984), 94, Brown and Parker, “For God So Loved the World?” 51.
Brown and Parker, “For God So Loved the World?” 51.
Brown and Parker, “For God So Loved the World?” 52.
Brown and Parker, “For God So Loved the World?” 52.
Brown and Parker, “For God So Loved the World?” 54–55.
Brown and Parker, “For God So Loved the World?” 54.
Brown and Parker, “For God So Loved the World?” 54–55.
Brown and Parker, “For God So Loved the World?” 55.
“As long as the death of Jesus is aimed God-ward, one cannot avoid the implication that death is the means through which God enables reconciliation, and thus God uses or sanctions a violent death,” (J. Denny Weaver, “The Nonviolent Atonement: Human Violence, Discipleship and God,” in Stricken by God: Nonviolent Identification and the Victory of Christ, eds. Brad Jersak and Michael Hardin [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007], 316–55, 342).
Mk. 14: 36.
Lk. 10: 21–22
Jn. 10: 17.
Jn. 17: 4–5; 17: 21–26.
Mk. 10: 45.
Jn. 10: 18.
Linda Peacore asserts that the failure of feminist theology to adequately deal with the subject of women’s sin leads to flaws in feminist atonement theology (Linda D. Peacore, The Role of Women’s Experience in Feminist Theologies of Atonement [Eugene: Pickwick, 2010], 162).
Joy Ann McDougall, “Sin—No More? A Feminist Re-Visioning of a Christian Theology of Sin,” Anglican Theological Review 88:2 (2006), 232–233.
McDougall, “Sin—No More?” 233–234.
Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Justice as a Condition of Authentic Liturgy,” Theology Today 48:1 (1991), 6–21, 8.
Prov. 3: 11–12.
Hos. 11: 3–9.
Ps. 23: 3, 6.
Mk. 10: 45.
Jn. 10: 7–16.
“It is fascinating to note that Gross (a Jew who has converted to Buddhism) believes that there are motifs present in Eastern religion which are very different from those found within monotheism. They may be much more acceptable to feminists …” (Daphne Hampson, After Christianity [Valley Forge: Trinity Press International, 1996], 126), “Many, though, dive into Buddha’s deep waters to learn how to peacefully and without harm confront racism and other systems of oppression and to heal the devastating impact that racism, classism, sexism, and heterosexism can have on the psyches of black women, children, and men. While no community is perfect, it is the case that many black women are exploring Buddhism even while engaging an everyday translation of lived Christian liberation theology into Buddhist tongue” (Melanie L. Harris, “Buddhist Resources for Womanist Reflection,” Buddhist-Christian Studies 34 [2014], 107–114, 110–111).
Brown and Parker, “For God So Loved the World?” 49.
William C. Placher, “Christ Takes our Place: Rethinking Atonement,” Interpretation 53:1 (1999), 5–20, 17.
2 Cor. 5: 21; Mk. 10: 45; 1 Jn. 1: 7–9; Heb. 1: 3; Col. 2: 14; 2 Cor. 5: 24.
Jn. 1: 29.
Eph. 2: 15; 2 Cor. 5: 18–20; Col. 1: 20.
Jn. 3: 16; Rom. 11: 15; Gal. 3: 13; 4: 5; Jn. 8: 36; Gal. 2: 4; 5: 1, 13; Rom. 8: 2.
Rom. 8: 21; Jn. 10: 17; Rom. 5: 8; Gal. 2: 20; 1 Jn. 3: 16.
Mk. 14: 22–24.
Mk. 15: 34.
1 Pet. 2: 24; Isa. 53: 4.
Jn. 12:32; Eph. 2: 14–22.
Chen Gu Ying enumerates seven drawbacks to Daoism, two of which are related to passivity: i.e., that submission of oneself to nature may weaken human will, reason, and feeling, which are distinct from nature, and that the stillness that comes from following nature may give us a mental peace but may harm human creativity (Gu Ying Chen (陳鼓應), A New Perspective of Lao-Zhuang (老莊新論), trans. Jin Sik Choi (Seoul, Sonamu, 1997), 78–79.