1 Introduction
Emer de Vattel has been widely considered a seminal figure in the European tradition of the law of nations. While attaching himself to the earlier tradition of natural jurisprudence, he offered a normative system of the law of nations that was more firmly and explicitly anchored to the political practice of his contemporary Europe than were the doctrines of his predecessors. Vattel promoted the practical applicability of his Droit des gens (1758), stressing that it was not so much written for interested âprivate individualsâ, i.e. other scholars or the general public, but it was a âlaw of sovereignsâ that was primarily intended for âthem and their ministersâ. It would not help much, he explained, if his maxims were studied only by those who had no influence over public affairs; the âconductors of statesâ, on the other hand, if they chose to learn this science and adopt its maxims as the âcompassâ for their policies, could produce many âhappy resultsâ.1 Vattel emphasized the easy comprehension and applicability of his book, contrasting his approach with that of Christian Wolff, whose treatise on the law of nations could be understood only if one âpreviously studied sixteen or seventeen quarto volumes which precede itâ.2 As Vattel famously declared, his original intention was to introduce Wolffâs system to a wider readership, by rendering his rigid and formal work more âagreeable and better calculated to ensure it a reception in the polite worldâ.3
While it is clear that Vattelâs work amounted to much more than a systematic account of Wolffâs principles,4 it is in the manner of presentation that the differences between the two scholars are the most striking. Already the choice of French over Latin, the language of diplomats over that of the republic of letters, is a sign of an appeal to political and diplomatic rather than scholarly circles. But an even more important difference appears from Vattelâs choice of examples. The Swiss scholar illustrated his maxims with numerous historical cases, with a clear purpose in mind. He explains that if the aim of a book is not just to inform readers of the right principles of action but also to motivate those who are in charge to follow these principles, it is not sufficient to lay out a systematic account of the law: one also needs to cite examples, âto render the doctrine more impressiveâ.5 For this reason, âwhenever I found a convenient opportunity, I have, above all things, endeavoured to inspire a love of virtue, by shewing, from some striking passage of history, how amiable it is, how worthy of our homage in some truly great men, and even productive of solid advantageâ.6 Teaching through exempla is, of course, an essential feature of humanist rhetorical strategy that most seventeenth-century natural jurists had also followed, with a few notable exceptions such as Thomas Hobbes and the early Samuel Pufendorf, who set out to construct a more rigid geometrical system.7 But it is important to note here that Vattel contrasts his choice of examples with that of his predecessors: âI have quoted the chief part of my examples from modern history, as well because these are more interesting as to avoid a repetition of those which have been already accumulated by Grotius, Puffendorf, and their commentatorsâ.8
The broader aim of this chapter is to discuss the relationship between Vattelâs normative system and his usages of history. I will argue that Vattelâs resort to examples from modern history had a greater significance for his overall theory than he modestly indicates in the passage quoted above, and also a far greater importance than earlier historiography has attached to it. In previous research, Vattelâs uses of history have not been addressed in any systematic manner, creating an impression that Vattel was not interested in history as such, and that his examples, therefore, serve indeed only as illustrations. Some scholars have suggested more explicitly that Vattelâs approach is ahistorical, in the sense that he provides a normative account that is not anchored in any systematic understanding of European or civilizational history. Walter Rech, for example, has stated that Vattel âmoved away from historyâ, replacing the âhistoricismâ or âcultural relativismâ of his predecessors (Bodin, Grotius and Bynkershoek) with a âfaith in universal Reasonâ. Vattelâs ahistorical approach was, in Rechâs view, purely rationalist, and the âinherent rationality and conformity with the principles of the natural law of nationsâ of his âEuropeâs international lawâ enabled him to justify âthe hegemony of the civilizedâ.9
Another example is Ian Hunterâs interpretation of Vattel, which in its central contentions is almost an exact opposite to those of Rech. In a number of essays Hunter presents a convincing refutation of the post-colonialist critique of Vattel, arguing that Vattelâs concerns were primarily intra-European. Rather than constructing a universalist theory aimed at justifying European colonization or dispossessing the barbarian, Vattelâs central objective was âto consolidate the civilizing effect of the intra-European regulation of warfareâ.10 For this purpose Vattel worked with a âdouble registerâ of norms. In their conscience, sovereigns were bound by the natural law principles of universal justice based on a Wolffian natural law metaphysics of self-perfecting corporate persons.11 In the actual practice of international relations, where there was no universal authority to form judgements on the conduct of free, independent and equal nations, these universal principles were suspended and replaced with a body of rules that Vattel calls âvoluntary lawâ.12 These were prudential rules drawn from European state practice, the essence of which was to treat both parties in war as legally equal, no matter how their behaviour seemed from the point of view of universal justice. Voluntary law was derived from natural law, as it was natural law itself that commanded sovereigns to suspend its rigorous principles in favour of these prudential rules in order to reduce the violence of inter-state warfare.13 Hunter portrays Vattelâs theory as âdiplomatic casuistryâ that operates in the space between these distinct normative registers, providing the diplomats who were serving the interests of a European territorial state with the tools of adjusting universal justice to the conditions of national self-interest. The suspension of natural law in the interests of oneâs own nation simultaneously served the interests of the society of nations as a whole, supporting the principles of non-discriminatory war and peace settlement through compromise.14
Among the variety of intellectual sources that inform Vattelâs vision of international order, Hunter attributes a distinct role to European public law, collections of treaties, and diplomatic history, from which the prudential voluntary law rules were inferred.15 But with regard to his usage of the conjectural histories of the Enlightenment, Hunter appears in line with Rech, although on opposite grounds. For Rech, Vattelâs supposed lack of interest in the histories of mankind and the denial of any collective advancement of humanity16 is a sign of his disregard of cultural-historical diversity for the sake of justifying the forced export of Europeâs international law. Hunter also denies that Vattel âbased his construction of the law of nature and nations on a universal philosophy of justice or a universalising philosophical historyâ but this was not because of a Eurocentric prejudice but because his thought was wholly internal to âa specifically European political historyâ.17
One can only agree with Hunter that a universalizing philosophical history was not the main pillar on which Vattel constructed his normative theory. Indeed, Vattel writes hardly anything explicit about the history of mankind or the logic of collective advancement of humanity. Nevertheless, the lack of a systematic account of philosophical history does not mean that we should reduce his theory to a mere European peace project. This chapter is an attempt to show that his concern with European nations and European international relations had a universalist framework, as he projected his pragmatic diplomatic-historical account onto a specific version of Enlightenment philosophical history. It was not a stadial conjectural history of humanity that was sketched by Pufendorf and developed more fully by Scottish authors only after Vattelâs work was published,18 nor a Rousseauian sceptical vision of the corrupting force of civilization. Instead, he drew on Voltaireâs optimistic account of general human progress that was driven by enlightened monarchs who exercised a specific kind of political virtue. Vattelâs debt to Voltaireâs thèse royale is particularly visible in his account of the Russian tsar Peter the Great that drew directly on Voltaireâs historical works. I will argue that through his portrayal of Peter the Great, Vattel intended to demonstrate the potential of global human progress, which did not rely on the implementation of natural law by force, nor on virtuous self-denial, but on the proper, enlightened understanding of self-interest.
