Möchten Sie über diese Zeitschrift informiert bleiben? Klicken Sie bitte auf die Buttons, um unsere Alerts zu abonnieren.
Möchten Sie über diese Zeitschrift informiert bleiben? Klicken Sie bitte auf die Buttons, um unsere Alerts zu abonnieren.
What Is a Cognitive System? In Defense of the Conditional Probability of Co-contribution Account
in Cognitive SemanticsSearch for other papers by Robert D. Rupert in
Current site
Google Scholar
A theory of cognitive systems individuation is presented and defended. The approach has some affinity with Leonard Talmy’s Overlapping Systems Model of Cognitive Organization, and the paper’s first section explores aspects of Talmy’s view that are shared by the view developed herein. According to the view on offer – the conditional probability of co-contribution account (cpc) – a cognitive system is a collection of mechanisms that contribute, in overlapping subsets, to a wide variety of forms of intelligent behavior. Central to this approach is the idea of an integrated system. A formal characterization of integration is laid out in the form of a conditional-probability based measure of the clustering of causal contributors to the production of intelligent behavior. I relate the view to the debate over extended and embodied cognition and respond to objections that have been raised in print by Andy Clark, Colin Klein, and Felipe de Brigard.
Kauf
Sofortzugang erwerben (PDF-Download und unbegrenzter Online-Zugang):
Institutszugang
Melden Sie sich mit Open Athens, Shibboleth oder Ihren institutionellen Anmeldedaten an.
Persönliche Anmeldung
Melden Sie sich mit Ihrem brill.com-Konto an
-
Anderson Michael L. 2010. Neural reuse: A fundamental organizational principle of the brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33: 245–313.
-
Anderson Michael L. 2014. After Phrenology: Neural Reuse and the Interactive Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
-
Botvinick Matthew M. , and Cohen Jonathan D. . 2014. The computational and neural basis of cognitive control: Charted territory and new frontiers. Cognitive Science 38: 1249–1285.
-
Brooks Rodney . 1999. Cambrian Intelligence: The Early History of the New AI .Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
-
Burnston Daniel C. 2016 a. A contextualist approach to functional localization in the brain. Biology and Philosophy 31: 527–550.
-
Burnston Daniel C. 2016 b. Computational neuroscience and localized neural function. Synthese 193: 3741–3762.
-
Chalmers David J. 2008. Foreword to Andy Clark’s Supersizing the Mind (in Clark 2008).
-
Clark Andy . 2007. Curing cognitive hiccups: A defense of the extended mind. Journal of Philosophy 104(4): 163–192.
-
Clark Andy . 2008. Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. New York: Oxford University Press.
-
Clark Andy . 2011. Finding the mind. Philosophical Studies 152: 447–461.
-
Clark Andy , and Chalmers. David J. 1998. The extended mind. Analysis 58: 7–19.
-
Cole Michael W. , Reynolds Jeremy R. , Power Jonathan D. , Repovs Greg , Anticevic Alan , and Braver Todd S. . 2013. Multi-task connectivity reveals flexible hubs for adaptive task control. Nature Neuroscience 16(9): 1348–1355.
-
Brigard De , Felipe . 2017. Cognitive systems and the changing brain. Philosophical Explorations 20(2): 224–241.
-
Dechêne Alice , Stahl Christoph , Hansen Jochim , and Wänke Michaela . 2010. The truth about the truth: A meta-analytic review of the Truth Effect. Personality and Social Psychology Review 14(2): 238–257.
-
Dennett Daniel C. 1991. Consciousness Explained. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company.
-
Dretske Fred . 1981. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
-
Driver Jon , and Mattingly Jason B. . 1998. Parietal neglect and visual awareness. Nature Neuroscience 1: 17–22.
-
Fodor Jerry A. 1983. The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
-
Friston Karl . 2013. Life as we know it. Journal of the Royal Society, Interface 10(86), 20130475: 1–12.
-
Gernsbacher Morton A. , and Robertson David A. . 2005. Watching the brain comprehend discourse. In Healy A. (ed.) Experimental Cognitive Psychology and Its Applications, pp. 157–167. Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association.
-
Hohwy Jacob . 2016. The self-evidencing brain. Noûs 50(2): 259–285.
-
Hutchins Edwin . 1995. Cognition in the Wild. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
-
Klein Colin . 2010. Critical notice: cognitive systems and the extended mind by Robert Rupert. The Journal of Mind and Behavior 31(3 & 4): 253–264.
