

REMARKS ON COGITATIO IN AVERROES'
COMMENTARIUM MAGNUM IN ARISTOTELIS DE ANIMA
LIBROS¹

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In his seminal 1935 study of the internal senses in medieval thought,² Harry Austryn Wolfson presented a detailed account of the development of the "classification and terminology" of the Greek, Arabic, Hebrew and Latin traditions on sensory powers which he called, "post-sensational faculties,"³ that is, powers which are posterior to the five external senses. In explaining the complex development of teachings on the internal senses from Aristotle's texts, Wolfson recounted the Aristotelian understanding of Galen who specifically locates the διανοητικόν or cogitative faculty in the middle ventricle of the brain and John of Damascus whose equally Aristotelian account follows the Stagirite (*De Anima* III 7, 431a14–17; *Metaphysics* VI 4, 1027b29–30) in attributing judgments of good and bad as well as combination and separation of ideas to the διανοητική ψυχή or the cogitative soul and to δianoia or cogitation.⁴ One of the many fruits of Wolfson's discussion was an

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² "The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic and Hebrew Philosophic Texts," *Harvard Theological Review* 28 (1935): 69–133. Also see "Isaac Israeli on the Internal Senses," in *Jewish Studies in Memory of George A. Kohut* (New York, 1935), pp. 583–598; "Maimonides on the Internal Senses," *The Jewish Quarterly Review*, n.s., 25 (1953): 441–467; and "Notes on Isaac Israeli's Internal Senses," *The Jewish Quarterly Review*, n.s., 51 (1961): 275–287. These four studies are all reprinted in *Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion*, 2 vols., ed. Isadore Twersky and George H. Williams (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1973), vol. 1, pp. 250–370. Wolfson's work was put to good use by George P. Klubertanz, S.J., in *The Discursive Power. Sources and Doctrine of the Vis Cogitativa According to St. Thomas Aquinas* (St. Louis: The Modern Schoolman, 1952) which, while flawed, still provides many clear accounts and valuable insights into the nature of the cogitative power in the thought of Islamic and Latin Christian thinkers.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 70–71.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 71–73, 80–81.

explanation of the development of the Avicennian doctrine of estimation (*wahm*, in Latin *estimatio*, sometimes *existimatio*) as arising “out of a desire to supplement a deficiency which seemed to exist in Aristotle’s account of the actual motion of pursuit and avoidance which is observed in both man and animal.”⁵ With *wahm* used to describe instinctive behavior consequent upon non-rational animal imagination analogous to human reasoning or deliberation (λογιστική, βουλευτική), Wolfson wrote, the Arabic *fikr* now was to be associated with imagination and no longer was to be seen as simply the power of combining and separating ideas. “In the case of διάνοια combined with imagination, it is the combination and separation of images, i.e., the construction out of images of things existent, new composite images of things nonexistent, or the breaking up of images of things existent into images of things nonexistent.”⁶ From this moment on, and not without some foundation in Aristotle’s own texts as indicated, *fikr/cogitatio* and their related derivative terms are used to characterize human rational powers which are essentially activities involving the body and bodily instruments insofar as imagination is necessarily bodily.

Wolfson’s brief discussion of *fikr/cogitatio* and the other inner senses in Averroes⁷ was the starting point for a much more comprehensive study by Helmut Gätje in 1965.⁸ In that account Gätje also provided a more detailed account of the cogitative power in the thought of Averroes. This power which exists only in humans has a corporeal substrate for its activities in the middle ventricle of the brain. As such it is something which belongs to each individual distinctively and which is not the same as the rational power of intellect. And while Aristotle does call it “the passible intellect,” its activity is nevertheless different from that of intellect, according to Averroes.⁹ Gätje also stressed the importance of Averroes’ understanding of the notion of the intention (*ma’ nā, intentio*). For inten-

⁵ Ibid., p. 89. Re. *wahm*, see Deborah L. Black, “Estimation (*Wahm*) in Avicenna: The Logical and Psychological Dimensions,” *Dialogue* 32 (1993): 219–258.

⁶ Wolfson, “The Internal Senses,” p. 92; also pp. 98–91.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 107–110.

⁸ Helmut Gätje, “Die ‘inneren Sinne’ bei Averroes,” *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 115 (1965): 255–293. One of the most comprehensive and valuable accounts of intellect and the internal senses in Averroes is Michael A. Blaustein’s doctoral dissertation, “Averroes on the Imagination and the Intellect” (Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1984).

⁹ Ibid., p. 278.

tions, when grasped by the individual human being's imaginative power of cogitation either in sorting through the results of concrete perception by other senses or in recognizing for himself the knowledge which comes about by way of intellect, are necessarily particularized or made individual by the particular human subject in which they come to exist.¹⁰

While Wolfson's explication of terminology and its development was not without discussion of concerns of a metaphysical sort, my purpose here is to expand modestly upon his work and that of Gâtje by providing a preliminary exposition of Averroes' understanding of cogitation (*cogitatio*, *fikr*, *mahashaba*)¹¹ in his *Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle*¹² with reference to metaphysical requirements which follow from his commitment to certain central Aristotelian teachings. To that end I first provide an account of his doctrine of cogitation in the *Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle* with reference to his teachings on the separate Agent and Material Intellects. Secondly, I consider the extent to which his views are suitably considered Aristotelian in character. And finally I conclude with consideration of the terminology and doctrine found in the now lost Arabic translation of the *De Anima* which was used by Averroes as his primary text in the preparation of his *Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle*.

I

Averroes' teachings on the nature of cogitation in his mature *Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle* are not discontinuous with his views expounded in earlier works such as his *Epitome of the Parva Naturalia*, his *Epitome of the De anima*, and his *Middle Commentary on the De Anima*.¹³ In the early *Epitome of the Parva Naturalia* (565/1170)

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 279–282.

¹¹ See Wolfson, pp. 73–75, notes 21–27 and 35.

¹² *Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros*, ed. F. Stuart Crawford (Cambridge, 1953), hereafter Crawford. The *Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle* by Averroes is not extant in Arabic. Fragments of the Arabic original were found and published by A. Ben Chahida in "Iktishāf al-naṣṣ al-ʿarabī li-ahamm ajzāʾ al-sharḥ al-kabīr li-kitāb al-naṣṣ taʿlīf Abi l-Walid ibn Rushd," *al-Hayāt al-Thaqāfiyya* 35 (1985): 14–48.

¹³ See Alfred L. Ivry, "Averroes' Short Commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima*," *Documenti e studi sulla traduzione filosofica medievale VIII* (1997): 511–549, in

he showed that he accepted much of Avicenna's understanding of this bodily imaginative power. But there, as also in the later *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*,¹⁴ he rejected Avicenna's notion of a distinct power called the estimative faculty (*wahm*, *existimatio*), preferring to say that this power which is analogous to the rational power in human beings is merely a function of the imaginative power in animals, not a distinct power as Avicenna thought. The difference is that in human beings, the rational imaginative power, cogitation, is connected with intellect, while in other lower animals instinctual actions which resemble what occurs on the basis of discrimination and cogitation in human beings are merely the workings of imagination.¹⁵

In his *Epitome of the De Anima*, Averroes refers to the rational power (*al-quwwah al-nāṭiqah*), but the terms *fikr* (cogitation) and *tamyīz* (discrimination, discernment) are not highlighted. Nevertheless, in this work his understanding of imagination in non-rational animals and in humans is much the same as in the *Epitome of the Parva Naturalia*, for here he writes: "... For animals cannot have existing in them a power higher than this, namely the imaginative, except in the case of human beings for whom there is the rational power."¹⁶ It is for this rational power or faculty both to grasp inten-

particular, pp. 511–519 with its discussion of the short, middle and long commentaries.

¹⁴ Averroës. *Tahafot al-tahafot*, ed. Maurice Bouyges, S.J., (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1930), pp. 546–547; *Averroes' Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence)*, translated by Simon Van Den Bergh (London: Luzac & Co., 1969), p. 336.

¹⁵ *Die Epitome der Parva Naturalia des Averroes*, ed. Helmut Gätje (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1961), Arabic text, pp. 46–47. *Averrois Cordubensis Compendia Librorum Aristotelis Qui Parva Naturalia Vocantur* (Arabic), ed. Henry Blumberg (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1972), p. 39.6–12. *Averrois Cordubensis Compendia Librorum Aristotelis Qui Parva Naturalia Vocantur* (Latin), ed. A.L. Shields and H. Blumberg (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1949) pp. 52–53. English: *Averroes. Epitome of Parva Naturalia*, tran. Harry Blumberg (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1961), pp. 24. Blumberg's translation of *al-mumaiyizah* as "the estimative faculty" is more than a little infelicitous with respect to the thought of Averroes who identifies *al-mumaiyizah* with the cogitative faculty. It is more suitable to render it, "the discriminative faculty," for Averroes. Blumberg's translation, "the cogitative faculty, that is to say, the estimative faculty," p. 26, adds an explanatory remark not found in the Arabic which merely has *al-mufakkir* or the Latin *cogitans*, "the cogitative (power)." Also see Blumberg's translation, p. 92, notes 30–31.

¹⁶ *Epitome of the De Anima*, ed. Salvador Gómez Nogales (Madrid 1985), Arabic, p. 89.11–12.; *Talkhiṣ Kitāb al Nafs (Paraphrase du "de Anima")*, ed. Ahmed Fouad El Ahwani (Cairo, 1950), p. 65.18–20; *La Psicología de Averroes. Comentario al Libro Sobre el Alma de Aristoteles*, tran. Salvador Gómez Nogales (Madrid, 1987), p. 179.

tions which arise from perception by the external senses and to be involved in conceptualization and affirmation (*taṣawwur, taṣdīq*).¹⁷ These higher activities are able to occur thanks to the Agent Intellect which makes it possible for intelligibles to be grasped in the material intellect. As Davidson puts it, “the Epitome establishes through an analysis of human thought that the potential or material human intellect can be nothing other than a generated-destructible disposition residing in the imaginative faculty of the soul, or, as Averroes puts it, in the forms, or images, making up the contents of the imaginative faculty. To take the potential human intellect as an eternal substance would entail the absurdity of a thing’s being potential and actual at the same time.”¹⁸ But in material added later to his original composition, Averroes rejects his original position in the *Epitome of the De Anima* and asserts that the material intellect must in fact be immaterial, separate and eternal in its substance.¹⁹

With discussion less extensive than what is found in the *Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle*, the *Middle Commentary on the De Anima* sets forth a similar teaching on *fikr*, cogitation, with the terms *fikr* (and derivatives) occurring only six times and *tamyīz* (and derivatives) occurring only nine times.²⁰ There cogitation and discrimination are called powers of the soul (57.4, 59.12–13) and the activity of “the discriminating power” (*al-quwwah al-mumaiyizah*) is termed “discrimination through intellect” (*al-tamyīz bi-l’-aql* 115.2–4). And choice, which involves the soul’s imaginative powers, is said to take place in cogitation or in the cogitative power of the soul (*fi l-fikr* 139.4), while deliberation (*al-ra’y*), which equally requires the

¹⁷ *Epitome of the De Anima*, p. 95.3–4; *Talkhiṣ Kitāb al Nafs*, p. 68.5–6; *La Psicología de Averroes*, pp. 184–185. See H.A. Wolfson, “The Terms Taṣawwur and Taṣdīq in Arabic Philosophy and their Greek, Latin and Hebrew Equivalents,” *The Moslem World* 33 (1943): 114–128; and Gätje, “Die ‘inneren Sinne’,” pp. 273–274.

¹⁸ Herbert A. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect* (New York and Oxford, 1992), p. 269.

¹⁹ *Epitome of the De Anima*, pp. 128.10–129.6; *Talkhiṣ Kitāb al Nafs*, p. 90.5ff.; *La Psicología de Averroes*, pp. 213–214. “The material intellect, Averroes is suggesting, may well be an entity of a sort that the original text of the Epitome, directly prior to the interpolation, refused to contemplate, namely, an eternal substance which is nonetheless not an actual intellect. That will be the position of Averroes’ Long Commentary on the De Anima. The Long Commentary will also develop the notion that human intelligible thought has two subjects.” Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes*, p. 271.

