1 Introduction
It was a speech made by the King to Parliament in October 2013 that placed a development plan for Casablanca on the agenda. At the opening of the parliamentary sessionâwhich every year begins with a royal speech, King Mohammed vi focused on the irresponsibility of politicians in carrying out their mandate. To back up his argument, he pointed to the lack of development in Casablanca, its âglaringâ inequalities and the weakness of its public facilities. âMismanagementâ by elected officials, said the monarch, was âthe source of problemsâ that had led to âthis city, one of Moroccoâs richestâ being âthe city of the most glaring social disparities, [â¦] the finance and business centre, but also a centre of poverty [and] unemploymentâ.1 The King did not
This disavowal of the political class was not in itself anything new under the reign of Mohammed vi. It was rooted in the crisis concerning political brokerage and the difficulties the political class was experiencing in renewing its ranks (Iraki, 2005; Zaki, 2009; Tozy, 2010). These difficulties were preventing elected officialsâat both the national and the local levelsâfrom assuming the function of âintercessionâ between the monarchy and the people, a function assigned to them by the Moroccan political system (Tozy, 1991). However, the October 2013 speech was distinguished both by the explicit reference to the elected officials of Casablanca and by its development imperative. A brief summary of the place occupied by development in the modes of government employed during the reign of Mohammed vi will highlight the reasons for the Kingâs demand for change.
The use of the vocabulary and repertoire of developmental is emblematic of the authoritative discourse with which Mohammed vi marked a break with the old order. His reign, which began in 1999, has been marked by the rise of the developmentalist agenda in the exercise of power. The monarch decided on and launched various âprogrammesâ, âinitiativesâ and âvisionsâ of development; these continued to punctuate the first fifteen years of his reign.2 In the context of the stateâs economic and institutional transformation, the figure of the King as developer has encouraged the reconfiguration of the repertoires of state action (Catusse and Karam, 2009): the âmanagerialâ turn in modes of government (Jobert, 1994; Ogien, 1995; Hibou and Tozy, 2002), in line with the rising importance of donors on the public agenda, has furnished the measures necessary for this change to occur; the multidimensional nature of developmentalist action, meanwhile, has created many new areas for state intervention. As a âBuilder King with social concernsâ (Catusse and Vairel, 2010), the monarch has continued to promote the technocratic and economistic concerns that have distinguished public action since independence. The social dimension
Thus, the royal speech of October 2013 seems to me to be part of the wider dispositif set up in response to the demonstrations of 2011: like the address of 9 March 2011, which called for constitutional reform and the holding of fresh legislative elections (Dupret and Ferrié, 2011), the October 2013 speech positioned the King as âtheâ agent of changeâin this case, both economic and social. This allowed the monarchy to maintain the initiative and to define its
This chapter will be devoted to a study of the consultation process, the terms of its implementation, and the conditions of the production of the measures and actions of development that have been settled on, in order to grasp what âdevelopmentâ means in the Moroccan context. It thus highlights the âbattlefieldââto use the term employed by Béatrice Hibou and Irene Bono in the Introduction to this volumeâin and through which the development plan has been âshapedâ (Berman and Lonsdale, 1992). This is a field in which conflict, the balance of power, and resistance are expressed in statements that mask them. This way of rendering the political dimension invisible thus places development within an area of consensus whose hidden face covers the deeply
This chapter is based on research conducted as part of the preparation for my PhD thesis, which is dedicated to the figure of the wali and his practices of government. It is based on a combination of research tools and techniques: first, participant observation, which led me to join the focus group set up by the stateâs representative and participate in the work of the âMobility and Public Spaceâ committee and the drafting of its proposals; an ethnographic approach, which enabled me to observe the development plan âin the makingâ, and involved, during the eight months over which the process was spread, many different observation sites (various working groups, public meetings and official ceremonies, meetings of the city council, etc.); I also conducted, further along in the process, a dozen interviews with community figures, administrators, and politicians so as to capture the way key players understand and intervene in the process; and, finally, I collected and analysed various kinds of data (correspondence, documentation, and grey literature) circulated in the course of the process.
2 The Wali, Actor of the Royal Demand for Change
The day after the royal speech of October 2013, the Kingâs demand for change led to the appointment in Casablanca of a new Wali. The setting of the stage for the appointment of Khalid Safir, along with his intrinsic qualities, ledâellipticallyâto this regional representative of the state being positioned as the individual responsible for taking action.
