…
Menschenfeindliche Hetze war in der Vergangenheit und sie ist auch heute der Nährboden für Gewalt bis hin zum Mord. Wer diesen Nährboden düngt, macht sich mitschuldig. [Anti-human incitement has been in the past and is still today the breeding ground for violence, even culminating in murder. Anyone who fertilizes this breeding ground is complicit.]
Schäuble (2019)
∵
1
Kassel, Halle, and Hanau are three German cities which mark the threat to democracy of right-wing terrorism in Germany. In June 2019, the regional district president of Kassel, Walter Lübcke was shot to death by a right-wing extremist. In October 2019, another right-wing extremist tried to enter the Jewish synagogue in Halle to kill the worshippers. He did not gain entry to the synagogue due to a heavy door, so he killed two people on the street instead. In February 2020, a third right-wing extremist killed nine people with migration backgrounds in a Shisha-bar in Hanau.
It is not only these assassinations which urge policymakers and the government to act but also the constant number of citizens in the German society among whom right-wing populist, far right-wing, and extremist attitudes are becoming ever more popular, resulting in an increasing number of right-wing, extremist-motivated incidents of violence and crimes. In the 1970s, German society faced a series of incidents of left-wing extremist violence, but today it is mostly confronted with anti-immigration sentiments, Euroscepticism, religious extremism, Islamic extremism, and Salafism. This chapter focuses on right-wing extremism and right-wing terrorism. Borum’s thesis that ‘an individual’s mindset and worldview establish a psychological climate’ for or against radicalization or the risk ‘of involvement in violent extremism’ (2014, p. 287) is the key starting point in this chapter for the theoretical considerations regarding the preventive potential of civic and citizenship education.
The chapter starts with a definition of right-wing extremism and right-wing terrorism. Following a brief outline the current situation of right-wing terrorism in Germany, this chapter touches upon the challenges citizenship and civic education are facing today. The difference between participation in school and outside of school is highlighted with reference to international research. The idea of good citizenship is discussed. The role of attitudes as a protective factor against right-wing extremism leads to the key point of this chapter: the linkage of three theoretical models. Borum’s mindset is combined with the learning opportunities model (Angebots-Nutzungs-Modell, Helmke, 2010, p. 73) and the model of political competence (Detjen et al., 2012) in order to identify opportunities for preventing radicalization through citizenship education in schools. It is assumed that civic and citizenship education can support young people in building their identities, developing values, and strengthening their self-concepts, and that it encourages their participation in society. The objective of this chapter is to aggregate existing knowledge and to stimulate new ideas for evaluating the potential of citizenship education to prevent radicalization. Due to the lack of empirical findings, these theoretical ideas have to be taken as recommendations rather than evidence-based advice.
2
A definition of right-wing extremism as opposed to right-wing terrorism is the basis for the considerations in this chapter.
2.1 Definitions
2.1.1 Right-Wing Extremism
Right-wing extremism is often used as a generic term for antidemocratic attitudes and behaviours. Even if the term is discussed in a controversial manner, there is a consensus (Salzborn, 2014) on the ideology of inequality which devaluates people according to their ethnic origin, race, religion, class, gender, or sexual orientation. This leads to anti-Semitism, racism, and xenophobia, which is in accordance with Heitmeyer’s prominent sociological conception of group-based hostility (2002). Other elements of right-wing extremism are the desire for an authoritarian state, the denial of pluralistic values in democracy, anti-liberalism, the acceptance and use of violence, as well as the trivialization and justification of the National Socialist era and the Second World War. Alongside the criticism of the theoretical foundation, several researchers developed a scale for measuring right-wing extremism and right-wing attitudes since the year 2000 (e.g. Decker et al., 2014; Best et al., 2013; Zick et al., 2017).
2.1.2 Right-Wing Terrorism
A binding and generally accepted definition of right-wing terrorism is not available yet due to the problem that common definitions of terrorism cannot simply be transferred to the type of political violence and terrorism motivated by right-wing ideologies. ‘Right-wing extremist terror often fell through the cracks of security agencies. … This concerned the character and forms of organization of the terrorists, the specifics of their mode of action, and the composition of victim groups’ (Botsch, 2019, p. 10). This article uses Virchow’s definition, who describes terrorism ‘as planned, not only singularly violent, actions by (semi-) secret individual actors or groups that aim to create fear and intimidation among a larger number of people and/or to influence decisions of political actors or social groups without aiming for personal enrichment’ (Virchow, 2019, p. 15).
3 Right-Wing Extremism in Germany
Over the past ten years, there has been a constant trend towards populist and right-wing parties and organizations, like the Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany) party (AfD), the Patriotic Europeans Against the
3.1 Politically Motivated Right-Wing Violence and Crimes
At the end of 2018, the strength of the extremist movement amounted to a total of 24,100 members after deducting multiple memberships. As in the previous reporting year, 12,700 people were classified as violent; of these, more than one in two people were considered right-wing extremists. After an increase in right-wing extremist crimes and violence in 2015 and 2016 followed by a significant decrease in 2017, the number of crimes reduced by 0.3% in 2018, while the number of violent acts increased by 3.2% (BMI, 2018, p. 10). Xenophobia and anti-Semitism remain the decisive motive for right-wing extremist violent acts. The new high-profile images of enemies for right-wing extremists include asylum seekers and Muslims as well as political decision-makers.
