This chapter lays the table for the dinner that is the rest of this book. The proverbial feast that I am promising entails, of course: various instances of transformational ethics, which I track down for the sake of putting together a particular display of the âcinemakeoverâ â an image, that is, of how we may use films for personal transformation. Yet before we can get to that menu, we first need to be clear about the table around which we are actually gathering; because my tracking down of transformational ethics will be exclusively within the theoretical project of âfilm as philosophyâ. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to chart the main contours of this project within which I do my meta-critical work. The markers that I lay down on the table here will guide my analyses throughout the rest of the book. This holds especially true for the conclusion of the chapter, where I embed my charting of film as philosophy within a set of fundamental ontological horizons that frame the project.
My analysis in this chapter is not a historical account of film as philosophy, nor is it an overview along the lines of influential theorists and their arguments (e.g. Wartenberg 2011b; Falzon 2013; Sinnerbrink 2013). In the pages that follow, rather, I am taking the first, crucial steps of my own meta-theoretical project with respect to the project of film as philosophy, as I will distinguish and plot in relation to one another the various conceptions of film as philosophy that, together, comprise this project. As noted, the resulting constellation of conceptions, with their key assumptions, will provide the main reference points to the transformational ethics of film that I explore later in the book. But it is my contention that the mapping arrived at in this chapter also aids film as philosophy as such â that is, apart from any questions of transformational ethics â by drawing analytical lines and connections along which debate can be more constructively carried forward.
1 A Two-Way Street: Philosophy of Film and Film as Philosophy
What is the nature of the relationship between film and philosophy? The very endeavor of doing philosophy of film, in which such questions are posed, already presupposes a basic understanding of this relationship: that film
Yet, over the past two decades, considerable attention has been devoted to the possibility of inverting this conventional understanding, thus marking the overt emergence of film as philosophy. While the film work of Gilles Deleuze and Stanley Cavell â perhaps the unofficial âgodfathersâ of film as philosophy â has certainly laid much of the groundwork, the late 1990s and onwards witnessed a drastic upsurge of the view that film is more than the mere passive object upon which philosophy is exercised: rather, films have the ability to make their own, uniquely cinematic, contributions to philosophical understanding; films can serve as a distinctive source of philosophical thinking or knowledge (Wartenberg 2011b; Sinnerbrink 2013). It is a transition moreover characterized by a growing interest in how fiction films, specifically, and mainstream fiction films in particular, have a claim to stake in doing philosophy.1
This idea goes by many names: âfilm as philosophyâ (Smith & Wartenberg 2006; Wartenberg 2011a), âcinema as philosophyâ (Livingston 2006; 2008; 2009), âcinematic philosophyâ (Wartenberg 2011a), âphilosophy through filmâ (Falzon 2013), âfilm-philosophyâ (Colman 2009; Carel & Tuck 2011; Sinnerbrink 2011a; Sinnerbrink 2013), even âfilmosophyâ (Frampton 2006a). Regardless of this proliferation of terms, however, these notions all converge on the view that âphilosophyâ (whichever way it is understood) can be conceived of from the point of view of film; and that, instead of merely being subjected to pre-existing theoretical agendas, film should be allowed to articulate its âphilosophicalnessâ on its own terms. Especially according to the hotly debated âbold thesisâ of film as philosophy, as Paisley Livingston (2006) coined it, film has certain philosophical capacities that are held to be intrinsically part of the distinctively multi-modal nature of the medium. Put differently, philosophy (or some quality thereof) can be uniquely incarnated by the cinematic process â which entails that film has the capacity to make genuine contributions to philosophical understanding, by distinctively cinematic means.
Of course, to affirm this promising inversion between film and philosophy is one thing. But to ask how exactly film may engage with/in philosophy is quite another. Once you go into details, this turning of the tables on philosophy advocated by film philosophers scatters into a miscellany of often competing viewpoints and assumptions. Worse, even, is that the business of writing about film as philosophy often proceeds on autopilot, showing little to no regard for âexplicit theoretical discussions of the legitimacy of using film as a vehicle for philosophyâ (Wartenberg 2006: 19). This is especially true of the burgeoning practice of doing pop-philosophical exegeses of movies â bearing titles of the âX and Philosophyâ kind, where âXâ can stand for anything from Alien to X-Men (cf. Wartenberg 2003: 139, 141; Smith 2010).
As an encapsulating term, âfilm as philosophyâ thus invokes a wild assortment of postulations and perspectives, joined together only by the view that, in one way or another, films can take part in the enterprise of philosophy. Yet, while pop-philosophical ignorance of the issue remains rampant, the assortment does feature increasing efforts at theoretical substantiation of its claim. Such efforts, some more forthright than others, amount to a theoretical project, one that presents âfilm as philosophyâ first and foremost as a question: to what extent, and on what grounds, can we claim films to be a form of philosophy? The answers that philosophers put forward in response â their various conceptions and theories of film as philosophy, that is â makes up the meta-picture that I endeavor to sketch below.
2 Degrees vs. Conditions: Axes of Engagement
Whether they do so consciously or not, a number of philosophers contribute to the theoretical project of film as philosophy by advancing distinct conceptions,
- 1)the degree of engagement
- 2)the condition of engagement
The degree-axis deals with the extent to which film is understood to engage with and contribute to philosophy: in other words, does the philosopher pose a weak, moderate, or bold engagement between film and philosophy? The condition-axis involves the claimed or assumed conditions that enable (or, for some, prohibit) film to engage with/in philosophy.
Existing assessments of the film as philosophy debate tend to revolve only around arguments and positions along the first axis, pertaining to degrees of engagement. Typically, in these assessments, the axis of conditions finds itself conflated with the first.3 Yet it is crucial to keep in view the distinct claims that the two axes essentially deal with. Whereas the first involves the extent to which film can âbeâ philosophy, measured by its assumed contribution or value to the enterprise of philosophy, the second involves the conditions of engagement which give film the means to be philosophy â irrespective of the (weak, moderate, or bold) extent to which it is âphilosophyâ.
To give equal prominence to conditions of engagement is to set up a much more constructive picture of the project of theorizing film as philosophy. As Murray Smith (2010) observes, the âfield lacks [â¦] anything like a properly developed âmetaphilosophyâ of filmâ. And the project is especially headed nowhere unless we, as philosophers, can get a firmer grip on the (related, complementary, or inconsistent) assumptions that guide different claims of how film engages with/in philosophy. And it is precisely to those assumptions that an appraisal of various conditions of engagement leads us. The conditions posed by philosophers are always tethered to significant presuppositions at work within their theories of film as philosophy, as will become increasingly clear.
3
Let us begin by first considering the film-philosophy relationship along the more conventional of my two axes of inquiry: the degree to which film is claimed to engage with/in philosophy (see Smith & Wartenberg 2006; Livingston 2008; Cox & Levine 2011: 1â22; Wartenberg 2011a; Falzon 2013; Sinnerbrink 2013). From this vantage point, the philosophical status of film as described and debated by philosophers is approached as being of varying degrees or intensities, from weaker claims that films can only offer illustrations of heuristic value to bold claims which hold that films can actually do or be philosophy. The stronger the degree â that is, the stronger the sense that film is philosophical â the greater a filmâs supposed contribution to philosophy is taken to be.
In what follows, I break up what is obviously a continuum of degrees into three basic positions sufficient for our purposes: film considered as being in (1) a weak, (2) moderate, or (3) bold engagement with/in philosophy. Defenders of a merely âweak engagementâ oppose any significant sense in which film can be said to be philosophy. Advocates of a âbold engagementâ, on the opposite side of the spectrum, go so far as suggesting that film has the potential to be its own independent form of philosophy in ways comparable to standard verbal philosophical discourse or, alternatively, in a mode entirely unique to film. And somewhere between these two extremes lie various tempered outlooks on a âmoderate engagementâ.
3.1 Weak Engagement: âFilm as (Illustration of) Philosophyâ
While there is a range of well-rehearsed a priori arguments against any strong claims of film as philosophy, no one seems to have a problem with the idea that film can be an illustrative, heuristic or educational resource to philosophy (Livingston & Plantinga 2009: xviii; Wartenberg 2011a: 17).4 This âweak engagementâ is indeed the most uncontroversial sense in which films can âbeâ philosophy: they can offer illustrations of (predetermined) philosophical ideas, themes or theories.5 According to this view, film narratives, especially popular narratives, can be a useful heuristic or pedagogical resource for philosophy by being a means for depiction, clarification or reflection (Sinnerbrink
To defenders of a âweak engagementâ between film and philosophy this is as far as the philosophical capacities of film can go. These theorists deny film the status of being philosophy in any stronger sense, and oppose claims that film can contribute to philosophy in ways that are exclusive to the cinematic medium. Apart from explicitly (verbally) voicing philosophical arguments or theories, or more generally offering pedagogically useful material to prompt philosophical activity, these theorists argue that films cannot do philosophy. This âphilosophical disenfranchisement of filmâ (Wartenberg 2007: 16; Sinnerbrink 2011c) rests on a few recurring objections to the idea of film doing philosophy, which can be summarized as follows:
- 1)General âPlatonicâ objections: the visual images and representations on which film is based cannot be a source of true knowledge (Falzon 2013; Wartenberg 2007: 16â31; Smith 2006).
