1 Introduction
In this paper, I explore the phenomenon of private donations to public bodies—in other words, money or property donated by private individuals for the benefit of their places of origin or residence—as attested in mainland Greece of the Roman period. While occasionally treated within their social, cultural, and religious context, such transactions have received considerably less attention from the legal and economic points of view, which form the basis of my discussion.
Attested in the Greek world since the early Hellenistic period, funds acquired in this way contributed substantially to the income of the Greek poleis, either by covering a specific public expense, or by generating regular income over the years upon investment of capital and accumulation of interest. The practice continues to be observed in the imperial period, particularly over the first and the second centuries CE, and may be taken to indicate an increasing dependence of the Greek communities’ economic stability on private benefactions. Ranging, in purpose, from more personal to entirely public concerns, transfers of funds or property from private individuals to civic institutions, recorded on a number of public and funerary monuments, often prescribed specific use of the revenues accrued and were accompanied by penalty clauses which were to come into effect in the event of non-compliance.
What follows is focused primarily on these conditions and clauses attached to private donations to public bodies, some even modifying local rules of legal standing. After a brief introduction into the source material, I investigate the underlying mechanisms which allowed for the imposition of highly variable conditions and penalty clauses, and ask whether the latter should be seen as purely dissuasive or, instead, as reflecting local socio-economic and legal realities. I then discuss the implications of the occasional involvement of Roman provincial and central authorities in authorising or confirming such transfers of funds between public bodies and private individuals, the vast majority of whom were Roman citizens of local origin.
I demonstrate, first, how these transactions reflect the continuation of a Hellenistic practice under Rome, and highlight how individual agency and private concerns could influence and shape provincial legal practice. In a similar vein, I argue that occasional resort by either the beneficiaries or the donors themselves to Roman authorities with a view to secure these transactions is indicative of a desire for an additional layer of protection rather than a movement toward Roman law.
2 Private Donations to Public Bodies and the Problem of Misappropriation
With its possible roots in Pharaonic Egypt, the practice of private individuals donating money or property for the benefit of their communities, normally prescribing a specific use of the revenues accrued, is found in the Greek sources since at least the fourth century BCE.1 The practice remains widely attested throughout the Roman Empire, including its Western provinces, and has modern parallels in both the civil and common law systems, as well as the Islamic law.2 As legal transactions, closely tied with social practice—euergetism, or munificence—and intended to convey a clear economic benefit, these documents make a particularly interesting case study for the broader topic of law and economic performance in the Roman world.
The two volumes of Bernhard Laum’s Stiftungen in der griechischen und römischen Antike, though by now outdated, still provide a good general idea of the geographic and temporal distribution of documentary sources recording the practice in the Graeco-Roman world.3 In 1950s, Eberhard F. Bruck articulated a hypothesis that the Hellenistic donations of the sort provided a model for the Roman ones, as he wrote of the Nachahmung, or the imitation of the Greek practice in the West.4 The phenomenon has also been discussed on a handful of occasions in relation to Roman law, often stressing its ‘vulgar nature’ and the lack of interest in it on behalf of the Roman jurists.5 More importantly, Edward Harris recently pointed out the danger of the anachronistic use of the term ‘foundation’ (Ger. Stiftung) to refer to private donations to public bodies in the Greek sources: though still prevalent in modern scholarship, the term is misleading in that such transfers of funds or property did not result in the creation of an institution with a legal personality of its own.6 Instead of relying on modern legal terminology, such transactions should be treated and referred to as what they really were: donations or gifts with strings attached, often but not exclusively enacted in the context of a donor’s will.7
Among the common features of these transactions, as alerted to in the introduction, were the prescription of the specific use of the funds or the revenues accrued, and the provisions for the protection of funds against neglect or misappropriation by the civic authorities, normally followed by the so-called entrenchment clauses prohibiting any changes to the mutually agreed terms.8 Pliny’s letter to his fellow townsman Caninius in Comum is often quoted as an example of the lack of trust that potential donors could have in the representatives of their beneficiary communities: “If you give money to a community, it may be squandered; if you give land, it may be neglected as other public lands”.9 This demonstrates sufficiently that, in Pliny’s day, no universal security system existed to protect such transfers of money and/or land from private individuals to civic communities, which may explain the ubiquity of entrenchment clauses as well as variability of penalties.
As regards the latter, a common issue with epigraphic sources of the sort is their summary nature. Though spelling out a fine or some other form of punishment, most penalty clauses lack any specification with regards to the enforcing authority. Similarly, it is not always clear whether the penalty was to be imposed as a result of court action or an authoritative decision of one or more civic institutions. Even in cases where the authority exacting a fine is specified, we cannot be entirely sure if this was done summarily or after some form of judicial proceedings whereby the guilty party was condemned.10
If we choose to think of penalty clauses on public inscriptions as serving a primarily dissuasive purpose, the omission of the exact legal procedure would be less surprising: specification of the consequences of whatever legal process may be applied (e.g. monetary fine, ἀτιμία, ἀσέβεια) could be considered sufficient to discourage breach of contract, misappropriation of funds, violation of tombs, and so on. On the other hand, it is important to keep in mind that penalties in the form of monetary fines or confiscation of property constituted a form of income for the communities too, so the provisions for their exaction should have been made sufficiently clear.
When it comes to private donations to public bodies, however, a rather peculiar problem arises. Namely, in cases where the primary beneficiary of such a donation is a community, represented by its civic institutions, can this same community also be the beneficiary of a fine payable upon non-compliance with the agreed terms? Intuitively, this does not seem right. If civic institutions, which were the primary recipients of funds in such transactions, were also the prime suspects of misappropriation of those funds, what measures were there to prevent it? To see what kind of solutions benefactors would come up with in practice, we should turn to documentary sources.
