The notion of Polish-Caucasian brotherhood, which I link to the Polish ethnopolitical myth, based on the narrative of fighting a common enemy â Russia, was born among the circles of Polish independence émigrés residing in Western Europe during the period of the Commonwealthâs partitioning. It was characterised not only by Romantic overtones manifested in literary works but was also closely connected to politics, first and foremost with the activities of the Hôtel Lambert headed by Prince Adam Czartoryski. This organization, pursuing policy aimed at the restoration of an independent Polish state, tried to coax the European powers into building an anti-Russian coalition of which Poles would constitute an important element. One of the regions in which they would play that important role, in the opinion of the Hôtel Lambert representatives, was the Caucasus. The key issue was one of image â they wanted to convince European leaders and public opinion that the Polish émigrés had great potential to influence this trouble spot within the Russian Empire. These efforts contributed to the specific perception of the region developed by Polish émigrés in Europe, the effects of which can also be seen in the contemporary image of the Caucasus.
After going into exile following the fall of the November Uprising, Adam Czartoryski set about building his quasi-diplomatic posts. The main role in the Caucasus plans was played by Istanbul, where the politicianâs agents resided. This was an important outpost, for Turkey had conflicting interests with Russia on many levels that also applied to the Caucasus. Another country whose interest reached this region was Great Britain, which was concerned about the growth of Russiaâs military capabilities and the expansion of its borders in Asia. British interest in the Caucasus was well illustrated by the fact that in 1835, David Urquhart, who sought to curb Russian influence and was actively involved in the question of Circassian independence, was sent to the British embassy in Istanbul as secretary. His attitude is well illustrated by the fact that even before he departed for the post, he founded, together with WÅadysÅaw Zamoyski1 and president of the Literary Association of the Friends of Poland in London, Thomas Beaumont, the anti-Russian publication Portfolio, in which many pages were devoted to Caucasian affairs. Among other things, it was in Portfolio that the declaration of independence of Circassia was printed, which Urquhart wrote personally.2
The Hôtel Lambert activistsâ interest in the Caucasus developed around the middle of the 1830s. This resulted from their supposition that in the event of a war with Russia, the possibility of which was being discussed in Europe at the time, one of the main theatres of war would be this region â something Adam Czartoryski, among others, was convinced of. Moreover, it was of interest to politicians because of the thousands of Poles serving in the ranks of the Russian army there (Widerszal 2011: 50). Of significance was also that Russia had to maintain its numerous troops in the Caucasus at great expense (Memorandum 1836).
One of the first examples of interest in the region can be seen in a memorial submitted in 1834 by Prince Czartoryski to British politicians. It presented plans for the creation of an 18,000-strong Polish army in the Caucasus, composed primarily of deserters from the tsarâs army. This unit, aided by Persia and Turkey and working with the independent highlanders of the Caucasus (Caban 2001: 167â168), was to pose a serious threat to Russia. It was soon realized that the implementation of the project was unrealistic. This was because, for it to be realized, all or almost all the Poles serving in the tsarist army would have had to desert (Caban 2001a: 739).
Ludwik Widerszal made one interesting point in his work. According to the historian, there was a major difference between the pro-Caucasian actions of Urquhart and those of Czartoryski and Zamoyski. He considered the Britonâs enthusiasm for the cause of the highlanders selfless because it was driven by ideological belief. According to Widerszal, some even saw in his activities a holy war for the cause of the Caucasian peoples (see Brewda 1999: 24). A similar statement was made by American historian Charles King, who said that for the Briton and those around him, the Circassian cause was linked not only to action against Russia but also to the British commitment to defending the rights of oppressed peoples in general (King 2007: 249). King put Urquhart in the same ranks as Thomas Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) â of individuals fascinated by the cultures of peripheral groups inhabiting the area stretching from Central Europe to the Arabian Peninsula, and who contributed to the sprouting of the seed of national feeling that could then be used politically (King 2007: 238).
One can, of course, debate the American historian as to whether it was indeed due to the values they shared that the two individuals he mentioned became involved in fostering a ânational spiritâ among the Circassians and Arabs, or whether British interests were at stake. Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that Urquhart contributed to the emergence of Circassian nationalism. He not only wrote the Circassian declaration of independence but also designed their national symbols. His actions were aimed at making out of them a modern, united nation with one unified government representing them internationally. In Urquhartâs case, I perceive actions that, in perspective, were intended to benefit Great Britain politically. In turn, I am sceptical of claims that he was driven by some altruistic desire to help âoppressed peoplesâ.
In the opinion of Widerszal, representatives of the Hôtel Lambert were interested in the Caucasus only because of the immediate and short-term gains that dealing with these âAsian hordesâ could bring to the Polish cause, in Adam Czartoryskiâs words (Widerszal 2011: 53). One can also be supported in this assumption by documents produced within the princeâs camp, such as the Zarys wyprawy na Kaukaz, o jej celach i spodziewanych skutkach (Outline of an expedition to the Caucasus, on its aims and expected results), drawn up in 1847 in Paris by Ludwik Bystrzonowski (Zarys wyprawy 1847). It defined two goals for the Caucasus expedition. The first, and most important, was to bring âbenefits for Polandâ, while the second was to âharm Russiaâ. This lacks any declaration of âbringing freedom to the Caucasian peoplesâ or similar pronouncements. The armed forces of Shamil and the Circassians are classified in the document as âtoolsâ that can be used for both of these purposes.
In 1836 Czartoryski sent his emissary Marian Brzozowski to Istanbul. From the memorandum written for Brzozowski, we learn that Czartoryski sought to establish a âPolish outpostâ in the Caucasus, which would maintain contact with the regionâs inhabitants and provide them with military assistance in their fight against Russia. It was also meant to enter into a pact with Poles serving in the tsarist army. Additionally, Brzozowskiâs task was to gain information about the actual forces of the Caucasian highlanders, their organization, the plans of their commanders and the possibility of forming a regular army, as well as to gauge the attitude of Poles towards desertion from Russian units. Moreover, Czartoryski was interested in the question of whether a Polish general could inspire confidence in the local population and head the Circassian armed forces, or at least a portion of them (Memorandum 1836).
Adam Czartoryski also provided Marian Brzozowski with an instruction. It shows that David Urquhart, then secretary of the British embassy in Istanbul, considered it desirable to coordinate the Polish and Caucasian independence movements. For this reason, he asked Czartoryski to assign a Polish officer to special tasks. The Polish politician appointed Brzozowski to just this role. In coordination with Urquhart, he was to either go to the Caucasus or remain in the Ottoman Empire. This should be linked to Czartoryskiâs position that Polish actions ought to be coordinated with British policy (Memorandum 1836). However, Brzozowski only ever reached Istanbul and never ended up leaving for the Caucasus (Å»urawski vel Grajewski 2003: 189).
In 1836, the case of the ship Vixen, which was a provocation prepared by David Urquhart and WÅadysÅaw Zamoyski, reverberated loudly across Europe. In 1831 Russia took steps indirectly targeting English entrepreneurs. It was that year that foreign ships were forbidden to call at the Circassian shores, except at a few points where Russian forts were established. The idea was that this would restrict the supply of armaments to the highlanders of the Western Caucasus, who remained outside the control of the Russian administration. As a result, English goods to Circassia could be transported primarily as contraband smuggled on small Turkish ships (Widerszal 2011: 30â54). This practice was carried out even though the Sultan also forbade trade with the Circassians, a consequence of pressure from the Russian ambassador (Czerkassia 1837: 192). At the time, whether Russia had the right to act so was widely debated in Europe. It was believed that Article 4 of the 1829 Treaty of Adrianople, which granted her the eastern coast of the Black Sea, may have been in contradiction to international law (Vixen 1837: 15).
