The Duplicity of the Theoretical: On Heideggerâs First Freiburg Lectures
äºResearch in PhenomenologySearch for other papers by Rodolphe Gasché in
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Abstract
At first sight, âtheoryâ does not seem to be a major issue in Heideggerâs thought. Yet, as his early Freiburg lectures from 1919 demonstrate, Heideggerâs development of a phenomenological method of his own required a systematic debate with the neo-Kantians and the philosophical privilege they accorded to theoretization. While laying the foundation for a phenomenological method whose prime object is the lived experience of the surrounding world, Heidegger sketches out a double concept of theorization, one which, through a process of successive stages of un-living, culminates in the objectified conception of an empty âsomething,â and another concept of theoretization for which the âsomethingâ is âthe experienceable in general,â and which guides the a-theoretical encounter of phenomenology as an âarchontic form of lifeâ with the world, the other, and the ânot yet.â
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| å ¨é¨æé´ | è¿å»ä¸å¹´ | è¿å»30天 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| æè¦æµè§æ¬¡æ° | 392 | 29 | 3 |
| å ¨ææµè§æ¬¡æ° | 72 | 0 | 0 |
| PDFä¸è½½æ¬¡æ° | 46 | 1 | 0 |
The Duplicity of the Theoretical: On Heideggerâs First Freiburg Lectures
äºResearch in PhenomenologySearch for other papers by Rodolphe Gasché in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Abstract
At first sight, âtheoryâ does not seem to be a major issue in Heideggerâs thought. Yet, as his early Freiburg lectures from 1919 demonstrate, Heideggerâs development of a phenomenological method of his own required a systematic debate with the neo-Kantians and the philosophical privilege they accorded to theoretization. While laying the foundation for a phenomenological method whose prime object is the lived experience of the surrounding world, Heidegger sketches out a double concept of theorization, one which, through a process of successive stages of un-living, culminates in the objectified conception of an empty âsomething,â and another concept of theoretization for which the âsomethingâ is âthe experienceable in general,â and which guides the a-theoretical encounter of phenomenology as an âarchontic form of lifeâ with the world, the other, and the ânot yet.â
| å ¨é¨æé´ | è¿å»ä¸å¹´ | è¿å»30天 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| æè¦æµè§æ¬¡æ° | 392 | 29 | 3 |
| å ¨ææµè§æ¬¡æ° | 72 | 0 | 0 |
| PDFä¸è½½æ¬¡æ° | 46 | 1 | 0 |