- 2)The explicitness objection: film lacks the explicitness needed to present the precise claims which characterize philosophical thought (Wartenberg 2007: 16; cf. Smith 2006: 40).
- 3)The generality objection: film narratives, with their specific depictions, scenarios, characters, and actions cannot present the abstract, universal, and generalized claims which are essential to philosophy (Wartenberg 2007: 24).
- 4)The imposition objection: the âphilosophyâ attributed to films is really the activities, frameworks, and presuppositions of philosophers that are ultimately imposed onto them (Wartenberg 2007: 25).
- 5)Objections related to the different structuring interests: film and philosophy have essentially different goals and concerns; unlike philosophical texts, epistemic aspects of the films are subject to filmâs (primary) aesthetic aspirations (Smith 2006).
Mention should furthermore be made of Paisley Livingstonâs âproblem of paraphraseâ, which although not typically cited as a standard objection to film as philosophy, has also been influential in the context of its criticism (2006: 12; 2008: 600â601). Livingston argues that the âbold thesisâ of film as philosophy â which he formulates as such: that capacities belonging exclusively to the cinematic medium offer films the means to make original and independent contributions to philosophy â runs into an apparently insoluble dilemma. The problem, in short, is an evidentiary one. The bold claim that a film makes a philosophical contribution needs to be substantiated with a (verbal) explanation
3.2 Moderate Engagement: âFilm (to Some Extent) as Philosophyâ
Between the opposites of outright denying and enthusiastically granting film the status of being philosophy lies a variety of moderate positions. These positions generally hold that films can do more than the âmere illustrationâ of philosophy â often pointed out in this context is that films may also adopt a reflective attitude towards, and thus do something with, the themes they show us (e.g. Grau 2006: 119, 128â129; Shaw 2006: 112, 117).
More to the point, the theories that I group together here propose a âmoderateâ engagement with/in philosophy insofar as they generally wish to avoid global, a priori assertions of the philosophical abilities of film. The philosophers involved tend to be circumspect, specifying strict criteria for the restricted set of cases that may count as films doing philosophy. Coupled with that, they maintain a good deal of soberness about how much of a contribution such films can actually make to philosophy. Noël Carroll (2013: 162), for example, makes it clear that only some films can promote philosophical insight; and on the question of whether films can actually do philosophy he admits to his âintuition that authentic cases are rareâ (2006: 184). Thomas Wartenbergâs (2007; 2011b) widely recognized âmoderate thesisâ of films doing philosophy is equally indicative of this self-critical restraint. For him, the possibility of film as philosophy remains an open, empirical one. Wartenberg approaches the question by cautiously considering how films can assume the form of generally accepted philosophical methods; thought experiments, in particular (2007: 9, 31, 133â134). But he insists that such instances need to be argued for and indicated in a local, individual, and empirical manner, in order to demonstrate how particular films, in particular circumstances, can instantiate particular philosophical techniques.
A prominent criterion which moderate stances repeatedly resort to is that one can only speak of âfilm as philosophyâ if the filmmaker(s) somehow intended to use a film for doing philosophy. So much for the often proclaimed
3.3 Bold Engagement: âFilm as Philosophyâ
Film as philosophy, conceived as a bold engagement, holds that film does not simply offer practical illustrations or reflect philosophical themes but can actively engage in philosophizing, broadly construed, doing so on its own
I do not look to these films as handy or popular illustrations of views and arguments properly developed by philosophers; I see them rather as themselves reflecting on and evaluating such views and arguments, as thinking seriously and systematically about them in just the way philosophers do. Such films are not philosophyâs raw material, nor a source for its ornamentation; they are philosophical exercises, philosophy in action â films as philosophizing. (2008: 4)
In reaction to the charges of his critics, who hastily assume that this view on film as philosophy is a global claim, Mulhall however pleads for a âpriority of the particularâ (2008: 129â155). By this he insists that claims about filmâs ability to do philosophy, especially given the various forms it may assume, should not be formulated on the basis of general theoretical stances, but rather on detailed readings and interpretations of individual films. Robert Sinnerbrink (2011a: 123) â who proposes a bold conception of his own, âcinematic thinkingâ â sets himself the same priority. For Sinnerbrink, the âphilosophical dimensions of film [â¦] are enacted or performed rather than posited or provenâ, resulting in the claim that âthe question of âfilm as philosophyâ cannot be decided by theoretical argument aloneâ (2011a: 141). He thus also develops his approach
Bold film-philosophical projects such as those of Mulhall and Sinnerbrink are by default repudiations of a generally perceived âunequalâ, âhierarchicalâ relation between film and philosophy, whereby philosophers are prone to make film the lesser âjunior partnerâ, âhandmaidenâ, or âinstrumentâ of philosophy (Carel & Tuck 2011: 2; Cox & Levine 2011: 10; Sinnerbrink 2011c: 32â32; Frampton 2006a: 9â10). Sinnerbrink invokes Arthur Danto in his designation of the âphilosophical disenfranchisement of filmâ, which speaks to these chronic tendencies to subordination, as he sees them, of reducing the aesthetic into an inferior mode of knowing which requires âpureâ philosophical thought to analyze, organize, clarify and ultimately complete it (2011a: 4, 8, 128; 2011c: 25). Any translation of film into a philosophically acceptable meta-language, says Sinnerbrink, means that films lose their singularity and complexity by being reductively subsumed within that theoretical framework (2011c: 26, 33). In Mulhallâs similar diagnosis, this is a matter of philosophers who render films passive objects for the mere application of theoretical constructions, constructions that have their origin outside of the films and, often, the field of film studies as such. The consequence is that films simply become a means of confirming the truth to which the theoretical apparatus is already committed (Mulhall 2008: 7â8).
Having spoken of meeting of film and philosophy as a âtwo-way streetâ, we thus find in the camp of bold theories an acute sensitivity for the âdirectionâ less travelled: philosophy of film should make a u-turn from philosophy engaging with film, âphilosophy about filmâ, to equally recognize its complementary reversal â âfilm as philosophyâ, filmâs perceived ability to engage with/in philosophy. To generate more traffic in the opposite direction, consensus has it, films should be allowed to âspeak for themselvesâ, in their own, uniquely cinematic, terms. Mulhall for instance argues that theoretical frameworks are blind to what films themselves may have to contribute to our philosophical understanding of those very films (2008: 8).10 Films may have features that just as much contribute to the philosophical exploration of issues as pre-established
3.4 A Reconsideration of Degree: âEngaging inâ versus âEngaging withâ Philosophy
My description of theories situated along this axis of filmâs engagement of philosophy â focusing on the extent of engagement â can however do with a further specification. Meta-analysis of film as philosophy in terms of the claimed degree of engagement requires that one sometimes uncouples the conjunction of âwithâ and âinâ within the term âfilm engaging with/in philosophyâ, as I have used it up to this point. After all, the proposition that a film engages with philosophy â irrespective of whether filmâs perceived engagement is âweakâ, âmoderateâ or âboldâ â is very different from saying that it engages in philosophy. In terms of the conditions of engagement that they presuppose, the latter requires film to somehow conform to, or âbecomeâ, philosophy in a way that the former does not.
The need for this distinction grows in significance the further one moves up along this axis towards bolder conceptions of the extent to which film can contribute to philosophy. A comparison between those of Mulhall and Sinnerbrink, as briefly touched on above, makes for a particularly clear case in point. As will still be elaborated upon later, both theorists claim particular films to engage in a form of reflection. But while for Mulhall this reflection involves films âthinking seriously and systematicallyâ about philosophical issues âin just the way philosophers doâ (2008: 4), Sinnerbrink works from the understanding that filmâs distinctive kind of reflection is quite unlike that of conventional philosophy.
Although I will still resort to the umbrella-reference, âfilm engaging with/in philosophyâ, I now do so with the understanding that there are, at the very least, two types of engagement at stake here. And although theories on both sides of this distinction are concerned with the extent of filmâs supposed contribution to philosophy, it should be kept in mind that for some of them films do so precisely by not becoming philosophy.
4 Conditions of Engagement
The question of the âdegrees of engagementâ between film and philosophy is only one side of the story. Theories of film as philosophy should also be considered along a complementary âaxisâ that consists of putative conditions for filmâs engagement with/in philosophy. This axis involves an essentially different claim, as there has to be something that allows film to engage with/in philosophy â irrespective of the supposed degree of this engagement. Any theory of film as philosophy harbors an understanding of the distinctive means whereby film may engage with, or perhaps even be (a form of), philosophy. An evaluation of theories along this axis therefore looks for what they posit as the enabling conditions for film to relate to, and contribute to, philosophical reflection. These conditions involve the claimed properties, capacities or related contexts of film(s) which supposedly enable and constitute its active relationship with philosophy. A consequent meta-critical âplottingâ of positions on the two axes â that of the âdegree of engagementâ correlated with these âconditions of engagementâ â can therefore show how a group of theories may be equally bold in their claim that film can do philosophy, yet differ in the supposed conditions that allow for this.