3 Epigraphic Evidence
One of the most detailed documents concerning a gift of money to a community is preserved on an inscription from Gytheion in Lakonia, dating to 42 CE, which records the transfer of 8,000 denarii to the polis, enacted by a woman named Phaenia Aromation.11 The document prescribes that the capital ought to be let out by the archons and the synedroi of the polis upon “adequate real securities” (a standard procedure also in the Hellenistic period), and that the interest accrued upon these loans should be used toward the perpetual supply of oil to the gymnasium and the city, to be enjoyed by “the citizens of Gytheion and the foreigners”.12 Among further conditions of her donation, we find an explicit prescription that slaves be also allowed to enter the gymnasium and anoint themselves on particular days of the year, undisturbed by civic or gymnasium officials.13 While perfectly in line with Phaenia’s self-portrayal as a major civic benefactress, this condition could have hardly been received with enthusiasm by the polis’ officials, since slaves were normally excluded from the Greek gymnasia.14 Phaenia’s donation was thus explicitly intended to benefit the entirety of the city’s population, including non-citizens and even slaves. The management of her donation was entrusted entirely to the polis’ institutions, and the annual interest collected on the loans contracted from her fund was payable directly into the public treasury. With this in mind, the provisions concerning non-compliance with the terms of Phaenia’s donation become particularly interesting.
Among the potential offences envisaged, the donor’s first and seemingly main concern was the possible neglect of her beneficence: “no one should dare, either in a private capacity or publicly, to neglect my donation”, she insisted. More specifically, such an offence is anticipated precisely on the part of the archons and/or the synedroi by way of mismanaging “the eternal supply of oil”, failing to receive adequate real securities when initiating the loans, or otherwise failing to remain “within the terms of [her] donation”. In order to keep the civic authorities in check or, verbatim, “to avoid the polis receiving the reputation of negligence”, the document introduces a clause of voluntary prosecution, namely, “anyone who wishes of the Greeks or the Romans will be able to prosecute the polis for neglect before the demos of the Gytheatai”.15
By spelling out the terms of the procedure allowing Romans resident in Gytheion to bring a public action against the polis, Phaenia or, rather, her legal aid provided against any legal constraints related to possession of local citizenship. We know from other epigraphic sources that a sizeable Roman citizen community existed in Lakonia in the Augustan period, certainly including Gytheion.16 A similar clause of voluntary prosecution with regards to mismanagement of (sacred) funds is also found in an earlier document from the same polis, namely, the so-called lex sacra of 15 CE,17 thus attesting to the active part that could be accorded to all members of a provincial society in the legal life of their community, particularly, in matters related to public benefit.
The exact procedure by which an indictment was to take place is further described in Phaenia’s inscription as follows: the archons were to receive a formal denunciation (ἐπανγελία), and the prosecutor (κατήγορος) had to submit a written indictment (ἀντίγραφον) with a time limit to the synedroi.18 The tricky part here is, of course, the fact that those receiving and processing the indictment—namely, the archons and the synedroi—would, presumably, occupy the same offices as those against whom the indictment had been initiated in the first place. In this sense, the role accorded to the assembly in the prescribed procedure (ll. 27–28) reveals not only continuous relevance of this political organ in local administration of justice in the imperial period, but also suggests that the assembly could be seen as providing a check on other civic institutions, namely, the council and chief civic officials.19
The clause that follows the prosecution procedure, in fact, anticipates the possibility that the indictment may not be accepted by the synedroi at all: “if they do not process it, [something] shall be cut out …”.20 At this point, the inscription contains an unfortunate lacuna, but Kaja Harter-Uibopuu has convincingly suggested that ἐκκολλήσαντω here may be referring to the removal of the record of Phaenia’s donation from the city’s public records.21 This seems to agree with the following provision: namely, the transferral of Phaenia’s donation from Gytheion to Sparta, save the award of 2,000 denarii which would be given to the successful prosecutor.22 In other words, in the event that the city’s mismanagement of Phaenia’s donation was proven in due process or, indeed, if civic officials refused to comply with the procedure prescribed—perhaps, overall, a more realistic scenario—her donation was to be removed from Gytheion and transferred to another city, presumably, under the same conditions. If the Spartans, too, were proven to neglect or otherwise misuse the money, the donation had to be transferred yet again, only this time no longer to a community, but to the (priests of) the Dea Augusta, or the recently deified Livia.23 While we may struggle to see how the transfer of Phaenia’s locally-managed donation from Gytheion to Sparta would have been enforced in practice, it is safe to assume that the prohibitive clauses themselves were often considered enough to deter the beneficiary from ever wanting to find out.24
Interestingly, a clause prescribing the transfer of funds to another community in the event of non-compliance is found on several later inscriptions from the western part of the empire. For instance, a donation by a centurion of 7,500 denarii to the colony of Barcino in Spain, to be used toward financing boxing events and provision of oil, provided for the transfer of money to Tarraco in the case of non-compliance with the terms of his donation.25 Comparably, 750 denarii left by an individual to the vicani of Minnodunum in Germany, whose interest was to go toward the expenses of a local gymnasium, was to be transferred to the incolae of Aventicum in the case of mismanagement by Minnodunum.26 These examples suggest a Hellenistic influence not only in the form of these donations, but also their purpose, related to athletic activities.
Coming back to the case of Gytheion: crucially, the conditions of Phaenia’s donation can be seen as modifying local rules of legal standing not once, but twice. First, by granting slaves, traditionally barred from entering gymnasia in the Greek poleis, access to the facilities twice a year for three consecutive days at a time. Then, by explicitly allowing non-citizens to bring a public suit against the polis. This latter condition likely developed in direct response to the Roman presence in the region, which significantly contributed to the juridical heterogeneity of local communities. Two inscriptions recording private donations to public bodies from different periods in time may serve as an illustration: while a second century BCE inscription from Aigiale on Amorgos makes clear that the prosecutor had to be a local citizen, a first century CE donation from Ephesos specifies that “anyone who wishes, whether citizen or foreigner” was invited to bring a legal claim against non-compliant archons.27
Though likely borne out of the donors’ own personal concerns and their wish to cover all bases, prescriptions regarding the penal procedure in cases of non-compliance had to be sanctioned by civic authorities. Namely, upon the city’s official acceptance of Phaenia’s donation, a decree would have been passed by the synedroi and the assembly. This way, the stipulation concerning the penal procedure would acquire full legal force, albeit limited to this specific transaction. Note, in this context, that the terms agreed upon between the private benefactor and the public beneficiary in the donation deed from Aigiale, mentioned above, were explicitly treated and registered as civic law.28
Regardless of Phaenia’s apparent possession of Roman citizenship, it is imperative to stress once again that the provisions for penal jurisdiction specified in her donation are entirely local. No Roman authorities are mentioned anywhere in the text, and the only clue to Phaenia’s possible anticipation of a potentially Roman jurisdictional framework is her acting with the authorisation of a legal guardian (ll. 60–61: διὰ φροντιστοῦ καὶ κυρίου Πο[πλίου] | [Ὀφελλίου Κρίσπο]υ).29 The same expression is found in a roughly contemporaneous sacred manumission record from Delphi, where a certain Donata acts through her legal guardian whose nomenclature suggests a non-Roman status.30 Since the Hellenistic period documents from Delphi record women performing sacred manumissions without their legal guardians,31 and the practice was not regulated by Roman law following the creation of the provincia Achaia, it is plausible that Roman procedural guidelines were followed by some—particularly, by those recently enfranchised—as an additional precaution rather than a formal requirement.
