Abstract
This article analyzes the responses of Poland’s three primary religious groups—the Roman Catholic Church, the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and Jehovah’s Witnesses—to the COVID-19 pandemic. Drawing on data from the RECOV-19 project, it examines each organization’s adaptations to state-imposed health restrictions, focusing on the Catholic Church’s dominant influence and contrasting it with the minority positions of the Orthodox Church and Jehovah’s Witnesses. The analysis highlights how the pandemic exposed and reinforced existing power dynamics in Poland’s religious landscape, where the Catholic Church’s dominance shapes both public discourse and minority faiths’ ability to advocate for their interests. The study reveals how religious pluralism operates within an environment dominated by Catholic–state cooperation, particularly during times of crisis.
1 Introduction
This article is based on the Recov-19 research project. See the introduction of this special issue for details about the project’s rationale, methods, and data sources (Ganiel et al. this issue). A much fuller explanation has also been published (Radde-Antweiler et al. 2025).
During the three-year COVID-19 pandemic, Poles, the government, and religious organizations gradually learned to cope with the virus’s challenges and the resulting economic and social changes. To combat virus spread and protect public health and safety, the government introduced key measures including home isolation, congregation limits, closure of public buildings, social distancing, and mandatory face coverings. Alongside work, education, and entertainment, churches and religious groups had to adapt their practices to changing pandemic restrictions.
This article analyzes how Poland’s three main religious groups—the Roman Catholic Church (RCC), the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and Jehovah’s Witnesses (JW)—responded to the COVID-19 pandemic. We examine how each organization’s actions and narratives intersected with public health and politics, highlighting the position of minority churches in a context where the Catholic Church dominates public life (Grzymała-Busse 2015; Meyer Resende and Hennig 2021). We analyze how minority churches face subtle pressures to align with dominant narratives or risk exclusion from public discourse.
The pandemic coincided with the term in office (2015–2023) of Law and Justice (PiS), an illiberal and populist party, contributing to increased political polarization and low public trust (Pohorila and Slomczynski 2023). The Catholic Church’s legally and historically privileged position in Polish public life has shaped its reactions and influence, contrasting with religious minorities’ different adaptations to state measures.
We begin by presenting Poland’s pandemic timeline, contextualizing individual churches’ varying responses. We then analyze how the three denominations responded to the pandemic through three key lenses: their discourses on health, illness, and science; their relationships with policymakers; and their digital innovations. We argue that the pandemic crisis made more visible existing power imbalances in Polish society, where Catholicism is deeply intertwined with national identity and the state. This affected everything from practical religious observance to the implementation of public health policy, demonstrating how religious pluralism operates within the constraints of Catholic-state cooperation. The final section analyses how the prominent position of the Catholic Church influenced the public presence and responses of minority faiths during the pandemic, limiting the ability of minority denominations to influence discourse and policy and reinforcing their marginalization.
1.1 Timeline of the Pandemic
The COVID-19 pandemic in Poland developed in three waves, with the government responding through a series of restrictions and measures. The first wave began on 4 March 2020, with the first confirmed case. On 13 March restrictions were introduced, including a fifty-person limit on religious gatherings. On 20 March the Polish government declared an official pandemic outbreak. On 24 March religious assemblies were restricted to a maximum of five people, and a day later to two people, with nonessential travel banned. On 31 March a two-meter social distance requirement was introduced.
As the first wave subsided, some restrictions were relaxed. From 20 April, religious gatherings and funerals for up to fifty people were allowed. The second wave began in October 2020, prompting the introduction of a zoning system that divided the country into red, yellow, and green areas based on infection rates. By 6 November 2020 the entire country was designated as a red zone, with strict restrictions on church attendance (one person per 15 m²) and mandatory face covering. The third wave began in March 2021: restrictions were tightened, including limits on the number of people in places of worship. In May 2021 a gradual lifting of restrictions began, including the reopening of schools and some public spaces (but not churches). This changed in June, when churches were allowed to be 50 percent full and then 75 percent full, subject to face-covering requirements.
In 2022 restrictions were further relaxed. In February the government announced reduced quarantine and isolation periods and the return of students to schools. By 1 March, almost all COVID-19 restrictions had been lifted, although mask-wearing remained mandatory in some areas. Finally, on 28 March all remaining restrictions, including mandatory mask-wearing, were lifted. Analysis of the restrictions reveals a pattern of reactive policymaking, with restrictions tightening and loosening based on case numbers and deaths. The government’s approach evolved from blanket national restrictions to a more nuanced regional approach, and then back to nationwide measures as cases increased.
