1 A New Headquarters in Halifax
While the Austrian ambassador was feeling lonely with his reduced delegation at the resumed seventh session in New York, Elisabeth Mann Borgese was going through some upheavals in her private life. In the autumn of 1978, she left her position as a fellow at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in Santa Barbara. Since the foundation of the International Ocean Institute on Malta, Mann Borgese had used the initials of the institute in most of her unclos correspondence. It is questionable to what extent she was still involved in the day-to-day business at the crumbling centre, taking into account her hectic itinerary and her commitments to the Austrian delegation and Law of the Sea projects. In 1978, however, a fresh home base appeared on the horizon. Her new position would be a fellowship at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Canada.
During a memorial lecture held in June 2010, the man who employed her, Gilbert Winham, told the story of how she came to Halifax. It began when the university received a letter from Elisabeth Mann Borgese, who Winham knew ‘not by person but by reputation’.1 The political science department had been contacting other institutions in search of a ‘mid-level research-associate’,2 and they had asked the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions whether they had anyone suitable. Elisabeth Mann Borgese replied saying that she did not have any candidates to propose, but ‘would we consider her [own] candidacy?’3 Later, Winham found out that the centre in Santa Barbara was ‘a dying institution’.4 As with so many accounts featuring Elisabeth Mann Borgese, Winham’s lecture mentioned her eccentric lifestyle. In the case of Dalhousie University, this became apparent more or less as soon as she got the position, when she asked whether the university could help her find a house with space for her famous English setter kennel, which at the time consisted of about six dogs.5 The university found a house in Sambro Head, a fishing village some
Elisabeth Mann Borgese’s house by the sea
monacensia literaturarchiv und bibliothek münchen, emb f 22photo: nica borgese
1978 was also the year in which the first volume of The Ocean Yearbook was published. The publication was branded ‘a flagship ioi publication’,7 and was produced out of the International Ocean Institute in Malta. Elisabeth Mann Borgese described the purpose of the yearbook in the preface of the first volume: ‘Besides assembling economic and ecological data related to the exploration and exploitation of the oceans, the Ocean Yearbook attempts to analyse trends and to present them in their interaction’.8 The first issue was very much concerned with recent unclos issues, and Arvid Pardo contributed to the publication with a commentary of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (icnt) that had been developed by the participants at the conference.9 The headquarters of the International Ocean Institute would remain on Malta,
From 1978 onwards, though, Mann Borgese’s own home base would be Halifax. Many years later, she was asked how she had decided to end up in Halifax. She answered pragmatically that she had not made the decision herself, but that it had been chance or fate that had brought her there. And she had stayed because she liked it.11
There were, perhaps, certain things that made Dalhousie University attractive. The campus was small and the university was relatively unknown, but it had all the facilities a university needed. Maybe she hoped she could create something there that had not been possible in Santa Barbara. Then again, perhaps she was just looking for a job and the position suited her. In addition, Halifax was largely anglophone, and it was closer to New York and Europe than the west coast of the United States had been. A position in Canada was also Mann Borgese’s chance to leave the United States. She had been vocal about her disdain for much of the United States’ politics, and was perhaps happy to get away from it.12 While Mann Borgese began to settle into life in Halifax, preparations for the eighth unclos session scheduled for March 1979 were taking shape.
2 Austria’s Report on Jens Evensen’s Intersessional Meeting – Visions Falling Apart
Though Elisabeth Mann Borgese was reinstalled as adviser for Austria in 1979, we learn from the letters she and Karl Wolf exchanged in the last four years of
The letters that passed between Wolf and Mann Borgese during this period show that she was well informed about unclos, and that she attended meetings and wrote reports. Her detailed overviews, reviews and reports on several core issues of the negotiations are testament to her in-depth knowledge on the matters in question,18 and she was clearly able to attend the ‘back-room meetings’ in which a lot of the decision-making happened. Meanwhile, Austria’s downbeat attitude became increasingly pronounced. In January 1979, Wolf wrote a letter to Mann Borgese from Oslo – where he was serving in the Austrian embassy – in which he voiced his concerns about Austria’s further participation in unclos, recounting that ‘The mood in Vienna is still not the best’.19 It seemed that several other members of the Group of Landlocked and Geographically Disadvantaged States were beginning to retreat too. Even on a personal level, Karl Wolf admitted that he was starting to doubt whether the outcome of the convention could be favourable for states without a coastline.20
By the end of 1979, the conference still faced the same fundamental problems as it had in 1977 and 1978.21 The whole issue could be boiled down to the
The intersessional meeting in autumn 1979 reflected the overarching mood at the conference. Although there was a strong will among the delegates to finalise the convention, certain issues were proving difficult to agree on, and the United States delegation was particularly stubborn in its demands about how the International Seabed Authority would function. These were the issues that burdened the negotiation process.