²⁰ *Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s de Anima*, ed. Alfred L. Ivry (Cairo, 1994), index, pp. 229–230, 234, 241.

involvement of imagination and images, is said to occur on account of the activity of cogitation or the cogitative power (*min fīl al-fikr* 145.15). Moreover, "conceptualization through intellect" (*al-taṣawwur bi-l-'aql*) is characterized as perishable insofar as the bodily powers and their corporeal subject (the ventricles of the brain) are perishable, but the intellect responsible for abstracting intelligible forms from intentions in imagination is not itself perishable. (33.16–17, 34.3–5) That power of intellect (*quwwah al-'aql*) is completely unmixed with a perishable subject. (126.4) Such appears to be Averroes' teaching on the cogitative power and related matters, whether we read the *Middle Commentary* with Herbert A. Davidson as originally holding "that the material intellect is a mere disposition" but later having added to it an "excursus, which determines that the material intellect is a hybrid entity and not a mere disposition after all"²¹ or we read it with Alfred L. Ivry as a composition dependent upon the *Long Commentary on the De Anima* but proposing a different theory of intellect.²² Differing on the question of the unity of the Material Intellect and the Agent Intellect, Ivry has held that the two are one in accord with his understanding of several statements by Averroes in the *Middle Commentary* and Davidson has held that the two are substantially distinct intellectual entities in accord with the text of the *Long Commentary*.²³

²¹ Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes*, p. 277

²² Ivry, "Averroes' Short Commentary," p. 518, and *Middle Commentary on Aristotle's de Anima*, introduction, pp. 10–11. Note that Ivry's views in "Averroes' Short Commentary" are somewhat more nuanced than in his previous discussions of the relationship of the Middle and Long Commentaries on the *De Anima*. Cf. "Averroes' Middle and Long Commentaries on the *De Anima*," *Arabic sciences and philosophy* 5 (1995): 75–92; and "Averroes' Middle Commentary on the *De Anima*," in *Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy. Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy (S.I.E.P.M.)*, ed. Reijo Työriñoja et al. (Helsinki, 1990), vol. III, pp. 79–86.

²³ "Pour comprendre Averroès, il faut savoir que l'intellect matériel ne constitue que l'être en puissance d'une même substance qui, en acte, est nommée Intellect Agent. Ainsi, ce sont deux états de la même substance, sous sa forme passive puis active dans le corps." Alfred L. Ivry, "La Logique de la science de l'âme. Étude sur la méthode dans le Commentaire d'Averroès," in *Penser avec Aristote* (Paris: Editions Erès, 1991), pp. 687–700. See p. 693. The key passages in the *Middle Commentary* which lead Ivry to view the Agent Intellect and the Material Intellect as two aspects of the same substance seem to be Averroes' statements at pages 124.2ff., 130.1 and 137.3ff., as indicated by Ivry on p. 20, n.13, of his introduction to the critical edition of the *Middle Commentary*. I am not convinced of the necessity of this view, but this

The *Long Commentary on the De Anima* contains Averroes' most extensive account of cogitation and the other internal senses and also the most extensive account of Averroes' epistemological and metaphysical teachings on soul and intellect. There cogitation is listed as the third of the internal senses in order of ascending spirituality. First is the common sense followed by the imaginative power, the cogitative power and finally the power of memory. The cogitative power, itself an individual bodily power, has the task of distinguishing or discerning individual intentions found in the images consequent upon sense perception.

But it was already explained in *Sense and Sensibilia* that such is the order of those powers in the brain through a demonstration giving the being and the cause. But that does not contradict what was said here. For the cogitative power according to Aristotle is *ā* individual distinguishing power because it discerns things only in an individual way, not in a universal way. For it was explained there that the cogitative power is only a power which distinguishes the intention of a sensible thing from its imagined image. That power is one which is such that its relation to those two intentions, to the image of the thing and to the intention of its image, is just as the relation of the common sense to the intentions of the five senses. The cogitative power, therefore, is of the genus of the powers existing in bodies. Aristotle explicitly said this in that book, when he placed the individual distinguishing powers in four orders. In the first he placed [416] the common sense, next the imaginative power, next the cogitative power, and afterwards the power of memory. He made the power of memory the more spiritual, then the cogitative, then the imaginative, and last the sensible.²⁴

is an issue I will have to address in detail elsewhere. Cf. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes*, pp. 292, 293, 332–333. What is at issue with respect to the interpretation of the *Long Commentary on the De Anima* is how Averroes' statement on the unity of the two intellects is to be understood. *Et universaliter, quando quis intuebitur intellectum materiale cum intellectu agenti, apparebunt esse duo uno modo et unum alio modo. Sunt enim duo per diversitatem actionis eorum; actio enim intellectus agentis est generare, istius autem informari. Sunt autem unum quia intellectus materialis perficitur per agentem et intelligit ipsum. Et ex hoc modo dicimus quod intellectus continuatus nobiscum, apparent in eo due virtutes, quarum una est activa et alia de genere virtutum passivarum.* Crawford, pp. 450–451. As I see it, the *Long Commentary on the De Anima* does indeed hold for these two intellects to be separate substantial entities. In his paper in the present volume Ivry now acknowledges that the Material Intellect and the Agent Intellect are distinct substances in the *Long Commentary on the De Anima*.

²⁴ *Sed iam declaratum est in libro de Sensu et Sensato quod talis est ordo istarum virtutum in cerebro per demonstrationem dantem esse et causam. Sed illud non contradicit illi quod dictum est hic. Virtus enim cogitativa apud Aristotelem est virtus distinctiva individualis, scilicet quod non distinguit aliquid nisi individualiter, non universaliter. Declaratum est*

As such, imagination, a power not present in all animals, is a prerequisite for the discriminatory activity of cogitation.²⁵ Apparently leaving aside the sensible distinguishing marks of the particular which are the proper sensibles and the common sensibles found in the imagination, the cogitative power discerns the individual intention which is the individual form of the particular thing, "the intention of this individual man and the intention of this individual horse,"²⁶ and then places the result of its activity in memory.

That individual intention is what the cogitative power distinguishes from the imagined form. The cogitative power²⁷ extracts it from the things which were adjoined to it from among those common and proper sensibles and deposits it [*ea/eam* var.] in the faculty of memory. This same [intention] is what the imaginative power grasps, but the imaginative power grasps it as conjoined to sensibles, although the grasp [of memory] is more spiritual, as has been determined elsewhere.²⁸

Cogitation here is deemed less spiritual than memory because it does not retain in itself the denuded individual intention but rather conveys to memory what it worked to produce, the most spiritual and least sensible individual intention.²⁹ It seems, then, that for

enim illic quod virtus cogitativa non est nisi virtus que distinguit intentionem rei sensibilis a suo idolo ymaginato; et ista virtus est illa cuius proportio ad has duas intentiones, scilicet ad idolum rei et ad intentionem sui idoli, est sicut proportio sensus communis ad intentiones quinque sensuum. Virtus igitur cogitativa est de genere virtutum existentium in corporibus. Et hoc aperte dixit Aristoteles in illo libro, cum posuit virtutes distinctivas individuales in quatuor ordinibus: in primo posuit sensum communem, deinde ymaginativam, deinde cogitativam, et postea rememorativam. Et posuit rememorativam magis spiritualem, deinde cogitativam, deinde ymaginativam, et post sensibilem. Crawford, pp. 415–416.

²⁵ Crawford, p. 178

²⁶ ... *comprehendunt igitur intentionem huius hominis individualis, et intentionem huius equi individualis* Crawford 225.47–48.

²⁷ An extant fragment corresponding to this text has *al-quwwah al-mufarrikah* here. See Ben Chahida, "Iktishāf al-nass ...," p. 39.

²⁸ *Et ista intentio individualis est illa quam distinguit virtus cogitativa a forma ymaginata, et expoliat eam ab eis que fuerunt adiuncta cum ea ex istis sensibilibus communibus et [p. 226] propriis, et reponit ea in rememorativa. Et hec eadem est illa quam comprehendit ymaginativa, sed ymaginativa comprehendit eam coniunctam istis sensibilibus, licet eius comprehensio sit magis spiritualis, ut alibi determinatum est.* Crawford, pp. 225–226. I read ... *reponit eam* ... with Crawford's manuscripts BG.

²⁹ In "Memory, Individuals, and the Past in Averroes' Psychology," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 5 (1996): 161–187, Deborah Black seems to solve the problem of how Averroes can call the faculty of memory the most spiritual. She argues persuasively that for Averroes "Memory is not the faculty whereby we retain past perceptions or are aware of the past as past but rather the faculty by which we grasp the individual as such." p. 162.

Averroes what is grasped in the faculty of memory is the individual intention of the human being, e.g., Michael, as the particular intelligible intention of his individual form by which he exists in the world as a human being. Michael may grow tall as a youth or shrink short as an old man, grow fat or become lean, wear a successful disguise or show his face openly, but through all this and even more radical changes, perhaps such as extensive deformity in an accident or even a sex changing operation, he/she is Michael existing by his/her own individual form and it is apparently this individual form which is the individual intention of Michael.

For Averroes, here, as in the other works cited above, this cogitative power is possessed only by rational animals.³⁰ The Avicennian doctrine of *wahm*, estimation, never appears in the entire text of the *Long Commentary on the De Anima*.³¹ Rather, as we have already seen in other works, "Imagination exists in other animals, but cogitation exists in rational animals;" "... aside from the rational animal, none

³⁰ The celestial bodies which are animated by immaterial intellectual souls are rational animals in an equivocal sense. The being of humans consists in the composition of matter actualized by soul. In the case of the heavens, the matter or potency of the heavenly bodies is for change in place, not change in substance. While they do indeed have desire, they do not have imagination or the cogitative power. While Averroes acknowledges that Aristotle does speak of the possibility of animals better than humans which could be possessed of cogitation and intellect (Crawford, pp. 172–173), these cannot be the celestial bodies. Lacking senses, both external and internal, because their souls are not actualities of bodies, the heavens do not have imagination or cogitation. Rather, they have intellect and desire (Crawford, p. 179) and they move by conceptualization by intellect (*al-taṣawwur bi-l-'aql*) and the desire which comes about consequent to that (*Averroes Tafsir ma ba'd al-Tabī'ah*, ed. M. Bouyges [Beirut, 1948], p. 1600). The questions of the nature of the heavens and of how motion is caused in them were the subject of a great deal of reflection by Averroes, including a treatise devoted to the topic. See *Averroes' De Substantia Orbis. Critical Edition of the Hebrew Text with English Translation and Commentary* by Arthur Hyman (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Jerusalem: The Medieval Academy of America and the Israeli Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1986). The issues involved here as well as key texts are discussed in detail and set forth with clarity and insight by Gerhard Endress in "Averroes' *De Caelo*, Ibn Rushd's cosmology in his Commentaries on Aristotle's *On the Heavens*," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 6 (1995): 9–49. Some of these issues are also discussed in David B. Twetten, "Averroes on the Prime Mover Proved in the Physics," *Viator. Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 26 (1995): 107–134; in Barry Kogan, *Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1985); and in Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes*.

³¹ *Existimatio* does appear in the *Long Commentary on the De Anima* but is often (but not always) likely a rendering of the Arabic *ẓann*. See, for example, *Long Commentary on the De Anima* III Text 57, Crawford p. 529, where the Latin *existimationis* corresponds to the Greek τοῦ δόξαν (*De Anima* 434a11). Cf. Gätje, "Die 'inneren Sinne'," p. 274.

has cogitation because none has reason.”³² But the human soul’s cogitative power does not possess in its own right and per se the ability to extract the intentions of individuals. The distinguishing activity of the cogitative power is an activity of a generable and corruptible corporeal subject which seems, nevertheless, to have some part which is able to be rational at the lower level of the extraction of individual intentions from sensible existences in the world, according to Averroes.³³ The cogitative power, which can also be called the passible intellect, is “a kind of reason” (*aliqua ratio*) which requires a connection to the separate rational power in order to carry out even its distinguishing of the individual intention.³⁴ Intellect has four senses in Aristotle, Averroes writes, the material intellect, the intellect in a positive disposition (*in habitu*), the agent intellect and the power of imagination, i.e. the cogitative power.³⁵ And it is the major role of this cogitative power to make it possible for there to be in some way a grasping of intelligibles on the part of individual human beings such that the human soul and the human being as a whole may somehow participate in a more transcendent activity, intellectual activity, and thereby deserve the denominations, rational soul and rational animal.

