

**OTTOMANS, HUNGARIANS, AND HABSBURGS  
IN CENTRAL EUROPE**

# THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND ITS HERITAGE

*Politics, Society and Economy*

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OTTOMANS, HUNGARIANS,  
AND HABSBURGS  
IN CENTRAL EUROPE

*The Military Confines in the Era of Ottoman Conquest*

EDITED BY

GÉZA DÁVID AND PÁL FODOR



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## CONTENTS

LIST OF MAPS .....	VII
NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND USAGE .....	VIII
PREFACE (PÁL FODOR) .....	IX
INTRODUCTION (GÉZA DÁVID and PÁL FODOR) .....	XI

### PART ONE: THE HUNGARIAN-HABSBURG FRONTIER

GÉZA PÁLFFY	The Origins and Development of the Border Defence System Against the Ottoman Empire in Hungary (Up to the Early Eighteenth Century) .....	3
ANDRÁS KUBINYI	The Battle of Szávaszentdemeter–Nagyolaszi (1523). Ottoman Advance and Hungarian Defence on the Eve of Mohács .....	71
JÓZSEF KELENIK	The Military Revolution in Hungary .....	117

### PART TWO: THE OTTOMAN FRONTIER

KLÁRA HEGYI	The Ottoman Network of Fortresses in Hungary ...	163
GÁBOR ÁGOSTON	The Costs of the Ottoman Fortress-System in Hungary in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries .....	195
PÁL FODOR	Making a Living on the Frontiers: Volunteers in the Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Army .....	229
GÉZA DÁVID	An Ottoman Military Career on the Hungarian Borders: Kasim <i>Voyvoda</i> , <i>Bey</i> , and <i>Pasha</i> .....	265
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY .....		299
INDEX .....		315



## LIST OF MAPS

1. The castles of the Croatian and Wendish-Bajcsavár confines in 1582 65
2. The castles of the Bajcsavár, Kanizsa, and Győr confines in 1582 67
3. The castles of the Mining Town's and Upper Hungarian confines in 1582 69
4. Southern Hungary at the end of the fifteenth century 82
5. The battle of Szávaszentdemeter, 1523 106
6. Ottoman fortresses in Hungary 173

## NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND USAGE

Modern Turkish spelling has been used throughout the volume save for the conventional sign for *'ain*.

Personal and place-names are given in their Hungarian forms with occasional rendering to their Ottoman versions. This practice may cause some trouble to the reader accustomed to English, German, and Ottoman place-names, but he can easily overcome these difficulties by resorting to the index where the corresponding Hungarian, Ottoman, Southern Slav, etc. forms are shown.

## PREFACE

This book is the fruit of a collective effort by Hungarian scholars specialising in Ottoman and Habsburg-Hungarian history of the fifteenth-seventeenth centuries.

The idea that experts of the two sides should work and publish together in English the results of their respective and complementary research into the conflict of the two great powers of the age, was raised in 1995. Two major considerations lay behind the formulation of such a plan. On the one hand, it was thought that a two-sided, collective approach could considerably contribute to a more realistic assessment of the significance of the Habsburg-Hungarian-Ottoman frontier. On the other hand, we realised that while Hungarian historians achieved a great progress in the study of the subject, due to linguistic barriers, their results mostly remained unnoticed or unknown in non-Hungarian scholarly literature.

In order to translate the idea into practice, a project has been launched at the Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences under the direction of Pál Fodor. With the participation of both Europeanists and Ottomanists, four thematic volumes have been produced in the second half of the nineties. The first of these is now published in this book and is concerned with the border defence systems established on the territory of Medieval Hungary in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The other three volumes will also be dealing with issues which were vital in the functioning of frontiers, including ransom slavery, information gathering and trade between the two worlds.

The project could not have been realised without the generous assistance of two Hungarian scholarly institutions. OTKA, Hungary's biggest scientific research foundation, has supplied considerable sums in the last four years thus enabling us to produce texts of acceptable standards in English and to employ competent professional editors. I am grateful to the foundation for their appreciation of our undertaking. The Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy not only provided the infrastructure to our work but its publishing section undertook to produce the camera-ready version of this volume. I would like to thank

Ferenc Glatz, President of the Hungarian Academy, Zoltán Szász, Director of the Institute of History, and Kornélia Burucs, the head of the editorial staff at the Institute and Attila Csányi, the technical editor for their wholehearted support. I express my gratitude to Andrew Gane, Judit Pokoly and Vera Kovács Fodor for their invaluable linguistic assistance.

My deepest thanks are due to my colleagues who spared no pains to complete their contributions in time and in the form required by the editors. I should also note that although I was in charge of the project, right at the early phases of it I asked Géza Dávid to collaborate in editing the material and preparing it for publication. The idea of inviting him came naturally as during an earlier project, when I was invited by him to participate, we could co-operate perfectly well together. Thus, in a sense, the present book can be regarded as a successor to our earlier collaborative work entitled *Hungarian-Ottoman Military and Diplomatic Relations in the Age of Süleyman the Magnificent* (Budapest, 1994).

At last but not least, we all (contributors and editors) are indebted to the Brill Publishing House and its series' editors of the 'Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage'; especially to Professor Suraiya Faroqhi who kindly undertook the painstaking work of commenting on our manuscript. We owe Trudy Kamperveen special thanks for her prompt and effective arrangements and proposals during the entire editorial process.

Budapest, March 2000

*Pál Fodor*

## INTRODUCTION

A little more than one hundred years have passed since Frederick J. Turner published his legendary essay on the role of the frontier in American history. Similarly to many other historians, Turner was not primarily interested in 'objective historical reality', but sought instead historical arguments for the emancipation of the West as it tried to find its identity and place against the East. This was how he realised the importance of the notion of the frontier. In his interpretation, the peculiarities of American life and political institutions did not grow out of Anglo-Saxon traditions, but from the borders of the American West. It was the conquest of free lands and the ensuing way of life that created American democracy, individualism, and specific American values. Here, in the western frontiers, Americans acquired their capability for continuous rebirth, and it was here, in the border areas, that the composite character of the American nation was forged.<sup>1</sup>

Turner's concept was repeatedly criticised from the 1930s onwards, but the frontier as a distinct social, political, and cultural space, which was worth being investigated *in se*, attracted increasing interest among both historians and social scientists. For a long time, emphasis was understandably laid on the dividing role of frontiers. For instance, Fernand Braudel, who regarded the Mediterranean as an area of cultural unity with distinctive traits, attached great importance to civilisational boundaries. In his opinion, a civilisation obtains its genuine character by preventing certain alien influences from crossing its borders and by adhering to its own forms of behaviour and mentality as determined by long-term structures.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Significance of Frontier in American History*. Madison, 1894. For an evaluation of Turner's concept, see *Turner and the Sociology of the Frontier*. Ed. by Richard Hofstadter and Seymour Martin Lipset. New York-London, 1968. Turner's views were succinctly summarised by Hofstadter: *ibid.*, 3-8.

<sup>2</sup> Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*. Vol. 2. New York-Hagestown-San Francisco-London, 1972, 757 ff. For several critical remarks of Braudel's frontier concept, see Francisco Bethencourt, "The Inquisition and the Religious Frontiers in Europe." Paper delivered at the conference *Frontiers of Faith. Religious Exchange and Constitution of Religious Identities, 1400-1750* held at the Central European University, Budapest, March 8-9, 2000 (forthcoming).

In recent decades, traditional views concerning the frontier have been fundamentally challenged. Instead of being seen as unchanging barriers over centuries, or as separating-integrating zones (Turner), frontiers are now considered to be areas of mediation, linkage, as well as confrontation, where an intensive exchange of cultural, ideological, religious, and commercial goods and men (i.e. renegades) takes place, and which are shifting continuously. Recently, the notion of frontier began to be applied to the analysis of the historical transformations of inner social boundaries and turned out to be particularly useful when describing the problems of minorities. Obviously, the tendency towards the relativisation of the notion of the frontier is strictly connected to the dominant ideas of our age. That the North African corsair states, for example, have become a favourite topic is hardly a mere coincidence. These peculiar frontier communities, situated on the margins of the great civilisations, are often regarded as holders and forerunners of values that stand in the centre of our post-modern and globalised world: otherness, religious tolerance (or even secularism), minority rights, self-government, and a free interplay between cultures and religions. The interest is justifiable, but the search for historical precedents is not without danger; it can easily lead to apologetical idealisation and to constructions which have little to do with one-time historical reality.<sup>3</sup>

Curiously enough, Ottoman historians discovered the significance of the frontier throughout early Ottoman history just as Turner's concept was beginning to incite heated debates. In the 1930s, two influential works were written on the rise of the Empire. Arguing along similar lines, the authors of the two books maintained that the Ottoman state had been established in a particular border milieu and by social groups whose developing ethos, culture, and social structure was quite different from that prevailing in the Islamic heartland.<sup>4</sup> While Paul Wittek identified the Islamic Holy War (*gaza*) and the *gazi* confederations committed to its precepts as the motivating force of this frontier society, Mehmed F. Köprülü saw population pressure and the state building capacity of the Muslim Turks as the ultimate reasons for the setting into motion of the

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<sup>3</sup> For a most alarming example, see Peter Lamborn Wilson's eulogy to the pirate state of Sale: *Pirate Utopias. Moorish Corsairs and European Renegades*. Brooklyn, 1995.

<sup>4</sup> Mehmed Fuad Köprülü, *Les origines de l'Empire ottoman*. (Études orientales, III.) Paris, 1935. Paul Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire*. London, 1938.

West-Anatolian marches. Wittek deduced the complete dynamics of early Ottoman history from a single dichotomy: the tension between the frontier dominated by *gazis* and the Orthodox imperial hinterland. Wittek thought that this theory satisfactorily explained even the fall of the Empire. For him, the Ottomans were forced from the stage of history because they abandoned the principle upon which the foundations of their state had been built: uninterrupted religious war against Christians.<sup>5</sup>

Although Wittek's ideas have been much criticised, the syncretic frontier character of the early Ottoman state has never been disputed, the only difference being the replacement of Muslim commitment and bands of *gazis* by booty and Turkish tribal warriors. The last synthesis which reassesses and in part reconciles the concepts of Wittek and Köprülü, describes the Ottoman frontier culture in a genuinely comprehensive way.<sup>6</sup> It emerges that the Muslim identity of the early Ottomans did not exclude tolerance. Free passage and an acceptance of foreigners were concomitants of life on the marches. Despite religious differences, a similar code of behaviour or honour regulated the attitudes of people living on both sides of the Ottoman-Byzantine borders. The frontier was a melting pot where accommodation, symbiosis, and religious syncretism coexisted with militancy and religious idealism.<sup>7</sup>

The original Ottoman 'frontier state' had become divided into two larger structural entities by the seventies of the fourteenth century. On the core territories, the dynasty built out an imperial type, centralised administration which relied upon completely new sorts of institutions (tax on prisoners [*pençik*], janissaries, *kadiasker*, *beylerbeyi*, etc.) and the Muslim Orthodoxy. Meanwhile, the former allies of the ruling group were driven to the confines, where the first so-called frontier lordships (*uc beyliğis*) began to be organised at this time (at least in the Balkans).<sup>8</sup> Due to the

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<sup>5</sup> Cf. Colin Imber, "Paul Wittek's 'De la défaite d'Ankara à la prise de Constantinople'," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* 5 (1986) 65-81.

<sup>6</sup> Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds. The Construction of the Ottoman State*. Berkeley-Los Angeles-London, 1995. This work gives a complete overview of the historiography of the question.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 79 ff. especially 84 and 89. Cf. Michel Balivet, *Romanie byzantine et pays de Rum turc. Histoire d'un espace d'imbrication gréco-turque*. Istanbul, 1994.

<sup>8</sup> On these, see Halil İnalcık, "Ottoman Methods of Conquest," *Studia Islamica* 2 (1954) 104-129. *Idem*, "The Rise of the Ottoman Empire," in *A History of the Ottoman Empire to 1730*. Edited by M. A. Cook. Cambridge-London-New York-Melbourne, 1976, 31-34, 36-37. Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, "En marge d'un acte concernant le *pençik* et les *aqınğı*," *Revue des Études Islamiques* 37 (1969) 26-43.

conquests, these border areas were pushed incessantly north- and westwards, and thus even further from the centre. As a result, traditional social strata and values could survive for a while. However, after the mid-fifteenth century, the centre gradually abolished the relative autonomies of these regions. In this way, the last third of the fifteenth century saw the emergence of the border defence systems that gave rise to similar structures in the classical sixteenth century, such as the Ottoman confines in Hungary.

In the course of the fifteenth century, Hungary came to be one of the strongest military rivals of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. Hungarian defence, which was being organised more and more systematically, slowed down Ottoman expansion considerably and after 1464, the division of Bosnia between the two powers, brought it to a complete halt. This state of affairs induced the Ottoman leadership to incorporate its own marches more tightly into the empire's military organisation and to prepare them for the tasks of defence without lessening their original offensive potential. The reorganisation was necessary because one of the most important elements of border warfare was to make incursions into the enemy's territories and to plunder the surroundings of fortresses, and the Hungarian troops were just as capable of such actions as the *akıncıs* of the other side. After the conquest of Serbia in 1459 and the southern parts of Bosnia in 1463-1464, the Ottomans based their defence system on the network of forts consisting of captured and newly built facilities (e.g. Jajce) in the two countries, on the mobile forces of the *sancaks* established there, and on the flotillas fitted out on the rivers.<sup>9</sup> Raids and (in the case of the Hungarian incursions) defence were led by the district governors (*sancakbeyis*) of two large districts located along the confines, Semendire (Smederovo/Végszendrő) and Bosna. The holders of these offices were usually nominated from among the most

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<sup>9</sup> Hazim Šabanović, "Vojno uredjenje Bosne od 1463. do kraja XVI stoljeća," *Godišnjak društva istoričara Bosne i Hercegovine* 11 (1960) 173-223. Olga Zirojević, *Tursko vojno uredjenje u Srbiji (1459-1683)*. (Istorijski Institut, 18.) Beograd, 1974. Milan Vasić, *Martolosi u jugoslovenskim zemljama pod turskom vladavinom*. Sarajevo, 1967. Ferenc Szakály-Pál Fodor, "A kenyérmezei csata (1479. október 13.) [The Battle of Kenyérmező, October 13, 1479]," *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 111:2 (1998) 311-314.

capable *akıncı* commanders such as the Mihaloğlus and the Malkoçoğlus, who for a long time were therefore given the title of *uc beyi*, as well.<sup>10</sup>

The relative military equilibrium between Hungary and the Ottoman state had been upset by the early sixteenth century and the Ottoman Empire, now a super power, gained definite ascendancy over its rival. The shift in the balance of power was clearly demonstrated by events in 1512 during which the Ottomans succeeded in carving out a large section of the Hungarian southern line of defence for the first time since 1464.<sup>11</sup> In 1520 Süleyman ascended to the throne and decided to launch a general assault on Hungary (and the West). Within just a few years, the Ottoman army had occupied all the main fortresses of the southern defence zone, including Belgrade (1521), the key to the whole system.<sup>12</sup>

In 1526, the Ottomans won a decisive victory over the Hungarians in the battle of Mohács and took the Syrmium (Sirem) region into their possession. Since the Hungarian ruler died in the clash, the estates had to elect a new king. Being unable to agree upon the person, one party elevated János Szapolyai (1526) to the throne, and the other party Ferdinand I of Habsburg (1527). Reassessing the new situation, in the following one and a half decades the Ottomans attempted to consolidate their rule in the whole of Hungary in part by launching campaigns against the Habsburgs (1529, 1532) and in part by allying themselves with János Szapolyai whose Hungarian Kingdom they reduced to vassalage. Since these efforts produced few results, in 1541 they decided to take control of the Hungarian capital Buda and to renew the wars against the Habsburg central lands. But the Ottoman troops were unable to march

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<sup>10</sup> M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, "Mihal-oğulları," in *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*. Vol. 8. Istanbul, 1979,<sup>3</sup> 285-292. Franz Babinger, "Beiträge zur Geschichte des Geschlechtes der Malkoç-oghlu's," in *idem*, Aufsätze und Abhandlungen zur Geschichte Südosteuropas und der Levante. Bd. I. München, 1962. 355-369. Olga Ziroyeviç, "Der Sandschakbey von Smederevo Ali-Bey Mihaloğlu," in *VII. Türk Tarih Kongresi. Ankara: 25-29 Eylül 1970. Kongreye sunulan bildiriler. (Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınlarından IX/7<sup>a</sup>.)* Vol. II. Ankara, 1973, 567-577.

<sup>11</sup> Szakály Ferenc, "Nándorfehérvár 1521-es ostromához. Egy királyi adománylevél köztörténeti tanulságai [On the Siege of Nándorfehérvár in 1521]," *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 25 (1978) 484-499. *Idem*, "Phases of Turco-Hungarian Warfare before the Battle of Mohács (1365-1526)," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 33 (1979) 102-103.

<sup>12</sup> For this and what follows, see Gyula Káldy-Nagy, "Suleimans Angriff auf Europa," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 28:2 (1974) 163-212. Pál Fodor, "Ottoman Policy towards Hungary, 1520-1541," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 45:2-3 (1991) 271-345. Gábor Barta, *La route qui mène à Istanbul*. (Studia Historica, 195.) Budapest, 1994. Ferenc Szakály, *Lodovico Gritti in Hungary 1529-1534. A Historical Insight into the Beginnings of Turco-Habsburgian Rivalry*. (Studia Historica, 197.) Budapest, 1995.

until Vienna again, and could not subdue the whole of Hungary. Northern and western Hungary remained under the rule of the Habsburgs (as Hungarian kings), and came to be denoted as 'Royal Hungary' by the contemporaries. In the eastern parts of Hungary the Principality of Transylvania came into being, which was a vassal of the Ottoman Empire, though it retained its independence in domestic affairs, and at the beginning was governed by the Szapolyai family and by some pro-Ottoman magnates (like Péter Petrovics and George Martinuzzi). Only the middle parts of the country were occupied by the Ottomans, where they established themselves and implanted their own institutions. The adversaries soon created their respective border defence systems consisting of hundreds of fortresses. However, the frontiers between the three 'countries' never became stiffened because the Ottomans made repeated efforts to expand their dominion. They succeeded in creating new provinces (*vilayets*) both in the sixteenth and in the seventeenth centuries (1552: Temesvár; 1596: Eger, 1660: Várad, 1663: Újvár), but the tripartite division of Hungary remained virtually unchanged during the whole period. In reality, the Ottoman government acknowledged this state of affairs as early as in 1547 when in the peace treaty concluded with the Habsburgs they *de facto* accepted the rule of Ferdinand I in Royal Hungary.<sup>13</sup>

In earlier periods the Hungarian lines of defence had largely followed the Danube-Sava line, but after the middle of the sixteenth century the Hungarian and Ottoman defence zones were to be found in the heart of medieval Hungarian territory. The frontier extended from the Maros-Temes region in the east, across the northern edge of the Great Plain, central and south-western Transdanubia, Slavonia, and Croatia, to the Dalmatian coast in the south-west. Several hundred kilometres in length, the semicircular line of fortifications formed arguably one of the most important sections of the Islamic-Christian frontier that stretched from the Pontic steppes to northern Africa. At any rate, the figures show that the two competing military machines were at their most extensive on the Hungarian stretch of this long frontier. The defence systems were well-organised and highly durable. A great number of soldiers were employed in the area by both sides and expenses were correspondingly high. In the 1520s, the total number of Ottoman soldiers stationed in the

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<sup>13</sup> Cf. Ernst Dieter Petritsch, "Der Habsburgisch-osmanische Friedensvertrag des Jahres 1547," *Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchiv* 38 (1985) 49-80.

Balkan fortresses (including guards manning the forts on the Hungarian border) was approximately 27,000.<sup>14</sup> Soon, however, 18,000 Ottoman soldiers stood guard in Hungary alone, i.e. to the north of the Danube-Drava line, and this number increased to 19,000 in the seventeenth century.<sup>15</sup> Together with the *timar*-holders and the irregular units, Ottoman forces in Hungary numbered almost 30,000 men. If we add to this number approximately 10,000 Ottoman fortress soldiers and 3-4,000 *sipahis* stationed in the *vilayet* of Bosnia, we find that total Ottoman forces in Central Europe numbered almost 50,000. The figures on the Habsburg side—albeit somewhat more modest than those on the Ottoman side—are similarly impressive: for instance, in the middle of the sixteenth century, we find about 16-17,000 cavalry and infantry soldiers stationed in the approximately 120 Habsburg border fortresses located between the Adriatic coast in the west and the Transylvanian border in the east. About 80 per cent of these forces were employed on the Hungarian section of the frontier, i.e. to the north of river Drava. Together with the insurgent armies of the Hungarian and Croatian nobles and the private armies of the Hungarian and Croatian magnates, total Habsburg forces must have numbered more than 30,000 men. The sums of money spent on the two opposing armies also demonstrate the outstanding significance of this section of the frontier. These expenses were so great that on the Habsburg side all the resources of Central Europe had to be mobilised for a period of one and a half centuries. The Austrian Hereditary Lands, Moravia, Bohemia, and the Holy Roman Empire provided one and a half million Rhenish forints annually for the soldiers' salaries and other military expenses.<sup>16</sup> Meanwhile, for most of the sixteenth century, the Ottomans supplemented insufficient local revenues with large transfers from the central treasury. And in the seventeenth century the Ottoman Empire was required to spend a significant part of its Balkan tax revenues on maintaining its military positions in Hungary.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "H. 933-934 (M. 1527-1528) malî yılına ait bir bütçe örneği," *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 15:1-4 (1954) 281-296.

<sup>15</sup> Klára Hegyi, "Ottoman Military Force in Hungary," in *Hungarian-Ottoman Military and Diplomatic Relations in the Age of Süleyman the Magnificent*. Ed. by Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor. Budapest, 1994, 143, 146.

<sup>16</sup> See Pálffy's study in the present volume.

<sup>17</sup> Klára Hegyi, *Török berendezkedés Magyarországon [Ottoman Rule in Hungary]*. (História könyvtár, Monográfiák, 7.) Budapest, 1995, 46-47. See also Ágoston's contribution in the present volume.

However, it was not only the number of soldiers deployed (and the amount of money spent) in the area that transformed the Hungarian front into one of the most important military arenas of the period. Another contributing factor was the quality of the forces concentrated in the area. With its standing troops, excellent logistics, and relatively uniform military command, the Ottoman Empire had perhaps the most efficient army in the world. Indeed, at the beginning of the conflict, the military and logistical strength of the Ottomans was considerably superior to that of the Habsburgs. However, the Habsburgs improved in the course of the fights of subsequent decades, and in the second half of the sixteenth century it was they who took up the initiative by introducing elements of the so-called 'military revolution' to the Hungarian theatre of war. By the end of the century the Habsburgs had surpassed the Ottomans in the application of the new fortification techniques and the mass use of hand firearms. Moreover, the Habsburgs also undertook the modernisation of their military administration. Together with other improvements, these innovations were enough to equal out the numerical and logistical superiority of the adversary and to prevent further Ottoman expansion in Central Europe. Habsburg modernisation attempts also had a substantial effect on the Ottomans, who recognised the necessity of equipping their soldiers with small arms and of increasing the relative size of the infantry within the army. Thus, the Hungarian front may be regarded as one of the main areas of military acculturation and transfer in the period. In addition to direct military engagement and the taking of booty, an important role in this process was also played by smuggling.<sup>18</sup>

Developments in the military field also had a decisive effect on the political fate of Central Europe. The experience gained by the Austrian Habsburgs in the construction and maintenance of defence systems, including the establishment of new military institutions and a permanent

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<sup>18</sup> Gábor Ágoston, "Habsburgs and Ottomans: Defense, Military Change and Shifts in Power," *The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 22:1 (1998) 126-141. Lajos Gecsényi, "Az Edlasperg-ügy. A magyar kereskedők bécsi kapcsolatai a 16. század első felében [The Edlasperg Affair: The Vienna's Connections of Hungarian Merchants in the First Half of the Sixteenth Century]," *Történelmi Szemle* 35:3-4 (1993) 279-295. Gábor Ágoston, "Koraújkori kiviteli tilalmak és fegyverkereskedelem: az oszmánok és Anglia [Early-Modern Age Embargo and Weapon Trade: The Ottoman Empire and England]," in *In memoriam Barta Gábor. Tanulmányok Barta Gábor emlékére*. Ed. by István Lengvári. Pécs, 1996, 183-194. See also J. Kelenik's article in this volume.

army, continuously expanded their room for manoeuvre. This process culminated in the establishment of the unified Habsburg Empire in Central Europe at the beginning of the eighteenth century. One is tempted to say that without the Ottomans, the Habsburg Monarchy might never have become such an influential political entity: since, on the one hand, the modern institutions of the absolutist Habsburg government of the eighteenth century evolved—almost without exception—out of the military and financial apparatus of the previous two centuries; on the other hand, by sustaining the feeling that the whole region was under threat, the military activity of the Ottomans and their repeated attempts to achieve further territorial expansion helped to establish an imperial structure that transcended the old national framework.<sup>19</sup> Last but not least, the Turkish threat also had a decisive influence on the identity of the new great power. The need to take a stand against Islam as the religion of the enemy could be used by the Habsburg empire builders both as a legitimation of their own (Catholic-based) confessional absolutism and as an element in the construction of a historical mission for the Empire.<sup>20</sup>

Regardless of the numbers of soldiers guarding the frontier and the sums spent on defence, the two opposing defence systems in Hungary could never become impenetrable walls. Troops setting out on raids or in order to tax defenceless villages could always find gaps through which they could pass into the territories of the adversary. The Hungarians, who had been forced into three different states, also had little regard for the boundaries. The Hungarian population of Royal Hungary, the Principality of Transylvania, and Ottoman Hungary considered the Ottomans to be no less than intruders. As time passed, the economic and cultural contacts they established with each other became so close that they could state with good reason that they lived in three countries but in one fatherland (*patria*). None the less, the Habsburg-Hungarian-Ottoman frontier may not be classified as an open frontier. Apart from the exchange of military technology and a certain amount of material

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<sup>19</sup> Cf. John Elliott, "Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry: The European Perspective," in *Süleymân the Second and His Time*. Ed. by Halil İnalçık and Cemal Kafadar. Istanbul, 1993, 162.

<sup>20</sup> Maximilian Grothaus, "Zum Türkenbild in der Kultur der Habsburgermonarchie zwischen dem 16. und 18. Jahrhundert," in *Habsburgisch-osmanische Beziehungen*. Wien, 26.-30. September 1983. *Colloque sous le patronage du Comité international des études pré-ottomanes et ottomanes*. Hrsg. von Andreas Tietze. Wien, 1985, 67-89.

acculturation, the Christian and Muslim sides had little effect upon one another. Compared with other frontier zones, the number of converts in Central Europe was insignificant—the number of Hungarian renegades was particularly low.<sup>21</sup> The Habsburgs almost completely refused to allow Muslim and Serb merchants (the latter being regarded as allies of the former) to enter their territory. Meanwhile the Turks were equally hostile towards arrivals from Habsburg lands.<sup>22</sup> Thus, for a while, Hungarians living in the Ottoman territories acted as intermediaries. But such Hungarians remained very much part of the Christian cultural community—in part out of fear of the compelling force of Royal Hungary. The Ottomans and their (mostly Orthodox) fellow-travellers from the Balkans were similarly averse to the influences of Latin (Catholic) Central Europe. Thus, though far from closed in a military sense, in civilisational terms the frontier zone in Hungary proved to be rather impermeable. The Ottomans ruled a large part of Hungary for more than one hundred and fifty years, and yet they left little behind them when they were driven out, except for a number of characteristic food and clothing items, embroidery patterns, musical motifs and instruments, and buildings.<sup>23</sup>

Given the importance of these border defence systems, it is quite natural that historians from the countries affected (Austria, Croatia, Hungary, Slovenia) considered it important to study them as early as the second half of the nineteenth century. In the course of their research, they collected together a great amount of information and data. However, this knowledge has been unevenly integrated into international scholarship. While numerous monographs in German, Croatian or English have been published on the Croatian-Slavonian section of the Habsburg defence system,<sup>24</sup> we still have no such comprehensive work on the important

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<sup>21</sup> Klára Hegyi, "Etnikum, vallás, iszlamizáció: a budai vilájet várkatonaságának eredete és utánpótlása [Ethnic Groups, Religion, and Islamisation: The Origins and Replacement of Ottoman Garrison Soldiers in the Province of Buda]," *Történelmi Szemle* 40:3-4 (1998) 229-256.

<sup>22</sup> Ferenc Szakály, *Gazdasági és társadalmi változások a török hódítás árnyékában* [Economic and Social Changes During the Ottoman Conquest]. (História könyvtár. Előadások a történettudomány műhelyeiből, 5.) Budapest, 1994, 13.

<sup>23</sup> Klára Hegyi, *Egy világbirodalom végvidékén* [On the Frontier of a World-Empire]. Budapest, 1975, 262-277.

<sup>24</sup> The most important works are enumerated in note 1 of Pálffy's article. Research on the so-called 'triple frontier area' (*Triplex Confinium*) between the Venetian Republic, the Ottoman Empire, and the Habsburg Monarchy has been performed within the framework of a multinational and interdisciplinary project since 1997; see Drago Roksandić, *The Triplex Confinium. International Research Project: Objectives, Approaches and Methods*. Budapest, 1998.

Hungarian segment. Although there is a huge Hungarian literature (including some monographs) on the field battles and castle sieges fought by the Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs, and on elements of the Habsburg defence system, much of this material is available only in Hungarian and is therefore inaccessible to scholars unfamiliar with this language.<sup>25</sup> We should perhaps mention, as an exception, a collective volume edited by János M. Bak and Béla K. Király and incorporating a series of articles with information on the findings of Hungarian historians.<sup>26</sup> The situation is no better as regards our knowledge of the Ottoman frontier area. It is only in the last two decades that scholars have begun to address this issue in a systematic way and using Turkish archival sources. Thus, despite a certain amount of progress, a general monograph is still a long way off.<sup>27</sup>

Without doubt a considerable number of mistaken or baseless assumptions have been circulating in the non-Hungarian scholarly

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<sup>25</sup> To mention some of the new works in this field: Géza Pálffy, *Katonai igazságszolgáltatás a királyi Magyarországon a XVI-XVII. században* [Military Jurisdiction in Habsburg-Hungary in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries]. Győr, 1995. *Idem*, *A császárváros védelmében. A győri főkapitányság története 1526-1598* [In Defence of the Imperial City. A History of the Captaincy-General of Győr 1526-1598]. Győr, 1999. *Idem*, *Európa védelmében. Haditérképészet a Habsburg Birodalom magyarországi határvidékén a 16-17. században* [In Defence of Europe. Military Cartography on the Hungarian Frontier of the Habsburg Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries]. Second, revised and enlarged edition. Pápa, 2000.