That the report was sent to Elisabeth Mann Borgese is an indication of how heavily she was still involved in the discussion and negotiations at unclos, despite the new commitments that accompanied her move to Halifax. She had to get used to a new work environment, teach courses and carve out a position for herself in the department. By the time she had been in her position in Halifax a year, she had already managed to establish a branch of the International Ocean Institute at Dalhousie University32 and had also started to develop and organise an ‘International Ocean Institute Training Programme for Third World Participants’.33 In January 1980, Mann Borgese replied to Wolf’s report about the intersessional meeting. She wrote that she had heard about a ‘Russian proposal’34 to make ‘accession to Part xi optional’,35 which she found ‘somewhat alarming’.36 Taken as a whole, her letter reflected Wolf’s earlier pessimism. She even wrote that she had no hope there would be any progress made at the next meeting – which was scheduled for March and April
The state of the world was that Soviet Russia had invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, and antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union was heating up. Although Elisabeth Mann Borgese did not mention the conflict directly, this must have been the ‘devastating’ situation she referred to. It seemed possible that the deteriorating international relations between the two superpowers might threaten the progress of the convention. Wolf replied in January 1980, confirming Mann Borgese’s worries. He wrote that ‘The proceeding of the Law of the Sea Conference and how it will be influenced in a negative way by the currently prevailing frosty climate is a completely open question’.38
3 Losing the President of the Law of the Sea Convention Causes a Crisis
it was still a negotiating text, and the hope was to turn it into an official draft in time for adoption by consensus, if possible rather than by vote – 1981. In fact, delegations had unanimously agreed in Geneva in August 1980 that, after nearly seven years of negotiations, they would make the New York meeting in March-April the last negotiating round.43
This was a bad shock. Poor Shirley. In Vienna he was still so funny and literally sang and danced. He was an old good faithful friend. Anyone who
does not want the convention to be finished will seize the opportunity to take advantage of this tragedy.46
She then quickly moved on to damage limitation. If the convention were to be finalised, a replacement for the lost president had to be found, and fast. Mann Borgese outlined two available options: either they could elect a new president or they could appoint the current vice-president. Mann Borgese favoured the ‘vice-president solution’,47 because it would avoid wasting time on the procedures necessary to elect a new president.48 The disadvantage was that there would be no leader in ‘difficult moments’.49 According to Elisabeth Mann Borgese, the two candidates who came to mind for the new president role were Tommy Koh of Singapore and Chris Pinto of Sri Lanka. Mann Borgese weighed up the advantages and disadvantages of Koh and concluded, ‘Tommy has gained great prestige through his excellent work and has the trust of the US. Singapore is not popular with the 77’.50 As it turned out, the delegates at the convention decided that the deceased president should be replaced by a new candidate, and Tommy Koh from Singapore was picked for the job.51 Appointing a new president so late in the convention was a challenge for the president himself, but it also caused some more general changes. The delegate who would take over Amerasinghe’s position was different in both character and diplomatic style. Clyde Sanger compared Tommy Koh’s presidential style at the convention with that of Amerasinghe, noting that Koh was ‘of a quite different temperament, eager to master the detailed subject and quick to plunge into issues with articulate argument’.52
Tommy Koh stepped up to become president at a difficult moment. He was soon faced with trying to sort out a dramatic US withdrawal, alongside finding compromises to resolve the outstanding seabed issues. For the few remaining
4 United States’ Retreat Stalls the Negotiations
This was not the only change in presidency to put a strain on the conference. Shortly after the delegates had settled down to continue the negotiations, Ronald Reagan was elected as the next president of the United States. With his election in 1981, the US’s attitude towards the Law of the Sea Treaty changed for the worse.53
Among the vast heaps of Elisabeth Mann Borgese’s documents at the Dalhousie University Archives, there is a little collage that perfectly represents Mann Borgese’s view of the Reagan administration. In a folder labelled ‘Arvid Pardo’,54 three photographs are glued to a yellowed piece of card. On the left-hand side are two polaroid pictures of Arvid Pardo. From the collection of books in the background, he is perhaps in a library or study of some sort. He looks friendly behind his enormous, black-framed glasses, with his hands in his pockets and his tie loose around his neck. On the right hand side of the card, there is a picture of Ronald Reagan saluting in an open aeroplane door. Above the pictures, an anonymous hand has written in crooked letters, ‘Which man do you trust with the future??’55
Perhaps the collage was an inside joke, made by one of Mann Borgese’s students on an ocean governance course and stuck on a wall somewhere. Whatever its origins, it is a neat illustration of how Mann Borgese and probably other participants at the conference saw Reagan as a disruptive force. Instead of holding a steady course – like Arvid Pardo, who remained true to his common heritage principles – Reagan radically changed the tack of US policy. He swapped out his whole delegation and took a policy line that was almost hostile towards everything the convention had achieved. By openly questioning the whole endeavour, Reagan was taking the ‘hard-line posture’ that the Washington Post journalist, Claiborne, had reported on in 1978.56
‘Which man do you trust with the future??’
dalhousie university archives ms-2-744 box 235 folder 4creator: unknown
participating in the treaty by entities that were not sovereign states (including regional organizations, like the eec, and liberation movements); the power of the Preparatory Commission in writing the rules and regulations for the Seabed Authority; and – a newly raised concern of the United States. ‘preparatory investment protection’ (or pip) for those private enterprises that had already invested millions in the exploration of manganese nodule deposits […].58
Malone told the tenth session that the US Government had ‘serious problems’ with the negotiating text and in August, at the ‘resumed tenth’ session in Geneva, he named eight particular concerns to do with seabed mining but did not mention any other article.60
According to Sanger, Malone’s actions at the tenth session brought the negotiations to a ‘crawl’.61 The US was essential to the convention, and without its cooperation, there was a serious risk that the Law of the Sea Treaty would turn into an ineffectual, symbolic international convention on the oceans. Additionally, the US withdrawal in 1981 could ‘inspire’ other industrial states to re-consider their willingness to collaborate. When the US announced that it would not attend any more meetings in 1981, the outcome of the convention was suddenly thrown into doubt.62
5
The situation must have inspired Mann Borgese and others to throw themselves into damage limitation efforts. Various reports, appeals and speeches from among Elisabeth Mann Borgese’s papers demonstrate that she had detailed knowledge and insight into the various ongoing conflicts at unclos, both small and large, and this was especially true of the tenth session in 1981, at which the US under Reagan and Malone announced they would have to review the draft treaty.
