The main title of the present volume is: âThe Enigma of Fichteâs First Principles/Das Rätsel von Fichtes Grundsätzen.â It is so titled because, surprisingly, even after more than two hundred years of research there still remains many unresolved issues regarding the first principles of Fichteâs philosophical system. In the Preface to the Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre (1794/95), Fichte had given some advice about his manner of philosophizing: âI find it especially important to recall that I will not say everything, but I want to leave something for my reader to think about. [â¦] This is because I wish to promote independent thinking.â1 â This seems to be particularly the case for the topic of the Grundsätze: Fichte has not explicitly stated every single detail, but left to readers and scholars the task of exercising their own intellectual powers to more precisely determine the exact content, form, and scope of the first foundational principles of the Wissenschaftslehre. This foreword will give a brief overview of the contributing articles, as well as some general reflections on why the first scientific principles of Fichteâs philosophy continue to remain enigmatic, including the necessity of seeing these first principles within the total system of the Wissenschaftslehre.
The majority of the articles in this volume are based on papers given at an international conference originally held from 27â28 April 2018 at the University of Leuven, Belgium. They all have been reworked, updated, and peer-reviewed for this publication. I wish to thank Karin de Boer and Elise Frketich for their help in co-organising the conference, Henny Blomme, Stephen Howard, Luciano Perulli, Pierpaolo Betti and Wai Lam Foo for their assistance, the Institute of Philosophy at the University of Leuven for supporting and hosting the conference, as well as all the participants for generously making their latest research available here in this issue. I also extend my sincere thanks to the other scholars who subsequently agreed to write a paper for this volume. Their further efforts have resulted in a much more comprehensive survey of the topic of first principles in Fichteâs entire system. Finally, I am extremely grateful to the main editorial team of the Fichte-Studien: Marco Ivaldo, Alexander Schnell, Thomas Sören Hoffmann, Bryan-Joseph Planhof, and Martin Wilmer, for their expertise and help in bringing this volume to fruition, as well as the editorial staff at the publisher Brill, particularly during these difficult months of a global pandemic.
The first group of three articles in this volume treats the topic of first principles in the very earliest writings of Fichte, from approximately the period 1790â1794. The second group of articles examines specific questions relating to first principles in the technical presentations of the Wissenschaftslehre, especially the Jena Grundlage of 1794/95, as well as the 1804 Berlin and 1805 Erlangen versions. These specific questions concern the nature and status of the first principle and its connection to the second and third principles; the possibility of a change or rupture in the foundations of the Wissenschaftslehre, and the relation of the first principles to logic, reflection, existence, facticity, and the deduction of the categories. The third group of articles looks at the question of the first principles in the sub-disciplines of the Wissenschaftslehre, including the domains of aesthetics, right, ethics, history and nature. This volume 49 of the Fichte-Studien is then completed with five further contributions on various topics and three book reviews.
The First Scientific Principles of the Wissenschaftslehre
Why does the topic of Fichteâs first principles remain so enigmatic? Apart from the pedagogical issue of readers and scholars having to exercise their own powers of thought, one could imagine that this foundational topic has been thoroughly exhausted by Fichte scholars, and that in the year 2021 there is now nothing more to say or discover. As this volume abundantly shows, that is not at all the case, a lot of fresh perspectives can be opened up and new discoveries made, while many apparent or real contradictions need to be overcome or properly addressed.