As the main state authority in the region, the Wali represents both the King and the government in the region, a singular status that duplicates the dual nature of Moroccan power. As a devolved authority of the Ministry of the Interior, the Wali occupies a âcrucialâ place in the modes of government of the region (Moujahid, 2009): his role can be considered equivalent to that of the Préfet (prefect) in France before the decentralisation of 1982.5 However, unlike the functions of the Prefect (Bouabid and Jaidi, 2007), the tasks and the skills of the Wali are not explicitly recognised from the legal and institutional perspective.6 Beyond the statement of his kingly functions, making him the
As an actor âdesignatedâ from above as being responsible for implementing change, the Wali intervenes only indirectly in the definition and implementation of local public policies: he ensures the coordination of local authorities, which control institutional, legal and financial resources (there are three of these in Casablancaânamely, municipality, prefecture, and region), the central administration of the Ministry of the Interior (the supervisory authority), and various government entities. Coordinating public action is difficult in Casablanca due to the dispersed nature of the cityâs government: the urban fabric is institutionally fragmented and divided among a myriad of institutions and
3 The âEnlarged Think Tankâ, An Expression of Consensus with Regard to an Apolitical Vision of Development
Consultation for the definition of the development plan took shape with the forming of a focus group, the âenlarged think tankâ, and in the subsequent establishment of six âadministrative commissionsâ. In total, between January and September 2014, the date of the presentation of the finalised development plan to the King,11 this consultation involved nearly â800 peopleâ12âcommunity figures, private and public agents, experts, regional and central officials and local politicians. The operationalisation of the consultation process and its technical nature turned the think tank into a standardised tool whose forms of bureaucracy aided its depoliticisation and facilitated consensus with regard to its implementation, ensuring that highly fragmented social, economic, political and administrative forces formed an alliance around the development project.
The instrumentation of the consultation resulted in the deployment of a scheme designed and implemented by the stateâs representative, which led, firstly, to a division of labour within the focus group. Thus, the think tank was
The administration of the think tank was entrusted to the Regional Investment Centre (Centre Régional dâInvestissement: cri), a regional public body that depends administratively and hierarchically on the Wali. A secretariat was
While the think tank was working, the Wali intervened directly in March 2014 by organising a study day devoted to international experiences17 in order to âinspire the model for transforming the metropolis of Greater Casablancaâ. The finalisation of the development plan was preceded by meetings in the summer of 2014 between the Wali and the chairs of the working groups.18 The process was also punctuated by several official meetings whose ceremonial nature, protocol, and introductory addresses made by the Wali all served to underline the royal dimension of the proceedings. In this manner, the launch of the consultation with civil society was the occasion, in December 2013, of a formal dinner in the presence of the Wali and members of Casablancaâs voluntary sector elite; the handing over of the deliverables created by the eight working groups were the subject of ceremonial sessions at the wilaya throughout the month of April, in the presence of the Wali, officials of the regional administration and local political representatives. Furthermore, the completion of the development plan was celebrated in September 2014 with a royal closing ceremony at the Palace of Casablanca during which the ten financing agreements between the local authorities, government departments, private delegates and sponsors from Casablanca, who made it possible to mobilise eur 3 billion, were officially signed. Finally, the official dissolution of the think tank, in January 2015, one year after it had been set up, was marked by a ceremonial event at the wilaya at which the creation of an observatory of civil society was announced, in line with recommendations from the working groups.
The launch of the consultation on âdeveloping Casablancaâ, and its implementation, thus enabled the stateâs representative to act on time and space. The consultation process would indeed form a âspace-timeâ for the negotiations, simultaneously bringing together a set of players available to deal with
4 Schemes of Participation and the Establishment of Formal Arenas for Reflection
The concept of development and its multiple meanings, economic and technical, opened up room for manoeuvre for the establishment of the think tank and formal consultation arenas, which in turn helped to unite the diverse forces making up Casablancan society.
The definition of the think tankâs working themes drew, first, on a plurality of imaginaries and representations of the way Casablanca could be transformed, as evidenced by the statements issued by the eight focus groups: âCasa, a place of economic prosperityâ, âCasa, a place for livingâ, âCasa, a city for allâ, âCasa, a city of leisure, culture and historyâ, âCasa, a city of dreamsâ, âCasa, a model of devolution and decentralisationâ, âCasa, a city in the vanguardâ and âCasa, a city of knowledge.â The pluralist field of development thus gave the think tank an opportunity to marry together the diversity of voluntary associations in Casablanca, allowing it, for example, to bring together the representatives of 120 Casablancaâs associations. General themes were then classified into âworking areasâ, which in turn gave rise to subgroups (committees) which thus created more formal arenas for consultation: the group âCasa, a place for livingâ, for example, was divided into six committeesââHousing, urban planning, infrastructureâ, âMobility and public spaceâ, âSecurity and solidarityâ, âHealth and emergenciesâ, âEnvironmentâ and âAdministrative Servicesââin which participants were brought together because they belonged to the same profession or were members of the same community association.