It is of course so: in assessing claims of how certain elements of film enable it to uniquely âpartakeâ in, or at the very least align with, philosophy,
One major distinction that can be drawn regarding such assumptions is the difference between âphilosophyâ as a verb and âphilosophyâ as a noun â philosophy as something that you do, an activity, versus philosophy as subject matter, a relatively independent body of knowledge or discourse characterized by its own themes and interests. As will become clear below, philosophers of film across the Analytic-Continental divide prefer to approach philosophy as a verb â as a process, an action, an act of creation, even. Yet what the philosophy-as-verb perspective overlooks is that the act of philosophizing (whether by a person or a film) still presupposes something that one philosophizes about, the noun-aspect of âphilosophyâ, which involves a certain subject matter. Such decided assumptions about âphilosophyâ are therefore likely to result in equally decided â and hence: selective, one-sided, impoverished â notions of film as philosophy too.
The pertinence of such assumptions to the debate is clearly visible in the way detractors of the idea of film as philosophy get accused of a too narrow, reductive view of what âphilosophyâ is (e.g. Mulhall 2008: 130â146; Sinnerbrink 2011a: 117; Carroll 2013: 174). Such accusations tell us that any theory of film as philosophy has to offer some meta-philosophical account of what it regards âphilosophyâ to be, even if only implicitly so (cf. Smith 2010; Falzon 2013). Yet the same applies to what is meant by âfilmâ or âcinemaâ. So our assessments should also not lose sight of the parallel assumptions and definitions that also go into a theoristâs understanding of the âfilmâ in âfilm as philosophyâ.
In the discussion that follows, I start with the less controversial conditions for film as philosophy, roughly corresponding with âweakâ and âmoderateâ positions on the axis of âdegrees of engagementâ. I however take special interest in the âbolderâ notions of film as philosophy that I then work my way toward, as they provide the key case studies for my ethical analyses later in the book.
4.1 Film as Illustration and Representation
The first and most widely assumed condition for films to engage with/in philosophy is that they can obviously illustrate philosophical ideas â even if this is taken to only achieve a âweakâ, heuristic relation with philosophy.
But what exactly do films have to represent to gain philosophical value? One apparent option is that films can directly represent actual philosophical discourse. A film may for example deal with a particular philosopher â like Derek Jarmanâs Wittgenstein (1993), the documentary Derrida (Kirby Dick & Amy Ziering 2002) or, more recently, Hannah Arendt (Margarethe von Trotta 2012). Or, alternatively, characters may explicitly discuss recognized philosophical ideas and texts, as in Richard Linklaterâs Waking Life (2001) (see Falzon 2013). However, a film that merely exemplifies an established piece of philosophy without somehow developing and furthering it cannot be said to do philosophy in any significant sense; such a film does not so much âmakeâ philosophy as simply recount it (Carroll 2006: 174; Shaw 2006: 113).
Another option, much more comprehensively explored, is the indirect representation of philosophical discourse, particularly by virtue of the narrative status of films. A fiction film may for example function as a an adaptation of a recognized philosophical text or passage â as, for example, Bernardo Bertolucciâs The Conformist (1970), which by its appropriation of Platoâs allegory of the cave arguably adds a socio-critical dimension to Platoâs epistemology (Falzon 2002: 19, 23).
Yet exponents of this approach to film as philosophy do not necessarily require film narratives to deal with canonized philosophical thought as such. For example, in his reflections on how âpopular fictionsâ can do âpopular philosophyâ, Noël Carroll argues that Alfred Hitchcockâs Vertigo (1958) makes a contribution to the philosophy of love (2013: 183â192). By that he does not refer to any philosophy in particular, but rather to how the film can simply be âphilosophically revelatoryâ to the general public, its target audience, by enabling these viewers to discover some pathologies to which romantic love is prone (Carroll 2013: 184, 192). And the film achieves this, Carroll concludes, not through explicit articulations in character dialogue or voice-over narration, but through the narrative structure of a âdouble romanceâ based on the sequential juxtaposition of two love affairs (2013: 185â186, 192).
Of course, the claim that a filmâs narrative makes a philosophical contribution is not the same as stating that the contribution is made on the basis of a distinctly cinematic representation. The latter requires that a film makes its philosophical contribution through representing its narrative, if not in a medium-specific manner, at least in a manner that foregrounds the experiential
4.2 Philosophical Methods
4.2.1 A Methodological Characterization of Philosophy
A second general condition for films to do philosophy, one usually hammered on by Analytic philosophers, is that films must somehow give expression to the recognized methods of philosophy â things like arguments, thought experiments, and counter-examples, among other tried and tested techniques of the discipline.
Thomas Wartenberg (2007; 2011a) is the most influential representative of this approach to film as philosophy. He sets off from a âmethodological characterizationâ that rejects specifications of philosophy based on its subject in favour of a more suitably uncontentious conception of philosophy: philosophy as involving characteristic forms, methods, or techniques through which it addresses its subject matter. If it can consequently be shown, as Wartenberg proposes, that some films can successfully âscreenâ a given philosophical technique, then we are quite right to claim that those films are doing philosophy (Wartenberg 2007: 29â31).
The two philosophical techniques that have received the most attention as potential conditions for film as philosophy are the argument and the thought experiment.
4.2.2 Argument
Debates over the philosophical status of film often hover around the condition of argumentation: can a film â and particularly a popular fiction film â do
Detractors of this idea generally argue that film does not measure up to what they consider to be the qualifying features of argumentation. For them, claims of film being or doing philosophy are at best metaphorical â apart from verbal arguments articulated by characters, ad nauseam, in a case like Woody Allen, film as a predominantly visual and narrative art cannot give reasons, make arguments or draw conclusions, hence it cannot be philosophy in the proper sense (Sinnerbrink 2011a: 117).
One such detractor is Bruce Russell (2005). With his account of the âphilosophical limits of filmâ, he holds that potential philosophical contributions of film are strictly limited to raising philosophical questions and, in cases of sufficient explicitness, offering counterexamples to proposed necessary truths â nothing more. As he stresses, a film cannot establish a philosophical thesis. This is because, firstly, the particular examples that a film presents are not sufficiently generalizable and, secondly, the elements of an imaginary, fictional world do not necessarily correspond to the actual world and therefore cannot offer real evidence or data. Julian Bagginiâs (2003) criticism of Mulhallâs work on the Alien tetralogy proceeds along similar lines, even though he does not seem to work with such a tightly defined notion of philosophical argumentation. Baggini emphasizes that âfor philosophy to be anything more than an exchange of opinions, it must involve the giving of good reasons for accepting or rejecting the position under discussionâ (2003: online). Although many films and works of literature do offer compelling symbolic representations of the world, most do not provide reasons for us to accept these representations as accurate. And, spoiler-alert: Baggini finds such reasons also to be lacking in the quartet of Alien films.
Film may however be seen as engaging in argumentation if notions of what counts as an âargumentâ â or, more generally, ârationalityâ â are made less restrictive. This is the go-to rebuttal against overly reductive âlogicisticâ standards levelled at the possibility of film as philosophy. I highlight two examples: the views of Stephen Mulhall and, once again, Noël Carroll.
Mulhall clearly appeals to a more inclusive notion of cinematic argument when he argues that (films) doing philosophy can take more forms than only that of narrowly construed arguments or âreason-givingâ (2008: 137). The shift from âreason-givingâ to mere âreasoningâ opens up considerably more possibilities for film to be of philosophical value. Instead of offering arguments, Mulhall proposes, film may reorient, even re-conceive, the pre-existing âspace of thoughtâ within which arguments take place, by presenting alternative or novel ways of thinking about a given topic (2008: 137â138). By casting unique
Carroll (2013: 170â172) appeals likewise to a more loosely construed notion of âargumentâ in defending the idea that films may perform philosophical argumentation. He notes for example that explicit argumentation is not an essential feature of all philosophizing â think of Nietzschean aphorisms, or Wittgensteinian puzzles, typically unaccompanied by conventional argument (2013: 170). Yet the bigger problem, Carroll points out, is that detractors of filmâs capacity for argument are looking for the argumentation in the wrong place. The argument, as such, does not lie in the film but in the minds of viewers; films can provide the material that enables viewers to reason and to reach relevant philosophical insights by themselves (2013: 171â172, 179, 215). For Carroll, certain films have a âmaieuticâ character (a notion pertaining to the action of a midwife who draws an infant from the motherâs body) insofar as they elicit the reasoning required to reach a particular philosophical claim or insight (2013: 171, 186, 215). The actual argumentation is delegated to the viewer. Hence, Carroll concludes, filmic argument much rather proceeds in the manner of a rhetorical question â arguably a philosophical method in its own right (2013: 171, 180, 186). A series of rhetorical questions can further a philosophical thesis, since â[i]t elicits conclusions by recruiting the ratiocination and the standing beliefs of the audience to do the pertinent work of reasoning and analysisâ (2013: 186). Therefore, contrary to the intentionalism of other âmoderateâ stances noted earlier, Carroll makes central the involvement of the viewer in completing, and thus bringing home, the philosophical arguments that films may have to offer.
4.2.3 Thought Experiment
Another philosophical method typically singled out as a condition for film as philosophy is the thought experiment â a method that fiction films seem particularly suited to perform, much more than laying out premises and conclusions, at least.