1.2 Literature Review on COVID-19 and Religion in Poland
In Poland the operation of religious associations is regulated by the 17 May 1989 Act on Guarantees of Freedom of Conscience and Religion, which sets out the principles for the functioning of churches and other religious associations (Borecki 2012). For historical and social reasons, the Catholic Church has occupied a prominent position in public life since 1989 (Grzymała-Busse 2015; Meyer Resende and Hennig 2021), which indirectly affects the positions of minority religions. In order to explore this phenomenon in greater depth, we draw upon the theoretical framework provided by José Casanova’s concept of public religion (Casanova 1994). According to Casanova’s theory, churches are regarded as significant actors within the public sphere. Casanova identifies three levels at which public religion manifests itself: the state, political society, and civil society. The article delineates the strategy adopted by the three largest denominations in Poland—namely, the RCC, the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and JW—in articulating their perspectives within the public sphere in response to the pandemic and, in particular, to the public health measures initiated by the Polish government.
However, when considering the complex relationship between Catholicism and other religions in Poland in the context of illiberal government, important limitations are apparent in Casanova’s approach. He did not address the problem of the hegemony of one church, generalizing his conclusions to all religion. This approach presumes religious congruence in relations with nonreligious Poles (Trzebiatowska 2021) and overlooks that while pluralism may be recognized in principle, a religious field dominated by a single actor creates a specific dynamic, as Agnieszka Pasieka’s research has shown (2015). Although the law formally guarantees the equality of all registered denominations, real pluralism in Poland is hierarchical. It takes a form in which diversity is allowed, but within a framework that establishes Catholicism as dominant and norm-defining, relegating other voices to a secondary status at best.
Pasieka’s hierarchical pluralism offers a necessary correction of Casanova’s concept. It draws attention to the complex power dynamics and structural inequalities. The COVID-19 pandemic provided a unique opportunity to examine the hierarchical pluralism of the public sphere in Poland, particularly by comparing the ways in which the minority Orthodox Church and JW, on the one hand, and the hegemonic RCC, on the other, relate to the state.
The hierarchical pluralism of the public sphere in Poland during the COVID-19 pandemic was influenced by the close affinity between the RCC and the ruling Law and Justice Party, reinforcing the dominant position of the RCC among other faiths (Zubrzycki 2020). This relationship formed an additional context for the actions of minority religious groups during the pandemic, complicating their position in Polish society. The convergence of the RCC and Law and Justice manifested itself in several key areas. One of the most important of these is reproductive politics (Żuk and Żuk 2019).
The legal-institutional aspects of the restrictions and state-church relations in Poland during the COVID-19 pandemic were subjects of active academic debate. Researchers analyzed the constitutionality of restrictions on religious practice and highlighted the lack of adequate legal basis for introduced regulations, which undermined their legitimacy (Świto 2021; Stanisz et al. 2022). Research also points to the specificity of the Polish model; unlike some European countries that introduced total bans on religious gatherings, Poland adopted a moderate approach, preserving limited attendance at religious services (Mazurkiewicz 2021; Skoczylas and Piątek 2022). Catholic bishops’ attitudes to pandemic restrictions have also been analyzed (Stanisz et al. 2022). Many dioceses introduced more restrictive regulations than those imposed by the state, which provoked negative reactions from some of the faithful (Ignatowski 2022).
Researchers highlighted the RCC’s significant role as a mediator of social attitudes and in persuading Poles to accept government restrictions. Research by Pilch et al. (2023) showed that religiosity and trust in the church correlated positively with willingness to accept government-imposed restrictions. The study found no relationship between interpersonal trust and restriction acceptance, suggesting that trust in authority was crucial during the pandemic (see also Lefebvre, this issue). Researchers also examined attitudes toward COVID-19 vaccination in relation to religiosity and conspiratorial thinking (see also Ganiel, this issue). Maciuszek et al. (2023) showed that religiosity itself was not clearly associated with vaccination decisions, while trust in science strongly influenced both vaccination willingness and actual decisions.
The adaptation of Catholic institutions to pandemic conditions has been studied. Jupowicz-Ginalska et al. (2021) found that 40.8 percent of Catholic parishes broadcast Masses online, mainly via YouTube and Facebook. Surveys showed that in the pandemic’s first months, over 68 percent of Poles attended religious ceremonies via media (Boguszewski 2022). However, these were seen as complementary to traditional practices rather than alternatives (Kuciński 2022).