Secondly, the economistic understanding of development established a fundamental position for representatives of the economic base and allowed experts from consulting firms, new actors on the public stage (Leaders, 2015), to be appointed to the working committees. In this way, senior executives of multinationals or large private companies in Morocco, senior figures in
The establishment, in the wake of the think tank, of six administrative commissions opened up arenas for consultation, this time connecting the Wali with officials of the regional administration and external services of the state. The technical nature of development legitimised the central place of the regional administration, whose expertise had been the historic engine of its expansion in the region. The names and the working themes of these commissions this time took the administrative categories on the basis of which development issues could be discussed,24 thus emphasising the importance of infrastructure and urban development issues. In addition, the schemes implemented when the commissions were set up allowed the Wali to involve the thirteen governors then in post in Casablanca through the principle of the co-chairmanship of committees. Indeed, given the absence of hierarchically established links between these governors and the Wali,25 their mobilisation (which was essential both administratively and operationally), would have been made difficult or at least complicated without their presence on these committees.
In a bureaucratic environment characterised by the tendency of government bodies to split, the unifying character of development has certainly constituted a powerful resource for mobilising the regional services of the state in these commissions. But here too, the reactions triggered by the appointment of Khalid Safir following the royal speech and his proximity to the King were instrumental in mobilising local bodies; it is indeed significant that, in the
5 The Exclusion of Elected Officials and the Opening up of Non-Formalised Forums for Consultation
The preparation of the development plan was, however, marked by the exclusion of local elected officials from the formal consultation forums. While they did play a part before and after the process at public meetings, they were not members of the focus groups. Nor were they incorporated into the administrative committees that were drawing up the development plan. Nor were they even consulted by the think tank participants in their roles as elected politicians. When they were consulted, it was in an individualised manner, or was the result of formal representational protocol. This exclusion, however, did not mean that elected representatives did not play a part; simply that they were relegated to the margins of the formal process. Negotiations with city councillors actually took place outside the formal dispositif of consultation, in non-formalised places and spaces that connected the Wali, politicians, and policy makers of the central government.
The technical and apolitical nature of development made it possible to remove local representatives from the consultation process. They were initially sidelined by the ânegativeâ and âaccusatoryâ character of the Kingâs speech, which imposed a form of silence. The interpretations of the royal address by officials of the Ministry of the Interior strengthened this silencing effect, with the announcement, the day after the speech, of the âlaunching of an auditâ (Le360, 2013b) of the accounts of the city council. The exclusion of elected representatives was also partly the result of competition between community representatives and local politicians, who, at the local level, tussle over the legitimacy of the implementation of public action (Benidir, 2010). Only in a very exceptional case did the chair of the focus group âCasa, a place for livingââwhose association had, three years earlier, been put in charge (alongside the administration) of a programme to renovate the medina of Casablancaâtake the initiative to consult with a representative of the city council, unlike
At all events, these different logics of exclusion prevented local officials from claiming loudly and clearly any formal role in the consultation process. Instead, the situation meant that these officials were placed in a bargaining position essential for the continuation of the process. Ultimately, after all, it is the elected officials who have the legal resources necessary for the adoption of local public policies: the measures taken and announced as part of the development plan require the approval and the vote of the Municipal Assembly. And it became necessary to submit matters to the vote of councillors early in the consultation process because of the dispositifs on which the financial and institutional architecture of the development plan rested. Such was the case with mixed local development companies (ldcs), whose capital came from the city council and the state, thus necessitating the vote of the municipal assembly. It was thus to this space of negotiation that the relationship between the Wali, the regional and national governments, and the elected officials shifted.