Thomas Wartenberg has been a frequent advocate and expositor of this approach (e.g. Wartenberg 2003; 2007: 55â75; 2011a: 18â21). To name one prominent instance: he argues that the philosophical significance of The Matrix (Lana & Lilly Wachoski 1999) lies in its screening of René Descartesâ classic thought experiment of the âevil demonâ scenario (Wartenberg 2007: 56). In the
Yet thought experiments as philosophical method should not be reduced to dealing only with narrative scenarios. Theorists have therefore also expressed interest in what this approach has to say about how non-narrative, structural avant garde films may do philosophy (see Carroll 2006; Wartenberg 2007: 117â132; 2011a: 21). In this regard, Noël Carroll (2006) claims that Ernie Gehrâs structural film, Serene Velocity (1970), is an instance of philosophizing through the moving image; and that it achieves this feat by functioning as a philosophical thought experiment. For Carroll (the thought experiment is âpatently a form of argumentationâ that âcan also be designed to reach positive conclusionsâ (2006: 180). But Carroll makes it clear that the thought experiment necessarily involves the reflective resources of the viewer/listener and that the resultant âargument, so to speak, transpires in the movement of thought in the readerâs mind and not necessarily on the page [or in the film]â (2006: 180). In the case of Serene Velocity, the filmâs rhythmic juxtaposition of moments of stillness and moments of movement draws the viewer into reflecting on the difference between photography and cinematography, while at the same time vividly foregrounding the possibility of movement in film (2006: 178). Hence the film acts as âa piece of conceptual of analysisâ showing us that movement is an essential attribute of any instance that we may call film (2006: 179, 183). Wartenberg (2011a: 21), who deals with such minimalistic structural films along similar lines, distinguishes this essentially non-narrative mode of philosophical work as the performance of âreal cinematic experimentsâ.
4.3 Philosophical Thinking
A third prominently argued-for condition for films to engage with/in philosophy is that films can somehow stage or enact philosophical thought. Considering the work of classical theorists like Sergei Eisenstein (cinematic
4.3.1 âThinking in Just the Way Philosophers Doâ
As discussed before, Stephen Mulhall (2008) makes this claim in a bravely unambiguous fashion â stating that the films he deals with exhibit âreflective engagementâ to the extent that they can be said to âphilosophizeâ. As âphilosophy in actionâ, these films are considered to âthink seriously and systematicallyâ, âaddress questionsâ, âdeploy and develop issuesâ, âcritically evaluate theoriesâ, âreflect on their own conditionsâ and even âgive account of themselvesâ (Mulhall 2008: 3â5, 7â9; cf. Livingston 2008: 592).
Quite similar assumptions about how film can engage in its own philosophical reflection are on display in Simon Critchleyâs well-known commentary on The Thin Red Line (Terrence Malick 1998). Critchley warns, much like Mulhall does, that reading the film through the philosophical meta-language of an established theory is to be concerned with ideas about the film, rather than with the film itself, and thereby to âmiss what is specific to the medium of filmâ (2005: 139). For him, the film-art of director Terrence Malick demands that we let the film itself do the philosophizing; âthat we take seriously the idea that film is less an illustration of philosophical ideas and theories [â¦] and more a form of philosophizing, of reflection, reasoning and argumentâ (2005: 139).12
It is never absolutely clear in these cases whether a filmâs âphilosophical thinkingâ is meant to be taken in some figurative sense. Yet Mulhall, especially, gives us no reason to believe that this is a mere flurry of metaphorical rhetoric. A particularly telling claim is that the films concerned exercise their reflective abilities âin just the way philosophers doâ (2008: 4). Hence, one can assume that this is a matter of film engaging in philosophy (and not with philosophy, as distinguished earlier) and that Mulhall is speaking of âphilosophizingâ in a more or less conventional and literal sense. It is presumably for this reason
Another way of putting this problem is that the exact (ontological) locus of the filmâs âphilosophical thinkingâ, â-reflectionâ or â-reasoningâ â and by implication the source or grounds of the filmâs supposed agency â in accounts such as Mulhallâs is not readily apparent. How is filmâs philosophical thinking constituted? It seems that there are three options (or some mixture thereof) of relevance here: firstly, that the âphilosophical thinkingâ is somehow inherent to the medium of film and the cinematic-narrative process that it enacts; secondly, that the âphilosophical thinkingâ of a film is ultimately an expression of the filmmakerâs thinking; or, thirdly, that a filmâs âphilosophical thinkingâ rather refers to thinking evoked in the viewer. Mulhall certainly comes across as wanting to convince us of the first option â that the thinking is predominantly inherent to the film. Yet indications of the second and third options repeatedly sneak into his film readings. In spite of his claim that films themselves âphilosophizeâ, for example, he exhibits an auteurist tendency to make the filmmakerâs intention of decisive importance in explaining the philosophical perspective of a film (e.g. 2008: 56; cf. Livingston 2008: 592â593). At other times, Mulhall also undermines the alleged independent thinking of film by drawing the viewerâs reflective work into the equation. He would speak of films as inviting, ultimately, certain interpretations or thematic considerations from us (e.g. 2008: 9, 30, 106, 254). In such instances, Mulhall seems to suggest that the philosophical thinking of film is basically that which takes effect in the viewer.
4.3.2 Thinking Philosophical Problems
To broadly qualify the âphilosophical thinkingâ performed by films as âexplorativeâ, âevaluativeâ, âsystematicâ or âself-reflexiveâ still does not spell out what filmâs philosophizing essentially involves, nor how it contributes to philosophy. Yet the field does offer some indications of what the âsubstanceâ of a filmâs philosophical activity may more specifically involve. One notable specification of the nature of filmâs âphilosophical thinkingâ sees it as a matter of film engaging with/in some philosophical problem. This offers a way of clarifying what is at stake when someone like Mulhall claims that films âreflect philosophicallyâ: it means that such films respond to a philosophical problem in a distinctly cinematic way. They therefore go beyond the illustration of philosophical problems by more concretely embodying, even addressing, such problems. Mulhall (2008: 3â5) indeed attests to this understanding by saying, for example, that the Alien films have a recurrent concern with the problem of the relation between human identity and embodiment.
Here Mulhall shows, most clearly so, his indebtedness to Stanley Cavell14, as Cavellâs early work especially is a paradigmatic example of approaching the âthinkingâ of films in terms of how they contend with philosophical problems. For Cavell, the film as a photographic medium is deeply interwoven with the modern condition of skepticism: the philosophical question of whether our finite knowledge and experience withhold us from certainty about the nature of the (âoutsideâ) world and other minds. Cavell famously locates filmâs philosophical value in it being âa moving image of skepticismâ (1979: 188; 2005 [1985]: 118). Yet in Cavellâs account the cinematic engagement with a
The role of the screen in cinema occupies a central place in Cavellâs line of reasoning â particularly as a barrier between the projected film world and the world of the viewer (see Schmerheim 2013a: 414). The screen makes the audience invisible by screening viewers from the world of the film; and at the same time it screens the existence of the film world from the viewer (Cavell 1979: 24). The screened reality of film and the audience thus exist in mutual absence to one another. In this way cinemaâs screening of the world expresses the modern skeptical attitude of a self, unhinged from our âpresentnessâ to the world, in which only the interposing âscreenâ of subjectivity is present to this isolated self (Cavell 1979: 22).15 The very conditions of cinema as photographic medium thus instantiates our ontological distance and detachment from reality, âthe modern fate to relate to the world by viewing it, taking views of it, as from behind the selfâ (Cavell 2005 [1985]: 116â117). By conveying the understanding that our only connection with the world is through our perceptions of it, film embodies the problem of skepticism (Rodowick, n.d.: 2). It is a âmoving image of skepticismâ âbecause I see what is not before me, because our senses are satisfied with reality, while that reality does not existâ (Cavell 2005 [1985]: 118).
Yet, film does more in this situation, as photographs still relate something of the real world to the film viewer. Here the extensive influence of André Bazin on Cavellâs thought is significant. Like Bazin, Cavell (1979: 16) stresses the photographic basis of film (Cavell 1979: 16; Eldridge 2014b: 4). A photograph is essentially a photograph of reality. While a painting presents us with the âlikenessâ of things, a photograph âpresents us, we want to say, with the thing itselfâ (1979: 17). This intuitive ontological connection between a photograph and what is photographed is, Cavell tells us, something of a mystery that we struggle to adequately capture in language (1979: 17â20). Yet this does not withhold him from claiming that âa photograph emphasizes the existence of its subject, recording itâ in a way that âit may be called a transcriptionâ (2005 [1985]: 118). So despite creating our skeptical state of ontological disconnection â the
Cavellâs view of the cinema is therefore more than an analogy or exemplification of skepticism: in addition to expressing the problem, film also addresses it, and in so doing shows us its possible overcoming. As Rodowick (n.d. 3) notes, âthe almost perfect realization of skeptical perception is a way, paradoxically, of reconnecting us to the world and asserting its causal presenceâ. This response to the problem of skepticism is realized through the conditions of cinema as medium. The images of cinema are after all not hand-made, but achieved through the âautomatismâ of photography. This entails that the automatic manufacturing of images of the world is achieved âby removing the human agent from the task of reproductionâ (1979: 23).16 Photography therefore promises an overcoming of skepticismâs subjective isolation by mechanically reproducing and presenting the world independently of human subjectivity. Yet what we ultimately want from such a sense of the worldâs âpresentnessâ is ânot exactly a conviction of the worldâs presence to us, but of our presence to itâ (1979: 22). And here Cavell admits that the photographic medium falls short as a âsolutionâ to skepticism: it only âmaintains the presentness of the world by accepting our absence from itâ (1979: 22). Photographyâs overcoming of subjectivity is thus compromised insofar as it makes reality present to me while I am not present to it (1979: 23). For this reason, cinema can only offer us the direction to an answer, the hope for satisfying the human wish âto escape subjectivity and metaphysical isolation â a wish for the power to reach this worldâ (1979: 21).