Urquhart and Zamoyski sent a British-flagged ship in 1836 with weapons for the Circassians, with the intent that the vessel encounters Russian ships on patrol off the Black Sea coast. This is evidenced, for example, by the diary of James Stanislaus Bell, the shipâs owner and close associate of David Urquhart, printed in the Kronika Emigracji Polskiej (Chronicle of the Polish Emigration) (see Bell 1837: 162). Both hoped that this would provoke a conflict between Great Britain and Russia, which could even lead to armed confrontation. Just as the organizers of the plot expected, the Vixen was seized by the Russian fleet. An international scandal erupted. The Polish émigré press wrote that a ârape of an English vesselâ had been committed (Vixen 1837: 15). British conservatives raised in parliament the question of the legality of Russian jurisdiction over the Circassian coast. There were also voices calling for a declaration of war against Russia and the introduction of a British fleet into the Black Sea (Ajrapetov 2006: 149â153). These discussions were reported daily by Polish journals, including the Kronika Emigracji Polskiej (Vixen 1837: 53â59). From Istanbul, Adam Czartoryskiâs envoy, Wojciech Chrzanowski, suggested the politician earnestly urge the British to send warships to the Black Sea under the pretext of protecting merchant vessels. This would have however contradicted the Russian-Turkish agreement of 1833 that closed the Bosporus Strait to foreign warships (Å»urawski vel Grajewski 2003: 189â190). These actions should be interpreted as a desire to bring about a war between the superpowers, which, according to Czartoryskiâs faction, could bring Poland independence.
The government in London, however, managed to de-escalate the situation and recognized Russiaâs right to establish its own laws in this part of the world. This marked the beginning of a period of thaw in Russian-English relations, which led to the signing of an agreement in 1840, an attempt to rebuild the Holy Alliance against France (Potemkin 2015: 426). From then on, Britainâs policy towards Russia entered a new phase: friction was not allowed on Caucasian issues, which were of secondary importance to the London Cabinet anyway. Only the Crimean War would bring a shift in attitude towards the Caucasus (Widerszal 2011: 64).
In 1837 David Urquhart managed to organize an expedition to Circassia, in which StanisÅaw Krajewski took part as interpreter. It brought no real benefits and MichaÅ Czajkowski wrote of it with irony, that what had been hailed as the eighth wonder of the world by English dailies and diplomacy amounted to a landing on the shore of Circassia and a two-month camp-out in an aul a mile offshore (Reychman 1972: 219).
A negative opinion of Urquhartâs actions related to the Vixen, as to indeed most of his actions as regards the Caucasus, was held by Henry Temple, which led to Urquhartâs dismissal from his post in Istanbul in 1837. As a consequence of the whole incident with the ship, some British and Polish politicians eventually lost hope that the government in London would take a more serious interest in the affairs of the Caucasus and prevent its conquest by Russia. As Ludwik Widerszal noted, from then on the Poles took sole charge of Caucasus policy, albeit maintaining contacts with the British in this field. This came however to the exclusion of David Urquhart, who had become persona non grata, especially among circles in the British Foreign Office, and whose name could now blemish any enterprise. For some Hôtel Lambert activists, this was no great loss. One of those sceptical towards cooperation with Urquhart was Ludwik Zwierkowski. In 1838, he wrote to his brother: âdo not believe any English affairs or arrangements around the Cherkess [â¦]. Spencer, Bell, Longworth, Urquhart, all are men who want to rouse their spice merchants against Moscow ⦠Not out of love for us, but for their own interests [â¦]â (Widerszal 2011: 61, 88).
After the change in British policy and, above all, after a clash with reality â when it became clear that desertions were not as numerous as had been assumed, activists of the Hôtel Lambert began mainly pushing for the formation of legions out of Poles residing in western Europe and the Ottoman Empire. There were also plans of establishing a Cossack-Ukrainian formation (Karbownik 2012: 216). At the same time, the commitment to forming a Polish army in the Caucasus was reduced (Caban 2008: 128â129). However, this did not mean that plans for the region were completely abandoned. In the mid-1840s, for example, a project involving the outbreak of a great independence movement of Caucasian peoples â Chechens, Dagestanis, Armenians, Georgians, Circassians, as well as Cossacks, was concocted. After Russiaâs expulsion from the Caucasus, the states therein were to be established as fiefdoms of Turkey, while the Cossacks would come under the sovereignty of Poland. Ludwik Widerszal noted that during the same period Adam Czartoryski presented a plan that he himself placed in the realm of fantasy and considered a distant prospect. As per him, the highlanders from the Caucasus were to strike along the Volga as far as Moscow. The Don Cossacks were to also head in its direction via the Don River and Voronezh. The Black Sea Cossacks and the Polish corps from Turkey, meanwhile, would march on Ukraine while congruently inciting an uprising in Poland (Widerszal 2011: 93, 106). We find a similar plan in the already mentioned Zarys â¦, drawn up by Ludwik Bystrzonowski (Czartoryski possibly based his concepts precisely on this plan). According to it, the goal of the expedition to the Caucasus would be to bring about an uprising against Russia in Poland. Shamil was to set out along the Volga to the north and lead the entire Muslim population behind him. As a result, the Astrakhan Khanate would be restored. As per Bystrzonowskiâs plan, however, the imamâs activities would not end there. He envisioned that Shamil would then march on Kazan and further north, operating with his forces between the Vyatka and Kama rivers. The Circassians, in turn, were to take western Georgia. One variant plan presented in the document assumed that the Poles, together with the Black Sea and Don Cossacks, would strike Moscow (Bystrzonowski 1847). Interestingly, very similar assumptions were also made in the 1860s. We find them, for example, in a memoir entitled Kwestia kaukaska (The Caucasus Issue) kept with documents left by WÅadysÅaw Czartoryski in the Princes Czartoryski Library. It assumes the outbreak of a revolution and uprising in Russia, during which Polish legions supported by âmasses of Circassiansâ would advance from the Kuban towards the Dnieper River (Kwestia kaukaska 1863).
In the 1840s, Adam Czartoryski attempted to deploy a Polish mission permanently residing at the side of Imam Shamil but lacked the funds to do so. Ludwik Widerszal put forward the thesis that the main source of money for the maintenance of the diplomatic service at the Hôtel Lambert was the offerings of rich Englishmen, made to the supporter of Polish independence Lord Dudley Stuart. However, to obtain new donations, tangible results of Adam Czartoryskiâs activities were required (Widerszal 2011: 102). These were absent. Thus, efforts were made to demonstrate Polish activity in the Caucasus through modest means.