<sup>26</sup> *From Hunyadi to Rákóczi. War and Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Hungary*. (War and Society in Eastern Central Europe, 3; Eastern European Monographs, 104.) Ed. by János M. Bak and Béla K. Király. Brooklyn, 1982.

<sup>27</sup> For the most comprehensive description of the Ottoman defence system, see Hegyi, *Török berendezkedés*, 81-117. Cf. Lajos Fekete, *Buda and Pest Under Turkish Rule*. (Studia Turco-Hungarica, 3.) Ed. by Gy. Káldy-Nagy. Budapest, 1976, 13-22. For a general assessment, see Ágoston, "Habsburgs and Ottomans," 126-141. For the administration and payment of Ottoman garrison soldiers, see Claudia Römer, *Osmanische Festungsbesatzungen in Ungarn zur Zeit Muráds III. Dargestellt anhand von Petitionen zur Stellenvergabe*. (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse. Schriften der Balkan-Kommission, Philologische Abteilung, 35.) Wien, 1995. and Klaus Schwarz, *Osmanische Sultansurkunden. Untersuchungen zur Einstellung und Besoldung osmanischer Militärs in der Zeit Muráds III.* (Freiburger Islamstudien, 17.) Aus dem Nachlass hrsg. von Claudia Römer. Stuttgart, 1997. On some aspects of sixteenth-century Ottoman-Hungarian relations, see the studies published in the volume entitled *Hungarian-Ottoman Military and Diplomatic Relations in the Age of Süleyman the Magnificent*. For a register of Ottoman castle guards in the province of Buda, see *Ottoman Garrisons on the Middle Danube (Based on Austrian National Library MS MXT 562 of 956/1549-1550)*. Transcribed into regular Arabic script and translated by Asparuch Velkov and Evgeniy Radushev. With an introduction by Strashimir Dimitrov. Budapest, 1996. For the maintenance of the Ottoman fortresses and

literature about the defence system to the north of the Danube-Drava line. The primary responsibility for this, however, rests with Hungarian historians, in part because they have not made their findings available (Habsburg-Hungarian side), and in part because they still have to clear up a number of important problems (Ottoman side). As a result, some of the most important issues have been raised by researchers with no knowledge of the Hungarian language and the peculiarities of the region who could not place the whole phenomenon in a proper historical setting. By way of example, William McNeill's book can be mentioned, which for many years was considered standard reading at American universities, and which is still cited by some today.<sup>28</sup> McNeill, who seems to have been completely ignorant of the structural differences between Central and Eastern Europe in the late medieval period,<sup>29</sup> considered fifteenth-seventeenth-century Hungarian society to have been of the same semi-nomadic and predatory mold as the Crimean Khanate. Based on this strange assumption, he created an imaginary Danubian and Pontic Europe with relatively uniform characteristics, as well as a Danubian and Pontic frontier zone, whose shared fate was incorporation—by 1800—into one of the so-called great agricultural (Habsburg, Ottoman, and Russian) empires.<sup>30</sup> Perhaps even more surprising than the blatant factual and conceptional errors of the book (e.g. errors concerning standards of Hungarian agriculture, the nature of Hungarian civilisation and nobility, and developments in Transylvania<sup>31</sup>) is the fact that McNeill's views provoked little real criticism in Hungary. A similar lack of comprehension with regard to the Hungarian border region marks the work of one of the main theorists of the military revolution, Geoffrey Parker. Showing little knowledge of the region, Parker defined warfare along the border

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certain local military elements, see Pál Fodor, "Bauarbeiten der Türken an den Burgen von Ungarn im 16.-17. Jahrhundert," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 35:1 (1981) 55-88. *Idem*, "The Way of a Seljuq Institution to Hungary: the *cerehâr*," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 38:3 (1984) 367-399. *Idem*, "Das Wilajet von Temeschwar zur Zeit der osmanischen Eroberung," *Südost-Forschungen* 55 (1996) 25-44. For further items, see the selected bibliography.

<sup>28</sup> William McNeill, *Europe's Steppe Frontier 1500-1800*. Chicago and London, 1964.

<sup>29</sup> On this, see Jenő Szűcs, *Les trois Europes*. Préface de Fernand Braudel. Traduit par Véronique Charaire, Gábor Klaniczay, Philippe Thureau-Dangin. Paris, 1985.

<sup>30</sup> McNeill, *op. cit.*, 13.

<sup>31</sup> McNeill considers Transylvania to have been the most European part of Hungary at the time, whereas in actual fact it was always the least developed region of the country.

as skirmishes between cattle-thieves and slavemongers.<sup>32</sup> The latest general work, Rhoads Murphy's *Ottoman Warfare*, pioneering in many respects, offers a more balanced account. Nevertheless, it too contains a number of disputable statements. While in accordance with the views of the present writers, he accepts that the Ottomans gave "particular emphasis to their frontiers with Europe" and that their border system in Hungary "persistently claimed the lion's share of Ottoman resources and attention of efforts",<sup>33</sup> Murphy seems to misinterpret the *raison d'être* and the real foundation of the Ottoman military establishment in Hungary. He argues that the Ottomans followed "restricted political objectives—confined essentially to protecting the status of central Hungary as a buffer zone offering protection against further Habsburg expansion to the east".<sup>34</sup> In the light of military events in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, during which each consecutive conflict (except for the attempts of the Habsburgs to occupy Transylvania in 1551-1552 and 1600-1604) grew out of Ottoman plans for expansion and attack, and in the knowledge that the Habsburgs adopted defence as their official strategy after 1577, it seems strange indeed to read such counter-factual views.

The above comments were made in order to demonstrate how much still needs to be done by scholars researching the Hungarian section of the Habsburg-Ottoman defence systems. This volume may represent a further step in this endeavour. To borrow a term from the field of linguistics, the aim of the authors is to present readers with a contrastive study. The first half of the volume (The Habsburg-Hungarian Frontier) contains three studies concerning various aspects of the Hungarian and Habsburg-Hungarian military border organisation. In his study, Géza Pálffy makes a first attempt to describe the development of this complicated structure from its beginnings in the fourteenth century to the establishment of the *Militärgrenze* in the early eighteenth century. Applying a new periodisation, Pálffy demonstrates the management and financing of the Hungarian border system in the fifteenth century, subsequent changes in the system implemented by the Habsburgs (including the financial and military role of the Austrian Hereditary

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<sup>32</sup> Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution. Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800*. Cambridge, 1988, 35-37.

<sup>33</sup> Rhoads Murphy, *Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700*. London, 1999, XVII.

<sup>34</sup> Murphey, *op. cit.*, 2.

Lands and the Holy Roman Empire), and the establishment—following a prudent compromise—of a dualistic power structure. This allowed the Habsburg imperial centre to assert its will, while leaving some room for action on the part of the Hungarian estates. As a result of this favourable arrangement, and despite the considerable material burden placed on Central Europe, the new border defence system constructed in the second half of the sixteenth century served as an excellent ‘bulwark of Christianity’ (*propugnaculum Christianitatis*) for a period of a century and a half. A completely new situation arose at the beginning of the eighteenth century. After the Habsburg victory over the Ottomans, the imperial court felt strong enough to do without the assistance of the Hungarians. Thus, fully ignoring the Hungarian estates, it established the so-called Military Frontier (*Militärgrenze*) on the southern borders of Hungary, and placed the whole area under the sole direction of the Aulic War Council. The Military Frontier was then settled with southern Slav refugees.

After Pálffy’s long-term survey, the author of the next article, András Kubinyi, concerns himself with a shorter time period, examining the issues of Hungarian defence between 1521 and 1526. With reference to a clash of seemingly local importance, he examines the last great attempts of the Hungarian state to increase its room for manoeuvre by reorganising the defence of the southern border and by launching an offensive against the Ottoman Empire. It may seem surprising to many that Kubinyi chose this period and these events as his subject rather than the well-known battle of Mohács in 1526. Nevertheless, the description he provides—based upon his archival research—clearly shows that the contest between the Ottomans and the Hungarians was decided during the years preceding Mohács rather than at Mohács itself. Although the clash at Szávaszentdemeter and Nagyolaszi in Syrmium ended in an overwhelming Hungarian victory (which led the sultan to have his brother-in-law, Ferhad pasha, executed), the resources of the Hungarians had been exhausted. The best Hungarian defence forces had fallen in battle, and the treasury had been thoroughly run down. Moreover, it was now quite obvious that the country could not count upon the support of other Christian states. This last victory—and the costs of such a victory—made defeat at Mohács inevitable.

The author of the third article, József Kelenik, chooses the effects of the ‘military revolution’ in Hungary as the subject of his inquiry. This issue is important because leading military historians tend to ignore the

Hungarian theatre of war when discussing the new methods of warfare (i.e. the sharp increase in the number and significance of firearms, the greater reliance on the artillery, the declining use of pikemen, a massive rise in the number of troops, *trace italienne*, etc.). Some, for instance Murphy, even deny the revolutionary character of these phenomena.<sup>35</sup> Examining the contracts of mercenaries in the so-called 'Long War' (1593-1606), Kelenik proves that the Habsburg troops' armament (small arms, artillery, etc.) and battle processes were among the most advanced of the period. Indeed, Hungary may be regarded as one of the places where the military revolution was born or first appeared.

The second part of the volume is dedicated to the Ottoman frontier. On the basis of Ottoman pay lists and *timar defteris* stemming from the period between 1543 and 1620, Klára Hegyi attempts, for the first time, to reconstruct the Ottoman network of fortresses, as well as the composition and size of the military units stationed in these strongholds. She outlines the principles followed by the Ottomans in the construction of their defence system, examining in detail the factors that gave rise to the establishment of new fortresses. She demonstrates the conscious manner in which the Ottomans—as they progressed from the border towards the interior of the territory—developed their complex fortress system, ensuring the presence in each stronghold of a military force that was commensurate with the strategic significance of the locality. The Ottomans made great efforts to erect strongholds and harbours along the military road beside the Danube which were not further than one day's march from one another, and to construct an effective ring of defence around the provincial centre of Buda. She points out that the Ottomans were quite capable of restructuring the whole system, if required to do so by the military situation or some other circumstances. An inventory containing the locations of all the fortresses in a given region and the numbers of paid troops stationed in them may be found in the appendix to her article.

Closely connected to the above works is Gábor Ágoston's analysis of the costs of the Ottoman presence and establishment in Hungary. Similarly to the Habsburgs, the Ottomans found that the greatest burden was payment of the soldiers. The prevalent view among scholars was that Ottoman Hungary produced constant financial deficit which could

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<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 105-115.

be offset only through the assistance of the centre. However, employing an analysis of the treasury accounts of the provinces, Ágoston reveals that the situation was far from being static. While the early decades of Ottoman rule were undeniably characterised by budgetary deficit, the situation improved after the consolidation of the administration by Sokollu Mustafa and Kara Üveys pasha. Indeed, by the 1570s, the region had become self-sufficient. At around this time, efficiency was greater on the Ottoman than on the Habsburg side. In the mid-1580s, however, the equilibrium was broken once again, and it was never re-established. The 'Long War' exhausted local resources, and in the seventeenth century a substantial part of tax revenues from the northern and central Balkans had to be transferred to the region. A more difficult task is to measure the amounts spent on the maintenance of the fortresses and on ammunition and food supplies. Ágoston concludes that although the costs of the maintenance of the Hungarian provinces imposed a heavy burden on the central treasury, this was smaller than that placed on the Habsburgs. None of this represents a unique phenomenon in world history: the defence of borders is accompanied everywhere by extra spending.

While Hegyi and Ágoston concentrate on the geographical distribution and financing of the Ottoman forces, Pál Fodor addresses the problems of manpower policies of the Ottomans. As is well-known, the resource potential of the empire and the military force that it was capable of mobilising differed considerably,<sup>36</sup> but the latter is very difficult to determine on the basis of available sources. This is especially true in the case of volunteers, who were strongly attracted by the peculiar circumstances of the borders. The volunteers sought to become members of the Ottoman military establishment by proving their prowess. For its part, the state encouraged them by holding out the promise of prebends and military posts. Many volunteers flocked to the border districts, thereby greatly adding to the numbers of Ottoman soldiers. It is this relatively unknown potential that is examined by Fodor. Reviewing the possible sources of manpower, he discovers six categories yielding volunteers in the largest numbers. He then reveals the position of the administration with regard to these categories, demonstrating the manner in which the officials differentiated between those who came from the status group of

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<sup>36</sup> Cf. R. Murpehy's remarks advising caution in this respect, *op. cit.*, 35-36.

the traditional *sipahi* and janissary classes, and other men who were termed *garib yiğits*. He describes in detail how the volunteers were enlisted, employed, and rewarded. Finally, by analysing a register of grants relating to a war involving the Ottomans in Transylvania in 1575, he concludes that the average rate of volunteers in the Ottoman armies was at least twenty per cent.

Albeit a number of factors indicate that the Ottoman system was far less meritocratic than is often thought, in the border districts the military command did place great value on aptitude and performance. In these areas, men of low rank could rise to great heights, remaining in responsible positions for unusually long periods. One such man was Kasım, the hero of Géza Dávid's study, who spent his whole life in the Ottoman-Hungarian border region. He started his career as a unit commander in Eszék, belonging to the retinue of the famous Yahya-paşaoglu Mehmed *bey* in the rank of *voyvoda*. Between 1530-1541, as commissary and mediator of the Ottomans, he took part in several important military and diplomatic missions. For example, shortly after the capture of Buda in 1541, he accompanied the Habsburg envoys to the sultan, an indication of his extraordinary prestige. Later, he was repeatedly charged with the creation of new administrative units, an obvious sign of his capacities. Among other posts, he was appointed the first district governor of Mohács, and then *beylerbeyi* of Buda and Temesvár, etc. An interesting aspect of his life is that he tried to accumulate wealth in the form of *çiftliks*, *mezra'as*, and mills. At least fourteen of Kasım's men were able to follow their master in acquiring similar smaller semi-private properties. His example shows us that even in the over-bureaucratized Ottoman Empire of the sixteenth century some people could find the ways and means through which a system of personal dependencies could emerge and freer forms of possession promoting individual interests could exist.

Géza Dávid

Pál Fodor



**PART ONE**  
**THE HUNGARIAN-HABSBURG FRONTIER**



THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE BORDER DEFENCE  
SYSTEM AGAINST THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN HUNGARY  
(UP TO THE EARLY EIGHTEENTH CENTURY)

GÉZA PÁLFFY

"The system of fortresses is the only means by which Your Majesty will be able to contain the power and the advance of the enemy, and behind which Your countries and peoples will be secure."<sup>1</sup> This is how Habsburg military leaders summarized their opinion about the significance of the Hungarian border defence system protecting the imperial city of Vienna, the Austrian hereditary lands, and the German Empire in 1577. It would be difficult to find a better expression to define the role of the defence system established by the late sixteenth century on the frontier zone of Hungary and its southern annexed provinces (Slavonia and Croatia) against the Ottoman Empire. Even though the Hungarian defence system constituted only a section of the long and varied frontier zone which stretched from Northern Africa via the Mediterranean islands, Italy, and Hungary to the Polish-Lithuanian and Russian territories and protected Europe against the Ottoman attacks, it is evident that the decisive events of the century long Ottoman-Habsburg confrontation occurred on the territory of Medieval Hungary.<sup>2</sup> On the basis of recent archival research and the achievements of Austrian, Southern Slav, and Hungarian historiography, this study attempts to provide an outline of the system and its development, concentrating on the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Towards the end of the twentieth century it is even more timely as, while several monographs have been published in different world languages about the defence systems on the Croatian and Slavonian

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<sup>1</sup> Pál Szegő, *Végváraink szervezete a török betelepedésétől a tizenöt éves háború kezdetéig (1541-1593)* [The Organization of the Hungarian Border Fortresses from the Establishment of the Ottoman Rule to the Outbreak of the Fifteen Years' War]. Budapest, 1911, 52.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Pál Fodor, "Ottoman Policy Towards Hungary, 1520-1541," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 45:2-3 (1991) 271-345.

territories,<sup>3</sup> no well documented study has been written about the system of the Hungarian defence districts and border fortresses which played a much more important role than the above mentioned areas in the whole structure.<sup>4</sup>

Earlier investigations have only discussed the Croatian-Slavonian part, that is a special section of the defence system established in the sixteenth century to resist the Ottoman advance, which was less decisive from the point of view of the whole area, and have treated it simply as the antecedent of the military frontier (*Militärgrenze*) organized at the beginning of the eighteenth century.<sup>5</sup> But the development of the defence

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<sup>3</sup> The most important works in chronological order: Fr[antišek] Vaníček, *Specialgeschichte der Militärgrenze*. I-IV. Wien, 1875. Jakob Amstadt, *Die k. k. Militärgrenze 1522-1881 (mit einer Gesamtbibliographie)*. (Inaugural-Diss.) Würzburg, 1969. Gunther Erich Rothenberg, *The Austrian Military Border in Croatia, 1522-1747*. (Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, 48.) Urbana, 1960, and *idem*, *The Military Border in Croatia 1740-1881: A Study of an Imperial Institution*. Chicago, 1966, and the two volumes together in German: Gunther E[rich] Rothenberg, *Die österreichische Militärgrenze in Kroatien 1522 bis 1881*. Wien-München, 1970. *Die k. k. Militärgrenze. Beiträge zu ihrer Geschichte*. (Schriften des Heeresgeschichtlichen Museums in Wien, 6.) Wien, 1973. *Die österreichische Militärgrenze. Geschichte und Auswirkungen*. Ed. by Gerhard Ernst. (Schriftenreihe des Regensburger Osteuropainstituts, 8.) Regensburg, 1982. *Vojna Krajina. Povijesni pregled-historiografija-rasprave*. Ed. by Dragutin Pavličević. Zagreb, 1984. Cf. also Winfried Schulze, *Landesdefension und Staatsbildung. Studien zum Kriegswesen des inner-österreichischen Territorialstaates (1564-1619)*. (Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für neuere Geschichte Österreichs, 60.) Wien-Köln-Graz, 1973. Karl Kaser, *Freier Bauer und Soldat. Die Militarisierung der agrarischen Gesellschaft in der kroatisch-slavonischen Militärgrenze (1535-1881)*. (Habilitationsschrift) Graz, 1985, and the most recent work by Jean Nouzille (*Histoire de frontières. L'Autriche et l'Empire ottoman*. Préface par Jean Bérenger. Paris, 1991) which is, however, a dull summary of earlier results.

<sup>4</sup> So far Kurt Wessely has been the only one to realize that for an understanding of the whole defence system against the Ottoman Empire it is indispensable to know the history of the Hungarian border defence zones as well: Kurt Wessely, "The Development of the Hungarian Military Frontier Until the Middle of the Eighteenth Century," *Austrian History Yearbook* 9-10 (1973-1974) 55-110, and *idem*, "Die Regensburger 'harrige' Reichshilfe 1576," in *Die russische Gesandtschaft am Regensburger Reichstag 1576*. Mit Beiträgen von Ekkehard Völkl und Kurt Wessely. (Schriftenreihe des Regensburger Osteuropainstituts, 3.) Regensburg, 1976, 31-55. Cf. also István Sinkovics, "Obrana mađarskog pograničnog teritorija od Turaka u XVI i XVII stoljeću," in *Vojna Krajina*, 163-174. The most important Hungarian monographs: Szegő, *op. cit.*, and Imre Szántó, *A végvári rendszer kiépítése és fénykora Magyarországon 1541-1593* [The Organization and Golden Age of the Border Defence System in Hungary]. Budapest, 1980.

<sup>5</sup> In Austrian, German, Croatian—and sometimes even Hungarian—works, the Croatian-Slavonian defence zones are called military frontiers (*Militärgrenze*) already from the middle of the sixteenth century, which is, in my opinion, a capital mistake. The units of the defence system of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the respective areas of the

line against the Ottomans<sup>6</sup> can only be understood in the knowledge of the whole—Hungarian and Croatian-Slavonian—border defence system and this is true for the history of its subsequent periods, too. Below this system will be examined as a whole, viewed from the administrative centres, that is from Buda until 1526, then temporarily from Pozsony and Vienna, and from 1556 up to the abolition of the military frontier in the nineteenth century, from the Imperial City and—for an intermediary period—from Graz (1578-1705) respectively. This is the only aspect which can provide us with a more coherent and complete picture about the strategy of defence of the medieval Hungarian Kingdom and that of the Habsburg military leadership, and about how the system was controlled.

#### THE PERIODIZATION OF THE HISTORY OF THE DEFENCE SYSTEM IN HUNGARY AGAINST THE OTTOMANS

The new approach makes it necessary to establish a new periodization for the history of Croatian and Slavonian territories which defines the most important shifts based on the qualitative changes within the whole system. The former periodization advanced in 1960 by Fedor Moačanin, and only partly corrected by those working on the problem later on, can hardly be used for the Hungarian territories in the narrow sense constituting the major and more decisive part of the defence system.<sup>7</sup> The Croatian author divided the nearly 500-year-old history of the Croatian-Slavonian defence region into the following two major and some minor periods:

1. period: From the beginning to 1593, the outbreak of the so-called 'Fifteen Years' War' or 'Long War'. Within this, he differentiated three subperiods:

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border fortresses (*Grenzgebiet, Grenze, Grenzfestungen*) were qualitatively different from the military frontiers organized in the early eighteenth century. Another remarkable mistake of Austrian historiography is to call the Croatian-Slavonian border territories Austrian Military Frontiers (*österreichische Militärgrenze*, see notes 3 and 25), as in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries it was not these that were called Austrian border fortress zone (*österreichische Grenze*), but the border castles subordinated to Győr. Therefore it is more accurate to use the term 'the Habsburg defence system against the Ottoman Empire' in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries for the imperial-royal border defence system in Hungary. Cf. Kurt Wessely, "Reply to Rothenberg's Comments," *Austrian History Yearbook* 9-10 (1973-1974) 119.

<sup>6</sup> It is to be noted that scholarly works have so far identified the border defence system against the Ottomans with the chain of fortresses, but this latter was, besides the mobile field troops and soldiery kept by the counties, etc., only one, though decisive element in it.

<sup>7</sup> Fedor Moačanin, "Periodizacija historije Vojne Krajine (XV-XIX st.)," *Historijski zbornik* 13 (1960) 111-117.

1.1. From the outset to 1522, when Ferdinand I, Archduke of Austria, sent an army at his own expense to help the defence of the Austrian territories threatened by the Ottomans.

1.2. From 1522 to 1578, when the administration of the Croatian and Slavonian border fortresses was subordinated to the newly established Inner Austrian War Council (*Innerösterreichischer Hofkriegsrat*, Graz), separating them from the Hungarian defence districts.

1.3. From 1578 to 1593.

2. period: From 1593 to 1881, the elimination of the system of military frontiers. Within this period Moaçanin defined five smaller sections, out of which two should be mentioned in connection with the era discussed in this paper.

2.1. From 1593 to 1683, the beginning of the so-called reconquering Turkish war (1683-1699). This war made it possible to establish the network of border fortresses and military frontier along the Sava, Tisza, Danube, and Maros.

2.2. From 1683 to 1755, the first reform of the military frontiers considered important by Moaçanin.<sup>8</sup>

Though the authors of monographs prepared after 1960 corrected Moaçanin's periodization in some points,<sup>9</sup> their approach to the border defence system shows no real change at all. This state of affairs can be ascribed to the fact that, due to language problems and a lack of archival research, they knew practically nothing about the Hungarian border defence system and therefore neglected it. So the periodization to be presented here is the first attempt to define new periods from the point of view of the whole defence system in Hungary against the Ottoman Empire, and also applicable to the history of the Croatian-Slavonian region. In my opinion the following three major and several minor periods can be differentiated:

The first one lasted from the beginning to 1526, the termination of the medieval Hungarian Kingdom. During this era, the southern defence network stretching from the Adriatic Sea to Transylvania was an organically coherent defence line of the Hungarian Kingdom.

The second period began in 1526 (the year of the battle at Mohács) and continued till the peace treaty of Karlovitz in 1699, which closed the epoch of the reconquering Turkish wars (1683-1699) and Ottoman rule in Hungary. After the peace had been concluded it again became possible

<sup>8</sup> Further periods: 2.3. 1755-1807, 2.4. 1807-1848, finally 2.5. 1848-1881.

<sup>9</sup> See the works cited in note 2.

to create a qualitatively new defence system called the 'military frontier' (*Militärgrenze*).

In the definition of the subperiods of the third phase (1699-1881), historians are more or less of the same opinion, so it is worth accepting the periodization of Moaçanin and Rothenberg.

In the following I would like to summarize the development of the border defence system up to the organization of the military frontiers in the early eighteenth century. By showing briefly the subperiods I will make an attempt to analyze the most important sections of the continually changing network and to evaluate its landmarks given the constraints of time and space. At the same time I would like to justify the significant changes I have applied in the periodization used so far.

## 1. THE DEFENCE SYSTEM OF THE MEDIEVAL HUNGARIAN KINGDOM (FROM THE OUTSET TO THE BATTLE OF MOHÁCS IN 1526)

### 1.1. *The origins of the defence system against the Ottomans (late fourteenth century–mid-1470s)*

In the 1360s, the military and political leadership of the Hungarian Kingdom did not recognize the danger it faced with the appearance of the Ottoman troops in Europe. Although the conquests of the growing military state were far away from the borders of the subsidiary provinces of King Louis Anjou I (1342-1382), the conspicuous political and military expansion of the Ottomans was a clear signal that they would hardly stop on the south-eastern Balkans after gaining the upper hand in the struggle among the Southern Slav rulers as their auxiliary troops. Though Louis I attempted—even if in a somewhat unprepared manner—to contain the conquerors by establishing the Bulgarian *banate* of Vidin between 1365 and 1369 and by placing Hungarian soldiers in the castles there, the strikes by the Ottomans in the 1370s and 1380s directly threatened the southern frontiers of Hungary. The situation was made worse by the fact that, towards the end of his rule, King Louis did not pay too much attention to the reinforcement of the southern border fortresses along the Lower Danube, and the confused years after his death further accentuated the problems of southern defence.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> On the history of the organization of the defence system before 1526, cf. Ferenc Szakály, "Phases of Turco-Hungarian Warfare Before the Battle of Mohács (1365-1526)," *Acta*

After Sigismund of Luxemburg, the Hungarian King (1387-1437), later Holy Roman Emperor (1410-1437), experienced the immediate threat by the Ottomans on the battlefield of Nicopol (1396) and his western neighbours did so by means of the constant attacks,<sup>11</sup> there remained only one possibility to defend Hungary. It became imperative that they lay the foundation of a border defence system capable of competing effectively with the enemy at the frontiers in the long run. Bearing this purpose in mind, Sigismund ordered that the border fortresses along the Lower Danube should be given into royal hands, they should be reinforced, and that new castles should be built between Szörény and Nándorfehérvár (for example Szentlászló). In addition, he started to place the mobile troops of the southern counties, of the *banates* existing since the time of the rulers of the Árpád House, and the soldiers serving in the border fortresses under central control. In the diet of 1397, held in Temesvár, which was of crucial importance concerning the defence of the southern borders, he tried to enforce his intention of qualifying the Hungarian military organization for defence purposes by means of several military laws.<sup>12</sup>

The reforms led to the establishment of the so-called *militia portalis*,<sup>13</sup> by which the ruler intended to create a light cavalry of considerable number which could be deployed on the frontiers. In order to increase the number of soldiers on the borders, Serbian refugees were more and

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*Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 33 (1979) 65-111. *Idem*, "The Hungarian-Croatian Border Defense System and Its Collapse," in *From Hunyadi to Rákóczi. War and Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Hungary*. (War and Society in Eastern Central Europe, 3.) Ed. by János M. Bak-Béla K. Király. Brooklyn, 1982, 141-158. Cf. also Leopold Kupelwieser, *Die Kämpfe Ungarns mit den Osmanen bis zur Schlacht bei Mohács, 1526*. Wien, 1899<sup>2</sup>. (I used these works in presenting all three subperiods, so I am not going to refer to them separately below.)

<sup>11</sup> For the earliest attacks against Hungary, cf. Bódog Milleker, *A törököknek első betörései Dél-Magyarországba Zsigmond és Albert királyok idejében és Keve és Krassó vármegyék megszűnése. 1393-1439* [The First Attacks by the Ottomans Against Hungary in the Time of Kings Sigismund and Albert, and the End of Counties Keve and Krassó]. Temesvár, 1914. On the attacks against Transylvania, cf. Gustav Gündisch, *Zur Überlieferung der Türkeneinfälle in Siebenbürgen*. Kolozsvár, 1947. On the first raids in Austrian territories, see Hans Pirchegger, "Die ersten Türkeneinfälle (1396, 1415, 1418)," *Zeitschrift des Historischen Vereines für Steiermark* 18 (1922) 63-73. See also the latest summary of the Southern Slav literature by Vasko Simoniti, *Vojaška organizacija na Slovenskem v 16. stoletju*. Ljubljana, 1991, 5-23.

<sup>12</sup> Elemér Mályusz, *Kaiser Sigismund in Ungarn 1387-1437*. Budapest, 1990, 136-166.

<sup>13</sup> It meant that well-to-do noblemen had to field one mounted archer for every 20, later, after 1435, for every 33 peasants. András Borosy, "The *Militia Portalis* in Hungary Before 1526," in *From Hunyadi to Rákóczi*, 63-80.

more frequently hired as light *hussars*, boatmen (*naszádos*) on the Danube or more increasingly, though temporarily, as peasant soldiers (*vojniki*, *Soldatenbauer*) in return for certain exemptions. The incomes of the country did not render it possible to maintain a regular army paid by the king protecting the frontiers, apart from the *banderium* of the ruler. In parallel to the enlargement of the defensive military forces, the organization of border defence was made more coherent. The military forces of the counties of the Temesköz were subordinated—though only temporarily, for some major actions—to the high sheriff of county Temes (*comes Temesiensis*), who, at the same time, was appointed captain of the garrison soldiers, besides heading his own *banderium*. A similar process started in the neighbouring *banate* of Macsó, lying west of the Temesköz.<sup>14</sup> Through personal negotiation, Sigismund, under the terms of the treaty of Tata in 1426, acquired from Djordje Branković the castle of Nándorfehérvár (Belgrade), which was essential for the strengthening of the defence. Ten years later he attached the castle to the *banate* of Macsó, and as a result a defence zone similar to the one in Temesköz came into being, since the *ban* of Macsó disposed of the military forces of the neighbouring counties of Baranya, Bodrog, Bács, Szerém, and Valkó. The two *ban* on the Croatian-Slavonian territories had similar military authority, what is more, the favourable natural endowments were further enhanced by reinforcing the fords on the Sava with wooden forts. At the same time, in the Temesköz, a chain of about twenty fortresses handled by the king secured the defence of the border.