Cavell offers a dramatic picture of how film can engage with philosophy on the basis of addressing a philosophical problem â in this case that of skepticism. Yet where does the âthinkingâ of film fit into this picture? Commentators of Cavell tend to be quick to use the notion without telling us what exactly constitutes the moment of filmâs âphilosophical thinkingâ (e.g. Eldridge 2014b). Cavell himself does not give a straight answer to this question. In speaking of the question of what a photograph is, Cavell (2005 [1985]: 117) remarks that he is âlikely to characterize this question as asking what a photograph is thinking aboutâ or âwhat the text knows of itselfâ. And this thinking not only takes the form of âself-referenceâ and âself-acknowledgmentâ, but also âsometimes of its knowledge of others, of meâ (2005 [1985]: 117). In the context of
4.4 Self-Reflection
A fourth claimed condition for films to do philosophy involves their ability to elicit and facilitate experiences of self-reflection. This approach requires that oneâs understanding of âphilosophyâ also makes room for the necessary self-examination and self-consciousness that go hand in hand with its practice. Since its earliest days Western philosophy was framed by the Socratic admonishment to âknow thyselfâ, which entails that philosophical methods and arguments should in the first place be applied to oneâs own thought and experience. The reasoning is thus that whenever films inspire, guide, or mediate relevant forms of self-reflection, they can be said to perform this important aspect of philosophy. In fact, this claim is frequently part and parcel of earlier discussed assertions that films engage in argumentation, or enact a âthinkingâ of their own, since the dividing line between the filmâs work and the reflective work of the viewer remains at best a porous one.17 A common claim in this context, for instance, is that âreflectiveâ films play the role of the interlocutor by leading its viewers in a process of self-reflective philosophical questioning â notably a questioning of the viewerâs beliefs (e.g. Sinnerbrink 2014b: 171; Carroll 2006: 180; Flory 2009: 5).
The condition of self-reflection for films to do philosophy is however more openly foregrounded in phenomenological approaches to film, which I would like to briefly illustrate in the terms set by Vivian Sobchackâs influential film
Sobchack leaves little doubt over the fact that she considers film to harbor self-sufficient phenomenological capacities. Notably, she invokes Maurice Merleau-Pontyâs notion of film as an essentially âphenomenological artâ, and offers an outline of what she considers to be historical predecessors of the idea of âfilm as phenomenologyâ (Sobchack 2009: 439â442). By posing the conjunction of âphenomenology of film/film as phenomenologyâ, Sobchack furthermore makes it clear that any phenomenological account of film should be inherently harmonized with a recognition of the phenomenological performativity of film itself, that âthe cinema enacts what is also being enacted by its viewerâ (Sobchack 2011: 192). The application of the phenomenological method to film and filmâs own reciprocal âapplicationâ of phenomenology are therefore two sides of the same coin â the one illuminates and âfleshes outâ the other (2011: 191â192).
Key to the special intertwinement that Sobchack identifies between film and phenomenology is the unique âmeta-phenomenologicalâ qualities of the former: film stages an experience of our experience, and thereby serves as a telling phenomenology of our own phenomenology.18 While phenomenology generally calls for the need to attend to phenomena as they are given to conscious experience, Sobchack emphasizes the distinctive self-reflective experience that necessarily accompanies our experience of cinema (Sorfa 2013: 355). She analyses, for example, how the supposed âminimalismâ of Derek Jarmanâs Blue (1993) â consisting of a single shot of the screen filled with the color blue, accompanied by a moving audio narration of Jarmanâs life â subjectively constitutes for its viewers âa meaningful experience of extreme self-reflection on the dynamics, habits, creativity, and plenitude of their own embodied perceptionâ (2011: 204; cf. 2009: 437). Film â comprising a âdouble movementâ of both recording experience and offering itself as an experience (Sorfa 2013: 353) â thus achieves what Sobchack (1992: 5) calls âexperience expressing experienceâ as the means to the viewerâs phenomenological self-reflection.
How, one may ask, can this kind of subjective agency inhere within film? Sobchack, first of all, eschews transcendental, incorporeal notions of phenomenology (Edmund Husserl) in favor of an existential phenomenology (particularly that of Merleau-Ponty) that emphasizes the contextual situatedness of consciousness (2009: 438, 443). This tradition of thought is extended to her understanding of the film-as-subject: the subjective agency of film â its capacity to express perception and reflection â is enabled by the âcommon structures of embodied existenceâ that precede and constitute film experience (1992: 5). The filmmaker, the film and the spectators share a capacity for and possession of experience, through the structures of embodied existence that they have in common. And their similar (perceptual, embodied, material, existential) modes of âbeing-in-the-worldâ form the inter-subjective basis of cinematic communication (1992: 5). Sobchack thus posits a deep-seated continuity (entailing also interaction and transition) between film and spectator inasmuch as they are equally constituted by a corporeal-material existence (Elsaesser & Hagener 2009 119; Sobchack 2011: 204).19
This gives another inflection to the characterization of cinema as âexperience expressing experienceâ, or what Sobchack alternatively terms as âthe expression of experience by experienceâ (1992: 3): the particular perceptive and expressive capacities of cinema as technology ânot only refer to embodied experience but also use embodied experience (of material enworldedness, orientation, movement, seeing, hearing, and reflection) as the medium of such
If we therefore ask what the conditions are for film to engage with/in phenomenology, Sobchack is really presenting us with two claims: the first condition relates to how film can have its own phenomenology (and thus engages in phenomenology); and the second relates to how film (as its own phenomenology) can in turn engage with and contribute to philosophical phenomenology. The first claim is that filmâs sharing in our experience â and more specifically our structures of embodied experience â is the enabling condition for film to enact its own phenomenology; or to enact what is also being enacted by its viewer, as Sobchack would likely put it. For this reason the meeting between a film and its viewer entails a dynamic, dialogic and dialectic engagement between âtwo perceptive and expressive subjectsâ (2011: 192â193). The second claim is that by staging for us an experience of (its) experience film can uniquely prompt processes of self-reflection on our own material, embodied experience (which we have in common with film). This marks filmâs unique contribution to philosophical phenomenology. A reflective posturing towards the self â in the experience of our experience, and the consciousness of our consciousness â is the most fundamental condition, the âground zeroâ, of the practice of phenomenology (see Gallagher & Zahavi 2010). For Sobchack, the âmeta-phenomenologicalâ capacities of film can lead viewers to that experiential space in a special way.
4.5 Cinematic Thinking
A fifth and final prominent claim, relating to possible conditions for film as philosophy, is that film adopts a dynamic relation to philosophy by way of its own distinctive âcinematic thinkingâ. The designation âcinematic thinkingâ, often embracing also broader notions of âaesthetic experienceâ and âthinkingâ, admittedly encapsulates a variety of related approaches. Yet it is not unreasonable to conclude that this line of theorization has a basic indebtedness to the influential film writing of Gilles Deleuze (1986; 1989), who remains the leading
There are two general themes in Deleuzeâs thinking that I deem especially influential in the cinematic thinking approach to film as philosophy: the implications of (a) his immanentist outlook in conjunction with (b) his understanding of philosophy as the creation of concepts.
First, Deleuzeâs immanentist, anti-representationalist philosophy strictly rejects the notion of the transcendental subject and the division between subject and object, or between consciousness and its contents, that it entails. For Deleuze, as Elsaesser and Hagener (2009: 158) helpfully sum up, âcinema is material and immaterial, a form of becoming rather than a mode of signification or meaning, and he posits for it an immanence of being in which matter, motion and consciousness are inseparably intertwinedâ. Images therefore function on a material-vitalist âplane of immanenceâ, enveloping subjectivity so radically that notions of its transcendence, interiority, separateness and even existence are rendered impossible. Deleuze effectively levels consciousness and cinema on the same level of existence â which he fleshes out in terms of matter, movement, force, energy, biology and neuro-physiology â thus allowing for sweeping unifications such as the well-known pronouncement that âthe brain is the screenâ (Deleuze 2000: 366). This perspective has given impetus to characterizations of âcinematic thinkingâ as not only being expressive of categories of immanence but, importantly, as being essentially distinct from other conventional senses of (our own) âthinkingâ. Any claim that film âthinksâ, in this context, should therefore not be taken as expressive of some subjective agency â as, for example, appears to be at play in the claim that films âthink philosophicallyâ (Mulhall, Cavell). Cinematic thinking, on this account, rather emerges as a provocative Other to philosophical thinking: it is not conceptual but perceptual, affective and imagistic; and accordingly resists paraphrase into conventional philosophical terms. Cinematic thinking is its own, wholly independent, mode of reflection. Yet, as Falzon (2013) rightly points out, such a radical rendering of âfilm as (its own) philosophyâ does run the risk of making cinematic âthinkingâ too different from philosophy for it to do anything recognizably philosophical. If so, film as an autonomous mode of thinking would at best only offer a way of escaping or transcending â and not engaging with â philosophical thought.