In 1844, a representative of Czartoryski, Ludwik Zwierkowski, went to the Caucasus with the task of establishing contact with Shamil (Adamczewski 2018: 47â62). He had with him letters from MichaÅ Czajkowski, in which the imam was proposed with undertaking joint ventures in the Caucasus and Europe. We learn quite a lot about Zwierkowskiâs expedition from the notes of its principal agent, to whom the envoy gave an account upon his return to Istanbul. In them, we learn that upon arrival in Dzhubga3 the Pole was welcomed with full honours by influential beys from among the Shapsugs and Abzakhs. As for Zwierkowskiâs trip to Shamil, almost all of those gathered expressed concern lest the imam appears among the Circassians and begins ruling them as despotically as he rules the Chechens, Lezgins, and other peoples in the eastern Caucasus. One of the more influential people was said to have said to Zwierkowski about Shamil:
Let Sheikh Shamil war on his own behalf and we will also war, but let him think not to govern us; to be under his rule is harder than under the rule of the Turks at the time when they controlled Anapa. You could make money off the Turks, while with Shamil you can only lose your head. If things were to come to this, it would be better to just submit to the authority of the mighty and strong Russian Tsar, who demands only subordination from us but does not lay claim to our property and protects the lives of his subjects. (Äajkovskij 1898)
Czajkowski stressed in his memoirs that âmany [i.e., of the Adyghe â P.A.] had contacts with the Russian authorities, from whom they received salaries and gifts. Besides, the love of freedom or, better said, of anarchy was in the blood of these peopleâ. Eventually, the Circassians took Zwierkowski to Shamil but declared to the Pole that there would be no collaboration with the imam, which he was to communicate to him personally. He reached the borders of Ossetia with a group of several Circassians. There he was wounded by an unknown assassin. Czajkowski came up with the suspicion that the Circassians themselves were behind this, fearing that Zwierkowski would bring Shamil with his murids (Czajkowski 1962: 199) down upon them. After the Pole was wounded, it was decided to send only two men further with letters to Shamil and await a reply. It soon arrived, which Zwierkowski then sent back to Czajkowski (Äajkovskij 1898). With that, his mission had ended.
Shamilâs letter to Czajkowski delivered through Zwierkowski is one of the few clues testifying to the establishment of contacts between the Polish émigrés and the leader of independent peoples in the eastern Caucasus. In his work, Adam Czartoryskiâs agent in Istanbul briefly discussed the contents of the letter. Shamil was said to have assured him that the bravery of the Poles was known to him and he would be happy if an alliance could be made with them. He also asked Czajkowski to report to his superior that from now on he would look upon all Poles who made it to him as his children and that they would be counted among his murids. According to Czajkowskiâs account, along with the letter from the imam he also received a letter from Daniyal, Sultan of Elisu. In it, the latter explained in detail all of Shamilâs wishes and spoke positively about the possibility of an alliance with the Poles. Daniyal was to assure Czajkowski that the imam would always remain a loyal ally. He also informed him that there were many Poles living in the area that could form an army, but would only be useful if commanded by a Pole, and that they were awaiting the arrival of such a leader (Äajkovskij 1898).
In his memoirs, MichaÅ Czajkowski provided information about another letter he allegedly received from Shamil. According to his account, in the mid-1840s, a Galician resident who served in the tsarist army at the rank of lieutenant arrived in Istanbul from the Caucasus. Having been involved in some intrigues in Volhynia, he was exiled to the Caucasus in 1836 as a private. After some time, he gained the favour of the Vorontsov couple.4 Because of this, he was quickly promoted to the rank of officer and was repeatedly sent to Shamil for negotiations. During one meeting, he was said to have told the imam that he was Polish, had resigned, and would like to return to his homeland. Shamil, who already treated the newcomer as a good friend, was said to have asked him if he knew MichaÅ Czajkowski. Terlecki replied that they had never met, though he was someone known to him as an author of works popular in Poland.5 Shamil then gave the officer a letter addressed to Czajkowski, along with a gift â a local outfit with a sabre, pistols, cartridges, and horse harness. All this Terlecki delivered to its addressee. In his memoirs, Czajkowski wrote that the horse harness was gifted to Witold Czartoryski6 for the Princes Czartoryski Museum (Äajkovskij 1898).
Both of Shamilâs letters to Czajkowski are interesting material for a researcher of Polish-Caucasian relations, but a problem stems from the fact that the originals have not been introduced into scholarly circulation (it is not known whether they have survived to our time at all). They are known only from Czajkowskiâs brief account of them, which he included in his memoirs published in Russian in 1883. This significantly limits the possibility of conducting a reliable analysis of them. It is also impossible to be absolutely certain that the imam actually sent them to Adam Czartoryskiâs agent and that they were not merely Czajkowskiâs invention, intended to raise his prestige and importance within the Hôtel Lambert.
In 1846, Kazimierz Gordon, who, on Czartoryskiâs instructions was travel to the Caucasus, arrived in Istanbul from Paris. WÅadysÅaw Zamoyski prepared instructions for him. These stipulated that he should not enter into any contact with the Black Sea, Azov or Line Cossacks, but wage a constant fight against them. In addition, the document formulated the following tasks: 1) wherever Polish Catholics reside, attempt to form independent units out of them; 2) send priests to the Poles so that they would not forget the faith and customs of their ancestors; 3) win permission from the Circassians and Shamil to build churches, and if it turns out that several thousand believers attend them, deploy to them a bishop; 4) establish contact with Shamil, Sultan Daniyal-Bek, and the English authorities in India via Persia and Herat, or otherwise with the English envoy in Persia and the English consuls in Russia and neighbouring countries. In Czajkowskiâs opinion, if these instructions were realized, one could conclude that activities in the Caucasus are best carried out on behalf of the Roman Catholic Church and England, rather than to serve Turkey and the Polish cause. Nevertheless, he noted that Mehmed Ali Pasha7 did allocate money and resources for Kazimierz Gordonâs expedition. Thanks to this aid, he went to the Ubykhs living on the eastern coast of the Black Sea. Czajkowski entrusted Gordonâs mission with two letters to Shamil. One of the letters Gordon had in his keeping. In it, the agent encouraged the imam to establish contacts with Adam Czartoryski to work out a plan for joint action against Russia. He wrote:
I have only God left to thank that we found the way to reach Y.M. [Your Majesty â P.A.] and to pray that the day soon comes on which our swords may resist this unsatiated foe, who, having wrought misery and destruction in our lands, aims to bring enslavement upon the peoples of the Caucasus. (Czajkowski 1846)
For reasons of security, in the event Gordon perished or did not reach the imam, the second letter was held by another member of the expedition. In it, too, joint action against Russia was proposed. In the letter, Czajkowski stressed that the international situation was extremely favourable and the slightest misunderstanding could lead to war between the powers. He also called for the formation of a detachment composed exclusively of Poles as part of the forces of the independent highlanders, with its own national emblems (Czajkowski 1847). This letter revealed that Ludwik Zwierkowski had made contact with Shamilâs naib, Suleiman-Efendi, two years earlier in Circassia.
Before leaving for the Caucasus, Kazimierz Gordon received instructions from MichaÅ Czajkowski that stated that âa necessary condition of the missionâ was to reach Shamil and come to an agreement with him. Regarding relations with Keranduk Berzeg (one of the leaders of the Ubykhs), it was specified that these were to be harnessed to achieve the goal of the mission. If the Ubykh intended to gain the kind of position in the Western Caucasus that Shamil possessed in Dagestan, then Gordon was to support and advise him, âalways guiding him, however, if not to the unconditional recognition of Shamilâs power, then to at least a close agreement with him and concerted action against Moscowâ. If, on the other hand, Keranduk avoided armed action, the Pole was to reach Shamil as soon as possible (Czajkowski 1846a). Excerpts from Gordonâs reports show that they reinforced Czajkowskiâs belief that Gordonâs presence in the Western Caucasus would âby no means advance relations with the Caucasusâ, while also indicating the âquestionable goodwill of the Cherkessâ. Instead, the principal agent needed to establish contacts with Shamil and only then organize broader ventures, such as sending a larger expedition (Czajkowski 1847a).