For example, we already arrive at a first enigma if we ask the simple questions: when and where exactly did Fichte discover the first foundational principle of his system? There is still no consensus on either the time or the place of this philosophical discovery. In the Prefaces to both the 1794 programmatic text Ãber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre and the 1794/95 Grundlage, Fichte himself characterizes the discovery as a form of sudden and fortunate inspiration: a glücklichen Zufall or Glück (fortune); however, he believes this discovery only occurred because of a serious and honest striving to raise philosophy to the level of a self-evident science.2 The suddenness is confirmed by the anecdotal evidence of Eduard Fichte and Henrik Steffens that it took place in a similar manner to Descartesâs inspiration by a warm winter stove.3 In a personal letter to Böttiger written from Zurich, Switzerland, Fichte speaks of an important âdiscoveryâ (Entdeckung) that was made around the âend of autumnâ 1793.4 Or again, in a December 1793 letter to Heinrich Stephani, Fichte speaks of a philosophical illumination that had happened roughly six weeks earlier: âThe system must be rebuilt. And this is what I have been doing for the past six weeks or so. Come celebrate the harvest with me! I have discovered a new foundation, on the basis of which it will be easy to develop the whole of philosophy.â5 This date of late 1793 is further supported by the Preface to the 1806 Anweisung zum seligen Leben, where Fichte speaks of his philosophy of religion being in continuous harmony with a main philosophical conception that had been bestowed upon him âthirteen yearsâ previously, i.e. in the year 1793.6 Thus, based on these textual sources, one general tendency has been to date Fichteâs âoriginal insightâ to Zurich in approximately October or November 1793. However, there is another tendency in the research that draws textual support from the Second Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre, where Fichte points out that the initial idea for a first principle of philosophy had appeared to him already in Königsberg in Prussia in 1791. This was in conversations with the Kantian expositor Johann Friedrich Schulz, âwith whom I once shared my then still vague idea of constructing philosophy in its entirety on the basis of the pure I.â7 So, is the place and time of Fichteâs philosophical discovery to be located in Zurich in late 1793, or two years earlier in Königsberg in 1791?
A second enigma concerns the actual content and form of the first foundational principle (Grundsatz). What exactly is the nature of the first principle, and did Fichte later change it? In the 1794/95 Grundlage, Fichte does not immediately state his first principle, but indicates that it has to be found:
§â¯1 First, absolutely unconditioned foundational principle
We have to seek out the absolutely first completely unconditioned foundational principle of all human knowledge. It cannot be proven or determined, if it is the absolutely first foundational principle.8
In accordance with his commitment to independent thinking on the part of the reader, one can see that at the outset of this text Fichte does not passively present or explain his first principle, but rather sets out the conditions for it to appear: it has to be absolutely first, unconditioned, and can neither be determined nor proved. One could ask: by adopting such an unusual methodological approach, did Fichte likewise wish to stimulate in his readers a sudden philosophical âinspirationâ, or as he would later term it, an âintellectual intuitionâ? In sections §â¯2 and §â¯3 of the Grundlage, Fichte then presents two further absolutely foundational principles, which differ from the first insofar as they are conditioned with regard to their content (§â¯2) or their form (§â¯3). Much ink has been shed in trying to understand how these latter two foundational principles relate in turn to the first foundational principle.
As regards the content of this first foundational principle of §â¯1 of the Grundlage, scholars seem to understand it in different ways. Either as the âabsolute Iâ, or the âpure Iâ, as âI amâ or simply as the âIâ; some consider it to be âI = Iâ, âI am Iâ, or again: the âI-hoodâ â the unity of the subject-object. Other scholars prefer a longer statement of the first principle, often the formulation found in point 10 of §â¯1 of the Grundlage: âthe I originally posits its own being absolutelyâ (Das Ich setzt ursprünglich schlechthin sein eigenes Sein).9 Are all these different formulations valid as the first principle of the Wissenschaftslehre? Fichte had asked his readers to think for themselves and seek out the first foundational principle of his philosophy, a principle forming the basis for the entirety of human knowledge, and the result in the scholarship appears to be many different formulations that might very well contradict one another. Most strikingly, several different first principles are put forward, despite Fichteâs insistence that there is one, and only one, first principle. Some scholars think this contradiction is only apparent, and can be resolved by viewing many of these formulations as variants of the same first principle of the âabsolute Iâ, expressed either in an abbreviated or more extended form. This would not be surprising, as Fichte himself said he would change his terminology and presentations, and perhaps this therefore holds for the multiple formulations of the first principle itself.