-
Klein Colin . 2012. Cognitive ontology and region- versus network-oriented analyses. Philosophy of Science 79: 952–960.
-
Klein Colin . 2018. Mechanisms, resources, and background conditions. Biology and Philosophy 33: 36 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-018-9646-y.
-
Lewis David . 1973. Counterfactuals. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
-
Mandelblit Nili , and Zachar Oron . 1998. The notion of dynamic unit: Conceptual developments in cognitive science. Cognitive Science 22(2): 229–268.
-
Marr David . 1982. Vision. New York: W. H. Freeman and Company.
-
McCaffrey Joseph B. 2015. The brain’s heterogeneous functional landscape. Philosophy of Science 82: 1010–1022.
-
Price Cathy J. , and Friston Karl J. . 2005. Functional ontologies for cognition: The systematic definition of structure and function. Cognitive Neuropsychology 22(3/4): 262–275.
-
Rathkopf Charles A. 2013. Localization and intrinsic function. Philosophy of Science 80: 1–21.
-
Rowlands Mark . 2010. The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
-
Rupert Robert D. 2004. Challenges to the hypothesis of extended cognition. Journal of Philosophy 101: 389–428.
-
Rupert Robert D. 2009. Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
-
Rupert Robert D. 2010. Extended cognition and the priority of cognitive systems. Cognitive Systems Research 11: 343–356.
-
Rupert Robert D. 2011. Cognitive systems and the supersized mind. Philosophical Studies 152: 427–436.
-
Rupert Robert D. 2013. Memory, natural kinds, and cognitive extension; or, Martians don’t remember, and cognitive science is not about cognition. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4: 25–47.
-
Sporns Olaf , Chialvo Dante R. , Kaiser Marcus , and Hilgetag Claus C. . 2004. Organization, development and function of complex brain networks. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8(9): 418–425.
-
Stanley Matthew L. , Gessell Bryce , and Felipe De Brigard. 2019. Network modularity as a foundation for neural reuse. Philosophy of Science 86: 23–46.
-
Talmy Leonard . 2015. Relating language to other cognitive systems: An overview. Cognitive Semantics 1: 1–44.
-
Tononi Giulio . 2008. Consciousness as integrated information: A provisional manifesto. Biol. Bull. 215: 216–242.
-
Tosun Sümeyra , Vaid Jyotsna , and Geraci Lisa . 2013. Does obligatory linguistic marking of source of evidence affect source memory? A Turkish/English investigation. Journal of Memory and Language 69: 121–134.
-
Weiskopf Daniel A. 2010. The Goldilocks problem and extended cognition. Cognitive Systems Research 11: 313–323.
-
Wellman Henry M. , Cross David , and Watson Julanne . 2001. Meta-analysis of theory-of-mind development: The truth about false belief. Child Development 72: 655–84.
-
Wilson Margaret . 2002. Six views of embodied cognition. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 9: 625–636.
-
Wilson Robert . 2004. Boundaries of the Mind: The Individual in the Fragile Sciences .Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
-
Zerilli John. 2019. Neural redundancy and its relation to neural reuse. Philosophy of Science 86(5).
| Insgesamt | Letzte 365 Tage | In den letzten 30 Tagen | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aufrufe von Kurzbeschreibungen | 866 | 162 | 19 |
| Gesamttextansichten | 47 | 1 | 0 |
| PDF-Downloads | 61 | 3 | 0 |
What Is a Cognitive System? In Defense of the Conditional Probability of Co-contribution Account
in Cognitive SemanticsSearch for other papers by Robert D. Rupert in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
A theory of cognitive systems individuation is presented and defended. The approach has some affinity with Leonard Talmy’s Overlapping Systems Model of Cognitive Organization, and the paper’s first section explores aspects of Talmy’s view that are shared by the view developed herein. According to the view on offer – the conditional probability of co-contribution account (cpc) – a cognitive system is a collection of mechanisms that contribute, in overlapping subsets, to a wide variety of forms of intelligent behavior. Central to this approach is the idea of an integrated system. A formal characterization of integration is laid out in the form of a conditional-probability based measure of the clustering of causal contributors to the production of intelligent behavior. I relate the view to the debate over extended and embodied cognition and respond to objections that have been raised in print by Andy Clark, Colin Klein, and Felipe de Brigard.
| Insgesamt | Letzte 365 Tage | In den letzten 30 Tagen | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aufrufe von Kurzbeschreibungen | 866 | 162 | 19 |
| Gesamttextansichten | 47 | 1 | 0 |
| PDF-Downloads | 61 | 3 | 0 |