According to Czajkowskiâs account, Gordon was not happy with the Circassians, as they treated all Poles who came to them as slaves. Alternatively, they sent them off to the Abazin, who lived in the Sukhum-Kale area and were subordinate to the Russians, and these in turn sold these Poles to Persia, Egypt, or Turkey. The locals supplied Gordon with only the most elderly and disabled, i.e. those who could not bring the locals financial profit. They also permitted the construction of two backyard chapels. Gordonâs mission yielded no further results, with the Pole soon ending up murdered (Äajkovskij 1898).
In Polish historiography, the popular account holds that the assassination was carried out by a tsarist agent â a Circassian or Armenian (see Drożdż 2008: 177; Zwierz 1996: 139), and this has also permeated into journalism.8 Such an account was already established within internal Hôtel Lambert documents. A dispatch sent from Istanbul to Paris in June 1847 stated that Gordonâs assassin was an official sent by Russia to exchange prisoners of war (Czajkowski 1847b). However, Czajkowski stated in a letter sent to WÅadysÅaw Sabatyn in 1873 that he was actually killed by Keranduk, with whom he was staying. The reason was supposedly the Poleâs affair with his hostâs wife (Rolle 1908: 116). This thread was elaborated upon by Czajkowski in his memoirs. In them, he recorded that after Gordonâs death, his servant Janek, who was fluent in Circassian, returned to Istanbul and recounted the whole incident. According to his story, once in the Caucasus, Gordon stayed at Keranduk Berzegâs, alongside whom he had sailed from Turkey. There, the Pole engaged in an affair with Berzegâs beloved wife, and it was for this reason that the Ubykh shot him with a pistol. Fearing his own colleagues, however, who valued Gordon and had become attached to him, he blamed a certain Armenian who was apparently sent by the Russians from Sukhum-Kale to carry out the murder. From this was born the legend that the Pole was murdered by an agent of the Tsar. Czajkowski claimed that Keranduk came to Turkey with the final wave of Circassian emigrants. Questioned by the Turks about the Gordon case, he was said to have told them, âTrue, I killed him, but he was my brother in arms, and she was my wifeâ. Elsewhere in his memoirs, Czajkowski added that in addition to amorous intrigues, Gordonâs murder resulted from Kerandukâs fear that he would give the Ubykhs over to Shamilâs rule (Czajkowski 1962: 12, 200).
In the 1840s, the Caucasian policy of the Hôtel Lambert failed to achieve any success. It is difficult to consider as such the contact made by one Circassian faction, centred around the controversial and ambiguous Seferbiy Zaneqo,9 with Adam Czartoryski concerning Circassian representation before the French government. Czartoryskiâs hopes for the creation of a Polish legion in the Caucasus were strengthened after the outbreak of the Crimean War. However, these plans changed after the crushing of the Turkish fleet by the Russians in the naval battle at Sinope in October 1853. After this allied defeat, it was intended to form units in the western part of Anatolia, in Kars. The realization of this concept was hindered by further Turkish defeats (Widerszal 2011: 109, 123â124). Earlier, as early as June 1853, the former head of the Hôtel Lambertâs Istanbul agency, MichaÅ Czajkowski (he ceased being its head after embracing Islam and transferring to Turkish service in 1850; he nevertheless continued to cooperate with Czartoryski) submitted a memorandum to the Turkish authorities, in which he advised organizing a broad coalition against Russia. This was intended to bolster support for the conduct of military operations among the European public. To this end, the Pole suggested, among other things, that Polish and Hungarian officers be called into service, that Cossack and Tatar military organizations be formed, and that an armed operation by the Circassians be organized and coordinated (SzpotaÅski 1911: 468â469). And here the fundamental problem became apparent. Polish emigrants residing in Western Europe were not very eager to participate in armed actions against Russia. Although after arrangements with Czajkowski the Turkish authorities did grant funding and requested that Karol Różycki, Wojciech Chrzanowski, WÅadysÅaw Zamoyski, and Ludwik Bystrzonowski enter military service at the rank of general, there was little reaction from said individuals. The first two refused, while Zamoyski relinquished his appointment to Feliks BreaÅski. Of those invited, only Bystrzonowski was open to going to the Ottoman Empire, as he had a plan for creating a Polish legion in the Caucasus (near Batumi) that would consist of 800 people â deserters from the tsarist army (though the design was never realized) (Chudzio 2011: 154â155).
Czajkowski achieved some success in forming units within the Turkish army. He became commander of the 1st Regiment of Sultan Cossacks. However, out of a total of 1600 soldiers, only 400 were Poles (SzpotaÅski 1911: 478). They were coalesced into one sotnia (a company), while an additional five were formed out of Bulgarians, Roma, Jews, Romanians, and various refugees from Russia. During the Crimean War, the unit fought in the European theatre, that is the Balkans. A significant problem in the course of forming Polish units, in addition to the aforementioned lack of volunteers and insufficient funding (for example, Bucharest residents held a fundraiser to buy shoes for Czajkowskiâs soldiers (Karbownik 2012: 220)), became the conflict between him and Zamoyski, who wished to take command of the unit. In addition to those loyal to the Hôtel Lambert, democratic circles led by General Józef Wybicki also tried to form their own legions in Turkey. However, these efforts lasted a few months and ended in failure. To some extent, problems with the organization of Polish units in the Turkish army should be linked to the opposition of Austria-Hungary (Morawski/SzawÅowska 2006: 138). The government in Vienna feared unrest among Poles living in Galicia if these units were to appear in large numbers close to this region. Nevertheless, the primary reason for the setbacks can be perceived as misunderstandings among the Poles themselves. In letters to friends, MichaÅ Czajkowski complained that his compatriots had not come to his aid during the Crimean War. Due to the intrigues of political opponents (he mentioned in this context mainly Zamoyski, who had been forming the 2nd Regiment of Sultan Cossacks) as well as Poles serving under his command, he was forced to resign. Czajkowski was also disappointed with recruitment to his units. In letters, he stated that his plans to fight Russia were not acknowledged by the Poles. In this context, he mentioned his intention to cross the Danube with his unit in 1863 and organize an uprising against Russia. Ultimately, however, this did not occur, as no one in Poland answered his call. Czajkowski lamented that his cause was not supported at home, and was resisted abroad among the exiles (SzpotaÅski 1911: 473â476). Some contemporary scholars identify the reasons for his disagreements with the Polish independence camp in Czajkowskiâs pan-Slavism and, above all, Ukrainianophilism. Though he strived for the restoration of the Commonwealth, his ideas around a hetmanate Ukraine and Slavic federation did not fit into the mainstream worldview of the Polish émigrés (Volxonskij et al. 2007: 147â160).
Other Polish generals in the Turkish army were much less successful than MichaÅ Czajkowski. Ludwik Bystrzonowski and Feliks BreaÅski, who had volunteered for the Turkish army, were assigned to the Caucasus front. They took part in the defence of Kars, but both quickly came into conflict with the commanders of the Turkish forces, and above all with the British providing support to the Turks. Bystrzonowskiâs behaviour was particularly negatively perceived during the Battle of Kurekdere in August 1853, when under unexplained circumstances he retreated away from the front line. Because of this, he was blocked from influencing Hôtel Lambert policy, and Adam Czartoryski himself began avoiding the general. In October 1854, both Bystrzonowski and BreaÅski left Kars and resigned, returning to Istanbul in the shadow of a scandal (Chudzio 2011: 168â170).