Given the church’s political involvement, the pandemic’s impact on religiosity and church attitudes interested both researchers and the public. Surveys show 83 percent of Poles reported no change in their religious life six months into the pandemic. Among those experiencing changes, regular prepandemic practitioners were more likely to maintain or increase religious commitment, while occasional practitioners more often reduced or abandoned religious activity (Bożewicz and Boguszewski 2021). Recent studies show weekly practice dropped from 39 percent in 2020 to 34 percent in 2024, and self-identified nonbelievers increased from 8 percent in 2019 to 14 percent in 2024 (CBOS 2024), indicating a persistence of isolation-period declines.
The causes of these changes remain debated. Beyond the pandemic, political polarization and broader secularization processes have been suggested (Klimski 2023; Mariański 2024). Research indicates uneven pandemic impacts on religious practices. Bożewicz and Boguszewski (2021) showed some deeply religious people intensified their commitment while those with weaker ties withdrew further, leading to their religious polarization theory. This process was particularly evident in responses to online services: regular practitioners embraced alternatives, while sporadic practitioners often withdrew completely. Overall, research suggests the pandemic accelerated existing secularization processes rather than created new trends, particularly among younger generations and urban residents, where practice decline was most pronounced (CBOS 2024).
2 Findings
This section outlines the key findings from our project’s core research areas (for further details, see Ganiel et al., this issue).
Table 1
Percentage of coded segments (per total no of coded segments) in official documents and religious media
|
Official documents |
Religious media |
|||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Code name |
ORT |
RCC |
JW |
% of coded segments/all coded segments |
ORT |
RCC |
JW |
% of coded segments/all coded segments |
|
HEALTH, ILLNESS, SCIENCE |
||||||||
|
Physical health |
6 % |
6 % |
4 % |
6 % |
10 % |
7 % |
1 % |
7 % |
|
Wellbeing |
6 % |
15 % |
9 % |
1 % |
3 % |
9 % |
3 % |
|
|
Justification by scientific/factual arguments |
6 % |
5 % |
5 % |
3 % |
4 % |
1 % |
4 % |
|
|
Justification by theological arguments |
43 % |
18 % |
43 % |
28 % |
24 % |
6 % |
20 % |
10 % |
|
Justification by moral/ethical arguments |
19 % |
4 % |
13 % |
27 % |
8 % |
12 % |
12 % |
|
|
Attitudes towards vaccination: pro vaccination |
7 % |
6 % |
7 % |
1 % |
2 % |
1 % |
||
|
RELATIONSHIPS WITH GOVERNMENTS AND POLICYMAKERS |
||||||||
|
Levels of cooperation/conflict |
29 % |
20 % |
7 % |
16 % |
10 % |
7 % |
7 % |
|
|
Wider societal impacts of restrictions/state actions: social |
3 % |
15 % |
16 % |
15 % |
0 % |
6 % |
4 % |
4 % |
|
Impact of restrictions on churches/religion: organizational issues |
25 % |
11 % |
28 % |
17 % |
6 % |
9 % |
8 % |
8 % |
|
Religious practices |
36 % |
31 % |
5 % |
21 % |
14 % |
6 % |
1 % |
7 % |
|
DIGITAL INNOVATIONS |
||||||||
|
Digital tools/platforms used |
3 % |
9 % |
5 % |
1 % |
4 % |
4 % |
3 % |
|
|
Attitudes towards digital technology |
3 % |
11 % |
6 % |
3 % |
4 % |
4 % |
||
When analyzing the proportion of coded segments for the theme “health, illness, and science,” it is apparent that theological justifications of the restrictions constitute a significant portion of the content, especially for Orthodox (in 43 percent of segments) and JW (43 percent), while being less prominent in RCC documents (18 percent) (see Table 1). Moral and ethical arguments are the second most prominent subtopic, and were found in 13 percent of coded segments in the documents, and in 12 percent of segments in the media. In the theme “relationships with governments and policymakers,” the impact of restrictions on religious practices receives attention in official documents, particularly from Orthodox and RCC sources. Impact of restrictions on organizational issues was the second most prominent topic, appearing in 17 percent of coded segments in the documents, but only in 8 percent of the media segments. “Digital innovations” were the least debated theme, with attitudes toward technology appearing in approximately 6 percent of coded segments in the documents, and in 4 percent of media segments; it is notable that the Orthodox Church documents did not discuss this issue at all.
Overall, the code distribution reveals that while official documents concentrate on core religious matters (theology, practices), and practical guidelines, religious media offer a broader range of topics, which, as expected, suggests different audiences and varying goals.
2.1 Discourses around Health, Illness, and Science
In response to the outbreak of the pandemic, the Polish Bishops’ Conference organized its statements around the category of threat that the virus posed to human health and life. This danger was often described in vague terms, without specifying the nature of this threat. This ambiguity can be explained by the limited knowledge about the virus’s transmission and effects at that time. But the analysis reveals that this vagueness served a dual function in the unfolding narrative of threat. First, the threat was indicated both as a consequence of the virus’s appearance and as a general framework for interpreting ongoing events. Second, it was used as an argument to persuade believers to observe hygiene practices and adapt to the gradually introduced restrictions.