2 Men and Monsters in Vattelâs Law of Nations
In order to understand Peter the Greatâs role in Vattelâs theory we first need to take a look at Vattelâs portrayal of human cultural and moral diversity. Despite the fact that Vattelâs Law of Nations does not offer a systematic classification of humanity, the large number of examples scattered throughout the book allow us to reconstruct a moral hierarchy of nations that characterizes the world in which his normative theory obtains. What emerges from the treatise is a picture of the globe that has been and still is inhabited by a variety of peoples whose customs, manners and civilizational achievements exhibit different stages of cultural and moral development. Accordingly, nations are labelled pejoratively as âsavageâ or âbarbarousâ, or positively as âcivilizedâ or âpolishedâ. Vattel employs these widely used labels to indicate that nations have realized their duty of self-perfection to different degrees. But he introduces an additional category, namely that of âmonstersâ, which cuts through all these distinctions. The concept of monsters does not refer to fabulous creatures known from early modern travel writings19 nor to a specific level of cultural development existing in some part of the globe, but it is a theoretical concept to signify individuals or nations who lack the minimum of morality that is necessary for social life, and who are, therefore, morally speaking, more similar to brutes than to men. As this concept is an important tool for Vattel to determine the applicability and scope of the voluntary law of nations, the distinction between monsters and men deserves a closer scrutiny.
The first instance where we encounter âmonstersâ occurs in the first book where Vattel discusses various obligations that nations owe to themselves by the laws of nature. It is important to note that these obligations are not derived from the HobbesianâPufendorfian minimal concept of natural law that restricts its purview to mere self-preservation and societal peace. Instead, the duties to oneself originate from the WolffianâLeibnizian metaphysics of perfectibility, with a view to achieving perfection and happiness, both as an individual and as a nation.20 A sovereign is thus not a mere peacekeeper but is ultimately responsible for creating the conditions where all citizens are capable and motivated to strive towards perfection, which is the road to happiness.21 The sovereign should, first of all, enable and promote economic activities that produce âa happy plenty of all the necessaries of life, with its conveniences, and innocent and laudable enjoymentsâ.22 Yet not all economic activities that might be able to provide for human necessities are morally equal for Vattel. There are some ways of life that are natural to men and thus conducive to achieving perfection; there are others that tend to corrupt the character and thus impede happiness; and finally, there are some that are thoroughly corrupt. Thus there is a gradation of employments, according to their effects on the human soul,23 but also according to the effects that they have on other nations.
This gradation is articulated in the chapter âOf the Cultivation of the Soilâ, where Vattel lifts agriculture above all other economic activities. Agriculture is not only the most stable foundation of national wealth and an infinite source of growth,24 but it is also the ânatural employment of manâ, which a sovereign should promote by any available means. Vattel does not place European nations above the rest of the world in this respect. Quite the opposite is the case, because in many European countries, especially in Spain, where the Church owns too much land, the Roman heritage has been forgotten and the âbeloved employment of the first consuls and dictators of Romeâ is disdained by âa little insignificant haberdasher, a tailorâ and âeven the most servile mechanicsâ. A positive modern example is provided by the Chinese, who hold agriculture in honour, with the result that China is the âbest cultivated country in the worldâ.25
Now Vattel moves on to those who fully neglect the obligation to cultivate the soil. Here he makes an important theoretical addition: this duty is not only derived from the obligation to pursue individual or national self-perfection but it is an âobligation imposed by nature on mankindâ as a whole, because the earth is given to all its inhabitants to nourish themselves, not to each nation separately. This perspective enables him to censure those who, âto avoid labour, chuse to live only by hunting, and their flocksâ.26 It is clear that Vattel morally condemns such âidleâ and wasteful modes of life but it also has important legal implications, because other, âmore industriousâ nations that are âtoo closely confinedâ are entitled to take possession of the vast tracts that are ârather ranged through than inhabitedâ.27 In another chapter, Vattel outlines a more systematic account of the acquisition of property. He argues that uncultivated lands should be considered âvacantâ, that is, without ownership in the legal sense, and therefore the colonization and appropriation by the âpeople of Europeâ of the lands of which the âsavagesâ did not make âactual and constant useâ was wholly legitimate.28 Vattel contrasts the legitimate colonization of North America with the conquest of the âcivilized empires of Peru and Mexicoâ, which in his view was a ânotorious usurpationâ.29 In another famous passage Vattel rejects Grotiusâs doctrine of universal punishment, which enabled the European nations to argue that they were entitled to subject these nations on the grounds of the civilizing and Christianizing mission.30 According to Vattel, sovereigns can rightfully punish only those transgressions that affect their own rights and safety.31 With regard to the question of cultivation, it is clear that an injury occurs only when the âsavagesâ do not allow the legitimate appropriation of their lands by colonists. But Vattel also mentions another class of non-agricultural savages who can be rightfully punished by everyone: âthose nations (such as the ancient Germans, and some modern Tartars) who inhabit fertile countries, but disdain to cultivate their lands, and chuse rather to live by plunder, are wanting to themselves, are injurious to all their neighbours, and deserve to be extirpated as savage and pernicious beastsâ.32 A much stronger language is warranted here because these nations violate not just the duty of self-perfection but infringe the natural rights of others. Those savages who do not harm others, however, should be treated humanely and moderately, as was done by the English settlers who even purchased the land from the North American Indians, although this was clearly not needed for the acquisition of a legal title.33
The second cluster of beastly or monstrous nations appears in various chapters of the second book, where Vattel examines the obligations that a nation owes to other nations. First, there is a general stipulation that when a sovereign condones the atrocities committed by the stateâs citizens, the entire nation can be punished as a common enemy: âwhen by its manners and by the maxims of its government it accustoms and authorizes its citizens indiscriminately to plunder and maltreat foreigners, to make inroads into the neighbouring countries, &c. [â¦] all nations have a right to enter into a league against such a people, to repress them and to treat them as the common enemies of the human raceâ. Vattel presents two examples, the Usbecks and the Barbary states, âwith whom the love of plunder, or the fear of just punishment, is the only rule of peace and warâ.34 He provides more cases of the maltreatment of foreigners in his discussion of the duty of hospitability, condemning those âsavage nations who treated strangers ill, that Scythian tribe who sacrificed them to Dianaâ, and agrees with Grotius that âtheir extreme ferocity excluded them from the great society of mankindâ.35 It also appears that it is not necessarily an entire nation that can act monstrously but a sovereign can alone become an enemy of mankind and can therefore be subjected to a collective punishment: âAs to those monsters who, under the title of sovereigns, render themselves the scourges and horror of the human race, they are savage beasts, who every brave man may justly exterminate from the face of the earthâ.36 Vattel does not present any contemporary examples here, but mentions only three mythical tyrants: âall antiquity has praised Hercules for delivering the world from an Antaeus, a Busiris, a Diomedeâ.37 Yet the context for this statement is the question of the rights of sovereigns to interfere in the quarrel of another sovereign with his subjects where those subjects have risen in self-defence against an âinsupportableâ tyranny. A single example of such a justified intervention is taken from modern history, namely the deposition of James ii by William of Orange.38 This suggests that monstrous tyrants can also rise among the civilized peoples of Europe.