Supporters and sympathizers of the right-wing extremist scene use the internet intensively to promote campaigns, mobilize for events, or plan actions. Social media networks, short news services such as Twitter, or video platforms such as YouTube are the core tools for right-wing extremists for communicating and spreading their ideology. Social media is not only used by right-wing extremist propaganda but also promotes the emergence of new actors. Following the assaults in Hanau and Halle, it is assumed that there is a new type of extremist, the so-called lone wolf, who is highly active on the internet and who has almost no real social life (Hartleb, 2020, p. 3). Hate speech and virtual extremism incite the lone wolf to eventually carry out attacks in real life and, most recently, also stream them live on the internet. For this reason, the German government coalition of the CDU and the SPD is currently planning to tighten the Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG). The new law aims to fight more effectively hate crime, criminally punishable fake news, and other unlawful content on social networks. This includes insult, malicious gossip, defamation, public incitement to crime, incitement to hatred, the dissemination of portrayals of violence, and threatening the commission of a felony.
4 Exploring Right-Wing Attitudes: The Mitte-Studien (Studies of the Political Centre)
Since 2002, two different sets of research have explored the right-wing attitudes of German citizens using a representative set of data, namely the FES-Mitte-Studien (Friedrich Ebert Foundation studies of the political centre to determine the prevalence of right-wing attitudes in Germany) and the GMF-Studien (Studies of the political centre to capture the prevalence of group-focused hostility). The results of research on right-wing extremist attitudes in Germany in 2002 were alarming. 30% of East Germans and 24% of West Germans had xenophobic attitudes. This percentage varied over the following years but is back at the same level in 2016. In 2018, 55% of East and West Germans reported feeling like foreigners in their own country due to the presence of Muslims (Decker & Brähler, 2018, p. 18). The Bertelsmann Foundation’s populism barometer shows a populist attitude among 30.5% of Germans, and this trend is rising (Vehrkamp & Merkel, 2018, p. 25). ‘Soft’ right-wing populist attitudes are more widespread than far-right ones. One in five surveyed people has right-wing populist attitudes. Right-wing populist attitudes are more widespread among East Germans than among West Germans. Zick et al. report that
5 Challenges for Citizenship and Civic Education
Several international organizations have developed concepts for citizenship education in the future, e.g. the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Learning Compass 2030 (Rychen, 2016), the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (United Nations, 2015), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation’s (2014) Global Citizenship Education, and the Reference Framework for Competences for Democratic Culture (Council of Europe, 2018). Each concept demands that education should foster the knowledge, skills, values, and attitudes for young learners ‘to build a more just, peaceful and sustainable world and to thrive as global citizens in the twenty-first century’ (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, 2014, p. 9). The concept of global citizenship is positively connoted in numerous political and democratic-theoretical conceptions. Citizenship competence is one of the eight key competences for democratic culture (Council of Europe, 2018), and high expectations are being placed on mature citizens regarding their problem-solving abilities and their active and responsible contributions to a solidarity-based, pluralistic community.
5.1 A Federal Goal: Citizenship Education in Germany
Education for democracy is anchored as a goal for each federal state in Germany. The following statement is taken from the website of the German Federal Ministry of the Interior under the heading ‘Society and the Constitution’:
Civic education is an essential part of democracy. Since the Federal Republic of Germany was first founded, civic education has evolved into an independent task with two main objectives:
- –to ensure that individuals have the knowledge and skills they need to form independent opinions and make informed decisions;
- –to enable them to reflect on their own situation, recognize and meet their own responsibilities to society and play an active role in social and political processes. (BMI, 2016)
The strategy of the German Standing Conference of Education Minister’s titled ‘Education in the Digital World’ focuses on ‘individual and self-directed learning, maturity, identity formation … and self-determined participation in the digital society’ (Kultusministerkonferenz, 2016, p. 10). The political competence model of Detjen et al. (2012) mentions not only attitudes, motivation, and knowledge, reasoning, and judgement skills, but also the ability to participate. To argue competently involves not only the articulation of interests but also persuasive reasoning. The key competences of knowledge, attitudes, participation, and argumentation skills seem to be identical in global concepts for citizenship education.
The normative objectives thus meet an empirically different reality. International school performance studies such as the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), the International Computer and Information Literacy Study (ICILS), and the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA)’s International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS) indicate that the knowledge, skills, and willingness of students in Germany to participate are partly below the European Union and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development average, and that the German school system continues to produce social inequalities along intersectional lines (school form, migration experience, gender, and socioeconomic characteristics, see Deimel et al., 2019). This could be explained by the small number of hours available for citizenship lessons (Gökbudak & Hedtke, 2019) and the high proportion of inexperienced teachers with no domain-specific diploma (Manzel et al., 2017).
A comparison of European data from the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS, see Schulz et al., 2017) from 2016 shows that political knowledge affects the dimensions of identity, political attitudes, political trust, and participation as well as self-efficacy. In the study Youth and Democracy conducted in Saxony-Anhalt, students reported that citizenship education is not very action-oriented and that they are assigned a rather passive, receptive role (Kötters-König, 2001, p. 7). Participatory competence with the facets
5.2 Civic Participation of Young People in and outside of School
The previous section has set out the difficulties of civic education in German schools. The next section refers to some studies conducted in other countries which face the same problem. The section contrasts the participatory role of young people within school with their actual participation outside of the school context. The concept of being a good citizen is questioned due to the fact that participation can also lead young people to stray from the democratic path, for example towards participation in right-wing demonstrations or by creating extremist posts in contested social media channels. Civic engagement and political action per se are not a guarantee for democracy. The alienation of young people from politics as highlighted by the Shell Youth Study 2019 is discussed as well as normative ideas regarding democratic competences.
