1 The Life of the Convention after 1982
The most fascinating aspect of the life of the Law of the Sea Convention is that, although it formally reached the finish line in 1982, in reality the work was nowhere near complete. In the immediate aftermath of unclos, the Preparatory Commission started its work on organising the International Seabed Authority as per the specifications of the treaty.1 Elisabeth Mann Borgese was deeply involved with the work in the Prep Com. In order to understand how committed Mann Borgese was to applying her internationalist ideas to unclos through Part xi, it is worth providing an overview of the last twelve years of her work with the convention.2
There is a vast amount of material in Mann Borgese’s archive that could be used to illustrate what exactly happened during the Prep Com period, but above all, one document will be central to reviewing the last twelve years of her work with the convention. In the document, Mann Borgese explained to a wider audience the work of the Prep Com and the problems the committee had encountered. The document is dated 4 June 1991 and has the title ‘The Law of the Sea: Ratification, Implementation, and Progressive Development’.3 It is a speech, likely delivered to Canadian government officials at a ‘symposium’4 that is not more clearly defined. We learn that Mann Borgese was the first speaker at the symposium, because she began her speech by apologising
When the fate of the draft convention was at stake in 1981, Mann Borgese had taken action in the form of her ‘appeal to act now’. Now, ten years later, she would do something quite similar. The purpose of the speech was to give the audience ‘Ten reasons why this Convention is so important and why it is important to bring it into force now: this year’.7 There is no need to go into detail about why Mann Borgese was convinced that the convention was important. Ten years after the convention had opened for signature, her reasons for supporting it were the same as they had been during the storm of voting in 1982. The convention had preserved the common heritage of mankind, and would provide the opportunity for developing countries to gain wealth and partake in important industrial operations through the establishment of the International Seabed Authority in Part xi.8 The interesting aspect of the speech is that Mann Borgese went on to assess the work of the Prep Com, which had been holding annual meetings since 1983.9 According to Mann Borgese, the Prep Com had two official written mandates and one unofficial mandate.10 The first mandate (resolution i)11 was to establish ‘the Commission and task it with paper work, the drafting of rules and regulations headquarter agreements, studies etc’.12 In other words, the Prep Com was to take care of the administrative side of establishing international institutions. According to Mann Borgese, this task had gone fairly well. The second mandate (resolution ii)13 was to create ‘an interim regime for deep-seabed mining, to protect the
The real head-scratcher was the ‘unwritten’ mandate. In Mann Borgese’s words this was, ‘to adjust and adapt the ideas and ideals of the Seventies to the economic and political realities of the Nineties […]’.18 And Mann Borgese feared that this element of the Prep Com’s work had not gone well at all. There are several possible explanations as to why this was the case – at least in Mann Borgese’s view. The most obvious explanation would be that the ‘unwritten mandate’ was not actually a mandate at all. To ‘adjust and adapt’ was not one of the Prep Com’s designated tasks.19 While it was clearly something Mann Borgese wished to allocate to the Prep Com (and it is likely that other Prep Com participants supported and shared her view), officially the Prep Com had no such mandate. So why did Mann Borgese single it out at the symposium?
‘dialogue’, ‘to make the Convention universally acceptable’, which frustrates and invalidates the work of the Preparatory Commission, manifestly paralyses the ratification process and leads us headlong towards the
disintegration of the Convention and the calling for a Fourth Conference on the Law of the Sea […].20
What Mann Borgese meant by this was that she feared Part xi of the convention – the part that the Prep Com was working with because it contained all the provisions on the International Seabed Authority and the seafloor – was going to be renegotiated. Elisabeth Mann Borgese felt that the Prep Com was becoming superfluous or even meaningless thanks to the Secretariat’s desire to engage in a new dialogue.21 She predicted that this would lead to the ‘pick and choose’22 approach that the participants of the convention had worked so hard to avoid.
The underlying issue was the US’s persistent refusal to sign the convention. Other industrialised states had followed its lead, and unless these major industrialised countries became state parties to the treaty, the consensus strategy that had made the convention such a laborious undertaking would not have paid off. Only if the majority of states joined would the consensus model have been worth the effort – otherwise the convention would end up being a symbolic treaty, binding developing nations to a contract that did not make sense without the backing of the developed states. Since Part xi remained the largest obstacle, the international community had tried to find a way through – hence the Secretariat’s action in engaging in dialogue.