The second influential Deleuzian theme in the context of film as philosophy is the view that philosophy â not only as a practice, but as a power or force, as per Deleuzeâs process ontology â involves the creation and invention of concepts (e.g. Deleuze 2005). Essentially, for Deleuze, â[a] theory of cinema is not
In what follows, I present two paradigmatic examples of how the cinematic thinking approach construes the idea of film doing philosophy, both proceeding from the Deleuzian tenets laid out above: Robert Sinnerbrinkâs âromantic film-philosophyâ and Daniel Framptonâs âfilmosophyâ.20
4.5.1 Cinematic Thinking in âRomantic Film-Philosophyâ
Robert Sinnerbrink, as noted earlier, opposes the prevailing tendency to disenfranchise cinematic aesthetics by subjecting it to conceptual theorization. As an alternative, he proposes what he calls a âromantic film-philosophyâ (2011c: 26, 36â38; cf. 2011d), which âresponds to film as a way of thinking, one that might
Sinnerbrink mostly associates cinematic thinking with âmore challenging kinds of filmâ and singles out the work of directors David Lynch, Lars von Trier and Terrence Malick as cases in point (2011a: 9â10, 138â139). Films like Inland Empire (David Lynch 2006), Antichrist (Lars von Trier 2009) and The New World (Terrence Malick 2005), he argues, can evoke new ways of thinking and feeling through novel strategies of questioning and experimentation. âSuch films [â¦] have aesthetic and cinematic qualities that prompt an experience conducive to thought; films that provoke, incite, or force us to think, even if we remain uncertain as to what kind of thinking (or writing) might be adequate to such an experienceâ (Sinnerbrink 2011a: 141â142). The challenge of these films is that, while they typically provoke philosophical reflection, they simultaneously evade philosophical appropriation, since they actively resist reduction to philosophical theories or translation into general abstractions, claims and arguments. And, in doing so, they challenge existing normative frameworks and open up alternative possibilities of thought. Sinnerbrinkâs analysis of Mulholland Drive (David Lynch 2001) usefully illustrates this: rather than exploring scenarios of global illusion that draw attention to a distinction between appearance and reality, the film can be seen as bringing into question the very distinction between the real and the illusory, in order to explore an indeterminate zone between fantasy and reality (Sinnerbrink 2005).
What does all of this entail for the idea of film as philosophy? A first point is that, for Sinnerbrink, films do not contribute to philosophy, or âdoâ philosophy, by becoming philosophy. Since cinematic thinking is essentially distinct from conventional philosophical reflection, films have the power to engage with philosophy â not to merely engage in philosophy. A second point is that the philosophical value of cinema thus lies in its capacity for âconfrontationâ and âresistanceâ. Sinnerbrink frames capacity in terms of the Deleuzian claim that
Central to Sinnerbrinkâs vision of how cinematic thinking may benefit philosophy, therefore, is the need to take oneâs lead from film(s) with openness and receptivity to its specific forms of aesthetic disclosure. Philosophizing âwithâ film is essentially an act of recognizing, drawing out and elaborating the âthought immanent within filmâ (2011a: 181; 2011c: 40, 43). Such translations between âmedia of thoughtâ (that is, between film and philosophy) are at once also potential transformations of the thought involved (2011a: 181). The âromanticâ film philosopher therefore acts as a mediator, even a medium, between the philosophical and the cinematic. And by seeking novel, creative ways of expressing distinctly cinematic forms of thinking in a suitable philosophical idiom, the encounter between film and philosophy can become one in which our philosophical thinking â even our âexperience of the modern worldâ â is renewed and reformed (2011a: 7; 2011c: 43).
4.5.2 Cinematic Thinking in âFilmosophyâ
Daniel Framptonâs Filmosophy (2006a) is by his own admission intended as a âmanifesto-likeâ provocation and paints an accordingly provocative picture of cinematic thinking. Filmosophy is a call for a âthoughtful poetics of cinemaâ, a âstyle of understanding filmâ, the primary aim of which is to (re-)describe the film form (and âfilm-beingâ) in terms of filmâs own thinking (2008: 369, 373). For Frampton (2006a: 6), âseeing film as thoughtful, as the dramatic decision of the film, helps us understand the many ways film can mean and affectâ.
Frampton emphasizes that this filmind should not be taken as an empirical entity, but as a re-orientating conceptual understanding, a theoretical postulation, of the origin of a filmâs actions and events. In this way he wishes to place the source of film-thinking âinâ the film itself. The filmind is therefore part of the film, the film itself, as it functions from a âtrans-subjectiveâ (neither subjective nor objective, nor limited to any subjectivity of narration or character) ânon-placeâ or ârealm of perspectiveâ as the ultimate controlling force of the film-world. The film steers its own discourse (2006a: 7, 73, 86â87). The filmind is therefore not transcendental, but rather âactual and activeâ as âwe can actually âsee the film thinkingââ (2006a: 93). It accounts for each filmâs own individual character, style and identity. Each film is unique because it has its own filmind, autonomous and free to think and create as its wishes (2006a: 83).
The place of the âfilmindâ vis-Ã -vis the respective minds of the filmmaker and the film spectator, however, remains underdeveloped. Frampton admits that the filmind is âalwaysâ created by filmmakers, who translate their motives and ideas into cinematic form by harnessing and using various strategies of film-thinking (2006a: 75). But in the same breath he distinguishes the filmind from the filmmakerâs intentions by appealing to the experience of the filmgoer: the claim being that the (making of the) film cannot transcend the more comprehensive concept of film-thinking insofar as artistic intentions cannot completely control the experiences of the filmgoer. This creates the impression that the filmind has some special relation with the viewerâs freedom of subjective experience. But then Frampton also goes to great lengths to dissociate film-thinking and experience from its human counterparts. He is critical of theorists like Vivian Sobchack who see an anthropomorphic, âhuman-typeâ subjectivity in film subjectivity, as âit seems obvious that film âexperienceâ looks very different to our experienceâ (2006a: 42).
As to be expected, the supposed inherent differentness of filmâs thinking receives considerable attention from Frampton. The notion of a thinking filmind, and indeed film as thinking, Frampton explains, should not be taken
The differentness and otherness of film-thinking looms even larger once Framptonâs turns his attention to how film relates to philosophy. The ideas belonging to film-thinking, which are so specific that they cannot be reduced to our language about film, represent a poetical thinking that achieves a different order of philosophical-ness. So by harnessing the âlanguagelessâ ânon-conceptualâ and âimagistic thinkingâ of film, âfilmosophy attempts to find the philosophical in movements and forms of filmâ, on the understanding that âfilm can add a new kind of thought to philosophyâ (2006a: 10â11). This is a trademark claim of the cinematic thinking approach to film as philosophy: that it is a confrontation of essential differences, between film and philosophy, that allows for the production of new thoughts (cf. Huygens 2008: 2). To deepen our sense of these differences, Frampton unleashes a barrage of dramatic terms for the distinct intellectual attributes of film-thinking (e.g. 2006a: 98, 196). In addition to being an âemotional intelligenceâ that is allusive, ambiguous, complex and tension-ridden, film-thinking is also characterized as âprimalâ, âarchaicâ, âmessyâ, âlooseâ, âevocativeâ, âfuzzyâ, ânon-rationalâ, âintuitiveâ and âaffectiveâ; it moreover relies on âhintsâ, âvague notions of ideasâ, âemotional ideasâ, âfeelings of thoughtsâ and âfragments of conceptsâ. With these designations Frampton apparently wishes to demarcate the exact opposite of the traditional intellectual attributes of philosophy. Yet he also points out: these notions should not be taken as bad versions of clear logical thinking. This is rather thinking of a different order, distinctly filmic thinking, âfilm-ideasâ, existing in a state of image, flow, and flux (2006a: 98).
4.6 A Reconsideration of Conditions? The Suspended Condition of âNon-philosophyâ
At the start of this survey of conditions for film to engage with/in philosophy, I noted that assumptions about what philosophy is tend to dictate how theorists approach the question of filmâs own philosophical resources. If, for instance, philosophy is taken as a matter of exercising certain philosophical techniques, then film can be said to do philosophy in cases where it enacts an argument or thought experiment. Or, if philosophy is primarily seen as a kind of thinking, then one may conclude that films can think in ways that philosophers do. But the whole intention of âfilm as philosophyâ, as I have explained it, is to be a reversal of perspectives â to approach philosophy from the point of view of film and ask what philosophy âin the image ofâ film may look like. So are the theorists of film as philosophy not simply subjecting film to the agenda of
This objection, in short, captures John Mullarkeyâs (2009a; 2009b; 2011) intervention in the debate. His central criticism of the field is that the all-encompassing, essentialist nature of most theories of film as philosophy (and certainly all those discussed here) cannot avoid the reduction of film to illustrations of the theoristâs preferred version of philosophy (2009a: 65; 2011: 88). This criticism is especially aimed at bolder claims of filmâs philosophical ability. âIf film thinksâ, Mullarkey tells us, âit is not in its own way but in philosophyâs wayâ (2011: 88). If a film is considered to âphilosophizeâ, it only does so in correlation with some privileged approach to philosophy (2009a: 66). While many film philosophers critically reject the imposition of general âphilosophies of filmâ (or âabout filmâ) on individual films, Mullarkey holds that there is always a totalizing (exclusive, reductive, illustrative) âphilosophy of filmâ (or, again, âabout filmâ) underlying any notion of âfilm as philosophyâ that wants to make films âspeak for themselvesâ. So while the likes of Mulhall, Critchley or Sinnerbrink intend to perform âopenâ readings of a film, their understanding of the filmâs âownâ philosophical views inevitably remain interpretations that are pre-figured by established philosophical points of view.