The limited possibilities for engagement and participation in school are addressed by Oser and Biedermann (2006) for Switzerland: ‘(a) students can participate significantly more in their families than in school and (b) they are not involved in decision-making processes in school about topics which influence their lives prima facie’ (p. 25). A recent study in Swedish schools also indicates that students are more likely to be seen as learning objects. They are informed, show respect for others, submit their own proposals, but they go unheard and have to accept teachers’ decisions:
It could be argued that in the context of formal student participation, students are almost robbed of democratic experiences and unauthorized as a collective to act politically in school, which will have consequences for their future democratic experiences, attitudes, and knowledge.
(Anderson, 2019, p. 161)
As explained in the previous paragraph, the alienation from institutionalized politics combined with ‘committed scepticism’ (O’Toole et al., 2003, p. 51) meets an expansion of opportunities for civic participation outside of the classical electoral arena in recent years (Norris, 2002). New forms of collective as well as individual action are on the rise (Theocharis & van Deth, 2017). With smartphones and mobile internet access, a vast quantity of (political) information is available in a wide variety of contexts which requires corresponding
Participation in non-institutionalized and personalized formats is increasing. The video on the destruction of the CDU by the German YouTube influencer Rezo (2019) illustrates how the borders between the private and public spheres are becoming blurred and shows the impact of new media participation on traditional democratic parties. Deliberative discourses in public spaces are facing new challenges due to the transformation of the media landscape through the internet and social media channels. Although 77% of young people in Germany are satisfied with democracy, 24% are inclined towards populism (Albert et al., 2019). Young people are not willing to participate in public discourse because of a deep disappointment with encrusted and ineffective political structures, non-responsiveness, or because of their socioeconomic status (SES). These selection mechanisms generate and reinforce power and inequality relations and thus undermine bridging and bonding in society. The International Computer and Information Literacy Study (ICILS, Fraillon et al., 2018) impressively demonstrates the division between digital natives with high digital skills and marginalized digital immigrants who often have migration backgrounds and low SES. Although all citizens can publish their own views on the internet via social media channels without gatekeepers, opportunities for participation in political decision-making are strongly influenced by sociodemographic factors.
Bearing in mind the difficulties that young people are facing in and outside of school and along different participation forms such as elections, demonstrations, boycott, or social media posts, it is important not to overlook the vital role of attitudes towards democracy. The following paragraph further debates the idea of good citizenship and its impact on citizenship education.
Westheimer’s concept of good citizenship (2015) includes participation not only as singular actions by citizens outside of the political arena and its institutions but also as common initiatives for the common good and the need for governance legitimated by majority decisions. There are numerous projects of action-oriented community learning settings following the concept of John Dewey (1994), but the empirical evidence is controversial. One criticism is that these approaches have more to do with ‘voluntarism, charity, and obedience’ (Westheimer, 2015, p. 37) than with democracy. ‘Service learning and non-profit engagement without reflection prove to be unsustainable and must therefore be combined with school preparation and follow-up’ (Anders et al., 2020, p. 149).
In the case of secondary schools, the Education Action Council, in its current 2020 opinion, notes significant differences in the quality of citizenship
Citizenship education is expected to foster self-efficacy and problem-solving skills so that young people identify with democracy and do not drift into extreme milieus. But even if researchers in the didactics of citizenship education in Germany are dealing with right-wing extremism (e.g. Behrens, 2019; Hafeneger et al., 2019; Schedler et al., 2019; Besand, 2018; Schmitt, 2018; Möllers & Manzel, 2017), there is a lack of empirical data regarding the potential of citizenship education lessons at school to prevent right-wing attitudes and right-wing extremist actions in young people. It has not yet been proven whether citizenship lessons and an education for democracy can contribute to the development of individual protective factors, which include a sense of social belonging, empathic behaviours, and the ability to understand the perspective of others.
The role of attitudes leads to the next section, which briefly presents multiple explanations for the development of far-right attitudes. A helpful concept for a new theoretical model for a type of citizenship education that prevents young people from radicalization and terrorism seems to be Borum’s mindset, which is introduced in this section.
6 Explanations for the Emergence of Right-Wing Attitudes
6.1 Radicalization Patterns
There are multiple explanations for why young people change their attitudes towards far-right or extremist values (Baier et al., 2006; Zick & Küpper, 2009). Zick and Küpper emphasize that extreme right-wing patterns ‘arise from the interaction of individual, intergroup and social factors’ (p. 299) and thus
Personality models for explaining far-right attitudes assume that political and social attitudes are accompanied by certain personality traits. The affinity for political extremism can also be favoured by certain characteristics of a person. One of the personality models is the concept of the authoritarian character according to Adorno et al. (1950). As the primary socialization authority, parents play an important role in the development of political orientations. Children assume certain affective ties to nations and parties and develop basic competences based on their parents’ views, which they later transfer to politics (Sann & Preiser, 2008). Gniewosz and Noack (2006) highlight the importance of intra-family communication about attitudes, norms, and values in the formation of xenophobic attitudes of children and adolescents. However, Raabe and Beelmann (2009) state that negative attitudes towards foreign groups are not wave-like—as often reported—with their peaks at the ages of six and seven, and then again at fourteen to fifteen years, but instead tend to increase in their extent intra-individually. This result is ‘all the more relevant the higher the stability of prejudices and the more prejudices in adolescence and adulthood are dependent on developmental conditions in childhood’ (Raabe & Beelmann, 2009, p. 116). It should also be mentioned that the numbers of victims of violence inflicted by parents are increasing (Bergmann et al., 2019, p. 3).