Elisabeth Mann Borgese addressed this issue in a document with the title ‘The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea – An Appeal for Action Now’.63 The date of the document is uncertain, but since it addresses the incidents at the tenth session in April 1981, we can assume it must have been written sometime after that. Unfortunately, we also do not know where or even if it was published, making it difficult to gauge her influence through this kind of document. Nevertheless, it gives us valuable insights into Mann Borgese’s view on the crisis with the US and her ideas about how to overcome the issues and proceed with the negotiations.
Mann Borgese started her appeal for action by saying that the conference’s tenth session had ‘marked a most regrettable set-back’64 because it had been ‘paralysed by the U.S. announcement that the Reagan Administration was undertaking an extensive, comprehensive review of the Draft Convention and would not be in a position to negotiate this year’.65 She then reported on the four different options that the new president of unclos, Tommy Koh, had presented on how the conference might unfold in the light of the United States’ withdrawal. Case one: the US would change their mind and return to the bargaining table speedily. The convention might then be able to close in 1981. Case two: the US would ask for changes that were insignificant enough to be incorporated into the convention without major negotiation. In this case too, finalising things in 1981 would still be possible. Case three: the US would demand extensive changes, which would delay the negotiations significantly and make it impossible to see an end to the convention in the upcoming years. And the
These, then, were the possible scenarios for the future. Mann Borgese feared that the US would choose the third option, and would demand major changes to the convention – especially the seabed mining sections in Part xi. She worried that the US would exert serious influence on the fate of the convention because its eventual participation in the treaty was of major importance for many states. Therefore, the US was effectively in a position to demand such sweeping changes to the paragraphs on seabed mining that the common heritage principle could end up being practically removed.67
For Mann Borgese, the future looked bleak. She predicted that ‘unless the Convention is adopted this year it will not be adopted at all’.68 In her view, any re-negotiation of basic issues would ‘break up the Conference’.69 To prevent this from happening, she proposed to resort to voting for the adoption of the convention, instead of seeking consensus.70 As we might recall, this was a last-resort option and only the president of the convention could approve it. It was also a favourable option for those states who found themselves in diplomatically difficult positions, but who would outnumber rival industrial states in certain cases. The danger with this strategy would be the effect it might have on those who lost out in the voting, and whether they would end up adopting the convention or not. In essence, to introduce voting was to risk losing the support of important industrial states, and the consensus model had been followed precisely to prevent this from happening. Why would Mann Borgese want to re-consider the fundamental processes at this late stage?
Naturally, Elisabeth Mann Borgese had thought of this too. In her appeal to action, she argued as to why voting might be a decent last resort solution, even though ‘the losses, already now, would be heavy’.71 The losses would be the US, Japan and many of the European states. Mann Borgese still hoped that pushing
Apparently, Tommy Koh’s assessment of the situation was not so different from Mann Borgese’s. According to her, he had said that he was willing to go through with the convention in the absence of the US, but the difference between their two proposed approaches was in the timing. Koh wanted to wait and see whether the US delegation would return to the bargaining table, and what demands they might bring with them. Mann Borgese, on the other hand, urged that time was short and they had to act. Therefore, the ‘appeal [was] to act now’.73
To be functional, the Authority has to adjust its activities to the reality that is emerging in the 80s, which is very different from the perceptions of the 70s. This can be done without changing the Convention. The Preparatory Commission is the body most suited to this task.78
This lead to the second point she found necessary to agree on prior to voting: that no amendments should be allowed to the convention once it was adopted.79 This would prevent opening up new discussions around core issues that had been agreed upon in laborious discussion over the course of many years. We have to remember that during the negotiations, participants had worried on several occasions that re-opening issues could cause a kind of chain reaction of new negotiations that would aggravate all kinds of old conflicts and feuds. If amending the convention was forbidden, then they could avoid opening ‘Pandora’s box’ or – to return to an old metaphor – destroying the jigsaw puzzle. The US’s announcement that it wanted to review several parts of the draft text concerning the seabed had already proven how re-opening issues could threaten the whole convention. Third, since changes over time were unavoidable, Mann Borgese proposed that there should be a ‘Review Conference’80 five or ten years after the convention was adopted, to discuss disputed Articles.81 Elisabeth Mann Borgese closed her appeal for action by stating that: ‘If we force action now, we may, or we may not, succeed. If we accept US pressure for stalling, the cause is lost. We may get a Convention now. We certainly will not get one in 1982 or later’.82
Obviously Mann Borgese preferred to try and pass the Draft Negotiation Treaty without the US, rather than risking serious changes to it. What made this version of the draft treaty so important to Elisabeth Mann Borgese and her allies that they would risk pushing it through without US support?