Given the above testimonies, Polish attempts to create national units within the Turkish army should be considered unfulfilled. By the same token, I consider Charles Kingâs statement that âPoles were sometimes organized into special regiments and even accompanied Ottoman forces in the invasion of western Georgia during the Crimean Warâ to be exaggerated (King 2008: 56). It is worth noting that there were plans to use Polish units in the Caucasus, but these were opposed by the Poles themselves. They viewed this as a threat to the national interest, while the émigré leaders sought to use them in territories closer to Polish lands, such as Moldavia, in the hopes that this would lead to a national uprising. Thus, the Turkish offensive in the Western Caucasus commenced lacking any units under Czajkowskiâs command (Widerszal 2011: 145â146).
The case of the formation of Polish troops in the Ottoman Empire provides interesting research material in terms of studying the issue of Polish involvement in the struggle against the Russian Empire in the 1850s. In the opinion of Andrzej Furier, the key problem, besides the issue of Western European powersâ support and consent of the authorities in Istanbul, was the question of recruits. Several conscription centres were set up in Europe â including Paris, London, Strasbourg and Marseilles â but the influx of volunteers was small (Furier 2006: 196). Polish prisoners of war from the Tsarist army taken captive by the Allies during the Crimean War also did not join Polish units fighting against Russia in large numbers. In his memoirs, Czajkowski gave the example of Poles who found themselves in French prisons after the Battle of Bomarsund, which took place in September 1854. Napoleon III decided to send back to Istanbul those of them who would declare their desire to fight in Polish units against Russia. In such cases, the French promised to pay their passage and living expenses. Czajkowski reported that the money was distributed generously, but many of those who took it did not make it to Turkey, remaining instead in other countries to wait out the hard times of war. On the other hand, Poles who did want to reach their destination were stopped in France and Malta by WÅadysÅaw Zamoyskiâs men, as he did not want fresh recruits to come under Czajkowskiâs command (Czajkowski 1962: 224).
Just after the end of the Crimean War, the most famous military mission that Poles would take part in was dispatched to the Caucasus. At its head stood Teofil ÅapiÅski. It should be noted that by that time the attitude of European countries towards the Adyghe had changed, which was because they had not taken action against Russia and behaved passively during the war. Adam Czartoryski wrote about this in a letter to Zaneqo sent in February 1859, in which he explained why their governments will not assist the Circassians (Czajkowski 1859).
No Polish émigré organization participated officially in the preparations for ÅapiÅskiâs expedition, as it was prepared chaotically and unprofessionally from its onset. For this reason, too, politicians and activists had no desire of getting involved in such provisional operations. Nevertheless, one can find traces of cooperation between Teofil ÅapiÅski and representatives of the Hôtel Lambert in Istanbul. The Pole turned out, however, to be a less-than-ideal organizer. For example, insufficient supplies of weapons were prepared, so some participants of the expedition had neither rifles nor pistols. In addition, much of the equipment was stolen in transport by ÅapiÅskiâs Turkish accomplices. Cooperation from Zaneqo, with whom the Poles were supposed to undertake joint action against the tsarist army, was also lacking. It turned out that his attitude toward the Russians was ambiguous. He personally seemed to act against them, while several people in his closest circle openly cooperated with the Russians. Zaneqoâs son, for example, served as their guide in punitive expeditions against the local population (ÅÄ tka 1988: 83â113), whereas his milk brother10 passed letters sent by ÅapiÅski to the more high-profile Circassians on to the Russians (Filipson 1857).
With time, it became clear that Zaneqo did not so much want to use the Poles against the Russians as against the independent Shapsugs, with whom he was feuding (ÅÄ tka 1988: 84). It was not until 1859 that ÅapiÅski began negotiations with Muhammad-Amin, the naib in the Western Caucasus appointed by Imam Shamil. The Pole signed an agreement with him (on behalf of Adam Czartoryski, who was most likely not informed prior) to form a Polish unit and decided to go over to his side (Ugoda 1859). While Muhammad-Amin had controlled a real force just a few years earlier, by 1859 he no longer possessed significant troops, due in large part to his conflict with Zaneqo. The naib eventually ceased fighting after Imam Shamilâs surrender at Gunib, which occurred in August 1859, and left for Turkey. Teofil ÅapiÅski would leave the Caucasus that same year.
Upon arrival in Istanbul, the Pole had nothing to be tasked with. One agent of the Hôtel Lambert wrote to WÅadysÅaw Zamoyski that he did not know what to do with ÅapiÅski, as he risked compromising the organization and its plans entirely, and would most willingly dispatch him to Paris. In Paris, ÅapiÅski was not welcomed either. For a while, a place was sought for him within the Polish units forming in Italy. However, he refrained from signing up as a large role therein was played by Hungarians, and these the Pole detested. His critical attitude towards them had developed during the Spring of Nations. The author of ÅapiÅskiâs biography, Jerzy ÅÄ tka, noted that he held an almost organic dislike of Hungarians and considered them all potential traitors (ÅÄ tka 1988: 123â129).
ÅapiÅskiâs character and perhaps difficult financial situation caused him to pay a secret visit to the Russian embassy in Istanbul in the middle of 1860, where he submitted a memorandum to the Russians outlining a rapid conquest of the Caucasus. In it, he described the relations between the Ubykhs, Shapsugs, and Abazins. The Pole stated that the only way to handle the highlanders was through force. He advised that houses be set aflame during marches against the local population and that expeditions should be organized more often and with more rigour than before. ÅapiÅski stressed that the Circassians should be persuaded by all means to move to the Ottoman Empire (one can thus consider the Pole a supporter of resettlement policy). He noted in the presented document: âWe reiterate once more that we consider it possible to conquer this country, but will consider it a conquered country only when the tribe is expelled or disarmed and when Russian colonists are settled along the Black Sea coastâ. At the same time, despite his offer to the Russians, ÅapiÅski tried to raise funds to continue his expedition against the Russians in Circassia and maintained close contacts with the Circassian émigré community in Turkey. The case of this memorandum was only revealed in the early 20th century. ÅÄ tka approached it emotionally and admitted that the document was the most appalling source he had read while looking for materials for Teofil ÅapiÅskiâs biography. He noted that ÅapiÅskiâs conduct could usually be explained by financial troubles. The historian concluded that if he had wanted to make the biography more belletristic, he would have attempted to explain the move more casually: ÅapiÅski may have hoped that the Russians would take his advice and attack the Circassians, thereby triggering an all-out war in the Caucasus. The Pole may have thought â in ÅÄ tkaâs opinion â that the desperate highlanders would resist the invaders, and that the countries of Western Europe would join in the conflict and prevent the annexation of Circassia to Russia (ÅÄ tka 1988: 123â129, 216â227).