Deprivation, victimization by parents or other people, an affinity for violence, and right-wing attitudes are seen as potential risk factors for becoming a right-wing extremist. Students with lower levels of formal education commit more right-wing motivated crimes than students with a higher formal education (Krieg et al., 2019, p. 146). Committing a political crime can mark the end of a development process. In this respect, children and particularly young people are endangered by far-right ideas and popular propaganda as their political attitudes can still be shaped and exploited (Maresch & Bliesener, 2015). Far-right attitudes are usually preceded by far-right behaviours. Of course, the opposite is also conceivable: far-right motivated criminal acts and violence may lead to the radicalization of attitudes.
In addition to the family as the origin of radicalization, three other factors are often discussed as being relevant for developing extremist attitudes. First, Baier et al. (2006) emphasize the influence of schools and peers on the political
Socialization models provide further explanations for right-wing extremism. According to Baier et al. (2006), socialization models ‘link both structural and individual causes from the point of view of a learning history or career’ (p. 292). The theory of social disintegration according to Anhut and Heitmeyer (2008) states that ‘the greater the experience of disintegration for subgroups of the majority society, the greater the integration problems of the minorities to be absorbed and the greater the tensions between the members of the different groups are to be expected’ (p. 143).
6.2 Borum’s Mindset Concept
The previous vision of individual protective factors directly leads to Borum’s mindset concept. In the process of radicalization into violent extremism (RVE), key turning points can trigger radicalization—or not.
Radicalization often starts with individuals who are frustrated with their lives, society, or foreign policy of their governments. A typical pattern is that these individuals meet other like-minded people, and together they go through a series of events and phases that ultimately can result in terrorism. However, only a few end up becoming terrorists. (Precht, 2007, p. 5)
Borum’s idea of a mindset that establishes a psychological climate which increases a person’s risk of embracing extremism works on the assumption that radicalization is multi-determined (Borum, 2012). His different worldviews of ‘authoritarianism, apocalypticism, dogmatism and fundamentalism’ can be connected to the research on epistemological beliefs (Krettenauer et al., 2014; Kuhn & Park, 2005; Mason & Scirica, 2006). Human beings develop epistemological understanding to coordinate the subjective and objective aspects of knowing (Kuhn et al., 2000). At the absolutist level two of epistemological understanding, critical thinking is unnecessary because the truth is readily discernible. The more individuals develop multiplist or evaluativist beliefs (levels three and four), the more they develop a tolerance towards other opinions: because everyone has a right to their own opinion, all opinions are equally right. Therefore, choices have to be made concerning one’s own values, for example. Rather than facts or opinions, knowledge at an evaluativist level of
In addition to the world views, Borum focuses on psychological vulnerabilities. In particular, the need for personal meaning and identity and the need for belonging create a weakness that may push individuals towards a radical ideology. Young people are looking for their place in society, and they want to participate in democracy and engage in their futures. This is a possible starting point for citizenship education. If students do not feel heard by politicians and have low trust in institutions, their activities can be pushed onto the wrong path. The perception of injustice in society and political decision-making can heat up moral emotions. ‘Moral emotions are those “linked to the interest or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or agent”’ (Haidt, 2003, p. 853, as cited in Borum, 2014, p. 293). The dimension of emotion is involved in the learning process. Weißeno and Grobshäuser report the results of different studies on the correlation between students’ self-concept, knowledge, political trust, and willingness to participate. The domain-specific self-concept as well as political interest show significant impacts on knowledge (Weißeno & Grobshäuser, 2019, p. 130). Self-efficacy is a significant predictor of political competence. A critical understanding of complex political decisions, different interest groups, and diverging values is necessary to counteract possible disappointment with the political system.
7 A Combined Theoretical Approach for Empirical Research on the Contribution of Citizenship Education to Preventing Right-Wing Extremism
As I outlined at the end of the previous section, my main purpose is to connect Borum’s idea of a mindset with two models of teaching, learning, and the acquisition of competence. The utilization of learning opportunities model (Helmke, 2010) consists of three main axes and is surrounded by a number of context variables such as school form and school community (e.g. housing conditions, unemployment rate in the community, etc.), which also influence success at school. On one side of the model are the teachers with their professional knowledge (content knowledge, pedagogical content knowledge,
Political alienation and the feeling of political powerlessness, meaninglessness, and normlessness isolation (Solhaug, 2012, p. 5) are the opposites of political trust and a sense of being able to affect the political system. Therefore, citizenship education can foster beliefs and motivation among students. Solhaug’s study regarding political alienation and marginalization from mainstream society among migrant students in Norway shows the significance of identity and effective political citizenship in order to strengthen students’ self-efficacy and political trust in democracy and its institutions.
School teachers and their lessons cannot change the daily life circumstances with which their students are confronted. They can influence neither the formal education and job situation of their students’ parents nor their students’ housing conditions, their socioeconomic factors, and favourite peer groups. But according to Hattie (2009), professional teachers do have a significant effect on students’ learning outcomes, and teachers do matter in developing students’ political knowledge and civic skills via cognitive activation, feedback, problem-solving, and classroom management.