The creation of ldcs was a result of the first consultations undertaken by the Wali after his arrival in the wilaya.28 These instruments made new financial schemes possible, in particular lifting the constraints related to the underfunding of the region. A further advantage was that they circumvented the obstacle of the dispersal of power centres when projects were implemented by consolidating local and central decision-makers on their boards. The negotiations initiated by the Wali for the legal creation of these instruments and for their effective implementation opened up, in the course of the negotiation process, forums for negotiation with elected officials. In such a context, the elected officials drew firstly on the provisions relating to the holding of the municipal
In addition, the close financial supervision exercised on the city council by the General Management of Local Groups (Direction générale des collectivités locales, dgcl) opened up room for manoeuvre for the central government, which enabled it to influence, during the process, the relationship between the city council and the wilaya in a discreet, non-formalised manner. The financing for projects, even those approved by the city, requiredâif these projects were to be effectiveâprior negotiations with the dgcl as the dgcl administered the funds generated in the form of vat, funds which were redistributed
Political negotiation thus moved to the margins of formal spaces for reflection, shifting into individualised spaces where the administration and political representatives are brought together, which has led to the concealment of conflict, power relations, and, in short, of politics. It also explains why, faced with a process of consultation that had excluded them, elected officials often preferred to choose silence rather than protest, while exercising their power, if only to create difficulties.
6 The Concealment of the Political Dimension
The political dimension, then, is expressed at different levels in the consultation process, but the dispersed architecture of the dispositif leads to the concealment of this political dimension, hiding power struggles over the definition of development policies. The consensus around an economistic and technical vision of development upon which the consultation was built does not, in fact, remove the political dimension. It prevents neither the coexistence of divergent and conflicting visions of the choices, solutions and priorities of development, nor competition with regard to the definition of target populations and regions to be developed.
The shifting of political negotiations to the margins of the formal arenas of the dispositif of consultation is one way in which the political dimension is concealed. Using their institutional and legal prerogatives, as I have mentioned, the elected officials who were excluded came back into the fray by increasing their bargaining power vis-Ã -vis the regional and central administrations. This repositioning led to a placing of the political dimension within the invisible sphere of negotiation, masking its highly individualised and asymmetric character and favouring political actors able to negotiate with the state, such as those in a position to influence how elected city councillors would vote. This explains why the only occasion on which the consultation process undertaken by the Wali was the subject of public criticism from local councillors was precisely the eve of the first municipal session during which ldcs were put to the
The central government, meanwhile, drew on its ability to mobiliseâor notâfinancial resources in order to influence the definition of the development plan; its masterly inactivity resulted in the political dimension being concealed in a second way. The elevated rail service project is undoubtedly the most explicit example. As a technical solution advocated by the mayor, and adopted in principle by the city council a year earlier, the project was met with reluctance on the part of the central government, which preferred a less expensive, technological optionâthe development of a Bus Rapid Transit System (brts). The lack of technical and financial assistance proffered by the central government in the context of the steps taken by the mayor during the consultation process, when he approached foreign donors to finance the elevated rail service, limited his room for manoeuvre given the weakness of the municipal budget. The difficulties of reconciling the divergent views of the administration and the mayor were resolved thanks to an alliance between the Wali and the mayor when the council voted on the development planâs specific measures at the end of the process. This alliance ensured a compromise that involved, on the one hand, the extension of the tram line instead of the creation of a brts and, in return, on the other hand, the abandonment of the elevated rail service project.
In formal consultation forumsâthat is to say, the think tankâs working groupsâthe political dimension was redeployed in the economic, technical
The avoidance of the political dimension was not just a mechanical effect related to the architecture of the process. It also resulted from the Waliâs effacement in the face of the conflict, which can be understood as a fourth way in which the political dimension was made invisible. The schemes set up by the stateâs representative, and his whole way of acting, testify to a desire to âdefuseâ the expression of the political dimension. Thus, the methodology of âsimple consensusâ set out by the Waliâthat is to say, the creation of one deliverable per working group, limited the controversies within the think tank. The segmentation of the feedback process for the proposals of the eight working groups also prevented any confrontation between these groups over their choices and differing proposals, even though they sometimes found themselves working on the same themes. In addition, during the process the ways in which deliverables were to be submitted to the Wali assumed a character that did not lend itself to controversy. One of the first feedback sessions of one of the eight working groups, for example, took place in the hall of the city council in the presence of its elected members. The meeting was an occasion for intense polemics, which however were aimed not at questioning the appropriateness of the proposals submitted, but at allowing each elected official to defend âhis or herâ territory, or âhis or herâ population.36 This explains why subsequent meetings with the other working groups were held in camera in the wilaya, in the presence of senior officials from the Ministry of the Interior and representatives of elected bodies alone, in order of rank, giving these meetings a ceremonial and solemn nature not conducive to controversy. The study day37 organised during the process, which brought together all the local political representatives, regional officials, and members of the think tankâthat is to
If the way in which he embodies royal power gives the Wali power of action, it still weakens him: it makes any form of protest and criticism potentially destabilising since âto challenge the approach being made and the negotiations to which it has led mean challenging royal authorityâ (Bono, 2010). Questioning, in any way, the preparation of the development plan thus comprises a potential threatâor at least is perceived as such by the stateâs representative. This aversion to the âpoliticalâ dimension thus positions the Wali not as an actor in the conflict, but as an actor situated in an âelsewhereâ of the conflict, in the space of consensus that is built in the context both of the asymmetry of power relations between actors and of the asymmetry of the resources each is able to mobilise when faced with the state.