6
There are two possible interpretations of Elisabeth Mann Borgese’s appeal to save the treaty through immediate and drastic action. The first one is the explanation she herself laid out in the ‘appeal to act now’. Namely that there would either be a treaty passed through by voting – without the US – or there would be no treaty at all. If we take this to be the genuine reason, then the motivation was that of necessity. It was an all-or-nothing approach, in which Mann Borgese was willing to face whatever losses needed to be incurred to rescue what was left. However, another interpretation is possible. Namely, that the draft treaty that was agreed upon in 1980 favoured Mann Borgese’s aims for Part xi. It contained provisions for a reasonably strong and flexible International Seabed Authority, it was set up to prevent amendments (and thereby preserve the common heritage principle), and it involved the establishment of a preparatory commission (prep com)83 that would be responsible for breathing life into the International Seabed Authority after the treaty was finished.
sets the new Law of the Sea into its full historic context. […] It recognizes the unity of ocean space; it highlights the importance of U.N. Resolution 2749 (xxv) which declares the seabed and its resources to be a Common Heritage of Mankind; and it inserts the making of the new Law of the Sea into the broader U.N. effort to create a more equitable international economic order.88
All in all, Mann Borgese expressed hope that the convention, with the 1980 draft intact, could be finalised without the US and still be effective. Her hope was that enough states would ratify it that they would eventually pressure hesitant industrial countries into becoming treaty parties. It seemed that Mann Borgese would rather accept a possibly ineffective treaty with Part xi intact, than an effective treaty with a non-existent Part xi.
For even if we had concluded the convention, nothing would have happened for years, since the economic world situation does not require marine mining, because the raw materials are cheaper on land and initially for the next decades the 200 miles zone and then the Continental shelf share of the individual coastal states will be sufficient. No one needs the area.93
The last sentence is a harsh statement. The original term he used in German is even harsher: ‘Kein Mensch, braucht die Area’, which means that no human being needs the Area. This is interesting in that Part xi was the part of the Law of the Sea that Elisabeth Mann Borgese and Wolf had shaped in the course of their work for Austrian delegation. Why was Wolf being so negative about the situation? Why would he dismiss a part of the treaty – concerned with the seabed outside national jurisdiction – that had essentially been the whole reason the Austrian delegation were interested in negotiations on ocean governance in the first place?
And when the Americans come with their change requests, that will be the end. Everyone will then shed crocodile tears, especially the big states
of the 77, but secretly they will be very happy that the US pulled these chestnuts out of the fire for them and stained itself with the blame of the whole world.94
This final remark was an accurate illustration of how divided the developing countries were over Part xi of the convention. By 1981, not all of the Group of 77 were in agreement on Part xi and the common heritage approach. Wolf’s assessment of the situation within the Group of 77 proves that the conflict clearly transcended the north-south axis, and that it had come to revolve mainly around the opposing interests of coastal and landlocked states. A number of developing states had large coastlines and thus had an inherent interest in an extensive continental shelf. Since any kind of deep sea activity remained far out of reach, for those countries the shallow waters of the continental shelf held much more promise of wealth than some far-off deep seabed that had crippled negotiations and had morphed from being a beacon of hope for developing world economies into a stumbling block that threatened the very existence of the convention.
There was not much the delegates could do other than bide their time and see whether the Reagan administration would return to the negotiations. Elisabeth Mann Borgese’s plea to go ahead and agree on the Law of the Sea without the US went unheard. Instead, the international community waited for the US to come back with their list of proposed changes.
7 Moving on in Halifax – The Second International Ocean Institute
While things looked grave at the United Nations, at least Elisabeth Mann Borgese’s work at the university and with the International Ocean Institute was going well. In November 1981, she wrote a letter to Wolf about her day-to-day life in Halifax. She could report that she had just finished a book on ocean mining95 and that she already had too much ‘to be lumbered with’.96 She had
She also told Wolf about her plans to turn the International Ocean Institute into a United Nations University Campus so that it would be ‘easier financially. If it is at all possible to make plans in this crazy world’.101 Though Mann Borgese seemed somewhat sobered by the developments – or lack of them – in the Law of the Sea negotiations, she was still very much involved. She told Wolf that she had recently been at a meeting at the International Law Academy in the Hague with people like Yankov, Warioba, Njenga, Pinto and Arvid Pardo – all key figures in the negotiations and all on the side of the developing countries. She reported that in general one heard a lot of criticism towards the draft convention, but that she ‘came away with the feeling that it must be signed’.102 She did, however, recommend that there should be an overall revision Article, since ‘it makes no sense that only Part xi should be revised, and the rest should last for eternity’.103 She also chimed in on a worry that Wolf had expressed early in 1981, namely that ‘there was a broad consensus that the Seabed Authority