Some evidence of private donations to public bodies come from civic decrees rather than donation deeds. An early first century CE inscription records a decree passed by the boule and the assembly of Thasos, officially accepting the testamentary donation of land by Marcus Varinius Rebilus (l. 7: τὴν δὲ τῶν [ἀγ]ρῶν δωρεὰν).32 Similarly to monetary gifts of the sort, this one-off donation was made in perpetuity, non-alienable, and intended to accrue annual revenue to the polis by means of leasing out the land. Among inalienability clauses, we find a prohibition against pledging or selling the land either in full, or in part.33 This is followed by a specification of punitive measures: anyone who makes a motion (εἰσήγησις) regarding this donation, either orally or in writing, and who puts it to vote or records it in the civic archives will be liable to a fine of 20,000 staters payable to the temples of the Sebastoi, receive ἀτιμία upon himself and his γένος, and be charged with ἀσέβεια εἰς τοὺς Σεβαστούς.34
Here, too, the potential culprits envisaged would appear to be the civic officials: the same ones who were entrusted with the management of the gifted land and its revenues. It is hardly surprising, then, to find a religious entity named as the beneficiary of the fine exacted upon non-compliance with the terms of the donation. Furthermore, as noted by Julien Fournier in his commentary of the inscription, evoking the charge of impiety against the imperial family can also be seen as a shortcut for making this a case for Roman jurisdiction, in case the civic courts of Thasos proved inefficient.35 Crucially, this document demonstrates that private donations to public bodies in the Roman period had to be formally accepted by the civic institutions, just as they did in the preceding centuries. The act of voting a public decree in the assembly and/or the city council is precisely what gave the conditions attached to these donations, as well as the penal procedure prescribed, legal force. In this sense, Roman period documents demonstrate considerable continuity with the earlier Hellenistic practice.36
The extent of the involvement of civic institutions arguably depended on the nature of the donation, as well as its perceived economic viability. To put differently, significant monetary or otherwise gifts intended to generate annual revenue for the recipient communities, would normally be accepted by more public means, and contain more clearly spelled out procedural guidelines. Comparably, those of lesser public interest and driven by largely private concerns such as personal commemoration, were less likely to impose strict conditions and procedures—or, perhaps more so, the public bodies were less likely to ratify them.
For instance, a testamentary donation by Marcus Vettius Philon, dating to 95 CE, was accepted by the decree of the council of Derriopoi (l. 3: δόγματος ἀναγραφή), without the apparent involvement of the demos.37 In accepting the money, the council confirmed the specific terms attached, namely, that the interest accrued from letting the capital out would be used towards an annual commemorative celebration and a public banquet in honour of the donor’s patron, and no other purpose.38 Another donation of 1,000 denarii made to the same community in Macedonia by Lucius Aelius Agrestianus in 192/3 CE, prescribed the use of the interest accrued toward the donor’s personal commemoration involving sacrifices and public banquets, and stipulated that, in the event of non-compliance, the capital was to be transferred to his heirs and their descendants.39 Presumably, a public decree of the city council would have followed as well, thus authorising the acquisition and the use of the funds.
It is interesting to observe, particularly with regards to testamentary donations, that the vast majority of donors bear Roman gentilicia, sometimes alongside Greek cognomina. The phrases such as κατὰ διαθήκην or ἐκ διαθήκης closely resemble the Latin per testamentum or ex testamento, thus suggesting the influence of Roman private law vocabulary.40 In theory, Roman citizens had to bequeath their property following the strict procedural rules of the Roman ius civile. Furthermore, juristic and literary sources relate that Roman citizens were not able to bequeath their property to peregrine communities until Nerva, or to peregrine individuals until Antoninus Pius.41
The various legal hindrances in Roman law related to bequests of Roman citizens to peregrines or, in this case, peregrine communities, are relevant here in terms of the availability of legal remedies (or the lack thereof), and might explain why some Roman citizens in the provinces chose to initiate donations to their communities within local legal frameworks, as was the case with Phaenia in Gytheion.42 Another question, as ever, is that of strict observation of Roman legal prescripts in the provinces. In one of his letters, Pliny mentions an inheritance left by his fellow townsman Calvisius Rufus directly to the town of Comum and, as such, legally invalid: “It is beyond question that a community cannot be appointed heir nor take share of an inheritance before the distribution of the estate”.43 Nonetheless, Pliny then weighs the man’s wishes against the prescripts of the law, and concludes that “the wishes of the deceased seem worthy of more consideration than the letter of the law”.44 This suggests, at the very least, that invalid (from a Roman law point of view) transfers of property continued to be initiated even in Italy, regardless of the strict provisions of the ius civile. If such was the situation in Italy, it is even less surprising to find similar instances in the provincial context. Compare, in this sense, an extract from Paulus in the Digest, which makes clear that the cases where Roman citizens residing in the provinces failed to adhere to certain Roman law regulations, even when these regulations were beneficial to them, were fairly common.45
Entrusting one’s heirs with transferring money or property to a community was one of the ways to circumvent that community’s inability to claim bequests.46 Fideicommissa must therefore provide an explanation for at least some of the testamentary donations claimed by peregrine communities in the provinces: for instance, Pliny’s communication to Trajan regarding the estate of one Iulius Largus which the latter had asked Pliny to transfer to two communities in Pontus-Bithynia on his behalf did not receive so much as a frown from the emperor.47 The bequest of Anthestia Fusca in Styberra, Macedonia, providing for restoration of a temple and statues, in addition to 5,000 denarii left to the city’s council, is likely an epigraphic attestation of just that, as the execution of her bequest is explicitly undertaken by her heirs.48
4 Declarations of Protection by Roman Authorities
Some second century CE donations to public bodies include an expression of support by Roman provincial or central authorities, which led to some scholars arguing for a gradual shift of the practice toward Roman jurisdiction or, as James H. Oliver put it, toward “the protection of Roman Public Law”.49
A fragmentary inscription from mid-second century CE Gytheion, for instance, records proconsular confirmation of a monetary donation to the polis made by Tiberius Claudius Atticus.50 It would appear that, upon being offered the money, the civic authorities of Gytheion sent an embassy to Hadrian and requested that the funds be protected by a special declaration. The emperor communicated his positive response to the governor of Achaia, who then issued an edict (διάταγμα, l. 15) declaring the protection and inviolability of the terms of Atticus’ gift. A similar declaration is also found in the record of the donation to the Eleusinian sanctuary by a Roman senator from Crete.51 The declaration, nonetheless, goes on to confirm the jurisdiction of local religious authorities—the hierophant and the dadouchos—over the management as well as the protection of funds.52
On the other side of the same coin we find cases of donors themselves approaching Roman authorities in order to obtain an additional level of support for their benefactions. A well-known inscription of 104 CE records a dossier of documents related to the benefactions of the equestrian Gaius Vibius Salutaris to the city of Ephesos.53 Within the dossier, we find Salutaris’ proposal to the civic authorities of Ephesos, the latter’s ratification of the terms of his donation, and two letters written by a proconsul and a propraetorian legate. The motivation section of the city’s decree accepting and thus ratifying Salutaris’ donation deed (ll. 73–83) reveals that the benefactor himself prompted both the city’s authorities and the two representatives of Roman power to confirm the terms of his donation. That said, the provisions for the administration of funds as well as the prosecution of cases of non-compliance seem to once again be entrusted entirely to local authorities. Essentially, the main purpose of Roman declarations here was to confirm the terms that had already been agreed upon between the donor and the civic authorities of Ephesos, and urge the latter to respect and adhere to the donor’s wishes.