The formation of the defence network under relatively calm conditions was facilitated by the fact that the Ottoman state underwent one of the most critical periods of its history during the so-called *interregnum* between 1402 and 1413. The Hungarian military leadership, however, did not make use of the opportunity to chase out the Ottomans. Still, due to the activity of the *comes Temesiensis*, Pipó of Ozora (Filippo Scolari), who implemented the military reforms of Sigismund and the Thallóczi brothers (Matkó and Frankó), and owing to the campaigns and

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<sup>14</sup> At the turn of the 1430s Sigismund put the Teutonic Order in charge of the *banate* of Szörény defending the entrance at the Lower Danube. But his hopes in connection with this plan soon failed. Erich Joachim, "König Sigmund und der Deutsche Ritterorden in Ungarn 1429-1432. Mitteilungen aus dem Staatsarchiv Königsberg," *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung* 33 (1912) 87-119, and recently Jenő Glück, "A német lovagrend a XV. századi Bánságban [The Teutonic Order in the Fifteenth-Century Banate]," *Zounek. A Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok Megyei Levéltár Évkönyve* 8 (1993) 33-44.

organizational activity of János Hunyadi in the 1440-1450s, the medieval Hungarian Kingdom managed to build up a system on the southern territories of the country, which was still not coherent enough but adequate for permanent defence.

*1.2. The formation of a coherent defence system: the military reforms of Matthias Corvinus and their aftermath (1470s-1521)*

Though the foundations of the border defence system were laid during Sigismund's reign, the siege of Nándorfehérvár in 1440 indicated that those buffer states in the Balkans which had previously served to protect Hungary would soon be ruined by the Ottoman advance. In the long run, neither the so-called winter campaign (1443-1444) by János Hunyadi, nor his success in Nándorfehérvár in 1456, nor even the Bosnian actions by Matthias Corvinus in 1463-1464 could stop the process by which the Hungarian military force was once and for all driven back to the frontiers of the country by the 1460s, except for the north-western Bosnian fortresses around Jajca.

The nearly fifty years' 'peace-time' starting in the mid-1460s, which was characterized by the clashes of the raiding troops of the contending parties, offered an excellent opportunity for the Hungarian King to unify and reform the defence system constructed by his predecessors, that is to make preparations for permanent defence. The shift in the foreign policy of Matthias Corvinus (1458-1490) from the South-East to the West might have served the same purposes.<sup>15</sup> Presumably, he intended to create an Eastern-Central-European great power with material resources to be able to finance the reorganized defence line and to compete successfully with the Ottoman Empire that had changed into a European great power with the capture of Constantinople in 1453.

The reorganization of the defence system was accomplished in the middle of the 1470s. The aims of the innovations were to create a more coherent defence system, which could be controlled from the centre and was not divided into many political, military administrative centres, furthermore to establish an army that could be mobilized faster and in a more unified way to protect the borders. In the southern regions from the Adriatic to the Eastern-Carpathians, Matthias Corvinus united and integrated under the command of three military officials the two basic elements of the defence system: on the one hand, the military forces and the network of the border

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<sup>15</sup> Gyula Rázsó, "Hunyadi Mátyás török politikája [The Ottoman Policy of Matthias Corvinus]," *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 22 (1975) 305-348.

fortresses, and on the other, the *banderia*, county and noble troops, that is the military of the areas neighbouring the frontiers. This was the most decisive and most significant part of his reforms.

As a first step, in 1476 Matthias united the offices of the *ban* of Croatia-Dalmatia and Slavonia. His intention was to subordinate the commanders of border fortresses, as well as the mobile troops of the counties, barons and nobles of the area, under the unified control of the Croatian-Slavonian *ban* (*banus Croatiae et Slavoniae*) from the sea to the Lower Danube. Though he had already attempted to unify the two offices as early as in the mid-1460s, his endeavours were frustrated for a decade by the pursuits for independence of the *ban* of Macsó, Miklós Újlaki, who was appointed King of Bosnia in 1471.<sup>16</sup> After the occupation of Szabács in 1476 and the death of Újlaki in 1477, nothing could prevent him from implementing his plan. At the same time, he organized the region of the Lower Danube into a unified border defence system, similar to the Croatian-Slavonian territories. To this end he created the office of the captain-general of the Lower Parts (*supremus capiteneus partium regni Hungariae inferiorum*), which was, with a few exceptions,<sup>17</sup> assumed by the high sheriffs of county Temes. From that time on, besides their *banderia* of considerable numbers, the captain-generals disposed of the military forces of both the border fortresses and the neighbouring counties. At the same time, as high sheriffs of county Temes, they were also responsible for the civil administration of the area. While the Croatian-Slavonian *ban* was personally in charge of the military and civil administration of Dalmatia, Old Croatia,<sup>18</sup> and the Slavonian counties

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<sup>16</sup> András Kubinyi, "Die Fragen des bosnischen Königtums von N. Újlaki," *Studia Slavica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 8 (1958) 373-384.

<sup>17</sup> The captaincy-general of Pál Tomori (1523-1526), the Archbishop of Kalocsa, who had his residence in Pétervárad and died in the battle of Mohács, has to be ranked among these.

<sup>18</sup> It is appropriate to note here that Croatia and Slavonia as administrative and territorial notions had different meanings during the middle ages and in the sixteenth-eighteenth centuries. The medieval 'Old' Croatia was situated south-west of the river Sava, and its territory extended between the Kapella Mountain and the Adriatic Sea, bordering on Slavonia in the north-east. Slavonia proper was located between the Drava valley and the Kapela Mountain, extending as far as the river Vrbas in the east. The Ottoman advance created a completely new situation by the second half of the sixteenth century. By that time the southern parts of Old Croatia were lost, its population sought refuge in the north, and for this reason in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries the name Croatia designated the areas stretching from the Adriatic to the Sava, then, in the eighteenth century, to the Drava, which was formerly named Slavonia, then Upper Slavonia. For Slavonia proper shrank to the territory between Drava, Sava, and Csázma by the 1570s. In the second half of the eighteenth century, however, it included the counties Pozsega, Valkó, and Szerém (the so-called Lower Slavonia), and from that time on, Slavonia meant exclusively that territory.

of Zágráb, Varasd, Kőrös, Verőce, Dubica, Szana, and Orbász, due to the reforms of Matthias, the captain-general of the Lower Parts had the same responsibilities over the six counties of Temesköz (Keve, Krassó, Temes, Torontál, Arad, and Csanád), over the neighbouring six counties of Bodrog, Bács, Csongrád, Békés, Zaránd, and Bihar, and over the counties of Pozsega, Valkó, and Szerém between the Drava and Sava, that is all the military and administrative duties over the territories called the Lower Parts.<sup>19</sup> The third great unit of the defence line was led by the Voivode of Transylvania (*vajvoda Transilvaniae/Transilvaniensis*) with the same authority.<sup>20</sup>

As a result of the reforms of Matthias Corvinus, the bases of the defence system against the Ottoman Empire laid down by Sigismund of Luxemburg were transformed and changed into a coherent system. At the end of the fifteenth century the Hungarian Kingdom was surrounded by a vertically and horizontally divided, unified network of defence. In depth it consisted of two parallel lines of border fortresses. The southern line stretched from Szörény via Orsova, Szentlászló, Nándorfehérvár, Zimony, Szabács, Szrebernik, Jajca, and Knin up to Skardona and Klissza, the second, northern line from Lugos, Karánsebes, and Temesvár via Pétervárad, the minor castles of the Szerémség and Dubica, Krupa, and Bihács to Zengg on the Dalmatian coast. The same system was divided into three sections vertically together with the Transylvanian territories: the Croatian-Slavonian part with Bihács as its headquarters, the area east of it ranging to Wallachia with the centre of Temesvár called Lower Parts and the Transylvanian border area. All three parts had the function of serving and supporting the border fortresses, in which there were several thousand Southern Slav and Hungarian garrison soldiers, boatmen, and

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<sup>19</sup> For the history of the captaincy-general of the Lower Parts, see recently László Fenyvesi, "A temesközi-szörénységi végvárvidék funkcióváltozásai (1365-1718) [The Changes in Function of the Border Fortress Area of the Temesköz and Szörénység]," in *Végvárok és régiók a XVI-XVII. században*. (Studia Agriensia, 14.) Eger, 1993, 238-246.

<sup>20</sup> The only debatable element of the reform is why Nándorfehérvár did not become the seat of the newly nominated captain-general of the Lower Parts. All this might be in connection with the devaluated office of the *ban* of Macsó held by Lőrinc, the son of Miklós Újlaki. Though it might have seemed wiser to send the captain-general of the Lower Parts to Nándorfehérvár, the events afterwards justified the decision by Matthias Corvinus as the office with the seat in Temesvár survived the fall of Nándorfehérvár in 1521, and continued to function until 1556 with different centres as will be discussed later on. Cf. the different opinion by Ferenc Szakály, *A mohácsi csata* [The Battle of Mohács]. (Sorsdöntő történelmi napok, 2.) Budapest, 1977,<sup>2</sup> 55-56.

peasant soldiers paid by the king.<sup>21</sup> So in case of danger, the captain-generals of the border territories, as the leaders of the more secure interior counties, disposed of a significant number of *banderia*, county and noble troops, and unanimously controlled both the border fortresses and the mobile field troops. Their concrete tasks were determined by the ruler, who—without having an independent body controlling the military affairs—arrived at decisions on the defence of the country after consultation with the Royal Council (*consilium regis/regni*) residing in Buda.

### 1.3. *The fall of the defence system of the medieval Hungarian Kingdom (1521-1526)*

Before the loss of Nándorfehérvár, the key fortress of the Danube line, in 1521,<sup>22</sup> the system of border defence did not seem to differ much from the network that came into being after the reforms of Matthias Corvinus. While one element of the defence, however, the chain of fortresses still existed, though in a bad state of repair, the other main component, the mobile troops of the neighbouring and inner parts of the country became practically unusable. So in the disastrous economic, social, and political conditions of Hungary in the Jagellon-era (1490-1526), the defence system became mutilated already before the fall of Nándorfehérvár. The loss of the most important castle then launched a process that culminated in total collapse. Given the lack of a field army that could be moved and controlled quickly and coherently, Nándorfehérvár could only have been replaced by a castle of similar size and significance along the Danube. A stronghold of such strength, however, was to be found only several hundred kilometers further north, in the centre of the country, in Buda.

The fall of Nándorfehérvár resulted in a huge breach in the defence line and brought about the loss of several neighbouring fortresses: Zimony and Szabács were captured in the same year, Orsova, Knin, and Skardona one year later, Szörény, the other bulwark of the Lower Danube, fell into Ottoman hands in 1524. The perdition of the castles entailed the loss of

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<sup>21</sup> Cf. András Kubinyi's article in the present volume.

<sup>22</sup> Ferenc Szakály has dealt with the reasons and circumstances of the loss of the key fortress in several studies, which obtains very useful points of reference. Ferenc Szakály, "Nándorfehérvár, 1521: The Beginning of the End of the Medieval Hungarian Kingdom," in *Hungarian-Ottoman Military and Diplomatic Relations in the Age of Süleyman the Magnificent*. Ed. by Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor. Budapest, 1994, 47-76. *Idem*, *A mohácsi csata*, 56-58, and *idem*, "Nándorfehérvár 1521-es ostromához. Egy királyi adománylevél köztörténeti tanulságai [On the Siege of Nándorfehérvár in 1521. The Historical Lesson to Be Drawn From a Royal Deed of Gift]," *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 25 (1978) 484-499.

those villages whose inhabitants had previously served as peasant soldiers for a pay of some months and for different exemptions. So Süleyman the Magnificent, the new sultan (1520-1566), extinguished the southern line of the frontier fortresses—except for Jajca and Klissza—with in a period of some years. These castles served as stepping-stones for him to do away with the last remnants of the second line as well, except for some Croatian fortresses, in the decades after the battle of Mohács in 1526.

With the collapse of the southern chain of fortresses, the Hungarian military leadership lost the zone that was to have defended the whole kingdom. The second, northern line in the interior of the country was not facilitated by the natural surroundings to such an extent as the previous one that was situated almost entirely along mountains and rivers. There was a threat that if the gaps could not be filled very fast, Pétervárad, which was chosen to substitute Nándorfehérvár, could not be reinforced, and no mobile troops were fielded, the whole interior plain area of the country would soon fall. Although some measures were taken by the *palatinus* István Báthory and the captain-general of the Lower Parts Pál Tomori aimed at bringing the fortresses of the second line into a defensible condition and at reinforcing them with paid infantrymen and *banderia*, these failed one after the other, due to the modest incomes of the country. As a result, the entire southern defence system inevitably collapsed in 1526, when the last units of the mobile field troops and the major border fortresses perished. The death of Louis II (1516-1526) at the same time brought about the fall of the medieval Hungarian Kingdom.

Before the collapse of the medieval border defence system, a change took place whose effects could not be felt in the 1520s, but which proved very important in the long run. Already in the early 1500s, Kings Vladislav II (1490-1516) and Louis II and the Croatian barons and nobles turned to Emperor Maximilian I (1493-1519) for help to jointly avert the danger threatening the Austrian provinces as well. But during the rule of Maximilian I, the external military support assisting the *ban* of Croatia remained only a plan. However, after the fall of the first chain of fortresses, Archduke Ferdinand I, assessing the danger threatening the Austrian provinces governed by him—mainly Carniola (*Krain*), Carinthia (*Kärnten*), and Styria (*Steiermark*)—resigned himself to a significant step. During the siege of Nándorfehérvár in 1521 he summoned his estates for a special meeting and, at the request of his brother-in-law, Louis II, he

proposed to send several thousand German infantrymen to support Hungary. On the basis of the documents at our disposal, it can be stated that about 2,000 infantrymen set off for Hungary, and this was the first time when there was an actual attempt by the Austrian provinces to assist in the defence of the Hungarian Kingdom.<sup>23</sup> From 1522 to the defeat at Mohács more and more frequently did field troops arrive from the neighbouring Austrian provinces to the area controlled by the Croatian *ban*, but they were not placed into the border fortresses as constant garrisons yet.<sup>24</sup> Though the regular Austrian military aid seemingly strengthened the defence in this section of the border, in fact it dissolved the unified leadership of the military force that had been commanded by the *ban* up to this time. The captain-generals (*Obrister Feldhauptmann der niederösterreichischen Lande*) of the troops sent by the Austrian estates were appointed by the latter and were not subordinated to the *ban*, though the consequences of this duality did not manifest themselves in these years, but only after the fall of the Hungarian Kingdom in 1526. As the most decisive element of the defence system, the chain of fortresses still remained under the control of the *ban* at that time.

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<sup>23</sup> Lajos Thallóczy–Antal Hodinka, *Magyarország melléktartományainak oklevéltára (Codex Diplomaticus Partium Regno Hungariae Adnexarum)*. Vol. 1. *A horvát véghelyek oklevéltára. 1490-1527* [Archives of the Croatian Border Fortresses 1490-1527]. (Monumenta Hungariae Historica I. Diplomataria, XXXI.) Budapest, 1903, 34-38: Nos. XXXV and LXII-LXXIII: Nos. 1-10. The year 1521 which I propose to start a new period, is both appropriate for marking the collapse of the first chain of fortresses and for referring to the date when Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria began to support the defence system of the medieval Hungarian Kingdom with his financial and military power. That is why the year 1522 in Rothenberg's monograph (*The Austrian Military Border*) is worth modifying to 1521.

<sup>24</sup> In connection with this, see Gunther E. Rothenberg, "The Origins of the Austrian Military Frontier in Croatia and the Alleged Treaty of 22 December 1522," *Slavonic and East European Review* 38 (1960) 493-498. Cf. also Winfried Schulze, "Die österreichische Militärgrenze," *Militär-geschichtliche Mitteilungen* 9 (1971) 191-192. Though Rothenberg proved in his study published in 1960 that the alleged treaty of December 22, 1522 between Louis II and Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria is merely the result of a mistake by František Vaníček (F. Vaníček, *op. cit.*, 5-6) who misinterpreted the talks at the Imperial Diet (*Reichstag*) of Regensburg in 1522-1523, he (Rothenberg) was not the first to realize this. Lajos Thallóczy, in his introduction to the above quoted collection of documents had already corrected the mistake (L. Thallóczy–A. Hodinka, *op. cit.*, Nos. LVIII-LX and LVIII: n. 1). Rothenberg's merit is that he again drew attention to the problem, as Thallóczy's results were often ignored even by Hungarian scholars. Pál Szegeő, *op. cit.*, 13 and 32. Cf. recently Gerhard Rill, *Fürst und Hof in Österreich von den habsburgischen Teilungsverträgen bis zur Schlacht von Mohács (1521/22 bis 1526)*. Bd. 1. *Außenpolitik und Diplomatie*. (Forschungen zur Europäischen und Vergleichenden Rechtsgeschichte, 7.) Wien–Köln–Weimar, 1993, 42-43: n. 17.

## 2. THE DEFENCE SYSTEM AGAINST THE OTTOMANS IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES

The defeat at Mohács opened up a new era in the history of Hungary. The country lost not only its ruler, but almost the whole of its southern defence system, including both the network of border fortresses and the neighbouring parts supporting them with their field troops. All this resulted in the establishment of Ottoman rule in Hungary, the coronations of John Szapolyai I (1526-1540) and Ferdinand I (1526-1564) as kings of Hungary, and the division of the country into three parts. Though the sovereignty and independence of the country did not entirely disappear in the following centuries, its territory became the battleground of two great powers, the Habsburg and the Ottoman Empire. In 1526, however, the question was whether Hungary would be able to organize a new defence system or whether it would share the fate of what had been its vassal states in the Balkans. And if the country was to succeed, in which part of it, in what framework, and under whose leadership would the new defence system come into being.

### *2.1.a. One and a half decades of confusion: the period of the commanders-in-chief of the royal army paid by Ferdinand I of Habsburg*

The fifteen years after 1526 remind us of the events at the turn of middle of the fifteenth century. Only the performers of the Christian party had changed: now the Austrian provinces were in the same situation as the medieval Hungarian Kingdom had been earlier. The question was the same: would they manage to stop the enemy in front of the borders, on the territories of Hungary under the authority of Ferdinand I, crowned the king of this country, or, as the Croatian-Slavonian *ban* Tamás Nádasdy expressed it in his letter to Ferdinand in the summer of 1539: "If Your Holy Majesty does not support this country with your other provinces it will certainly happen that, due to the loss of this country, the other provinces of Your Holy Majesty will be lost."<sup>25</sup> But the extent of the danger was not adequately assessed in Vienna at the end of the 1520s. To put it more accurately: even if they recognized the Ottoman threat, they did not have the power to act against it effectively. For the

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<sup>25</sup> "Nisi Vestra Sacratissima Maiestas alicunde ex aliis regnis suis huic regno providerit, actum erit de eo, et ex amissione huius regni amittentur alia etiam regna Vestrae Sacratissimae Maiestatis." Wien, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv [hereinafter ÖStA], Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv [hereinafter HHStA], Ungarische Akten (Hungarica) [hereinafter Hungarica], Allgemeine Akten [hereinafter AA], Fasc. 39. Konv. F. 1539. Juni-Juli fols. 36-37.

organization of a new defence system—as had been implemented on the southern frontiers of Hungary in Matthias Corvinus' time—there was a need for a longer period of peace, for the appropriate economic and financial background and political support, for a diplomacy that was aware of the Ottoman's customs and methods, for an appropriate apparatus to organize and control the system, and last but not least for a thorough knowledge of local Hungarian circumstances. None of these conditions were met at that time.

The conflict between the two rulers of Hungary brought about civil war conditions in the country and its annexed provinces (Slavonia and Croatia). To save his territories, John I was forced to cooperate with the Ottomans, while they advanced capturing more and more fortresses in the Szerémség and Croatia.<sup>26</sup> But these southern territories of Hungary seemed far away enough from Vienna, not to mention the palace of emperor Charles V (1519-1556) in Toledo, for whom the Hungarian theatre of war was overshadowed by the Mediterranean and Italian provinces also threatened by the Ottomans. Although it was obvious to those knowing the geographical situation of Hungary that if the castles of Buda and the plain areas could not stop the Ottomans, they would get several hundred kilometers nearer the centre of the Austrian provinces. In vain did the siege of Vienna in 1529 cause a shock, the Habsburg military leadership was unable to perform the tasks of defence against the Ottomans.<sup>27</sup> Though among those Austrian commanders who knew little about the conditions in Hungary there were some who realized the severe consequences of delay,<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Gábor Barta, "A Forgotten Theatre of War 1526-1528 (Historical Events Preceding the Ottoman-Hungarian Alliance of 1528)," in *Hungarian-Ottoman Military and Diplomatic Relations*, 93-130.

<sup>27</sup> Christine Turetschek, *Die Türkenpolitik Ferdinands I. von 1529 bis 1532*. (Dissertationen der Universität Wien, 10.) Wien, 1968.

<sup>28</sup> After the royal troops led by Hans Katzianer captured the castle of Szepesvár, the residence of the family Szapolyai, Ulrich Leysser chief field armoury officer (*Obrist-Feldzeugmeister*) suggested to his ruler on March 28, 1528, that the artillery arsenal here and in other places should be transported to the southern border fortresses and the ruined cannon should be cast again with the same purpose: "Euer Kunigliche Majestät etc. hetten solh Geschucz, klain vnd groß behaltenn, vnd die ortflegkhen gegen dem Turgkhenn damit versechenn ... hetten Euer Kunigliche Majestät etc. new geschucz giessen vnnd die Turgkhisch Gräniczen damit versechen lassenn." ÖStA Kriegsarchiv [hereinafter KA] Alte Feldakten [hereinafter AFA] 1528/3/16 c. It is not a coincidence that it was Leysser who made these proposals as he had already taken part in the recruitment of the auxiliary troops commanded to Croatia from 1522 so he was among those who rightly assessed the real degree of the Ottoman threat (see L. Thallóczy-A. Hodinka, *op. cit.*, 145-147: No. XCI and 148-149: No. XCIII).

Ferdinand's political, economic, and military resources allowed two things in this period. On the one hand, with his troops sent to Hungary, he gradually broke the power of his rival king, and on the other hand, with the help of the most endangered provinces of Carniola, Carinthia, and Styria, he started to reorganize under his own control the Croatian border defence system coordinated by the *ban*.<sup>29</sup>

The two processes took place in a similar framework and were accompanied by similar problems. In order to strengthen his power both in Hungary and in Croatia and Slavonia, Ferdinand sent considerable numbers of foreign (mainly German) troops. These were supplemented by the paid soldiers of the Hungarian and Croatian nobles supporting the Habsburgs, and by the units of the counties and insurgent fielded under the laws of the country. The cooperation of the German and Hungarian troops was not unclouded. The question of control caused serious conflicts from the moment the first *Landsknecht* set foot on Hungarian soil, as the commander-in-chief of the troops serving in Hungary or Croatia (*Obrister Feldhauptmann der niederösterreichischen Lande in Ungarn/in Kroatien*) at the cost of the 'Lower Austrian estates' (at that time still composed of Lower Austria, Carniola, Carinthia, and Styria) tried to extend his authority both over the Hungarian and Croatian contingents. But according to the so-called *palatinus'* articles of 1485, the deputy commanding these troops in the absence of the king was the *palatinus regni Hungariae*.<sup>30</sup> The situation was further complicated by the fact that this office had not been filled since 1530 and the governor (*locumtenens regni Hungariae*), the leader of the governorship (*locumtenentia regia*), created to replace the *palatinus*, did his best to keep control over the Hungarian troops.<sup>31</sup> There was a similar conflict between the Croatian

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<sup>29</sup> Though in the summer of 1528 Martin Fleugaus, the armoury officer of Ferdinand in Carniola (*Zeugwart in Krain*), mustered the border fortresses (Szeged, Temesvár, Csanád, and Lippa) in Temesköz with the aim of checking how they could be strengthened to serve the purpose of defence against the Ottomans, they could not prevent them from getting into the hands of John I. ÖStA KA AFA 1528/7/6. See also ÖStA HHStA Hungarica AA. Fasc. 8. Konv. 1. 1528. Jan.-Juni fols. 175-176.

<sup>30</sup> *Magyar törvénytár. (Corpus Juris Hungarici) 1000-1526. évi törvénycikkek* [Articles of 1000-1526]. Explained and referenced by Dezső Márkus. Budapest, 1899, 398-399: article No. 4.

<sup>31</sup> István R. Kiss, *A magyar helytartótanács I. Ferdinánd korában és 1549-1551. évi leveles könyve* [The Hungarian *Locumtenentia* under Ferdinand I and its Letter Book from 1549 to 1551]. Budapest, 1908, and Győző Ember, "A helytartói hivatal történetéhez a XVI. században [To the History of the *Locumtenentia* in the Sixteenth Century]," in *Emlékkönyv Szentpétery Imre születésének hatvanadik évfordulójának ünnepére*. Budapest, 1938, 142-156.

*ban* and the Austrian commander-in-chief. We can assume that the parties were perfectly aware of the high stakes in the struggle for the sphere of authority. The point was that the winner could take charge of the Hungarian and Croatian military affairs and simultaneously the control of the border defence system. So in the next fifteen years the Habsburg military leadership made an attempt at what Sigismund of Luxemburg and his successors could not achieve. They tried to ensure their power by campaigns led outside the Austrian provinces and by taking control of the military affairs and border defence in such areas they sought to stop the Ottoman advance. For this purpose the economic and military power of the Austrian provinces sufficed even if Charles V was reluctant to give support. For Hungary to preserve its sovereignty and territory to some extent, it seemed that it had to pay an enormous price in return. The Hungarian military-political officeholders and the estates formerly controlling the country and its defence had to renounce their positions in leading the military. There was hardly any reassuring way out of the dead end.

Up to the peace of Várad in 1538 made with John Szapolyai, the foreign troops led to Hungary by the Austrian commanders-in-chief secured—if not quite satisfactorily—the territory on which the new defence system could be organized later on. Although Kassa, the key to Upper Hungary remained in the hands of John I, and then passed to his son, John Sigismund between 1536 and 1552, an adequate counterpoint was created by supplying the castle of Sáros with a significant Habsburg garrison. The fortresses protecting Vienna (Komárom, Esztergom, Tata, and Győr) were similarly provided with soldiers of various nationality (i.e. Germans and Spaniards) paid by king Ferdinand. These military decisions, however, lacked any kind of strategy aimed at the formation of a coherent defence system. Practically, they were decisions made in an emergency situation.

Between 1526 and 1541, the military affairs of Hungary and the annexed areas were almost exclusively controlled by the above mentioned Austrian commanders-in-chief of Ferdinand. After the battle of Mohács the only efficient army was constituted by the German troops and by the cavalry units paid also from abroad but led by Hungarian and Southern Slav captains (Bálint Török, Lajos Pekry, and Pál Bakics). As the payment of these troops was covered by the ruler from his Austrian provinces, his right to command them could not be debated. So in these confused times

the 'task' of the governors (*locumtenens regni Hungariae*) in Pozsony was only to consult the commanders-in-chief not well-versed in the Hungarian conditions and to quarrel about the spheres of authority. The real military assistants of the commander-in-chief were the field marshals (*Feldmarschall*) commanded to help him and the war councillors (*verordnete Kriegsräte*) either staying beside him or in Vienna—including a war secretary (*Kriegssekretär*).<sup>32</sup> So in this period a new military administrative organization came into being, which, though subject to changes in its personnel, showed some signs of stability and became of great significance as the precedent of the Aulic War Council (*Wiener Hofkriegsrat*).

In Croatia the changes in the military administration and border defence were similar and even faster than in Hungary. John I, after the death of his captain-general and *ban*,<sup>33</sup> Kristóf Frangepán in September 1527, had less power to support his followers there. After the resignation in 1528 of Ferenc Batthyány, the Croatian-Slavonian *ban* who had supported Ferdinand, the vacancy of the office offered an excellent opportunity to curtail the sphere of authority of the *ban*, and the *locumtenens* in Pozsony had hardly any word in the direction of these remote territories. At the same time, the Ottomans—as in the next one and a half centuries—regarded this territory as a secondary theatre of war besides the main Hungarian front in its narrow sense. In spite of this fact, the Austrian provinces were mostly threatened in these areas in this period, and therefore the estates of Carniola, Carinthia, and Styria soon managed to transfer control of this section of the defence system of the medieval Hungarian Kingdom to Archduke Ferdinand and reorganize it for their own protection.<sup>34</sup>

Thus the Habsburg military administration started to form the first unit of the new defence system against the Ottomans in the Croatian border area. It has already been mentioned as a precedent that after 1521 field troops paid by the Austrian estates regularly marched to Croatia,

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<sup>32</sup> On the war councillors, see the *Hungarica* collection of ÖStA HHStA (AA. Fasc. 2.-Fasc. 70. *passim*) from the period 1526-1550.

<sup>33</sup> "Cristoforus de Frangepanibus ... regnorum Dalmaciae, Croaciae et Sclavoniae banus ac capitaneus regius generalis" (Velike, August 27, 1527) ÖStA HHStA Hungarica AA. Fasc. 7. Konv. 3. 1527. fol. 38. Cf. Gábor Barta, *La route qui mène à Istanbul 1526-1528*. (Studia Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 195.) Budapest, 1994, 12-13 and 86.

<sup>34</sup> On the help given by the Styrian estates: Günther Burkert, *Ferdinand I. und die steirischen Stände. Dargestellt anhand der steirischen Landtage 1526-1541*. (Inaugural-Diss.) Graz, 1976, 57-173.

but it did not entail—and it could not within the medieval Hungarian Kingdom—the transformation of the defence system. However, Ferdinand I in his capacity as King of Hungary and Croatia, sent troops paid by his Austrian estates to the castles of Zengg and Klissza in 1527 and to Bihács after the resignation of Ferenc Batthyány in 1528.<sup>35</sup> In addition to taking charge of the major border fortresses, more and more field troops also arrived in the Sava region to stop the Ottoman raids, and their commanders-in-chief (Miklós Jurisics, Hans Katzianer) began to organize the border fortresses under royal administration into a coherent system. As a first step, in 1538 they set up the post of the captain-general whose responsibility encompassed the region called the Old Croatian confines (*alte krabatische/kroatische Grenze*) in later sources. In the last days of April, when the *ban* Péter Keglevich, defending Bihács again, renounced his control over the castles he had been in charge of, Ferdinand appointed Erasm von Thurn the captain-general of Zengg, Bihács, Ripács, and Otocsác, and the minor fortresses belonging to them, that is of the Old Croatian confines.<sup>36</sup> With the appointment of Thurn the construction of the western section of the Croatian border defence system extending from the Una to the Adriatic Sea actually started, and the work was continued by the commanders-in-chief in Croatia and Slavonia (*Obrister Feldhauptmann windischer und krabatischer/kroatischer Lande*) appointed after 1540, firstly by Hans Ungnad.<sup>37</sup> In accordance with the practice followed in the case of the commanders-in-chief in Hungary they were also assisted by

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<sup>35</sup> L. Thallóczy–A. Hodinka, *op. cit.*, 671: No. DXXIV, 672-674: No. DXXVI and 677-686: Nos. DXXXII-DXXXV and LVII.