Figure 5.1 clearly shows the key points at which teachers and citizenship education lessons can start to foster individual protective factors. Both the four dimensions of political competence and the learning activities with adaptive feedback and group tasks can help to build a sense of social belonging and empathic behaviours. If empathy is a protective factor (Hosser & Beckurts, 2005) against racism by preventing antisocial or delinquent development, as Bäckström and Björklund (2007) proved with Swedish students between the ages of sixteen and twenty, then empathy could be important for getting students involved in social actions via role plays in which they start learning to argue from different perspectives. Role plays and simulated political debates ‘can prevent simplistic binary understandings (good/bad) and absolutist views, which are used by extremists, but they can be challenged by critical
The learning opportunities model combined with the model of political competence (based on concepts drawn from Helmke, 2010, and Detjen et al., 2012)
Political education has the potential to be a tool that prevents populism. It can cause cognitive irritation through objectification and controversy, prevent closed world views, and strengthen individual political maturity through political knowledge and democratic transfer of values while keeping in mind the diversity of the society. In the digital era, information and media literacy play a central role in the battle against fake news and hate crime on the internet. The conformation bias—the tendency to attend selectively to information that is consistent with
Abbreviations
| AfD | Alternative für Deutschland [Alternative for Germany], right-wing party |
| BMI | Bundesministerium des Inneren, für Bau und Heimat [Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community] |
| BfV | Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz [Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution], the domestic intelligence service of the Federal Republic of Germany |
| BKA | Bundeskriminalamt [Federal Criminal Police Office] |
| CDU | Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands [Christian Democratic Union party of Germany] |
| FES-Mitte-Studien | Mitte-Studien der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung zur Erfassung rechtsextremer Einstellungen [Friedrich Ebert Foundation studies of the political centre to determine the prevalence of right-wing attitudes in Germany] |
| GMF-Studien | Mitte Studien zur Erfassung Gruppenbezogener Menschenfeindlichkeit [Studies of the political centre to capture the prevalence of group-focused hostility] |
| ICCS | International Civic and Citizenship Education Study |
International Computer and Information Literacy Study | |
| IEA | International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement |
| NetzDG | Netzwerkdurchsuchungsgesetz [Network Enforcement Act] |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| Pegida | Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes [Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident] |
| PISA | Programme for International Student Assessment |
| SES | Socioeconomic status |
| SPD | Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands [Social Democratic Party of Germany] |
| UN | The United Nations |
| UNESCO | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization |
References
Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). The authoritarian personality. Harpers.
Albert, M., Hurrelmann, K., Quenzel, G., Schneekloth, U., Leven, I., Wolfert, S., & Utzmann, H. (2019). Jugend 2019—18. Shell Jugendstudie: Eine Generation meldet sich zu Wort [Youth 2019—18th Shell Youth Study: A generation speaks up]. Beltz. https://www.shell.de/about-us/initiatives/shell-youth-study/about-the-shell-youth-study/_jcr_content/root/main/containersection-0/simple/simple/call_to_action_copy/links/item2.stream/1642665734978/9ff5b72cc4a915b9a6e7a7a7b6fdc653cebd4576/shell-youth-study-2019-flyer-de.pdf
Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Addison-Wesley.
Anders, Y., Daniel, H. D., Hannover, B., Köller, O., Lenzen, D., McElvany, N., Hans-Günther Roßbach, H.-J., Seidel, T., Tippelt, R., & Wöβman, L. (2020). Gutachten 2020: Bildung zu demokratischer Kompetenz. Waxmann Verlag. https://www.vbw-bayern.de/Redaktion/Frei-zugaengliche-Medien/Abteilungen-GS/Bildung/2020/Downloads/ARB_Gutachten_Bildung-zu-demokratischer-Kompetenz_2020.pdf
Anderson, E. (2019). The school as a public space for democratic experiences: Formal student participation and its political characteristics. Education, Citizenship and Social Justice, 14(2), 149–164. https://doi.org/10.1177/1746197918776657
Anhut, R., & Heitmeyer, W. (2008). Desintegration, Konflikt, Ethnisierung [Disintegration, conflict, ethnicalization] In P. Imbusch & W. Heitmeyer (Eds.), Integration—Desintegration. Ein Reader zur Ordnungsproblematik moderner Gesellschaften (pp. 129–147). Springer.
Bäckström, M., & Björklund, F. (2007). Structural modeling of generalized prejudice: The role of social dominance, authoritarianism, and empathy. Journal of Individual Differences, 28(1), 10–17.
Baier, D., Pfeiffer, C., Windzio, M., & Rabold, S. (2006). Schülerbefragung 2005: Gewalterfahrungen, Schulabsentismus und Medienkonsum von Kindern und Jugendlichen. Abschlussbericht über eine repräsentative Befragung von Schülerinnen und Schülern der 4. und 9. Jahrgangsstufe [Student survey 2005: Experiences of violence, absenteeism and media use of children and adolescents in the fourth and ninth grades]. KFN.
Behrens, R. (2019). Politische Bildung in der Schule und die Konjunktur rechtsextremer und rechtspopulistischer Herausforderungen [Political education in school and the stimulus of right-wing and populist challenges]. In M. Gloe & H. Rademacher (Eds.), Demokratische Schule als Beruf. 6. Jahrbuch für Demokratiepädagogik (pp. 231–241). Wochenschau.
Bergmann, M. C., Kliem, S., Krieg, Y., & Beckmann, L. (2019). Jugendliche in Niedersachsen. Ergebnisse des Niedersachsensurveys 2017 [Young people in Lower Saxony: Results of the Lower Saxony survey 2017]. KFN.
Besand, A. (2018). Von Sachsen lernen. Oder wie angemessene ‘Bearbeitungsstrategien’ auf rechtspopulistische Bewegungen aussehen könnten [Learning from Saxony. What appropriate management strategies for populist movements might look like]. In U. Bitzegeio, F. Decker, S. Fischer, & T. Stolzenberg (Eds.), Flucht, Transit, Asyl—Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven auf ein europäisches Versprechen (pp. 394–409). Dietz.