In terms of penalty clauses, what we find more often in the case of epigraphically-attested declarations of support by Roman authorities is the emergence of the imperial fiscus among the beneficiaries of the fines exacted in the event of non-compliance. In the Eleusinian case, for instance, the penalty prescribed was vindication of property twice the value of the original donation to the fiscus, while in the case of Salutaris at Ephesos, the fine was split between the fiscus and the temple of Artemis. The extent to which this was an administrative innovation cannot be easily assessed. Overall, epigraphic references to fines confiscated to the fiscus often lack uniformity: e.g. some fines attached to funerary violations or sacred manumissions include the fiscus, while others do not. As such, they may be more indicative of spontaneous private action than any provincial or central regulations.54
In other words, in the context of private donations to public bodies, the threat of vindication of money or property to the imperial fiscus, as an extra-civic institution, could well have been agreed upon between the donor and the recipient community before any resort to Roman authorities took place. Think, in this sense, of the donation of 50,000 denarii to the Lycian koinon by the famous Opramoas, confirmed by an imperial legate of Lycia and Pamphylia in the following words (ll. 66–70): “I therefore render inviolable his gift which is now being published, that it be forever forbidden to endanger or alter the sum, and that the gift remains subject to the other rules which he chose and announced”.55 That we find both beneficiary communities and donors themselves occasionally seeking the support of provincial or central authorities need not warrant an official requirement or even regular practice.56 Instead, the expression of support by Roman authorities of transfers of funds or property between private individuals and public bodies should be understood as providing an additional layer of protection: for the donors, against misappropriation or diversion of funds by those left in charge of their management, and for the cities, against any issues related to Roman private law, e.g. the heirs’ attempts to retrieve the funds by claiming invalid testament.57
5 Conclusion
Overall, what emerges from this brief discussion is the remarkable flexibility of financial transactions between private individuals as donors and civic or public bodies as beneficiaries, and the accommodating nature of local legal frameworks in matters related to their public revenues. In this sense, the epigraphic evidence for the Roman period demonstrates considerable continuity with the earlier Hellenistic practice.58
Closely tied with social practices, namely, euergetism or munificence, these transfers of funds and/or property were, nonetheless, legal transactions, intended to convey a clear economic benefit, even if highly variable conditions attached to them tend to reflect the donors’ personal concerns more than evocation of a particular legal framework. Indeed, the majority of legal actors attested in these documents are Roman citizens of local origin, and the practice illustrates how they could successfully negotiate their way between the local and the Roman legal frameworks in matters relating to transmission of property.
The penalty clauses are far from standardised or fossilised too: while some donation deeds prescribed hefty fines payable to sanctuaries or the imperial fiscus, others provided for transfer of funds to a new beneficiary or the donor’s heirs. Others yet, tried to engage the entire beneficiary community in protecting the terms of the donation by introducing clauses of voluntary prosecution. Publication of donation deeds together with all their terms and conditions can also be seen as an additional means to ensure compliance: Phaenia, for instance, prescribed that one of the three copies of her benefaction be set up at the gymnasium, where the oil purchased from the interest accrued on her gift would be primarily used.59 Should this variability be taken to mean that local justice no longer worked and people were forced to resort to methods of ‘self-help’?
Any such donations to public bodies, including those containing a declaration of support and protection by Roman authorities, had to be formally accepted by local civic institutions. The official acceptance of private funds as a new source of public revenue is precisely what gave the terms attached to these transactions legal force, even when those terms could be seen as modifying local rules of legal standing, e.g. by granting slaves access to gymnasia or allowing non-citizens to bring public suits against the polis. Individual agency and personal concerns may thus be seen as influencing provincial legal development in a sphere where the legal and the social realms were considerably intertwined. In short, these documents are better understood as recording the making of law rather than strict imposition or application of a particular legal framework with its procedural regulations.
Proposals of financial gifts by private individuals to their places of residence continued to be put before local citizen assemblies well into the third century CE: an inscription from Orkistos, dating to 237 CE, records a bequest of one Varius Aurelius Marcus, which was ratified by the “assembly of all people” ([ἐκ]κλησίας ἀχθείσης πανδήμου προ[κα]|[θ]εζομένης … ἔδοξε τῷ Ὀρκιστηνῶν δ[ήμῳ]).60 The involvement of the entire civic body in accepting and ratifying the terms of private benefactions, thus, continued to be perceived as creating a stronger obligation on behalf of the civic authorities to uphold the terms of such donations.