In the first pandemic decree of the episcopate, the first point stated that the regulations were being introduced “in view of the threat to health and life” (KEP 2020c). Two weeks later, in view of the increasing number of cases of the disease, the council called for “scrupulous observance of the rules of sanitary safety during liturgical celebrations” (KEP 2020b). As late as February 2020, that is, before the introduction of the first quarantine, the president of the Polish Episcopal Conference, Archbishop Stanisław Gądecki, called for the observance of “basic principles of hygiene” (KEP 2020a), to be implemented, among other things, by receiving Communion on the hand and in the Spirit. The analysis shows that bishops felt obliged to work out detailed recommendations for the various elements of rites and the functioning of churches in general (for example, the issue of water in the stoup). At the same time, there was an effort to maintain autonomy and control over the regulations introduced.
In the official documents, however, we do not find any theological interpretations of the pandemic or its consequences. This is surprising given that the RCC in Poland often interpreted historical events in a sacred context (Porter 2001), often entering into dispute with the democratic state (Potz 2024). Instead, interpretations of the pandemic emerged in Catholic niche groups (Rachwol 2023; Baran 2024), and it was only in response that the episcopate felt obliged to explicitly distance itself from interpretations of the pandemic as divine punishment or a direct action of God. Consistently, the pandemic is presented at first as an undefined threat, then as a challenge to the state and the nation, an individual test of faith, and an opportunity to deepen human solidarity.
The content of the analyzed Catholic media is in line with the Episcopal narrative. The pandemic is often described as a difficult time, a test for humanity, with mostly negative consequences. At the same time, there is some hope that the pandemic’s trials and tribulations may in fact be a renewal of religious belief for some people, and a trigger to change their lives for the better. There are very few references that focus on the theological explanation of the meaning of the pandemic—if it is a punishment by God, or something else. The articles focused on reassuring the readers that God is loving and merciful, rather than vengeful and spiteful. It is therefore less of a theological discussion than a word of consolation.
The narrative maintained in official documents and the media also recurred in individual interviews. One of the interviewees, asked whether religion explains why the pandemic has befallen us, replied:
I wouldn’t even go in that direction, because it’s like looking for something that you did wrong and God shook his finger at you. That’s not even the point, but … Such a difficult time, the time of the pandemic … A time when people were dying, when they were losing everything. And someone would say that this is a terrible time. I don’t know, to put it simply, from the perspective of faith I say that Satan works very strongly. But if this person slowly, calmly looks at it all, you can see how God works very strongly then. God has never demanded heroism from us. This is what the catechism teaches us.1
As of August 2024, Poland reported approximately 120,636 COVID-19 related deaths out of more than 6.68 million confirmed cases, resulting in a case fatality rate (CFR) of approximately 1.81 percent, which is high compared to countries with similar health care inputs. However, in the documents analyzed, we find few references to death and dying (Prawo.pl 2024). The RCC, at the level of the episcopate and in the religious media, does not generally address this issue, although deaths among the clergy are reported, and sympathy for the relatives of the deceased is occasionally expressed. It was also a marginal theme in the analyzed religious press. The need to refer some individuals to a psychologist indicates a growing awareness among clergy of mental health care during the pandemic.
On 17 March 2020 the Holy Council of Bishops of the Orthodox Church issued a statement in which
in connection with the state of the Covid-virus epidemic threat in our country and the pandemic in the world, the Holy Council of Bishops of the Orthodox Church, concerned about the situation, addresses the faithful of our church with a call to vigilance and responsibility in their daily lives and appeals for strenuous prayers to the Lord of Life—Jesus Christ for the cessation of the epidemic and the health of all the sick, as well as those who bring them help—doctors and all medical personnel.
SBKP 2020a
This document is the only text in which the Orthodox Church addresses the pandemic so extensively. In the months that followed, the church continued to adapt to the changing situation and briefly reaffirmed the earlier recommendations, with minor modifications and calls for strict adherence to current sanitary-epidemiological regulations. This document, like most of them, is aimed at Orthodox believers and considers pandemics from a perspective of Orthodox rituals and practical matters.
In the public documents and religious press, the Orthodox Church presents the pandemic as a test and challenge to faith. The Holy Council of Bishops in November calls the pandemic a “scourge of God,” without elaborating further on its causes (SBKP 2020b). The bishops focus on the individual dimension, arguing that “only a strong faith, prayer, a widespread abstinence, penance … will help us to overcome the epidemic today too” (SBKP 2020a).