Best, H., Dwars, D., Salheiser, A., & Salomo, K. (2013). Politische Kultur im Freistaat Thüringen. ‘Wie leben wir? Wie wollen wir leben?’—Zufriedenheit, Werte und gesellschaftliche Orientierungen der Thüringer Bevölkerung [Political culture in the Free State of Thuringia] [Ergebnisse des THÜRINGEN-MONITORs 2013]. Drucksache des Thüringer Landtags 5/7051.
Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat. (2016, May 15). Gesellschaft und Verfassung. Politische Bildung [Society and constitution. Political education]. Bundesministerium des Inneren. Retrieved October 22, 2020, from https://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/themen/heimat-integration/gesellschaftlicher-zusammenhalt/politische-bildung/politische-bildung-node.html
Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat. (2018). Verfassungsschutzbericht 2018 [2018 report on the protection of the constitution]. https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/publikationen/themen/sicherheit/vsb-2018-gesamt.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4
Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat (BMI). (2019a, May 14). Politisch Motivierte Kriminalität im Jahr 2018: Bundesweite Fallzahlen [Politically motivated crime in 2018: Federal figures]. https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/veroeffentlichungen/2019/pmk-2018.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2
Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat (BMI). (2019b, December 17). Bundesinnenminister Seehofer: ‘Rechtsextremismus noch stärker in den Blick nehmen’ [Minister of the Interior Seehofer: We have to keep a keen eye on far-right extremism]. Bundesministerium des Inneren. https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/kurzmeldungen/DE/2019/12/pk-bm-bfv-bka.html
Borum, R. (2012). Radicalization into violent extremism II: A review of conceptual models and empirical research. Journal of Strategic Security, 4(4), 37–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.2
Borum, R. (2014). Psychological vulnerabilities and propensities for involvement in violent extremism. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 32, 286–305.
Botsch, G. (2019). Was ist Rechtsterrorismus? [What is right-wing terrorism?] Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (APUZ), 49/50, 9–14.
Council of Europe (2018). Reference framework of competences for democratic culture. Vol. 1: Context, concepts and model. Council of Europe Publishing. https://rm.coe.int/prems-008318-gbr-2508-reference-framework-of-competences-vol-1-8573-co/16807bc66c
Decker, O., & Brähler, E. (2018). Flucht ins Autoritäre. Rechtsextreme Dynamiken in der Mitte der Gesellschaft. Die Leipziger Autoritarismus-Studie [Escape into authoritarian regimes]. Psychosozial-Verlag. https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/leipziger_autoritarismus-studie_2018_-_flucht_ins_autoritaere_.pdf
Decker, O., Kiess, J., & Brähler, E. (2014). Die stabilisierte Mitte. Rechtsextreme Einstellung in Deutschland 2014 [The stabilized centre]. Universität Leipzig. https://www.amadeu-antonio-stiftung.de/w/files/pdfs/mitte_leipzig_internet.pdf
Decker, O., Kiess, J., & Brähler, E. (2016). Die enthemmte Mitte. Autoritäre und rechtsextreme Einstellung in Deutschland [The uninhibited centre]. Psychosozial-Verlag.
Deimel, D., Hoskins, B., & Abs, H. (2019). How do schools affect inequalities in political participation: Compensation of social disadvantage or provision of differential access? Educational Psychology, 40(2), 146–166.
Detjen, J., Massing, P., Richter, D., & Weißeno, G. (2012). Politikkompetenz—ein Modell [Political competence—a model]. Springer.
Dewey, J. (1994). Erziehung durch und für Erfahrung [Education through and from experience] (2nd ed.). Suhrkamp.
Fraillon, J., Ainley, J., Schulz, W., Friedman, T., & Duckworth, D. (2018). Preparing for life in a digital world. IEA International Computer and Information Literacy Study 2018 International Report. IEA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38781-5
Frenzel, F. (2020). Corona-Proteste: Wie ‘Widerstand 2020’ in Sachsen-Anhalt verbreitet ist [Coronavirus protests: The reach of Widerstand 2020 in Saxony-Anhalt] [Interview]. mdr Sachsen-Anhalt. https://www.mdr.de/sachsen-anhalt/interview-widerstand-zwanzig-zwanzig-corona-covid100.html
Fürstenau, M., & Hille, P. (2020, February 20). Rechtsextremismus: Die neue Dimension des Terrors [Right-wing extremism: The new dimension of terror]. Deutsche Welle. https://www.dw.com/de/rechtsextremismus-die-neue-dimension-des-terrors/a-52436923
Ghosh, R., Chan, A. W. Y., Manuel, A., & Dilimulati, M. (2016). Can education counter violent religious extremism? Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 23(2), 117–133. https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2016.1165713
Gniewosz, B., & Noack, P. (2006). Intergenerationale Transmissions- und Projektionsprozesse intoleranter Einstellungen zu Ausländern in der Familie [Intergenerational processes for transmitting and projecting intolerant attitudes towards foreigners in the family]. Zeitschrift für Entwicklungs- und Pädagogische Psychologie, 38(1), 33–42.
Goede, L.-R., Schröder, C. P., & Lehmann, L. (2020). Perspektiven von Jugendlichen. Ergebnisse einer Befragung zu den Themen Politik, Religion und Gemeinschaft im Rahmen des Projektes ‘Radikalisierung im digitalen Zeitalter (RadigZ)’ [Perspectives of young people: Results of a survey on the topics of politics, religion and community in the context of the project Radicalization in the digital age (Radigz)]. KFN.
Gökbudak, M., & Hedtke, R. (2019). Ranking Politische Bildung 2018. Politische Bildung an allgemeinbildenden Schulen der Sekundarstufe I im Bundesländervergleich [Ranking political education 2018]. Bielefeld: Fakultät für Soziologie – Didaktik der Sozialwissenschaften. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.28614.93760
Gronostay, D. (2019). To argue or not to argue? The role of personality traits, argumentativeness, epistemological beliefs and assigned positions for students’ participation in controversial political classroom discussions. Unterrichtswissenschaft, 47, 117–135.