Nations that are always ready to take up arms on any prospect of advantage, are lawless robbers: but those who seem to delight in the ravages of war, who spread it on all sides, without reasons or pretexts, and even without any other motive than their own ferocity, are monsters, unworthy the name of men. They should be considered as enemies to the human race [â¦]. All nations have a right to join in a confederacy for the purpose of punishing and even exterminating those savage nations.39
Vattel makes here a distinction between two kinds of immoral nations: those who wage war without a just cause, only for the motive of advantage, and those who do not have any reasons, pretexts or apparent motives but enjoy warfare as such. This distinction is not a novelty proposed by Vattel. His direct source of inspiration was Christian Wolff, who, in turn, drew on a long discussion of monstrously bellicose nations that was introduced by Hugo Grotius. But Vattel added an important further construction onto these foundations: a focus on pretexts as the criterion for distinguishing between monsters and men. Let us have a brief look at the foundations so as to gain an understanding of the role of monsters and the function of pretexts in Vattelâs theory.
Vattel starts his account of the causes of war with a distinction between âjustificatory reasonsâ, which refer to legal grounds of war, and âmotivesâ, which refer to expediency.40 This distinction, too, is an inheritance from Grotius, who discussed a number of cases from antiquity when rulers had publicly presented a justifying reason (causa justifica) but the actual motive (causa suasoria) was âa strong desire of glory, empire and richesâ.41 Wolff utilized exactly the same terminology for a distinction between justifying (justifica) and persuasive (suasoria) reasons.42 All authors in the early modern tradition of natural jurisprudence argued that if a war was waged without legitimate justifying reasons (i.e. an injury done or threatened), it was unjust, as it violated the (perfect) rights of the other nation. But even worse were those who lacked even the expedient motives: these nations were described as ferocious, savage, beast-like enemies of mankind. Grotius writes that to covet dangers for dangerâs sake is a âvice that so far passes the bounds of humanity, that by Aristotle it is styled brutishnessâ.43 As Grotius further elaborates in the chapter about punishments, such men are not completely human because, normally, people commit crimes for some wicked, self-oriented motives. Sinful desires are part and parcel of humanity whereas pure wickedness without any benefit to oneself is not: âThere is hardly any man wicked for nothing, and if there be any one who loves wickedness for its own sake, he is a sort of monsterâ.44 This is something so unnatural that Jean Barbeyrac in his commentaries on Pufendorf, referring to Grotiusâs discussion of different kinds of unjust wars, doubts that such nations actually exist.45
Wolff also presents a Grotian typology of unjust wars that is based on the existence and relative force of âjustifyingâ and âpersuasiveâ reasons: first, wars undertaken solely for utility; second, wars waged for utility but with the existence of a just cause; and third, wars waged for utility but under the appearance of quasi-justifying reasons (i.e. pretexts). The strongest moral condemnation belongs, again, to the fourth type: âThe war of those who, influenced neither by justifying nor by persuasive reasons, are carried into wars, is not only unjust but also transgresses the law of humanityâ.46 Like Grotius and Barbeyrac, Wolff is puzzled why anyone would go to war without any apparent benefit to oneself. Therefore, those who, âinfluenced neither by justifying nor by persuasive reasons, are carried into war, must represent to themselves as a benefit the war considered as such, consequently, filled with a mistaken notion of good, they must gain pleasure from it, and consequently the slaughter and mangling of men and the destruction of property belonging to innocent men delights themâ.47
Wolffâs recipe for dealing with such monsters is also influenced by Grotius, who famously argued that every sovereign had the right to exact punishments not only for injuries done to the nation itself but for âany grievous violations of the law of nature or nationsâ.48 Thus war can be waged against those who âoffend against natureâ. The list of such offenders includes those who practise tyranny, those who are inhuman to their parents, those who eat human flesh and those who practise piracy. The last group are described as semi-human monsters whose âdepravity of mindâ has cut them off from human society. Against âsuch barbarians, and rather beasts than menâ, a war is just and even ânaturalâ.49 Wolff, however, takes the side with those critics of Grotius who argued that such an indeterminate account of universal punishment is an anathema to international order. Nevertheless, he did not go so far as to agree with Pufendorfâs wholesale rejection of the possibility of applying the concept of punishment to international relations.50 Wolff restricted the right of punitive war only to injuries done to oneself: âFor no one has a right of a war except one to whom a wrong has been doneâ.51 But in Wolffâs view this restriction is not applicable to those who delight in war as such. Since these people âdo not hesitate to injure any nations simply for self-gratification [â¦] a right of war belongs to all nations in generalâ against them.52
As we can see from the above, Vattelâs account of the âenemies of the human raceâ who can be punished and even exterminated by all nations drew directly on that of Wolff. But Vattel added a very important twist to Wolffâs argument that enabled him to determine with greater precision whether we are dealing with men or with monsters. This, in turn, was vital for him in order to determine whether or not natural law stipulations were to be suspended and a voluntary law regime applied in a particular case. In Vattelâs view, this cannot be decided on the basis of an analysis of the content of justifiable reasons presented by a party in war, because, as discussed above, nobody can claim to be able to judge the rightfulness of a sovereignâs cause. It may indeed often be the case that someone goes to war merely from motives of advantage; his conduct in that case is âreprehensible, and sullied by the badness of his motivesâ. War is so dreadful that only âmanifest justice, joined to a kind of necessityâ renders it exempt from reproach.53 Nevertheless, as Vattel emphasizes, he cannot âbe charged with injusticeâ, because âin every case susceptible of doubt, the arms of the two parties at war are to be accounted equally lawful, at least as to external effectsâ.54
Therefore, since no nation can assume for itself the functions of a judge, and consequently cannot pronounce upon the justice of the war, although by natural law a war cannot be just on both sides, since nevertheless each of the belligerents claims that it has just cause of war, each must be allowed to follow its own opinion; consequently by the voluntary law of nations the war must be considered as just on either side, not indeed in itself [â¦] but as regards the results of war.56
Pretexts are at least a homage which unjust men pay to justice. He who screens himself with them shews that he still retains some sense of shame. He does not openly trample on what is most sacred in human society: he tacitly acknowledges that a flagrant injustice merits the indignation of all mankind.59
It should be noted that the shift of focus from substantive justice to pretexts does not mean a decriminalization of all enemies in warfare, nor an abandonment of the just war theory as such, as claimed by Carl Schmitt and his followers. The Schmittian interpretation has posited that Vattel, following the lead of Grotius, abandoned the âmedieval doctrine of just warâ and stipulated the legal equality of both sides in war, as long as the war was waged by a sovereign authority.60