The JW s reacted quickly and decisively to the onset of the pandemic. As early as March 2020 the decision was taken to suspend meetings in the Kingdom Halls and move to online meetings. The decision was taken at headquarters in the USA, but neither in the material collected nor in the interviews conducted did we find any sign of it being contested in Poland. The first pandemic document outlined five principles that were encouraged by emphasizing their “practicality.” These took the following form: do not panic; stick to the recommendations, and guidelines of the authorities; take care of hygiene; show love to others; follow the temporary changes made in the church. In the documents that followed, these principles were further developed and explained with examples of how to apply them.
The analysis of JW articles (from Strażnica) reveals similar messages. JW s assert that by maintaining a bond with Jehovah, they experience God’s peace, which provides them with inner harmony even in difficult situations. Utilizing biblical recordings helps them experience peace and alleviate anxiety during epidemics, enabling them to focus on God and positive thinking. They are confident that epidemics and other hardships align with Jesus’s prophecies, believing that the knowledge of these prophecies gives them a sense of peace and prevents unnecessary surprise in the face of disease outbreaks.
The documents and JW press contain an interpretation of the pandemic embedded in the theology of JW s. The onset of the pandemic fitted into the expectation of the fulfillment of biblical prophecies concerning the “last days.” They cited biblical references, including Luke 21:11 and Revelation 6, which mention epidemics and plagues as signs of the end times. It is important to note, however, that the pandemic did not mean that the end of the world would occur at some specific time. The unfulfilled prophecies of the end of the world that have emerged in the history of the JW s (Penton 2015) most likely contributed to the fact that a specific date for the end of the world was not pronounced. The radical interpretation of the pandemic as a sign of the apocalypse is relativized by juxtaposing it with other events such as natural disasters or the threat of wars. In other words, the COVID-19 virus confirmed the millenarian concepts of the JW s, but it did not explicitly prejudge their realization. However, the pandemic certainly concretized the indefinite prediction of Armageddon. A similar situation occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, when the JW s identified with unwavering certainty the specter of nuclear war with the impending end of the world (Holden 2002).
2.2 Relationships with Governments and Policymakers
In response to the pandemic outbreak, the Polish Bishops’ Conference organized its statements around the category of threat that the virus posed to human health and life. This danger was often described in vague terms, without specifying its nature. While this ambiguity can be explained by limited knowledge about the virus’s transmission and effects at that time, analysis reveals that this vagueness served a dual function in the unfolding narrative. First, the threat was presented both as a consequence of the virus’s appearance and as a general framework for interpreting ongoing events. Second, it was used as an argument to persuade believers to observe hygiene practices and adapt to gradually introduced restrictions.
The first clear clash came before Christmas 2020. At that time, Archbishop Gądecki wrote a letter to the prime minister, in which he formulated a request for a change in the limit of persons per square meter. A whole series of arguments were included in the letter, the most important of which concerned citizens’ rights. The archbishop wrote:
The Church has not given up its rights, including the right to religious freedom guaranteed by Article 53 of the Polish Constitution. On legal grounds—as on theological grounds—we can say that religious freedom is not simply one of the human rights, but it belongs to the fundamental human rights, the protection of which is a sine qua non of a democratic legal state.
Gądecki 2020
The archbishop’s position was supported by the Catholic press. Interestingly, references to freedom of belief often appeared through quotes, that is, the author of the article quoted someone else who was against the restrictions. Freedom of belief had both a human rights/constitutional dimension and an ethical/religious one—the former pertained to arguing that limiting the right to practice is against the constitution (or the law in general), while the latter also reminded the readers that religious practice should be their priority, and that they should not be afraid to practice.
This argument suggests that the episcopal president would comply with government regulations only insofar as they aligned with the church’s understanding of its place in the republic’s legal order. In a letter of June 2021, in the face of the government’s intransigence, Archbishop Gądecki went even further and formulated explicitly “an objection to the further—so drastic—restriction of the right of the faithful to profess and practice their faith in public. Maintaining such heavy restrictions can be seen not only as a kind of discrimination, but as a restriction of religious freedom” (Gądecki 2021). The narrative arc of the Polish RCC’s stance during the pandemic illustrates a shift from initial cooperation with state authorities to a more assertive position. This transition demonstrates its commitment to maintaining its influential role in Polish public life, even as it navigates the complexities of a health emergency.