Despite the unpromising outlook, Mann Borgese was positive that the International Seabed Authority could be saved, since it was an ‘ingenious idea’.106 Within the parameters of a revised draft convention, she still saw the chance to ‘rethink its functions’.107 Mann Borgese was obviously not going to give up on her vision for the International Seabed Authority, although she could tell that the new head of the US delegation, Leigh Ratiner, was ‘up to mischief’.108 Elisabeth Mann Borgese predicted that the US would hold off until spring 1982, then would submit some points of change, ‘pro forma’.109 Maybe it would not even do that. Instead, she suspected that the US might prolong its silence so as to sow confusion among the other delegations. Therefore, in her view the main question remained whether the participating states were willing to finalise the treaty without the US or not.110
8 Shedding Crocodile Tears? A Law of the Sea without the United States
Eventually, those crocodile tears had to be shed. Contrary to Mann Borgese’s predictions, Reagan returned to the bargaining table in January 1982 with a
Alvaro de Soto of Peru, who had often led the Group of 77 in negotiations, said that the US opposition ‘was more of an ideological than a practical nature […] there was no way to make the ends meet – time would not have helped the United States scale down its demands’.116
It [sic: the Green Book] is an intolerably burdensome document’; while on behalf of the Group of 77 Iman Ul Haque of Pakistan declared that the US proposals ‘would set the negotiations back to the early seventies’.117
In the end, despite opposition from the president, Tommy Koh, the US delegates called for a vote, likely aiming to close all future discussions for good and to see whether there was still enough support for the convention at all. A hundred and thirty delegates voted for the draft convention.122 Among them were many of the Group of 77, along with Canada, France, Japan, the Nordic countries and New Zealand.123 The US, Israel, Venezuela and Turkey voted against, and 17 countries abstained from the vote, which were: Britain, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Spain, Thailand, and nine socialist countries.124
Several Articles of Part xi of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention represented victories for Mann Borgese and her allies. Article 136 declared, ‘The Area and its resources are the common heritage of mankind’.131 In Article 140, meanwhile, the International Seabed Authority was given the mandate to govern the Area according to principle of benefit-sharing. The Article runs: ‘Benefit of mankind: The Authority shall provide for the equitable sharing of financial and other economic benefits derived from activities in the Area through an appropriate mechanism, on a non-discriminator basis […]’.132 Also, the power of the authority in connection with underprivileged treaty parties was taken care of in Article 152, 1 and 2: ‘The Authority shall avoid discrimination in the
From 1982 onwards, the convention ‘took on a life of its own’.137 This ethereal ‘life’ was, of course, not entirely unsupervised by further discussions at the United Nations. The Prep Com – of which Elisabeth Mann Borgese was a member on behalf of the Austrian delegation138 – played a role in this future life of the convention, as did other committees. Opening for signatures was just the start. It would take another twelve years until the required sixty ratifications were reached and the treaty could come into force. In the meantime, the life of the convention continued to unfold with Elisabeth Mann Borgese in the midst of it.
Gilbert Winham, introductory remarks, 2010.
Gilbert Winham, introductory remarks, 2010.
Gilbert Winham, introductory remarks, 2010.
Gilbert Winham, introductory remarks, 2010.
Cf. Gilbert Winham, introductory remarks, 2010.
Cf. b-iii.17-mann-144, 09.10.1978.
Sunli M. Shastri, ‘Elisabeth Mann Borgese: A Life Dedicated to Pacem in Maribus’, Ocean Yearbook, 18 (Brill 2004): 81.
Elisabeth Mann Borgese, ‘Man and the Oceans’, Ocean Yearbook 1 (Brill 1978): 1.
See Elisabeth Mann Borgese, et al, eds, Ocean Yearbook 1 (Brill 1978).
See the full list of pim conference at: International Ocean Institute, Pacem in Maribus,
Cf. Elisabeth Mann Borgese and Eberhard Görner, ‘“Für mich ist Politik, an eine bessere Zukunft zu denken”’- Ein Gespräch’, in Elisabeth Mann Borgese und das Drama der Meere, exhibition catalogue, eds. Holger Pils and Karolina Kühn (Hamburg: mareverlag, 2012), 226.
See Hermann, ed., Die Meer Frau, 87: ‘The US was “on the other side of the political spectra”’.
emb back as adviser, see a/conf.62/inf.11, 4, 14 August 1979.
ms-2-744, Box 114, Folder 7, Wolf to emb, 16 January 1979.
ms-2-744, Box 114, Folder 7, Wolf to emb, 16 January 1979.
ms-2-744, Box 16, Folder 19, emb cv.
She would be a member of the Prep Com Seabed Authority with Austria from 1982 onwards, see ms-2-744, Box 16, Folder 19, emb cv.
We will come back to various proposals in this chapter.
ms-2-744, Box 114, Folder 7, Wolf to emb, 16 January 1979. ‘Die Stimmung in Wien für die Seerechtskonferenz ist nach wie vor nicht die beste’.
ms-2-744, Box 114, Folder 7, Wolf to emb, 16 January 1979. ‘Man ist auch in Wien mehr und mehr der Ansicht, dass für uns, also die ll-gds überhaupt nichts herausschauen wird und es fällt mir selbst immer schwerer, nicht dieser Auffassung zu sein’.
See Sanger, Ordering the Oceans, 45–46.
ms-2-744, Box 114, Folder 7, Wolf to emb, 12 December 1979. ‘3. UN-Seerechtskonferenz: Bericht über das Intersessionelle Meeting über die Schlussklauseln (Genf, 19.-28. November 1979) vom 31. Oktober 1979’.
ms-2-744, Box 114, Folder 7, Wolf to emb, 12 December 1979.
ms-2-744, Box 114, Folder 7, Wolf to emb, 12 December 1979.
ms-2-744, Box 114, Folder 7, Wolf to emb, 12 December 1979. ‘Trotz des sehr sachlichen Klimas und des offensichtlichen maximalen Bemühens der Teilnehmer, zu Ergebnissen zu kommen, liess sich doch nicht verbergen, welche grundsätzlichen Schwierigkeiten noch vor allem zwischen den Entwicklungsländern und den Industriestaaten und hier vor allem den USA bestehen’.
ms-2-744, Box 114, Folder 7, Wolf to emb, 12 December 1979. ‚[…] bemüht, ein System der International Seabed Authority zu erreichen, welches aufgrund der Mehrheitsverhältnisse in den Vereinten Nationen dann von ihnen gehandhabt werden kann […]’.
ms-2-744, Box 114, Folder 7, Wolf to emb, 12 December 1979. ‚[…] die USA betont nach wie vor, dass ein so organisiertes System nicht die leiseste Chance habe, vom Kongress ratifiziert zu werden’.