For pharaonic Egypt: S. Allam, ‘Foundations in pharaonic Egypt: The oldest-known private endowments in history’, Die Welt des Orients 37 (2007), 8–30; for the Hellenistic period: K. Harter-Uibopuu, ‘Money for the polis. Public administration of private donations in Hellenistic Greece’, in R. Alston and O.M. Van Nijf, eds. Political Culture in the Greek City after the Classical Age (Leuven 2011), 119–139, and E.M. Harris, ‘Toward a typology of Greek regulations about religious matters: A legal approach’, Kernos 28 (2015), 71–77, with further references.
Cf. Allam 2007, op. cit. (n. 1), 26–27; T. Bekker-Nielsen, Urban Life and Local Politics in Roman Bithynia: The Small World of Dion Chrysostomos (Aarhus, 2008), 70.
B. Laum, Stiftungen in der griechischen und römischen Antike I–II (Berlin, 1914).
E.F. Bruck, ‘Die Stiftungen für die Toten in Recht, Religion und politischem Denken der Römer’, in E.F. Bruck, (ed.), Über Römisches Recht im Rahmen der Kulturgeschichte (Berlin, 1954), 46–100, and id, ‘Les facteurs moteurs de l’origine et du développement des fondations grecques et romaines’, Revue internationale des droits de l’antiquité 2 (1955), 159–166.
R. Feenstra, ‘Le concept de fondation du droit romain classique jusqu’à nos jours: théorie et pratique’, Revue Internationale des Droits de l’Antiquité 3 (1956), 245–263; Allam 2007, op. cit. (n. 1), 27. For the ‘vulgar nature’: Bruck 1955, op. cit. (n. 4). See also C.E.F. Rickett, ‘Charitable giving in English and Roman law: A comparison of method’, Cambridge Law Journal 38 (1979), 118–147, for a comparative survey of charitable giving in English and Roman law. The main problem with Rickett’s discussion, however, is his treatment of Roman provincial sources as necessarily reflecting ‘Roman law’, without the slightest differentiation between the Italian municipia or Roman colonies in Spain, and the Greek poleis which had a long history of private benefactions of their own.
Harris 2015, op. cit. (n. 1), 71–72. Cf. Rickett 1979, op. cit. (n. 5), 141: “The establishment of the foundation as a legal creature possessing a separate personality began only in the post-classical period”. The term is nonetheless used for the Hellenistic period in Harter-Uibopuu 2011, op. cit. (n. 1), interchangeably with ‘trust fund’ and ‘private donation’, and in C.P. Jones, ‘A deed of foundation from the territory of Ephesos’, Journal of Roman Studies 73 (1983), 116–125, among others, for the Roman period.
I thank Edward Harris for his useful comments in this regard at the Ancient Law in Context workshop in Edinburgh, April 2019.
For entrenchment clauses: J. Sickinger, ‘Indeterminacy in Greek law. Statutory gaps and conflicts’, in E.M. Harris and G. Thür, eds. Symposion 2007: Vorträge zur Griechischen und Hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte (Vienna 2008), 99–112.
Plin. Epist. 7.18: Numeres rei publicae summam: verendum est ne dilabatur. Des agros: ut publici neglegentur.
See e.g. Peplos’ donation to Ephesos (edition and translation in Jones 1983, op.cit. (n. 6), 125, ll. 4–5: “these sums [sc. fines] shall be exacted by the archons of the subsequent year and by the paraphylax”.
IG 5.1.1208, with K. Harter-Uibopuu, ‘The trust fund of Phaenia Aromation (IG V.1 1208) and imperial Gytheion’, Studia Humaniora Tartuensia 5 (2004),
Lines 11–17: ὅπως ἐκ τῆς ἐ]μῆς χάριτος καὶ δωρεᾶς ἀθάνατα προσ[γίνη]|[ται κέρδη τοῦ ἀρ]γυρίου ἐγδιδομένου καὶ τῶν λαμβανόν[των τὸ] | [ἀργύριον ἐγγύ]ας ἐνγαίους τῇ πόλει διδόντων ἀξι[οχρέονας] | [ἵνα ἐκ τῶν τόκων τ]ὸ ἔλαιον εἰς αἰῶνα τοῖς Γυθεατῶν πολί[ταις τε] | [καὶ ξένοις χορ]ηγῆται, πᾶσάν τε πίστιν καὶ σπουδὴν [οἱ ἄρχον] |[τες καὶ οἱ σύ]νεδροι εἰσφέρωνται κατ’ ἔτος, ὅπως ἀΐδιο[ς ἡ τοῦ ἐ]|[λαίου δόσις τῶι] γυμνασίωι διαμίνῃ καὶ τῇ πόλει. (“In doing so they should make every effort in order that immortal benefit is derived from my gift and the donation of the capital that is being lent and that those who receive the capital should give real security commensurate with the loan, so that oil may always be provided from the interest paid to the citizens of Gytheion and the foreigners. The archontes and the synedroi must contribute all good faith and industry every year, in order that the supply of oil to the gymnasium and the polis remains everlasting.”, here and thereafter, trans. by K. Harter-Uibopuu, op. cit. (n. 11))
Lines 38–41: βούλομαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς δούλους τῆς τοῦ [ἐλαίου εἰς αἰῶ]|[να χορηγ]ίας μετέχει<ν> κατ’ ἔτος ἐπὶ ἓξ ἡμέρας, τρῖς [μὲν τὰς σε]|[βαστέ]ους καὶ τρῖς τὰς τῆς θεοῦ, μήτε ἄρχοντος [μήτε συνέδρου] | [μήτε γ]υμνασιάρχου κωλύοντος αὐτοὺς ἀλείφεσθαι. (“I also wish that the slaves shall share in the eternal supply of oil every year for six days, of which three (should be) festival days of the Augusti and three festival days of the goddess, when no archon or synedros or gymnasiarchos shall prevent them from anointing themselves.”)
See, for instance, the gymnasiarchical law of Beroia, mid-second c. BCE, denying entry to slaves, freedmen, and their sons (ll. 27–29): P. Gauthier and M. Hatzopoulos, La loi gymnasiarchique de Beroia. Meletemata 16 (Athens 1993), whence SEG 43.381, cf. SEG 27.261. See also N.B. Crowther, ‘Slaves and Greek athletics’, Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica 40:1 (1992), 38–39, with references. Compare IG 4.606 from Argos, dating to the first c. CE, commemorating a certain Tiberius Claudius Diodotos as the first and only (μόνος καὶ πρῶτος) to give out oil to free people and slaves alike.