Hafeneger, B., Unkelbach, K., & Widmaier, B. (Eds.). (2019). Rassismus-kritische politische Bildung: Theorien–Konzepte–Orientierungen [Political education that is critical of racism]. Wochenschau.
Haidt, J. (2003). The moral emotions. In R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer, & H. H. Goldsmith (Eds.). Handbook of affective science (pp. 852–870). Oxford University Press.
Hartleb, F. (2020). Die Spur des einsamen Wolfes. Rechtsterrorismus [The footprints of the lone wolf. Right-wing extremism]. Das Parlament, 12/13, 3.
Hattie, J. A. C. (2009). Visible learning. A synthesis of over 800 meta-analyses relating to achievement. Routledge.
Heitmeyer, W. (2002). Deutsche Zustände, Band 1–10 [Conditions in Germany]. Suhrkamp.
Helmke, A. (2010). Unterrichtsqualität und Lehrerprofessionalität. Diagnose, Evaluation und Verbesserung des Unterrichts [Lesson quality and teacher professionalism] (3rd ed.). Kallmeyer.
Henn, M., & Ford, N. (2014). Social differentiation in young people’s political participation: The impact of social and educational factors on youth political engagement in Britain. Journal of Youth Studies, 17(3), 360–380. https://doi.org/10.1080/13676261.2013.830704
Henn, M., & Ford, N. (2012). Young people, political participation and trust in Britain. Parliamentary Affairs, 65, 47–67.
Hosser, D. & Beckurts, D. (2005). Empathie und Delinquenz [Empathy and delinquency]. KFN. https://kfn.de/wp-content/uploads/Forschungsberichte/FB_96.pdf
Kultusministerkonferenz. (2016). Strategie der Kultusministerkonferenz: Education in a digital world. Beschluss der KMK vom 08.12.2016 i.d.F. vom 07.12.2017. Berlin https://www.kmk.org/fileadmin/Dateien/pdf/PresseUndAktuelles/2017/Strategie_neu_2017_datum_1.pdf
Kötters-König, C. (2001). Handlungsorientierung und Kontroversität. Wege zur Wirksamkeit der politischen Bildung im Sozialkundeunterricht [Focus on action and controversy. Pathways for fostering the effectiveness of political education]. APUZ, B50, 6–12.
Krettenauer, T., Colasante, T., Buchmann, M., & Malti, T. (2014). The development of moral emotions and decision-making from adolescence to early adulthood: A 6-year longitudinal study. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 43, 583–596.
Krieg, Y., Beckmann, C., & Kliem, S. (2019). Fortschreibung der Regionalanalysen Rechtsextremismus in Schleswig-Holstein. Regionalanalyse Rechtsextremismus in Schleswig-Holstein [Continuation of the regional analyses of right-wing extremism in Schleswig-Holstein]. KFN. https://kfn.de/wp-content/uploads/Forschungsberichte/FB_149.pdf
Kuhn, D., & Park, S.-H. (2005). Epistemological understanding and the development of intellectual values. International Journal of Educational Research, 43, 111–124.
Kuhn, D., Cheney, R., & Weinstock, M. (2000). The development of epistemological understanding. Cognitive Development, 15, 309–328.
Mager, U., & Nowak, P. (2012). Effects of student participation in decision making at school. A systematic review and synthesis of empirical research. Educational Research Review, 7(1), 38–61.
Manzel, S. (2017). Medienkompetenz als eine Schlüsselkompetenz für politische Urteils- und Handlungsfähigkeit [Media skills as a core competence for political competence]. In H. Gapski, M. Oberle, & W. Staufer (Eds.), Medienkompetenz—Herausforderung für Politik, politische Bildung und Medienbildung (pp. 207–217). Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung.
Manzel, S., Hahn-Laudenberg, K., & Zischke, F. E. (2017). Lehrervoraussetzungen. Ausbildung und Überzeugungen von Lehrer*innen im Fach Politik/Sozialwissenschaften [Prerequisites for teachers of political education]. In H. J. Abs & K. Hahn-Laudenberg (Eds.), Das politische Mindset von 14-Jährigen. Ergebnisse der International Civic and Citizenship Education Study 2016 (pp. 325–353). Waxmann.
Maresch, P., & Bliesener, T. (2015). Regionalanalysen zu Rechtsextremismus in Schleswig-Holstein Abschlussbericht Oktober 2015 [Final report on regional analyses on right-wing extremism in Schleswig-Holstein]. KFN. https://kfn.de/wp-content/uploads/downloads/Abschlussbericht_21102015.pdf
Marx, I. (2020, February 19). Änderungen beim NetzDG. Verschärfte Gesetze gegen Hass und Hetze [Changes in the Network Enforcement Act]. Tagesschau.de. https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/hasskriminalitaet-internet-101.html
Mason, L., & Scirica, F. (2006). Prediction of students’ argumentation skills about controversial topics by epistemological understanding. Learning and Instruction, 16, 492–509.
Möllers, L., & Manzel, S. (2017). Populismus und Politische Bildung [Populism and politial education]. Schriftenreihe der Gesellschaft für Politikdidaktik und politische Jugend- und Erwachsenenbildung, Bd. 17. Wochenschau.