Insofar as the human imaginative powers of cogitation and

³² *Et ymaginatio existit in aliis animalibus, cogitatio autem in rationabilibus.* Crawford, p. 529 ... *et preter animal rationale nullum habet cogitationem, quia non habet rationem* Ibid., p. 530.

³³ *Deinde dixit: DISTINCTIO AUTEM ET AMOR ET ODIUM, etc. Idest, distinctio autem, que attribuitur virtuti cogitative, et amor et odium, que attribuuntur rationi, scilicet que recipiunt actionem rationis; videtur enim in hac parte anime quod sit aliquod rationabile, quia est obediens intellectui in hominibus bonis. Ista igitur non sunt actiones istius intellectus, sed sunt actiones virtutum habentium hanc actionem secundum quod habent illam actionem. Et addidit hanc conditionem, scilicet SECUNDUM QUOD HABENT, quia impossibile est ut iste virtutes sint nisi cum intelligere; sed si attribute fuerint ei, non erit attributio secundum quod sunt.* Crawford, p. 90.

³⁴ *Et sunt tres virtutes quarum esse declaratum est in Sensu et Sensato, scilicet ymaginativa et cogitativa et rememorativa; iste enim tres virtutes sunt in homine ad presentandam formam rei ymagine quando fuerit sensus absens, et ideo dictum fuit illic quod, cum iste tres virtutes adiuverint se adinvicem, forte representabunt individuum rei secundum quod est in suo esse, licet autem non sentiamus ipsum. Et intendebat hic per INTELLECTUM PASSIBILEM formas ymaginationis secundum quod in eas agit virtus cogitativa propria homini. Ista enim virtus est aliqua ratio, et actio eius nichil est aliud quam ponere intentionem forme ymaginationis cum suo individuo apud rememorationem, aut distinguere eam ab eo apud formationem et ymaginationem.* Crawford, p. 449.

³⁵ *Hoc nomen igitur INTELLECTUS secundum hoc dicitur in hoc libro quatuor modis. Dicitur enim de intellectu materiali, et de intellectu qui est in habitu, et de intellectu agenti, et de virtute ymaginativa.* Crawford, p. 452.

memory are individual powers which grasp bare intentions of individuals, they cannot properly be said to grasp intelligibles qua intelligibles. The rational soul is indeed moved by the forms of things which exist in act outside the soul because the rational soul gives its consideration to the individual intentions in imagination which are there in imagination as a consequence of sense perception. But the intelligibles existing outside the soul in things as their forms are not intelligibles in act but rather the forms of things which are intelligible in potency only, since they are only able to be grasped by a mind which would receive them as intelligible. They are actually intelligible only when they are intelligibles in act in a mind. The rational soul, then, must somehow be active in transforming what in themselves have only the natures of potential intelligibles into actual intelligibles. But the rational soul must also be passive because it is moved by the intelligibles insofar as they come to be in it.³⁶ For Averroes it is the task and function of the so-called “passible intellect” or cogitative power to play a part in the constitution of the rational power by extracting individual intentions and then presenting these before the active power of the Active Intellect. Only this Active Intellect can illumine these imaginative intentions in such a way that by its action what was individual now has prompted “conceptualization by intellect” such that intelligibles come to exist in act in the intellect.³⁷ Stressing that it is

³⁶ *Dicamus igitur: quoniam autem formare per intellectum est aliquo modo de virtutibus receptivis, sicut est de virtute sensus, manifestum est ex hoc. Virtutes enim passive sunt mobiles ab eo cui attribuuntur; active autem movent illud cui attribuuntur. Et quia res non movent nisi secundum quod est in actu, et movetur secundum quod est in potentia, necesse est, inquantum forme rerum sunt in actu extra animam, ut moveant animam rationalem secundum quod comprehendit eas, quemadmodum sensibilia, inquantum sunt entia in actu, necesse est ut moveant sensus et ut sensus moveantur ab eis. Et ideo anima rationalis indiget considerare intentiones que sunt in virtute ymaginativa, sicut sensus indiget inspicere sensibilia. Sed cum videtur quod forme rerum extrinsecarum movent hanc virtutem ita quod mens aufert eas a materiis, et facit eas primo intellecta [385] in actu postquam erant intellecta in potentia, ex hoc modo videtur quod ista anima est activa, non passiva. Secundum igitur quod intellecta movent eam, est passiva, et secundum quod moventur ab ea, est activa. Et ideo dicit Aristoteles post quod necesse est ponere in anima rationali has duas differentias, scilicet virtutem actionis et virtutem passionis. Et dicit aperte quod utraque pars eius est neque generabilis neque corruptibilis, ut post apparebit. Crawford, pp. 384–385.*

³⁷ Cf. Gâjje, “Die ‘inneren Sinne’,” p. 274: “Während sich das intellektive Konzipieren (*taṣawwur nuḡī*) auf universale, dem konkret-individuellen Stoff gänzlich entbundene Erkenntnisinhalte richtet, geht das Konzipieren der Vorstellungskraft (*taṣawwur ḥayālī*) auf einen konkreten und damit immer noch stofflichen Erkenntnisinhalt.”

different from the active intellect and the material intellect because it is a particular material power which is located in the brain and hence is generable and corruptible,³⁸ Averroes writes that the cogitative power is absolutely requisite for knowledge to come about because "the material intellect understands nothing without the passible intellect."³⁹ In this way the cogitative power and all the other imaginative powers of the soul contribute to the development of the rational soul, although they are not of themselves and strictly speaking rational or intellectual powers. What discerns intelligibles is in one sense the rational soul and in another sense not the rational soul but what is higher, the material intellect.⁴⁰ This, then, is the intellect in which the intelligibles come to exist in act.

Averroes follows Aristotelian epistemology which holds that we do indeed come to have knowledge of the world consequent upon sense perception. But, as he stresses, the external and internal sense powers are only able to yield individual intentions, not the universals required for knowledge. Given the assumption of the existence of knowledge which is universal in character, he follows Aristotle and others of the Greek and Islamic traditions in assigning to the activity of the agent intellect a causal role in the coming to be

³⁸ *Virtus enim cogitativa, sicut declaratum est in libro de Sensu et Sensato, quando iuvabit se cum informativa et rememorativa, innata est presentare ex ymaginibus rerum aliquam quam nunquam sensit, in eadem dispositione secundum quam esset si sensisset eam, fide et informatione; et tunc intellectus iudicabit illas ymagines iudicio universalis. Et intentio cogitationis nichil aliud est quam hoc, scilicet ut virtus cogitativa ponat rem absentem a sensu quasi rem sensatam. Et ideo comprehensibilia humana dividuntur in hec duo, scilicet in comprehensibile cuius principium est sensus, et comprehensibile cuius principium est cogitatio. Et iam diximus quod virtus cogitativa non est intellectus materialis neque intellectus qui est in actu, sed est virtus particularis materialis. Et hoc manifestum est ex dictis in Sensu et Sensato. Et oportet scire hoc, quoniam consuetudo est attribuere intellectui virtutem cogitativam. Et non debet aliquis dicere quod virtus cogitativa componit intelligibilia singularia; et iam declaratum est quod intellectus materialis componit ea; cogitatio enim non est nisi in distinguendo individua illorum intelligibilium et presentare ea in actu quasi essent apud sensum; et ideo, quando fuerint presentia apud sensum, tunc cadet cogitatio, et remanebit actio intellectus in eis. Et ex hoc declarabitur quod actio intellectus est alia ab actione virtutis cogitative, quam Aristoteles vocavit intellectum passibilem, et dixit eam esse generabilem et corruptibilem. Et hoc est manifestum de ea, cum habet instrumentum terminatum, scilicet medium ventriculum cerebri. Et homo non est generabilis et corruptibilis nisi per hanc virtutem, et sine hac virtute et virtute ymaginationis nichil {477} intelligit intellectus materialis. Crawford, pp. 476–477.*

³⁹ ... intellectus materialis nichil intelligit sine intellectu passibili ... Crawford, p. 451. Also see Crawford, p. 452, where Averroes cites his alternate translation to confirm that by passible intellect Aristotle means the human imaginative power.

⁴⁰ Cf. Gäje, "Die 'inneren Sinne'," pp. 273–274.

of intelligibles in act in the material intellect. Unlike Avicenna who holds that intelligibles come directly from the agent intellect itself,⁴¹ for Averroes there is a significant sense in which what are known are things of the world. "[T]he material intellect is what is in potency all the intentions of universal material forms ..."⁴² Of course, Avicenna would indeed accept this statement, but for him this material intellect is individual for each human being, while for Averroes it is one for all humanity and separate in existence. Now for Averroes the material intellect is itself discerning and knowing because it receives universal forms. But it could not receive universal forms if it were a particular individual existing in a body or a power of a body, for then the received forms would be particularized by nature of the particular subject into which they are received, that is, they would be intelligible in potency, not intelligible in act.⁴³ Consequently, there cannot be a plurality of material intellects into which the same intelligibles are received, for the intelligible is the universal and each is essentially one. The material intellect, then, must be one for all human beings and must be a storehouse⁴⁴ of intelligibles to which science and its arguments refer

⁴¹ See Davidson, pp. 94–95.

⁴² ... [I]ntellectus materialis est illud quod est in potentia omnes intentiones formarum materialium universalium ... Crawford, p. 187.

⁴³ Et cum ista est diffinitio intellectus materialis, manifestum est quod differt apud ipsum a prima materia in hoc quod iste est in potentia omnes intentiones formarum (388) universalium materialium, prima autem materia est in potentia omnes iste forme sensibiles non cognoscens neque comprehendens. Et causa propter quam ista natura est distinguens et cognoscens, prima autem materia neque cognoscens neque distinguens, est quia prima materia recipit formas diversas, scilicet individuales et istas, ista autem recipit formas universales. Et ex hoc apparet quod ista natura non est aliquid hoc, neque corpus neque virtus in corpore; quoniam, si ita esset, tunc reciperet formas secundum quod sunt diversa et ista, et si ita esset, tunc forme existentes in ipsa essent intellecte in potentia, et sic non distingueret naturam formarum secundum quod sunt forme, sicut est dispositio in formis individualibus, sive spiritualibus sive corporalibus. Et ideo necesse est, si ista natura que dicitur intellectus recipit formas, ut recipiat formas modo alio receptionis ab eo secundum quem iste materie recipiunt formas quarum conclusio materia est terminatio prime materie in eis. Et ideo non est necesse ut sit de genere materialium istarum in quibus forma est inclusa, neque ipsa prima materia. Quoniam, si ita esset, tunc receptio in eis esset eiusdem generis; diversitas enim nature recepti facit diversitatem nature recipientis. Hoc igitur movit Aristotelem ad imponendum hanc naturam que est alia a natura materie et a natura forme et a natura congregati. Crawford, pp. 387–388.