<sup>36</sup> "Pro conservandis partium istarum ad confinia Turcharum iacentium locis ... in Capitaneum assumpsimus et constituimus illique Castrorum et Oppidorum nostrorum Bihigij et Repatz, Civitatisque nostrae Segniensis et Ottoschutz cum omnibus eorundem attinentiis curam administrationemque demandavimus", and "in supremum Capitaneum universorum regni nostri Croatiae locorum finimorum simul et gentium ibidem nostrorum, nec non Civitatis nostrae Segnensis et Attatschvz ac praeterea et oppidorum nostrorum Bihigij et Repath assumpsimus et constituimus." ÖStA HHStA Hungarica AA. Fasc. 35. Konv. 1. 1538. Apr. fols. 94-95. Cf. *ibid.*, fols. 86-87, 89, 93 and 96-99.

<sup>37</sup> Budapest, Magyar Országos Levéltár [hereinafter MOL] E 144, Magyar kincstári levéltárak, Magyar Kamara Archivuma [hereinafter MKA] Történelmi emlékek, Belügy box 1. fols. 63-64. January 12, 1540. Without place. The *Bestallung* of Ferdinand I for Hans Ungnad "Oberister Veldhawbtman vnserer Funff Niderosterreichischen, Windischen vnd Crabatischen Lannde". Cf. Bernd Zimmermann, "Landeshauptmann Hans Ungnad von Sonnegg (1493-1564). Ein Beitrag zu seiner Biographie," in *Siedlung, Macht und Wirtschaft. Festschrift Fritz Posch zum 70. Geburtstag*. (Veröffentlichungen des Steiermärkischen Landesarchivs, 12.) Ed. by Gerhard Pferschy. Graz, 1981, 210.

war councillors delegated by neighbouring provinces.<sup>38</sup> In parallel to this the settlement of and offering of privileges to the Vlachs (*Valachi*) and Uskoks (*Uscoci*) started in the Croatian-Slavonian areas, whose certain groups later on played an important role in the defence of border fortresses and then from the eighteenth century in the military frontiers.<sup>39</sup>

In the period lasting from the battle of Mohács to the fall of Buda, the formation of a new defence system was initiated by the Habsburg military leadership only in the Croatian border area between Zengg and Bihács. Ferdinand I took the necessary steps only in the territories mostly threatened by the Ottomans and even if he recognized the real nature of this danger (namely that Vienna was also menaced) he was unable to create a coherent defence system to avoid it. With his troops regularly sent to Croatia-Slavonia and Hungary each year, he only spontaneously retorted his rival king John I; at the same time, he commissioned commanders-in-chief to take charge of the military affairs and border defence in Hungary. And though he did not seek to organize a new defence system in these far away areas of Hungary, that is he was not energetically involved against the Ottomans, with these steps he still ensured those regions where later on the new chain of fortresses could be built up as the basis for the organization of the new defence system. He could also benefit from the serious mistakes committed by the Ottoman military leadership; in 1529 and 1532, Süleyman I withdrew his troops to the line of the Lower Danube and Drava and did not retain those fortresses which afterwards faced him as the bulwarks of the new defence network and could only be regained at the expense of severe losses.

#### *2.1.b. The first attempts to organize a new defence system (1541-1556)*

The fall of Buda in 1541 and of the fortresses of Siklós, Pécs, Székesfehérvár, Tata, Nógrád, Hatvan, then of Esztergom on the Danube, and the loss of Valpó and Atyina in Slavonia during the 1543-1544 campaign justified those few who were of the opinion already in the 1530s that these fortresses would have to be reinforced and a new defence system covering the whole country organized. The repeated advance of the Ottomans created a completely new situation. While up to this point the creation of the new system—with the exception of the most endangered

<sup>38</sup> Schulze, *Landesdefension*, 60-61.

<sup>39</sup> Kaser, *op. cit.*, 60-79. Catherine Wendy Bracewell, *The Uskoks of Senj. Piracy, Banditry, and Holy War in the Sixteenth-Century Adriatic*. Ithaca-London, 1992.

Croatian areas—could be postponed, now there was no further possibility of delay due to the threat to Styria, Lower Austria (*Niederösterreich*), and Vienna. Immediate action was needed in the Slavonian parts, in Hungary, and particularly in the foreground of Vienna, which the Ottomans had already menaced by marching to the Austrian frontiers. The pattern and the methods were given: border defence regions had to be formed that were similar to those which used to protect the southern borders of the medieval Hungarian Kingdom; the basis had already been established in the Croatian border zone. This was no easy task—not only for financial or military reasons. While the military leaders of the estates of Carniola, Carinthia, and Styria in the Croatian territories already had a certain knowledge of the place and some practice in the basics of how to create a defence line, the leaders of the endangered Lower Austria could only start their job with the help of the commander-in-chief delegated by them and of the Hungarian estates. At the same time, the opposite was true as well. It was not by chance that the estates of Hungary, whose territory decreased to the shape of a crescent, stressed so many times in the following years that, for the maintenance of the border fortresses, “there is a need for the financial and military assistance of the Holy Imperial and Royal Majesties and of the Imperial Princes... because the Hungarian war tax (*subsidium*) alone cannot cover all these at all.”<sup>40</sup> The parties fighting for control over the Hungarian military affairs were forced to cooperate in order to survive. Fortunately, there were politicians and military leaders on both sides who understood the real consequences of the lack of cooperation.

Though the Hungarian estates elected two captain-generals of the country (*supremus capitaneus regni Hungariae*, *Obrister Landeshauptmann in Ungarn*) at the diet of Besztercebánya in 1542,<sup>41</sup> they could not fulfil their tasks due to the lack of financial resources. The districts of those fortresses that could be fitted into a new line were ruined owing to the Ottoman

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<sup>40</sup> “Subsidium vel pecuniarum, vel gentium Sacrae Caesareae et Regiae Majestatum ac imperii principum omnino est necessarium..., nam Hungaricum per se subsidium ad ista omnia haudquaquam satis futurum esse, jam majestas sua intelligit.” 1547: article 16. *Magyar törvénytár. (Corpus Juris Hungarici) 1526-1608. törvényczikkek* [Articles of 1526-1608]. Accompanied by explaining notes by Dezső Márkus [hereinafter *CJH*]. Budapest, 1899, 198-199.

<sup>41</sup> Antal Föglein, “XVI. századi közigazgatástörténeti adatok Zólyom vármegyéből [Data on the Administrative History of County Zólyom in the Sixteenth Century],” *Századok* 57-58 (1923-1924) 474: n. 1.

campaigns so their upkeep and the payment of soldiers could not be covered by their diminished incomes. Realizing this, the Hungarian estates asked Ferdinand I in 1546 to care for the fortresses of Dombó, Kaposújvár, Somogyvár, Lak, Szigetvár, Tihany, Csesznek, and Szentmárton in Transdanubia, for Ság, Pásztó, Drégely, Szécsény, Buják, and Léva north-east of the Danube with the help of his Austrian provinces, as these fortresses had been deprived of all their incomes by the Ottoman advance.<sup>42</sup> By this time the Ottomans quickly moved forward despite their military mistakes, for after their occupation of the fortresses in the Szerémség there were no natural obstacles (mountains, major rivers or marshy areas) up to Lake Balaton or the Northern and Transdanubian Mountains which could have stopped them. The field troops led by the royal commanders-in-chief were not able to counterbalance the disadvantages deriving from the natural surroundings so the fortresses enumerated by the estates could rely on only diminished support. While before 1521 all the military and financial resources of the country could be mobilized in order to protect the two southern border castles defence lines, by the late 1540s this task was mainly entrusted to the Austrian provinces and to the German Empire. In vain did the Hungarian estates try to finance the fortresses from the war tax (*subsidium* or *dica*) of the decreased country in 1546; and later too, their efforts resulted each time in failure.<sup>43</sup>

From all this the military leadership in Vienna came to the conclusion that the field troops occasionally sent to Hungary and Croatia-Slavonia were not sufficient to protect their provinces. Lower Austria and Styria were now faced with the same task as Carniola and Carinthia—which had been financing the Old Croatian border for a decade. Their odd support, often granted yearly, but still depending on the extent of the Ottoman menace had to be replaced by constant participation. While Lower Austria, in order to survive, had to undertake the supply of the fortresses protecting Vienna and its district and the castles north of Lake Balaton, Styria had the same job concerning the border fortresses of Slavonia shrunken to the territories between the Sava and Drava west of Pozsega. At the same time, the estates of Carniola and Carinthia were confronted with new tasks from the 1550s on as the owners of the fortresses in the region from Bihács to Sziszek and north of the river Una

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<sup>42</sup> "Quae [castra] omnibus fere proventibus ac redivibus per Turcas spoliata sunt." 1546: article 44. *CJH* 180-181.

<sup>43</sup> MOL E 554 MKA Városi és kamarai iratok. Fol. Lat. 851.

more and more frequently turned to their ruler for help. The reason for this was that the Croatian-Slavonian *ban*, gradually deprived of the military authority he had possessed before the battle of Mohács, was unable to protect this territory effectively with the infantry and cavalry troops consisting of only a few hundred people paid by the king from the *dica*, that is he remained as helpless without the support of the neighbouring Austrian provinces as the two captain-generals of the country elected by the Hungarian estates.

In the foundation of the new defence system in the 1540s, a decisive role was played by Niklas Graf zu Salm, royal commander-in-chief, and Pál Várday, Archbishop of Esztergom and *locumtenens*. Salm, commander-in-chief for the whole theatre of war against the Ottomans (*Obrister Feldhauptmann der Krone Ungarn, der Windischen, Kroatischen und Niederösterreichischen Lande*)<sup>44</sup> and appointed in 1546, had a better working relationship than his predecessors with the *locumtenens* and with the Transdanubian captain-general (*supremus capitaneus partium Transdanubianarum*) and the 'Cisdanubian' captain-general (*supremus capitaneus partium Cisdanubianarum*) appointed to the territories north and east of the Danube. The process which resulted in the formation of a coherent defence system ranging from the Adriatic Sea to the Transylvanian border in twenty years was the fruit of their work starting at the turn of the 1550s. Furthermore, the methods which were always applicable in their perfected forms if new defence zones had to be created against the Ottoman advance, came into being in this period. And though the military leadership in Vienna was still far from organizing the defence on the basis of a coherent strategy, the many forced measures brought their first results by 1556.

The restructuring work was hampered by the fact that most of the castles to be included in the new system of fortresses were privately owned at that time. An outstandingly important task of Salm, Várday, and their successors was either to take these fortresses entirely into royal use (Szigetvár, Eger, Gyula) or to make sure that the royal garrison should be placed in the private ones (Pápa, Csesznek, Devcsér). Sometimes new fortresses (Oláhújvár)—mainly palisades—were erected, though this was still not common practice. It was of more importance, though, that several minor forts were strengthened in the district of royal castles and were

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<sup>44</sup> ÖStA HHStA Hungarica AA. Fasc. 54. 1546-1547. fols. 14-29. Contemporary copy (Vienna, March 21, 1546).

manned from large fortresses and that the castles, mansions and cloisters not fitting in the system were destroyed. But these actions were always accomplished in the last minute so the establishment of the new defence network proceeded quite haltingly; and the abandoned castles that were not blown up often became very important elements in the Ottoman system of strongholds in Hungary.

The taking over of the castles by the king and the supply of them with soldiers were followed by their fortification. However, most of the construction works in this period were not subject to comprehensive controls and buildings were not constructed according to modern architectural procedures but in a rough-and-ready way, mainly by building palisades made of soil and beams.<sup>45</sup> The exception to this rule was the fortification of the strategically most important castles such as Esztergom, Komárom, Győr, Szolnok, Eger, and Kassa under the direction of Italian professional military architects hired by the Vienna high command.<sup>46</sup> At the same time, there were halts in the war supplies and provision of food, and the use of German and Hungarian soldiery together caused some further problems so far unknown to the Habsburg military leadership. Though in order to defend the *hinterland* provinces they started to create a system of signalling with gunshots and fires (*Kreidschuss- und Kreidfeuersystem*),<sup>47</sup> the whole defence line still did not work effectively enough. To develop this border defence into a coherent system there was a need for a central directing body that could govern them according to the same concept. But before the establishment of this in 1556 the formation of the units of the new defence system began, if not in integrated frameworks. The following table provides information on these defence zones, the cavalry and infantry troops serving in them, and on the monthly and annual costs of their pay.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Vidor Pataki, "A XVI. századi várépítés Magyarországon [The Fortification of Castles in Hungary in the Sixteenth Century]," *A Bécsi Magyar Történelmi Intézet Évkönyve* 1 (1931) 98-132.

<sup>46</sup> Endre Marosi, "Partecipazione di architetti militari veneziani alla costruzione del sistema delle fortezze di confine in Ungheria tra il 1541 e il 1593," in *Rapporti veneto-ungheresi all'epoca del Rinascimento* (Studia Humanitatis, 2.). Ed. by Tibor Klaniczay. Budapest, 1975, 195-215.

<sup>47</sup> German *Mörser zu Kreidschüssen* or *Lärmörser* = Latin *mortarium pro dando signo seu rumore* or *bombarda ad sonum apta* = Hungarian *hírlövő mozsár* or *hírpattantyú* = Croatish *glasnik* and Turkish *haberdar*. Simoniti, *op. cit.*, 169-179. Gustav Otruba, "Zur Geschichte des Fernmeldewesens in Österreich," in *Technologisches Gewerbemuseum. Jahresbericht 1955/56*. Vienna, 1956, 15-43.

<sup>48</sup> 1556: ÖStA HHStA Hungarica AA. Fasc. 76. Konv. 1. 1556. Jan.-Juli fols. 16-37.

*The organization of the defence system against the Ottomans and the number and payment of the soldiers in the border fortresses, 1556*

	Number of fortresses	Number of infantry	Number of cavalry	Total monthly payment	Total annual payment
Old Croatian confines	2 major fortresses + minor ones	565	241	6433 r. f. 50 k.	77 206 r. f.
Wendish confines	15 + field troops	944 <sup>49</sup>	900	9263 r. f. 21 k.	111 160 r. f. 12 k.
Troops led by the <i>ban</i>	?	200	300	2338 r. f.	28 056 r. f.
Border fortresses around Szigetvár	Sziget + minor ones	1080	826	8144 r. f. 11 k. 1 d.	97 730 r. f. 15 k.
Border fortresses around Győr	8	1874	987	11 933 r. f. 36 k.	143 203 r. f. 12 k.
Komárom	1	928 <sup>50</sup>	150	5788 r. f.	69 456 r. f.
Confines protecting the mining towns	7	762	826	6711 r. f. 35 k.	80 539 r. f.
Border fortresses in Upper Hungary	min. 4 + field troops	1375 <sup>51</sup>	859 <sup>52</sup>	10 250 r. f.	123 000 r. f.
Captaincy-general of the Lower Parts	min. 2 + field troops	250	915	4927 r. f. 5 k.	59 125 r. f.
Imperial troops in Transylvania	—	1000	2000	13 000 r. f.	156 000 r. f.
Total	about 50	8978	8004	78 789 r. f. 38 k. 1 d.	945 475 r. f. 39 k.

R. f.=Rhenish forint; k=Kreuzer; d=Pfennig

<sup>49</sup> I counted the 24-person auxiliary staff of the commander-in-chief—including the artillerymen serving in the fortresses—in the infantry.

<sup>50</sup> The 928 infantrymen consisted of 528 Hungarian boatmen (*naszádos*) and 400 German infantrymen (*Landsknecht*).

<sup>51</sup> I included in this figure the muster master (*Mustermeister*), the muster scribe (*Musterschreiber*), the war paymaster (*Kriegszahlmeister*), and the war paymaster inspector (*Kriegszahlmeister-Kontrolleur*) who were employed to supply the fortresses from Pozsony to Gyula, and also the 125 infantrymen calculated from the amount of pay they received in the castle of Sáros.

<sup>52</sup> Together with the 59 coach-horses (*Postpferd*) used in Hungary.

Up to 1556 there were no essential changes in the organization of the Old Croatian confines established by 1538. Their fortresses were divided into two captaincies (*Hauptmannschaft*), the castle districts of Zengg (Otocác, Brinje, Brlog) and Bihács (Ripács, Szokol, Izacsics, and Toplicski turanj).<sup>53</sup> In addition to their garrison, the troops of the border zone included the soldiers serving in the guard-houses (German *Skart*, *Skarthus*; Latin *excubia*; Hungarian *góré*; Turkish *çardak*)<sup>54</sup> and in the forests paid by the ruler (*Skartleut*), whose task was—according to a contemporary document—to watch day and night and signal in case of a raid by the enemy.<sup>55</sup> The sailors on the Adriatic Sea, who played an important role in controlling the coastline south of Zengg, belonged to this organization as well. Besides the troops of the commander-in-chief, the Croatian border area was defended by the *bans* Péter Keglevich and Tamás Nádasdy (1537-1542), then from 1542 by *ban* Miklós Zrínyi (1542-1556) with a few hundred of his cavalry and infantry, especially on the territories ranging from Bihács to Sziszek along the Una and the Kulpa.

Since the Ottomans were gradually advancing on the Slavonian territories between the Drava and the Sava in the 1540s, in order to defend Styria, the foundations of the so-called Wendish, that is Slavonian border defence zone (*windische Grenze*) were relatively quickly laid. Soldiers paid by the Styrian estates were sent to the border fortresses of the river valleys (Lónya, Csázma, Drava) south and south-east of Varasd, which were supported by the field troops of the commander-in-chief, even occasionally by the army of the *ban* in case of a major Ottoman raid. In addition to the 1,800 royal troops—similarly to the Croatian border line—several nobles had their own armies, which also took part in the defence of the more and more threatened part of the country, though these were not subordinated to the commander-in-chief. Niklas Graf zu Salm appointed in 1546 worked in Hungary, which was more endangered than Slavonia, therefore, as he had been represented in this border region by his assistant

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<sup>53</sup> Radoslav Lopašić, *Spomenici hrvatske krajine (Acta historiam confinii militaris Croatici illustrancia)*. III. *Od godine 1693 do 1780 i u dodatku od g. 1531 do 1730*. (Monumenta Spectantia Historiam Slavorum Meridionalium, XX.) Zagreb, 1889, 390-391: No. III.

<sup>54</sup> See the picture of a typical example in *Vojna Krajina*, *supra*, 33.

<sup>55</sup> "Tag und nacht zwischen den türkischen Schlössern auf der Wacht liegen müssen." Sándor Takáts, *Rajzok a török világból* [Sketches from the Ottoman World]. II. Budapest, 1915, 70: n. 2. *Skartleuts* were employed on the Croatian border later, too. In 1573 for example eight guards were serving "am Wasserflus Vnna": ÖStA KA AFA 1573/11/1.

commanders-in-chief (*Verwalter der obristen Feldhauptmannschaft*) several times, after his death in 1550, the title of the commander-in-chief of Hungary and Croatia-Slavonia was divided into two parts. While his tasks in Hungary were assigned to Sforza Pallavicini appointed field marshal (*Obrister Feldmarschall in Ungarn, supremus bellicus mareschallus in Hungaria*),<sup>56</sup> Hans Ungnad became commander-in-chief in the Croatian-Slavonian border area (*Obrister Feldhauptmann an den windischen und kroatischen Grenzen*) in 1553.<sup>57</sup> In the control of this second defence region and in the communication with the three provinces paying the soldiers, assistance was provided by a Styrian, a Carniolan, and a Carinthian war councillor, apart from the field marshal (*Feldmarschall*) in the mid-1550s. The personnel of the commander-in-chief also included a muster master (*Mustermeister*), a war paymaster (*Kriegszahlmeister*), a provision officer (*Proviandmeister*); furthermore, on the Croatian border a special deputy (*Leutnant*) was also commanded to help him.

The establishment of the new defence zones in Hungary was most rapid on territories protecting Vienna and Lower Austria. An important step in this direction—which also determined later developments—was that, in parallel to the appointment of Salm as commander-in-chief in 1546, the fortresses north of Lake Balaton (Győr, Pápa, Veszprém, and Szentmárton) were supplied with soldiers paid by the Lower Austrian estates.<sup>58</sup> Thus the organization of a border fortress zone was also initiated in Hungary, a zone similar to both the one that had existed before the battle of Mohács and the one that had already taken shape in Croatia. That this new defence unit was of extreme importance to Vienna is shown by the fact that in its eight fortresses there were many more soldiers in 1556 than in the two dozen castles of the Old Croatian and Slavonian confines protecting the three Inner Austrian provinces.

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<sup>56</sup> See note 65.

<sup>57</sup> Lopašić, *op. cit.*, 1889, 420-426: No. XV.

<sup>58</sup> ÖStA Finanz- und Hofkammerarchiv [FHKA], Hofkammerarchiv [hereinafter HKA] Niederösterreichische Kammer RN 46. 1566. Jan. (without fols.) and *ibid.*, Hofffinanz Ungarn [hereinafter: HFU] RN 2. 1546. fols. 48. a/ 1-18. See also Lajos Geccsényi, "Ungarische Städte im Vorfeld der Türkenabwehr Österreichs. Zur Problematik der ungarischen Städteentwicklung," in *Archiv und Forschung. Das Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv in seiner Bedeutung für die Geschichte Österreichs und Europas*. (Wiener Beiträge zur Geschichte der Neuzeit, 20/1993.) Ed. by Elisabeth Springer und Leopold Kammerhofer. Wien-München, 1993, 64-65, and Angelika Hametner, *Die niederösterreichischen Landtage von 1530-1564*. (Phil. Diss.) Wien, 1970, 84.

Up to his death in spring 1550, Niklas Graf zu Salm controlled the defence of the country and started to fashion the new defence system with his deputy, his war councillors and his secretary, and with the *locumtenens* Pál Várday (died in 1549), cooperating with him efficiently. He was greatly assisted by Tamás Nádasdy, the Transdanubian and András Báthory, the Cisdanubian captain-general of the country. While Nádasdy, after the royal taking over of Szigetvár in 1546, tried to create a coherent system out of the castles south of Lake Balaton and the ones protecting his estate of Kanizsa (Szigetvár, Kaposvár, Dombó, Lak, Berzence, Babócsa, Segesd, Kiskomárom, etc.) with the help of the captain of Szigetvár under his captaincy-general,<sup>59</sup> András Báthory attempted to fulfil similar tasks in Upper Hungary. Meanwhile, in 1551, with the help of George Martinuzzi, there was an unsuccessful attempt to place Transylvania under Habsburg leadership. While Ferdinand I sent a major army to the principality led by Gianbattista Castaldo, the Ottomans captured fortresses of crucial importance (Veszprém, Palota, Drégely, Szécsény, Hollókő, Buják, Ság, Gyarmat) during their 1552 campaign. Only the heroic fighting of the garrison of Eger could stop the enemy threatening the upper parts of the country. But Szolnok and Temesvár were occupied and had to be replaced by Gyula and Várad, as in 1550, after the taking of Temesvár for Ferdinand; the Vienna high command had tried to reorganize the captaincy-general of the Lower Parts (*capitaneatus partium regni Hungariae inferiorum*) created by Matthias Corvinus in the mid-1470s as part of the new defence system. In accordance with the medieval concept, considerable number of soldiers were sent to Temesvár and the neighbouring minor fortresses; furthermore, an attempt was made to mobilize the nearby counties in the *hinterland* to defend these strongholds, though they were rather exhausted by the Ottoman devastation. The loss of Temesvár and Szolnok in effect shattered this experiment. And although in 1554 the office often called in this time the captaincy-general of the areas beyond the Tisza (*supremus capitaneatus partium Trans-tibiscanarum*) was held by the Bishop of Várad and later—after Várad was attached to Transylvania (1557)—by the captain of Gyula, it was only a matter of time before the remnants of the captaincy-general organized in

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<sup>59</sup> For these smaller castles, see Csaba Csorba, "Erődített és várrá alakított kolostorok a Dél-Dunántúl török kori végvári rendszerében [Cloisters Fortified and Converted into Castles in the South-Transdanubian System of Border Fortresses in the Ottoman Era]," *Somogy megye múltjából. Levéltári évkönyv* 5 (1974) 13-47.

the southern parts of the country in the 1470s submitted to Ottoman advance.<sup>60</sup>

The occupation of the fortresses in county Nógrád in 1552 and of Fülek two years later cut an enormous wedge into the country under Ferdinand I's rule.<sup>61</sup> There was a chance that the Ottomans would sever the connection between the territories near Vienna and the areas and fortresses on the two banks of the Tisza. At the same time, the mining towns situated in Hungary along the river Garam, still providing a lion's share of incomes in the diminished country, passed into the forefront of Ottoman conquest. Vienna regarded their protection—similarly to the significant Upper Hungarian parts—as extremely important. After the fall of Fülek in 1554, they placed János Balassa, the high sheriff and captain of Zólyom (*comes and capitaneus Zoliensis*) in charge of the border fortresses defending the mining towns from Léva to Divény (Léva, Korpona, Bozók, Zólyom, Kékkő, Divény, Libetbánya, etc.).<sup>62</sup> Balassa held this office called the captain-general of the mining towns (*supremus capitaneus civitatum montanarum*) up to 1562. Similar tasks were fulfilled in Upper Hungary by Gábor Perényi (1554-1555),<sup>63</sup> the successor of András Báthory, who was appointed Voivode of Transylvania (1552-1553), and by István Dersffy, the captain of Kassa (1556-1557) after Perényi deserted to John Sigismund.<sup>64</sup>

Albeit the instruction sent to field marshal Sforza Pallavicini in November 1552 decreed that all the soldiers in the border fortresses north,

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<sup>60</sup> A summary of all this: Géza Pálffy, "Védelmi övezetek a Tiszától keletre a XVI. században [Defence Zones East of the River Tisza in the Sixteenth Century]" in *In memoriam Barta Gábor. Tanulmányok Barta Gábor emlékére*. Ed. by István Lengvári. Pécs, 1996, 209-227.

<sup>61</sup> Markus Köhbach, *Die Eroberung von Fülek durch die Osmanen 1554. Eine historisch-quellenkritische Studie zur osmanischen Expansion im östlichen Mitteleuropa*. (Zur Kunde Südosteuropas, II/18.) Wien-Köln-Weimar, 1994.

<sup>62</sup> MOL E 185 MKA Archivum familiae Nádasdy [hereinafter E 185], Missiles. The letter of János Balassa to Tamás Nádasdy. Zólyom, July 9, 1555.

<sup>63</sup> On the appointment of Perényi: "Anno Christi 1554. die 8. Martii supremus regni Ungariae dux et capitaneus a rege Ferdinando constituitur." Budapest, Országos Széchényi Könyvtár [hereinafter OSzK], Kézirattár [hereinafter Kt.] Fol. Lat. 1402. fol. 7. Agreement with him on the payment of his soldiers: MOL E 211 MKA Lymbus Series II. Item 24. fols. 74-75.

<sup>64</sup> Dersffy's instruction: Košice, Archiv Mesta Košic, Collectio Schwartzenbachiana No. 1780 and ÖStA KA AFA 1557/6/ad 8. His appointment: MOL E 142 MKA Acta publica Fasc. 11. No. 35.

west, and east of the Danube were to obey him,<sup>65</sup> this did not come into effect except for the castles south-east of Győr designated as his headquarters.<sup>66</sup> In the curtailment of Pallavicini's authority those interests can be recognized which motivated the two captain-generals of the country and first of all Tamás Nádasdy, appointed *palatinus* in 1554. They did not want to give up the leadership of the defence system or at least active participation in it. And the successes of the Ottomans between 1552 and 1554 prevented the Habsburg military leadership and Pallavicini from solving the problem of authority amongst the most urgent defence measures. The new system could not be organized without the Hungarian landowners and military leaders possessing castles near the border and well-versed in warfare against the Ottomans (such as Nádasdy, Balassa, Báthory, Perényi, Dersffy, Ferenc Tahy, or János Krusith), not to mention the Croatian-Slavonian *bans*. The reason for this was that there were scarcely any Lower or Inner Austrian military leaders at that time who could have efficiently replaced the Hungarian nobles knowing the Hungarian military and political situation. It seemed advisable to involve the Hungarians in controlling certain units of the defence system at the expense of some compromise. As *palatinus*, Nádasdy was practically in charge of the fortresses around Szigetvár south of Lake Balaton; János Balassa organized the castles protecting the mining towns; Gábor Perényi and then István Dersffy undertook the military control of the Upper Parts of the country east of county Gömör (*partes superiores*).

By the mid-1550s the establishment of the new defence system had been commenced all over Hungary ruled by Ferdinand I. This huge military organization—even in European terms—did not work under unified

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<sup>65</sup> "Datis ... ad universos ac singulos capitaneos, castellanos et milites nostros ex utraque Danubii parte existentes firmissimis mandatis, ut eundem tanquam supremum bellicum marescalcum nostrum colant et observent ipsique debitam et convenientem obedientiam praestent" (Ebersdorf, November 16, 1552). ÖStA HHStA Hungarica AA. Fasc. 68. 1552. Nov. fols. 108-112. Cf. also "ipsique simul curam arcium et locorum nostrorum in superioribus regni nostri Hungariae partibus, ex utraque Danubii parte existentium demandaverimus" (Ebersdorf, November 16, 1552). *Ibid.*, Fasc. 49. Konv. A. 1542. Okt. fols. 39-40 (under bad archival placement) and M. Köhbach, *op. cit.*, 214-215, furthermore ÖStA KA Memoiren 28/1334/11. pp. 268-269.

<sup>66</sup> "Vigore instructionis ratione officii mei bellimarsalcatus mihi datae universi praesidiarii milites, equites et pedites ex utraque parte Danubii adusque Tijbiscum et Dravum existentes mihi subiacent, verum deinde postquam bellimarsalcatus officio fungor, me inscio plures capitanei et milites cum sunt dimissi vel noviter conducti, tum de uno in alium locum traducti ..." MOL E 185 Missiles. The letter of Sforza Pallavicini to Tamás Nádasdy. Győr, July 6, 1555.

central control at that time. In the long run, however, the varied zones and units of the system could not be efficiently operated without the coordination of the central military administration because it was at that time that military affairs in Europe started to develop in such a way which was later labelled as the 'military revolution' by modern historians.<sup>67</sup> Strategy and tactics were gradually transformed, firearms became more and more decisive, the new methods of the castle fortification were invented in Italy, the military sciences underwent an unusually fast development, huge armies began to be employed—just to mention the basic and well-known changes. All this required that qualitatively new methods of logistics should be worked out, economy should serve the purposes of war, and last but not least that military-administrative reforms should be carried out with the aim of facilitating central control and the logistics of the armies and the border defence zones. And though up to 1556 the signs of these changes could hardly be recognized in the Hungarian theatre of war, the new system could not be controlled without a central supreme command even in this immature form. This was realized in time in Vienna, which had just become an Imperial City, when in November 1556 the Aulic War Council (*Wiener Hofkriegsrat, Consilium Bellicum*) was set up.