An analysis of the secular press and content analysis of religious press shows an interesting divergence.2 In the Catholic press, the church is typically depicted as cooperating with the state at both the national level and the parish level. The bishops and priests are often presented as actively supporting the promotion of safety measures and vaccinations. The articles often stress that the church remains an important source of spiritual and moral support, and that during the pandemic it may be even more significant, therefore closing of the churches should only be ordered as a last resort. Only Tygodnik Powszechny included criticisms of those bishops and priests who ignored or openly defied safety regulations, for example, by organizing religious celebrations despite the risk of spreading the virus, or by not allowing Communion on the hand.
Topic modeling of the secular press identifies seven religion-related themes. These themes reveal both the contexts in which religion and the pandemic were discussed together, and provide insights into how religious institutions, particularly the RCC, dealt with the challenges of COVID-19 and how the media covered these events. Two of the most prominent topics show that in the early days of the pandemic, the organization of rituals was the most prominent issue. Articles focused on the day-to-day functioning of churches, with a strong emphasis on practical adaptations to worship. During the second wave of the pandemic, articles emerged describing violations of pandemic regulations. The bishops’ lack of control over individual parishes and the government’s failure to respond to observed cases of abuse were criticized.
The analysis of Orthodox Church documents and the Orthodox press suggests that the church demonstrated full readiness to cooperate closely with state authorities regarding COVID-19 pandemic restrictions. On several occasions, it recommended to “follow the recommendations of the administrative and sanitary authorities” (SBKP 2020b). The Orthodox bishops did not voice any objections toward the restrictions implemented by the state authorities. However, this does not mean that these recommendations were universally followed. The quoted exhortation to observe the ordinances came with an important caveat: it was to proceed “without violating the principles of our faith and tradition” (SBKP 2020b). The council did not indicate where these inviolable boundaries lay. It was apparent from the in-depth interviews that this principle applied primarily to the traditional form of giving the Eucharist.
In Orthodox countries, the issue of Communion during the pandemic was highly controversial (Kessareas 2023). The bishops declared the Eucharist a source of life and health, immune to disease. The official documents cited scripture, including Christ’s words that His followers would cast out demons and handle poison without harm (Mark 16:18). As one of the interviewees stated: “After all, there are a lot of diseases that you can get infected with through saliva. But somehow no one questioned it before, because it’s God who is able to heal and destroy everything. This is what our faith is all about” (Leader interview, Poland, Orthodox).
The Orthodox press echoed this view, highlighting clergy who, despite serving in hospitals and administering the Eucharist to the sick, remained uninfected and unharmed. One article referenced a study by a Greek scientific commission that evaluated the risk of infection through Communion. Throughout the pandemic, the Orthodox Church in Poland did not alter its Communion practices, though occasional objections from the faithful were noted in interviews. These dissenting voices were rare and remained within the Orthodox community, never becoming a public issue. The church refrained from engaging with state authorities to validate its stance on Communion, nor did it seek official endorsement. No evidence indicates that the authorities addressed this issue, though it is possible they were aware and chose to overlook it.
The press and documents of the JW s showed unconditional support for government pandemic restrictions. They described adherence to restrictions as a religious duty, stating that
we must be subject to the superior authorities whom Jehovah allows to exercise certain functions. … Anyone who defies authority defies the order established by God. We know that God permits the existence of these authorities and wishes Christians to be subject to them if their orders do not conflict with his laws.
JW 2020
As one interviewee stated:
We are simply used to respecting the law that we have, that the state imposes on us. If it requires something, it is reasonable, it does not conflict with our principles, then we always respect it. And I do not think deeply about whether it was right or wrong. Such were the decisions and we had to accept them.3
However, declared obedience to the authorities is not unconditional. The JW s accept that they are bound by secular law only if it does not violate God’s law. The declared compliance regarding pandemic restrictions was due to the recognition that no such violation had occurred. The enthusiasm and pride with which the JW s speak of subordination to the secular authorities in this regard also became an opportunity to give good testimony and build a positive image of the organization.
2.3 Digital Innovations
The RCC in Poland, despite recognizing digital media’s power (Gądecki et al. 2020), uses it in a limited and traditional way on the institutional level. During the pandemic, it mostly focused on broadcasting Masses or providing information about religious events. The church’s approach to digital media is reflected in its language, using outdated terms like “tele-bridges” for online Mass attendance. While the church acknowledged that social media helped priests maintain community connections during the pandemic, there was little discussion in the material about utilizing these resources postpandemic.
The main concern in the RCC documents was the limited Mass attendance and how it was affected by online transmissions. During Easter 2020 bishops and priests were encouraged to livestream services, but simultaneously, the episcopate urged “whole families to return to the churches” as soon as possible.