⁴⁴ ὡς περ θησαυρός, as Themistius puts it in his *In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis*, ed. R. Heinze, *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, vol. V (Berlin 1899), p. 99.20. *bahīth*, a secret hiding place, in *An Arabic Translation of Themistius'*

in the formation of universal propositions. As Davidson puts it, "individual men tap into the material intellect's thought of the active intellect by developing their own intellects *in habitu*, by acquiring a complete corpus of intelligible thoughts."⁴⁵ These intelligible thoughts in the individual human beings, as we have seen, cannot be the intelligibles themselves, unless to be "in" and to be "thoughts" are understood equivocally. Clearly, since these thoughts cannot be the intelligibles, what they can be are images which refer to the intelligibles. Davidson rightly remarks, "Through images in the imaginative faculty, the soul becomes conscious of intelligible thoughts. Consequently, although men share a common material intellect, each still owns his personal individual thoughts, and thoughts are not shared."⁴⁶ For the intelligibles to be "in" the individual human being, they must be operationally or functionally present there, not ontologically present there.⁴⁷ These intelligibles are the famous speculative intellect and speculative intelligibles which have a twofold existence, one in the separate material intellect in which they are intelligibles in act and exist primarily and eternally as the metaphysical nature of the substance of the material intellect requires, and another existence which is generable and corruptible in accord with the nature of their generable and corruptible human subject.⁴⁸

Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima, ed. M.C. Lyons (Columbia, South Carolina, and Oxford, England, 1973), p. 180.2.

⁴⁵ Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes*, p. 332.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 290.

⁴⁷ See Arthur Hyman, "Aristotle's Theory of Intellect and Its Interpretation by Averroes," in *Studies in Aristotle*, ed. Dominic J. O'Meara (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1981), pp. 161–191. "It should finally be noted that the manner in which the agent intellect is the form of the speculative intellect differs from that in which a corporeal form is the form of a corporeal substance. For in the latter case form and matter are united as different aspects of the same substance, while in the former case the agent and speculative intellects are, in some fashion, ontologically distinct. From this it follows that the agent intellect is joined to the speculative intellect through an operational rather than an ontological union." p. 190.

⁴⁸ *Questio autem dicens quomodo intellecta speculativa, erunt generabilia et corruptibilia et agens ea et {400} recipiens erit eternum, et que est indigentia ad imponendum intellectum agentem et recipientem si non est illic aliquod generatum, illa questio non contingeret si non esset hic aliud quod est causa esse intellecta speculativa generata. Modo autem, quia ista intellecta constituentur per duo, quorum unum est generatum et aliud non generatum, quod dictum fuit in hoc est secundum cursum naturalem. Quoniam, quia formare per intellectum, sicut dicit Aristoteles, est sicut comprehendere per sensum, comprehendere autem per sensum*

Now, insofar as the intelligibles are operationally present in the individual human being by way of images, they are there at the disposal of the human cogitative power which is responsible for our willing and acting in a voluntary way. The cogitative power is what is also able to conjure up an image in the absence of a sensation as if a sensed object were present.⁴⁹ With respect to determining what is our proper course of action with a view to the future, we are able to use our knowledge had by our sharing of the speculative intelligibles with the material intellect to try to determine what we should do as intelligent human beings and good moral persons.⁵⁰ Reason in the individual, present there thanks to the intelligent person's participation in the knowing taking place in the material intellect, manifests itself in the cogitative power's ability to sort through sensible images comparing them with intelligibles represented in the human individual by images coming about through the cogitative power. This is the power which judges and chooses actions by way

perficitur per duo subiecta, quorum unum est subiectum per quod sensus fit verus (et est sensatum extra animam), aliud autem est subiectum per quod sensus est forma existens (et est prima perfectio sentientis), necesse est etiam ut intellecta in actu habeant duo subiecta, quorum unum est subiectum per quod sunt vera, scilicet forme que sunt ymagines vere, secundum autem est illud per quod intellecta sunt unum entium in mundo, et istud est intellectus materialis. Crawford, pp. 399–400. See pp. 399–401, 404–407.

⁴⁹ ... [E]t causa in hoc est quia homo ponit principium sue considerationis in rebus possibilibus de rebus presentibus quas videt. Et ideo possibile est ut homo cogitet in aliqua re adeo quod inveniet ex eo aliquod individuum quod ante non senserit, sed senserit ei simile, non ipsum idem. Et innuit per hoc modum secundum quem potest inveniri per cogitationem ymago vera cuius individuum nunquam fuit sensatum ab aliquo cogitante. Crawford, p. 476.

⁵⁰ See note 31. In the Latin of his *Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics*, cogitation also plays this role: *Et quemadmodum virtus moralis est habitus electionis: et electio, quae est ei, est concupiscentia proveniens a cogitatione et ab usu oppositionis. Et ideo apprehensio est verax et concupiscentia sana, quando fuerit electio virtuosius. Averroes. In Moralia Nicomachia Expositione in Aristotelis Opera Cum Averrois Commentariis, III (Venetiis Apud Iunctas, 1552; repr., Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1962), 82G; Ergo operatio quae est partis cogitativae quae est a bono et a malo, est veritas et falsitas, quoniam operatio omnis partis intellectualis est aut verum aut falsum. Ibid., 82H; Et prudens pollens consilio absolute est ille, qui arbitratur cogitatione quid est melius homini ex factis et invenit ipsum ... oportet prudentem scire universales et particulares simul, propter quod haec scientia est operativa, et operativum quidem circa particularia est. Ibid., 86 H-I. Regarding Averroes' *Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics*, see Jerzy B. Korolec, "Mittlerer Kommentar von Averroes zur Nikomachischen Ethik des Aristoteles," *Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum* 31 (1992): 61–188; and L.V. Berman, "Excerpts from the Lost Arabic Original of Ibn Rushd's *Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics*," *Oriens* 20 (1967): 31–59, and "Ibn Rushd's *Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics* in Medieval Hebrew Literature," in *Multiple Averroes*, ed. J. Jolivet et al. (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1978), pp. 287–321.*

of comparing and reckoning imaginations, the power possessed by a rational animal having opinion and requiring reason.⁵¹

Is this cogitative power, then, our true self insofar as it is responsible for the forming of intentions presented to the material intellect and so is also responsible for whatever awareness of intelligibles comes to be in our individual consciousnesses? Is it our true self insofar as it is responsible for our deciding our present and future courses of action and thereby responsible for our becoming more or less intelligent and more or less good as rational human persons? Or might it be better to call the self of a rational being that which gives it its distinctive nature, its rationality? In this latter case, the self would be the separate agent intellect together with its effects on our own individual intellectual consciousnesses, our final form, as Averroes puts it.⁵² However, neither cogitation nor intellect causes motion, and surely it seems that the self should be what causes

⁵¹ ... [E]t necesse est ut una virtus numeret illas ymaginationes donec comprehendat ex eis magis amatum, sicut unum numerat numeros inequales donec comprehendat magis maiorem; similiter cogitatio numerat ymaginationes et comparat inter eas donec possit pati ab ymaginatione alicuius earum. Et hec est causa quare animal rationale habet existimationem; existimatio enim est consensus qui provenit a cogitatione. Deinde dixit: non enim habet cogitationem, etc. Idest, et preter animal rationale nullum habet cogitationem, quia non habet rationem; et motus animalium est propter delectationem, et est motus simplex, non diversus, quia non habet virtutem cogitativam cum appetitu ita quod hee due virtutes dominarentur sibi adinvicem adeo quod moveretur animal quandoque propter voluntatem sicut in animali rationali. Crawford, p. 530.

⁵² Et etiam, quomodo attribuitur actio propria intellectui agenti, que est facere intellecta, intellectui generabili et corruptibili, scilicet qui est in habitu? Nisi ponat quod intellectus qui est in habitu sit intellectus agens compositus cum intellectu materiali, ut dicit Themistius, aut ponat quod forma postrema nobis qua abstrahimus intellecta et intelligimus est composita ex intellectu qui est in habitu et intellectu agenti, ut Alexander et Avempeche ponunt, et sicut nos reputamus.

Et si etiam hoc posuissimus esse ita, non contingeret ex complemento actionis eius que est creare intellecta {490} nisi complementum actionis in intelligendo ea, non in intelligendo res abstractas, cum intelligere eas impossibile est ut attribuaturs generationi, aut fieri ab aliquo ente generato (v.g. ab intellectu qui est in habitu) nisi per accidens; et si non, tunc generabile efficietur eternum, sicut diximus.

Et contingit etiam sermoni dicenti quod forma qua extrahimus intellecta est intellectus qui est in habitu compositus cum intellectu agenti magna questio. Eternum enim non indiget in sua actione generabili et corruptibili. Quomodo igitur componitur eternum cum corruptibili ita quod ex eis fiat una actio? Sed post loquimur de hoc. Videtur enim quod ista positio est quasi principium et fundamentum eius quod volumus dicere de possibilitate continuationis cum rebus abstractis secundum Aristotelem, scilicet positio quod forma postrema nobis qua extrahimus intellecta et facimus ea per voluntatem nostram est composita ex intellectu agenti et intellectu qui est in habitu. Hoc igitur videmus de sermone expositorum Peripateticorum in hunc finem esse possibilem, scilicet intelligere in postremo res abstractas. Crawford, pp. 489–490.

motion in us. But for both Averroes and Aristotle, the cause of motion is the object of appetite together with our appetite for that object. "Because the thing, insofar as it is an animal, has appetite, it is necessary that it move itself in virtue of that intention. No appetite exists without imagination, for every thing which imagines either has that imagined form by which it is moved from sense, or it has it from cogitation. In human beings, however, it is had from cogitation, while in other animals from sense."⁵³ Yet, since all of these are required for the constitution and activities of the rational person, perhaps it is best not to single out one part of the soul but rather to say with Aristotle, as does Averroes, that it is better to say that it is the human being who acts by means of the soul and its powers.⁵⁴

II

There need be no surprise ... at Aristotle's assertion that what thinks and knows is the mind belonging to the soul, and that it is present *in* the soul as the active as well as the passive element: "These distinct elements must be present in the soul also." Perhaps "features" might serve better to translate the Greek *diaphoras* here, but in any case the meaning is plainly that the separate, immortal and eternal mind is somehow *in* the soul, even though it is separate in its own nature. In fact, the questions whether it is separate and how it is separate are introduced as applying to the "part of the soul" by means of which knowing and thinking take place. The final answer is that the passive mind is perishable, while the other mind is alone eternal. In the framework of soul as the instrument by which the individual man thinks, this can hardly mean anything else than that the cognitive agent in question is the man himself, thinking through the instrumentality of the twofold mind.⁵⁵

This remark on Aristotle's philosophy of mind comes from a

⁵³ *Et quia res secundum quod est animal habet appetitum, necesse est ut per illam intentionem moveat se. Et omnis appetitus non est sine ymaginatione; omne enim ymaginans aut habet illam formam ymaginatam, a qua movetur, ex sensu, aut habet eam ex cogitatione; in homine autem habetur ex cogitatione, in aliis vero animalibus ex sensu.* Crawford, p. 528.

⁵⁴ Aristotle, *De Anima* I 4, 408b14–15. *Deinde dixit: SED MELIUS VIDETUR NON DICERE, etc. Idest, et ideo melius est ut locutio sit in omnibus istis actionibus quod homo faciat hoc per animam, non quod anima distinguat aut edificet aut addiscat aut habeat pietatem, sed homo addiscit per animam aut distinguit per eam.* Crawford, p. 85.

⁵⁵ Joseph Owens, "The Self in Aristotle," *Review of Metaphysics* 41 (1988): 707–722. See p. 717.

study entitled, "The Self in Aristotle," by the well-known Aristotelian scholar, Joseph Owens. In the course of his presentation in that article, Owens recalls that for Aristotle there are powerful affinities between the divine life of the separately existing Intellect and human rationality insofar as human fulfillment is to be found in intellectual activity manifested ultimately in separately existing Intellect. Referring to the famous remarks in Book X of the *Nicomachean Ethics* in which Aristotle urges the pursuit of the divine life insofar as it may be possible for us, Owens recounts that Aristotle "urges men to live according to the divine feature in their intellectual activity. The divine life of the separate mind is held up as the supreme goal of human life, and of human contemplation."⁵⁶ Similarity between divine and human intellectual activity, however, does not mean that for Aristotle the separate intellect which makes human thinking actual is identical with the First Cause or God, as Alexander would have it,⁵⁷ since the Aristotelian account here only sets forth what is needed to address the problematic of *De Anima* III 5. There Aristotle seems to assert that the actuality of human personal intellectual understanding must be traced to eternal intellect separate in nature from the individual human being in which thought somehow takes place. He gives us no detailed account of the details of the process other than to say that the agency of a separate intellect is required for the sort of thinking which grasps universals. Yet even with that understanding, it is still clear that Owens has good reason for holding that the acting human self in Aristotle's account is, "the real agent in one's moral conduct ... the composite of matter and form that constitutes the individual man." That is to say, the true self is the agent in individual actions, "the whole man, the composite individual, using the separate mind as an instrument."⁵⁸

To this we can add that such a view is strongly supported by Themistius in his *Paraphrase of the De Anima* when he argues in the

⁵⁶ Ibid. See *Nicomachean Ethics* X 7, 1177a11–18.