ms-2-744, Box 114, Folder 7, Wolf to emb, 12 December 1979. ‘Points of discussions were: „Amendment (Art. B)”, “Zusätzlich zur Revisonskonferenz nach 20 oder 25 Jahren, möchten die Entwicklungsländer eine Möglichkeit schaffen, ihre diesbezüglichen Wünsche schon vorher durch amendments durchsetzen zu können”’.
ms-2-744, Box 114, Folder 7, Wolf to emb, 12 December 1979. ‚Relation to Part xi (art. D) In der Debatte zu diesem Punkt zeigt sich das unterschwellige Befürchten der Entwicklungsländer, es könne zu einer Trennung zwischen der Kovention und ihres Teiles xi (International Seabed Authority) kommen’.
ms-2-744, Box 114, Folder 7, Wolf to emb, 12 December 1979. ‘Denunciation (Art. G) […] Die Hauptsorge ist offenbar, dass ein grosser Industriestaat die Konvention aufkündigt und dann unilateral an die Ausbeutung des Meeresbodens schreitet. Nach Darstellung des US-Vertreters ist jedoch eine relativ einfache Aufkündigung Grundlage für die Ratifikation des Vertragswerkes durch den Kongress’.
ms-2-744, Box 114, Folder 7, Wolf to emb, 12 December 1979. ‚Inkrafttreten der Konvention (Art. 301 des icnt) 60 Ratifikationen’.
Cf. Shastri, ‘Elisabeth Mann Borgese’, 81.
ms-2-744, Box 16, Folder 19, emb cv.
ms-2-744, Box 114, Folder 7, emb to Wolf, 15 January 1980.
ms-2-744, Box 114, Folder 7, emb to Wolf, 15 January 1980.
ms-2-744, Box 114, Folder 7, emb to Wolf, 15 January 1980.
ms-2-744, Box 114, Folder 7, emb to Wolf, 15 January 1980. ‚Nun bin ich wieder zuhause in Halifax, und find hier Deinen hoch interessanten Bericht. Ich hatte schon von einem Russischen Vorschlag, accession to Part xi optional zu machen, gehört, und das ist natürlich einigermassen besorgniserregend. Im übrigen ist die Weltlage nun dermassen verheerend, dass man sich kaum vorstellen kann, dass irgendwelche Fortschritte gemacht werden können, auf unserer nächsten Sitzung’.
ms-2-744, Box 114, Folder 7, Wolf to emb, 25 January 1980. ‘Wie es mit unserer Seerechtskonferenz weitergehen wird und inwieweit sie durch das derzeit herrschende frostige Klima im negativen Sinn beeinflusst werden wird, ist eine vollkommen offene Frage’.
Sanger, Ordering the Oceans, 48.
Sanger, Ordering the Oceans, 48.
See ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 13, emb, The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea: An Appeal for action now. Harrison about the draft convention, see Harrison, Making the Law, 46:
‘At the close of the ninth session in 1980, the title of the document was changed to “draft convention,” although its status as a negotiating text remained unaffected until its final adoption in 1982’.
ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 13, emb, The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea: An Appeal for action now. Concerning the remaining issues, see ‘[…] the question of the delimination between States with adjacent or opposite coasts and the settlement of dispute thereon; an American proposal for a provision regarding preparatory investment protection; and details concerning the preparatory Commission’.
Sanger, Ordering the Oceans, 48.
Cf. ms-2-744, Box 114, Folder 8, Wolf to emb, 4 December 1980.
Cf. ms-2-744, Box 114, Folder 8, Wolf to emb, 4 December 1980.
ms-2-744, Box 114, Folder 8, emb to Wolf, 26 December 1980. ‘Das war ein arger Schock, mit dem armen Shirley. In Wien war er noch so lustig und hat, buchstäblich gesunden und getanzt. Er war auch ein alter guter treuer Freund. Wer nun nicht will, dass die Convention fertig wird, wird diese tragische Gelegenheit schön ausnutzen ’.
ms-2-744, Box 114, Folder 8, emb to Wolf, 26 December 1980. ‚Die Vice-President Lösung hätte den Vorteil von weniger Prozedur-Quälerei und Zeitverlust’.
ms-2-744, Box 114, Folder 8, emb to Wolf, 26 December 1980.
ms-2-744, Box 114, Folder 8, emb to Wolf, 26 December 1980. ‚[…] und den Nachteil, dass in schwierigen Momenten, die sicherlich bevorstehen, keine Führung da ist’.
ms-2-744, Box 114, Folder 8, emb to Wolf, 26 December 1980. ‘Tommy hat sich durch seine ausgezeichnete Arbeit grosses Prestige erworben, und hat das Vertrauen der US. Singapore ist aber bei den 77 nicht beliebt’.
Cf. Sanger, Ordering the Oceans, 42. See also Sebenius and Green, Tommy Koh.
Cf. Sanger, Ordering the Oceans, 42.
For US problematique, see Ratiner, ‘American Rigidity’, 27.
ms-2-744, Box 235, Folder 4, Which man do you trust with the future?
ms-2-744, Box 235, Folder 4, Which man do you trust with the future?
See Sanger, Ordering the Oceans, 49: ‘As a result of the virtual withdrawal of the United states, negotiations at unclos-3 during 1981’. emb said in her appeal that the US left the convention, see ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 13, emb, The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea: An Appeal for action now.
Richardson left in October 1980. See Sanger, Ordering the Oceans, 49.
Sanger, Ordering the Oceans, 49.