The analyzed Catholic media presented contradictory views on digital media use. Initially, they celebrated online participation, noting how “experiencing the liturgy at home became an opportunity for deeper discovery of the family community” (Gądecki 2020b). However, later coverage emphasized the negative aspects of digital media, including the proliferation of online gurus, information chaos, and the banalization of religion. Tygodnik Powszechny highlighted the clergy’s concerns about losing touch with the faithful who might choose online attendance over in-person participation.
The Orthodox Church demonstrated a more positive attitude toward some media formats, arranging Orthodox liturgy broadcasts on public television (TVP) from March 2020 to June 2021. The broadcasts were aired on regional state television, until they were terminated. However, this was treated as a temporary solution, emphasizing the importance of traditional participation in the Mass. In the analyzed Orthodox press and documents, the topic of digital media was rarely brought up. It seems that the official church sources largely ignored the topic, neither disallowing nor praising digital media activities. At the same time, the interviews show that there was a variety of online Orthodox offerings whose scope and intensity depended on the available resources, the initiatives of the parish, and the attitudes of the clergy.
JW s showed the most comprehensive digital adaptation out of all three organizations. They have expanded their website and app (JW Library) content, and the interviewees reported that the transition to online activities was generally smooth and without major problems (Kołodziejska, this issue). The analysis of media and documents confirms that the JW s successfully transferred their practices to the digital sphere during the pandemic, maintaining participation through Skype and Zoom. Their Commemoration broadcasts attracted nonbelievers, with reports of positive feedback (“We felt as if we were in the Kingdom Hall together with others” [leader interview, Poland, JW]) rarely found in the documents of other religious groups. When in-person meetings became possible, JW s continued encouraging individual choice regarding virtual participation.
Both Catholic and Orthodox Churches shared theological reservations about digital religious practices, but their theological reasoning differed. Catholic resistance centered on sacramental theology requiring institutional mediation and physical community, while Orthodox resistance derived from mystical theology emphasizing direct divine encounter through traditional liturgical forms. JW’s theological framework, focused on Bible study, organizational authority, and evangelization rather than sacramental mysticism, enabled comprehensive digital adaptation without theological compromise. Within this context, hierarchical pluralism affected primarily how these theological positions gained public recognition and legitimacy. Catholic theological concerns about digital worship received extensive media coverage and public discussion, while Orthodox theological resistance—though potentially stronger—remained largely invisible in public discourse.
3 Religious Pluralism and Power Dynamics during the COVID-19 Pandemic
An analysis of public documents from the three churches reveals a striking disproportion in the amount produced: RCC = 166, Orthodox Church = 11, JW = 30. During the first period of the pandemic in 2020, the RCC published sixty-five documents, the Orthodox Church five, and the JW s ten. While the Orthodox Church and JW s exclusively addressed their faithful regarding organizational matters during the pandemic, the RCC’s documents encompassed broader social, economic, and political issues relevant to society at large. The RCC addressed not only the faithful but also Poles generally, speaking on behalf of both the church hierarchy and society as a whole.
The disproportion in the number of documents published by the studied churches is reflected in the analyzed Polish secular press (Mandes 2024).4 Out of 915 articles, only thirty-nine were about or mentioned the Orthodox Church and nineteen the JW s, mostly short notes about religious celebrations. In the case of Orthodoxy, additional articles appeared in international affairs coverage. The Orthodox Church’s absence in public discourse on the pandemic, evident in both the scarcity of official documents and lack of media interest, suggests full acceptance and implementation of public health measures. However, the material collected during interviews shows that some within the Orthodox Church maintained traditional Communion practices, violating the sanitary rules introduced during the initial phase of the pandemic. This reveals a discrepancy between their official position of supporting pandemic regulations and their actual practices. The Communion issue exemplifies a broader, deep-rooted strategy of the Orthodox Church in Polish public space—one of withdrawal and silence. The COVID-19 pandemic did not initiate but rather highlighted the church’s positioning on the margins of the public sphere and its avoidance of public discourse, cultivated for decades as a way of maintaining autonomy and avoiding potential controversy (Wynot 2014).
In the case of the Orthodox Church, its historical presence in Poland may have provided it with some level of recognition in its dealings with state authorities, but it was still secondary to the RCC. The JW s, as newer and often stigmatized as a sect, faced greater challenges in enforcing their needs and rights during the crisis. Their response to the public health measures may have affected public perceptions and their relationship with state institutions, potentially reinforcing their marginal status. JW s, known for their cautious approach to medical interventions, had no qualms about vaccines. Also, they adopted internal sanitary regime rules and decided to move the organization of their meetings to online platforms. This contrasts sharply with the approach of the RCC and Orthodox Church, and also explains why there were no tensions with the government administration. The interviews show that Bethel and some places of worship were controlled by the state authorities. However, as our interviewees proudly emphasized, they were met with admiration by the representatives of the authorities for their strict observance of the restrictions.