Lines 19–28: [ἐὰν δὲ οἱ γινόμ]ενοι κατ’ ἔτος ἄρχοντες ἢ οἱ σύνεδροι ἢ ἡ πό[λις ὀ]|[λιγωρήσωσιν] τῆς εἰς αἰῶνα τοῦ ἐλαίου χορηγίας ἢ μὴ κα[τὰ τὰ] | [γεγραμμένα ἐγ]δανείσωσι τὸ ἀργύριον ἢ μὴ ἀξιοχρέονας [ἐνγαί]|[ους ἐγγύας λάβωσ]ιν παρὰ τῶν τὸν ἐλαϊκὸν μελλόντων [τῶι δημο]|[σίωι ἀποφέρε]ιν τόκον, ἵνα ἐκ παντὸς ᾖ τὸ ἄλειμμα [τῇ πό]|[λει, ἢ μὴ μερ]<ι>μνήσωσι εἰς τὸ τὴν ἐμὴν τοῦ ἀργυρίου [δόρ]|[εάν ἐμμένει]ν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τῆς πόλεως γενέσθαι δόξα[ν κατολι]|[γωρίας, ἐξέστω] τῷ βουλομένῳ καὶ Ἑλλήνων καὶ Ῥωμαίων̣ [κα]|[τηγορῆσαι ὀλι]γωρίας τῆς πόλεως ἐπὶ τοῦ δήμου [τῶν Γυθε]|[ατῶν. On voluntary prosecution in more detail, see L. Rubinstein, ‘Volunteer prosecutors in the Greek world’, Dike 6 (2003), 87–113.
SEG 11.924, r. Augustus: Ῥωμαῖοι | οἱ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν τῆς | Λακωνικῆς πραγματευό|μενοι. Cf. IG 5.1.1146, ll. 32–40 (= Syll.3 748; SEG 50.386): two Roman brothers acting as creditors in Gytheion in the 70s BCE.
SEG 11.923.
Lines 28–30: δεχο]μένων μὲν τῶν ἀρχόντων τὴν ἐπανγελί[αν ταύ]|[την, τὸ δὲ ἀντίγ]ραφον διδόντος τοῦ κατηγόρου καὶ προθεσ[μί]|[αν τοίς συνέδροι]ς.
Compare lines 46–56 of the famous Athenian oil law drafted by Hadrian (IG 22.1100), which specified that lawsuits of up to fifty amphorae in value were to be judged by the boule alone, while those exceeding this limit had to be heard before the boule and the demos, thus clearly discrediting the view that city councils took over all lawsuits of higher significance in the imperial period or, indeed, that public assemblies lost their judicial powers altogether.
Line 30: μὴ δεχομένων δὲ ἐκκολλήσαντ[ω …]
Harter-Uibopuu 2004, op. cit. (n. 11), 12.
Lines 31–34: τ]ὸ μὲν τέταρτον ἔστω μέρος [τῶν] | [ὀ]κτακ[ισχιλίων διναρίων] τοῦ κατηγορήσαντος, ἐὰν ἐλ[έν]|[ξῃ] τὴ[ν τῶν Γυθεατῶν] ῥαθυ[μία]ν, τὰ δὲ ἑξακισχίλια δινά[ρια τῆς] | [π]όλεως [τῶν Λακεδ]αιμονίων. (“A fourth of the eight thousand denarii shall belong to the prosecutor who has exposed the callousness of the Gytheatai, and the six thousand denarii shall belong to the polis of the Lakedaimonioi.”)
Lines 34–38: ἐὰν̣ [δ]ὲ καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι [ὀλι]|[γω]ρήσωσιν [τῆς ἐμ]ῆς χάριτος, ἔστω [τὰ ἑ]ξακισχίλια διν[άρια] | [τῆς] Σεβαστῆ[ς θε]ᾶς, ἐλένξαντος τοῦ β[ουλ]ομένου τὴν [Λα]|[κεδα]ιμονίων ὀλιγ[ω]ρίαν καὶ τοῖς Σεβαστοῖς τὸ ἀρ̣[γύριο]ν ἀνε[νεγ]|[κόν]τ̣ος. (“If the Lakedaimonians too neglect my donation, the six thousand denarii shall belong to the Dea Augusta, if a volunteer prosecutor has demonstrated the neglect of the Lakedaimonians and has transferred the capital to the Sebastoi.”)
This must surely apply to the penalty of 250,000 denarii payable to the Jewish patriarch in the case of non-compliance with the terms of Tiberius Claudius Polycharmos’ donation of part of a building to the Jewish community at Stobi in Macedonia: I.Stobi 19, 163/4 CE. Note the scholarly disagreement regarding the dating of this inscription, some preferring a later date, as the Jewish patriarch is not otherwise attested before the third century CE: see discussion in E. Habas, ‘The dedication of Polycharmos from Stobi: Problems of dating and interpretation’, The Jewish Quarterly Review 92 (2001), 41–78, rightly pointing out that the fine of 250,000 denarii is extraordinary for either dating. The donor’s evocation of a religious authority, albeit remote, must be playing a primarily dissuasive role too, appealing to the primary beneficiaries of his donation, i.e., the Jewish population of Stobi. For Jewish communities in Thessalonike, see P.M. Nigdelis, ‘Synagoge(n) und Gemeinde der Juden in Thessaloniki: Fragen aufgrund einer neuen jüdischen Grabinschrift der Kaiserzeit’, Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 102 (1994), 297–306, and A. Koukouvou, ‘Η εβραϊκή κοινότητα της Βέροιας στην Αρχαιότητα: Νέες επιτύμβιες επιγραφές’, Tekmeria 4 (1998), 13–31, for Beroia.
ILS 6957, 161–169 CE.
CIL 13.5042, third c. CE. S. Mrozek, ‘Le fonctionnement des fondations dans les provinces occidentales et l’économie de crédit à l’époque du Haut-Empire romain’, Latomus 59:2 (2000), 327–345, interprets this as a system of mutual guarantees (“systeme d’assurance des fondations”) between the provincial towns due to their close proximity, economic ties, and shared political elite.