In principle, Elisabeth Mann Borgese agreed with the Secretariat that something had to be done. However, she disagreed with the form of action they had suggested. She wanted the Prep Com to have the power to adapt the convention to the changing situation. In essence, Mann Borgese wanted more definitive power over rules and regulations for the Prep Com. She proposed a three-point plan of action, which she believed could rescue Part xi and prevent it from floundering in re-opened discussions. First, she proposed freezing all Articles that were concerned with finances and any specific provisions on how deep sea mining was to be conducted, since they were ‘totally meaningless and unreal in the present situation’.23 Instead, Mann Borgese proposed renegotiating
What officials had observed in the development of the convention during the years running up to 1991 was that it was those same core issues in Part xi that were still stopping states from ratifying it. Therefore, United Nations officials were looking for other solutions. Clearly, the convention itself could not be re-written, but parts of it could. Elisabeth Mann Borgese was opposed to this solution, and with good reason. She probably suspected that if the United States and other industrial states got their way with Part xi of the convention, the common heritage principle would be in real danger. The US strategy in the ‘Green Book’ from 1982 had shown that US officials were mostly interested in a free market approach to the area outside national jurisdiction, and many of the other industrial states felt the same way. As long as the provisions of Part xi were frozen, they were still in existence and could not be changed. Freezing the provisions could have two other advantages. First, the freezing period would enable developing countries to catch up to the industrial states in the technological sphere. Second, technological progress (and thereby the possibility and form of future seabed mining) would be easier to assess the closer that development came to actual mining activity. All those rules and regulations formulated in the 70s and 80s had been developed without any clear idea of the future realities of such technological activity. Perhaps Mann Borgese hoped that freezing the provisions of Part xi would give her more time to prepare a defence of the common heritage elements, while also giving the international community time to make more accurate predictions about future technological progress. We must remember that Arvid Pardo’s speech in 1967 had accelerated negotiations because he had emphasised the imminent possibility of mining seabed minerals on the seafloor outside national jurisdiction.
Elisabeth Mann Borgese argued for keeping the mandate of adapting Part xi within the Prep Com for one simple reason: it would ensure that the committee retained its decision-making power for the future form of the International Seabed Authority. Unfortunately, since this particular mandate was ‘unwritten’, others had different plans.
2 The Boat Paper – A Betrayal of the Task?
Developments between 1991 and 1994 showed that Elisabeth Mann Borgese faced a number of obstacles as she attempted to convince others of her plan. Her initial actions were twofold: she engaged in an active ratification campaign28 and sent out letters to key figures in the Law of the Sea negotiations who were rooting for adapting the convention. Various examples of these proposed adaptations could be studied. We will focus on one case that would prove an almighty headache for Elisabeth Mann Borgese: The ‘Boat Paper’29 incident.
The Boat Paper was an anonymous document (although many knew who was behind it)30 that put forward a number of changes to Part xi of the convention, essentially to make it acceptable to the United States. The paper first surfaced at the start of the 90s, and a revised version was submitted in 1993.31 Its content flew in the face of everything Elisabeth Mann Borgese had worked for since 1967. The Boat Paper case would lead to a full-on quarrel between Elisabeth Mann Borgese and Satya Nandan of Fiji32 – one of the officials responsible for the Boat Paper and a man who would later become the first secretary-general of the International Seabed Authority.33 Nandan had initiated the ‘dialogue’ proposed by the secretary general, a course of action that would ring in the creation of the 1994 Implementation Agreement.34
I am very angry with Nandan, who wants to change our convention before it comes into force. He has no right to do that. Aside from that, it’s stupid, and Baker has already made it very clear that the US is not interested in amendments, and still wants nothing to do with the convention.47
The Seychelles have just ratified, and thus we have reached 48. All we need is 12 more. I have started very active campaigns in India, and in Germany, whose accession is merely a question of time; I have reasons to hope that Bulgaria may ratify very soon. Portugal may ratify after the elections this fall. Even Canada is beginning to change its mind. I hope and pray that Italy will be a leader in Europe.48
The letter to Italy shows that Mann Borgese was strategic with her ratification campaign. She knew that if she could get one European nation on board, others might follow. Hence this plea to Italy in 1991, heavy with claims about the state of ratification plans in other European nations – which were likely exaggerated in an attempt to get Italy to take the bait.
