This book shows why we can justify blaming people for their wrong actions even if free will turns out not to exist. Contrary to most contemporary thinking, we do this by focusing on the ordinary, everyday wrongs each of us commits, not on the extra-ordinary, âmorally monstrous-likeâ crimes and weak-willed actions of some.
Maureen Sie was born in 1966, in Eindhoven, The Netherlands. She is employed as Assistant Professor of Meta-ethics at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam, The Netherlands. Her research concerns questions of Meta-ethics and theories of moral responsibility. Her most recent publication is the co-edited volume Reasons of Oneâs Own (Ashgate, 2004). Her previous publications on the subject of responsibility are: âResponsibility in Autonomy Undermining Circumstances,â Ethical Perspectives, 5, (1998), pp. 30â35; âGoodwill, Determinism and Justification,â Human Action, Deliberation and Causation, Jan Bransen and Stefaan E. Cuypers (eds.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, (1998), pp. 113â129; âFreedom and Blameworthiness,â Moral Responsibility and Ontology, Ton van den Beld (ed.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers (2000), pp. 113â128; âMad, Bad, or Disagreeing? On Moral Competence and Responsibility,â Philosophical Explorations, 3 (September). Assen: Van Gorcum, (2001), pp. 262â281.
Editorial Foreword by Gerhold K. Becker
Foreword by Paul Russell
Preface
ONE Responsibility, Determinism, and Freedom
TWO Practical Compatibilism and Ultimacy Pessimism
THREE Freedom and Blameworthy Actions
FOUR Blameworthy Actions and Normative Disagreements
FIVE Ultimacy Pessimism and the Question of Authority
Works Cited
Glossary
About the Author
Index