Thus, according to this interpretation, the formal concept of justice replaced the substantive one, and the ânon-discriminatoryâ treatment of belligerents was established as a legal principle, with no reference to the existence or non-existence of a just material cause for war. Schmitt argued that Vattel reached âthe classical transparency of the enlightened 18th centuryâ and displaced the whole problem of a substantive, normative justice âopenly and clearly in the mere âformâ, i.e. in the purely state structure of warâ.61
It is, however, impossible to reconcile this argument with Vattelâs account of monsters and the declaration of war. As we saw, a declaration was required not for the sake of proving that a war was waged by sovereign authority but for the sake of publicly announcing the reasons for war. Vattel never argued that the exercise of sovereign authority was sufficient to qualify as a legitimate belligerent who should enjoy non-discriminatory treatment under the regime of voluntary law. On the contrary, his distinction between men and monsters retained the traditional separation between just and unjust enemies in a particularly strong form, and this distinction was not tied to the concept of sovereignty. This position is clearly evident in Vattelâs treatment of the Barbary corsairs, who admittedly exercised sovereignty over their own territories but who nevertheless were to be punished as the enemies of humankind by other nations. This is also recognized by Walter Rech, who struggles to reconcile his firm support for Schmittâs thesis with Vattelâs account of the Barbary states. Rather than using the latter as evidence to question Schmittâs interpretation of Vattelâs normative system, Rech concludes that Vattel is inconsistent and betrays his own principles. He first attributes to Vattel the aim of âmoving away from the traditional just war doctrine by focusing on the modality as opposed to the morality of warfareâ. But Vattel failed to reach this supposed goal, because in order to âmake a case against Barbary warfare [he] had to depart from the idea that sovereignty as such elicited the right to wage warâ. Therefore, in Rechâs view, Vattel âproblematically resorted to the just cause argument, which he put aside when describing the âwar in due formâ between European sovereignsâ.62
I do not see the need to accuse Vattel of inconsistency or hypocrisy in this respect, because the figure of monsters and the argument of pretexts were introduced by him precisely to maintain the principles of natural justice as the overarching framework within which voluntary law could operate. It was not the case that âstrict natural law re-enters into forceâ in the face of âgrave and systematic violations of the âvoluntary law of nationsââ, as Rech has argued.63 On the contrary, strict natural law was always binding in conscience, and the voluntary law regime would not be applicable to nations or sovereigns who clearly and evidently violated the principles of natural justice, which is why they would be punished with its full force. Therefore, the requirement of a declaration of reasons was not mere âformâ but it enabled men to be distinguished from monsters, buttressing the validity of natural justice. Vattel thus retained the distinction between justus hostis and an unjust enemy who should be treated as a common criminal, even though he lowered the bar for the qualification as justus hostis so as to render the potential criminalization less arbitrary and subjective.
Moreover, the presentation of a pretext was not a purely formal criterion because it functioned as an indication that a nation or a sovereign possessed a minimum of natural morality. This minimum was established not with regard to how a nation treated others but with regard to how it behaved towards itself, that is, whether or not it had a basic understanding of its own proper good and the desire to advance it. A sovereign who presented a pretext was at least willing to appear that he was playing by the rules. This purely expedient or self-interested action indicated the presence of two basic components of moral behaviour upon which one could hope to build more advanced levels of morality: first, that sovereign (or nation) was not led purely by desires but demonstrated the presence of a certain level of instrumental rationality; and secondly, that it had a âsense of shameâ, that is, an awareness of the existence of the moral rules of human society. The thrust of Vattelâs theory is that peaceful international relations could not be realistically built on altruistic considerations of other nationsâ good but upon enlightened self-interest.64 In the course of history, nations would gradually realize that the best way to advance their own interests was to pursue âmutual affectionâ by honouring other nationsâ rights and performing the offices of humanity: âWise and prudent nations often pursue this line of conduct from views of direct and present interest: a more noble, more general, and less direct interest, is too rarely the motive of politiciansâ.65 Therefore, one could achieve peaceful and cooperative relationships that enabled mutual self-perfection even with selfish nations but not with monsters, who were guided by brutish desires rather than by motives of advantage.
3 Peter the Great and the Moral Development of Nations
As suggested in the introduction to this chapter, Vattelâs portrayal of men and monsters was not an abstract normative system but it was projected onto European history in a manner that reveals an underlying but not fully articulated civilizational history of mankind. Unlike the works of his predecessors Grotius, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, Wolff and others, Vattelâs treatise reveals a belief in recent momentous historical change and the corresponding understanding that his own age was qualitatively different from preceding ones. Law of Nations is peppered with references to âthe present ageâ66 and the âenlightened centuryâ,67 which has higher moral standards than the earlier times.68 Vattelâs account implies that the last 100 years had been a particularly productive period in the long-term moral history of mankind. The âsacred precepts of natureâ that obliged nations to cultivate friendship with others for their own long-term interest were not an inborn knowledge of moral psychology but were âfor a long time unknown to nationsâ.69 The ancients had no notion of the duty they owed to other nations by virtue of common humanity but âat length the voice of nature came to be heard among civilized nations; they perceived that all men are brethrenâ.70 But as we saw above, not all nations had heard this voice of nature or acted upon it, which explains the moral diversity of mankind, with a fundamental fault-line between monsters and men.
Emer de Vattelâs fascination with Peter the Great can be explained in the context of his account of the moral development of nations. Peter the Greatâs Russia served for him as an example that pointed to the possibility of accelerating the historical process which in general seemed to be slow and gradual. Rather than reflecting a genuine and critical interest in what had actually happened in Russia during and after Peter the Greatâs reign, the figure of the tsar was used by Vattel as a vehicle to emphasize the transformative capacity of a single monarch who had a proper understanding of enlightened self-interest. Therefore, Peter had a different and more ambiguous role than was typical of progressive sovereigns of Europe, such as Louis xiv, who could draw on the long-term development of polite customs and manners of their cultured nations. The ambiguity of Peterâs role expressed Vattelâs dual concerns. On the one hand, his figure pointed to the need to adhere to the minimum standards of morality necessary for peaceful international coexistence. On the other hand, Peterâs rational and self-interested striving towards perfecting his nation was simultaneously a call to European sovereigns to act as agents of improvement rather than falling back to former, false concepts of military honour and vainglory that could put national welfare and international order in danger.