The strategy did not really pay off. Come 1993, she was still working on Italy. This time the recipient of her appeal was Umberto Colombo, who she knew in person and addressed by his first name. The letter was sent in December 1993, in the wake of the ‘Boat Paper’ crisis.49 In the letter she urged Colombo to convince the Italian government to ratify the convention. She also voiced her concern about the fate of the convention, saying that ‘The “Consultations” are at a cross-roads’.50 She wrote about the ‘infamous, anonymous “Boat Paper”
I am very worried about our convention because it is in the process of dissolution. The so-called Secretary-General’s Consultations are first-class racquets [sic: rackets]. Nandan has done this to us. He is paid for it by the Australians. Five villains did all the damage: Nandan, Scholtz (USA), Anderson (UK), French (Australia), and Rattray. The latter because he wants the Authority so badly in Jamaica that he does not care if he gets it alive or dead. Well, he gets it dead.
The so-called “Boat Paper”, which is now to pass as a resolution by the General Assembly, is a real shame. The Authority and our poor Enterprie [sic: Enterprise] are just there to do nothing. Nandan will be appointed Secretary General of the Authority, he too, to do nothing, but becomes the highest paid official in the U.N. System. Worse than the content is the procedure that scoffs description, slaps the Vienna Convention on Treaties in the face and generally does not concern itself with international law. A bad precedent case.61
The not-so-anonymous Boat Paper finally passed through the General Assembly and morphed into the ‘Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part xi’.62 While Mann Borgese called it a slap in the face for the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, others have described it as a triumph of international law-making.63 We cannot go into detail on why exactly the
What had the ‘villains’ changed? What ‘damage’ had they inflicted upon Part xi and thus upon the core of what Elisabeth Mann Borgese had worked for at the United Nations? Elisabeth Mann Borgese was very clear about the effect of the changes to Part xi through the Boat Paper. At the end of May 1994, she wrote to Njenga: ‘Our poor Law of the Sea Convention has been kidnapped!’64
3 The Law of the Sea Kidnapped by Villains in 1994
enhance the prospect for widespread ratification of the Convention by responding to problems with the deep seabed mining regime in Part xi, particularly those that troubled industrial states, including the United States.67
The initiative was effective. The United States, together with almost all other industrial states, signed the agreement the next day.68 However, the US still did not sign the convention itself, and other industrialised states remained reluctant. Some have discussed whether the agreement did indeed realise its
If Mann Borgese’s assessment is to be believed, these changes so drastically altered the core of the common heritage principle that it was more or less dead in the water, together with the authority that was supposed to safeguard and govern it.70 Working through the whole agreement point-by-point would exceed the scope of this book, but we can look into some of the core elements of the mining provisions and the International Seabed Authority to see what was changed and how. To do this, we will go through the concerns Elisabeth Mann Borgese had expressed in her letter to Colombo in 1993, when she had feared the impact that the Boat Paper would have on Part xi. Had these things genuinely become reality in 1994?