2.2.a. *The consequences of the foundation of the Aulic War Council in Vienna (1556-1566)*

Before 1556 the theatre of war against the Ottomans in Hungary had been governed by the commanders-in-chief of Ferdinand I and the military councillors (*verordnete Kriegsräte*) ordered to help them, who were appointed only for the period of a campaign. The control of the new defence system was greatly hampered by the fact that the commanders-in-chief had to share their tasks with the *bans* in the Croatian-Slavonian border areas, and in Hungary with the *locumtenens*, from 1554 to 1562 with the *palatinus*, and also with the two captain-generals of the country. With the establishment of the Aulic War Council in 1556 the problem of central

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<sup>67</sup> I mention only some authoritative works: Michael Roberts, *The Military Revolution, 1560-1660*. Belfast, 1955. Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution. Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800*. Cambridge, 1988. Jeremy Black, *A Military Revolution? Military Change and European Society, 1550-1800*. Macmillan, 1991, and most recently *The Military Revolution Debate. Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe*. Ed. by Clifford Rogers. Boulder-San Francisco-Oxford, 1995. For the impact of the military revolution in Hungary, see the article of József Kelenik in the present volume.

military leadership and administration was finally settled.<sup>68</sup> The commanders-in-chief and their councillors were replaced by a board of experts that had a considerable number of members and met daily. The board had the task of exercising complete central control over the military administration. So its measures taken in the name of the ruler could not be defied either by the *locumtenens* or the captain-generals of Hungary and the *bans*. All this decided the struggle for the leadership of the central military control with the Hungarian estates and their leaders to the advantage of the ruler and his Austrian estates. After the death of the influential *locumtenens* and *palatinus*, Tamás Nádasdy, in 1562, the *locumtenentia regia* finally lost its function of controlling military affairs, and it could not regain it after the considerable strengthening of the estates in the seventeenth century either.

The establishment of the Aulic War Council was necessitated by the requirement that the different parts of the new defence system be organized into a unified whole. This was expressed by the fact that diplomacy towards the Ottoman state closely connected with the defence was mostly administered by the War Council until the early eighteenth century. On the other hand, all those offices that were to be organized or stabilized in the following decades to coordinate the different fields of military affairs fully served the supply of the border fortresses in the sixteenth century. The control over the arsenals of the border fortresses and the *hinterland* supply bases (Graz, Laibach, Triest, Prague, Kassa, etc.) and over the central direction of war supplies was put in charge of the chief arsenal officer (*Obrist-Zeugmeister*). The fortification works in the border areas were coordinated by construction supervisors (*Bausuperintendent*, for example in Vienna, Győr-Komárom, the Croatian-Slavonian confines), then later as their superior, by the chief fortification commissary (*Obrist-Baukommissar*) residing in Vienna from the 1560s. The two most problematic areas of military affairs were also led by separate officers with their increasing staff. Food provision was organized by the chief food provision officer (*Obrist-Proviantmeister*), the payment of the soldiers was solved by the chief muster master (*Obrist-Mustermeister*) and his

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<sup>68</sup> Thomas Fellner–Heinrich Kretschmayr, *Die österreichische Zentralverwaltung. I. Abt. Von Maximilian I. bis zur Vereinigung der österreichischen und böhmischen Hofkanzlei (1749). I. Geschichtliche Übersicht.* (Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für neuere Geschichte Österreichs, 5.) Wien, 1907, 234–241, and Oskar Regele, *Der österreichische Hofkriegsrat 1556–1848.* (Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs, Erg. Bd. I/1.) Wien, 1949, 13–17.

subordinates, the war paymasters (*Kriegszahlmeister*). The chief pontooneer (*Obrist-Schiffmeister*, then *Obrist-Schiffbrückmeister*) and the directors of the arsenals (*Zeugwart*) in Vienna and Pozsony had a great task in the field of war supplies and the equipment of the Danube fleet.<sup>69</sup>

After 1556, the duties of the War Council and diplomacy towards the Ottomans were discharged by the staff of the Aulic War Chancery (*Hofkriegskanzlei*, *Cancellaria Bellica*) which was composed of two secretaries (*Sekretär*), one *Registrator*, one *Expeditör*, several drafters (*Konzipist*) and scribes (*Schreiber*), some servants (*Diener*) and a translator (*Dolmetscher*).<sup>70</sup> At the same time, due to the administrative reforms of Ferdinand I, the financial matters of Hungary and the Austrian provinces had been managed for some decades by separate offices also constantly meeting at certain headquarters and working as a team. The Aulic Chamber (*Hofkammer*, *Camera Aulica*) set up in 1527 was the leading organ of financial administration. As a result, in certain matters it exerted some influence on the Hungarian Chamber (*Ungarische Kammer*, *Camera Hungarica*) working in Buda in 1528-1529, then in Pozsony after its reorganization in 1531. Their role in financing the military was of utmost importance as the War Council itself had only restricted financial powers; the payment of the garrison soldiers was ordered by the War Council, but it was actually assigned by the chambers. The Lower Austrian Chamber (*Niederösterreichische Kammer*, *Camera Austriaca*) also had special tasks in this respect as from the 1540s the payment of the soldiers in the fortresses in the vicinity of Győr that were defending Vienna was taken up by the Austrian province.

In parallel to the establishment of the central leading organ of the military affairs, negotiations started between Ferdinand I and the Austrian and Hungarian estates in 1555-1557 to create a coherent defence system. Though it is beyond the scope of this study to present these negotiations in

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<sup>69</sup> On the chief arsenal officer (1567): ÖStA FHKA HKA Niederösterreichische Herrschafts-akten W-61/C/90/B. RN 300/2. fols. 1050-1053; on the construction supervisors: V. Pataki, *op. cit.*, and E. Marosi, *op. cit.*; on the chief fortification commissary (1578): ÖStA KA Sonderreihe des Wiener Hofkriegsrates, Hofkriegsrätliches Kanzleiarchiv [hereinafter HKR KIA] VI. 6; on the chief food provisional officer (1558): ÖStA KA Protokolle des Wiener Hofkriegsrates [hereinafter HKR Prot.] Reg. Bd. 140. fols. 89-90; on the chief muster master: O. Regele, *op. cit.*, 84: Anlage 9, and on the chief pontooneer (1557-1558): Wilhelm Brinner, *Geschichte des k. k. Pionnier-Regimentes in Verbindung mit einer Geschichte des Kriegs-Brückenwesens in Oesterreich*. Wien, 1878, 7-9 and 611-613: No. 1.

<sup>70</sup> Friedrich Firnhaber, "Zur Geschichte des österreichischen Militärwesens. Skizze der Entstehung des Hofkriegsrathes," *Archiv für Kunde österreichischer Geschichts-Quellen* 30 (1864) 98-99 and 140-147: No. XVI.

detail, two major developments demonstrate the kind of preliminary work needed to qualitatively transform the border defence zones. In January 1556 in Vienna, the representatives of Lower and Upper Austria (*Oberösterreich*), Styria, Carniola, Carinthia, and Görz assembled to take measures against the Ottoman assaults for at least two or three years in advance and to discuss how they could make the defence more efficient with their financial aid. At this meeting the estates arranged for the establishment of the War Council, granted considerable sums for the provision of the border fortresses protecting their provinces and declared their claim that the captain-generals of the troops in border castles paid by them should be chosen from among their candidates. This time it was finally decided that from then on the Austrian estates—even if they had to be forced—should participate in the upkeep and direction of the Hungarian and Croatian-Slavonian border defence zones not only with field troops but with permanent garrisons, too.<sup>71</sup>

At their talks with the ruler and the representatives of the Austrian estates in 1555-1556, the military leaders of the Hungarian estates also accepted out of necessity that in addition to the central direction of border defence, they would gradually lose control of the Croatian-Slavonian border fortresses and the ones south of Győr. However, they tried to ensure the war taxes paid by the counties and other resources of the country to supply the troops of the *bans* and the captain-generals of Hungary and of the line of border fortresses south of Lake Balaton and ranging from Pozsony to as far as Gyula.<sup>72</sup> So they managed to gain control of these frontier zones. In their application submitted the following year they proposed the supply of the most important border fortresses with permanent royal troops. With their proposal they effectively designated the most significant elements of the system of border castles up to 1566: south and east of the Danube Komárom, Oláhújvár, Léva, Bozók, Murány, Eger, Gedő, Kassa, Huszt, Ecsed, Várad, and Gyula; in Transdanubia Győr, Pápa, [Zala]Szentgrót, [Zala]Komár, [Nagy]Kanizsa, Csurgó, Berzence, Palota, Tata, Vízvár, and Tihany.<sup>73</sup>

<sup>71</sup> Jod. Stülz, "Ausschustag der fünf niederösterreichischen Lande in Wien 1556," *Archiv für Kunde österreichischer Geschichts-Quellen* 8 (1852) 155-173.

<sup>72</sup> MOL E 156 MKA Urbaria et Conscriptioes Fasc. 23. No. 7. MOL E 142 Fasc. 3. No. 10 and ÖStA HHStA Hungarica AA. Fasc. 76. Konv. 1. 1556. Jan.-Juli fols. 40-62.

<sup>73</sup> ÖStA KA Akten des Wiener Hofkriegsrates [hereinafter HKR Akten] Exp. 1557. März No. 162.

The structure of the border defence zones developed in accordance with the pretensions put forward at the negotiations between the Austrian and Hungarian estates in the decades up to 1566. As the Ottomans were gradually advancing in 'peace-time' as well, especially along the Drava,<sup>74</sup> there was a need for organizing the Croatian-Slavonian border fortresses under a single captain-general. In terms of this idea and of the decisions made at the meeting in Vienna mentioned above, Hans Lenković<sup>75</sup> was appointed the first captain-general of the Croatian-Slavonian confines (*Obrist windischer und kroatischer Grenze*) in spring 1556 rather than a commander-in-chief (*Obrister Feldhauptmann an den windischen und kroatischen Grenzen*). Another fundamental change took place in the summer of 1559. The so-called New Croatian confines (*neue kroatische Grenze*)<sup>76</sup> had been organized by this time on the north-western bank of the Una from Sziszek to Bihács and opposite Kostajnica, which had been captured three years earlier. At the same time, Lenković was again appointed the captain-general of the two—Old and New—Croatian and Wendish confines, and he was assisted by deputies (*Obrist-Leutnant*) in the three sub-zones.<sup>77</sup> This practically meant the final completion of the Croatian confines (*kroatische/krabatische Grenze/Grenzgebiet*) combining two smaller parts in a short time and the Wendish border castles (*windische Grenze/Grenzgebiet*), though they were for a long time controlled by one captain-general.

The field marshal Sforza Pallavicini had similar authority in the area protecting Vienna in the period before the establishment of the Aulic War Council. His successor, Adam Gall, appointed the captain-general of Győr (*Obrist/Oberst zu Raab*) at the same time as Lenković in March 1556, practically—if not by decree—had the authority of a captain-general over the troops in the border fortresses south-east of Győr.<sup>78</sup> From 1546 the

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<sup>74</sup> Staatsarchiv Nürnberg [hereinafter StA Nürnberg], Ansbacher Reichstagsakten (Rep. 136.) Bd. 40. No. 19.

<sup>75</sup> ÖStA KA Sonderreihe des Wiener Hofkriegsrates, Bestellungen [hereinafter Best.] No. 35. Though recent literature considers Hans Ungnad, appointed in 1553, the first border defence captain-general, his rank as commander-in-chief (*Obrister Feldhauptmann*) was only a transition to the formation of the office of border defence captain-general possessed by Lenković (*Grenzobrist*). Cf. Rothenberg, *Die österreichische Militärgrenze*, 37 and 236-237: n. 33.

<sup>76</sup> "Die New Crabatische Vnnd Yeczto die gefערlichist Gräniczen."

<sup>77</sup> ÖStA KA Best. No. 80 and ÖStA KA HKR Prot. Reg. Bd. 141. April 12, 1559, No. 77 and *ibid.*, September 1. No. 1.

<sup>78</sup> Geceşenyi, *op. cit.*, 66-67. Cf. ÖStA KA Best. No. 41 and ÖStA KA Memoiren 28/1334/11. pp. 213-215.

garrison troops were paid almost entirely by the Lower Austrian estates who therefore demanded that an Austrian or German captain-general delegated by the military leadership in Vienna be placed in charge of them. During the term of office of Gall (1556-1560), and then that of his successor, Eck Graf zu Salm (1560-1574), the authority of the captain-general of Győr further increased over the border fortresses south-east of Győr, which practically resulted in the formation of the Győr confines (*raaberische Grenze/Grenzgebiet*). In 1562, this was imparted to the commanders of the border fortresses as well (*capitaneis in finibus Austriacis intra Danubium et lacum Balathon existentibus*) when it was ordered that they acknowledge Salm their superior and captain-general (*pro antecessore et superiore capitaneo*), that is the captain-general (*Grenzobrist*) of the border fortresses around Győr.<sup>79</sup>

Local direction of the border castles around Szigetvár, and of those protecting the mining towns and Upper Hungary was carried out by the military leaders of the Hungarian estates until 1566. The small fortresses south of Lake Balaton were controlled directly by the chief commanders of the fort of Szigetvár (*supremus capitaneus arcis Sziget*) and were under the influence of *palatinus* Tamás Nádasdy until 1562. From 1563 to 1566, they belonged to Miklós Zrínyi, the Transdanubian captain-general, who at the same time held the title of captain-general of Szigetvár.<sup>80</sup> The defence of Upper Hungary was organized in a similar way; border fortresses and counties were put in charge of Imre Thelekessy, the captain-general of Kassa and Upper Hungary (*supremus capitaneus civitatis Cassoviensis et partium regni Hungariae superiorum*) by Archduke Maximilian in May 1559.<sup>81</sup> As a result, the territories east of county Gömör were withdrawn from the authority of the Cisdanubian captain-general and together with the border fortresses to be found there they were subordinated to the newly established Upper Hungarian captaincy-general. So the authority of the mentioned Cisdanubian captain-general

<sup>79</sup> ÖStA KA Best. No. 102.

<sup>80</sup> The instruction of Zrínyi as the Transdanubian captain-general (April 28, 1563): ÖStA KA HKR Prot. Exp. Bd. 142. fol. 166. His *Bestallung* (May 28, 1563): ÖStA KA Best. No. 122, and ÖStA KA HKR Akten Exp. 1564. Juni No. 24. The survey of his forces as captain-general (after January 19, 1564): ÖStA KA HKR Prot. Reg. Bd. 143. fols. 8-9.

<sup>81</sup> The instruction of Thelekessy (May 8, 1559): MOL E 136 MKA Diversae instructiones [hereinafter E 136] No. 173. fols. 323-331. A letter warning the Hungarian troops in Upper Hungary to be obedient in connection with his appointment: ÖStA KA HKR Prot. Reg. Bd. 141. 1559. Mai. 13. No. 66.

shrunk to the areas between counties Pozsony and Zólyom. This did not cause a problem as the latter office was vacant at that time. When in 1564 István Dersffy was appointed the new Cisdanubian captain-general, he was also commissioned to be responsible for the border fortresses protecting the mining towns and earlier directed by János Balassa (1554-1562) and István Dobó (1562-1564).<sup>82</sup> From that time on these border fortresses together with the castle of Oláhújvár began to be called *confinia antemontana* or *confinia ante montanas civitates* in Latin and *bányavárosok előtti végváarak* in Hungarian (confines in front of the mining towns), but in German they continued to be called *bergstädterische Grenze*, which also meant the border castles protecting the mining towns.

2.2.b. *The consolidation of the new defence system: the Border Fortress and District Captaincy-Generals (1566-1578)*

In the course of the last Hungarian campaign of sultan Süleyman, Szigetvár and Gyula were captured by the Ottomans in 1566. The loss of the two key fortresses brought about the perdition of a whole chain of castles, as the main feature of the defence system was that its units, the border zones were composed of a major stronghold and several minor castles subordinated to it. While the fall of Gyula marked the end of the history of the captaincy-general of the Lower Parts (*capitaneatus partium regni Hungariae inferiorum*) created by Matthias Corvinus in mid-1470s, the downfall of Szigetvár resulted in the loss of the areas south of Lake Balaton. Already in the early 1560s Gyula fell into the same isolated situation as Jajca after the battle of Mohács. Its occupation was only a matter of time as it was surrounded by Ottoman castles (Szolnok) to the west and east or fortresses (i.e. Várad) belonging to the Ottoman vassal state of Transylvania. And up to as far as Tokaj in the north there was no other castle that could have substituted it. So the royal defence system was pressed back several hundreds of kilometers to the line of the Tisza and the Northern Mountains. As opposed to Gyula, there were more favourable opportunities to make up for the loss of Szigetvár. The hilly areas of the counties of Zala and Somogy, the marshy valley of the river Kanizsa and the medieval castles to be found there could be transformed into a system similar to the one around Győr after a chief castle and the headquarters of a new captain-general had been designated. The necessity

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<sup>82</sup> Dersffy's *Bestallung* (January 22, 1564): ÖStA KA HKR Prot. Reg. Bd. 143. fol. 10. His instruction (after February 6, 1564): *ibid.*, fol. 16. Cf. 1563: article 16. *CJH* 488-491.

of this was immediately recognized in Vienna as—with the loss of southern Transdanubia—the eastern border of Styria and the Wendish confines became more threatened than ever before.

The peace treaty of Adrianople (Edirne) made for eight years in 1568 opened up a new phase in the Habsburg-Ottoman struggle following the battle of Mohács. Until the outbreak of the Long War in 1591 no serious Ottoman attack was launched against Hungary; still, peace was only ostensible at the border of the two world empires. This period was characterized by constant incursions, attempts to extend taxation to the territory of the enemy, and by skirmishes on the frontier to capture some minor border fortresses. For this reason the era is called the 'Little War' (*Kleinkrieg*). The situation is well illustrated by a command of Emperor Maximilian II (1564-1576); he ordered the captain of the fortress of Kiskomárom situated at the southern end of Lake Balaton to keep his soldiers in such readiness "as if there was no peace of any kind"<sup>83</sup> in order to protect the neighbouring territories.

Not only did the long peaceful period facilitate the creation of the offices controlling the different areas of military affairs mentioned above, but it also ensured that the defence system could really assume a coherent character. In the long run this process, which lasted for several decades, was determined by how the Austrian provinces took part in financing the border defence zones in Hungary and to what extent the Aulic War Council was able to control defence and restrict the leading military role previously held by the Hungarian estates. This question came to the forefront after 1566, as the territory of Hungary under Habsburg authority shrunk to a rather narrow strip stretching from the Adriatic Sea to the Danube between Pozsony and Komárom after the loss of Szigetvár. Only in the Cisdanubian area as far as county Zólyom and in Upper Hungary did some territories remain untouched by Ottoman incursions. Consequently, the defence system in Hungary became deprived of any *hinterland*. In this situation Maximilian II and his successors had no other

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<sup>83</sup> "Milites autem nostros nihilominus pro nostrae ditionis tibi subiectae et vicinae securiore permansione in eorum officio et statione, non secus, quam si nullae induciae essent, die noctuque excubantes atque in omnem fortunae casum promptos semper retineas." MOL P 485 Családi levéltárak, Majthényi család, 8. csop. 1. fols. 2-3 (Pozsony, July 14, 1567). Cf. Gustav von Gömör, "Türkennoth und das Grenzwesen in Ungarn und Croatien während sieben 'Friedensjahren' von 1575 bis 1582. Nach Quellen des k. k. Kriegs-Archivs," *Mitteilungen des k. k. Kriegs-Archivs* (1885) 155-178 and Vasko Simoniti, *Turki so v deželi že. Turški vpadi na slovensko ozemlje v 15. in 16. stoletju*. Celje, 1990, 172-196.

choice but to use the resources of his provinces and the German Empire to supply the Hungarian marches. The necessity of this step was soon realized by the Habsburg military leadership from those military registers that were prepared nearly every year to calculate the amount needed to pay the soldiers serving in the border fortresses in Hungary.<sup>84</sup> It is worth selecting three muster- and pay-registers (*Muster-* and *Soldliste*) from the sixteenth century (1556, 1576, 1593) and using them to determine to what extent Hungary was in need of the support of the neighbouring provinces and the German Empire.<sup>85</sup>

The incomes of Hungary in the sixteenth century are not entirely known due to the divergent financial administration and the lack of sources. But we can rely on the estimates made by Gyula Szekfű in 1935, which have been generally accepted. Szekfű put the total income of Hungary in the second half of the sixteenth century at 750,000 Rhenish forint (*reinisch Gulden*) at most. This sum could never be collected completely as, on the one hand, most of it was locally remitted, and on the other hand, it could not be entirely spent on maintaining defence and on the payment of the soldiers. According to Szekfű, a maximum of 350,000 Rhenish forint was spent on military expenses out of this amount.<sup>86</sup> This is half of the total income, which seems an over optimistic estimate given that the data suggest only 20.4% of the cash income of the Hungarian Chamber was spent on the military in 1555-1562.<sup>87</sup> Despite this it is worth comparing the two maximum estimated values with the amounts of the pay of the soldiers in the three years mentioned above. The following graph provides information on the ratio between the total annual income of Hungary and the sums spent on the military and the amount of money needed for the payment of the soldiers in the border castles.


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<sup>84</sup> On these, cf. Géza Pálffy, "A magyarországi és délvidéki végvárrendszer 1576. és 1582. évi jegyzékei [The Registers of the Hungarian and Croatian-Slavonian Border Fortresses of 1576 and 1582]," *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 108:1 (1995) 114-185.

<sup>85</sup> 1556: ÖStA HHStA Hungarica AA. Fasc. 76. Konv. 1. 1556. Jan.-Juli fols. 16-37. 1576: ÖStA HHStA Reichstagsakten der Reichskanzlei [hereinafter RTA] Fasc. 53. fols. 350-369. Published by Pálffy, *op. cit.*, 141-158. 1593: Alfred H. Loebel, *Zur Geschichte des Türkenkrieges von 1593-1606. I. Vorgeschichte*. (Prager Studien aus dem Gebiete der Geschichtswissenschaft, Heft 6.) Prag, 1899, 19-29.

<sup>86</sup> Gyula Szekfű, *Magyar történet* [Hungarian History]. III. Budapest, 1935,<sup>2</sup> 134 and 137.

<sup>87</sup> Győző Ember, "A magyar királyi kamara pénzübeli bevételei és számadásai 1555-1562 [The Cash Incomes and Accounts of the Hungarian Chamber in 1555-1562]," *Századok* 116 (1982) 537.



The data in the graph clearly show that the maximum estimated incomes of Hungary could not cover the pay of the soldiers in the border fortresses. And if we only examine the maximum estimated sum spent on military expenses we may conclude that it was enough to cover only 25-30% of the pay of the soldiers in the established border defence system. The sums in 1576 indicate clearly why Carinthia, Carniola, Styria, Lower Austria, the German Empire, and even Bohemia and Moravia had to participate constantly in the maintenance of the border defence system in Hungary. It also has to be emphasized that this calculation does not include such 'considerable sums' as the Ottoman diplomacy, fortification of castles, the production and supply of ammunition, food provision, intelligence service, war posts and the costs of the Danube fleet,<sup>88</sup> though these amounts were gradually increasing due to the perfection of administration and the results of the military revolution. As a consequence, the border defence against the Ottomans became a common task of the whole of Eastern Central Europe and the Habsburg Empire. It was not accidentally stressed by the War Council before the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) that "every province should upkeep their own confines in Hungary."<sup>89</sup>

<sup>88</sup> "Es ist aber alhie Zumerckhen, das hierczue nit gerait würt, was auf die Jarliche Türckhische verehrung, alles nottwendig gepew, Artoloreij, Munition, Arsonal, Prouiandt sachen, was auch durchs Jar auf Musterung vnd andere Comissions sach laufft, welches man nit eigentlich wissen khan, Aber auff dise abbemelte Possten Laufft Jarlichen ain ansehenliche grosse Summa gelts." ÖStA HHStA RTA Fasc. 53. fol. 369.

<sup>89</sup> "Das Jedes landt seine sondere Graniczen in Hungern Zuerhalten" (December 29, 1613). ÖStA KA HKR Akten Reg. 1613. Dez. No. 68.

The method of financing the border defence mentioned by the War Council is of special significance because it fundamentally influenced the final structure of the defence system. In the past, the southern defence line of the medieval Hungarian Kingdom had been maintained from the country's own incomes, but the situation had changed drastically by the mid-1560s. While Hungary preserved its sovereignty and independence after the battle of Mohács, a defence system came into being on its territory that was financed by the hereditary provinces of Habsburgs and the German Empire, etc. The price of the support of the Austrian provinces was high. The Hungarian estates, along with the central control of the military affairs—and the Ottoman diplomacy which meant foreign affairs as well—gradually had to renounce the direction of the border fortresses which were of crucial importance to the protection of the neighbouring provinces. However, they could not be totally ignored in the local administration of the border defence, as the county, nobility, and other Hungarian troops could not be subordinated to German captain-generals. This conflict was perceived in Vienna and—in the knowledge of the results—it can be firmly stated that it was solved satisfactorily. A compromise had to be found which permitted the Aulic War Council to exert control over the border defence, but did not exclude the Hungarian estates. In order to achieve this, the border fortresses maintained from the support of the Austrian provinces were gradually withdrawn from the authority of the office-holders of the Hungarian estates, the Croatian-Slavonian *ban*, then later the Transdanubian and Cisdanubian captain-generals of the country. As a consequence, the defence system against the Ottomans assumed a dualistic character. To put it more precisely: on each territory of Hungary two kinds of captaincy-general came into being.

In the organization of the border defence the most decisive role was played by the so-called border fortress captain-generals (*Grenzbörst/Grenzoberst, supremus capitaneus confiniorum*). They were responsible for the direction of the minor border castles (*Grenzfestungen/Grenzorten, confinia*) subordinated to a major key fortress designated as their headquarters in a certain area, that is in the confines or border fortress zone (*Grenze/Grenzgebiet*). In parallel to them, on the same territories and at the same time, the so-called district captain-generals (*Kreisbörst/Kreisoberst, supremus capitaneus partium regni Hungariae*,

*prorex, banus*<sup>90</sup>) were operating. They directed the military affairs of the counties in the districts (*Kreis, partes*) under their authority and disposed of the troops directly subordinated to them consisting of the out-of-date nobility, county, and town insurgent troops and of the so-called district captain-general army of some hundred cavalry and infantry paid by the king. While the office of border fortress captaincy-general was filled by the representatives of the Austrian estates or Hungarian nobles accepted by them, the district captain-generals were exclusively Hungarian subjects. The separation of the border fortress and the district character of the defence system is further complicated by the fact that the two offices were often—in some parts of the country always—held by the same person. All this depended on whether the War Council wished to exercise complete control over a border defence zone or whether it ceded the direction to Hungarians (mainly on territories which were not so dangerous for the Austrian provinces). In order to understand the seemingly complicated system we have to enumerate the border fortress and district captaincy-generals that had been created by the mid-1570s from the Adriatic Sea to Transylvania.

In Croatia and Slavonia the border defence had been organized by the Croatian-Slavonian *ban* (*banus Croatiae et Slavoniae, ban in Kroatien und Slavonien/ban in Windischland*) before the battle of Mohács. The *ban* was the military commander of his *banderia*, the royal garrisons, and the insurgent noble and county troops in his area. After 1526 he lost control of the Old Croatian border fortresses and then of the Slavonian and New Croatian castles. Later, after several decades, in 1559 their direction was taken over by the Croatian-Slavonian border fortress captain-general (*Obrist der kroatischen und windischen Grenze*) and by his deputies, the assistant Croatian (*Obristleutnant der kroatischen Grenze*) and Wendish border fortress captain-generals (*Obristleutnant der windischen Grenze*). As the incomes of the diminished country did not cover the supply of the border fortresses, they were financed by the estates of Carniola, Carinthia, and Styria, and thus the *ban* was forced to renounce control over them. From that time on his authority in his capacity as district captain-general

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<sup>90</sup> The contemporary Hungarian term to designate the district captain-generals was "captain of the country" (*országhadnagy, országhadkapitánya*). See Gr. Illésházy István nádor följegyzései 1592-1603. és Hidvégi Mikó Ferencz históriája 1594-1613 [The Records of the palatinus Count István Illésházy 1592-1603 and The History of Ferenc Hidvégi Mikó 1594-1613]. (*Monumenta Hungariae Historica II. Scriptores, VII.*) Ed. by Gábor Kazinczy. Pest, 1863, 8, 16, 28, 43 and 56.

was restricted to the military affairs of the counties in Croatia and Slavonia, that is to the practically unusable noble insurrection and the troops fielded by the counties of Kőrös, Varasd, Zágráb, and to his own forces mainly consisting of 250 cavalry and 250 infantry. The latter can be regarded as his previous *banderium*, though their pay was assigned from the war taxes granted by the Croatian estates and by other Hungarian incomes in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (see map 1).