The attitude of the Polish episcopate toward the government’s policies and restrictions evolved over time. Initially, the episcopate fully accepted the government’s actions, seeing the virus as a threat to health and life. The church not only adapted to the restrictions imposed by the government, but pre-emptively introduced its own sanitary regulations, which were not subject to official regulation (for example, the way Communion was administered, the removal of water from the stoup, the recommendation to separate the confessor from the penitent with a foil). At the same time, the episcopate emphasized from the beginning the autonomy of the church. Over time, as the knowledge of the virus grew, the sense of danger diminished and voices of dissatisfaction with the policy were heard in society. The church joined these voices and began to adopt a less compliant stance.
Since mid 2020, the RCC had been balancing between accepting government regulations and seeking to maintain decision-making autonomy over their practical implementation. This position was defended by referring to the special position of the church. The spiritual dimension of the fight against the pandemic was emphasized and its role in the crisis was claimed to be as important as the actions of secular institutions. By invoking “centuries” of spiritual strengthening through the Catholic sacraments and prayer, the church placed itself in a privileged position of a veto player (Zuba 2022) in the public discourse, who does not hesitate to accuse the government of violating human rights and the right to freedom of religion in a situation of disparate actors in pandemic regulation.
4 Conclusions
Our analysis reveals the complex dynamics of religious pluralism in a country where Catholicism is deeply intertwined with national identity and state structures. The empirical evidence presented illustrates three distinct patterns of response. At first, the Catholic Church went along with pandemic rules, but it soon began using its influence to argue for religious exemptions. The church framed its concerns in terms of constitutional rights, combined with selective enforcement of restrictions by authorities. This trajectory demonstrates how the dominant religious actor could challenge the state using its position in the public sphere and authority while invoking universal principles that primarily served its institutional interests.
In contrast, the Orthodox Church adopted a strategy of public compliance and silence, publishing only eleven official documents and receiving minimal media attention. However, our interview data reveals a more complex reality: While officially supporting pandemic regulations, some Orthodox communities quietly maintained traditional practices. This discrepancy between public compliance and private practice reflects what our analysis identifies as a survival strategy within hierarchical pluralism—avoiding public confrontation while preserving essential religious practices through discretion and withdrawing from public discourse.
JW s were the most prepared to deal with the pandemic. They moved all their activities online, and the authorities praised them for following the rules. Their thirty official documents and minimal media presence reflect their position as a minority group that has learned to navigate hierarchical pluralism through adherence to state authority, using compliance as a means of legitimacy-building and positive testimony.
The pandemic showed that, in times of crisis, the major Polish churches have not changed their power dynamics; it showed that they maintain the status quo. The RCC’s assertive response was enabled by its historically privileged position and close ties with the Law and Justice government, while minority churches’ responses were constrained by their lower status. Hierarchical pluralism manifested itself in multiple ways: institutional privilege (for example, open letters to the prime minister and media attention), selective enforcement (authorities’ differential application of restrictions), and adaptive strategies by minority groups. Our research also shows how theological frameworks intersect with power dynamics within hierarchical pluralism. The high proportion of theological justifications in Orthodox and Jehovah’s Witnesses documents compared to Catholic sources suggests that minority groups invest more heavily in religious legitimation of their responses, while the dominant church can rely on its established authority to make broader social and political claims.
Although our analysis supports the hierarchical pluralism framework, other factors may have influenced the responses of religious organizations. Differences in theological traditions and organizational structures may have shaped responses independently of power dynamics. Additionally, resource constraints and digital capabilities may have influenced organizations’ ability to produce documents and engage in public discourse during the pandemic.
The findings of our research have broader implications for our understanding of church–state relations and religious freedom in contexts where one religious tradition holds a dominant position. The pandemic revealed that, in practice, inequality may coexist with formal legal equality among religious organizations, particularly during crisis situations, when the state’s capacity for oversight and enforcement becomes strained. The concept of hierarchical pluralism is a valuable framework for understanding these dynamics beyond Poland, offering insights into societies where dominant religious traditions shape the parameters within which religious diversity operates.
Leader interview, Poland, Catholic.
The analysis of articles published by three newspapers (Fakt, Gazeta Wyborcza, and Rzeczpospolita) between 1 March 2020 and 28 February 2023 was carried out using text mining methodology. The focus was on quantitative analysis, topic modeling, and sentiment analysis. The aim is to extract meaningful patterns and insights from the text data, which consists of articles related to specific topics and time periods.
Leader interview, Poland, JW.
Parts of these reports are available on request.
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