Elisabeth Mann Borgese had reported that the Boat Paper proposal planned to weaken the council of the International Seabed Authority. This was true in that the agreement provided for a seat on the council for ‘the State, on the day of entry into forces of the Convention, having the largest economy in terms of gross domestic product’.71 This was obviously the United States.72 Furthermore, the ‘one nation, one-vote assembly’ was also changed to a chamber system. This meant that the developing states could not use their superior numbers to overpower the industrialised states when it came to important decision-making.73 Another point of Part xi that had been of the utmost importance for Mann Borgese’s idea of a more just distribution of opportunity and wealth was the provision for technology transfer. In the 1982 convention, it was inscribed that ‘Private deep seabed miners would be subject to a mandatory requirement for the transfer of technology to the Enterprise and to developing countries’.74 This technology transfer was of paramount importance for a well-functioning future Enterprise under the International Seabed Authority that would mine on behalf of the developing countries. Without technology transfer, the
The agreement also weakened the overall ability of the Enterprise to enter into joint ventures with private investors, since any investor could now prevent themselves from being drawn into a joint venture arrangement. The investor or miner also had ‘priority rights to the reserved area if the Enterprise itself does not apply for exploration or exploitation rights to the reserved area within a specified period’.76 Concerning access to mining sites outside national jurisdiction, the agreement granted the US so-called ‘grandfather rights’, and decreed that general access to promising mining sites would be ‘on a first-come, first-served basis’.77 This tore down the idea of equal chances for access, since industrial states like the US with the necessary technology could easily reach these promising sites faster than developing countries who would have to acquire the technological knowledge and skills first. Finally, the review conference was abolished,78 since it could ‘impose treaty amendments on the United States without its consent’.79
The bottom line was that the Implementation Agreement pretty much destroyed everything Elisabeth Mann Borgese and her allies had worked for during the unclos negotiations. It is hardly surprising, then, that she was furious when the Boat Paper surfaced and disrupted the promising provisions of Part xi as set out in the 1982 convention. However, in theory, the common heritage of mankind is permanently written into the Law of the Sea Convention, since the delegates had agreed that the Law of the Sea Treaty should not be amended. The Implementation Agreement is a paper outside of the convention that gives instructions on how to read Part xi, but it does not change or amend what is written in the 1982 convention. This means that the principle of common heritage of mankind remains inscribed in the convention, although its practical implications for activity in the Area are questionable. Some would argue that it has in effect been abolished altogether,80 while others maintain
Her career did not end until her death in 2002. Right to the last, she continued working for the Law of the Sea. She held annual training programmes at the International Ocean Institute in Halifax and in the other institutes around the world, to which she invited scholars, entrepreneurs and government officials from developing countries to educate them in ocean governance and share technological expertise. On a small scale, Elisabeth Mann Borgese achieved one of her ambitions for the Law of the Sea Convention, in the form of technology transfer through education. The International Ocean Institute – though downscaled and slightly differently governed than in its heyday – is still running, putting on at least one training class each year and continuing Mann Borgese’s work.
Cf. Bernaerts, Bernaerts’ Guide, 9: ‘Resolution I: Establishment of a Preparatory Commission for the International Sea-Bed Authority and for the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea; […]’.
For an overview of the first years, see Elisabeth Mann Borgese, ‘Notes on the Work of the Preparatory Commission’, Ocean Yearbook 5 (Brill 1985): 1–9,
ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 12, emb, the Law of the Sea: Ratification, Implementation, and Progressive Development.
ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 12,
emb, the Law of the Sea: Ratification, Implementation, and Progressive Development.
ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 12,
emb, the Law of the Sea: Ratification, Implementation, and Progressive Development.
ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 12,
emb, the Law of the Sea: Ratification, Implementation, and Progressive Development.
ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 12, emb, the Law of the Sea: Ratification, Implementation, and Progressive Development.
Cf. ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 12, emb, the Law of the Sea: Ratification, Implementation, and Progressive Development.
Cf. ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 12, emb, the Law of the Sea: Ratification, Implementation, and Progressive Development.
Cf. ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 12, emb, the Law of the Sea: Ratification, Implementation, and Progressive Development.
See, Article 308, 4&5, in Bernaerts’ Guide, 258.
ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 12, emb, the Law of the Sea: Ratification, Implementation, and Progressive Development.
See, Article 308, 4&5, in Bernaerts’ Guide, 258.
ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 12, emb, the Law of the Sea: Ratification, Implementation, and Progressive Development.
ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 12, emb, the Law of the Sea: Ratification, Implementation, and Progressive Development.
ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 12, emb, the Law of the Sea: Ratification, Implementation, and Progressive Development.
ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 12, emb, the Law of the Sea: Ratification, Implementation, and Progressive Development.
ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 12, emb, the Law of the Sea: Ratification, Implementation, and Progressive Development.
ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 12, emb, the Law of the Sea: Ratification, Implementation, and Progressive Development.
ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 12, emb, the Law of the Sea: Ratification, Implementation, and Progressive Development.
Cf. ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 12, emb, the Law of the Sea: Ratification, Implementation, and Progressive Development.
ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 12, emb, the Law of the Sea: Ratification, Implementation, and Progressive Development.
ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 12, emb, the Law of the Sea: Ratification, Implementation, and Progressive Development.
Cf. ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 12, emb, the Law of the Sea: Ratification, Implementation, and Progressive Development.
ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 12, emb, the Law of the Sea: Ratification, Implementation, and Progressive Development.
ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 12, emb, the Law of the Sea: Ratification, Implementation, and Progressive Development.
See ms-2-744, Box 87, Folder 4, ms 87-4 Wolf to emb, 4 July 1981.
For ratification efforts, see ms-2-744, Box 276, Folder 1.
For the 1993 version of the Boat Paper, see ms-2-744, Box 323, Folder 18, Boat Paper. Draft Resolution for Adoption by the General Assembly, 3 August 1993.
ms-2-744, Box 276, Folder 1, emb to Colombo, 30 December 1993.
Boat paper version 1993
See ms-2-744, Box 236, Folder 11, Satya Nandan, biographical note.
emb commented on this in a letter to Wolf. See ms-2-744- Box 355, Folder 24, emb to Wolf, 7 May 1994.
See ms-2-744, Box 236, Folder 11, Satya Nandan, biographical note.
ms-2-744, Box 236, Folder 11, emb to Satya, 13 June 1991.
ms-2-744, Box 236, Folder 11, emb to Satya, 13 June 1991.
ms-2-744, Box 236, Folder 11, emb to Satya, 13 June 1991.
ms-2-744, Box 236, Folder 11, emb to Satya, 13 June 1991.
ms-2-744, Box 236, Folder 11, emb to Satya, 13 June 1991.
ms-2-744, Box 276, Folder 1 emb to Njenga, 31 January 1990.
ms-2-744, Box 276, Folder 1, Njenga to emb, 19 February 1990.
ms-2-744, Box 276, Folder 1, Njenga to emb, 19 February 1990.
ms-2-744, Box 276, Folder 1, Njenga to emb, 19 February 1990.
ms-2-744, Box 276, Folder 1, Biography Njenga.
Ratification efforts with Njenga in ms-2-744, Box 276, Folder 1.
See folder Ms 355-24.
ms-2-744- Box 355, Folder 24, emb to Wolf, 13 January 1991. ‚Ich bin sehr zornig auf Nandan, der da unsere Convention ändern will noch eh sie in Kraft tritt. Dazu hat er kein Recht. Abgesehen davon ist es dumm, und Baker hat bereits ganz klar gesagt, die USA ist an amendments nicht interessiert, und will nach wie vor von der Konvention nichts wissen’.
ms-2-744, Box 276, Folder 1, emb to Michelis, 4 July 1991.
ms-2-744, Box 276, Folder 1, emb to Colombo, 30 December 1993.
ms-2-744, Box 276, Folder 1, emb to Colombo, 30 December 1993.
ms-2-744, Box 276, Folder 1, emb to Colombo, 30 December 1993.
ms-2-744, Box 276, Folder 1, emb to Colombo, 30 December 1993.
ms-2-744, Box 276, Folder 1, emb to Colombo, 30 December 1993.
ms-2-744, Box 276, Folder 1, emb to Colombo, 30 December 1993.
ms-2-744, Box 276, Folder 1, emb to Colombo, 30 December 1993.
ms-2-744, Box 276, Folder 1, Colombo to emb, 21 January 1994.
ms-2-744, Box 276, Folder 1, Colombo to emb, 21 January 1994.
Cf. ms-2-744, Box 276, Folder 1, Colombo to emb, 21 January 1994.