Yet Fichte also underscored that the first principle must be self-evident to all: âSince this proposition is supposed to be certain immediately and through itself, this can only mean that its content determines its form and its form determines its content.â10 Are all the above formulations immediately certain and self-evident? Fichte was similarly clear as early as the 1794 Recension des Aenesidemus that in order to have a living foundation for his philosophy, the content of any true first principle had to be ârealâ or âmaterialâ, and not abstract, formulaic or theoretical, like those found in the sciences of logic or mathematics.11 This is furthermore a distinction that can be easily overlooked â the classic and crucial Fichtean distinction between the outer letter (Buchstabe) and inner spirit or mind (Geist). That is to say, we have to clearly distinguish between the mere linguistic expression of the first principle that can be summarized in words or signs, and the actual living content or cognitive act to which these words refer: âThe Wissenschaftslehre establishes a proposition (Satz) that has been thought and then expressed in words. Such a proposition corresponds to an action (Handlung) of the human mind.â12
Other researchers have argued that perhaps there is no one single Grundsatz, or even that Fichteâs system is not foundational at all. This leads to the related problem or charge: the reason why there exists many variations of the first principle is because Fichte himself continually changed or modified it. That is to say, Fichte adopted a different first principle later in Berlin, because supposedly his early Jena system was not working. If this is the case, then there is a distinct rupture in the transcendental and scientific foundations of Fichteâs system. Indeed, this alternative seems tempting and even obvious to many people, especially since many of the later Berlin writings clearly appeal to some kind of transcendent or religious foundation. Or can this contradiction between the early Jena and later Berlin presentations be satisfactorily resolved? In this regard, we have to remember that Fichteâs primary philosophical method in the Grundlage is the method of synthesis, which concerns none other than the resolution of cognitive paradoxes or apparent contradictions. And of course: properly answering the question of a rupture in the foundations of the Wissenschaftslehre first of all involves correctly determining what exactly the first principle of the early Jena system is. If researchers choose the wrong first principle for the Jena period, then it will be hard to convincingly and accurately prove a rupture later on in Berlin. Hence, it is extremely necessary for Fichte scholarship to attain a more comprehensive consensus regarding the first principle in Fichteâs chief scientific text in Jena, the 1794/95 Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre. And that is exactly what many of the contributions in this volume have striven to do.
The Sub-Disciplines of the Wissenschaftslehre
The Wissenschaftslehre was not merely to have a rigorous foundation based on three interrelated first principles, but also to be a general system of the whole of human knowledge and of all the other specific sciences. In sum: âThe Wissenschaftslehre is supposed to be the science of all the sciences.â13 Moreover, Fichte was fully convinced of the originality of his philosophy: âthis science is a newly discovered science whose very idea did not previously exist, and this can only be obtained and judged from the Wissenschaftslehre itself.â14
As early as the year 1795, after the publication of the Grundlage and the Grundriss, Fichte believed that he had now done enough for a competent reader to already have a perfectly sufficient overview of the method, ground, and scope of his system, and how this foundation could be further expanded upon:
In the present book [Grundlage], as well as if one includes the text: Grundrisse des Eigentümlichen der Wissenschaftslehre in Rücksicht auf das theoretische Vermögen, I believe I have developed my system so far that every competent judge can completely have an overview of both the ground (Grund) and extent (Umfang) of the system, as well as the method (Art) as to how one can further build on the former.15
In the 1794 Ãber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre Fichte had listed a number of disciplines that were to be built on the foundation of the more general Wissenschaftslehre. These projected sub-disciplines or particular sciences included: a theory of aesthetics, the philosophy of nature, a doctrine of God, a doctrine of right, and a theory of ethics, and again, âwhose first foundational principles are not merely formal, but material.â16 Each of these specific sub-disciplines of the Wissenschaftslehre should likewise have a first foundational principle. The Wissenschaftslehre is to provide the first principles to these other particular sub-disciplines, and they should in turn relate back to the first principles of the general Wissenschaftslehre. Hence, each of the foundational principles are to be viewed from two sides, from the side of the main foundational principle, and from the side of the specific sub-discipline:
In this respect the Wissenschaftslehre is supposed to provide all the sciences with their first principles. It follows that all those propositions which serve as first principles of the various particular sciences are, at the same time, propositions indigenous to the Wissenschaftslehre. Thus, one and the same proposition has to be considered from two points of view: as a proposition contained within the Wissenschaftslehre, and also as a first principle standing at the pinnacle of some particular science.17
Here we encounter further puzzling aspects of Fichteâs system. How exactly does the first principle of the general Wissenschaftslehre relate in a twofold manner to the first principles of the particular sub-disciplines? And how many sub-disciplines or particular sciences are there? Similar to the first 1794 edition of Ãber den Begriff, the 1798/99 lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo conclude with a classification of the different sub-disciplines of the system, including a theory of nature, a system of ethics, a doctrine of right, a philosophy of religion, as well as a theory of aesthetics.18 While the 1806 Anweisung zum seligen Leben seems to list five main disciplines in a hierarchical manner, with the conception of nature at the bottom and the system of science at the summit.19 To complicate matters, the second series of the 1804 lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre had argued that any five disciplines can in turn be split up into a further five, with the total result of âtwenty-fiveâ sub-disciplines, or what Fichte also terms as forms or âbasic determinations of knowledge.â20 Indeed, in the later Jena, Berlin and Erlangen periods Fichte gave presentations on other topics such as political theory, economics, the theory of the state, philosophy of history, theory of the scholar, the philosophy of mathematics, and so on. So does the Wissenschaftslehre have five, twenty-five, or even more sub-disciplines?
Not only is the number of sub-disciplines puzzling. Fichte maintained that once the entire system was completed it would return back to its original starting point. In other words, the architectonic of the system is supposedly circular:
A first principle has been exhausted when a complete system has been erected upon it; that is, when the first principle necessarily leads to all the established propositions, and all the established propositions necessarily lead back in turn to it. [â¦] When this science is established, it will be shown that this circular course (Kreislauf) is really completed, and the researcher will be left back precisely at the point from which he had started.21
Thus, there is a beginning point and an endpoint to the Wissenschaftslehre, and when the system is exhausted one will see how they harmonize and that the researcher has circled back to the starting point. In the Second Introduction, Fichte stated that the start of the Wissenschaftslehre commences with the âintuition of the Iâ, and it concludes with the âidea of the Iâ.22 He stressed that the intuition and idea should not be confused with one another and are therefore distinct. But how exactly is the architectonic circular if these two points are distinct? This is another problematic issue concerning the intersection between the main foundational principle and the first principles of the sub-disciplines of the Wissenschaftslehre.
The Total System of the Wissenschaftslehre
In any event, Fichte viewed the general foundation, together with all its particular sub-disciplines, in which the researcher returns and circle backs to the original starting point, as constituting a philosophical whole, or as the total system of the Wissenschaftslehre. It was conceived as a scientific foundation for all human knowledge or as a modern philosophical encyclopaedia. In fact, in 1813 Fichte advertised a series of lectures at the University of Berlin with precisely this title: âAllgemeine wissenschaftliche Encyclopädieâ (General Scientific Encyclopaedia).23
But was this total encyclopaedic system of the Wissenschaftslehre ever completed? We have to remember, for Fichte the system attains completion (Vollendung) or is exhausted when it returns back to its starting point. That is the difference between the general Wissenschaftslehre and any of the particular sciences. Unlike the latter, the former can be completed:
The Wissenschaftslehre therefore has absolute totality. In it, the One leads to the All, and the All to the One. It is the sole science that can be completed; accordingly, completion is one of its defining characteristics. All the other sciences are infinite and can never be completed; because they do not return back again to their first principle.24
There is much debate on this point, both for and against the completion of the Wissenschaftslehre. With the publication of the Grundlage des Naturrechts in 1796/97 and the Sittenlehre in 1798 we do appear to have finished versions of at least two major sub-disciplines of the Wissenschaftslehre already by the year 1798. Notwithstanding, in the Preface to the second 1798 edition of Ãber den Begriff, Fichte admitted that his system was still far from complete, and there remained a lot of work to finish it: âFor the completion of the system, there is still indescribably much to do. The ground has hardly been laid, and the building has scarcely begun.â25 Significantly, however, in that same text he did dispense entirely with the âhypothetical classification of the Wissenschaftslehreâ, that is, with the above-mentioned projected sketch of the architectonical idea of its various sub-disciplines, because he now considered that its contents had been sufficiently incorporated into the Grundlage text.26
