From Psychology to Morality: Sympathy, Imagination and Reason in Humeâs Moral Philosophy

Gerardo LÃ³pez Sastre

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Chapter 4 From Psychology to Morality: Sympathy, Imagination and Reason in Humeâs Moral Philosophy

in Empathy: Emotional, Ethical and Epistemological Narratives

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Gerardo LÃ³pez Sastre

Gerardo LÃ³pez Sastre
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Art:: Kapitel

Seiten:: 41â52

DOI:: https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004398122_005

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Abstract

Humeâs point of departure in the moral field is the existence of what he calls benevolence, sympathy or humanity, the psychological mechanism that makes us aware of other peopleâs feelings and causes us to worry about them. For Hume, a person originally framed to have no concern for his fellow creatures would be a monster, what we would call a psychopath today. Most people in real life gain pleasure from seeing othersâ happiness and feel uneasy when they are in the presence of their pain. But this sympathy is not impartial, as is clear from the fact that it operates according to the degree of familiarity we have with others. We sympathize more with people close to us than with those that are not, more with people we know than with strangers, more with our fellow countrymen than with foreigners. However, this psychological fact should not shape our moral judgements. The moral point of view needs the exercise of our imagination. Sometimes we have to imagine we are closer to others to pass a moral judgment on them. At other times we have to forget they belong to the past. Consequently, using our imagination to experience different situations, we arrive at a âsteady and general point of view.â And we have to use our reason as well, since discovering the usefulness of a quality or behavior (and this presence of utility pleases, that is, generates our sympathy) can sometimes be difficult. To say it in other words, we can discover that our original or spontaneous sympathy was wrong.

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Empathy: Emotional, Ethical and Epistemological Narratives

Reihe:Â At the Interface / Probing the Boundaries, Band: 123

ISBN:: 9789004398122

Verleger:: Brill

Print-Publikationsdatum:: 24 May 2019

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Chapter 4 From Psychology to Morality: Sympathy, Imagination and Reason in Humeâs Moral Philosophy

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Empathy: Emotional, Ethical and Epistemological Narratives

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Chapter 4 From Psychology to Morality: Sympathy, Imagination and Reason in Humeâs Moral Philosophy