7 The Blur of the Concept of DevelopmentâThe âAdjusterâ of Conflicting Temporalities
The conflicts that arose were not only linked to negotiations over the definition of public policies, they also had a time dimension. The preparation of the development plan, indeed, involves several dispositifs for action: the state of âurgencyâ that imposes the need for action, the royal order authorising the action of the stateâs representative, the concrete imperatives of development that require consultation and, finally, the participation that expands the circle of negotiations. Although they are all implemented in order to serve âdevelopmentâ, these dispositifs produce disjunctions because of their different relationships with the âtimeâ of public action, whether the short âtimeâ of urgency, the long
Because of his central position in the process, the Wali finds himself at the intersection of these temporal requirements, whose overlap produces tensions. So the âshort timeâ of urgency comes into âoppositionâ with the âlong timeâ of development (Callens et al., 2007): the language of urgency employed by the King puts the population in the position of expecting immediate solutions and forces the Wali into a position where he needs to meet this expectation. Thus one can understand how, during the consultation process, a âPlan of priority action for the short termâ was implemented, the measures of which were subsequently integrated into the development plan. Furthermore, the royal dimension of the development plan requires the stateâs representative to meet the expectations of the King, whose monitoring of regional public action is embodied in royal visits (Goeury, 2014): these are the object of the Waliâs temporal expectations, disturbing the temporality of public action. The prevailing perspective during royal sojourns has thus resulted in moments of acceleration and intensification in the pace at which the development plan is drawn up.39 The temporal stakes of the royal visits act both as a constraint and as a resource with regard to the actions of the stateâs representative. On the one hand, they strengthen the negotiating power of elected officials, who themselves are not responsible for the conduct of the process. Such was the case throughout the months of March and April, during the negotiations on the creation of ldcs; the delay in which fuelled the Kingâs discontentment and led to the cancelling of his stay in Casablanca (Panorapost, 2014). On the other hand, the planning of the ceremony at which the development plan would be presented to the King accelerated negotiations with the central government.40
The synchronisation of the times for negotiation is, in turn, hampered by the dispersal of decision-making centres: political time (that of the city
The interweaving of these different times was facilitated, first, by the participatory schemes that created the think tank, the rhetoric and instruments of which were the same as those advocated by international donors: the âstrategy of extraversionâ with regards to participation (Bayart, 2009, xxv) provided the means to supervise very closely the consultation with civil society, which facilitated its synchronisation with the time constraints imposed by the other political and technical dispositifs. Thus, the co-option by the Wali of the leaders of the working groups and his proximity to the vast majority of these leaders have allowed him to influence the nature of the proposals and the pace of their development. The constraints affecting the Waliâs actions were, for example, fully internalised by Mustapha Mellouk, head of the working group âCasa, a place for livingâ, in his report to the participants: the âurgencyâ, âthe need to formalise proposals very quickly, to identify quick winsâ and to be ârealisticâ in the definition of proposals are all injunctions which use, verbatim, the guidelines and the lexicon used by Khalid Safir. Similarly, Melloukâs hesitation with regard to the issue of the elevated rail service reflect the Waliâs indecision with regard to how to schedule it within the development plan, an indecision itself caused by the unfinished nature of the negotiations between the central
Second, the blurring of the concept of development has opened up room for manoeuvre when it comes to adjustments imposed by the disjunctions
Third, the material nature of the mediaâs presentation of the development plan has opened up room for manoeuvre to cope with constraints on the visibility of the action of transformation undertaken by the state. The presentation of the development plan has assumed different shapes, has taken place under different rubrics and has been prefaced by different âintroductory