Norris, P. (2002). Democratic phoenix. Reinventing political activism. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511610073
Oser, F., & Biedermann, H. (2006). Partizipation—ein Begriff, der ein Meister der Verwirrung ist [Participation—a term that is supremely confusing]. In C. Quesel & F. Oser (Eds.), Die Mühen der Freiheit. Probleme und Chancen der Partizipation von Kindern und Jugendlichen (pp. 17–38). Rüegger.
O’Toole, T. P., Aaron, K. F., Chin, M. H., Horowitz, C., & Tyson, F. (2003). Community-based participatory research. Journal of General Intern Medicine, 18, 592–594. https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1525-1497.2003.30416.x
Precht, T. (2007, December). Home grown terrorism and Islamist radicalization in Europe: From conversion to terrorism [Research report funded by the Danish Ministry of Justice]. https://www.justitsministeriet.dk/sites/default/files/media/Arbejdsomraader/Forskning/Forskningspuljen/2011/2007/Home_grown_terrorism_and_Islamist_radicalisation_in_Europe_-_an_assessment_of_influencing_factors__2_.pdf
Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. Simon & Schuster.
Raabe T., & Beelmann, A. (2009). Entwicklungspsychologische Grundlagen [Foundations of developmental psychology]. In A. Beelmann & K. J. Jonas (Eds.), Diskriminierung und Toleranz (pp. 113–135). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-91621-7_6
Rezo [Rezo ja lol ey]. (2019, May 18). Die Zerstörung der CDU [The destruction of the CDU]. [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Y1lZQsyuSQ
Rychen, D. S. (2016). Key competencies for a successful life and a well-functioning society. EDU/EDCP 2016/23/ANN1. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. http://www.oecd.org/education/2030/E2030-CONCEPTUAL-FRAMEWORK-KEY-COMPETENCIES-FOR-2030.pdf
Salzborn, S. (2014). Rechtsextremismus. Erscheinungsformen und Erklärungsansätze [Right-wing extremism. Manifestations and explanations]. Nomos/UTB.
Sann, U., & Preiser, S. (2008). Emotionale und motivationale Aspekte in der Lehrer-Schüler–Interaktion [Emotional and motivational aspects in student-teacher ineractions]. In M. K. W. Schweer (Ed.), Lehrer-Schüler–Interaktion. Inhaltsfelder, Forschungsperspektiven und methodische Zugänge (pp. 209–226). Springer. https://www.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-91104-5
Schäuble, W. (2019). Hintergründe des Lübcke-Mordes zügig aufklären [Swiftly solve the motives for the Lübcke murder]. Deutscher Bundestag. https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2019/kw26-de-einleitende-worte-schaeuble-649448
Schedler, J., Achour, S., Elverich, G., & Jordan, A. (Eds.). (2019): Rechtsextremismus und Schule [Right-wing extremism and school]. Springer VS.
Schmitt, S. (2018). Rechtspopulismus, Arbeit, Jugend—Herausforderungen für die politische Bildung [Right-wing populism, work, adolescents—challenges in political education]. In L. Möllers & S. Manzel (Eds.), Populismus und Politische Bildung (pp. 101–107). Wochenschau.
Schulz, W., Ainley, J., Fraillon, J., Lusito, B., Agrusti, G., & Friedman, T. (2017). Becoming citizens in a changing world. IEA International Civic and Citizenship Education Study 2016 International Report. Springer.
Solhaug, T. (2012). Political alienation among migrant youth: Exploring the mechanism of political alienation and acculturation among migrant youth in Norwegian schools. Education, Citizenship and Social Justice, 7(1), 3–18.
Sturzbecher, D. (2001). Jugend in Ostdeutschland. Lebenssituationen und Delinquenz [Young people in East Germany]. Leske und Budrich.
Theocharis, Y., & van Deth, J. (2017). Political participation in a changing world. Conceptual and empirical challenges in the study of citizen engagement. Routledge.
United Nations. (2015). Transforming our world: The 2030 agenda for sustainable development. A/RES/71. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld/publication
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation. (2014). Global citizenship education: Preparing learners for the challenges of the 21st century. https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000227729
Vehrkamp, R., & Merkel, W. (2018). Populismusbarometer 2018. Populistische Einstellungen bei Wählern und Nichtwählern in Deutschland 2018 [Populism barometer 2018]. https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/BSt/Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/ZD__Studie_Populismusbarometer_2018.pdf
Virchow, F. (2019). Zur Geschichte des Rechtsterrorismus in Deutschland [On the history of right-wing terrorism in Germany]. APUZ, 49/50, 15–19.
Weißeno, G., & Grobshäuser, N. (2019). Die Bedeutung von Emotion und Motivation für das Lernergebnis im Politikunterricht [The importance of emotion and motivation for learning outcomes in political education]. In S. Frech & D. Richter (Eds.), Emotionen im Politikunterricht (pp. 114–134). Wochenschau.
Westheimer, J. (2015). What kind of citizen? Educating our children for the common good. Teachers College Press.
World Health Organization. (2020, April 24). “Immunity passports” in the context of COVID-19. https://www.who.int/news-room/commentaries/detail/immunity-passports-in-the-context-of-covid-19
Zick, A., & Küpper, B. (2009). Rechtsextremismus: Erscheinungsformen, Strategien und Ursachen [Right-wing extremism: Manifestations, strategies, and causes]. In A. Beelmann & K. Jonas (Eds.), Diskriminierung und Toleranz: Psychologische Grundlagen und Anwendungsaspekte (pp. 283–302). Springer.
Zick, A., Küpper, B., & Krause, D. (2016). Gespaltene Mitte, feindselige Zustände. Rechtsextreme Einstellungen in Deutschland 2016 [Divided centre, hostile conditions. Righ-wing attitudes in Germany in 2016]. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.