On the territory between the Drava and the Danube, a similar fate befell the Transdanubian captaincy-general set up in 1542 by the Hungarian estates. After the Lower Austrian estates assumed the burden of financing the border fortresses protecting Vienna in 1546, their command was taken over by field marshal Sforza Pallavicini and then—by the late-1560s—by the captain-general of the confines around Győr (*Obrist in Raab und zugehöriger Grenzfestungen*). The authority of the Transdanubian district captain-general (*Kreisobrist in Transdanubium, supremus capitaneus partium regni Hungariae Transdanubianarum*) was subsequently restricted to the military affairs of eleven counties (Moson, Sopron, Vas, Zala, Győr, Komárom, Veszprém, Fejér, Somogy, Tolna, and Baranya) and the border fortresses around Szigetvár, south of Lake Balaton, and a further 150 cavalry and 100 infantry. After 1566, his sphere of influence was even more limited. After the fall of Szigetvár the Aulic War Council organized a new border fortress captaincy-general with Kanizsa as its centre, and appointed Ferenc Tahy as its separate captain-general. Although he was still called the captain-general of the border fortresses between Lake Balaton and the rivers Mura and Drava (*supremus capitaneus inter lacum Balaton et fluvios Muram et Dravum regni Hungariae finium*) by contemporary sources,<sup>91</sup> his successors held the title of the captain-general of the border fortresses around Kanizsa (*Obrist in Kanischa und zugehöriger Grenzfestungen*). Following the Ottoman occupation of the counties of Tolna and Baranya, the authority of the Transdanubian captain-general shrank to the military affairs of the Transdanubian district (*partes Transdanubianae*) consisting of the nine counties left and his infantry and cavalry troops mentioned above. This captain-general had no permanent residence; it always depended on whether the person holding the office chose to be stationed in his own private estate or in a border castle with his troops. In the latter case he was the commander

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<sup>91</sup> The extract of Tahy's instruction (November 13, 1567): ÖStA KA AFA 1566/11/1. See also from 1567: "finium intra lacum Balaton et Dravum ac Muram supremus capitaneus" ÖStA FHKA HKA Familienakten D-T. 5. fol. 1 and fol. 4.

of that castle as well. In order to protect the border more efficiently and to enhance cooperation, this practice was applied more often. This explains why György Zrínyi, son of Miklós Zrínyi (died in 1566, Szigetvár), could be both the captain-general of the border fortresses around Kanizsa and the Transdanubian district captain-general (see map 2) at the same time in two periods (1574-1575 and 1583-1592).<sup>92</sup>

The structure of defence on the Cisdanubian territory east of Pozsony up to as far as county Zólyom was to a certain extent different from the setup in Croatia-Slavonia and Transdanubia. The fortresses here were of special significance for the security of the Bohemian and Moravian provinces. Their estates, at the incentive of the ruler, started to take part in the supply of the border castles protecting the mining towns (*confinia antemontana* or *confinia antemontanas civitates*, *bergstädterische Grenze*) from the 1570s on, mainly from the fortification of the totally new border fort, Érsekújvár (Neuhäusel).<sup>93</sup> They, however, did not want to interfere in their control, so this was carried out by the captain-general of the border fortresses defending the mining towns (*bergstädterischer Grenzobrist*, *supremus capitaneus confinium antemontanorum*) from 1564. He was the district captain-general of the ten counties (Pozsony, Nyitra, Trencsén, Bars, Turóc, Árva, Liptó, Hont, Nógrád, and Zólyom) of the Cisdanubian parts (*partes Cisdanubianae*). Thus, after 1564, the office of the Cisdanubian district captain-general (*Kreisobrist in Cisdanubium*, *supremus capitaneus partium regni Hungariae Cisdanubianarum*) practically comprised the office of the captain-general of the border fortresses defending the mining towns as well. This is testified by the fact that, when Simon Forgách in 1569 was appointed the captain-general of the confines and the district, he received only one instruction (see map 3).<sup>94</sup>

<sup>92</sup> That the two offices were distinct is shown by the fact that Zrínyi received two instructions when he was appointed in 1574, and in 1588 he was supported by two assistant captain-generals in both captaincy-generals (*Grenzobristleutnant* and *Kreisobristleutnant*). August 14, 1574: "Instruction vber die Craißhaubtmanschafft herdißhalb der Thonaw." ÖStA KA HKR KIA IX. c. 1 and ÖStA KA HKR Prot. Reg. Bd. 159. fol. 14. September 4, 1574: "Instruction vber die oberst Haubtmanschafft Zu Kanischa." *ibid.*, fol. 15. 1588: Archiv des Germanischen Nationalmuseums Nürnberg [hereinafter Archiv GNM Nürnberg], Weltliche Fürsten [hereinafter WF], Siebenbürgen ZR 7657. fol. 75 and fol. 80.

<sup>93</sup> On this, see the documents of the Bohemian diets: *Die böhmischen Landtagsverhandlungen und Landtagsbeschlüsse vom Jahre 1526 an bis auf die Neuzeit*. I-VII. 1526-1591. Ed. by Königlich Böhmisches Landesarchiv. Prag, 1877-1891 and *Regesta fondu Militare archivu ministerstva vnitra RČS. v Praze*. Díl I. 1527-1589. (Prameny k Československým dějinám vojenským. Svazek I.) K vydání připravil František Roubík. Praha, 1937.

<sup>94</sup> ÖStA FHKA HKA HFU RN 21. 1570. Aug. fols. 100-108 and MOL E 136 No. 173. fol. 351 (October 26, 1569).

The border defence in Upper Hungary had a more distinct character. Here there was constant warfare with the vassal of the Ottomans, John Szapolyai and his son John Sigismund until the late-1560s. For strategic reasons the direction of the garrison troops, of the armies of the counties and of the Empire sent here could not be separated. These were unanimously subordinated to the Upper Hungarian captain-general of the field troops and other forces (*Feldobrist/Generalobrist in Oberungarn, supremus capitaneus partium regni Hungariae superiorum*), from 1559 to the above mentioned Imre Thelekessy (1559-1560), then to Ferenc Zay (1560-1565), formerly imperial ambassador to Constantinople, and to the Europe-wide famous Lazarus Freiherr von Schwendi from 1565 to 1568.<sup>95</sup> After the treaty of Speyer with Transylvania in 1570, there was no need to separate the troops of the border fortresses and of the counties either, so in the Upper parts of the country (*partes superiores*) the same captain-general—the so-called Upper Hungarian military assistant of the ruler (*prorex, királyképe*: “image of the king”)—was responsible for both the border fortresses and the 13 counties of the area (Gömör-Kishont, Heves, Borsod, Szepes, Sáros, Torna, Abaúj, Zemplén, Ung, Szabolcs, Szatmár, Bereg, and Ugocsa). In this manner in Upper Hungary a captaincy-general came into being (see map 3) which resembled that was existing in the southern parts of the country (*partes inferiores regni Hungariae*) before the battle of Mohács. However, the offices and ranks formed, owing to the development of military administration and logistics, marked an essential difference. At the incentive of Lazarus Freiherr von Schwendi, a separate chamber (*Szepesi Kamara, Zipserische Kammer, Camera Scepusiensis*) was set up in Kassa in 1567 to finance the border fortresses more efficiently. In addition to the local centralization of the financial administration, several offices were established whose task was to act as substitutes of the central office holders of the Aulic War Council in this remote area.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> Wilhelm Janko, *Lazarus Freiherr von Schwendi oberster Feldhauptmann und Rath Kaiser Maximilian's II.* Wien, 1871, and Roman Schnur, “Lazarus von Schwendi (1522-1583). Ein unerledigtes Thema der historischen Forschung,” *Zeitschrift für historische Forschung* 14 (1987) 27-46.

<sup>96</sup> Upper Hungarian deputy of chief arsenal officer in Vienna (*Obrist-Zeugmeister-Leutnant in Oberungarn*) from 1567; Upper Hungarian military judge (*Kriegsrichter in Oberungarn, iudex bellicus in partibus regni Hungariae superioribus*) from 1568; Upper Hungarian chief architect (*Baumeister in Oberungarn*) around 1580; Upper Hungarian saltpetre supervisor (*Salitterverwahrer in Oberungarn*) from the mid-1590s, and temporarily in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: Upper Hungarian muster master (*Mustermeister in Oberungarn*), war paymaster (*Kriegszahlmeister in Oberungarn*), pontooneer (*Schiffbrückmeister in Oberungarn*) and food provisional officer (*Proviantmeister in Oberungarn*). On these, see Géza Pálffy, “A főkapitányi

Within this structure in Upper Hungary a separate captaincy-general was set up on the territories adjacent to the Principality of Transylvania in the mid-1560s. Upon the proposal of Lazarus Freiherr von Schwendi, the captain-general of Szatmár or the territories beyond the river Tisza (*Obrist zu Sakmar samt zugehörigen Ortflecken jenseits der Theiß, supremus capitaneus Zatmariensis et partium Transtibiscanarum*) was put in charge of the military administration of the border fortresses (Kálló, Kisvárda, Ecsed, and Szatmár) and the counties (Szabolcs, Szatmár, Ugocsa, and partly Bereg) east of the Tisza. By this measure the defence of the territories far away from Kassa was effectively ensured. With the captaincy-general of Szatmár a special Hungarian frontier zone came into being which did not protect the territories under the authority of the Hungarian king against the Ottoman Empire, but against a rising Christian state that was a vassal of the sultan.<sup>97</sup> At the same time, the principality itself established its own border defence zone against the Ottomans whose castles (Zsáka, Bajon, Sarkad, Bél, Belényes, Székelyhíd, Adorján, etc.) were controlled by the captain-general of Várad (*Obrist in Wardein, supremus capitaneus Varadiensis*) with powers of authority similar to those of the border fortress captain-generals in the Hungarian Kingdom.

The fortress of Komárom also had a distinguished role in the defence system. This was vividly expressed by the *palatinus* Miklós Eszterházy (1625-1645): "Komárom is a fort of its own, it does not depend on any captain-general".<sup>98</sup> Its special situation was due to its extreme significance. Komárom served the defence of the Imperial City directly with its Danube fleet, with the Hungarian boatmen (*naszádos*). Its chief commander (*Obrist in Komorn, supremus capitaneus Comaromiensis*) was in charge of the German infantry stationed in the fort, the boatmen serving in the town

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hadiipari műhely kiépülése Kassán és nyersanyagellátó forrásai [The Formation of the Arsenal of the Captain-General in Kassa and its Raw Material Resources], in *Végyvár és környezet*. (Studia Agriensia, 15.) Ed. by Tivadar Petercsák and Ernő Pethő. Eger, 1995, 183-221. *Idem, Katonai igazságszolgáltatás a királyi Magyarországon a XVI-XVII. században* [Military Jurisdiction in Habsburg-Hungary in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries]. Győr, 1995, 84-85. Cf. also Ondrej R. Halaga, *Počiatky Košíc a zrod metropoly. Hospodársko-sociálne, správne a kultúrne dejiny*. Košice, 1992, 380-390.

<sup>97</sup> Pálffy, "A magyarországi és délvidéki végvárrendszer," 124-125.

<sup>98</sup> "Comaromium per se est, quod a nullo supremo generali capitaneo dependet." Az 1642. évi meghíúsult országgyűlés időszaka (1640 december–1643 március) [The Period of the Uncelebrated Diet in 1642 (December 1640–March 1643)]. (Esterházy Miklós nádor iratai I [Documents of *palatinus* Miklós Esterházy]. Kormányzattörténeti iratok [Administration Documents].) Ed. by István Hajnal. Budapest, 1930, 129: No. 45. Cf. also László Kecskés, *Komárom az erődök városa* [Komárom, the Town of Forts]. Budapest, 1984.

next to the fortress, and the Hungarian *hussars*. His only superior was the Aulic War Council, whose leaders after 1566 appointed exclusively German chief commanders—with the exception of Miklós Pálffy (1584-1589)—to head the border castle.

When the peace treaty of Adrianople with the Ottomans expired in 1576, the Habsburg border defence in Hungary constituted a well organized system. In the 123 border castles registered at this time, there were 22,500 cavalry and infantry troops. The most decisive task in the defence was fulfilled by the border fortress and the district captaincy-generals in Hungary proper. By way of illustration it is enough to say that only 22% of the whole amount of pay was spent on the salary of the soldiers serving in the 72 castles of the Croatian-Slavonian border, while 14% was allocated to the nine fortresses in the confines around Győr, and 32% to the 13 castles in Upper Hungary. By that time, the significance of the Croatian-Slavonian confines, undoubtedly more important for the Austrian provinces in the 1520s-1530s, was overshadowed by the Hungarian defence zones. At this time and throughout the following century, the bulwark of Lower Austria, primarily of Vienna and of the German Empire was Hungary in the narrow sense.<sup>99</sup> The Croatian-Slavonian border defence zone lay far away from the immediate direction of the Ottoman advance. Thus the Aulic War Council was able to yield its administration in 1578 to the leaders of the Inner Austrian territories, which had strengthened and become independent in the meantime.

### 2.3.a. *The endeavours to modernize and their results: the reforms of the great military conference in Vienna (1578-1591)*

While the border defence developed into a coherent system by the mid-1570s, the Ottomans had established their own line of border fortresses, and these served as a basis for their slow but steady advance.<sup>100</sup> They expanded their tax-collecting activity in Hungary by constant plundering and then also occupied dozens of villages.<sup>101</sup> In 1575 they

<sup>99</sup> "Cron Vngern—ein Propugnackel vnnd VorMaur Deutscher Lannden" (1570). StA Nürnberg, Ansbacher Reichstagsakten (Rep. 136.) Bd. 43. No. 19.

<sup>100</sup> Klára Hegyi, *Török berendezkedés Magyarországon* [Ottoman Rule in Hungary]. (História könyvtár. Monográfiák, 7.) Budapest, 1995, 81-117.

<sup>101</sup> The Ottoman advance is testified by those reports which were prepared by the military administration of Vienna on the attacks and damages made by the enemy and sent to the ambassadors to Constantinople in order to make a complaint to the sultan. See for example: ÖStA HHStA Türkei (Turcica) Karton 43. Konv. 1. 1580. Nov.-Dez. fols. 25-32 and ÖStA KA HKR Akten Exp. 1589. Aug. No. 88 and *ibid.*, Reg. 1591. Dez. No. 41. Cf. also Gömöry, *op. cit.*, and Simoniti, *op. cit.*

launched more serious attacks; in addition to their raids, they captured the castles of Divény, Kékkő, Somoskő in the mining district and Fonyód by Lake Balaton, and they fought a nearly constant battle near Budački by the river Korana in the Croatian confines, where the assistant captain-general of the Croatian border fortresses (*Obristleutnant der kroatischen Grenze*), Herwart Freiherr von Auersperg (1568-1575) fell, too.<sup>102</sup> In the meantime the peace treaty of Adrianople expired, and then Emperor Maximilian II died; therefore the Aulic War Council deemed it necessary to discuss the problems and, based on the experience gathered in the control of defence, to reorganize the system in an even more considered way. In order to achieve this they asked the central and local leaders of the border defence for preliminary proposals concerning the shortcomings as early as 1576; they made the Imperial Diet (*Reichstag*) in Regensburg grant a considerable military aid; and they summoned a great military conference in Vienna (*Wiener Hauptgrenzberatung*) in the middle of August 1577 to solve the problems.

At the military conference, which lasted for one and a half months and was chaired by Archduke Ernest, the basic questions concerning the defence system and strategy were discussed.<sup>103</sup> The problems of military discipline,<sup>104</sup> the fortification of castles, war supplies, and food provision were dealt with. The *Defensionsordnung* of the Austrian provinces and the difficulties of financing the border fortresses were also disputed, and what is more, the possibility of settling down the Teutonic Order in Hungary was also brought up—as it had been during the rule of Sigismund of Luxemburg in the fifteenth century.<sup>105</sup> But the central

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<sup>102</sup> P[eter] von Radics, *Herbard VIII. Freiherr von Auersperg (1528-1575), ein krainischer Held und Staatsmann*. Wien, 1862, VIII-IX and 368-369.

<sup>103</sup> The minutes of the great military conference (*Hauptgrenzberatung*) in Vienna survived in several copies: 1. ÖStA KA AFA 1577/13/2. 2. MOL P 108 Családi Levéltárak, Esterházy család hercegi ágának levéltára, Repositoriumok 77. Fasc. N. 3. Archiv GNM Nürnberg, WF Österreich ZR 7670. 4. Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek [hereinafter ÖNB]. Handschriftensammlung Cod. 8678. 5. ÖNB Cod. 8345. 6. ÖNB Cod. 12 660. The military conference has not been given due attention by historians. Cf. Wessely, "Die Regensburger 'harrige' Reichshilfe 1576," 38-49. Schulze, *Landesdefension*, 65-69, and extracts of the conference published in Hungarian by István Geőcze, "Hadi tanácskozások az 1577-ik évben [Military Conferences in the Year 1577]," *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 7 (1894) 502-537 and 647-673.

<sup>104</sup> Pálffy, *Katonai igazságszolgáltatás*, 75-77.

<sup>105</sup> Hans von Zwiedeneck-Südenhorst, "Über den Versuch einer Translation des Deutschen Ordens an die ungarische Grenze," *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte* 56 (1878) 403-445. Wilhelm Erben, "Die Frage der Heranziehung des Deutschen Ordens zur Vertheidigung der ungarischen Grenze," *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte* 81 (1895) 513-599 and János Illéssy, "Törökvések a német lovag-rend meghonosítására Magyarországon [Endeavours to Settle the Teutonic Order in Hungary]," *Századok* 36 (1902) 233-248.

question was whether the peace with the Ottomans—made for eight years in 1568—could be maintained or whether offensive war should be launched against the enemy. From among the proposals made by Lazarus Freiherr von Schwendi and Upper-Hungarian captain-general Hans Rueber von Püchsendorf (1568-1584), the participants supported the ideas of the first, and voted for an even more organized and thoughtful defence strategy by realistically weighing the power of the German Empire and the Austrian provinces of the Habsburgs. Since the establishment of the new defence system, this was the first and last occasion that the problems of border defence had been so thoroughly discussed and a concept based on active defence (defensive war in other words) elaborated. Lazarus Freiherr von Schwendi's strategy comprised the formation of closed and strictly controllable defence zones, which, being based on the favourable natural surroundings, could resist the raids of the Ottoman forces more efficiently and at the same time stop the ever increasing Ottoman tax-collection in the Hungarian Kingdom.

Before dwelling on the implementation of the reforms it must be mentioned that the conference was an important step in the process that lasted from 1564 to 1578 and as a result of which the Croatian-Slavonian confines became subordinated to the Inner Austrian War Council (*Innen-österreichischer Hofkriegsrat*, 1578-1705) in Graz. Thanks to the monograph of W. Schulze, the circumstances of this are well known,<sup>106</sup> so it is enough to underline that the control of the defence system against the Ottoman Empire was divided into two parts in 1578. Archduke Charles was made responsible for the direction of the Croatian and Slavonian border areas as the captain-general of the Croatian-Wendish confines (*General-Obrist kroatischer und windischer Grenze*) under the central leadership of the Inner Austrian War Council, and at the same time Archduke Ernest was put in charge of the four Hungarian confines extending from the Drava to Transylvania (the border fortresses around

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<sup>106</sup> Schulze, *op. cit.* Cf. also Viktor Thiel, "Zur Geschichte der innerösterreichischen Kriegsverwaltung im 16. Jahrhunderte," *Zeitschrift des Historischen Vereines für Steiermark* 12 (1914) 159-170. Artur Steinwenter, "Die Übernahme der Grenzverteidigung in Kroatien durch den Beherrscher Innerösterreichs (1578)," *Zeitschrift des Historischen Vereines für Steiermark* 20 (1924) 43-59. Günther Probst-Ohstorff, "Die innerösterreichische Hofkriegsordnung und die windisch-kroatische Grenze," *Blätter für Heimatkunde* 35 (1961) 92-98.

Kanizsa, Győr, the mining towns and Upper Hungary).<sup>107</sup> The control over the Ottoman diplomacy remained the task of the Aulic War Council.

Though the administration of the defence system was divided into two, the leaders of the confines were required to cooperate closely. This cooperation can be exemplified by the creation of the confines district of Bajcsavár (*weitschawarische Grenze*) stretching from Kanizsa to the river Mura in 1578 (see map 2). Upon the incentive of György Zrínyi, the Styrian estates built the castle of Bajcsavár at their own expense right next to Kanizsa in 1578 and, together with Murakeresztúr and Fityeháza, which were also maintained by them, they attached the castle to the Wendish captaincy-general (*windische und weitschawarische Grenze*).<sup>108</sup> From that time on there was a need for coordinated cooperation of the captain-generals of the confines of Kanizsa and Wendish-Bajcsavár in the organization of defence of the area between the river Mura and Kanizsa. Moreover, as the significance of Kanizsa was increasing due to the threat to the Styrian and Lower Austrian estates, the latter took part in its fortification and supply as well.<sup>109</sup>

According to the defence strategy and concept worked out in 1577, the border fortress captaincy-generals were soon transformed into larger defence zones. The valley of the river Kanizsa was, for example, pounded up by mill dams, passages were obstructed or palisades and guard houses were erected nearby them, and minor castles that were not part of the system were blown up. As a result, employing the guard houses, they could more efficiently control passages that had been formerly used by the Ottomans, and with the formation of continuous water defence system they prevented the plunderers from creating newer ones. A similar system of guard houses was formed primarily out of the abandoned churches and minor medieval castles along the Rába and in the foreground of Győr, near Korpona and Zólyom in the mining district, as

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<sup>107</sup> The instruction of Archduke Charles: Radoslav Lopašić, *Spomenici hrvatske krajine (Acta historiam confinii militaris Croatici illustrancia). I. Od godine 1479 do 1610.* (Monumenta Spectantia Historiam Slavorum Meridionalium, XV.) Zagreb, 1884, 56-60: No. XXXIV. The unpublished instruction of Archduke Ernest: ÖStA KA HKR KIA IX. a. 2. Cf. 1578: article 15. CjH 676-677.

<sup>108</sup> Franz Otto Roth, "Wihitsch und Weitschawar. Zum Verantwortungsbewußtsein der adeligen Landstände Innerösterreichs in Gesinnung und Tat im türkischen 'Friedensjahr' 1578," *Zeitschrift des Historischen Vereines für Steiermark* 61 (1970) 151-214.

<sup>109</sup> Franz Pertl, *Die Grenzabwehr gegen die Türken im westlichen Ungarn und die niederösterreichischen Stände 1564-1601.* (Univ. Diss.) Wien, 1939, 33-69 a.

well as in Upper Hungary, on the road to Kassa along the river Bódva, near Szendrő (see map 3).<sup>110</sup> While there was an attempt to fortify every small place which could be important strategically, two completely new border fortresses were erected by the 1580s with the help of Italian military architects, complying with the principles of modern fortress architecture, which were later promoted to be the main castles of the particular confines and the headquarters of a captain-general. The fortress of Érsekújvár was built with considerable support from the Bohemian and Moravian estates in the mining district, on the right bank of the river Nyitra, which became the headquarters of the confines called from this time the border zone of Érsekújvár (*Neuhäuseler Grenze, confinia ad Újvár pertinentia*) following the appointment of Miklós Pálffy as captain-general in 1589.<sup>111</sup> On the Croatian border, at the confluence of the rivers Korana and Kulpa, the fort of Károlyváros (Karlstadt, Karlovac) was erected at the same time on the initiative and under the direction of Archduke Charles and this fort became the main castle of the Croatian frontier (*kroatische or Karlstädter Grenze*) of the divided Croatian-Slavonian confines.<sup>112</sup> Varasd, however, became the centre of the Wendish confines, and the border castles there began to be called the confines of Varasd (*Varasdiner Grenze*) from the early seventeenth century. Parallel to this, according to the strategy formed in 1577, the system of the Croatian-Slavonian border fortresses organized into captaincies (for example *Hauptmannschaft* of Zengg, Bihács, Ogulin, Hrasztovica in Croatia, and Ivanics, Kőrös, Varasd, Kapronca in Slavonia) and that of the guard houses called *čardaks* set up among them was further perfected (see map 1).

The implementation of the reforms decided in the talks slowed down considerably by the late 1580s, as with the debts of the Habsburgs amounting to several millions, there was no chance of accomplishing the innovations completely. Owing to this, the state of border fortresses rather

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<sup>110</sup> József Kelenik, "A kanizsai védelmi övezet és természetföldrajzi adottságai a XVI. század 70-es éveinek végén [The Defence Zone Around Kanizsa and its Geographical Characteristics in the Late 1570s]," in *Végvár és környezet*, 163-172 and Géza Pálffy, "A magyarországi török és királyi végvárrendszer fenntartásának kérdéséhez [The Costs of the Ottoman and the Habsburg Border Castle Systems in Hungary]," *Keletkutatás* 1995 tavasz, 61-86.

<sup>111</sup> The instruction of Pálffy and the indication of the new headquarters Érsekújvár in it (June 1, 1589): ÓStA HHStA Archiv Pálffy Arm. I. Lad. I. Fasc. I. No. 11 and MOL E 196 MKA Archivum familiae Thurzó Fasc. 34. No. 44.

<sup>112</sup> Milan Kruhek, "Postanak i razvoj tvrđave i grada Karlovca," in *Karlovac 1579-1979*. Karlovac, 1979, 81-104.

deteriorated by the end of the twenty-five year long period of peace. During the *Kleinkrieg*, however, the strongholds entirely fulfilled their tasks: the advance of the Ottomans became gradually more difficult, and their taxation, even if temporarily, was pressed back. The defence system of the Habsburg Empire against the Ottomans in Hungary and Croatia-Slavonia functioned effectively. The experience gathered in the administration of border defence and in the organization of new confines formed those methods and mechanisms which could serve as a basis for the direction and operation of the revived defence system after the Long War in the seventeenth century. This was the real result of the reforms accepted during the great military conference in 1577.

### 2.3.b. Border defence in the Long War (1591-1606)

The Ottoman successes during the Fifteen Years' or Long War,<sup>113</sup> counted from 1591 by the contemporaries,<sup>114</sup> cracked the system of defence in a similar way as the campaign of sultan Süleyman in 1566. Although the advance of the Ottomans was not so spectacular this time, the fall of Bihács (1592), Győr (1594), Eger (1596), and Kanizsa (1600) broke the border defence system in several places. These major fortresses and the attached minor castles had to be replaced by new border areas. In the course of open war this was hardly possible. The military leaders could only take forced measures as their predecessors had done in the early 1550s. The struggles of these fifteen years were, however, fundamentally different from the wars of the mid-sixteenth century. The Hungarian battleground of the Habsburg Empire against the Ottomans experienced its first modern war. In addition to siege wars the course of the war was determined mainly by the clashes of field troops.

The fall of Bihács in 1592 caused the least loss in the system of defence. Following the advance of the Ottomans in the valley of Una in the 1570s, Bihács became surrounded by Ottoman border fortresses, similarly to Jajca and Gyula earlier. Károlyváros, built in due time, and the chain of fortresses south of it in the valleys of Glina, Korana and Mrežnica was sufficient after 1592 to replace Bihács and its castles in the north-

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<sup>113</sup> See recently Jan Paul Niederkorn, *Die europäischen Mächte und der "Lange Türkenkrieg" Kaiser Rudolfs II. (1593-1606)*. Wien, 1993.

<sup>114</sup> For example, see the deed of gift of Ferdinand II (1619-1637) for András Keczer in 1631: "Genitor vero tuus, dictus Andreas Keczer, domi et militiae clarus in diversis expeditionibus bellicis, durante quindecennali aperto bello Turcico, fidelem Patriae operam impendisse." Carolus Wagner, *Diplomatarium Comitatus Sarosiensis*. Pozsony-Kassa, 1780, 440.

west.<sup>115</sup> On the territories east of Sziszek, along the river Kulpa, its tasks were taken over by the fort of Petrinja financed by the Styrian estates and by the gradually forming, special border area called the confines of the *ban* (*banische Grenze, confinia banalia*). Upon the initiative of the great military conference,<sup>116</sup> the 500 troops of the Croatian-Slavonian *ban* residing in Varasd were distributed among the small castles along the rivers Glina and Kulpa (Bovič, Brest, Brkišovina, etc.) which by the beginning of the seventeenth century gradually formed a coherent border zone confined to the line of the Kulpa. This meant that the *ban*, besides being in charge of the nobility's insurrection of the Croatian-Slavonian territories, gained control over some of the Croatian border fortresses. Thus, at the turn of the century, he acted both as a district and a border fortress captain-general. However, the division of his unified authority, characteristic of the period before the battle of Mohács, is testified by the fact that he had a special title concerning his tasks as a border fortress captain-general (*banus, necnon confinium Colapianorum regni Slavoniae supremus capitaneus*).<sup>117</sup> The castles directed by him were not subordinated to the War Council of Graz, but to that of Vienna, as their garrison was not paid from the support of the Inner Austrian estates but out of the war tax of the Croatian-Slavonian estates and other incomes from Hungary.

Unlike the loss of Bihács, the Ottoman occupation of Győr, Eger, and later Kanizsa represented a serious challenge for the Aulic War Council in Vienna and in Prague (*Prager Hofkriegsrat*, 1593-1611) organized by Emperor Rudolf II (1576-1612). Between Győr and the Imperial City there was no castle capable of containing a major Ottoman attack. And though the amounts originally spent on Győr and Tata were transferred to Magyaróvár, and the sums from Veszprém and Pápa to Sárvár in 1595,<sup>118</sup> no new confines could be organized to defend Vienna. Fortunately, the Ottomans were incapable of advancing further. The liberation of Győr in 1598 facilitated the reorganization of the border defence zone protecting Lower Austria. Furthermore, the fortress of Székesfehérvár freed in 1601

<sup>115</sup> Zorislav Horvat-Milan Kruhek, "Stari gradovi i utvrđenja u obrani Karlovca u XVI i XVII stoljeću," in *Karlovac 1579-1979*, 59-79.

<sup>116</sup> See the result of this step from 1588: Archiv GNM Nürnberg, WF Siebenbürgen ZR 7657. fols. 97-103. Cf. Kaser, *op. cit.*, 330-333 and Milan Kruhek, "Stvaranje i utvrđivanje obrambene granice na Kupu u toku XVI i XVII stoljeća," in *Vojna Krajina*, 215-257.

<sup>117</sup> *Zaključci hrvatskog sabora. Svezak I. 1631-1693*. Zagreb, 1958, *passim*.

<sup>118</sup> ÖNB Handschriftensammlung Cod. 10775. fols. 17-32 and Wien, Niederösterreichisches Landesarchiv, Ständisches Archiv, Ständische Akten A-VII-14.

was attached to the defence area, but, as it was kept only for a year, on the territories north of Lake Balaton the border before the Long War was restored.

Until 1606 the Christian troops were able to move only the borders of the confines of Érsekújvár further south. With the recapture of Fülek, Nógrád, Szécsény, and several minor Ottoman fortresses in counties Hont, Nógrád, and Gömör in the winter of 1593, the border area of Érsekújvár protecting the mining towns was considerably reinforced. Meanwhile, Eger, being in a forward position similarly to Bihács, had to be replaced in the seventeenth century by Szendrő, which had been gradually fortified from the 1570s, and its neighbouring castles (Putnok, Szádvár, Ónod, Tokaj, Krasznahorka, etc.). The most serious difficulty was caused by the loss of Kanizsa in 1600, as—unlike in the case of Bihács and Eger—only some insignificant medieval castles existed in the border fortress captaincy-general in its *hinterland*. Thus a completely new border zone had to be set up west of Lake Balaton. This so-called border area facing Kanizsa (*gegen Kanischawärts ligende Grenze, confinia Canisae opposita*) was at first established along the rivers Rába and Zala with centres at Körmend and the remote Sárvár.<sup>119</sup> However, the rebellion against the Hungarian King Rudolf led by István Bocskai frustrated the fast development of the new border defence zones all over Hungary. Their organization could only be carried out after the peace treaty of Zsitvatorok in 1606.

#### 2.4. *The organization of new border zones and the new methods of border defence (1606-1699)*

In 1606 another long period of peace, or more precisely an era of 'skirmishes' or *Kleinkrieg* on the borders, began. This period lasted for more than half a century in the Hungarian theatre of war. As during the rule of Matthias Corvinus and Maximilian II, the years of peace made it possible to form new defence units on the basis of the sixteenth-century methods and administrative experience. On the territory beyond the river Tisza, Szatmár retained its earlier status, though during the rule of Gábor Bethlen (1613-1629), and then of György Rákóczi I (1630-1648) and his son (1648-1660), it was often under the control of the Transylvanian princes.