Reagan administration sets up a new delegation to unclos. See Schmidt, Common Heritage, 218–219.
Sanger, Ordering the Oceans, 49.
Sanger, Ordering the Oceans, 49.
See ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 13, emb, The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea: An Appeal for action now.
ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 13, emb, The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea: An Appeal for action now.
ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 13, emb, The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea: An Appeal for action now.
ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 13, emb, The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea: An Appeal for action now.
ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 13, emb, The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea: An Appeal for action now.
Cf. ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 13, emb, The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea: An Appeal for action now.
ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 13, emb, The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea: An Appeal for action now.
ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 13, emb, The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea: An Appeal for action now.
Cf. ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 13, emb, The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea: An Appeal for action now.
ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 13, emb, The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea: An Appeal for action now.
ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 13, emb, The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea: An Appeal for action now.
Cf. ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 13, emb, The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea: An Appeal for action now.
Cf. ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 13, emb, The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea: An Appeal for action now.
Cf. ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 13, emb, The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea: An Appeal for action now.
Cf. ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 13, emb, The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea: An Appeal for action now.
Cf. ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 13, emb, The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea: An Appeal for action now.
ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 13, emb, The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea: An Appeal for action now.
Cf. ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 13, emb, The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea: An Appeal for action now.
ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 13, emb, The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea: An Appeal for action now.
Cf. ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 13, emb, The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea: An Appeal for action now.
ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 13, emb, The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea: An Appeal for action now.
ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 13, emb, The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea: An Appeal for action now.
ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 13, The Draft Convention by Elisabeth Mann Borgese.
See ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 13, The Draft Convention by Elisabeth Mann Borgese.
ms ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 13, The Draft Convention by Elisabeth Mann Borgese.
ms ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 13, The Draft Convention by Elisabeth Mann Borgese. ‘As set forth in article 136’.
ms ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 13, The Draft Convention by Elisabeth Mann Borgese.
ms-2-744, Box 87, Folder 4, ms 87-4 Wolf to emb, 4 July 1981. ‘Deine Hoffnungen, dass die einzelnen Länder sich auch ohne die USA entschliessen könnten, die Konvention abzuschliessen und dann auch zu signieren, teile ich leider nicht’.
ms-2-744, Box 87, Folder 4, ms 87-4 Wolf to emb, 4 July 1981. ‘enormen Gewinne’.
ms-2-744, Box 87, Folder 4, ms 87-4 Wolf to emb, 4 July 1981. ‘sich hüten’.
Cf. ms-2-744, Box 87, Folder 4, ms 87-4 Wolf to emb, 4 July 1981. ‚So gerne beispielsweise die Norweger die Konvention hätten, um ihre enormen Gewinne auch in einem internationalen Papier festzuschreiben, so sehr werden sie sich hüten es im Alleingang zu versuche’.
ms-2-744, Box 87, Folder 4, ms 87-4 Wolf to emb, 4 July 1981. ‚Denn auch wenn wir die Konvention abgeschlossen hätten, wäre ja zunächst auf Jahre hinaus überhaupt nichts passiert, da die ökonomische Weltlage keinen Meeresbergbau benötigt, da die Rohstoffe an Land gefördert billiger kommen und zunächst ja auf die nächsten Jahrzehnte die 200 Meilen Zone und dann noch der Kontinentalsockelanteil der einzelnen Küstenstaaten vollkommen ausreichen wird. Kein Mensch braucht die Area’.
ms-2-744, Box 87, Folder 4, ms 87-4 Wolf to emb, 4 July 1981. ‚Und wenn dann die Amerikaner mit ihren Änderungswünschen kommen, wird erst recht alles zu Ende sein. Jeder wird dann Krokodilstränen vergiessen, insbesondere die grossen Staaten der 77, aber insgeheim werden sie sehr froh sein, dass ihnen die USA diese Kastanien aus dem Feure geholt und sich dafür noch mit dem Tadel der ganzen Welt belastet haben’.
Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum, ed., Die Plünderung der Meere. Ein gemeinsames Erbe wird zerstückelt (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1981).
ms-2-744, Box 87, Folder 4, emb to Wolf, 2 November 1981. ‘Nun ist mein ocean mining Buch fertig – und ich hab schon wieder viel zu viel anderes auf dem Hals. Erstens ist es nun wirklich ernst mit der Universität – ich habe 28 Studenten, mit Doktoranden und Master Thesis Kandidaten: hübsch viel Arbeit. Dazu bin ich jetzt auch noch consultant für unido und für die Weltbank – alles hauptsächlich, um Geld für unser Training Programme aufzutreiben’.
ms-2-744, Box 87, Folder 4, emb to Wolf, 2 November 1981.
Cf. ms 87-4 ms-2-744, Box 87, Folder 4, emb to Wolf, 2 November 1981.
ms-2-744, Box 87, Folder 4, emb to Wolf, 2 November 1981.
See Chircop, ‘Elisabeth Mann Borgese’s humanist conception’, 216–217.
ms-2-744, Box 87, Folder 4, emb to Wolf, 2 November 1981. ‘Ausserdem werden wir die ioi in einen Campus der United Nations University umwandeln – dann wird auch finanziell alles etwas leichter gehen – wenn man überhaupt Pläne machen kann, in dieser verrückten Welt’.
ms-2-744, Box 87, Folder 4, emb to Wolf, 2 November 1981. ‘Alles in allem, hört man sehr viel Kritik an der Draft Convention, kam aber trotzdem mit dem Gefühl weg, sie muss unterzeichnet werden. Nur sollte man wirklich einen Revisions Artikel einfügen: es hat keinen Sinn, dass nur Part xi revidiert werden soll, und der Rest soll für die Ewigkeit bestehen’.
ms-2-744, Box 87, Folder 4, emb to Wolf, 2 November 1981.
ms-2-744, Box 87, Folder 4, emb to Wolf, 2 November 1981.