So where to from here for the film as philosophy debate? Mullarkeyâs proposal is to get away from any supposed conditions for film to do philosophy, since these inevitably reduce what filmâs thinking may be: âIf film is to think, if film is to philosophize, then we must first of all get away from any definition (that is, philosophy) of film, as well as any definition of thinking, or indeed of philosophy itselfâ (2009a: 77). Taking his lead from Francois Laruelle, Mullarkey approaches film as ânon-philosophyâ which involves a thinking âaccording to the Realâ (2009a: 77).21 The Real â and the Real of film, as one instance thereof â can never be captured and exhausted by (any one) philosophy (2011: 89). This allows Mullarkey to venture â in what he admits to be a âspeculative modeâ â towards his own tentative notion of the thinking of film: âthe resistance of film to singular philosophies is a kind of thinking, or meta-thinking, all its own, precisely because it does not allow us to begin with a definition of thought or philosophy, or rather, it forces us to change our theory of what theory (thinking, philosophy) isâ (2009a: 76).
While Mullarkeyâs contribution may be seen as a lethal blow to the entire âprojectâ of theorizing the conditions for film as philosophy, one should ask whether his critical assessment is in fact not also making film âan illustrationâ of a favored, âpre-figuredâ philosophical point of view â and that he thereby succumbs to his own criticism. Anticipating this objection, Mullarkey remarks that what he offers is not one more philosophy of film, but precisely a non-philosophy of film which he defines as âa thinking according to the Realâ (2009a: 77). Essentially, his non-philosophy does not dismiss other philosophies as false representations, but simply indicates each oneâs inherent limitation vis-Ã -vis its hold on the Real. Mullarkeyâs proposed approach is thus âmeta-theoreticalâ, not in the sense of being a theory about theories, but by embracing â somewhat conveniently, in a âdemocracy of thoughtâ â (all) other theoretical perspectives in its immanent thinking of the Real (see 2011: 91, 94). Yet does Mullarkey put the issue to rest? For example, after arguing that we need to get away from all definitions if we are to say that films philosophize, he notes that (surely privileged) notions of film as âmultipleâ, ârelationalâ and âeventalâ do not amount to definitions of film, but are âat bestâ âquasi-conceptsâ
In spite of my critical reservations, Mullarkeyâs central argument still deserves its spot on the âaxis of conditionsâ that I have detailed in this chapter. One strategy is to simply classify his claim, as pointed out above, as the most extreme instance of the already identified âcinematic thinkingâ condition. However, to do his argument more justice, one would do better to reserve a separate point with which to plot his approach, one at the imagined end of this axis. For it is inevitable that the debate would reach this point: the condition that Mullarkey claims is no condition â a ânon-conditionâ â insisting that the formulation of any condition will restrict the âphilosophyâ that film may become. Film can therefore only be philosophical in the capacity of ânon-philosophyâ, the notion of which usefully captures (apart from its technical Laruellian meaning) the supposed need to negate and suspend our definitions in an open embrace of filmâs own becoming-philosophical.
5 Conclusion: Motives and Meta-perspectives
In this chapter I have navigated readers through the most prominent conceptions of film as philosophy, with the aim of establishing what I take to be much needed meta-theoretical perspectives on this bustling sub-field of philosophy of film. Key to my charting of the debate was to disentangle two meta-analytical axes along which we can situate any claim (and even objections to the idea) that films can do philosophy. First, the axis of degrees, the extent to which film engages with/in philosophy, be it âweakâ, âmoderateâ, or âboldâ. And, second, the axis of conditions, dealing with the enabling means for film to engage with, or be, a form of philosophy.
The latter of the two, as I have noted, has not been sufficiently distinguished and clarified in assessments of the debate so far â which is odd. For the question of conditions is clearly the one that cuts to the heart of film as philosophy: on the basis of what, we can ask any of the philosophers lined up here, can a film engage with/in philosophy? As I have demonstrated, the answers provided by
However, to merely distinguish such an assortment of conditions for film as philosophy is but a small step towards a âproperly developed meta-philosophyâ that the debate is clearly still in need of (Smith 2010). Such a development, to my mind, would have to involve the articulation of further unifying meta-perspectives that can help relate these various claimed conditions and approaches to one another: to show how, despite their incompatibilities, these different approaches can still be situated within a degree of coherence and dialogue with one another. An important step to this end, however, is to get a tight grip on the respective assumptions that guide the respective theories of film as philosophy. As we have repeatedly seen in this chapter, these theories all proceed from definite assumptions, inevitably so, about the nature of both film and, in particular, philosophy. So this, too, would be required from a proper meta-theory: to frame these assumptions within a broader, synoptic view that can correlate, and perhaps even reconcile to some extent, the disparate commitments and standpoints from which philosophers take on the project of film as philosophy.
Therefore, as a manner of bringing the mapping enterprise of this chapter to a close, let me indicate what I think such a subsequent meta-theoretical development could look like, and thereby also set the scene for the chapters to come. I want to in a sense âlook beyondâ the positions presented here, and ask what is more basically at stake in the various enabling conditions proposed for film to do philosophy. It seems to me that a small set of foundational contexts, or ultimate horizons, repeatedly show themselves as pivotal motives in these theorizations. As meta-theoretical abstractions, the kind of motives that I have in mind involve such ontologically foundational, encompassing horizons of reality that theories cannot but adopt some orientation towards them. For this reason, they valuably encapsulate some of the pertinent assumptions at work in theories of film as philosophy. The three clearest of such motives, I find, are those of Knowledge, Subjectivity and Power, although the three can be usefully supplemented by the additional motive of Nature.22 Although I do not want to be seen as constantly jumping on the âmetaâ bandwagon, I consider these
Firstly, the motive of Knowledge is especially central to the work of analytic-cognitivist philosophers of film. Many of their debates appear to assume that arguments, thought experiments or even illustrations of philosophy are objective forms of knowledge and that films can only be considered as doing philosophy if they assume a similar status. Film as philosophy, for these philosophers, would entail that a film functions as a relatively self-sufficient knowledge artifact; much like a book or a taped lecture, it should be able to spell out its philosophical point of view in relative independence of its âauthorâ. Another way of putting it is that a film should have its own âconceptualâ or âintellectual competenceâ (Warr 2013: 120). Related to this is the tendency to assume that a film can only be called âphilosophicalâ insofar as it relates to established philosophical knowledge (e.g. Shaw 2006: 113; Livingston 2009: 199). But, moving beyond the confines of analytic-cognitivist approaches, advocates of âbolderâ conceptions of film as philosophy also draw from this motive in claiming that films can generate renewed and indeed new forms of knowledge (cf. Colman 2009: 8). Yet this convergence of analytic-cognitivist and more âcontinentallyâ inspired approaches, within the context of Knowledge, also points to a significant difference between them: the former is more likely to speak of âfilm engaging in philosophyâ inasmuch as film serves as an alternative medium or âexpressive deviceâ for dealing with established philosophical knowledge; the latter leans to the view that film rather âengages with philosophyâ by, among other things, producing new (forms of) knowledge.