In Vattelâs Law of Nations, Peter the Great is mentioned on ten occasions. We encounter the tsar who not only strives towards perfecting his nation but also appears to have achieved his goal of transforming Russia into a civilized country: âthings have been greatly changed in Russia; a single reign â that of Peter the Great â has placed that vast empire in the rank of civilized nationsâ.71 What Vattel means by âcivilized nationsâ is not, however, immediately clear, as he does not offer any definitions in his treatise. By contrast, Wolff had discussed at some length the differences between nations at various levels of moral and civilizational development. Wolff distinguishes barbarous nations from âcultured and civilizedâ ones: cultured nations (gentes doctae) are those who cultivate intellectual virtues, whereas civilized nations (gentes cultae) have âcivilized manners which conform to the standard of reason and politenessâ (quae cultis utitur moribus, seu ad normam rationis et suavitatem compositis).72 The distinction was purely theoretical, though, because in actual practice the care for intellectual virtues tended to lead to the adoption of civilized customs and manners and, vice versa, a neglect of the development of the mind led to the domination of natural inclinations that was typical of barbarians: âIf a cultured nation is assumed to cultivate the intellectual virtues without restriction, it will scarcely happen that it will not at the same time become civilized, since civilized customs develop from intellectual virtues, just as the uncivilized from the natural inclinations, unrestricted by reasonâ.73
Although Vattel is not interested in these specific definitions, a Wolffian eudaimonist doctrine of happiness provides the background against which he develops his portrayal of Peter the Great. As Wolff had argued, the cultivation of intellectual virtues is not morally indifferent but nations âoughtâ to become civilized and therefore âdevelop the mind by that training which destroys barbarismâ.74 In practice it was the ruler of the state who was responsible for âperfecting and preserving his nationâ.75 In contrast to the HobbesianâPufendorfian model of a relatively limited state where the sovereign functions primarily as a peacekeeper, Vattel follows Wolff in attributing a key role to the sovereign in âprocuring the true Happiness of the Nationâ.76 This meant that the sovereign was responsible not only for providing material conditions for a happy life but also for directing the life projects of citizens beyond âearthly enjoymentsâ towards achieving âtheir own perfectionâ. An important means for doing so was the advancement of arts and sciences, which âenlighten the mind and soften the mannersâ.77 Vattel uses the opportunity to attack Rousseauâs sceptical theory of civilization, without mentioning the name of his opponent: âLet the friends of barbarism declaim against the sciences and polite arts; â let us, without deigning to answer their vain reasonings, content ourselves with appealing to experienceâ.78 The empirical proof is found when we compare âEngland, France, Holland, and several towns of Switzerland and Germany, to the many regions that lie buried in ignorance, and see where we can find the greater number of honest men and good citizensâ.79 Peter the Great functions here as a prime example of the present, more enlightened age, when the utility and necessity of âliterature and the polite artsâ are generally acknowledged: âThe immortal Peter I thought that without their assistance he could not entirely civilize Russia, and render it flourishingâ.80
This grand design of perfecting through civilizing is also the leitmotiv in other instances where Peter is mentioned in the first book. For example, Vattel disapproves of the general idea that a sovereign can freely appoint his successor, which for him is associated with a âshocking, improper and dangerousâ notion of a patrimonial state.81 But Peterâs example shows that there are exceptions to this rule because he nominated his wife to succeed him, not for his own private advantage but for the welfare of his empire: âHe knew that heroine to be the most capable person to follow his views, and perfect the great things he had begunâ. From this example Vattel derives a more general, albeit a rather vaguely formulated rule in the spirit of enlightened despotism: âIf we often found on the throne such elevated minds as Peterâs, a nation could not adopt a wiser plan in order to ensure to itself a good government, than to intrust the prince, by a fundamental law, with the power of appointing his successorâ.82
We see from these examples that Peter the Great was a rare, extraordinary figure whose grand design was to âentirely civilize Russiaâ but it is not apparent yet, in the first book, whether and to what extent, in Vattelâs opinion, he had actually reached his goal. In the second and third book, which deal with nationsâ duties towards others and with the issue of war, it appears that his concept of âcivilizedâ did not imply an advanced level of âpolitenessâ which would make Russia comparable with England, France or Switzerland, but rather the minimum level of morality to enable it to interact on an equal footing with those states. Vattel frequently refers to âpoliteâ or âpolishedâ nations whose behaviour towards others expresses the âsuperior gentlenessâ of his age.83 This is particularly visible in war, where the âpolished nations of Europeâ84 have adopted much higher moral standards than required by the stipulations of the necessary or voluntary law of nations. In the third book of the treatise, Vattel keeps heaping praise on European sovereigns for their customs of warfare, presenting thus a standard of humanity that all nations should aspire to: âAt present the European nations generally carry on their wars with great moderation and generosity. These dispositions have given rise to several customs which are highly commendable, and frequently carried to the extreme of politenessâ.85
The standard of civilization that Russia had achieved was on a completely different level. In fact, the congratulatory remark that praised Russia for reaching the rank of civilized nations occurs in the context of the discussion of the duties towards foreigners. Vattel mentions here a particularly grievous violation of the rights of individuals, namely the imprisonment of shipwrecked foreigners. This had also been practised in Muscovy but, as we saw above, things had âgreatly changedâ in Russia during Peterâs reign, which had placed the state âin the rank of civilized nationsâ.86
The czar Peter the First, in his manifesto against Sweden, complained that the cannon had not been fired on his passing at Riga. He might think it strange that they did not pay him this mark of respect, and he might complain of it; but to have made this the subject of a war, must have indicated a preposterous prodigality of human blood.87
The name of pretexts may likewise be applied to reasons which are, in themselves, true and well-founded, but, not being of sufficient importance for undertaking a war, are made use of only to cover ambitious views, or some other vicious motive. Such was the complaint of the czar Peter I that sufficient honours had not been paid him on his passage through Riga.88
But, as indicated above, the mere fact that Peter presented such a manifesto is a sufficient sign that he is not a monstrous enemy of mankind.89