⁵⁷ Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De Anima Liber Cum Mantissa*, ed. Ivo Bruns (Berlin, 1887), [*Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, Suppl. II, pt. 1] 88–89. Guthrie follows Alexander in identifying Agent Intellect with God in *A History of Greek Philosophy*. VI. *Aristotle: an encounter* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 322–327. This is also the opinion of John Rist in his *The Mind of Aristotle. A Study in Philosophical Growth* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), p. 182.

⁵⁸ Owens, p. 718.

excursus to his paraphrase of *De Anima* 3.5 along lines already set forth by others in the tradition.⁵⁹ Themistius remarks that

We, then, are either the potential intellect or the actual [intellect]. So if, in the case of everything that is combined from what is potential and actual, something (*to tode*) and what it is to be something (*to tôide einai*) are distinct, then the I (*to egô*) and what it is to be me (*to emoi einai*) would also be distinct, and while I am the intellect combined from the potential and the actual [intellects], what it is to be me comes from the actual [intellect]. Thus while the intellect combined from the potential and the actual [intellects] is writing what I am [now] discursively thinking about and composing, it is writing not *qua* potential but *qua* actual [intellect], for activity from the latter is channeled to it.⁶⁰

While Themistius does hold that “the I (*to egô*) and what it is to be me (*to emoi einai*) would also be distinct,” that is, that the “I” or self which acts is a bodily rational animal, he ultimately traces the actuality of this embodied self as rational and intellectual to the separate actual intellect saying, “What it is to be me therefore comes from the productive (active) intellect alone ...”⁶¹ That is, the true nature of what it is to be a human being in full actuality as a rational animal requires that our selfhood as rational be tied to and identified with separate intellect. That said, however, my individual nature as an embodied actuality, as an individual, a *this*, requires that my human self be that of an animal rightly characterized as rational only in virtue of my employment of the powers of separate intellect, it would seem.

In light of this analysis from Themistius and what we have already seen of the teachings of Averroes, it seems reasonable to say that

⁵⁹ See P. Moraux, “Le *De Anima* dans la tradition grecque: Quelques aspects de l’interprétation du traité, de Théophraste à Thémistius,” in *Aristotle on Mind and the Senses: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Aristotelicum*, ed. G.E.R. Lloyd and G.E.L. Owen (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 281–324. See p. 323 n. 136.

⁶⁰ Themistius, *In Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis*, ed. R. Heinze, *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, vol. V (Berlin, 1899), 100.16–22; Lyons (see note 44), p. 182.2–7. English translation of the Greek by Robert B. Todd in *Themistius, On Aristotle’s On the Soul* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 124–125. Also see Helmut Gätje, *Studien zur Überlieferung der aristotelischen Psychologie im Islam* (Heidelberg: Karl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1971), “Die Übersetzung der Paraphrase des Themistios und sein Einfluß auf Averroes,” pp. 63–68.

⁶¹ παρὰ μόνου τοίνυν τοῦ ποιητικοῦ τὸ ἐμοὶ εἶναι Themistius, Heinze 100.31–32; tran. Todd, p. 125; Arabic: Lyons 182.16–17. Here and in what follows I add “(active)” to Todd’s translation for proper correspondence with my rendering of Averroes’s terminology.

Averroes' understanding reflects faithfully in a general way one possible view of Aristotle's thought and that it certainly is in continuity with what we find in the Greek tradition. Intellect and rationality are attributed to human beings only in virtue of their powers derived from their relationship to separate intellect in which the nature and powers of intellect exist primarily and as cause of human rationality. Consequently, intellect or νοῦς might be said to be predicated of human beings only derivatively, not primarily. This is supported by a recent article in *Revue des Etudes Grecques* on the topic of the composition of concepts in Book III chapter 6 of Aristotle's *De Anima* and in some Greek and Arab commentators.⁶² Using many of the same texts but apparently working independently of the research of Wolfson and Gätje, Michel Fattal argues that "in Aristotle νοῦς as νόησις knows indivisibles directly but also possesses the capacity for thinking discursively and for bringing multiplicity back into unity."⁶³ As Fattal sees it, "Intellect in fact is going to use διάνοια as a faculty of soul attached to the body to compose, unify or reunite the multiplicity of concepts."⁶⁴ While his efforts are primarily directed to the question of the composition of concepts, what is important for research on the thought of Averroes as Aristotelian commentator is that Fattal's study on this topic rightly highlights the fact that νοῦς has two senses in Aristotle, one in the strict sense which is found most clearly presented in *De Anima* III 6, the familiar notion that intellect is not subject to error, and another sense much more broadly encompassing functions associated with intellectual activities on the part of human individuals in physical bodies. Among these functions are those which involve διάνοια, ὑπόληψις, δόξα, λογισμός, and other related human func-

⁶² Michel Fattal, "La Composition des concepts dans le *De Anima* (III, 6) d'Aristote. Commentaires Grecs et Arabes," *Revue des Etudes Grecques* 108 (1995): 371–387. Similar issues in the thought of Aristotle are also discussed by Fattal in, "L'Intellection des indivisibles dans le *De Anima* (III, 6) d'Aristote. Lectures arabes et modernes," in *Corps et Âme. Sur le De Anima d'Aristote*, ed. Gilbert Romeyer Dherbey (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1996), pp. 423–440. Fattal seems to be unaware of the work of Wolfson and Gätje, see notes 2 and 8 above, and sets forth his own understanding of some of the same textual materials.

⁶³ "... [A]lors que chez Aristote le νοῦς comme νόησις saisit directement les indivisibles mai possède également la capacité de penser discursivement et de réunir la multiplicité dans l'unité." Fattal, "La Composition des concepts," p. 379.

⁶⁴ "L'intellect va en fait se servir de la dianoia comme faculté de l'âme rattachée au corps pour composer, unifier ou réunir la multiplicité des concepts." Fattal, "La Composition des concepts," p. 379.

tions involving rationality in varying degrees. Such a position is much like what we find in Averroes on cogitation and intellect.

Fattal, moreover, goes on to cite two important examples of texts of Themistius on this topic, texts which were translated into Arabic.⁶⁵ At p. 109, lines 18–20, of the *Paraphrase* Themistius says, “The intellect also often adds the thought of time when it thinks discursively about objects that are in the past or the future, and apprehending time too, whether past or future, along with [such objects] is quite unique to the intellect in its role as the capacity [of the soul] beyond imagination.”⁶⁶ Here προσνοεῖ ... τὸν χρόνον and διανοηται are regarded as activities of νοῦς and in the corresponding Arabic these are unhesitatingly identified with intellect. Furthermore, Fattal points out, we find in Themistius the phrase ὁ νοῦς διαίρει, “Intellect distinguishes,” with the corresponding Arabic, *wa-l-aql huwa alladhī yumaiyizu-hā*, “Intellect is what distinguishes them.”⁶⁷ Now, while Fattal does mistakenly think that the edition of the Arabic *De Anima* by Badawī contains the text of Ishāq,⁶⁸ it is nevertheless confirmed by him that, as he puts it, “Even if ... Aristotle does not say expressly that it is νοῦς as διάνοια which thinks in a discursive way in unifying what is multiple, some of the Greek and Arabic commentators quickly perceived the equivalence which there was between noetic and dianoetic thought.”⁶⁹

Of course, what we have found in Averroes is not a perception of equivalence, but rather an awareness of the equivocal uses of the terms *al-aql*, “intellect” (*intellectus*), *‘aqala*, “to think” (*intelligere*) and

⁶⁵ Fattal, “La Composition des concepts,” pp. 379–380.

⁶⁶ Translation by Robert B. Todd in *Themistius, On Aristotle's On the Soul*, p. 135. πολλοῖς δὲ προσνοεῖ καὶ τὸν χρόνον ὅταν ὡς περὶ γενομένων ἢ ἐσομένων διανοηται, καὶ τοῦτο ἴδιον ἦδη τοῦ νοῦ τῆς ὑπὲρ τὴν φαντασίαν δυνάμεως τὸ συναντιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ χρόνου ἦτοι παρελθόντος ἢ μέλλοντος. Heinze 109.18–20; Arabic: Lyons 199.5–8.

⁶⁷ Heinze 109.34–35; Lyons 200.1.

⁶⁸ Abdurrahman Badawī's Arabic edition, *Aristotelis De Anima* (Cairo, 1954) carries an attribution to Ishāq Ibn Hunain which is almost certainly incorrect. See the discussion of the Arabic translations of the *De Anima* in R.M. Frank, “Some Fragments of Ishāq's Translation of the *De Anima*,” *Cahiers de Byrsa* 8 (1958–59): 231–251; Gâtje, *Studien*, pp. 20–44; Rafael Ramon Guerrero, *La Recepcion Arabe del De Anima de Aristoteles: al-Kindi y al-Farabi* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1992), pp. 92–110; and Aristotle's *De Anima*. Translated into Hebrew by Zerahyah Ben Isaac Ben Shealtiel Hen. A Critical Edition with an Introduction and Index, by Gerrit Bos (New York, Köln and Leiden, 1994), introduction pp. 9–12.

⁶⁹ Fattal, “La Composition des concepts,” p. 379.

nātiq "rational" (*rationalis*) as predicated of human beings and separate intellect. *Per se* the human being and the human internal senses are not rational, do not think, and do not have intellect. For Averroes it is only in virtue of our natural functional linkage to separately existing immaterial intellect that we can have those characteristics predicated of us. We do not think and we do not conceptualize of ourselves. Rather, all conceptualization is by means of intellect, *taṣawwur bi-l-'aql*, "conceptualization by intellect." He has the clear understanding that intellect and intellectual thinking exist primarily in the separate intellects and are properly predicated of the separate intellects, as is evident in his understanding of the speculative intellect's presence in the individual as perishable and presence in the separate intellect as eternal.⁷⁰ These actualities exist only derivatively in particular human beings of whom intellect and the power to think are also only predicated in a derivative and equivocal way.

In much of his thought in the *Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle*, Averroes follows the work of Themistius very closely, as Davidson notes.⁷¹ Careful study of the *Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle* yields the impression that the *Paraphrase* of Themistius was always open on Averroes' study table as he composed his commentary. And we find Themistius writing,

We shall investigate what he calls 'the passive and perishable intellect' as we proceed, and the fact that he does not adopt this as the potential [intellect], but some other intellect to which he gave the name 'common' in Book One, together with which [the productive (active) intellect] thinks the things here, and with which it thinks discursively

⁷⁰ See pp. 229–230 above.

⁷¹ "The position on the material intellect which Averroes adopts in the *Long Commentary on the De Anima* is Themistius' position, as Averroes understands it, with a correction and an addition. Themistius, Averroes writes in the *Long Commentary*, construed the material intellect rightly but missed a critical detail; he did not realize that actual human thought, or human 'theoretical intellect,' although in one respect eternal, is in another respect generated-destructible. Averroes also does something that Themistius did not do, in construing the material intellect as a quasi-material incorporeal substance and assigning it a precise place in the incorporeal hierarchy. He identifies it as the last of the incorporeal intelligences, standing directly below the active intellect in the hierarchy of existence." Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes*, p. 293. Also see Gätje, *Studien*, "Die Übersetzung der Paraphrase des Themistios und sein Einfluß auf Averroes," pp. 63–68.