In 1806, in the Preface to his chief text on the philosophy of religion, the Anweisung zum seligen Leben, oder auch die Religionslehre, Fichte declared that his late popular writings were perfectly in harmony with his earlier scientific system, and that the Anweisung should henceforth be viewed as the âsummitâ and âbrightest point of lightâ of all his writings.27 If so, with this detailed study on the philosophy of religion had the Wissenschaftslehre finally become completed in 1806? Or was it now just philosophically transcendent? According to Fichte, his system remained fully immanent and transcendental, and never became transcendent or dogmatic. Many critics and current scholars disagree with him on this point. They see the later turn to popular writings on religion and faith around 1800 to be no longer compatible with a scientific and rational system of philosophy. However, if this interpretation of a later irreconcilable religious turn is correct, why did Fichte already state in the 1794/95 Grundlage that the Wissenschaftslehre is ânot atheisticâ,28 and room must therefore be made in it for a philosophy of religion?29
Whatever view we adopt regarding the question of continuity or rupture between the early and later presentations of the Wissenschaftslehre, we should be aware of another piece of advice that Fichte had given in the 1795 Preface to the Grundlage. In fact, it is so crucial, Fichte underscored it twice. And that is, however much we explicitly determine one element in the Wissenschaftslehre â and that of course holds for the first foundational principles and those of the sub-disciplines â no one specific element can be fully understood in isolation or on its own, but each and every element should additionally be viewed from the standpoint of the totality of the system:
One has to explain from the context, and first procure an overview of the whole before precisely determining a single isolated proposition; this is a method that obviously presupposes goodwill to do justice to the system rather than the intention of only finding errors in it. [â¦] I request future critics of this text to examine the whole, and to view every single thought from the viewpoint of the whole.30
It is exceedingly difficult for a single scholar, let alone the ordinary interested reader, to have a thorough grasp of the entirety of Fichteâs philosophical writings, including those on the different subs-disciplines of the Wissenschaftslehre. Hence, this was another of the central aims of this volume 49 of the Fichte-Studien, to help serious philosophical readers of the Wissenschaftslehre in the imposing task of obtaining a better insight into its total system. Naturally, this volume could not tackle all the above unresolved issues, nor can it provide an overview of every single facet or sub-discipline. Yet it does try to supply vital and up-to-date perspectives on some of the most relevant elements and key domains.
Eventually for Fichte, any final overview of the Wissenschaftslehre can only be generated by readers themselves, who need to freely employ their philosophical forces to attain such a perspective. Not simply their more analytic skills of judging, or the intellect, or understanding and reason, but also their powers of memory, their faculty of intuition, and lastly, the unifying and synthesising force of their own creative or productive imagination. This last point needs underscoring for it is often underappreciated. According to Fichte, it is not just poets and artists who need to utilise their creative imagination, but it is absolutely necessary for philosophers too, in order to grasp the central ideas of his system. Once this is done, the resulting insight hits the reader suddenly: âin a fortunate minute the sought-after image presents itself before the soul like a flash of lightning. [â¦] It depends on this faculty [of the creative imagination] whether a person philosophizes with spirit or not. The Wissenschaftslehre is of such a nature that it cannot be communicated at all through the mere letter, but solely through the spirit. This is because for anyone who studies the Wissenschaftslehre, its foundational ideas (Grund-Ideen) have to be generated by the creative power of the imagination itself.â31 Failing to deploy the totality of oneâs intellectual forces will therefore result in a one-sided and incomplete picture of this system: âThe Wissenschaftslehre should exhaust the entire human being; hence, it can only be grasped with the totality of the human beingâs entire faculties â [â¦] this is a truth that is very unpleasant to state and to hear, but it remains a truth nevertheless.â32
May this volume inspire future scholars to make even further explicit what Fichte left unsaid or only implicitly pointed to. For them to employ all their faculties to try and resolve more precisely many of these puzzling questions and enigmas concerning the first foundational principles of Fichteâs Wissenschaftslehre on the one hand, and the totality of his system on the other.