However, it seems that the above interpretation goes too far. It is worth quoting here the opinions of Teofil ÅapiÅski held by Alexander Herzen and Mikhail Bakunin. The former wrote this about the Pole:
ÅapiÅski was, in all senses of the word, a condottiere. He had no fixed political beliefs. He could go along with the âwhitesâ and the âredsâ, with the dirties and the cleans; belonging by birth to the Galician nobility, by upbringing â to the Austrian army, he gravitated towards Vienna. Russia, and everything Russian, he hated wildly, madly, incorrigibly. (Gercen 2018: 275)
Bakunin, initially fascinated by ÅapiÅski, changed his mind about him and wrote that he was:
a brave man, skilful but devoid of conscience [â¦] a condottiere, a patriot in the sense of implacable and invincible hatred of Russians, as a professional military man, hating everyone, even his own nation. (Bakunin 1896: 118)
Perhaps ÅapiÅskiâs hatred of the Russians was not as great as was widely believed. It is nonetheless difficult to explain his proposal to them. It is not out of the question that, deprived of his means of livelihood, this was the way he tried to acquire the means to support himself. Towards the end of his life, he settled in Lviv and did not maintain social relations. In one section of Kronika in âDziennik Polskiâ11 from 15 May 1886, a short notice was published:
Teofil ÅapiÅski has passed away, legionary of 1848, Polish soldier from 1863, before that Turkish officer in the Caucasus, known for his ânaval expeditionâ in 1863, died at the general hospital on Holy Saturday. The late ÅapiÅski did not reside with anyone in recent times, which is why no one knew of his death and only today we found out about it, by accident at that. (Kronika 1886: 2)
The Hôtel Lambert agentsâ greater interest in the Caucasus arose when ÅapiÅski had already been in Circassia for a year. To a large extent, this was related to the fact that in 1858 WÅadysÅaw Jordan became the head of Adam Czartoryskiâs agency in Istanbul, assisted by his brother Zygmunt. Jordanâs correspondence demonstrates that the region was a priority for the agency even when there was no longer any prospect of obtaining aid for the peoples fighting for independence there, and when all the major activists from Hôtel Lambert headquarters were basically advising to fully cease the solicitation of Western governments and Turkey for this purpose. Despite low support from headquarters, Jordan continued his efforts with the Turkish authorities to obtain funds for the establishment of a Polish legion in the Caucasus (Nowak 2014: 170â171). Ludwik Widerszal reported that in 1860 Ibragim Karabatyr (most likely referring to Karabatyr Zaneqo, son of Seferbiy) arrived in Istanbul and approached Jordan, requesting Czarotryski act on behalf of the Circassians before the British government. The Polish agent asked for plenipotence to be issued and in 1861 received such documentation, but the British responded to the proposal in the negative (Widerszal 2011: 192â194). A few months before the outbreak of the January Uprising, however, WÅadysÅaw Zamoyski, taking advantage of his contacts in London, helped organize the arrival of a Circassian delegation to Great Britain (Nowak 2014: 171). Already after the outbreak of fighting in the Polish lands, a meeting was held in London on Russiaâs policy towards Poland and the Caucasus. A report on this initiative was published in a pamphlet entitled Poland and Circassia. It included a speech by WÅadysÅaw Zamoyski, who spoke of the Circassians as Polandâs tried and tested allies and argued that an independent Caucasus was necessary for both the Poles and the British (Zamoyski 1863). Visible in these actions are thus renewed attempts to create a coalition against Russia, one that would include Poles along with the Caucasian peoples.
The Caucasus was a key region for the Hôtel Lambert agency in Istanbul during the January Uprising. It actively began soliciting funds at the time from Britain, France, and Turkey for a Caucasus expedition and assistance for the Circassians. A diversion in the Caucasus was intended to tie up Russian troops and consequently weaken the empire of the tsars. Thus, an opportunity was sought to relieve the frail insurgent forces fighting in the homeland. In the spring of 1863, WÅadysÅaw Jordan presented the Polish National Government with a plan for the insurgents to capture Odesa. Since the Poles-in-exile themselves were not very eager to participate in military operations against Russia, Jordan intended to supplement the Polish forces with a contingent of two to three thousand Circassians. In 1863 WÅadysÅaw Jordan, in a letter to WÅadysÅaw Zamoyski, wrote enthusiastically that everything was already prepared for an uprising throughout the Caucasus and that he saw the chance of organizing a great diversion. It follows that the agent did not completely comprehend the situation in the region, where armed resistance against Russia was already petering out. He maintained a level of disconnect with reality similar to other conceptions of Hôtel Lambert representatives at the time. For example, WÅadysÅaw Jordan, together with Witold Czartoryski, assumed that Austria could cede Galicia to an independent Poland and in return receive Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Danube principalities from Turkey, while Turkey could take the Caucasus under its sovereignty (Nowak 2014: 171â174).
WÅadysÅaw Jordan did realize his intentions to a small extent. Because it was not possible to obtain subsidies from foreign partners, Witold Czartoryski equipped from his own funds a group of 150 people to be sent to the Caucasus. This nucleus of a Polish unit set out under the leadership of Klemens PrzewÅocki in the strength of a dozen officers and non-commissioned officers, mostly Poles, though there were others as well, Frenchmen for example. The remainder of the unitâs manpower was planned to be filled out by refugees from the tsarist army upon arrival in Circassia. However, the plan did not yield its intended results. As PrzewÅocki reported, the Circassians did not want to give over to the unit the Polish slaves in their possession, who were anyway already few in number by that time. He also stated that attempts to induce their compatriots to desert from the tsarist army fell flat (Widerszal 2011: 215). Klemens PrzewÅocki, having failed to form this Polish unit, returned to Istanbul in the spring of 1864. Thus, the information provided by PrzewÅocki differs significantly from such notions, sometimes held in Poland, that a Pole had halted the occupation of the Caucasus by the Russians for some time and organized a detachment in the strength of more than a thousand highlanders, or that WÅadysÅaw Zamoyski and Witold Czartoryski organized arms supplies to Chechnya (see Kuleba 1998: 21; Zwierz 1996: 141). At that time Chechnya was already under Russian control, and even beforehand representatives of the Hôtel Lambert entertained no such plans, nor possessed any such means, with regards to the eastern part of the Caucasus.
At the beginning of 1863 the only remaining opponents of the Russians in the Caucasus were small-scale mountain communities living on the northern slopes of the Caucasusâ main ridge, in the territory between the Adagum and Belaya rivers, and peoples living on the Black Sea coast, on the current Russian-Abkhazian border (such as the Ubykhs and Shapsugs). The operations of the tsarist army in this period ended with numerous successes, which led to the representatives of the free peoples to begin leaving the Caucasus in the summer of 1863. In autumn, the Abdzakh elders arrived at the camp of Nikolai Yevdokimov, head of the Kuban district. An agreement was made between them that by 1 February 1864, they would either accept Russian serfdom and begin resettling to their assigned places or depart for the Ottoman Empire. On 21 May 1864, four Russian units arriving from different parts of Circassia met at Qbaada aul12 and a solemn prayer was held to mark the completion of the conquest of the Caucasus. This day is considered the end of the Caucasian War. After this event, the Polish émigré communityâs plans for the region became even more unrealistic and could hardly serve as a pretext for obtaining further funds.
This does not mean, however, that the Poles abandoned such intentions. Józef Adam Grekowicz, for example, had his own plans for the Caucasus. During the January Uprising, he was appointed by the National Government as colonel and commander of a military unit that set out from Kraków to wage guerrilla war in the partitioned territories belonging to Russia (Grodziska 2016: 195). After combat had ended, the military man went into exile and lived, among other places, in France and Turkey. In 1877, Grekowicz appeared in Istanbul on behalf of the conspiratorial organization KoÅo Lwowskie (Lviv Circle). He had a project involving the instigation of a highlander uprising in the Caucasus, which would be coordinated with operations taken by the revolutionary Russian movement Zemlya i Volya (Land and Freedom) (Reychman 1959/1960: 573). The whole endeavour would be supported by a special Polish corps, which would carry out diversionary activities throughout the Turkish-Russian war fought between 1877â1878, with the intent of stoking the uprisingâs spread (Reychman 1939: 271). This was planned to encompass the whole of Russia and cause it to split into independent states, Poland included.