Peter the Great is contrasted simultaneously with polite nations and with monsters also in Vattelâs analysis of âthe rights of nations in warâ, which later became known as the âius in belloâ doctrine. Charles xii, the king of Sweden, listened to the âvoice of humanityâ when he released all Russian prisoners after the Battle of Narva of 1700. Peter, on the contrary, âstill impressed with the apprehensions which his warlike and formidable opponents had excited in his mind, sent into Siberia all the prisoners he took at Pultowaâ.90 Later the course of the war showed, however, that Peterâs action was more commendable: âthe Swedish hero confided too much in his own generosity: the sagacious monarch of Russia united perhaps too great a degree of severity with his prudence: but necessity furnishes an apology for severity, or rather throws a veil over it altogetherâ.91 Similarly, in the discussion of ravaging and burning in warfare, Vattel condemns âsavage and monstrous excesses, when committed without necessityâ, but Peter the Great is excused for similar behaviour because he was motivated by legitimate concerns of self-preservation: âThe czar Peter the Great, in his flight before the formidable Charles the Twelfth, ravaged an extent of above fourscore leagues of his own empire, in order to check the impetuosity of a torrent which he was unable to withstandâ.92 Vattel emphasizes that one should not too eagerly follow the example of the tsar, because these kinds of actions are only excusable in case of extreme necessity. A counter-example is provided by the French, who, âin the last century [â¦] ravaged and burnt the Palatinateâ without necessity, which is why âall Europe resounded with invectives against such mode of waging warâ.93 Like the case with tyrants who, as we saw, can appear anywhere in Europe, the apparently civilized states are not immune from monstrous war-mongers raising their heads either. Vattel stresses this possibility also in his discussion of monsters, who wage wars without reason or pretext. Historical âbarbariansâ such as Tamerlane, Attila and Genghis-Khan,94 âwho make war only for the pleasure of making itâ, serve here as warning examples to the bellicose rulers of Europe: âSuch are, in polished ages and among the most civilized nations, those supposed heroes, whose supreme delight is a battle, and who make war from inclination purely, and not from love to their countryâ.95
Peter the Great is thus a liminal figure whose barbarous origins are unmistakable (a person tolerant of a âprodigality of human bloodâ) but who has passed the threshold of humanity, showing in the process what the essence of civility is all about. True civility consists in actions that are based on the proper understanding of national interest and motivated by a love of country, not by a false concept of glory attainable by military conquests, which is the main threat to European peace. These views of Vattel reflect a vision of history that draws heavily on the philosophical histories of Voltaire. In his histories of Charles xii (Histoire de Charles XII, 1731) and Louis xiv (Siècle de Louis xiv, 1751), and especially in Essai sur les moeurs (1756) â a summary of world history and the narrative of the rise of Europe â Voltaire envisions a march of humankind towards a better and more âpolishedâ world, under the leadership of great legislating monarchs.96 Although Vattel never directly refers to Voltaire, his portrayal of Peter the Great is unmistakably Voltairean. Voltaireâs Histoire de lâEmpire de Russie (1760â1762), which recounts in great detail the progress achieved by Peter the Great, was published only after Vattelâs treatise, but Voltaireâs fascination with the tsar is evident already in the history of Charles xii, where Peter emerges as the other main protagonist. As J.G.A. Pocock has shown, Voltaire wrote his histories as an exponent of a thèse royale, as an admirer of enlightened absolutism who rejected the equation of absolute monarchy with despotism.97 Voltaire contrasted Louis xiv and Peter the Great, who were both legislators, with Charles xii, who was not: âThe Swedish king is presented as a hero and nothing else, a conqueror whose conquests have no meaning, a figure contrasted with that of his adversary Tsar Peter, who is both a conqueror and a legislatorâ.98
The contrast can also be expressed in terms of different understandings of glory: the Swedish king seeks it in personal heroism, while for Peter glory is intimately connected with the good of the nation. Vattelâs account of true glory draws on Wolffâs understanding of the âtrue and enduring fame of a nationâ,99 which depends on its perfection: âTrue glory consists in the favourable opinion of men of wisdom and discernment: it is acquired by the virtues or good qualities of the head and the heart, and by great actions which are the fruits of those virtuesâ.100 But Vattelâs attribution of these qualities and actions uncritically to Peter is almost certainly influenced by his reading of Voltaire, who was chiefly responsible for the construction of a mythological image of the tsar, who âresolved to be a man, to command men, and to create a new nationâ.101
The fact that Voltaireâs juxtaposition of Peter, âwho consulted only his interestâ, with Charles, who âhad never given way to anything but his idea of revenge and gloryâ,102 stimulated Vattelâs ideas is further attested by a dialogue that Vattel published in 1760. Its title indicates both the main protagonists and the topic to be discussed: âDialogue between Peter the Great and Charles xii of Sweden on the Glory of Conquerorsâ.103 Charles acts here as the spokesperson for military glory, which is acquired by great commanders in war. There is no doubt, however, that Vattelâs own views are represented by Peter, who contrasts military feats with other human achievements: âThere are other things which demand perhaps still greater ability, more sublime talents. Such are the enquiries of true philosophers, the deep designs of a legislator, the art of rulingâ. Peter does not despise military glory, conceding that âthe warrior whose bravery and abilities have preserved the State, should be foremost in the esteem of men, but always behind wise and enlightened Princes who are in essence the Fathers of their Peoples and the benefactors of the human raceâ. This is how Vattelâs Peter sees his own historical role: âI civilized a vast empire that I received from my Forefathers in a semi-barbarous state. [â¦] While famous Warriors have often been the cause of the destruction of their native lands, I have been the creator of mineâ.104
4 Conclusions
The philosophical histories of the Enlightenment investigated the driving forces and obstacles on the road towards human progress, with a view to providing instruction and guiding political reform in the present.105 Voltaire offered a specific view of the progress of mankind that was driven by enlightened monarchs with a proper understanding of national interest and true glory. The aim of this chapter was to show that Vattelâs normative account of the duties of nations to themselves and to other nations cannot be fully understood if we disregard the philosophical history-writing of the era. Vattel expressed the Voltairean thése royale most forcefully in his portrayal of Peter the Great. Peter appears as a demiurge who âcreatedâ his native country by civilizing it, but also as a liminal figure who passed the boundary between monsters and men, delineating more precisely where this boundary was situated. The figure of Peter the Great underlines Vattelâs minimalist definition of the notion âcivilizedâ, and at the same time demonstrates that a minimum level of morality is the proper foundation for further development towards enlightened forms of self-interest, which gives hope for the moral advancement of humankind and for a reduction in violence in inter-state relations. By tracing the changes in European customs of warfare in the present âenlightened ageâ, Vattel posited a dynamic account of international law, the development of which did not necessarily depend on constant positive international legislation by treaty-making but which could, at least partly, rely on voluntary adherence to the laws of humanity that many European sovereigns were already undertaking. This progress was threatened not so much by non-European barbarians or savages as by the monsters from within Europe who were led astray by a false concept of glory. Vattelâs unrealistically optimistic portrayal of Peter as a singularly virtuous ruler who leapfrogged the otherwise slow and cumbersome process of civilization, served as a moralistic reminder to other European sovereigns to seek glory not from military achievements but from leading the nation towards perfection and happiness.106
Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, ed. Béla Kapossy and Richard Whatmore (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund 2008), Preface, 18.