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<sup>119</sup> ÖStA KA HKR KIA IX. c. 4, MOL P 1313 Családi levéltárak, A herceg Batthyány család levéltára, A Batthyány család törzslevéltára, Memorabilia No. 237 and ÖStA KA Akten des Innerösterreichischen Hofkriegsrates, Croatica 1600. Nov. No. 1.

Eger was efficiently replaced by the border fortresses along the rivers Tisza, Sajó, and Bódva, above all by Szendrő and Tokaj. After 1607 the confines facing Kanizsa were finally organized with the centre of Egerszeg on the river Zala and in the districts of the castles of Lenti and Kiskomárom. In theory, the fortress of Légrád at the confluence of the Drava and the Mura also belonged to this border zone, but practically the members of the Zrínyi family were put in charge of it together with some other garrisons in the Muraköz (*praesidii Legradiensis ac totius Insulae Muraköz supremus capitaneatus, Zerinishche Grenze*). At the same time, the Styrian estates reinforced and organized into a coherent unit their border fortresses in the direction of Kanizsa (Hardberg, Fürstenfeld, Feldbach, Radkersburg, and Pettau) under the name of the Styrian confines (*steirische Grenze, steirische Konfinien-Plätze*), though this was not a captaincy-general.<sup>120</sup>

The Wendish border area with the centre of Varasd was united with Petrinja on the southern bank of the Kulpa and assumed the name of Wendish-Petrinja confines (*windische und petrinianische Grenze, regni Slavoniae confinia et Petrinia*). That part of the Croatian border fortress captaincy-general which was situated around Zengg west of the Mountain Kapela was with increasing frequency called the maritime confines (*Meergrenze, confinia maritima*) from the middle of the sixteenth century. As a result, the captaincy-general centered around Károlyváros was called the Croatian-maritime confines (*kroatische und Meergrenze, confinia Croatica et maritima/confinia Croatiae et maritima*) by the early seventeenth century. The border fortresses under the leadership of the *ban* along the river Kulpa (*banische Grenze, confinia banalia*) were often named as the Kulpa confines (*confinia Colapiana*).

The six border fortress captaincy-generals which constituted the decisive element of the defence system and the temporary captaincy-general led by the *ban* survived until 1663 in an unchanged form. The captaincy-generals were listed by *palatinus* Miklós Eszterházy in his memorandum to the ruler in 1641: "Under the jurisdiction of the Saint Crown of Hungary there are six captain-generals, or captaincy-generals from the Adriatic Sea to the Transylvanian borders, namely the ones of Kassa, [Érsek]újvár, Győr, the border fortresses facing Kanizsa, the Slavonian [that is the one of Varasd], the Croatian [that is the one of

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<sup>120</sup> ÖNB Handschriftensammlung Cod. 9225. fol. 4 and fol. 34.

Károlyváros], with the exception of the confines that are led by the Croatian-Slavonian *ban*."<sup>121</sup>

After the Ottoman war in 1663-1664, however, a significant change took place in the borders defending the mining towns. After the fall of the centre of the frontier castles captaincy-general (Érsekújvár), Vienna, Lower Austria, and the Bohemian-Moravian provinces became directly threatened, therefore a modern fort (Lipótvár) was erected on the bank of the Vág and a new border area was organized around it in 1665.<sup>122</sup> This new defence zone was called the confines facing Érsekújvár (*gegen Neuhäusel ligende Grenze, confinia contra Újvár posita*) or of Lipótvár (*leopoldische Grenze*).<sup>123</sup> The role of this zone was almost as important as that of the confines around Győr, also reinforced to be able to defend Vienna in this time. The administration of the fortresses around Lipótvár and of Pozsony was withdrawn from the authority of captain-general of the mining towns and was conferred on the German commander-in-chief of Lipótvár, who was the immediate representative of the Aulic War Council.

In addition to the border fortress captaincy-generals, the system of district captaincy-generals also survived in the course of the seventeenth century. In 1669 these were listed by a contemporary, János Vanoviczi, a missionary belonging to the Order of St Paul, in his submission to the Holy Congregation of the Propagation of the Faith (*Sacra Congregatio De Propaganda Fide*) in the following manner: "Out of the district captain-generals [in Hungarian: *királyképe*] the first lives in Varasd, Croatia, the second in Nemetújvár, Hungary, the third in Sempte, north of the Danube, the fourth, the Upper Hungarian captain-general in Kassa."<sup>124</sup> The first district captain-general mentioned was the Croatian *ban* Péter

<sup>121</sup> "Sunt huiusmodi supremi generales capitanei seu capitaneatus sub jurisdictione Sacrae Coronae Hungariae a Mari Adriatico usque ad limites et terminos Transylvaniae sex, utpote: Cassoviensis, Novae Arcis, Jauriensis, praesidiorum Canisae oppositorum, Sclavoniae et Croatiae regnorum, praeter confinia banalia, quibus banus Croatiae et Sclavoniae praeest." Hajnal, *op. cit.*, 128: No. 45.

<sup>122</sup> František Sedlák, "Z dejín pevnosti Leopoldov," *Vlastivedný Časopis* 12 (1963) 151-153 and Jozef Šimončič, "Mesto Leopoldov—jeho vznik a vývoj," *Vlastivedný Časopis* 20 (1971) 72-73.

<sup>123</sup> ÖNB Handschriftensammlung Cod. 7235. fols. 83-93 and ÖStA FHKA HKA HFU RN 219. 1665. März fols. 166-215.

<sup>124</sup> "Proreges, unus Varasdini in Croatia, alter in Nemet Uyuar, in Vngaria, tertius in arce Sente ultra Danubium, quartus Cassoviae, prorex partium superiorum regni Vngariae." *Relationes missionariorum de Hungaria et Transilvania (1627-1707)*. (Bibliotheca Academiae Hungariae in Roma. Fontes 1.) Ed. by István György Tóth. Roma-Budapest, 1994, 151: No. 14.

Zrínyi (1665-1670) residing in Varasd, who, in his capacity as a border fortress captain-general, also administered the special confines belonging to the *ban* along the river Kulpa. The Transdanubian district captain-general, Kristóf Batthyány, having his seat in Némétújvár, controlled the confines facing Kanizsa, while the Cisdanubian captain-general Pál Esterházy, residing in Sempte, supervised the confines protecting the mining towns, with the exception of Lipótvár and its zone. Consequently, the leadership of border fortress zones that were not of vital importance for the defence of the Austrian provinces was, as in the sixteenth century, given to Hungarian district captain-generals. Although, due to the shortcomings of the county and noble troops, the district captaincy-generals had lost most of their military importance by that time, this arrangement was reasonable because the Hungarian estates had consolidated their power in the seventeenth century. Having provided their blood as tax these estates still tenaciously insisted on maintaining these posts because these legitimized their actual participation in the defence, or at least in its local administration.

Besides the system of confines and district captaincy-generals, new forms and methods of frontier defence appeared and strengthened in the seventeenth century. These were related to the long period of peace and the policy of the Habsburg high command against the Ottoman Empire. During the Thirty Years' War the empire joined the competition of great powers by military means, and for this reason it tried to keep peace with the Ottomans. Less and less support was sent to supply the Hungarian theatre of war. As a result, the number of border fortresses with royal troops in them decreased from 120 in the late sixteenth century to 88, and the number of garrison troops from 22,000 to 17,000.<sup>125</sup> The system of guard houses previously controlled by the royal border fortresses and the roughly 5,000 soldiers paid by the king were difficult to replace. As a solution to this problem, the landlords living near the frontiers took a more active part in the defence against the Ottoman raids with their private troops and with their subjects doing military service in return for various exemptions, the so-called peasant soldiers (*Soldatenbauer*), who

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<sup>125</sup> Hajnal, *op. cit.*, 128-131: No. 45. It was only after the 1663-1664 Ottoman war that the Aulic War Council sent German troops attached into regiments in great numbers to the Hungarian border fortresses. István Czigány, *A királyi Magyarország hadügyi fejlődésének sajátosságai és európai összefüggései 1600-1700* [The Characteristics and European Connections of the Military in Habsburg-Ruled Hungary 1600-1700]. Unpublished Ph.D. Diss. Budapest, 1996.

were often settled on those territories.<sup>126</sup> On the Croatian-Slavonian borders the same role was played by the Vlachs (*Valachi*) and Uskoks (*Uscoci*), who obtained royal privileges in return for their military service.<sup>127</sup> The significance of the growing number of royal and private Heyduck settlements also increased from the early seventeenth century.<sup>128</sup> Thus the territories behind the military confines had to participate more actively in the border defence. The system of garrisons previously maintained by the king was replaced by a system of fortified settlements and guard houses defended by peasant soldiers and Heyducks and controlled by the border landlords and captain-generals. This second, *hinterland* defence line complemented the royal border defence system very well, as the latter and the district captaincy-generals were often administered by the same person in these places, which made closer cooperation between the royal and private troops possible.

### 3. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MILITARY FRONTIERS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

As a result of the so-called reconquering Turkish war launched in 1683 and concluded in 1699 by the peace of Karlovitz, the frontier between the two world empires was pushed back to the line of the Sava, Danube, Tisza, and Maros. The termination of Ottoman rule in Hungary made the maintenance of the border defence system built by the mid-sixteenth century by the Habsburg military leadership unnecessary. With the exception of Nándorfehérvár (Belgrade) and the Temesköz reoccupied only in 1718, the frontiers which had existed before the battle of Mohács were restored by the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The question in this situation was whether the new—the third—border defence system in the southern territories of Hungary against the Ottoman Empire should reflect the structural and administrative framework existing before Mohács or the one in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries, or whether it should be a completely different one.

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<sup>126</sup> István N. Kiss, "Gesellschaft und Heer in Ungarn im Zeitalter der Türkenkriege. Das Soldatenbauerntum," in *Die wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen der Türkenkriege*. (Grazer Forschungen zur Wirtschaft- und Sozialgeschichte, 1.) Ed. by Othmar Pickl. Graz, 1971, 273-296.

<sup>127</sup> Ekkehard Völkl, "Militärgrenze und 'Statuta Valachorum'," in *Die österreichische Militärgrenze*, 9-24. Kaser, *op. cit.*, *passim*. Bracewell, *op. cit.*

<sup>128</sup> István Rác, *A hajdúk a XVII. században* [The Heyducks in the Seventeenth Century]. (Magyar történeti tanulmányok, 2.) Debrecen, 1969.

Two proposals were worked out concerning the establishment of the new border defence system. One of them was forwarded by the *palatinus* Pál Esterházy (1681-1713) and the Hungarian estates in connection with the new establishment of the country in 1688,<sup>129</sup> the other was the concept of the Aulic War Council formed in the 1690s.<sup>130</sup> The Hungarian estates wanted to revive the medieval defence system with the restoration of the *banates* and the defence captaincy-generals, and the earlier authority of the *palatinus*, the military assistant of the ruler. At the same time, they wished to supply the border fortresses with regularly paid standing troops consisting of 12,000 German and 12,000 Hungarian and Southern Slav soldiers under the joint leadership of German, Hungarian and Southern Slav captain-generals. They would have fielded the latter ones out of the previous border castle soldiers in Hungary, though—in a similar way to the German army—in the framework of regiments. They considered the war tax of the reconquered country sufficient to cover the payment of the 24,000 soldiers.

The concept of the Aulic War Council was fundamentally different from the proposal of the estates. The military leaders in Vienna wanted to create a qualitatively new border defence system, which was to a certain extent similar to the setup in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. They intended to separate the zones of the new system from the reviving civil local administration, from the Hungarian counties, and to establish a distinct military frontier (*Militärgrenze*). They did not wish to involve the Hungarian estates in the control of the military frontiers to be divided into regiment districts (*Regimentbezirke/Kompaniebezirke*), as they intended to control the new border defence network completely from Vienna and not from Buda as had been the case in the middle ages. Under

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<sup>129</sup> Emma Iványi, "Esterházy Pál nádor és a magyar rendek tervezete az ország új berendezésével kapcsolatban [The Proposal of *palatinus* Pál Esterházy and the Hungarian Estates in Connection with the New Establishment of the Country]," *Levélári Közlemények* 42 (1971) 137-161 and János J. Varga, "Berendezkedési tervek Magyarországon a török kiűzésének időszakában. Az *Einrichtungswerk* [Schemes for a New Establishment in Hungary After the Expulsion of the Ottomans. The *Einrichtungswerk*]," *Századok* 125 (1991) 449-488.

<sup>130</sup> Apart from the works quoted in note 3, see recently Kurt Wessely, "Neuordnung der ungarischen Grenzen nach dem großen Türkenkrieg," in *Die k. k. Militärgrenze*, 29-93. From the Hungarian literature: Ákos Koroknai, *Gazdasági és társadalmi viszonyok a dunai és tiszai határőrvidéken a XVIII. század elején* [Economic and Social Conditions on the Military Frontier Along the Danube and the Tisza in the Early Eighteenth Century]. (Értekezések a történeti tudományok köréből. Új sorozat, 73.) Budapest, 1974.

this plan they could simply abolish the earlier division of the defence system into district and border fortress captaincy-generals, and could establish the unified authority of the new military offices. As opposed to the draft plan of the *palatinus*, they did not want the Hungarian border castle soldiers to take part in the protection of the frontiers. On the one hand, they themselves were reluctant to leave their border fortresses, around which they were more and more often engaged—in the seventeenth century—in the cultivation of land or animal husbandry, on the other hand, the dismissed and homeless members of the Hungarian border castle soldiery had already been recruited into Hungarian imperial regiments from the 1670s and 1680s. Due to their special light cavalry tactics they were needed on the French battlefields of the Habsburg Empire. Thus, apart from the German regiments, the troops of the new military frontiers were made up of Serbian, Croatian, and Vlach refugees who had settled in the southern territories of Hungary, doing military service in return for land and privileges. Only one common element of the ideas of the Hungarian estates and of the Aulic War Council was left: the reconquered country had to contribute financially to the supply of the new military frontiers to be established on the southern borders of the country.

The foundations of the new border defence system were laid in the first decade of the eighteenth century according to the concept of the Aulic War Council. From the Adriatic Sea to Transylvania, the military frontiers of Károlyváros, of the *ban*, of Varasd, the Sava, the Danube, the Tisza and the Maros were organized; these frontiers were later divided into well distinguishable regiment districts. While the major border fortresses were defended by the regular German regiments, the landed and privileged peasant soldier sentries served in the guard houses (*çardaks*) situated between them. Their central control was entirely taken over by the Aulic War Council after the dissolution of the Inner Austrian War Council in 1705. The Hungarian estates were fully excluded from the administration of the new border defence system established in the territories of Hungary. The military leadership in Vienna solved three problems with the creation of the military frontiers. It decided the struggle for the central and local administration of military affairs and border defence in the sixteenth and seventeenth century to its own advantage; by settling and incorporating in the border defence the mass of Southern Slav refugees, it abolished a possible centre of social tensions;

at the same time, it created a new border defence system which could effectively protect Hungary and the Habsburg Empire against the Ottoman troops until the formation of the nation states in the nineteenth century.

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Our survey of the 500 year long history of the border defence system in Hungary against the Ottoman Empire cannot have answered all questions that the reader might have. We are going to find these in the monography to be written on this topic. This piece of work has achieved its purpose if it could demonstrate that the development of the defence system against the Ottomans can only be understood in the knowledge of the complete Hungarian theatre of war, in the three periods designated above, as the real changes in the organization and administration of the defence system occurred in 1526 and 1699. Until the battle of Mohács the medieval Hungarian Kingdom contained the advance of the Ottomans with its coherent border defence system controlled by the Croatian-Slavonian *ban*, the captain-general of the Lower Parts (*supremus capitaneus partium inferiorum*) and the Voivode of Transylvania. After the collapse of the Kingdom, the Habsburg rulers were expected to solve the problem of stopping the enemy on the territory of Hungary and of defending the Austrian provinces. In the organization of the new defence system, however, they could not reject the help of the Hungarian estates, their counterparts in the dualistic state structure, and for practical reasons they could not oust them entirely from the local management of the system. This explains why the border defence was divided into a twofold system: the confines captaincy-generals financed by the ruler and based on the border castles and the district captaincy-generals based on the outdated insurrection of the nobility and the county troops. Though the former constituted the most important part of defence, it was only at the beginning of eighteenth century—and after the settlement of Southern Slav peasant soldiers—that the Aulic War Council was able to create a system of military frontiers in the southern territories of the country which excluded the Hungarian estates.

## APPENDIX

## ABBREVIATIONS

B = Bosnia; Cro = Croatia; H = Hungary; R = Romania;  
Slo = Slovakia; Slov = Slovenia; U = Ukraina

MAP 1: THE CASTLES OF THE CROATIAN AND WENDISH-BAJCSAVÁR  
CONFINES IN 1582

- |                                                |                                                         |
|------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. Laibach, Ljubljana, Slov                    | 34. Kreuz, Kőrös, Križevci, Cro                         |
| 2. Sankt Veit am Pflaum, Fiume,<br>Rijeka, Cro | 35. Gradec, Cro                                         |
| 3. Ledenice, Cro                               | 36. Ivanić, Ivanićgrad, Ivanics, Cro                    |
| 4. Zengg, Segnia, Senj, Cro                    | 37. Heiligenkreuz, Szentkereszt,<br>Sveti Kri, Cro      |
| 5. Bag, Karlobag, Cro                          | 38. Cirkvena, Cro                                       |
| 6. Brinje, Cro                                 | 39. Sanktpeter, Szentpéter, Sveti Petar<br>Čvrstec, Cro |
| 7. Brlog, Cro                                  | 40. Topolovac, Topolovác, Cro                           |
| 8. Otočac, Otocsác, Cro                        | 41. Sanktgeorgen, Szentgyörgyvár,<br>Djurđjevac, Cro    |
| 9. Dabar, Cro                                  | 42. Novigrad, Novigrad-Podravski,<br>Cro                |
| 10. Jesenica, Lička Jesenica, Cro              | 43. Kapronca, Kopriniz, Koprivnica,<br>Cro              |
| 11. Ogulin, Cro                                | 44. Dernye, Drnje, Cro                                  |
| 12. Svetica, Cro                               | 45. Keresztúr, Murakeresztúr, H                         |
| 13. Modruš, Modrus, Cro                        | 46. Fityeháza, H                                        |
| 14. Drežnik, Drežnik Grad, Cro                 | 47. Bajcsavár, Bajcsa, H                                |
| 15. Tržac, Cro                                 |                                                         |
| 16. Izačić, Izacsics, B                        |                                                         |
| 17. Bihać, Bihács, B                           |                                                         |
| 18. Ripac, Ripács, B                           |                                                         |
| 19. Slunj, Cro                                 |                                                         |
| 20. Cetin, Cetingrad, Cro                      |                                                         |
| 21. Mala Kladaša, B                            |                                                         |
| 22. Hresno, Cro                                |                                                         |
| 23. Smrčković, Cro                             |                                                         |
| 24. Blagaj, Cro                                |                                                         |
| 25. Budački, Cro                               |                                                         |
| 26. Karlstadt, Károlyváros,<br>Karlovac, Cro   |                                                         |
| 27. Petrova gora, Petrovac, Cro                |                                                         |
| 28. Hrastovica, Hrasztovica, Cro               |                                                         |
| 29. Srednji Gradac, Cro                        |                                                         |
| 30. Warasdin, Varasd, Varaždin, Cro            |                                                         |
| 31. Varaždinske Toplice, Cro                   |                                                         |
| 32. Remetinec, Cro                             |                                                         |
| 33. Ludbreg, Cro                               |                                                         |


*The territories under  
the command of the  
Croatian-Slavonian ban in 1582*

Croatia  
Kőrös county  
Varasd county  
Zágráb county




MAP 2: THE CASTLES OF THE BAJCSAVÁR, KANIZSA, AND GYŐR CONFINES  
IN 1582

- |                                                       |                                                                                                     |
|-------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 45. Keresztúr, Murakeresztúr, H                       | <i>The counties under the command of<br/>the Transdanubian district<br/>captain-general in 1582</i> |
| 46. Fityeháza, H                                      |                                                                                                     |
| 47. Bajcsavár, Bajcsa, H                              |                                                                                                     |
| 48. Légrád, Legrad, Cro                               |                                                                                                     |
| 49. Kanizsa, Nagykanizsa, H                           |                                                                                                     |
| 50. Szentmiklós, Miklósfa,<br>Nagykanizsa–Miklósfa, H |                                                                                                     |
| 51. Botszentgyörgy, Romlottvár, H                     |                                                                                                     |
| 52. Kanizsa melletti torony,<br>Nagykanizsa, H        |                                                                                                     |
| 53. Újudvar, H                                        |                                                                                                     |
| 54. Kacorlak, H                                       |                                                                                                     |
| 55. Komár, Kiskomárom,<br>Zalacomár, H                | Fejér                                                                                               |
| 56. Csákány, H                                        | Győr                                                                                                |
| 57. Kéthely, H                                        | Komárom                                                                                             |
| 58. Kiekmansziget, Kilimán, H                         | Moson                                                                                               |
| 59. Rajk, Alsórajk, H                                 | Somogy                                                                                              |
| 60. Zalavár, H                                        | Sopron                                                                                              |
| 61. Isabor, Isebor, Pacsa–Isabor, H                   | Vas                                                                                                 |
| 62. Pölöske, H                                        | Veszprém                                                                                            |
| 63. Kapornak, Nagykapornak, H                         | Zala                                                                                                |
| 64. Csány, Zalacsány, H                               |                                                                                                     |
| 65. Szentgrót, Zalaszentgrót, H                       |                                                                                                     |
| 66. Bér, Zalabér, H                                   |                                                                                                     |
| 67. Kemend, Kemendollár, H                            |                                                                                                     |
| 68. Lövő, Zalalövő, H                                 |                                                                                                     |
| 69. Győr, Raab, H                                     |                                                                                                     |
| 70. Pápa, H                                           |                                                                                                     |
| 71. Keszthely, H                                      |                                                                                                     |
| 72. Szigliget, H                                      |                                                                                                     |
| 73. Csobánc, H                                        |                                                                                                     |
| 74. Tihany, H                                         |                                                                                                     |
| 75. Vázsony, Vázsonykő,<br>Nagyvázsony, H             |                                                                                                     |
| 76. Veszprém, H                                       |                                                                                                     |
| 77. Palota, Várpalota, H                              |                                                                                                     |
| 78. Csesznek, H                                       |                                                                                                     |
| 79. Tata, H                                           |                                                                                                     |
| 80. Szentmártonhegy, Szentmárton,<br>Pannonhalma, H   |                                                                                                     |
| 81. Komárom, Komorn, Komarno, Slo                     |                                                                                                     |



MAP 3: THE CASTLES OF THE MINING TOWNS' AND UPPER HUNGARIAN CONFINES IN 1582

- |                                                        |                                                                                                   |
|--------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 81. Komárom, Komorn,<br>Komarno, Slo                   | 111. Balog, Felsőbalog, Veľký Blh,<br>Vámosbalog, Slo                                             |
| 82. Érsekújvár, Neuhäusel,<br>Nové Zámky, Slo          | 112. Eger, Erlau, H                                                                               |
| 83. Surány, Šurany, Slo                                | 113. Tokaj, H                                                                                     |
| 84. Komjáti, Komját, Komjatice, Slo                    | 114. Kálló, Nagykálló, H                                                                          |
| 85. Gimes, Ghymes, Hrad Gýmes,<br>Slo                  | 115. Kisvárd, H                                                                                   |
| 86. Kistapolcsány, Topoľčanky, Slo                     | 116. Ecsed, Nagyecsed, H                                                                          |
| 87. Léva, Levice, Slo                                  | 117. Szatmár, Satu Mare, R                                                                        |
| 88. Bakabánya, Pukanz, Pukanec, Slo                    | 118. Ungvár, Užgorod, U                                                                           |
| 89. Korpona, Karpen, Krupina, Slo                      | <i>The counties under the command<br/>of the Cisdanubian district<br/>captain-general in 1582</i> |
| 90. Bozók, Bzovík, Slo                                 | Árva                                                                                              |
| 91. Csábrág, Hrad Čabraď, Slo                          | Bars                                                                                              |
| 92. Zólyom, Altsohl, Zvolen, Slo                       | Hont                                                                                              |
| 93. Dobronya, Döbring,<br>Dobrá Niva, Slo              | Liptó                                                                                             |
| 94. Koszolnyik, Kozelník,<br>Zólyomkecskés, Slo        | Nógrád                                                                                            |
| 95. Selmecebánya, Schemnitz,<br>Banská Štiavnica, Slo  | Nyitra                                                                                            |
| 96. Szitnya, Szitna, Sitno, Slo                        | Pozsony                                                                                           |
| 97. Szentantal, Antol, Slo                             | Trencsén                                                                                          |
| 98. Sibrik, Halbergescheid, Žibritov,<br>Zsibritó, Slo | Turóc                                                                                             |
| 99. Szászi, Szásza, Sása, Slo                          | Zólyom                                                                                            |
| 100. Újbánya, Königsberg,<br>Nová Baňa, Slo            | <i>The counties under the command<br/>of the Upper Hungarian<br/>captain-general in 1582</i>      |
| 101. Szlatina, Szalatna,<br>Zvolenská Slatfina, Slo    | Abauj                                                                                             |
| 102. Végles, Viglaš, Slo                               | Bereg                                                                                             |
| 103. Ocsova, Očová, Nagyócsa, Slo                      | Borsod                                                                                            |
| 104. Libetbánya, Libethen,<br>Ľubietová, Slo           | Gömör-Kishont                                                                                     |
| 105. Breznóbánya, Briesen,<br>Brezno, Slo              | Heves                                                                                             |
| 106. Murány, Muráň, Slo                                | Sáros                                                                                             |
| 107. Kassa, Kaschau, Košice, Slo                       | Szabolcs                                                                                          |
| 108. Krasznahorka,<br>Hrad Krásna Hôrka, Slo           | Szatmár                                                                                           |
| 109. Szádvár, H                                        | Szepes                                                                                            |
| 110. Szendrő, H                                        | Torna                                                                                             |
|                                                        | Ugocsa                                                                                            |
|                                                        | Ung                                                                                               |
|                                                        | Zemplén                                                                                           |





THE BATTLE OF SZÁVASZENTDEMETER–NAGYOLASZI (1523)  
OTTOMAN ADVANCE AND HUNGARIAN DEFENCE  
ON THE EVE OF MOHÁCS

ANDRÁS KUBINYI

The years between 1521 and 1526, the capture of Nándorfehérvár and the battle of Mohács, is a period usually neglected by historical research or characterised negatively as if the Royal Court had not realised danger, had not made steps to reinforce the country's capability of resistance and had not tried to seek assistance from abroad. It is also easily forgotten that time was short and the tasks to be accomplished were complex and difficult.

We will try to demonstrate that there were attempts to strengthen the king's political stance vis-à-vis the Hungarian and Bohemian nobility and that important reforms were also planned in order to have a more efficient army. Efforts to secure foreign, mainly German and Czech military aid were also made in order to open an offensive war with the aim to reconquest the lost fortresses along the border-line while the sultan was engaged in the siege of Rhodes. All this happened under rather unfavourable conditions when Ottoman raids could be launched practically unhindered year by year against Hungary.

Military historians correctly emphasized the Ottoman victories (such as the capture of Scardona, Orsova, and Szörény), while the Hungarian achievements were only mentioned in passing,<sup>1</sup> though there were three major military successes during that period. Regarding their impact, the

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<sup>1</sup> See for example, Leopold Kupelwieser, *Die Kämpfe Ungarns mit den Osmanen bis zur Schlacht bei Mohács, 1526*. Wien und Leipzig, 1899<sup>2</sup>, 206-219. József Doberdói Bánlaky, *A magyar nemzet hadtörténelme, XII. rész. Az ország süllyedése a Jagellók alatt. A Mohácsi katasztrófa 1490-1526* [The Military History of the Hungarian Nation. Part XII. The Twilight of the Country Under the Jagellon Dynasty. The Disaster of Mohács 1490-1526]. Budapest, 1939, 146-167.

most important one was the 1522 campaign of János Szapolyai when he prevented Wallachia from being annexed by the Ottoman Empire. Thus he protected Transylvania from attacks from the east.<sup>2</sup> The aim of Kristóf Frangepán's campaign to Jajca in 1525 was only to supply a besieged fortress, still it proved that the Hungarians and Croats, under appropriate leadership, were able to mobilize a significant military force (6,000 men) and to break through the enemy lines with small losses on rough and difficult terrain.<sup>3</sup> Ultimately, the subject of our study, the Hungarian victory over Ferhad pasha and Bali *bey* in the summer of 1523 must be mentioned, as this was the battle that mobilized the largest forces in the era under issue.

#### THE HUNGARIAN BORDER DEFENCE SYSTEM BEFORE 1523

The beginnings of the border defence system can be dated to the times of the rule of king Sigismund (1387-1437), who acquired Nándorfehérvár, and it took its definite form under king Matthias (1458-1490). Its final organization was developed around 1480 by appointing Pál Kinizsi high sheriff of Temes county and the 'captain-in-chief of the Lower Parts'. The border defence system consisted of two lines. The southern defence line started at Szörény and ran through Nándorfehérvár, Szabács, and Jajca up to Klissza by the sea, the inner system started at Karánsebes, Temesvár, and Pétervárad, and it reached its final point at Bihács and Zengg. This border defence system was also vertically divided into two sections. The castles of Bosnia and Croatia belonged to the *ban* of Croatia and Slavonia, who was responsible for the supply of Jajca defended by local *bans*; and the regular headquarters of his army was mainly Bihács.

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<sup>2</sup> See the previous note and Joseph von Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*. Vol. II. Pesth, 1834, 45-47 [hereinafter Hammer, GOR]. N[icolae]. Jorga, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches nach den Quellen dargestellt*. Vol. II. Gotha, 1909, 390-392 [hereinafter Jorga, GOR]. For voivode Radu, see József Pataky, "Radu de la Afumați és Zápolya János magatartása Mohács előestéjén [The Behaviour of Radu de la Afumați and János Szapolyai on the Eve of the Battle of Mohács]," in *A magyar nemzetiség története és testvéri együttműködése a román nemzettel. Tanulmányok* [The History of the Hungarian Nation and Fraternal Cooperation with the Rumanian Nation. Studies]. Vol. I. Bukarest, 1976, 73-75. It is totally inconceivable why Bánlaky (*op. cit.*, 158) blamed Szapolyai for his campaigns to Wallachia, with which he prevented the country from being surrounded.

<sup>3</sup> So far the most detailed work: Lajos Thallóczy-Sándor Horváth, *Magyarország melléktartományainak oklevéltára 4. Jajcza (bánság, vár és város) története 1450-1527* [Archives of Hungary's Subsidiary Provinces 4. A History of Jajca (Banate, Castle, and Town) 1450-1527]. (Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Diplomataria, 40.) Budapest, 1915, CCXXXVIII-CCLIV.