Grekowicz presupposed that the uprising in the Caucasus must be strong enough that the Russian army, operating in Asia Minor, would have to retreat to hold its lines of communication and act against the insurrectionists. In his view, the tsar could not count on the absolute loyalty of his forces residing in the region, as they consisted, to his mind, largely of âunsureâ Circassians, Tatars, Poles, and a Russian âsuspicious elementâ. The Turks should pursue the retreating tsarist army, which would begin to âmelt awayâ and be forced to gather its forces in a concentration, which in turn would prevent it from containing the uprising. The uprisings rapid collapse, in the Poleâs opinion, would otherwise occur if the Turks were to give up on such an offensive. The primary operational Turkish bases, he argued, should become Batumi, Poti, and Sukhumi.
Grekowicz foresaw a momentous role for the Poles within his conception. Thus the Turks, for diversionary purposes, were to send a well-equipped Polish corps to the Caucasus, commanded by an officer well-known among Polish soldiers fighting in the ranks of the tsarist army. As per Grekowicz, in such a case Poles serving in the Russian army would begin to transfer en masse to the Polish corps and, consequently, having faced several defeats, the enemy forces would find themselves in disarray. On a par with the Polish corps, the Turks were to also send a Tatar unit, to which Tatars would defect in turn. At the same time, the revolutionary organization of Zemlya i volya was supposed to provoke mass desertions of Russians from the tsarist army. The two national corps, actively supported by the Circassians, would occupy Astrakhan and then spark a Tatar uprising on the Volga. Grekowicz considered this city crucial, as the main supply route for the tsarist army in the Caucasus led through it. Its capture would force the Russians to withdraw their forces from the Danube and move them deeper into their own territory. A further advance by the Turkish army, the Pole assumed, would threaten the existence of the Russian state. The Turks were to issue a manifesto stating they were entering foreign land to aid oppressed peoples, who were to gain independence. Russian revolutionaries would take advantage of the situation and launch an uprising in the eastern part of Russia. If it spread to the central part of the country, Grekowicz assumed, Polish troops could land on the northern shores of the Black Sea, which would become possible with the Turkish fleetâs domination, and a new operation could be launched (Grekowicz 1932: 453â456). The road to an independent Poland would lay open.
Polish plans concerning the Caucasus in the 19th century were drawn up primarily by people affiliated with the Hôtel Lambert. They established contacts with the Circassians living along the eastern coast of the Black Sea, which was motivated logistically by the proximity of the Ottoman Empire. A major problem in implementing the plans was that the Circassians fighting the Russians had not organized a central authority. This had occurred only in the eastern part of the Caucasus â Chechnya and Dagestan, which significantly increased the efficiency of operations. The lack of a supreme command among the Circassians and the consequence of such a state of affairs was pointed out by Czajkowski in his reports:
As for the Cherkess, I have long held the conviction that they were worth little and that they could not be counted on. That they were more like a collection of bold thugs, efficient thieves without any morals, who sold their children, their wives, their mothers, and themselves, rather than a martial and political nationality that could inspire confidence. (Czajkowski 1962: 198)
Moreover, according to Czajkowski, the Circassians did not want to change their situation at all and were content to have the Russians nearby. He supported this claim with the words of a representative of Seferbiy Zaneqo, who told him that the Circassians prefer the neighbourhood of the Russians to that of the Turks, as the former can be looted, while the latter possessed nothing and would themselves loot the Circassians, just as they loot their own subjects. In his memoirs, Czajkowski stated that not only he was disaffected with the Circassians, but some of the more influential Turks were also. In this context, he mentioned, for example, Foreign Minister Reshid Pasha and naval commander Riza Pasha. In his view, only Mehmed Ali Pasha, the sultanâs brother-in-law, cared for the Circassians but pointed out that he did so out of whimsy rather than conviction. It seems Imam Shamil also had an opinion of the Circassians analogous to the Poleâs. A paragraph from his letter to Czajkowski, which the latter quoted in his memoirs, can be cited as evidence. The leader of the independent peoples of the eastern Caucasus was to write: âIf you can by means of your influence with the Caliph and by the presence of your Poles transform the Cherkess from slave merchants, from robbers and thieves to warriors of the holy faith and fatherland, I am ready to accept any intrigue you may call me toâ (Czajkowski 1962: 200â201, 209).
MichaÅ Czajkowski had on the other hand a very positive opinion of Shamil and the peoples living in Dagestan and Chechnya. In his view, it was the imam who sought to build his own independent state, while the Circassians wanted to engage in slave trading and plunder. Although Czajkowski was sympathetic to the peoples of the eastern part of the Caucasus, being well-versed in the realities of the region he realized that given their considerable remoteness and the general situation related to Russiaâs military operations, establishing cooperation with them would be considerably difficult, if not impossible. According to the Pole, the most promising cooperation would be with the Black Sea and Azov Cossacks (Czajkowski 1962: 199, 201). However, his superiors at Hôtel Lambert headquarters did not allow him to take this up, which had ideological reasoning behind it. In WÅadysÅaw Zamoyskiâs view, contacts with the Cossacks were unacceptable, since they were enemies of Catholicism and Poland for religious and historical reasons. The politician believed that even if they stepped forward militarily to defend Poland, it could only doom her, as the Cossacks would not accept the Catholic faith, and would in turn seek to turn the Poles into followers of Orthodoxy and separate them from Western civilization (Äajkovskij 1898).
In his report on Ludwik Zwierkowskiâs expedition to the Caucasus, MichaÅ Czajkowski included the opinion that he saw neither now nor in the future any benefit to the Polish cause in contacts with the Circassians or even with Shamil. According to the Pole, these could not benefit Turkey either, given that the Circassians did not want to recognize the authority of the Turks, to whom they preferred the proximity of the Russians. With the former, they wanted to maintain only religious contacts, as well as commercial ones â to sell slaves to Turkey and acquire there all necessary goods, including weapons and ammunition. In wishing so, the Circassians also refused to enter into an alliance with Shamil or cooperate with him. Czajkowskiâs most important remark, in the context of Czartoryskiâs plans, was the observation that the Circassians, like the Chechens (who he stressed were much more devoted to their homeland), were ready to organize looting expeditions against neighbouring Russian settlements but could never be persuaded to go on an expedition deep into Russia. The leaders of the Hôtel Lambert, however, viewed relations with the Caucasus differently and believed that they had positive overtones for reasons of propaganda (Äajkovskij 1898).
In his memoirs, MichaÅ Czajkowski confirmed that during the period when he was Adam Czartoryskâs agent in Istanbul, three Polish representatives â Ludwik Zwierkowski, Kazimierz Gordon and one Mikorski from PoznaÅ â were sent to the Caucasus, although the latter failed to reach his destination and returned to Istanbul. Czajkowski underlined that he never wanted to organize similar expeditions and dissuaded Grand Vizier Mehmed Ali Pasha from doing so. In his opinion, such activities were doomed to failure in advance and led to nothing but suspicion, accusations, and ridicule. On the other hand, when WÅadysÅaw Jordan became Adam Czartoryskiâs political agent, two expeditions were organized to the Caucasus â those of Teofil ÅapiÅski and Klemens PrzewÅocki. In Czajkowskiâs opinion, the former demonstrated only the ineptitude and impunity of the Poles, as well as a lack of any preconception for cooperation with the Circassians. The latter, in turn, accelerated the Circassiansâ exodus from their homeland. In his view, both consumed huge sums of money and came up empty-handed (Czajkowski 1962: 200).