Aigiale: IG 12.7.515, l. 129: βουλόμενος Αἰγιαλέω[ν]. Ephesos: Jones 1983, op. cit. (n. 6), 125, ll. 5–6: ἐὰν δὲ μὴ πράξωσι[ν], αὐτοὶ ὀφειλέτωσ[αν] καὶ πραχθ[ήτ]ωσαν ὑπὸ παντ[ὸς τοῦ] [βουλο]μένου, πολείτου τε καὶ ξ[έ]νου.
IG 12.7.515, ll. 130–133: τὸν δὲ νόμον τόνδ[ε] | [ε]ἶν[αι κύριον] εἰς τὸν πάντα χρόνον, καὶ ὁ γραμματεὺς αὐτὸν ἀναγ[ρα]|[ψ]άτω εἰς τὰ δημόσια γράμματα πάντα καὶ εἰς τὰς δέλτους, οὗ οἱ [νόμοι] | [ε]ἰσ̣ὶν ἀναγ[εγ]ραμ[μ]ένοι. (“This law shall be valid for all time, and the secretary shall register it in the public records and in the tablets where the laws are registered”.) See discussion of this document in Harter-Uibopuu 2011, op. cit. (n. 1), 126–130.
The guardian’s name appears in full in l. 62. Harter-Uibopuu 2004, op. cit. (n. 11), 13, draws on H. Taeuber, ‘Stifterinnen im griechischen Osten’, in E. Specht, (ed.), Frauenreichtum: Die Frau als Wirtschaftsfaktor im Altertum (Vienna 1994), 199–219, to point out that Greek women, unlike their Roman counterparts, did not normally need a legal guardian to initiate such transactions.
FD 3.6.126, ll. 6–8: ἀπέδοτο Δωνά|τα διὰ κυρίου καὶ φροντιστοῦ Εὐνεικί|δα Εὐανθέως τὰν ἰδίαν θρεπτὰν Ζω|σίμαν τῶι Πυθίωι Ἀπόλλωνι. (“Donata consecrated, through her guardian Euneikidas, son of Euanthes, her home-bred slave Zosima to the Pythian Apollo.”)
E.g. SGDI 2.2066, 188 BCE.
SEG 18.350, with F. Camia, ‘II testamento di Rebilus e l’epistola di Vinuleius Pataecius ai Tasii’, Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 146 (2004), 265–271, cf. SEG 54.816, dating the inscription to the late first century BCE–early first century CE, and J. Fournier, ‘Retour sur un décret thasien: la donation testamentaire de Rebilus’, Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique 138 (2014), 79–102, arguing for 22 CE. Compare SEG 54.617: an honorary inscription for the same Rebilus from Serrai, possibly also in relation to donation of land. Note, in particular, the prohibition against any change to the decree (fr. C, l. 4: εἰ δέ τις εἰση[γήσηται]), almost identical to the one in the Thasian inscription (ll. 11–14): ἐὰν δέ τ[ις εἰση]γήσηται περί τ[ι]|νος τούτων ἢ γράψῃ ἤ ἐπιψ[ηφίσῃ ἢ ἄ]ναγράψῃ εἰς τὸ | τῆς πόλεως γραμματοφυλά[κιον, τ]ὰ μὲν γραφέντα | καὶ τὰ ψηφισθέντα ἄκυρα εἶναι. (“If someone introduces a proposal on this subject, submits it in writing, puts it to the vote or records it in the archives of the city, that the written proposal and the vote be null and void”, here and thereafter, trans. my own.)
Lines 7–11: τὴν δὲ τῶν [ἀγ]ρῶν δωρεὰν τη|ρεῖν ἀθάνατον ἡμᾶς καὶ μήτε [ὑπ]οθέσθαι ποτἐ τοὐ[ς] | ἀγροὺς ἡμᾶς μήτε ἀποδόσθαι [αὐ]τοὺς μήτε ὅλους | μήτε μέρη μήτε περι[ιδ]εῖν ἀπ[αλ]λοτριουμένους | κατὰ μηδένα τρόπον. (“That we keep the donation of land in perpetuity, without ever pledging these lands, nor selling them in whole or in part, nor allowing them to be alienated in any way.”) For inalienability clauses in general: J. Velissaropoulou-Karakostas, Droit grec d’Alexandre à Auguste (323 av. J.-C-14 ap. J.-C.): Personnes, biens, justice II (Athens 2011), 55–58.
Lines 11–20: ἐὰν δέ τ[ις εἰςη]γήσηται περὶ τ[ι]|νος τούτων ἤ γράψῃ ἤ ἐπιψ[ηφίσῃ ἤ ἐ]νγράψῃ εἰς τὸ | τῆς πόλεως γραμματοφυλά[κιον, τ]ὰ μὲν γραφέντα | καὶ τὰ ψηφισθέντα ἄκυρα εἶναι, [τὸν δὲ] εἰπόντα ἤ | γράψαντα ἤ ἐπιψηφίσαντα ἤ ἀναγ[ράψα]ντα τὴν γνώ|μην εἰς τὸ τῆς πόλεως γραμματοφ[υλ]άκιον ὀφεί|λειν τοῖς τῶν Σεβαστῶν ναοῖς στατῆ[ρ]ας ἀτι[μ]ή̣τ̣ο̣υ̣[ς] | [δ]ισμυρίους καὶ ἄτιμον εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ γέν[ος] | [ἐνέχ]εσθαι δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ τῆι εἰς τοὺς Σεβα̣σ̣τ̣ο̣ὺ̣ς̣ [ἀσε]|[βείαι·
Fournier 2014, op. cit. (n. 32), 93.
On the legal basis of Hellenistic donations: Harris 2015, op. cit. (n. 1), 71–77.
IG 10.2.300, cf. SEG 30.566.
Lines 16–19: ἔδοξεν τῇ βουλῇ | τὴν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς σεμνότητα κὲ βούλησιν | ἀποδέξασθαι ἐπί τε ταῖς ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ κατὰ | τὴν διαθήκην γεγραμμέναις αἱρέσεσιν; cf. ll. 22–25: μήτε τοῦ προγεγραμμέ|νου κεφαλαίου ἀπαναλίσκειν τι εἰς ἑτέραν | χρείαν μήτε τοῦ κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν γινομένου τό|κου.