(διανοεῖται) about those things, and to which loving, hating and remembering belong.⁷²

and

He even employs almost exactly the same expressions when he says earlier (1.4, 408b25–9), ‘And discursive thinking, and loving or hating, are not an affection of that thing [sc. the productive (active) intellect] but of the particular thing that has it, insofar as it has it. That is why when this too perishes, it [sc. the productive (active) intellect] neither remembers nor loves. For these [activities] did not belong to it, but to the common [intellect] which has perished. And the [productive (active)] intellect is surely something more divine and unaffected.’⁷³

In these passages Themistius links discursive activities which take place by means of a perishable bodily organ with separate intellect. The reason for this is that activities such as loving, hating and remembering involve a particular human individual and in some cases concerning such things as practical judgments can also involve a mixture of the intelligible in act (a grasp of the universal) and of the particular situation or entity. Separate intellect makes possible thinking of what is right or wrong, good or bad, sound or unsound, in our daily judgments of actions which concern things such as how we should act morally, what we should do or study for our fulfillment, etc., all of which involve reference to a universal and to particulars as well as a particular judgment as to how the universal fits or does not fit the particulars of the situation with which we find ourselves having to deal. To this extent, the human being in a sense ‘thinks over’ the possibilities but is able to do so only by way of separately existing intellect’s involvement in that activity, for without reference to the universal there can be no rational judgment concerning particulars.

Another source for Averroes in this, one not discussed by Fattal, was Alexander of Aphrodisias. Both the *De Anima* of Alexander and the *De Intellectu* attributed to Alexander were available to and used

⁷² Heinze, 101.5–9; Lyons, 183.9–13; Todd, tran., p. 125.

⁷³ Heinze, 101.18–23; Lyons, 184.3–8; Todd, tran., p. 126. Note also: “While desire that can perceive is appetite, desire that can think discursively is [identifiable as] willing (*boulêsis*), and while appetite is for what is pleasant, willing is for what is good.” Heinze 113.23–24; Lyons, p. 207.8–9; Todd, tran., p. 139.

by Averroes.⁷⁴ In his *De Anima* Alexander asserts the existence of a “judging” (κριτική τίς) power which is “rational” (λογικὸς) in nature in the soul of a human being. This rational power of soul has two sorts of objects, one consisting of practical matters of action and change in this world (τὰ μὲν πρακτικά τε εἶναι καὶ ἐν γενέσει) and the other objects eternal and necessary (τὰ δὲ αἰδιά τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖα). In the rational soul, he writes, there is the power which is concerned with matters of opinion and another concerned with matters of science. But each of these is suitably called intellect (νοῦς). One is practical, dealing with matters of opinion and deliberation, a principle of action involving will and desire with judgment; the other is concerned with science and theoretical matters.⁷⁵

In regard to the human self, Alexander held that the individual human being is a perishable particular material intellect which becomes knowing and in actual possession of intellect by way of a separate productive or active intellect. This productive intellect he identified as supremely intelligible, separate from matter, the cause of knowledge in our intellects, even as a source of being for other things.⁷⁶ In the thought of Alexander, this productive or active intellect is the ultimate deity, an impassible actuality and form, which enables us to reach our highest fulfillment by means of the intellectual actuality we are able to attain by contact with it. To that extent, it is more valuable than the material intellect in us which, while immensely important to us as human beings, nevertheless is

⁷⁴ Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De Anima Liber Cum Mantissa*, ed. Ivo Bruns, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, Suppl. II, pt. 1 (Berlin, 1887), pp. 106–113. The Arabic is published in J. Finnegan, “Texte Arabe du ΠΕΡΙ ΝΟΥ d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise,” *Mélanges de l’Université Saint Joseph* 33, fasc. 2 (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1956), pp. 159–202. The Hebrew translation of a commentary on the *De intellectu* of Alexander by Averroes has been published by H. Davidson. See “Averroes’ Commentary on the *De intellectu* attributed to Alexander” (in Hebrew), in *Shlomo Pines Jubilee Volume 1* (Jerusalem, 1988), pp. 205–217. The Arabic of Alexander’s *De Anima* is not extant, according to F.E. Peters, *Aristoteles Arabus* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1968), p. 43.

⁷⁵ διαφέρει δὲ ἀλλήλων τὰ ὑποκείμενα τῇ λογικῇ δυνάμει τῷ τὰ μὲν πρακτικά τε εἶναι καὶ ἐν γενέσει καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ οὕτως καὶ μὴ οὕτως γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ αἰδιά τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖα, καὶ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν εἶναι δοξαστά, τὰ δὲ ἐπιστητά. διὸ καὶ τῶν τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων ἡ μὲν τίς ἐστι δοξαστική, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστημονική. καλεῖται δὲ ἑκάτερα νοῦς, ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν πρακτικός τε καὶ δοξαστικός καὶ βουλευτικός, ὃς ἀρχὴ γίνεται πράξεως, ὅταν ἡ βούλησις τε καὶ ὄρεξις συνοδεύῃ τοῖς ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ κριθέσιν, ὁ δὲ ἐπιστημονικός τε καὶ θεωρητικός. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ζητοῦμεν πράξεως χάριν, τὰ δὲ γνώσεως. Bruns 81.5–13.

⁷⁶ Bruns 88.17–91.7, esp. 89.11ff.. Cf. *De Intellectu*, Bruns 107.29–113.12.

bound up with matter and perishes with the rest of the soul at death.⁷⁷ Averroes found this doctrine expressing the necessity of the embodied human intellectual self's contact with transcendent intellect not only in the *De Anima* of Alexander but also in the *De Intellectu* attributed to Alexander: "And Alexander says that it is more correct to describe the intellect which is in us through its agent power, not through the patient [power], since affection and reception are common to the intellect, the senses, and distinctive powers, while action is proper to [intellect]. And it is better that the thing be described through its action."⁷⁸

For Averroes, the Agent plays an equally important role. The separate Agent Intellect in its activity in relation to the Material Intellect is characterized as our final form, while the acquired intellect is intellect in use by us to grasp the intelligible to the extent that this is made possible by way of intellect.⁷⁹ Our entire human selfhood is not attributed to the Agent Intellect.

When the intellect which is in act is a cause of the material intellect according to form in this action of its own (and this is through the ascension of the material intellect {485} in the presence of that form), then it is called the acquired intellect. This is because in that disposition

⁷⁷ Bruns, 89–90.

⁷⁸ *Et cum invenimus nos agere per has duas virtutes intellectus cum voluerimus, et nichil agit nisi per suam formam, ideo fuit necesse attribuere nobis has duas virtutes intellectus. Et intellectus qui est abstrahere intellectum et creare eum necesse est ut precedat in nobis intellectum qui est recipere eum. Et Alexander dicit quod rectius est describere intellectum qui est in nobis per suam virtutem agentem, non per patientem, cum passio et receptio communes sint intellectui et sensibus et virtutibus distinctivis, actio autem est propria ei; et est melius quod res describatur per suam actionem. Dico: et hoc non esset necesse omni modo, nisi si hoc nomen passio diceretur in eis modo univoco; non enim dicitur nisi modo equivoco.* Crawford, p. 440. "We find that we act in virtue of these two powers of intellect {440} when we wish; and nothing acts except through its form; [so] for this reason it was necessary to attribute to us these two powers of the intellect. The intellect which is responsible for separating and creating the intelligible necessarily precedes in us the intellect which is to receive it. Alexander says that it is more correct to describe the intellect which is in us through its agent power, not through the patient [power], since affection and reception are common to the intellect, the senses, and the distinctive powers, while action is proper to [intellect]. And it is better that the thing be described through its action. I say: and this would not be necessary in every way, unless this name affection were said in regard to these in a univocal way, for it is said only equivocally." Cf. Alexander, *De intellectu*, Bruns 111.8–23. Blaustein does not approach the question in this way but does recognize a certain supremacy of the cogitative faculty. See Blaustein, pp. 108–118.

⁷⁹ *Et cum intellectus materialis fuerit copulatus secundum quod perficitur per intellectum agentem, tunc nos sumus copulati cum intellectu agentis; et ista dispositio dicitur ADEPTIO et INTELLECTUS ADEPTUS, ut post videbitur.* Crawford, p. 411.

we will be thinking in virtue of it since it is form belonging to us, for then it will be the final form belonging to us.⁸⁰

For it seems that that position is as it were the starting point and foundation of what we want to say concerning the possibility of conjunction with separate things according to Aristotle, namely, the position that the final form belonging to us by means of which we extract and make intelligibles in virtue of our will is composed of the agent intellect and the intellect which is in a positive disposition. We, therefore, see this from the account of the Peripatetic commentators in regard to the fact that this is possible, namely to think separate things ultimately.⁸¹

Nevertheless, for Averroes individual human beings share in immortality only via their relationship to separate intellect in this life and via their existence as members of the human species which is eternal by succession of individuals.⁸² In his mature work Averroes stressed the ontological distinctness of the intellect from the human individual and that there is only a functional or operational unity of these in human thinking.⁸³ This view is a consequence of two key philosophical principles he came to hold as a result of his reflection on Aristotle's work and that of the Greek and Arabic tradition. First, to be intelligible in act, the intelligible cannot be received into a *this* or particular individual. Secondly, the intelligible in act must be one, not many, for if it were in many intellects, it would be many intelligibles in act, not one, and it would not have a single and common referent, with the consequence that science would not be possible.⁸⁴

⁸⁰ *Manifestum est igitur quod intelligit per hunc sermonem quod, quando intellectus qui est in actu fuerit causa secundum formam intellectus materialis in actione eius propria (et hoc erit per ascensionem intellectus materialis (485) apud illam formam), tunc dicetur intellectus adeptus, quoniam in illa dispositione erimus intelligentes per ipsum quoniam est forma nobis; quoniam tunc erit ultima forma nobis.* Crawford, pp. 484–485.

⁸¹ *Videtur enim quod ista positio est quasi principium et fundamentum eius quod volumus dicere de possibilitate continuationis cum rebus abstractis secundum Aristotelem, scilicet positio quod forma postrema nobis qua extrahimus intellecta et facimus ea per voluntatem nostram est composita ex intellectu agenti et intellectu qui est in habitu. Hoc igitur videmus de sermone expositorem Peripateticorum in hunc finem esse possibilem, scilicet intelligere in postremo res abstractas.* Crawford, p. 490. On the notion of our final or ultimate form, also see Crawford, pp. 392–393 and 407–408.

⁸² See Richard C. Taylor, "Personal Immortality in Averroes' Mature Philosophical Psychology," forthcoming in *Documenti e studi sulla traduzione filosofica medievale IX* (1998): 87–110.

⁸³ See note 47.