Cf. ms-2-744, Box 355, Folder 24, emb to Wolf, 7 May 1994.
ms-2-744, Box 355, Folder 24, Wolf to emb, 5 February 1989. ‘Die schönen Tage von Aranjuez sind vorüber – mit anderen Worten, meine Tätigkeit als österreichischer Delegierter zur Seerechts- nunmehr Vorbereitungskonferenz sind zu Ende gegangen’.
ms-2-744, Box 355, Folder 24, emb to Wolf, 7 May 1994. ‚Über unsere Konvention mache ich mir grösste Sorgen, denn sie ist in der Auflösung. Die so-genannten Secretary-General’s Consultations sind ein Racket erster Klasse. Das hat uns der Nandan angetan, der dafür von den Australiern bezahlt wird. Fünf Gauner haben den ganzen Schaden angerichtet: Nandan, Scholtz (USA), Anderson (UK), French (Australia), und Rattray. Der letztere, weil er die Authority so dringend in Jamaica haben will, dass es ihm egal ist, ob er sie lebendig oder tot bekommt. Nun, er bekommt sie tot. Das so genannte “Boat Paper”, das nun als Resolution durch die General Assembly passieren soll, ist eine wirkliche Schande. Die Authority und unser armes Enterprie [sic: Enterprise] sind nur dazu da, nichts tun zu können. Nandan wird Secretary-General der Authority, auch er, um nichts zu tun, wird aber der höchst bezahlte Beamte im U.N. System. Schlimmer noch als die Substanz ist die Procedure, die jeder Beschreibung spottet, der Vienna Convention on Treaties ins Gesicht schlägt und sich im Allgemeinen um Völkerrecht nicht bekümmert. Ein arger Precedenzfall’.
See a/res/48/263, 17 August 1994.
Discussed in E.D. Brown, ‘The 1994 Agreement on the Implementation of Part XI of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: breakthrough to universality?’, Marine Policy 19, no. 1 (January 1995): 5–20,
ms-2-744, Box 276, Folder 1, emb to Njenga, 26 May 1994.
ga Res 48/263, July 28, 1994.
Cf. Bernhard H. Oxman, ‘The 1994 Agreement and the Convention’, The American Journal of International Law 88, no. 4 (October 1994): 687,
Oxman, ‘1994 Agreement’, 688.
Oxman, ‘1994 Agreement’, 687.
Cf. D. H. Anderson, ‘Resolution and Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: a General Assessment’, ZaöRV 55 (1995): 275–289.
In fairness, not everyone holds Nandan’s work to be a ‘first class racket’. See Michael J. Lodge, ‘Satya Nandan’s Legacy for the Common Heritage of Mankind’, in Peaceful Order in the World’s Oceans. Essay in Honor of Satya N. Nandan edited by Michael W. Lodge and Myron H. Nordquist, 282–300. (Leiden/Boston: Brill Nijhoff, 2014).
Oxman, ‘1994 Agreement’, 690: Agreement, annex, sec. 3, para. 15.
Cf. Oxman, ‘1994 Agreement’, 690.
Cf. Oxman, ‘1994 Agreement’, 689.
Cf. Oxman, ‘1994 Agreement’, 689. Oxman refers to White House Fact Sheet Jan. 29, 1982.
Agreement, annex, sec. 5 para 2, quoted in Oxman, ‘1994 Agreement’, 689.
Agreement, annex, sec. 2, para. 5, quoted in Oxman, ‘1994 Agreement’, 693.
Oxman, ‘1994 Agreement’, 692.
Oxman, ‘1994 Agreement’, 695.
Oxman, ‘1994 Agreement’, 695.
See Taylor, ‘The Common Heritage’. Taylor illuminates the shortcomings of the principle. See also Sabine Höhler, ‘Exterritoriale Ressourcen: Die Diskussion um die Tiefsee, die Pole und das Weltall um 1970’, Jahrbuch für Europäische Geschichte 15, (2014): 53–82. Höhler argues that the chm principle introduced to unclos did not revolutionise territorial thinking through introducing global commons.
Payoyo discusses the possibilities for developing states in connection with the chm applied to the Area. See Payoyo, Cries of the Sea, 237. See also Annica Carlsson, ‘The US and UNCLOS III – The Death of the Common Heritage of Humankind Concept?’, Maritime Studies 95 (1997): 27–35,
ms-2-744, Box 355, Folder 24, emb to Wolf, 7 May 1994.
ms-2-744, Box 355, Folder 24, emb to Wolf, 7 May 1994. ‚Also, Teil xi (man muss ja zugeben, dass er nicht besonders gut war!) ist hin. […] Wenn die eez weg ist, und das Common Heritage, ein Spott – was bleibt?‘
ms-2-744, Box 355, Folder 24, emb to Wolf, 7 May 1994.