IG 10.2.348–349, ll. 23–28: ἐὰν | δ̣ὲ̣ μὴ ἄγωσιν τὴν ἡμέραν κα|θ̣’ ἃ̣ ἐ̣ν̣γέγραπται, ἔσται τὸ χρῆ|[μ]α τῶν κληρονόμων μου | ἢ τῶν ἐγγόνων ἢ κληρο|νόμων αὐτῶν. Cf. Scaevola in Dig. 33.1.21.3 for a similar stipulation in the bequest of a Roman citizen to Sebaste in Cilicia.
Though not necessarily that of Roman private law, as testamentary donations are widely attested in pre-Roman sources too: see, for instance, Syll.3 631 from Delphi, dating to 182 BCE, characteristic of Hellenistic period documents. See discussion in Harter-Uibopuu 2011, op. cit. (n. 1), 121–122, with other examples.
Communities: Ulp. Epit. 24.28: civitatibus omnibus quae sub imperio populi Romani sunt legari potest: idque a divo Nerva introductum postea a senatu auctore Hadriano diligentius constitutum est (“A legacy may be left to any city belonging to the Empire of the Roman people. This rule was first introduced by the divine Nerva, and was afterwards, at the instance of Hadrian, more specifically established by the Senate.”) Individuals: Gai. 2.110: peregrini quidem ratione ciuili prohibeantur capere hereditatem legataque (“peregrines are forbidden by the civil law from receiving estates and legacies”). Cf. Cic. Arch. 11, concerning proof of one’s Roman citizen status: “he more than once made a will according to our laws, and he entered upon inheritances left him by Roman citizens”, and Paus. 8.43.5: Antoninus Pius repealing a law which barred Roman citizens in the Greek provinces from leaving property to their children who were born in mixed marriages and thus followed the Greek status (ἐτέλουν ἐς τὸ Ἑλληνικόν).
It is equally possible that Nerva’s enactment referred to by Ulpian simply legitimised an already widespread practice, thus reflecting how the social nature of legal practices often preceded specific legal enactments.
Epist. 5.7: Nec heredem institui nec praecipere posse rem publicam constat.
Epist. 5.7: Mihi autem defuncti voluntas <…> antiquior iure est.
Dig. 22.6.9.5, in relation to the lex Falcidia.
Cf. Gai 2.285 on bequests to peregrines as the origo of fideicommissa. For more on fideicommissa, see Ch. 10 in this volume.
Plin. Epist. 10.75–76.
IG 10.2.336, 126/7 CE: τῇ πόλει καὶ τὸν ναὸν καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐτῷ ἀνδριάντας ἀποκαθέστησαν | καὶ δηνάρια πεντακιχείλια ἠρίθμησαν τῇ βουλῇ ἐκ διαθήκης Ἀνθεστίας | Φούσκας οἱ κληρονόμοι. Cf. ILS 7196, ll. 1–9, from Nakoleia in Phrygia, r. Hadrian.
J.H. Oliver, ‘The ruling power. A study of the Roman Empire in the second century after Christ through the Roman Oration of Aelius Aristides’, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 43:4 (1953), 963–980, on the Greek East, and D. Johnston, ‘Munificence and municipia: Bequests to towns in classical Roman law’, Journal of Roman Studies 75 (1985), 105–125, on Roman municipia in the West. Cf. K.M.T. Atkinson, ‘The ‘constitutio’ of Vedius Pollio at Ephesus’, Revue Internationale des Droits de l’Antiquité 9 (1962), 261–289.
IG 5.1.1147, r. Hadrian (ll. 8–25).
IG 22.1092, with J.H. Oliver, ‘The Eleusinian endowment’, Hesperia 21 (1952), 381–399, ll. 33–42. See also Oliver 1953, op. cit. (n. 49), 966–968, on the identity of the Roman ἔπαρχος.
Lines 39–42: προνοήσονται δὲ το[ῦ ὅ]λ̣ου μάλισ[τα ὅ τε ἱεροφ]άντης καὶ ὁ | δαδοῦχος πρὸς τὸ μὴ σ[α]λευθῆν[αὶ ποτε τοῦ]το τὸ κεφά|λαιον μήτε τὴν ποσό[τ]ητα τῶν [καθιερωμέν]ων δηναρίῳι | μειωθῆναι. (“It is especially understood that the hierophant and the daduchus shall have complete charge in order that this capital investment be never endangered and in order that the amount of the consecrated interest be never reduced by a single denarius”, trans. by Oliver 1952, op. cit. (n. 51).)
I.Ephesos 27.
Compare F. Millar, Rome, the Greek World, and the East. Vol. 2: Government, Society, and Culture in the Roman Empire (London 2004), 65, on the dubious legal basis of references to fines payable to the fiscus where the imposing authority is not specified.
TAM 2.905, Rhodiapolis, 152/3 CE, ll. 66–70: τὴν οὖν προδηλουμέ|νην αὐτοῦ δωρεὰν βεβαιῶ ἐπί τε τῷ ἀσάλευ|τον καὶ ἀμετάθετον εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον εἶ|ναι, καὶ ἐπὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἱρέσεσιν αἷς ἐπην|γ̣[ε]ί̣λ̣ατο.
As envisaged by Johnston 1985, op. cit. (n. 49), 121.
Cf. Oliver 1953, op. cit. (n. 49), 973.
Cf. Harter-Uibopuu 2011, op. cit. (n. 1), 130.
IG 5.1.1208, ll. 41–48: κα̣[ὶ εἰς] | [λιθίν]ας τρεῖς στήλας ἀναγραφῆναι τὴν τῆς ἐμῆς [χάριτος ἐ]|[πὶ τοῖς] ῥητοῖς γεινομένην τῷ γυμνασίωι καὶ τῇ πόλει δω[ρεάν] <…> μία δὲ εἰς τὸ γυμνάσιον, ἵνα καὶ πολ[ί]|[ταις καὶ] ξένοις εἰς αἰῶνα φανερὰ καὶ εὔγνωστος ᾖ πᾶσιν [ἡ] | [τῆς ἐμ]ῆς χάριτος φιλανθρωπία. (“And I wish that three stone stelai shall be inscribed with my donation and the terms on which it has been granted to the gymnasium and the polis <…> and one at the gymnasium, so that the generosity of my donation shall be well-known and evident to everyone, both citizens and foreigners, forever.”)
Edition and translation in W.H. Buckler, ‘A charitable foundation of A.D. 237’, The Journal of Hellenic Studies 57:1 (1937), 1–10.