As a manifestation of the royal speech cited at the opening of this chapter, the development plan took shape via the meanings that the various actors assigned to the royal words, based on their understanding, their position, their behaviour and the resources they could mobilise in order to participate in and to influence the process. The Casablanca Development Plan was thus achieved in and via a tangle of interests, logics, power relations and competition. The space-time opened for the process of negotiation was an arena in which, in singular forms, expression could be given to conflicts that were either directly related to the definition of the projects, or connected with competition that went well beyond that process of definition. The analysis of the process of the definition of the development plan has highlighted the conflicts that make up the plan; it has also led to progress in the understanding of the nature of those who drive development projects in Morocco. My study has thus tried to fill a gap in the major works on the development of major urban projects; works which affirm, more than they question, the royal dimension. Based on this premise, these works primarily focus attention on the objections and protests aroused by the implementation of development projects or the loyalties and alliances that form around the allocation of these projects. Such relatively Manichean readings present development as an âinstrumentâ outside society, placed at the service of building the consensus by which the monarchy perpetuates its hegemony. I have instead tried to show that the development plan is not so much the instrument of consensus as it is its âobjectâ and its âproductâ. This consensus is affected by the practices and political struggles that traverse society. It is formed in the asymmetry and unequal power relations that constitute it. The process of constructing the development plan highlights the strength of the interpenetration between the state and society, and the many forms it takes, whether that be through the dependencies, the competition, the workarounds or the âresistancesââas shown more specifically in the chapter by Adriana Kemp and Talia Margalit in this volumeâthat have led the players to shape it. The arrangements, alliances, and various mediations that have helped to define the development plan thus suggest that we view the state not as a ârefereeâ (Waterbury, 1975), but as an âarenaâ (Aymes et al., 2015): the âdevelopmentâ of Casablanca, marking the start of a âtime to actâ, thus comprised, first and foremost, a time in which the balance of power and the competing forces at work in Moroccoârelations in which the state and society are interconnectedâcould be brought up to date.
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Iraki A. (2005) âDu renouvellement des élites urbaines au Maroc. Ãlites urbaines, territoire et système politique localâ, Annuaire de lâAfrique du Nord, 41, pp. 81â95, http://aan.mmsh.univ-aix.fr/volumes/2003/Pages/AAN-2003-41_14.aspx (accessed on 20 June 2016).
Jobert B. (1994) Le tournant néo-libéral en Europe (Paris: LâHarmattan).
Kaioua A. (2015) âLe Grand Casablanca-Institution et gestion urbaineâ, paper presented at the seminar âTerritoire et urbanisationâ, Institut National dâUrbanisme -Ãcole de Gouvernance, Rabat, 10 February.
Le360 (2013a) âLâétat critique de Casablanca au cÅur du discours royalâ [The critical state of Casablanca lies at the heart of the royal speech]â, 15 October, http://fr.le360.ma/politique/letat-critique-de-casablanca-au-coeur-du-discours-royal-4623 (accessed on 22 February 2017).
Le360 (2013b) âCasablanca : lâIntérieur reprend les choses en main [Casablanca: the Ministry of the Interior reassumes control]â, 26 November, http://fr.le360.ma/politique/casablanca-linterieur-reprend-les-choses-en-main-6369 (accessed on 23 February 2017).
Leaders (2015) âQui élabore les stratégies au Maroc?â October, Tunis, http://www.leaders.com.tn (accessed on 23 February 2017).
MAP (Agence Marocaine de Presse) (2013) âTexte intégrale du discours de SM le Roi Mohammed VI à lâouverture de la première session de la troisième année législative de la 9ème législatureâ (Rabat : MAP), http://www.mapnews.ma/fr/discours-messages-sm-le-roi/texte-integrale-du-discours-de-sm-le-roi-mohammed-vi-louverture-de-la-pr (accessed on 16 June 2016).
Le Matin du Sahara (2014) âDéveloppement local. La création de sociétés approuvée à Casablancaâ [Local development. Creation of societies approved in Casablanca], 28 April.
Média 24 (2014) âà Casablanca, un groupe de conseillers dénoncent la marginalisation des élus [In Casablanca, a group of councillors criticises the marginalisation of elected representatives]â, 10 February.
Morocco (Ministry of Communication) (2014) âSa Majesté préside la cérémonie de lancement du projet Marrakech, cité du renouveau permanentâ [His Majesty chairs the launch ceremony for the project Marrakech, city of permanent renewal], 6 January, https://www.maroc.ma/fr/activites-royales/sm-le-roi-preside-la-ceremonie-de-lancement-du-projet-marrakech-cite-du-renouveau (accessed on 22 February 2017).
