On the Bearability of Others-Being: Bartleby, Expression and Its Justification

Ricardo Gutiérrez Aguilar

Jump to Content

Chapter 11 On the Bearability of Others-Being: Bartleby, Expression and Its Justification

In: Empathy: Emotional, Ethical and Epistemological Narratives

Author:

Ricardo Gutiérrez Aguilar

Ricardo Gutiérrez Aguilar
Search for other papers by Ricardo Gutiérrez Aguilar in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed

Type:: Chapter

Pages:: 142–151

DOI:: https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004398122_012

Purchase instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):

€42.00€35.00 excl. VAT

Add to Cart

Redeem Access Token

Abstract

Melville’s perhaps most famous character, Bartleby the Scrivener – maybe only sharing this Olympus with Ahab–, poses his crux of a problem through the difficulties of a rather succinct operation on mutual recognition: the principal character, curiously enough a lawyer, states that one has to “construe charitably to [ones] imagination what proves impossible to be solved by [ones] judgment”. Bartleby is impervious to any attempt reason and sane judgment do in fathoming his motives. In absence of proper rational justification then, it is recommended an ancillary method, that of a ‘charitable construction’ out of imagination. In this regard, there is no symmetrical relation between the efforts of the lawyer in making an individual out of what is treated merely as an object of ‘passive resistance’, and the total lack of intention in easing the operation of his understanding by Bartleby. Thus, no recognition of any kind. In the present chapter I will try to stress the possible conceptual articulation of the above-mentioned complementary method to the accustomed rational justification as a somehow alternative description to the very act of empathy – or recognition–. The first truly act of charity shall be represented under these circumstances in the fashion of an act of moral imagination. Probably just a subjective one. But such an act of attribution – whether self-inscriptive or not – implies a normative burden, a deontic-laden assumption in some cases, that I will try to elucidate with help of contemporary virtue epistemology where an expressivist account of self-knowledge could show its limits. Questions of the sort of ‘what type of expressions merit for the articulation of a biography?’, ‘what type of performative force would have a narrative of the likes of it?’ and ‘which mental states do have normative force?’, will be addressed briefly in order to clarify Bartleby’s experimentum crucis.

Citation Info

Save
Cite
Email this content

Share link with colleague or librarian

You can email a link to this page to a colleague or librarian:
Email this content
or copy the link directly:

https://brill.edhh.ma/abstract/book/9789004398122/BP000011.xml
The link was not copied. Your current browser may not support copying via this button.

Link copied successfully

Collapse
Expand

Empathy: Emotional, Ethical and Epistemological Narratives

Series: At the Interface / Probing the Boundaries, Volume: 123

E-Book ISBN:: 9789004398122

Publisher:: Brill

Print Publication Date:: 24 May 2019

Subjects

Front Matter

Back Matter

ProCite

RefWorks

Reference Manager

BibTeX

Zotero

EndNote

Metrics

	All Time	Past 365 days	Past 30 Days
Abstract Views	501	125	10
Full Text Views	9	1	0
PDF Views & Downloads	10	1	0

African Studies	Education	Media Studies
American Studies	History	Middle East and Islamic Studies
Ancient Near East and Egypt	Human Rights and Humanitarian Law	Musicology
Art History	International Law	Philosophy
Asian Studies	International Relations	Religious Studies
Biblical Studies	Jewish Studies	Slavic and Eurasian Studies
Biology	Languages and Linguistics	Social Sciences
Book History and Cartography	Life Sciences	Theology and World Christianity
Classical Studies	Literature and Cultural Studies

Subjects

Authors

Open Access

Product Information

Company

Contact

Chapter 11 On the Bearability of Others-Being: Bartleby, Expression and Its Justification

Abstract

Citation Info

Share link with colleague or librarian

Empathy: Emotional, Ethical and Epistemological Narratives

Table of Contents

References

Metrics

Metrics