Adam Czartoryskiâs faction spent several years trying to demonstrate to Western European society that its activities influenced (or could influence, given adequate funding) the struggle of the highlanders, which weakened Russia. Their focus came down to mainly winning the hearts of anti-Russian circles in Great Britain that sympathized with the Circassians. MichaÅ Czajkowski argued that: âFrom the earliest times the Cherkess were Englandâs warhorse, upon which, if the English werenât warring, they invaded the Russians, and in this they wanted to imitate the French, who had their Poles. England always wanted to match France in similar thingsâ (Czajkowski 1962: 198). Ludwik Widerszal, rightly it seems, noted that the nature of that era, which can be linked to the âspiritâ of Romanticism, turned out to be significant for the curiosity of European societies regarding the Circassians. Because the Caucasus was very poorly known to Europeans, on occasion fantastical rumours did circulate on its topic, arousing sympathy for its inhabitants, who remained shrouded in an aura of mystery (Widerszal 2011: 224â225).
It was advantageous for the Poles to spread the belief that Russiaâs actions in the Caucasus posed a threat to British interests, to the effect that it would become a trigger for conflict on a larger, European scale. This could have led, after all, to the emergence of an independent Poland.
Financial matters were not insignificant. After all, it was the anti-Russian liberal British aristocrats who generously sponsored the activities of the Hôtel Lambert. This is evident in Czajkowskiâs reports from when he served under Czartoryski. For example, in 1846, in one of his dispatches, he wrote that Kazimierz Gordonâs expedition to the Caucasus should provide a good motive for requesting new funds from the English (WyciÄ g z depeszy 1846). Czajkowski also raised this topic in his memoirs. He wrote there that when he presented the leaders of the Hôtel Lambert with arguments underlining the futility of contacts with the Caucasian peoples in the context of the Polish cause, he received a reply from WÅadysÅaw Zamoyski who stated they should be constantly supported and further encouraged to raid Russian possessions. In the words of the politician, quoted by MichaÅ Czajkowski, therein lay the only means to âdrawâ money from the English and Turks to increase the âperpetual fundâ. The larger this fund turned out to be, the more favourably it would impact the strength of Czartoryskiâs authority and importance, and the more his influence on Polish affairs would grow regardless of all the intrigues of his opponents (Äajkovskij 1898).
Thus, Adam Czartoryski was anxious to convince the British public of the great potential influence his faction maintained in the Caucasus and hence its great importance for policy of the government in London. This caused an overvaluation of the Hôtel Lambertâs capabilities to influence the situation in the region. This method of political calculation can be seen, for example, in Adam Czartoryskiâs letter to Ludwik Bystrzonowski from September of 1836. In it the prince wrote:
You need not have explained the importance of the matters being connived in the East. On this topic remember only that the initiative cannot hinge on us. It is only necessary that we show just how much strength they will find in us once the task begins, that today they will find in us self-sacrifice, perseverance, patience, and thousands of Poles under arms in the Caucasus. (Czartoryski 1836)
The Hôtel Lambert activists exaggerated above all the importance of Polish deserters from the Russian army. The conviction of their large numbers made it possible to submit plans involving the creation of Polish units, which were intended to constitute a serious military force in the region. This, in turn, provided a good pretext for seeking funds.
Reports exaggerating the success of the independent highlanders in their fight against the Russians also occurred, which may have further contributed to the unrealistic planning. MichaÅ Czajkowski was also guilty of this, though from among Adam Czartoryskiâs agents he was normally best-versed in Caucasian affairs. Thus, in 1844, he informed his superiors that Shamil had occupied Derbent and that the entirety of Dagestan had been engulfed by an uprising against Russia (Document 1844). Meanwhile, in the 1840s, the imam admittedly did win several significant victories over Russian troops, but never succeeded in capturing any city, nor were there any mass uprisings of which it could be said that âall of Dagestanâ had been engulfed in a liberation struggle.
It is appropriate to mention another interesting phenomenon on the margin of considerations surrounding Polish émigré circlesâ plans relating to the Caucasus, foremost those of the Hôtel Lambert led by Czartoryski. It has become popular today to perceive Adam Czartoryski as a politician who possessed a vision of Polish Caucasus policy and who supported the local peoples fighting against Russia. This topic has been addressed both in numerous scientific and journalistic works. However, in presenting the issue of the politicianâs attitude towards the Caucasus, authors practically omit the earlier period when he headed the Russian Foreign Ministry. This lasted only two years, from 1804 to 1806, but was marked by Russiaâs intensive annexation of the Caucasus: in 1804, for example, this concerned Imereti and Guria; that same year war also broke out with Persia and Russia annexed the Ganja Khanate; in 1805: the Shuragel Sultanate, Karabakh, Shirvan, and Shaki khanates; and in 1806: the Derbent and Baku khanates. One of the few historians that have mentioned this at all was Andrzej Nowak. The scholar, citing a correspondence between Adam Czartoryski and Prince Pavel Tsitsianov,13 who commanded the Russian troops conquering Transcaucasia, concluded that the minister had been very diligent in overseeing its annexation to Russia (Nowak 2008: 108). Despite the rather rich source material on Prince Czartoryskiâs involvement in the annexation of the Caucasus to Russia, this topic has not been even vaguely studied by Polish historians.
WÅadysÅaw Zamoyski (1803â1868) was a relative of Adam Czartoryski and also one of his closest associates. On behalf of the prince, Zamoyski directed the foreign policy of the Hôtel Lambert. He served as an officer in the Polish, Turkish, and British armies.
Interestingly, David Urquhart wrote the declaration of Circassian independence on his own initiative. In 1835, using his Circassian pseudonym Daud-Bey, he wrote a letter to the Circassians subsequently published in many European, including Polish, dailies, in which he called on them to declare independence and form a national government. He wrote that the Polish people would then understand that their own fate was linked to theirs and that the 20,000 Poles serving in the tsarist army would âsoon realize that their weapons are aimed at brothersâ (see List Dauda do Czerkiesów 1837: 91â93).
Dzhubga is currently located in the southwestern part of Krasnodar Krai in Russia.
The Vorontsovs arrived in the Caucasus in 1844, when Mikhail took office as viceroy of the Caucasus.
MichaÅ Czajkowski is the author of such works as: PowieÅÄ kozacka (1837), Wernyhora wieszcz ukraiÅski: powieÅÄ historyczna z roku 1768 (1838), Stefan Czarniecki (1840), Owruczanin (1841) czy Hetman Ukrainy (1841).
Witold Czartoryski (1822â1865) was the eldest son of Adam Czartoryski.
Most likely the reference is to Mehmed Emin Ãli Pasha, foreign minister of the Ottoman Empire at the time.
One journalistic example of this phenomenon can be found in an article by Piotr KorczyÅski, in which the author claims that âZwierkowski and Gordon became victims of the poisoned daggers of tsarist agents residing in Istanbulâ (See KorczyÅski 2015).
Seferbiy Zaneqo (1789â1859) â a political activist. Initially, he was in Russian service but fled to the Ottoman Empire. He then returned to his native Circassia and became one of the most influential individuals among the local peoples. Though Zaneqo acted against the Russians, his close circle, including his own son, occasionally cooperated with them. During the Crimean War, he was awarded the title of pasha by the Sultan.
In the Caucasus, it was customary to give children to persons unrelated to their parents for upbringing. The children of such individuals relative to the child being raised were referred to as âmilk brothersâ or âmilk sistersâ.
âDziennik Polskiâ was published in Lviv in the years 1869â1918.
Qbaada was located on the site of todayâs town of Krasnaya Polyana, east of Sochi.
Pavel Tsitsianov (1754â1806) â Russian general of Georgian descent. In 1802, he became the governor of Astrakhan and commander-in-chief of Russian troops in Georgia.