⁸⁴ *[D]iffinitio igitur intellectus materialis est illud quod est in potentia omnes intentiones formarum materialium universalium, et non est in actu aliquod entium antequam intelligat*

III

In addition to the work of Themistius and Alexander, there is yet another source for the doctrine of cogitation set forth by Averroes, namely the particular version of the Arabic translation of the *De Anima* which he uses for his primary text in his *Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle*. Averroes used two different Arabic translations of the *De Anima* in his *Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle*, one as his primary text which he quotes in its entirety as he comments on it section by section, and a second which he occa-

*ipsum. Et cum ista est diffinitio intellectus materialis, manifestum est quod differt apud ipsum a prima materia in hoc quod iste est in potentia omnes intentiones formarum (388) universalium materialium, prima autem materia est in potentia omnes iste forme sensibiles non cognoscens neque comprehendens. Et causa propter quam ista natura est distinguens et cognoscens, prima autem materia neque cognoscens neque distinguens, est quia prima materia recipit formas diversas, scilicet individuales et istas, ista autem recipit formas universales. Et ex hoc apparet quod ista natura non est aliquid hoc, neque corpus neque virtus in corpore; quoniam, si ita esset, tunc reciperet formas secundum quod sunt diversa et ista, et si ita esset, tunc forme existentes in ipsa essent intellecte in potentia, et sic non distingueret naturam formarum secundum quod sunt forme, sicut est dispositio in formis individualibus, sive spiritualibus sive corporalibus. Et ideo necesse est, si ista natura que dicitur intellectus recipit formas, ut recipiat formas modo alio receptionis ab eo secundum quem iste materie recipiunt formas quarum conclusio materia est terminatio prime materie in eis. Et ideo non est necesse ut sit de genere materialium istarum in quibus forma est inclusa, neque ipsa prima materia. Quoniam, si ita esset, tunc receptio in eis esset eiusdem generis; diversitas enim nature recepti facit diversitatem nature recipientis. Hoc igitur movit Aristotelem ad imponendum hanc naturam que est alia a natura materie et a natura forme et a natura congregati. Crawford, pp. 387–388. Et iste modus secundum quem posuimus essentiam intellectus materialis dissolvit omnes questiones contingentes huic quod ponimus quod intellectus est unus et multa. Quoniam, si res intellecta apud me et apud te fuerit una omnibus modis, continget quod, cum ego scirem aliquod intellectum, ut tu scires etiam ipsum, et alia multa impossibilia. Et si posuerimus eum esse multa, continget ut res intellecta apud me et apud te sit una in specie et due in individuo; et sic res intellecta habebit rem intellectam, et sic procedit in infinitum. Et sic erit impossibile ut discipulus addiscat a magistro, nisi scientia que est in magistro sit virtus generans et creans scientiam que est in discipulo, ad modum secundum quem iste ignis generat alium ignem sibi similem in specie; quod est impossibile. Et hoc quod scitum est idem in magistro et discipulo ex hoc modo fecit Platonem credere quod disciplina esset rememoratio. Cum igitur posuerimus rem intelligibilem que est apud me et apud te multam in subiecto secundum quod est vera, scilicet formas ymaginationis, et unam in subiecto per quod est intellectus ens (et est materialis), dissolvuntur iste questiones perfecte. Crawford, pp. 411–412. This latter text of Averroes is based on the account of Themistius at Heinze 104.1–14; Lyons, p. 189.2–15; Todd, tran., p. 129. The infinite regress argument is also found in Ibn Bājja's *Risālat Ittiṣāl al-aql bi-l-insān*, "Treatise on the Conjoining of the Intellect with Man," a work Averroes knew well. See Miguel Asín Palacios, "Tratado de Avempace sobre la Unión del intelecto con el Hombre," *Al-Andalus* 7 (1942): 1–47, section 8, Arabic Text pp. 14–15, Spanish translation, pp. 32–33. Also see Vincent Laguardère, "L'Épître d'Ibn Bāja sur la conjunction de l'intellect avec l'esprit humain," *Revue des Etudes Islamiques* 49 (1981): 175–196; see p.187.*

sionally consults for correction or control of his primary text of Aristotle.⁸⁵ What we find in the translation itself is something of considerable philosophical import and which was certainly substantial encouragement for the understanding of cogitation which Averroes had.⁸⁶ The term *cogitatio* and related forms such as *cogitare*, *virtus cogitativa*, *cogitabile*, *cogitans*, and the like, appear at least 26 times in the primary text of the *De Anima* used by Averroes as we have that text in Latin. We see that these are used to render a wide array of Greek terms, among them forms of λογιστικός, λογισμός, λογίζομαι, διανοέομαι, διάνοια, perhaps ὑπολαμβάνω and βουλεύω, once θεωρητικός in a mistake noticed by Averroes thanks to his use of the text of Themistius, βουλευτικός, and δόξα.⁸⁷ It would appear that the doctrine of cogitation or *fikr* as understood by Averroes, that is, the grouping together under the notion of cogitation those rational activities which take place in the body by means of the cogitative power which has its physical seat in the brain, was already in the very text of the version of the translation of the *De Anima* in Arabic used by Averroes as his primary text in the *Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle*. Perhaps, then, the translator of that version of the Arabic *De Anima* was influenced substantially by the Greek philosophical tradition and its understanding of Aristotle's text and chose not to reflect the distinctions in the Greek but rather to group those various activities discussed by Aristotle under the Arabic word *fikr* and related words from that root. Alternatively, perhaps the source of this extensive use of *cogitatio* and related terms in the Latin of the text of the *De Anima* in the *Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle* may have been the translator of the Latin, Michael Scot.

The situation, however, is much more complicated than even those possibilities would make it appear because the Arabic text used by Averroes for his *Lemmata* is not known to be extant in Arabic. The most complete witnesses to this lost translation of the *De Anima* are the complete versions of the text in Latin in the

⁸⁵ On the *De Anima* in Arabic, see the works mentioned in note 68. Averroes' alternate translation is that edited by Abdurrahman Badawi in *Aristotelis De Anima* and wrongly attributed to Ishāq Ibn Hunayn. Detailed and comprehensive discussion of the translations of the *De Anima* is beyond the scope of this paper.

⁸⁶ See the brief but valuable discussion in Gätje, "Die 'inneren Sinne'," pp. 282–284.

⁸⁷ See the attached Appendix.

Lemmata of the *Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle* translated by Michael Scot from Arabic and in the Hebrew translation from Arabic done by Zerahyah recently published by Gerrit Bos.⁸⁸ But before considering the question of whether the translator who rendered the text of Aristotle into Arabic is the source of this use of the notion of cogitation, another possibility needs to be considered, namely the possibility of corruption in the process of translation from Arabic into Latin.

Could it be that the Latin translator is responsible for this doctrine of *cogitatio* found in the *Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle*? There is no evidence indicating such a propensity for such extensive revision in the work of Michael Scot, who also translated other works of Averroes, among them the *Epitome of the Parva Naturalia*. In fact, there are four distinct sorts of evidence indicating consistency on the part of Michael Scot. First, in the *Parva Naturalia* there is no tendency to render terms as diverse in meaning as λογιστικόν, λογίζεται, δοξάζειν, ὑπολαμβάνει, βουλευεται, διάνοια, et al., by forms of *cogitatio*, *cogitare*, etc. Rather, *cogitare* and related forms are consistently used to render Arabic forms from the root *fkr*, as might be expected of a consistent translator. Second, the few extant fragments of the Arabic *Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle* edited by A. Ben Chahida contain no texts which are of direct assistance to us in the matter of the text of the *De Anima*. There are, however, two texts with terms relevant to this discussion of cogitation which clearly confirm that the Latin translation of the *Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle* is in accord with what we find in the *Epitome of the Parva Naturalia*. The Arabic corresponding to *distingueret* in the *Long Commentary* at Book III Comment 135.21 (p. 336) is *tamyīz*.⁸⁹ And for *virtus cogitativa* at *Long Commentary* Book II Comment 63.54 the Arabic has *al-quwwah al-mufakkirah*.⁹⁰ Third, study of the Arabic *Middle Commentary on the De Anima* also indirectly confirms the view that the Latin translator of the *Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle* is consistent in his renderings. Among the many passages which seem to be identical in these two works are

⁸⁸ Aristotle's 'De Anima'. Translated into Hebrew by Zerahyah Ben Isaac Ben Shealtiel Hen. A Critical Edition with an Introduction and Index, by Gerrit Bos (Leiden, New York and Köln, 1994). But also see the works mentioned in note 68, particularly that of Frank who studied the notes of Avicenna on the *De Anima*.

⁸⁹ Ben Chahida, "Ikūshāf," p. 42.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 39.

several of special value in this regard. For example, at Arabic p. 145.15–16 we find *huwa min fī li l-fīkr* corresponding to the Latin *de actione cogitativa*.⁹¹ And fourth, Averroes' citation of his alternate translation provides support for this view by showing the Arabic *tufakkiru* was translated as *cogitaverit*.⁹² Thus, the source of this use of cogitation to characterize a wide variety of activities on the part of the rational human individual as we see it in the *De Anima* accompanying Averroes' *Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle* appears not to be the Latin translator, Michael Scot.

Yet neither does it appear that the source for this use of cogitation and related notions is the translator of the text into Arabic. Study of the Hebrew rendering from the same Arabic translation of the *De Anima* indicates that, with respect to the use of the term “cogitation” (*cogitatio*, *fīkr*, *mahashaba* and related terms from the same roots), the Hebrew translation from Arabic is more consistent with the Greek of Aristotle than is the Latin translation from Arabic. That is, while the Hebrew and Latin come from the same Arabic translation, they give evidence of coming from different versions of that Arabic *De Anima*. The Hebrew *mahashaba* and its related forms⁹³ correspond to the Greek λογισμός and λογιστικός in 11 of the texts, to δόξα once, and to διάνοια once. The Hebrew, however, clearly uses different terms in at least 7 cases in which forms of *cogitatio* in the Latin are used to render forms of διανοέομαι (two times⁹⁴), διάνοια (two times⁹⁵), and βουλευτικός (three times⁹⁶). This is a matter worthy of more detailed study elsewhere. But what this seems to indicate in a preliminary way is that Averroes was apparently working from a faulty and even contaminated version of the lost Arabic *De Anima*, one less in accord with the distinctions found in the Greek of Aristotle than was the Arabic from which the Hebrew translation was made. In brief, while the doctrine of cogitation — the grouping together under the

⁹¹ See the Appendix, item 15a.

⁹² See the Appendix, item 8a and the remarks there.

⁹³ I leave aside Appendix, items 6 and 11a, since the former is non-technical use and the latter a mistake common to the Latin and Hebrew and apparently in the Arabic tradition.

⁹⁴ Appendix, items 2 and 4.

⁹⁵ Appendix, item 11b.

⁹⁶ See the Appendix, items 13, 15a and 15c. Item 5 of the Appendix is ambiguous but it seems likely that the Hebrew renders βουλεύεται.

notion of cogitation those rational activities which take place by way of body — is in fact found in the very text of the version of the lost Arabic translation rendered into Latin by Michael Scot, the Hebrew translation, nevertheless, contains no such doctrine as extensively expressed in its Aristotelian text and, as a consequence, seems to be from a different, and on this point and on at least one other of philosophical import, superior,⁹⁷ version of the lost Arabic.

IV

Averroes' understanding of the nature of the Material Intellect changed through the years as he sought to discover a way to resolve difficulties arising from conflicting demands of various Aristotelian principles.⁹⁸ Yet his understanding of the functions of the internal senses seems to be remarkably consistent through the years and across many of his works. In the case of cogitation (*cogitatio*, *fikr*, *mahashaba*), the notion that this power of the imaginative faculty of the human soul located in the middle ventricle of the brain played a central role in human intellectual activity was always present in his thought. And, while cogitation is discussed in the *Middle Commentary on the De Anima*, it is nevertheless the *Long Commentary on the De Anima* which provides the most comprehensive account of the cogitative power in human intellectual understanding and in voluntary human action concerning practical matters including morality. Still, upon close examination of the Latin and Hebrew translations of Arabic texts from the tradition of the lost Arabic *De Anima* used by Averroes, the particular text of Aristotle's *De Anima* copied by Averroes into the body of his *Long Commentary on the De Anima* appears perhaps to have been contaminated in its Arabic tradition. In the version possessed and used by Averroes, there was a wider use of the term "cogitation" (*fikr* and related terms) than in fact is to be

⁹⁷ I refer here to the famous mistranslation of *De Anima* III 5, 430a14–17, Crawford, p. 437, which refers to three, not two, intellects. The corresponding Hebrew is in accord with the Greek in mentioning two intellects. See the Hebrew at Bos, pp. 123–4, lines 272–274. While this and the consideration of *cogitatio/mahashaba* are matters which Dr. Deirdre Dempsey and I intend to pursue in another article, it is worth noting here that the Text and Averroes' explanation of these three intellects are precisely in accord with the explanation in the *De Intellectu* attributed to Alexander, Bruns 106.19–110.3. Cf. Averroes' Comment at *Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle*, III 5, pp. 389–390.