Secondly, various claims that film engages with/in philosophy can be traced back to assumptions about a basic involvedness that film has with Subjectivity. There are roughly three overlapping variants of this theme: that film gains its philosophical abilities by either (a) expressing, (b) eliciting, or (c) enacting different manifestations of Subjectivity, which could range from âthinkingâ, as higher-order subjective process, to more basic forms of subjective experience. To begin with, a widespread preference for speaking of âphilosophy through filmâ23 not only reflects the view that films mediate Knowledge, but moreover that it (a) gives expression to the subjective intentions of the filmmaker(s). This particular appeal to Subjectivity, we have seen, is central to the intentionalist positions of Livingston and Wartenberg. Here the interrelatedness of the various motives also becomes clear: Livingston, for instance, stresses that a film can only count as philosophy when there is a (subjective) intention, on the part of the filmmaker, to engage with established philosophical knowledge
Thirdly: approaches that claim for film its own distinctive kind of thinking, varied as they may be, tend to have a shared reliance on a Power motive. This is not âpowerâ in a pejorative sense of âdominationâ, but rather in a more general and neutral or affirmative sense: the power of influence, formation or creation. While there are suggestions that the philosophical potential of film resides its influence over Subjective experience, most of the approaches concentrate on the relation between the Power that film exercises in relation to philosophy as Knowledge. The Deleuzian paradigm, under influence of its Nietzschean underpinnings, sees film as an extension of more general forces of becomingness. Both film and philosophy are distinct kinds of âcreative activityâ; and film is taken to have a special function in the philosophical task of âcreating conceptsâ. Following Deleuze, the likes of Sinnerbrink and Frampton cast the Power inherent to âcinematic thinkingâ in rather dramatic terms: film is claimed to âchallengeâ, âresistâ and even âoverwhelmâ established forms of philosophical knowledge. Also Mullarkey draws on this context when pointing out that filmâs âresistanceâ to theory is itself philosophical and, moreover, a source of ânew philosophyâ. This highlights a prominent feature of Power as âmeta-conditionâ of film as philosophy: that it allows for various notions of how film may establish âthe newâ in philosophy. Whereas the Cavellian âmoving image of
Although it may not have the same prominence in theories of film as philosophy as the preceding motives, a fourth one must be added here. This is the fundamental horizon of âNatureâ, which should be taken in the most comprehensive sense of involving, not only âthe materialâ or âphysicalâ or âbodilyâ, but more broadly âthe worldâ, ârealityâ or âthe nature of thingsâ.24 This motive is a key aspect of how, for example, Cavell understands film to contribute to philosophy. For Cavell (as for Bazin), film, as a photographic medium, gains its philosophical power through its inherent relatedness to the Nature of the world. In staging our condition of isolation or absence from Nature, film at the same time holds the promise of restoring our connection and âpresentnessâ to the world. There is also an element of the Nature motive in Sobchackâs claim that film has Subjective agency by virtue of sharing the same material existence with the filmmaker and the viewer, as corresponding subjects. And the same horizon is at play in Mullarkeyâs contention that film, as âthe Realâ (Nature), cannot be exhausted by singular theories (Knowledge).
In conclusion, identifying these underlying, foundational motives â Knowledge, Subjectivity, Power, and Nature â helps to draw out important reference points for an ethical meta-analysis as intended in this book. Yet these motives also hold meta-theoretical merit to film as philosophy as a theoretical project over and above any of my ethical arguments. For one thing, this set of foundational motives offers the meta-theorist a springboard to a more cohesive picture of the overall project. In this set of motives, we have a useful means of clarifying not only essential distinctions but also relevant interrelations between different conceptions of film as philosophy. I am in particular thinking of how philosophy as Knowledge retains an implied presence within conceptions of film as philosophy guided by the motives of Subjectivity and Power respectively. Tracing such a connection helps elucidate shared assumptions that different theories may have with respect to the claim that film can be a form of philosophy â and thereby lays bare potential common grounds upon which future theorizing of film as philosophy can proceed. Any discussion of horizons as fundamental as Knowledge, Subjectivity, Power, and Nature will bring to light all sorts of intimate connections among themselves. Thus,
That said, the meta-critical agenda of the rest of the book is a much more specific one: I wish to cast the debate and broader project of film as philosophy within a distinctly ethical light. And, in order to shift to this agenda, the notion of fundamental horizons is indeed the right track to be on. My attention now turns to what is in fact another fundamental horizon amongst those already discussed here; one that is perhaps not as conspicuous, but just as persistent. This is the inescapable human horizon of the self, faced with the need to change itself. The historically recurrent ideal stemming from this horizon is the motive of personal transformation. It is a motive that makes an especially compelling series of appearances within the project of film as philosophy. As I will show, claims that films can do or be philosophy always go hand in hand, somehow, with suggestions of self-transformation that viewers may achieve through film. Yet in this context, as in any other, the motive of personal transformation does not operate in isolation; the other four accentuate this motive in noticeable ways. Therefore, I will also show that the ways in which philosophers construe film as philosophy in relation to the motive of Knowledge, or Subjectivity, or Power, largely determines the kind of personal transformation through film that they consequently suggest.
In order to consider the ways in which the motive of personal transformation enters the project of film as philosophy, however, we first need a more general, analytical grip on this motive itself, as well as the multiform transformational ethics that it can inspire. With this in mind, then, we move on to Chapter 2, where I construct my ethical framework of analysis.
My discussions of film as philosophy will roughly be restricted to the question as it pertains to narrative fiction film. This corresponds with a recognized tendency in the field to focus more on the latter (see Carroll 2013: 161; Livingston 2008: 591).
My emphasis of the two-way relationship between film and philosophy draws on similar distinctions made by Botz-Bornstein (2011), Colman (2009), Falzon (2013), and Sinnerbrink (2011a), among others.
Wartenbergâs (2011a; 2016) most recent overviews of different conceptions of film as philosophy, for example, are structured around four positions that pertain to degrees of engagement: (a) âextreme anti-cinematic philosophyâ, (b) âextreme pro-cinematic philosophyâ, (c) âmoderate anti-cinematic philosophyâ and, his own, (d) âmoderate pro-cinematic philosophyâ. Also see Sinnerbrink (2013), Falzon (2013), and McClelland (2011).
Philosophy goes to the Movies, by Christopher Falzon (2002) or Philosophy through Film, by Mary Litch (2010) are two well-known examples of film as philosophy approached as a heuristic-educational practice.
Films can of course also be âphilosophicalâ in a much more obvious, and widely acknowledged, sense: namely when they explicitly deal with recognized philosophers and philosophical texts.
The death of the author thesis, which includes the New Criticsâ rejection of authorial intent as âthe intentional fallacyâ (see Wimsatt & Beardsley 1946; Brooks 1951; Eliot 1982 [1919]), has always drawn its share of criticism â which as of late has been on the increase. For a prominent recent critique thereof, see Seán Burkeâs The Death and Return of the Author (2008).
Livingston is obliged to nuance this position as a âpartial intentionalismâ, however, since at the end of the day âintentions determine some, but not all, of the semantic properties of at least some works of artâ (2009: 93). For a critical assessment of Livingstonâs intentionalism, see Sinnerbrink (2011a: 129â130).
Livingston addresses the work and biography of Ingmar Bergman as a clear instance of film as philosophy meeting his strict intentionalist criteria (see 2009: 125â193).
Some prominent âmoderateâ theories of film as philosophy, as discussed above, are also characterized by a demand for the âpriority of the particularâ. See Wartenberg (2007: 31, 133â134) and Livingston (2009: 200).
One should however be skeptical of how any form of philosophical thought in a film can be discerned without inevitably relying on any pre-exiting philosophical framework whatsoever. More on this in Chapter 3.
This distinction is indebted to Chris Falzonâs (2013) insightful comparison of Mulhall and Sinnerbrink.
Malickâs cinematic oeuvre is frequently labelled as having a âcontemplativeâ quality (Cavell 1979: xivâxvii; Frampton 2006a: 74, 97, 193; Sinnerbrink 2011d: 180, 190; Rybin 2012). More on this in Chapter 4.
This reminds of how W.J.T. Mitchell (2006) approaches the power of images in the more or less literal terms of their having âdesiresâ, âdrivesâ, âneedsâ and âdemandsâ of their own. Novel as Mulhall and Mitchellâs personifications might seem, though, they do build on earlier, more acknowledged models â for example, the inclination in philosophical hermeneutics (e.g. Gadamer) to view the encounter between recipient and artwork as a meeting of two subjects, rather than subject and object.
Apart from the fact that Cavell is one of the few philosophers of film whose views Mulhall invokes, there is also a strong perception in the field that Mulhall represents a Cavellian approach. For a sample, see Smith and Wartenberg (2006: 2).
Since genre, for Cavell, is an extension of the medium of cinema he later also explores how skepticism comes into expression through specific genres of film â a prominent example being what Cavell (1981) labels the âcomedy of remarriageâ, which features in my discussion of Cavellâs ethics in Chapter 3.
Not that one should conclude that Cavell, and Bazin, adhere to an uncomplicated, naive photographic realism. See Eldridge (2014b: 7â9).
I have already covered Carrollâs âmaieuticâ characterization of filmic argumentation as prominent case in point.
Although Sobchack herself does not use the term âmeta-phenomenologyâ, as far as I am aware, I find Daniel Framptonâs label for her approach a useful one (e.g. Frampton 2006a: 91).
Sobchack (1992: 10) however warns that this continuity, this shared âdouble occupancy of cinematic spaceâ, should not be taken to entail a conflation of the film and the viewer. Filmâs own concretely bodied experience still stands over against that of the viewer.
There are certainly a host of other film philosophers who find more general inspiration in Deleuzeâs thought, beyond the context of the film as philosophy that I investigate here â among them, Patricia Pisters, Ronald Bogue, Felicity Colman, Gregory Flaxman, David Martin-Jones, and Paola Marrati, to name but a few.
As Mullarkey explains, the ânon-â in Laruelleâs concept of non-philosophy does not refer to a dialectic opposite or âotherâ of philosophy, but to âan enlargement of the set of things that can count as thoughtâ (2011: 91). Non-philosophy, as performative practice â a thinking, not of the Real, but alongside it â therefore seeks to work out what âphilosophyâ becomes when âthinking is everywhereâ (including in film).
My formulation of these motives draws, in part, on Johann Visagieâs theory of âmacromotivesâ (Visagie 1996a). Note that â like him â I use capital letters to distinguish the abstracted, technical qualification of these motives.