David W. Wood
J.G. Fichte, Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, 1794/95 (GA I/2: 253). (Unless otherwise noted, all translations from the German are mine). A new English translation of the Grundlage is forthcoming in: J.G. Fichte, Foundation of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre and Related Writings, 1794â95, edited and translated by Daniel Breazeale (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021).
Cf. BWL (GAÂ I/2: 111), GWL (GAÂ I/2: 251â252).
See the accounts in volume 1 of Fichte im Gespräch (FG), edited by Erich Fuchs, pp. 63â64. See the English translations of these accounts in: J.G. Fichte, Early Philosophical Writings, edited and translated by Daniel Breazeale (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 12â13.
J.G. Fichte in Zurich to Karl August Böttiger in Weimar, 8 January 1794 (GA III/2: 32).
J.G. Fichte in Zurich to Heinrich Stephani, mid-December 1793 (GA III/2: 28); Fichte, Early Philosophical Writings, p. 371.
AzsL (GAÂ I/9: 47).
J.G. Fichte, Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre (GA I/4: 225); English translation by Daniel Breazeale in: J.G. Fichte, Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre and Other Writings (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett, 1994), p. 57.
GWL (GAÂ I/2: 255).
GWL (GAÂ I/2: 261).
BWL (GA I/2: 121); Fichte, Early Philosophical Writings, p. 109.
Fichte, Recension des Aenesidemus (GAÂ I/2: 46); cf. GWL (GAÂ I/2: 267, 272, 363).
BWL (GA I/2: 148); Fichte, Early Philosophical Writings, p. 132.
BWL (GA I/2: 127); ibid., p. 114.
Fichte, [Ankündigung] âSeit sechs Jahrenâ, 1801 (GA I/7: 153); Fichte, âAnnouncementâ in: J.G. Fichte/F.W.J. Schelling, The Philosophical Rupture between Fichte and Schelling. Selected Texts and Correspondence (1800â1802), trans. and eds. Michael G. Vater and David W. Wood (Albany/N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 2012), p. 85.
GWL (GAÂ I/2: 252).
See the section âHypothetical Classification of the Wissenschaftslehreâ (Hypothetische Einteilung der Wissenschaftslehre), in: Fichte, BWL (GAÂ I/2: 151).
BWL (GA I/2: 151), Fichte, Early Philosophical Writings, p. 114.
WLnm-K (GAÂ IV/2: 262â266).
AzsL (GAÂ I/9: 106â114).
WL-1804-II (GAÂ II/8: 419).
BWL (GA I/2: 130â131); Fichte, Early Philosophical Writings, pp. 116â117 (trans. modified).
Fichte, Zweite Einleitung (GAÂ I/4: 265â266).
Cf. editorsâ preface to GAÂ II/16: 3.
BWL (GA I/2, 131); (cf. Fichte, Early Philosophical Writings, p. 117).
Ibid. (GAÂ I/2, 162).
Ibid. (GAÂ I/2, 160â161).
AzsL (GAÂ I/9: 47).
GWL (GAÂ I/2: 410).
I have elsewhere argued that Fichteâs scientific idea of a Tathandlung in the Grundlage has actually been adapted from the sphere of religion, specifically the rational tradition of the Johannine logos. Consequently, Fichteâs philosophical presentation of the Tathandlung in the Grundlage forms a purely rational transition from science to religion already in the year 1794. See David W. Wood, âFichteâs Absolute I and the Forgotten Tradition of Tathandlungâ, in: Das Selbst und die Welt â Beiträge zu Kant und der nachkantischen Philosophie (Festschrift für Günter Zöller), eds. Manja Kisner, Giovanni Pietro Basile, Ansgar Lyssy, Michael Bastien Weiss (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2019), pp. 167â192.
GWL (GAÂ I/2: 252â253).
Ibid. (GAÂ I/2: 415).
Ibid.