Cf. ms-2-744, Box 87, Folder 4, emb to Wolf, 2 November 1981. ‘[…] auch darüber, dass die Seabed Authority nichts zu tun haben wird, war man sich weitgehend einig: erstens, weil es kein seabed mining geben wird vor Ende des Jahrhunderts, und zweitens, wenn es kommt, kommt es in eez’s’.
ms-2-744, Box 87, Folder 4, emb to Wolf, 2 November 1981. ‘Da wir sie aber nicht verloren gehen lassen wollen, die Seabed Authority – es war doch eine geniale Idee – so müssen wir eben ihre Funktionen umdenken lernen: Das lässt sich machen, im Rahmen der Convention’.
ms-2-744, Box 87, Folder 4, emb to Wolf, 2 November 1981.
ms-2-744, Box 87, Folder 4, emb to Wolf, 2 November 1981. ‘Unwesen’.
ms-2-744, Box 87, Folder 4, emb to Wolf, 2 November 1981.
ms-2-744, Box 87, Folder 4, emb to Wolf, 2 November 1981. ‚Das Pentagon will den Vertrag. Was ich für das Wahrscheinlichste halte ist, dass bis Frühjahr gar nichts geschieht. Dann werden vielleicht, wenn überhaupt, pro forma ein paar Punkte eingereicht, von denen man genau weiss, dass die 77 sie ablehnen. Im übrigen, halte ich es für einen Fehler, solche Punkte einzureichen, da dies die Entschlossenheit der 77, die nicht so sehr stark ist, stärken würde. Viel besser, aus amerikanischer Sicht, weiter zu zaudern und zu zögern, und damit Konfusion anrichten. Wie dem auch sei, die Frage bleibt: werden die anderen Länder nun ohne USA abschliessen’.
Cf. Sanger, Ordering the Oceans, 51. See also ms-2-744, Box 87, Folder 4, Wolf to emb, 10 February 1982.
Schmidt, Common Heritage; Ratiner, ‘American Rigidity’.
Sanger, Ordering the Oceans, 52.
Sanger, Ordering the Oceans, 52.
ms-2-744, Box 87, Folder 4, emb to Wolf, 2 November 1981.
Sanger, Ordering the Oceans, 53.
Sanger, Ordering the Oceans, 52.
Sanger, Ordering the Oceans, 52.
Cf. Beesley, ‘Negotiating Strategy’, 190: ‘Initially, the Group of 12 consisted of heads of delegations acting in their purely personal capacity. We were all interested in the Convention. We had put a lot into it. […] We failed, and we deeply regret it, but we still remain convinced that we were very near success, in spite of the differences’.
The proposal can be found in a/conf.62/l.104 and Add.1, 13 April 1982.
Cf. Sanger, Ordering the Oceans, 52. See also Beesley, ‘Negotiating Strategy’, 190.
Cf. Sanger, Ordering the Oceans, 53: ‘And the conference president, Tommy Koh, refused various pleas […] to extend the session beyond 29 April when he learnt word that, apparently unknown to Ratiner, other US diplomats, led by Ken Adleman (then deputy head of the US Mission to the United Nations) were busy throughout the last week lobbying Western European countries with mining interests – and even Thailand – to vote against the convention, or at least to abstain. So, although both Koh and Beesley appealed to Malone not to insist on a vote […] the United States called for a vote on the whole draft Convention’.
Cf. Sanger, Ordering the Oceans, 53.
Cf. Sanger, Ordering the Oceans, 53. See also Harrison, Making the Law, 47 (102): ‘The principle objection of the USA was to the provisions of the International Seabed Area in Part ix of the Convention. Turkey, Israel and Venezuela also voted against the Convention, albeit for different reasons. Turkey and Venezuela both objected to the methods outlined in the Convention for delimiting the continental shelf and the eez. Israel, on the other hand, principally opposed the provisions on straits contained in Part ii of the Convention’.
See ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 13, emb, The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea: An Appeal for action now.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (with annexes, final act and procès-verbeaux of rectification of the final act dated 3 March 1986 and 26 July 1993), Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, United Nations Treaty Series, vol 1833. No. 31363, p.3, available at
Bernaerts, Bernaerts’ Guide, 9.
Three resolutions were passed, see Bernaerts, Bernaerts’ Guide, 9.
Cf. Bernaerts, Bernaerts’ Guide, 9: ‘Resolution I: Establishment of a Preparatory Commission for the International Sea-Bed Authority and for the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea […]’.
ms-2-744, Box 176, Folder 12, emb, the Law of the Sea: Ratification, Implementation, and Progressive Development.
Article 136, printed in Bernaerts’ Guide, 194.
Article 140, printed in Bernaerts’ Guide, 195.
Article 152, 1.2., printed in Bernaerts’ Guide, 202.
See Article 152, printed in Bernaerts’ Guide, 202.
Article 155 printed in Bernaerts’ Guide, 203.
Article 155 printed in Bernaerts’ Guide, 203.
Bernaerts, Bernaerts’ Guide, 9.
See ms-2-744, Box 16, Folder 19, emb cv.