⁹⁸ See Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes*, pp. 258–298.

found in Aristotle's Greek and arguably wider than what was in the original Arabic translation. While there is no indication in his philosophical accounts that his argumentation was controlled by that contaminated text of the *De Anima*, the circumstance of possessing an Arabic translation in which cogitation was found so broadly discussed may well have inspired Averroes to provide a more substantial and detailed account of his understanding of cogitation. But that is not necessary to explain his teachings. As we have seen, developments in the Greek commentary tradition already provided some foundation for such a doctrine as that of Averroes on cogitation. What seems to have had the greatest influence upon his understanding of cogitation is not merely the text he had before himself, but in fact the settling of his own mind regarding various complex questions concerning intellect and soul, especially in regard to the question of the nature of the Material Intellect in relation to human beings and the Agent Intellect. In that doctrine the cogitative power plays an essential part in the explanation of the role of human beings in the generation of intelligibles and in the subsequent human understanding of the world by means of the intelligibles, particularly in rational practical activities of various sorts bearing upon moral and intellectual perfection.⁹⁹

⁹⁹ I benefited from illuminating discussions with Alfred L. Ivry on the topic of cogitation in Averroes during the Cologne Symposium and also from discussion of the Hebrew text of the *De Anima* in subsequent letters, something I am pleased to acknowledge with thanks. I also later benefited from the critical comments of Herbert A. Davidson on this paper, something I am equally pleased to acknowledge with sincere thanks.

APPENDIX

- (1) I 74.6 (Crawford, p. 100): *ut cogitationem*
 DA 409b16: οἶον λογισμούς
 Bos p. 65 I.433: כמחשבה
 Badawi: الفكر
- (2) II 22.5–6 (p. 161): *in cogitatione ... a cogitare*
 DA 413b30–31: δοξαστικῶ ... τοῦ δοξάζειν
 Bos p. 77 line 96: בדעת עשיית הדעת
 Badawi: وبعضها مُرو
- (3a) II 32.4 (p. 177): *cogitationem / cognitionem* var.
 DA 415a8: λογισμὸν
 Bos p. 80 line 156: המחשבה
 Badawi: الفكر
- (3b) II 32.5 (p. 177): *cogitationem / cognitionem* var.
 DA 415a9: λογισμός
 Bos p. 80 line 157: מחשבה
 Badawi: الفكر
- (3c) II 32.5 (p. 177): *cogitationem / cognitionem* var.
 DA 415a10: λογισμός
 Bos p. 80 line 158: מחשבה
 Badawi: الفكر

Crawford declined to follow manuscript G which is more fully in accord with the Comment of Averroes. That the correct reading is *cogitationem*, not *cognitionem*, is confirmed by examination of the Greek and Hebrew.

- (4) III 5.4 (p. 387): *et dico intellectum illud per quod distinguimus et cogitamus*

- DA 429a23: λέγω δὲ νοῦν ᾧ διανοεῖται καὶ
ὑπολαμβάνει ἡ ψυχὴ
Bos p. 121 line 225–226: ... בשכל הדבר אשר בו נכיר /
בני אדם ונבדיל ...
Badawi: يتفكر به
- (5) III 33.7–9 (p. 474): *Cogitat enim quasi videret rem per modos
ymaginationis, et cogitatio eius in rebus fu-
turis est secundum res presentes.*
DA 431b6–8: ὅτε δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φαντάσμασιν
ἢ νοήμασιν, ὥσπερ ὁρῶν, λογίζεται
καὶ βουλευέται τὰ μέλλοντα πρὸς τὰ
παρόντα.
Bos p. 128 line 346: יחשוב
Bos p. 128 line 347: חולם
Badawi: ... صار إلى التفكير والارتياض فيما يأتى
وفىما حضر ...
- (6) III 36.2–3 (p. 479): ... *et cogitatio nostra in postremo erit ...*
DA 431b19: σκεπτέον ὕστερον
Bos p. 128 line 356: מחשב בתנו
Badawi: وسننظر أخيرا ...
- (7) III 42.8 (p. 510): *Principale enim existit in parte cogita-
tiva.*
DA 432b5: ἔν τε τῷ λογιστικῷ γὰρ ἡ βούλησις
γίνεται
Bos p. 130 line 396: ... בחלק המחשבי
Badawi: ... لأن الروية في الفكر ...
- (8a) III 46.1–3 (p. 513): *Sed illud quod movet neque est
pars cogitativa neque illa que dici-
tur intellectus. Pars enim cogitati-
va non videt illud quod facit ...*

DA 432b26–27:

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ λογιστικὸν
καὶ ὁ καλούμενος νοῦς ἐστίν
ὁ κινῶν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεωρητικὸς
οὐθὲν νοεῖ πρακτόν ...

Bos p. 131 lines 415, 416:

החלק המחשבי ... החלק
... המחשבי

Badawi:

وليس الفكر والعقل محرك الحيوان
حركة الانتقال، لأن النظر في
العقل ليس لعمل (#) ...

manuscript: بعمل

Note that the Hebrew is corrupt just as the Latin in repeating
החלק המחשבי *pars cogitativa* for ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεωρητικὸς.

Without mentioning his source, Averroes corrects this text in his
Comment at III 46.12 ff. using Themistius, Heinze 118.8–10, Lyons
217.9–12, where Themistius writes of the first theoretical intellect:
ἐπεὶ γὰρ διττὸς ὁ νοῦς, ὁ μὲν θεωρητικὸς οὐδὲν θεωρεῖ τῶν πρακτῶν
οὐδὲ περὶ φευκτοῦ καὶ ὀρεκτοῦ διανοεῖται ...

وليس أيضا النطقى الذى يقال له العقل هو المحرك فإن العقل ضربان
أحدهما نظرى والآخر عملى فأما النظرى فليس ينظر فى المعمولات
ولا يميز شيئا من أمر المهروب منه والمطلوب ...

Averroes also cites his alternate translation in his Comment at III
46.31–37 (pp. 514–515):

... Et demonstrat hoc quod invenimus in alia translatione,
scilicet: *multotiens cogitat intellectus in aliquo*
timoroso aut in aliquo delectabili, sed non propter hoc
erit timor aut delectatio; cor autem movetur motu timoris, {515}
sed non ex intellectu; et cum cogitaverit in aliquo
delectabili, tunc membrum aliud a corde movetur motu
delectationis.

“What we find in the other translation shows this, namely: *Frequent-
ly the intellect cogitates* (8b) *regarding something fearful or something*
desirable, but there will not be fear or desire on account of this. The heart,

however, is moved with the motion of fear {515} but not from the intellect. When it cogitates regarding something desirable (8c), then a member different from the heart is moved with the motion of desire.”

The corresponding Arabic in Badawi’s edition is:

وكثيراً ما يتفكر (#) العقل في شيء مخيف أو في شيء مُلذ فلا يكون الخوف عن أمر ولا للذة حركة؛ فإن القلب (##) يتحرك حركة الخوف — وليس ذلك عن العقل؛ وإذا تفكر في شيء (###) ملذ كان عضواً غير القلب المتحرك حركة اللذة.

manuscript: مما
manuscript: فما انقلب
manuscript: وملذ

The final part of this citation of the alternate translation corresponds to the beginning of III 47.1–4 (p. 515): *Et cum intellectus miserit et cogitatio affirmaverit fugere aliquid aut querere aliquid, non movebitur, sed facit illud quod convenit delectationi, sicut qui non potest se retinere.*

- | | | |
|------|--|--|
| (8b) | III 46.32 (p. 514):
DA 432b30
Badawi : | multotiens cogitat intellectus ...
πολλάκις διανοεῖται
(#) وكثيراً ما يتفكر |
| | # manuscript: | مما |
| (8c) | III 46.35 (p. 515):
DA 432b31–32:
Badawi, ed.: | cum cogitaverit in aliquo delectabili
διανοεῖται φοβερὸν τι ἢ ἡδύ
وإذا تفكر في شيء ملذ |

Note that this confirms the link of the Latin cogitare and the Arabic root *f-k-r* in the mind of the Latin translator since the extant Arabic of the alternate translation تفكر is rendered *cogitaverit* in

(8c) above. Note also that the text at (8b) cannot give evidence of this since Badawi had to restore it to يتفكر from the manuscript's مما .

- (9) III 47.1 (p. 515): *cogitatio*
 DA 433a2: τῆς διανοίας
 Bos p. 132 line III 422: המחשבה
 Badawi: <ولو رأى العقل وأمر الفكر بالطلب
 أو بالهرب (#)>

Badawi records the manuscript as reading القرب .

- (10) III 48.11 (p. 516): *alia enim animalia non habent existimationem neque cogitationem, sed ymaginationem.*
 DA 433a12–13: καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις οὐ νόησις
 οὐδὲ λογισμὸς ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ φαντασία
 Bos p. 132 line 431: . לא אמונה ולא מחשבה, אבל הדמיון .
 Badawi: (... في سائر الحيوان ليس الادراك إلا
 بالتوهم والفكر)

- (11a) III 49.1–2 (p. 516): *Et intellectus operativus (et est cogitans in re) differt a speculativo in perfectione*
 DA 433a14–15: νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἐνεκά του λογιζόμενος
 καὶ ὁ πρακτικὸς διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ
 θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει.
 Bos p. 133 line III 433: המחשב
 Badawi: العقل عقلاّن: عقل مفكر لعله ومن
 أجل شيء، وعقل عن تأمل؛ والفصل
 بينهما الابتداء من الغاية.

Note that in this case each Arabic translation is a possible render-

ing of the Greek, although the alternate Arabic (Badawi ed.) is more literal and less accurate in grasping the sense.

- (11b) III 49.7–9 (p. 517): ... *cogitatio apud actionem* ... *cogitatio movet* ...
 DA 433a18–19: διάνοια πρακτική ... ἡ διάνοια κινεῖ.
 Bos p. 133 lines 436–437: והאמונה אשר נוכח הפעולה. ... האמונה ...
 Badawi: ... وهما الشهوة والفكر العملى. والمطلوب المشتهى يحرك أيضا، <وما> من (#) أجله أن الفكر يحرك ...
 # manuscript: الشتهى يحرك أيضا من أجله أنه تتحرك المفكر والمشتهى ...

Note that διάνοια πρακτική is correctly rendered in the alternate translation (which Averroes does not consult here) as الفكر العملى, while the Latin and Hebrew both bear witness to a corrupt text of the Arabic tradition: והאמונה אשר נוכח הפעולה: *cogitatio apud actionem* *الفكر الفعلى

- (12a) III 50.8 (p. 518): *in cogitatione*
 DA 433a24: κατὰ τὸν λογισμὸν
 Bos p. 133 line 437: ... במחשבה ...
 Badawi ed.: العقل بالفكر
- (12b) III 50.10 (p. 518): *cogitationem*
 DA 433a25: τὸν λογισμὸν
 Bos p. 133 line 438: ... במחשבה ...
 Badawi ed.: فکر

- (13) III 52.5 (p. 521): *cogitantem*

- DA 433b3: βουλευτικόν
Bos p. 133 line 450: ... והמחלים ...
Badawi: قوة مروية
- (14) III 56.5 (p. 528): *cogitabile*
DA 433b29: λογιστικῇ
Bos p. 135 line 475: מחשביי
Badawi ed.: فكريًا
- (15a) III 57.2–4 (p. 529): *Virtus autem cogitativa est in rationalibus ... de actione cogitativa.*
DA 434a7: ἡ δὲ βουλευτικὴ ἐν τοῖς λογιστικοῖς ... λογισμοῦ ἥδη ἐστὶν ἔργον
Bos p. 135 line 483: הכח המיעץ
Bos p. 135 lines 484–485: הוא / מפעולת המחשבה
Badawi ed.: فالتوهم الحواسي، كالذى قيل،
 موجود في سائر الحيوان. وأما التوهم
 الذى يكون على الروية فإنما هو لذى
 النطق، فإن الاجتيار من فعل الفكر
- (15b) III 57.7 (p. 529): *Non enim habet cogitationem ...*
DA 434a11: καὶ αἴτιον τοῦτο τοῦ δόξαν μὴ
 δοκεῖν ἔχειν ...
Bos p. 135 line III 487: במחשבה
Badawi: وعلة ذلك أنه ليس له العزم
- (15c) III 57.10 (p. 529): *non habent virtutem cogitativam*
DA 434a11–12: τὸ βουλευτικὸν
Bos p. 135 line 488: הכח העצניי
Badawi: روية