Ibid., 12.
Ibid., 10â12.
Vattel himself outlines some differences in ibid., 13â16.
Ibid., 18.
Ibid., 19.
Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen (1642), ed. Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651), ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Samuel Pufendorf, Two Books of the Elements of Universal Jurisprudence (1660), ed. Thomas Behme (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2009); see Fiammetta Palladini, Samuel Pufendorf discepolo di Hobbes: Per una reinterpretazione del giusnaturalismo moderno (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1990).
Vattel, The Law of Nations, Preface, 20.
Walter Rech, Enemies of Mankind: Vattelâs Theory of Collective Security (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013), 118.
Ian Hunter, âGlobal Justice and Regional Metaphysics: On the Critical History of the Law of Nature and Nationsâ, in Law and Politics in British Colonial Thought: Transpositions of Empire, ed. Shaunnagh Dorsett and Ian Hunter (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 11â29, at 19.
Hunter, âGlobal Justice and Regional Metaphysicsâ, 17.
Vattel, The Law of Nations, Preliminaries, § 21.
Vattel, The Law of Nations, Preface, 17.
Ian Hunter, âVattelâs Law of Nations: Diplomatic Casuistry for the Protestant Nationâ, Grotiana 31 (2010), passim. For a similar interpretation, see Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 108â122.
Ian Hunter, âThe Figure of Man and the Territorialisation of Justice in âEnlightenmentâ Natural Law: Pufendorf and Vattelâ, Intellectual History Review 23:3 (2013): 289â307, at 291. This does not mean that Vattel replaced universalist rules with a mere conventional law of treaties or European customary laws. He explicitly distinguished between the universalist realms of natural law and voluntary law on the one hand, and conventional or particular law on the other hand, arguing that the latter realm does not belong to a treatise on the law of nations, but to âthe province of historyâ. Vattel, The Law of Nations, Preliminaries, § 24.
Rech, Enemies of Mankind, 119. Rech also denies that Vattel does not use the concept of âprogressâ, which is not correct. See the mentions of national âprogrèsâ in Vattel, The Law of Nations, book i, § 22, § 25; book ii, § 18.
Hunter, âThe Figure of Manâ, 291, has both Pufendorf and Vattel in mind.
See Istvan Hont, âThe language of sociability and commerce: Samuel Pufendorf and the theoretical foundations of the âFour-Stages Theoryââ, in The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe, ed. Anthony Pagden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 253â276.
See Jonathan P.A. Sell, Rhetoric and Wonder in English Travel Writing, 1560â1613 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).
Emmanuelle Jouannet calls this perfectionist-eudamonist aspect of Vattelâs theory âle droit-providenceâ, or âwelfaristâ purpose of the law, which complements the âliberalâ purpose, which is concerned with liberty and preservation of states: Emmanuelle Jouannet, The Liberal-Welfarist Law of Nations: A History of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 64, 105â106.
âThe society is established with the view of procuring, to those who are its members, the necessaries, conveniences, and even pleasures of life, and, in general, every thing [sic] necessary to their happinessâ, Vattel, The Law of Nations, book i, § 72.
Ibid.
See Vattelâs critique of luxury in the essay âDialogue Between the Prince of **** and His Confidant, on Certain Essential Elements of Public Administrationâ, in Vattel, The Law of Nations, 783â796; on Vattel in the context of the eighteenth-century debates on luxury, see Isaac Nakhimovsky, âVattelâs theory of the international order: Commerce and the balance of power in the Law of Nationsâ, History of European Ideas 33:2 (2007): 157â173.
Vattel, The Law of Nations, book i, § 77.
Ibd., § 80.
Ibid., § 81.
Ibid.
Ibid., § 209.
Ibid., § 81.
These passages have been in the focus of researchers who are interested in Vattelâs âcolonialâ legacy, such as: Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 194â196; Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 269â270.
Vattel, The Law of Nations, book ii, § 7; book i, § 169; see Simone Zurbuchen, âVattelâs law of nations and just war theoryâ, History of European Ideas 35 (2009): 408â417, at 412.
Vattel, The Law of Nations, book i, § 81.
Ibid.
Ibid., book ii, § 78.
Ibid., § 104.
Ibid., § 56. Vattelâs own terminology is: âPour ce qui est de ces Monstres, qui sous le titre de Souverain, se rendent les fléaux & lâhorreur de lâhumanité; ce sont des bêtes férocesâ. Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle, appliqués à la Conduite & aux Affaires des Nations & des Souverains (Londres, 1758), book ii, § 56.
Vattel, The Law of Nations, book ii, § 56. The quote is taken from Grotius: âAnd upon this Account it is, that Hercules is so highly extolled by the Antients, for having freed the Earth of Antaeus, Busiris, Diomedes, and such like Tyrantsâ. Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, ed. Richard Tuck (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2005), book ii, chap. xx, § 40.2.
Vattel, The Law of Nations, book ii, § 56; see book i, § 121: âThe monster who does not love his people is no better than an odious usurper, and deserves, no doubt, to be hurled from the throneâ.
Vattel, The Law of Nations, book iii, § 34.
Ibid., § 25.
Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, book ii, chap. 22, § 1.2. For a systematic distinction between âjustifying reasonsâ and âmotives of advantageâ, see also book ii, chap. 1, § 1.1.
Christian Wolff, The Law of Nations Treated According to the Scientific Method (1749), transl. Joseph H. Drake, rev. and ed. Thomas Ahnert (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2017), § 621.
Other words used by Grotius include feritas, saevitia, mera insania: Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, book ii, chap. 22, § 2.
Ibid., chap. 20, § 29.1.
âThus a war may be vicious, or unjust, with regard to the causes, for several ways: First, when we undertake it either without any justifying cause, or any motive of profit, thoâ never so little, but only out of a fierce and brutal fury, that makes us delight in blood and slaughter purely for the sake of killing. But there is reason to doubt, whether we can find any example of so barbarous a warâ. Samuel Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, transl. Basil Kennett, 4th ed. (London: J. Walthoe et al., 1729), book viii, chap. vi, § 4, 835, note 2. Pufendorf does not mention such nations, so Barbeyrac complements his analysis with additions from Grotius.
Wolff, Law of Nations, § 626.
Ibid.
Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, book ii, chap. 20, § 40.1.
Ibid., § 40.2â4.
On Grotiusâs idea of natural right of punishment and Pufendorfâs critique, see Gerald Hartung, âVon Grotius zu Pufendorf. Die Herkunft des säkularisierten Strafrechts aus dem Kriegsrecht der Frühen Neuzeitâ, in Samuel Pufendorf und die europäische Frühaufklärung, ed. Fiammetta Palladini and Gerald Hartung (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1996), 123â136, and more recent discussion by Peter Schröder, Trust in Early Modern International Political Thought, 1598â1713 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 101â103, 133â134.