Morocco (Ministry of Interior) (2005) âRéflexion sur le statut de Wali de régionâ, Lettre des collectivités locales, April-June, p. 6, http://www.pncl.gov.ma (accessed on 23 February 2017).
Moujahid A. (2009) âLe Wali, pivot de la gouvernementalité?â, in Miossec J.-M. (ed.) Terrains et échelons de la gouvernance: expériences en France et au Maghreb (Paris: LâHarmattan), pp. 277â325.
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Address by His Majesty the King at the opening of the first session of the third legislative session of the ninth Parliament, 11 October 2013 (map, 2013).
As a brief overview: the âpolicy on major infrastructure projectsâ for land development, the âslum-free cityâ programme and the âmajor projectsâ policy for urban development; the national initiatives for âHuman Developmentâ and for âSocial Developmentâ; and sector-specific visions for economic development, such as the âPlan Azurâ for tourism, the âPlan Maroc Vertâ for agriculture and the âEmergenceâ programme for new world businesses.
Figures with regard to properly equipped households and home ownership have experienced marked growth over the past fifteen years, as shown by the general census of population and housing in 2014, which can be found at http://www.rgph2014.hcp.ma/Presentation-des-principaux-resultats-du-RGPH-2014_a374.html (accessed on 20 June 2016).
The press editorials that followed the speech are enlightening: âGouvernance de Casablanca: incompétence sur toute la ligneâ [Governance of Casablanca: incompetence all down the line], LâÃconomiste (2013); âDiscours royal: Halte à la mauvaise gouvernance [Stop bad governance]â, LâObservateur (2013) and âLâétat critique de Casablanca au cÅur du discours royalâ [The critical state of Casablanca lies at the heart of the royal speech] Le360 (2013a).
Until the passing of the law on regionalisation in January 2016, the Wali was the executive of the regional council and the prefectural council of the Greater Casablanca Region; until that date, these authoritiesâ scope for intervention was limited to the conurbation of Casablanca.
On this subject, see Morocco, (2005).
The Wali is the authority in charge of regional investment centres.
The budget of the city of Casablanca is mad 3 billion, of which mad 2 billion is reserved for operating expenditure, mad 200 million for investment, and mad 800 million for compulsory expenditure.
The city of Casablanca is apportioned only 16 per cent of its tax revenues, which are accumulated centrally before being redistributed by the state.
Interviews, wilaya, city council, Casablanca, January 2015.
The âPlan de développement de Casablanca 2015â2020â.
Figures published by the Wali. Discours de Monsieur Khalid Safir, le Wali de la région du Grand Casablanca, Gouverneur de la Préfecture de Casablanca, meeting to report back on the work of the think tank, 16 January 2015. The speech can be read online: http://www.casainvest.ma (accessed on 20 June 2016).
Groupes de travail dans le cadre du Think tank élargi: présentation de Monsieur le Wali du Grand Casablanca, dinner to launch the activities of the working groups, Wilaya du Grand Casablanca, internal document, 9 December 2013.
Discours de Monsieur Khalid Safir, 16 January 2015.
Lettre de mission générale destinée aux présidents des groupes de travail: réflexion sur la stratégie de développement du Grand Casablanca, internal document, 2 December 2013.
Lettre de mission générale destinée aux présidents des groupes de travail: réflexion sur la stratégie de développement du Grand Casablanca, internal document, 2 December 2013.
Expériences nationales et internationales pour inspirer le modèle de transformation de la métropole du Grand Casablanca, workshop, Club Attijariwafa Bank, 8 March 2014.
Interviews, Chairs of focus groups, Casablanca, July and October 2014.
Public-spiritedness constituted, at least in the language used by members of the think tank, a form of legitimation. The text published on the Facebook account of the chair of the group âCasa, a city for allâ, spoke volumes: âWhen the Wali contacted me to suggest I joined the âThink Tank for Casablancaâ that he was setting up [â¦] I admit that I did not hesitate [â¦] because, given my activist ethics, I do not believe that we can evade our responsibilities when our Country is appealing to usâin however modest a way.â
The newspaper LâÃconomiste (2010), close to Casablancaâs economic circles, gave a sceptical reception to the announcement of this municipal development plan: âYet another development plan for Casablanca: what for?â.
âAnalyse du contrat de gestion déléguéeâ, Valyans-Mâdina Bus: accompagnement à la définition du plan de redressement de la société, July 2008, Partie ii. Documents confidentiels.
Interviews, Casablanca, 2014.
Interviews, Casablanca, 2014.
Thus, these commissions were constituted under the themes âMajor structural projectsâ, âHighways and road infrastructureâ, âHousing and urban regenerationâ, âMobility and urban transportâ, âHuman developmentâ and âGovernance and local public servicesâ.
While the Wali coordinates and supervises the activity of governors, the relationshipâin terms of authorityâbetween the governors and the Wali is not institutionalised.
Interviews, wilaya and central government, 2014, 2015.
Interviews, city council, 2014 and 2015.
Interviews, wilaya, January 2014.
Interviews, regional administration, city council, March 2014.
The city council has 147 councillors from 16 districts backed by the city council. In total, the city has 500 local councillors.
Interviews, city council, 2014.
Feedback meeting of the focus subgroup âMobility and public spaceâ, Regional Investment Centre, Casablanca, 29 January 2014.
Transport systems in the cities of Bristol, Bucharest and Kaunas were presented. The Bristol system was chosen for its organisation of freight, the Bucharest system for its fight against pollution, and the Kaunas system for its intelligent transport service.
I was instructed by the committee to conduct interviews with the delegate from the bus transport service, the public operator in charge of the trams, the municipal official in charge of highways, and the regional official in charge of traffic management; I was then asked to summarise the situation for all the participants.
Mustapha Mellouk, chair of the working group âCasa, a place for livingâ, at the meeting to finalise the deliverables of the group âCasa, a place for livingâ, Hôtel des Arts, Dar Bouazza, 16 March 2014.
Interview, think tank members, April 2014.
Expériences nationales et internationales pour inspirer le modèle de transformation de la métropole du Grand Casablanca, workshop, Club Attijariwafa Bank, 8 March 2014.
The study day was structured as six panels, each dedicated to a âmetropolitan transformation modelâ and including presentations from a representative of a major foreign consultancy firm and a political leader from the city in question.
The prospect of a royal visit in March 2014 first led to the hasty finalising of the proposals of the working group âCasa, a place for livingâ; thereafter, the date for reporting back on the groupâs work was subject, throughout the month of March, to successive schedule changes: the meeting at which progress would be reported, scheduled for 20 March, was postponed to 27, then to 28 March, finally being held on 11 April, the day after the cancellation of the royal stay in Casablanca.
Interviews, regional and central governments, Casablanca, 2015.
In Casablanca, at the turn of the new millennium, water management, sanitation, the supply of electricity, transport and waste collection were entrusted to private companies in the form of publicâprivate partnerships.
Meeting to finalise the deliverables of the group âCasa, a place for livingâ, Hôtel des Arts, Dar Bouazza, 16 March 2014.
The proposals recommended the implementation of a target model for the organisation of the transport system, the adoption of a fund for urban transport and the professionalisation of large taxis, measures that had either already been adopted or were being planned.
Lettre de mission générale destinée aux présidents des groupes de travail: réflexion sur la stratégie de développement du Grand Casablanca, internal document, 2 December 2013.
Procès verbal de la réunion dâharmonisation avec le groupe Casa-Lieu de Vie, internal document, 16 January 2014.
Interviews, regional government, Casablanca, January 2015.
Programme global et actions prioritaires pour la mise à niveau de la région du Grand Casablanca, press dossier, 10 February 2014.
Interviews, regional administration, Casablanca, January 2015.
Programme global et actions prioritaires pour la mise à niveau de la région du Grand Casablanca, press dossier, 10 February 2014; Plan de développement 2015â2020, rapport présenté lors de la cérémonie royale, 26 September 2014; Plan de développement 2015â2020, press dossier, 22 December 2014; Discours de Monsieur Khalid Safir, le Wali de la région du Grand Casablanca, Gouverneur de la Préfecture de Casablanca, meeting to report back on the work of the think tank, 16 January 2015.
The press conferences of 12 November 2013, 11 December 2013, 10 February 2014 and 22 December 2014.
During the press conference of 11 December 2013, the plans for an elevated rail service were announced; the conference of 10 February 2014 reported the completion of technical studies and the ongoing finalisation of the necessary financial package. Then, during the ceremony at which the development plan was presented to the King, the development of a dedicated transport system was announced, without specifying its nature.