Wolff, Law of Nations, § 636.
Ibid., § 627. It should be noted that Pufendorf also allows war against those who âkill and eatâ innocent travellers, but this can be waged only by the sovereign whose subjects have been attacked. Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, book viii, chap. 6, § 5.
Vattel, The Law of Nations, book iii, § 33.
Ibid., § 33, § 40.
Wolff, Law of Nations, § 887â888.
Ibid., § 888.
In fact, Grotius had already suggested that the modern laws of nations that restrict violence in a formal war between legitimate enemies may not be followed in case âwe should have to do with a state so barbarous, as to think it lawful without any manner or reason, or denunciation of war, to treat in a hostile manner the persons and goods of all strangersâ. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, book iii, chap. 9, § 19.2, 85.
Vattel, The Law of Nations, book iii, § 32.
Ibid., § 32. In his discussion of the faith of treaties, Vattel specifies that a pretext should not be âevidently frivolousâ. Ibid., book ii, § 222, 388.
Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum, transl. G.L. Ulmen (New York: Telos, 2006), 165â166; Rech, Enemies of Mankind, 3, 111. For an excellent discussion of the Schmittian argument, see Gabriella Silvestrini, âJustice, War and Inequality. The Unjust Aggressor and the Enemy of the Human Race in Vattelâs Theory of the Law of Nationsâ, Grotiana 31:1 (2010): 41â68.
Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, 165.
Rech, Enemies of Mankind, 108. Rech (58) also accuses Gentili of similar inconsistency.
Ibid., 3.
See Kapossy and Whatmore, âIntroductionâ to Vattel, The Law of Nations, xvii.
Vattel, The Law of Nations, book ii, § 12.
Vattel writes of the distinctiveness of the âpresent ageâ in relation to, for example, the arts and sciences (The Law of Nations, book i, § 113), treaties with non-believers (book ii, § 162), the treatment of hostages (book ii, § 246), and assassination and poisoning (book iii, § 155). Vattel also refers to âthose unhappy timesâ when the Popes intervened in the actions of sovereigns (book i, § 146, § 154).
â[â¦] dans un siécle éclairéâ: Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, book i, § 61, book ii, § 275. Elsewhere he says âWhy does there still remain any vestige of so barbarous a law in Europe, which is now so enlightened and so full of humanityâ, The Law of Nations, book ii, § 112. The term âenlightenedâ is also frequently used in book i, chap. 11â13, which discuss the duties of sovereigns to perfect the nation.
A typical example: âHow could it be conceived in an enlightened age, that it is lawful to punish with death a governor who has defended his town to the last extremity, or who, in a weak place, has had the courage to hold out against a royal army? In the last century, this notion still prevailedâ. Vattel, The Law of Nations, book iii, § 143.
Ibid., book ii, § 20.
Ibid.
â[â¦] a mis ce vaste Empire au rang des Etats civilisésâ. Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, book ii, § 108.
Wolff, Law of Nations, § 53.
âQuoniam vero Gentes barbarae moribus incultis utuntur, ideo Genti barbarae opponitur Gens docta & cultaâ. Ibid.
Ibid., § 55.
Ibid., § 38.
The chapter title of Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, book i, chap. xi: âSecond objet dâun bon Gouvernement, procurer la vraie félicité de la Nationâ.
Vattel, The Law of Nations, book i, § 110â113.
On Vattelâs criticism of Rousseau, see Béla Kapossy and Richard Whatmore, âEmer de Vattelâs Mélanges de littérature, de morale et de politique (1760)â, History of European Ideas 34:1 (2008), 77â103; Béla Kapossy and Richard Whatmore, âIntroductionâ, in Vattel, The Law of Nations, ix-xx; Theodore Christov, Before Anarchy: Hobbes and His Critics in Modern International Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 238â244.
Vattel, The Law of Nations, book i, § 113.
Ibid.
Ibid., Preface, 13; book i, § 61, 68.
Ibid., book i, § 70. Vattel adds here the example of the Roman emperors, whose right to appoint a successor by adoption produced âa series of sovereigns unequalled in history â Nerva, Trajan, Adrian, Antonius, Marcus Aureliusâ.
See for ibid., book ii, § 139, § 169, book iii, § 65, § 148.
Ibid., book iii, § 148; see also § 147, § 158.
Ibid., § 158.
Ibid., book ii, § 108.
Ibid., § 48.
Ibid., book iii, § 32.
For the historical context of the Russian manifesto, see Pärtel Piirimäe, âRussia, the Turks and Europe: Legitimations of War and the Formation of European Identity in the Early Modern Periodâ, Journal of Early Modern History 11:1/2 (2007), 63â86.
Vattel, The Law of Nations, book iii, § 32.
Ibid.
Ibid., § 167.
Ibid.
âSuch were several German tribes mentioned by Tacitus [â¦]. Such have been the Turks and other Tartars, â Genghis-khan, Timur-Bec or Tamerlane, who, like Attila, were scourges employed by the wrath of heavenâ. Ibid., § 34.
Ibid.
See Siofra Pierse, âVoltaire: Polemical Possibilities of Historyâ, in A Companion to Enlightenment Historiography, ed. Sophie Bourgault and Robert Sparling (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 153â188; Karen OâBrien, Narratives of Enlightenment: Cosmopolitan History from Voltaire to Gibbon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 21â55.
J.G.A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, Vol. 2: Narratives of Civil Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 75.
Ibid., 76.
Wolff, Law of Nations, § 49.
Vattel, The Law of Nations, book i, § 187.
Voltaire, The History of Charles the XIIth, King of Sweden, transl. W.S. Kenrick, to which is added, The Life of Peter the Great, transl. J. Johnson (London, 1780), 18. Voltaire also describes Peterâs civilizing projects â for example, âSciences, which in other countries have been the slow product of so many ages, were, by his care and industry, imported into Russia, in full perfectionâ (24). For Voltaireâs image of Peter, and the subsequent Enlightenment debates, see also Reto Peter Speck, The History and Politics of Civilisation: The Debate about Russia in French and German Historical Scholarship from Voltaire to Herder (PhD dissertation, Queen Mary University of London, 2010).
Voltaire, The History of Charles the XIIth, King of Sweden, 147.
Published originally in Mélanges de littérature, de morale et de politique, transl. and published in English by B. Kapossy and R. Whatmore in Vattel, The Law of Nations, 80â85.
Ibid., 83â85.
Speck, The History and Politics of Civilisation, 12.
Research for this chapter was kindly supported by the Pro Futura Scientia Fellowship of the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study.
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