As the *ban* of Slavonia, he also had the barons' contingents (*banderia*) fielded by Slavonia at his disposal, so in the event of any attack he was able to mobilize sufficient forces. On the eastern part of the defence system, the equivalent of the role of the Croatian-Slavonian *ban* was played by the high sheriff of Temes county, who from the time of Kinizsi until 1523, held the title of 'captain-in-chief of the Lower Parts', and in this capacity he was in command of the *banderia* in the southern areas. His base was Temesvár.<sup>4</sup> To a certain extent Transylvania counted as the third unit of defence, although it was different as it was separated from the Ottoman Empire partly by the Carpathian Mountains and partly by the two Romanian voivodeships that were dependent more or less on Hungary, so there was no need for castles there. The Voivode of Transylvania, however, had major military forces at his disposal, mainly when at the same time he was the high sheriff of the Székelys.

In the mid-1510s, it is possible to more or less accurately define the number of garrison soldiers paid by the Hungarian king. Information about this is available from a record—which is unfortunately not complete—by the royal vice-treasurer.<sup>5</sup> His data often correspond to the figures in the budget proposed by the royal treasurers in 1511, though they are sometimes higher,<sup>6</sup> so the scanty data on Croatia can be supplemented with the aid of this record. Concerning the amounts of pay and payment conditions, the budget can be consulted (see the table in next page).

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<sup>4</sup> See Ferenc Szakály, *A mohácsi csata* [The Battle of Mohács]. (Sorsdöntő történelmi napok [Crucial Historical Days], 2.) Budapest, 1975, 50-64.

<sup>5</sup> Budapest, Egyetemi Könyvtár Kézirattár. Litt. et ep. orig. [hereinafter Litt. orig.] No. 233. On the back of the register without date someone—Werbőczy?—wrote among others: "has notationes fecit vicethezaurarius, satis negligenter, sicut omnia solet". Dating can be assisted by the continuing note, which mentions the late Zsigmond Thurzó, the Bishop of Várad, who died in 1512 (cf. János Horváth, *Az irodalmi műveltség megoszlása* [The Distribution of Literary Education]. Budapest, 1944, 207) and Bertalan Beriszló, the Prior of Vrana (cf. Ivan Kukuljevich, "A vránai perjelség [The Priory of Vrana]," in Ede Margalits, *Horvát történelmi repertorium* [Croatian Historical Repertory]. Vol. I. Budapest, 1900, 653). There is one more terminus post quem here: Szrebernik, which fell in the autumn of 1512, is not mentioned in the text; cf. Georgius Pray, *Epistolae procerum regni Hungariae*. Vol. I. Posonii, 1806, 81-83.

<sup>6</sup> Magyar Országos Levéltár [hereinafter MOL], Mohács előtti gyűjtemény [hereinafter DI] 21279. Last published by Thallóczy-Horváth, *op. cit.*, 183-192, dated from 1504. Correct dating: György Bónis, "Ständisches Finanzwesen in Ungarn," in *Nouvelles Études Historiques*. Vol. I. Budapest, 1965, 88: note 29.

*Garrison soldiers paid by the Hungarian treasury around 1513-1514<sup>7</sup>*

Area commanded by a captain-in-chief	Headquarters	Weaponry			Total	
		cavalry	infantry	boatmen		
Transylvania	Under the command of the voivode	300 (?)	–	–	300 (?)	
The Lower Parts	The castle of Temesvár	655 (455)	–	–	655 (455)	
	Minor fortresses in Temes and Szőrény	285 (285)	–	–	285 (285)	
	The castle of Szőrény	400 (?)	–	–	400 (?)	
	The castle of Nándorfehérvár	700 (500)	400 (400)	1000 (1000) <sup>8</sup>	2100 (1900)	
	The castle of Szabács	250 (50) <sup>9</sup>	–	100 (100)	350 (150?)	
	Hussars of the Serbian lords	1300 (1400)	–	–	1300 (1400)	
	<i>Total of the Lower Parts:</i>	3590	400	1100	5090	
	Croatia	Under the direct command of the ban	500 (200) <sup>10</sup>	[200] (200) <sup>11</sup>	–	700 (200)
		Minor fortress <sup>12</sup>	?	?	?	?
Croatian counts		[752] (752) <sup>13</sup>	–	–	752 (752)	
The castle of Jajca <sup>14</sup>		280 (200)	420 (300)	–	700 (500)	
Minor Bosnian fortresses <sup>15</sup>		[125] (125)	[150] (150)	–	275 (275)	
The castle of Szrebernik <sup>16</sup>		– (?)	– (?)	–	– (?)	
<i>Total of Croatia:</i>		1657	770	–	2457	
<i>Total number of garrison soldiers:</i>		5547	1170	1100	7817	

<sup>7</sup> A question mark is placed where the budget of 1511 gave only the amounts paid to soldiers, but not their numbers; where the register after 1512 does not give numbers, the data of the 1511 budget is taken over and placed in square brackets.

<sup>8</sup> The 1511 budget placed 500 boatmen at Nándorfehérvár, and 500 at Szalánkemén. The headquarters were in the previous place.

<sup>9</sup> In 1511, 50 *voyniks* are mentioned instead of *hussars*.

<sup>10</sup> In 1511, he received pay as the captain of Zengg as well, but the budget does not give numbers. It is not known whether in the 500 horsemen of the later register the guards of Zengg are included or not.

<sup>11</sup> The register after 1512 is incomplete concerning Croatia. The number of infantry is given on the basis of the 1511 budget.

<sup>12</sup> The 1511 budget contains amounts, but no numbers.

<sup>13</sup> The register after 1512 mentions the 200 horsemen of János Korbáviai and states that the other Croatian counts also received money for horsemen. So the data of the 1511 budget was accepted.

<sup>14</sup> The 1511 budget includes altogether 500 horsemen and infantrymen without separating them. The register after 1512 mentions altogether 700 horsemen and infantrymen in the same way. In 1511 the bans received 12,000 *forints* in cash and 2,000 *forints* worth of salt to pay their 500 men. Regarding that both the horsemen and the infantrymen got 2 *forints* per month in cash and the horsemen received 0.83 *forint* worth of salt in addition, the pay mentioned above was enough for 200 horsemen and 300 infantrymen. This ratio has been considered a basis in the separation of the 700 soldiers into cavalry and infantrymen.

<sup>15</sup> The missing information from the register after 1512 was supplemented from the budget of 1511.

<sup>16</sup> The castle fell in 1512, so it is not included in our register. In 1511 no figures were given.

Apart from Transylvania, where the treasury had no military expenses except for the *banderium* of the voivode, there were two districts led by captains-in-chief: the Lower Parts with Temesvár, Nándorfehérvár, and Szörény, and the Croatian Banate with Jajca and the Bosnian fortresses. The difference between the two districts was conspicuous regarding both the number and the composition of the troops. The ratio of paid soldiers between the Lower Parts and Croatia was 2:1. In the Lower Parts the cavalry was the most numerous: 70.5% of the troops were cavalry, 7.9% infantry, and 21.6% boatmen. If the latter are not taken into account, this ratio is even higher for cavalry: 9:1. In the Croatian-Bosnian confines, however, 68.3% of the troops were composed of cavalry and 31.7% of infantry. (Unfortunately, the ratio of light and heavy cavalry cannot be established.<sup>17</sup>) In the Croatian-Bosnian castles, efforts were made to increase the number of infantry troops. A defence plan of Croatia nearly as old as the above-mentioned record, which can be dated from around 1503-1520, proposed to recruit the following troops: 300 heavy cavalry, 500 foreign, that is not Croatian *hussars* (light cavalry), 200 *hussars* to the fortress of Zengg, 650 mounted soldiers to be paid by the Croatian counts, altogether 1,650 cavalry troops, and 400 infantrymen to Croatia, and 200 to Zengg, altogether 600.<sup>18</sup> For the same region, I counted 1,252 mounted soldiers and 200 infantrymen in the Table given above, on the basis of the record and the 1511 budget. So in Croatia proper, the ratio of infantry was in fact 13.8%, while the defence plan aimed to increase the number of troops by raising the proportion of infantry to 26.6%.

Even if the plan had been accomplished, the garrisons of the Lower Parts would have retained their higher number of soldiers. In spite of this, ignoring the expenses, which cannot be easily determined, the Croatian-Bosnian border fortresses cost the treasury almost as much as

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<sup>17</sup> In the register after 1512, the horsemen of the Transylvanian voivode and the *bans*, the cavalymen in Temesvár and the neighbouring fortresses called *hussars* in other sources, and also the *hussars* of the Serbian *despot*, and those of the Jaksicses (Jakšić) and Bradách are equally called *equites*. The same source speaks of 300 *hussars* in Nándorfehérvár and 50 in Szabács, though the budget from 1511 mentions *voyniks*. For the data on *hussars* in the budget, see (with the date of 1504), Zoltán Tóth, "A huszárok eredetéről [On the Origin of the Hussars]," *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 47 (1934) 184-189.

<sup>18</sup> Litt. orig. No. 233: "Instructio ad Croatiam". According to a note from the turn of the century, the *ban* received money to pay 400, the vice-*ban* got money for 100, and the Croatian counts money for 1,276 horsemen (DI. 104613). So the number of the latter was continually decreasing, which can also be seen in the case of the *hussars* of the Lower Parts.

those of the Lower Parts. In the 1511 budget, the Voivode of Transylvania was allocated 12,000 *forints*, the Lower Parts were given 60,206 *forints*, while the Croatian-Bosnian castles received 56,020 *forints* for paying the soldiers. This would imply that the Lower Parts were cheaper for the treasury, since it could pay twice as many soldiers there for the same amount of money. A thorough examination of the question is indispensable, all the more so because significant changes occurred in this issue between the fall of Nándorfehérvár and the battle of Mohács. The budget of 1511, concerning the Croatian-Bosnian fortresses, was calculated with the pay for a year, that is for twelve months, which was 2 *forints* for the foot soldiers. In the case of Jajca, it can be determined that, without the infantrymen's pay, the 200 cavalry troops to be equipped by the *ban* were allocated 2 *forints* and 0.83 *forint* worth of salt per month for a year. The pay of the cavalry kept by the Croatian *ban* cannot be assessed, because he had to equip 200 mounted soldiers and guard the fortresses from 10,000 *forints* and 1,000 *forints* worth of salt. In addition, 200 light cavalry received 2,400 *forints* yearly, that is, similarly to the infantrymen, 2 *forints* monthly. The Croatian counts drew 10 *forints* per head a year from the treasury for the upkeep of the mounted soldiers they themselves recruited and paid.

In the Lower Parts only 400 infantrymen are listed in Nándorfehérvár. Without their officers, they received 14 *forints* in cash and 1 *forint* worth of cloth per head yearly. From among the cavalry, only the 100 horsemen kept by the high sheriff of Temesvár and the 200 horsemen kept by the *ban* of Nándorfehérvár were given a payment of 2 *forints* and 0.83 *forint* worth of salt monthly for 12 months (that is 24 *forints* in cash and 10 *forints* worth of salt a year).<sup>19</sup> All the other *hussars* both in Nándorfehérvár and Temesvár, in minor fortresses, and also the *hussars* of the Serbian lords and the *voyniks* (the Hungarian counterparts of the Ottoman *voynuks*) of Szabács—altogether 2,390 men—received only 7 *forints* a year, mainly with the following distribution: 3 *forints* in cash, 2 *forints* worth of salt, and 2 *forints* worth of cloth. They were generally

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<sup>19</sup> The *bans* of Nándorfehérvár actually fielded them, at least at the beginning of the century. The pay register of the cavalry *familiares* serving György Kanizsai, the *ban* of Nándorfehérvár, survived. They received a pay of 2 *forints* per month (*mensualis*) and 10 *forints* worth of salt a year (*sallararium*), which is equal to 0.83 *forint* worth of salt a month; cf. Béla Iványi, "A Kanizsaiak fizetési lajstroma [The Pay-List of the Kanizsais from 1503]," *Magyar Gazdaságtörténelmi Szemle* 12 (1905) 15-35.

said to be exempt from taxes. The boatmen were in a similar situation, with the slight difference that most of them drew only 5 *forints* a year (2 *forints* in cash, 2 *forints* worth of salt, and 1 *forint* worth of cloth) and they were also free of taxes. Zoltán Tóth already drew attention to this system of payment and correctly suggested that these soldiers might have been peasants.<sup>20</sup> So in 1511, 83.3% of the garrison troops in the Lower Parts were peasant soldiers receiving minimal pay, 7.1% of them served hardly more than half a year as infantrymen, and only 9.6% were continually stationed in the fortresses. By contrast, in the Croatian confines only the mounted soldiers of the local counts came into the same category as the *hussars* of the Lower Parts, although they received higher pay than those around Temesvár. In fact they served longer, presumably for a year.<sup>21</sup>

The difference is obvious. The Hungarian military leadership created a totally different military structure in the Croatian-Bosnian border area: defence here was based on professional soldiers, one third of whom were infantrymen, so the military leadership could make use of the total military force throughout the year. The garrison troops in the Lower Parts did military service in some periods of the year only, since they could not make ends meet from their pay and the occasional loot, so they worked as peasants. Apparently, defence was more emphasized on the Croatian-Bosnian border, while the Lower Parts were not considered to be seriously endangered, perhaps due to the rivers, so the military strategy was based on attack in those parts. This different character, the need for more foot soldiers in the Croatian-Bosnian fortresses, was pointed out by the report of Aluise Bon, ambassador of Venice in 1512.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Tóth, *op. cit.*, 188-189. F. Szakály refers to the fact that this pay was not enough to live on, therefore, he regards the 3 *forints* of the boatmen paid in 1504 as pay per month (cf. *op. cit.*, 78-79). This is, however, impossible on the basis of the budget from 1511. The boatmen were merchants, craftsmen, and peasants doing military service as well.

<sup>21</sup> As the Croatian lords also drew payment from the Venetians and the Austrians (see Tóth, *op. cit.*, 158), and in addition they themselves paid their soldiers, this force can be considered a regular army. It was king Matthias who agreed with the counts that they "cum certo numero equitum unicuique scilicet juxta suam facultatem designato parati semper esse, atque cum opus et necessitas postularet, sine cunctatione cum gentibus sibi designatis omni tempore ad requisitionem Bani nostri pro illius regni opportuna defensione adesse debeant". He gave them 8 *forints* per horse for this (this increased to 10 *forints* in the Jagellon era): Martinus Georgius Kovachich, *Formulae solennes styli*. Pesthini, 1799, 509-510.

<sup>22</sup> István Balogh, *Velencei diplomaták Magyarországról 1500-1526* [Venetian Diplomats on Hungary 1500-1526]. Szeged, 1929, 34. They wanted to strengthen Jajca with 400 infantrymen and 200 mounted soldiers, "licet li cavalli li pocho pol far per esser terra piccola".

It was, however, exactly these marches that were mostly in decay, as István Werbőczy asserted in a speech to the diet around 1520: "... these confines have been destroyed due to the constant attacks by the Ottomans, peasants have been expelled from the estates of the castles; in many places, especially in Bosnia and Croatia, only desolate fortresses have remained, only desolate walls..."<sup>23</sup>

In the border fortresses, however, it was not only these partly or wholly royal troops who did military service. Since the renewal of the banderial system (barons fielding their own contingents) after king Matthias, the king, the governors of the border area, the ecclesiastical and secular magnates had been obliged to set up troops, the so called *banderia*. In principle, the royal *banderium* consisted of 1,000 cavalry. The size of the *banderia* set up by the Voivode of Transylvania, by the high sheriff of Temes county and by the *ban* of Croatia was determined by the income drawn from the particular office. The ecclesiastical barons were supposed to equip the troops on the basis of their property and income from the tithe, and all the other lords on the basis of the number of their serfs.<sup>24</sup> A certain proportion of the royal *banderium*, the court *hussars*, were stationed in the border garrisons under the command of separate captains, for instance, in Jajca, Temesvár, and Karánsebes in 1525-1526.<sup>25</sup> From among the *banderia*, those of the ecclesiastical magnates were the most frequently employed; in 1519, for example, the heavy cavalry and the *hussars* of the

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<sup>23</sup> Vilmos Fraknói, "Werbőczy István kiadatlan levelei és egy országgyűlési beszéde, 1513-1526 [The Unpublished Letters of István Werbőczy and one of his Speeches at the Diet, 1513-1526]," *Magyar Történelmi Tár* 25 (1877) 142. It has to be remarked that the Hungarian garrison soldiers devastated the area around the Ottoman fortresses at the beginning of the century in the same way. Milan Vasić, "Der Einfluß der Türkenkriege auf die Wirtschaft des osmanischen Grenzgebietes in Serbien und Bosnien (1480-1536)," in *Die wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen der Türkenkriege*. (Grazer Forschungen zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte, 1.) Hrg. von Othmar Pickl. Graz, 1971, 308-311.

<sup>24</sup> Articles 15-22 of 1498 are the most detailed: *Corpus Juris Hungarici. Magyar Törvénytár. 1000-1526. évi törvényczikkek* [Articles of Law Between 1000 and 1526]. Published by Sándor Kolosvári and Kelemen Óvári. Budapest, 1899, 602-608. In my view, the soldiers armed by every 10 or so tenures and the so-called banderial forces were at that time identical, the soldiers fielded by the tenures were therefore paid soldiers, whose ranks may have included peasants as well. I will go into detail in connection with them later on.

<sup>25</sup> See the accounts from 1525-1526: Vilmos Fraknói, "II. Lajos király számadási könyve 1525. január 12.-július 16 [The Accounts of king Louis II from January 12 to July 16, 1525]," *Magyar Történelmi Tár* 25 (1877) 66 (Karánsebes), 132 (Jajca), 87 (Temesvár). Concerning 1526, see *DI. 24405*; cf. Tóth, *op. cit.*, 183-184.

Archbishop of Esztergom were sent to Slavonia and paid by their lord.<sup>26</sup> In addition to them, mainly the *banderia* of the lords and counties near the border were made use of for particular military campaigns.<sup>27</sup> It is, of course, widely known, that the *banderia* were never fully set up.<sup>28</sup>

The bulk of the banderial forces consisted of cavalry. The diet of 1518 in Tolna required only seven Upper Hungarian counties to field infantry troops,<sup>29</sup> though the military strategic plan, probably prepared by István Werbőczy in one of the parliamentary sessions that year, emphasized the role of the infantry as well. This plan enumerated 10,000 men on the basis of banderial conscription: 4,000 infantry troops, half of whom were equipped with lances, and the other half were musketeers; and 6,000 cavalry, half light, half heavy armoured. The plan went into detail on each landlord's obligation, such as to how many soldiers they were to equip. The Archbishop of Esztergom, for example, whose contingent was 800 cavalry, had to provide 500 infantrymen, 300 *hussars*, and 200 heavy cavalry. The plan took into account the *banderia* of only a few counties, for it was expected that some of the nobles and chapters would provide the money instead. Unfortunately, the plan survived somewhat fragmentary, so instead of 10,000 men, there were altogether 8,950, out of whom 2,175 belonged to the heavy cavalry, 2,825 were *hussars*, and 400 were mounted soldiers, although it is not known whether they belonged to the light or heavy cavalry; there were 1,600 musketeers, 50 archers and 1,900 other infantrymen.<sup>30</sup> Werbőczy

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<sup>26</sup> For the expedition to Jajca in 1525, the *banderia* of the Bishops of Győr and Zágráb, the Abbots of Pannonhalma and Somogyvár, of the Chapters of Csázma, Fehérvár, and Veszprém, also the *banderia* of the counts János Bánffy, György Báthory, János Ernuszt, László Kanizsai, László Móré, Tamás Szécsi, Farkas and Ferenc Szentgyörgyi, and the *banderia* of the counties of Esztergom, Fejér, Győr, Moson, Pozsony, Sopron, Vas, and Zala were mobilized; see Fraknói, *op. cit.*, 120-121, 133, 137, 149. One plan prepared by members of the lesser nobility (cited above in note 18) on the defence of Croatia, stated the following: "item, quod omnes domini magnates banderiatum et alii domini in toto regno Sclauonie bona habentes et etiam regnicole, prout tenentur, gentes eorum semper paratas habeant, ut tempore necessitatis, quum banus superinde eosdem requisitos habuerit, statim penes ipsum insurgere teneantur, sub pene etc."

<sup>27</sup> Thallóczy-Horváth, *op. cit.*, 282. Tóth, *op. cit.*, 163, 182.

<sup>28</sup> See Elemér Mályusz, "A magyar társadalom a Hunyadiak korában. A hűbériség és a rendiség problémája [Hungarian Society in the Hunyadi Era. The Problem of Feudalism and the Estates]," in *Mátyás király emlékkönyve* [Memorial Volume to king Matthias]. Vol. I. Ed. by Imre Lukinich. Budapest, s. a., 388. It is characteristic that the mobilization order for the expedition to Jajca cited above had to be repeated to most counts and counties.

<sup>29</sup> 1518 (Tolna): articles 1-6. (For the counties in Upper Hungary, see article 6.) Josephus Nicolaus Kovachich, *Sylogge decretorum comitialium*. Vol. I. Pesthini, 1818, 231-235.

<sup>30</sup> Litt. orig. No. 219.

himself was not a soldier; the plan for an offensive campaign with only 10,000 soldiers was unrealistic, even if the Ottomans were preoccupied in other areas, therefore it was obviously rejected. Still, it is the realization of the infantry's importance that makes this plan significant. In my opinion the author of the *Tripartitum Opus* (the first systematic Hungarian legal code), gained this idea from those members of the lesser nobility who realized the shortcomings of the cavalry-centred structure during the border struggles.<sup>31</sup>

However, no sign of any changes in the border defence system can be traced until 1521; no doubt, there was no money for it, either. But the fall of Nándorfehérvár created a new situation. The Ottomans invaded the Syrmium, and they captured many castles owned by landlords: Szávaszentdemeter, Kölpény, Berekszó, Barics, Kamonc, and Rednek;

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<sup>31</sup> Nearly half of the 16 lay judges elected to the royal council by the lesser nobility at the diet of 1518 in Bács had served in border fortresses for certain periods (Dezső Szabó, *A magyar országgyűlések története II. Lajos korában* [The History of the Hungarian Diets under Louis II]. Budapest, 1909, 243-244.) The longest period of service can be traced in the case of Lukács Kutasi. In the 1490s he was the commander of Barics in the service of the Archbishop of Kalocsa, Péter Váradi, but he had already served under Péter Geréb, the cousin of king Matthias (Carolus Wagner, *Petri de Warda ... epistolae. Posonii et Cassoviae, 1776, 15-17*). In 1504 he was in Nándorfehérvár holding a higher rank (Béla Iványi, "Horváth Pál nándorfehérvári vicebán jelentése 1504 [The 1504 Report of Pál Horváth, Vice-ban of Belgrade]," *Magyar Gazdaságtörténelmi Szemle* 12 [1905] 339.) In 1505 the infantrymen of Nándorfehérvár admitted that they received the pay that was to be given to them by the late György Mór from Lukács Kutasi (*A Tomaj nemzetségbeli losonczi Bánffy-család története. Oklevéltár* [The History of the Bánffy Family of Losoncz Belonging to the Clan of Tomaj. Collection of Documents]. Vol. II. Budapest, 1928, 414.) In the spring of 1518 he was the vice-high-sheriff of Temes and the vice-captain-in-chief of the Lower Parts at the same time (Szabó, *op. cit.*, 127-128). In lieu of the high sheriff István Báthory, who was preoccupied with national politics, Kutasi was in charge of the defence of the border area. Báthory once defeated the *sancakbeyi* of Semendire on the battlefield of Temes following the advice of Kutasi and his fellow vice-high-sheriff (*Az Lándorfehérvár elveszésének oka e vót és így esött* [This Was the Cause of the Loss of Belgrade and It Happened in This Way], in *Verancsics Antal m. kir. helytartó, esztergomi érsek ... összes munkái. II. Történelmi dolgozatok magyar nyelven. Vegyesek* [Collected Works of Antal Verancsics, Hungarian Royal Regent and Archbishop of Esztergom. II. Historical Works in Hungarian. Miscellaneous]. [Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Scriptores, 3.] Published by László Szalay. Pest, 1857, 133-134). But this professional soldier had the time to participate in the diets as the envoy of county Csanád (so at the turn of the century: Litt. orig. No. 246, or in 1505: Martinus Georgius Kovachich, *Supplementum ad vestigia comitorum*. Vol. II. Budaë, 1800, 336), that is why he was elected a lay judge. At the time of the diet in 1518 he was a vice-captain-in-chief and was well aware of the significance of the infantry from the period of his service in Nándorfehérvár.

Szalánkemén was destroyed.<sup>32</sup> Still, they withdrew from most of the fortresses, only Nándorfehérvár and Szabács were kept under their control. This is how István Beriszló, the *despot* (titular prince) of the Serbs and a Hungarian landlord, could be in his headquarters, Kölpény, in January, 1522 again.<sup>33</sup> These fortresses had not been particularly strong earlier either, but they were so heavily damaged in the sieges of 1521 that they became unfit to provide any serious defence later on.

The outer defence line was almost completely destroyed in 1521, only the two ends, Szörény and Jajca, together with Klissza, survived. All this necessitated the reform of the border defence system. At the session of the diet in November, 1521 the lesser nobility not only voted for a new kind of tax to be handled by the so called country treasurers elected by the estates, but also had in mind the transformation of the banderial system.<sup>34</sup> Only the most widely used official (maintained by the voivode, etc., in return of his office) and the ecclesiastical *banderia* were preserved, and the obligation of the nobility to fight and the duty of the barons to maintain *banderia* were cancelled. In case the latter still set up their troops, they would have had to be paid by the central financial administration. Finally, the appointment of one or two captains-in-chief was proposed.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Kemalpaşazade, *Mohács-náme*, in *Török történetírók* [Ottoman Chroniclers]. (Török-magyarokori történelmi emlékek. II. Írók [Historical Sources from the Ottoman Period in Hungary. II. Writers.]) Vol. I. Translated by József Thúry. Budapest, 1893, 214 [hereinafter Thúry]. The campaign journals of Süleyman I: Thúry, *op. cit.*, 287, 290, 306. Ferdi/Bostan, *A törvényhozó Szulejmán szultán története* [The History of Sultan Süleyman the Lawgiver], in Thúry, *op. cit.*, Vol. II. Budapest, 1896, 54. Celalzade Mustafa, *Az országok osztályai és az utak felsorolása* [The Classes of Countries and the Grades of Roads], in Thúry, *op. cit.*, Vol. II. 142-143. Mátyás Meszics, "A horvátok Beriszló bán után a mohácsi vész [The Croats after ban Beriszló up to the Battle of Mohács]," in Margalits, *Horvát történelmi reperetórium*, Vol. II. 333. For the siege of Nándorfehérvár and Zimony, see Jovanka Kalić-Mijušković, *Beograd u srednjem veku*. [Belgrade in the Middle Ages] Beograd, 1967, 239-268 and Ferenc Szakály, "Nándorfehérvár, 1521: the Beginning of the End of the Medieval Hungarian kingdom," in *Hungarian-Ottoman Military and Diplomatic Relations in the Age of Süleyman the Magnificent*. Ed. by Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor. Budapest, 1994, 47-76.

<sup>33</sup> Lajos Thallóczy-Antal Áldási, *A Magyarország és Szerbia közötti összeköttetések oklevéltára 1198-1526* [The Archives of the Contacts Between Hungary and Serbia 1198-1526]. (Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Diplomataria, 33.) Budapest, 1907, 357. Alexa Ivics, "A szerbek története Magyarországon Brankovics János deszpota halálától a mohácsi vészig, 1502-1526 [The History of the Serbs in Hungary from the Death of the *despot* George Brankovics up to the Battle of Mohács, 1502-1526]," in Ede Margalits, *Szerb történelmi reperetórium* [Serbian Historical Repertory]. Budapest, 1918, 689.

<sup>34</sup> Bónis, *op. cit.*, 93-102.

<sup>35</sup> Articles 34-37, 1521. Kovachich, *Sylloge*, Vol. I. 307-309.



This decree not only illustrates the nobility tried to evade military service, but also the fact they realized the importance of creating a mercenary army. As a matter of fact, they returned to the principles of king Matthias. The two captains-in-chief elected were the palatine István Báthory and the voivode János Szapolyai.<sup>36</sup> Both of them had been captains-in-chief up to that time with restricted territorial authority. The palatine, for example, had been the captain-in-chief of the Lower Parts, but the new appointment extended their authority to the whole country. The diet of August 10 in the following year, named the captains-in-chief the 'captains of His Royal Highness and the country'. They were ordered to transport the mercenaries employed by the state to the border fortresses and at the same time the royal treasurer was instructed to hire infantry troops to defend the castles and send 1,000 boatmen there, too. The ecclesiastical *banderia* were ordered there as well.<sup>37</sup> The significance of the infantry manifested itself again.

With the fall of Nándorfehérvár and Szabács and the destruction of Szalánkemén, the headquarters of the previously employed 1,100 boatmen ceased to exist. It is not known how many of them were killed during the war or during the Ottoman devastation of the Syrmium, since most of them lived in the villages in the vicinity of the castles. Some of them are known to have joined the Ottoman army.<sup>38</sup> Undoubtedly, the boatmen could not serve without their ports. The majority of the villages, which had been inhabited by the *hussars* occasionally serving in the occupied fortresses, might also have been devastated. After the provisional capture of Kölpény by the Ottomans, the despot could not be expected to provide 600 *hussars*. That meant that the fall of Nándorfehérvár and Szabács not only involved losing the most important fortresses of the outer or southern defence line, but also excluded those soldiers from the Hungarian military organization who served only occasionally for a couple of months' pay and had exemption from taxes. Consequently the need arose for regular paid troops.

Although somewhat inaccurately, the captains-in-chief and the country treasurers tried to meet the requirements of the new situation.

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<sup>36</sup> Szabó, *op. cit.*, 50-51.

<sup>37</sup> József Holub, "Az 1522-iki országgyűlés és törvénycikkei [The Diet of 1522 and the Articles of it]," *Századok* 52 (1918) 508.

<sup>38</sup> Augustinus Theiner, *Vetera monumenta historica Hungarum sacram illustrantia*. Vol. II. Roma, 1862, 750. My attention was drawn to these data by Ferenc Szakály.

On the basis of the incomplete treasury accounts and other documents that survived, the size of the Hungarian military force employed in the summer of 1522 can be defined.<sup>39</sup> The amount of salary of the soldiers was the same as in the budget of 1511. The infantrymen received 2 *forints* per month, the light cavalry got the same amount called *stipendium* or *mensualis* (monthly pay); and 10 *forints* per year (that is 0.83 *forint* a month) called *sallarium*. (The latter corresponded to the previous salt supply.) Other data (the six heavily armoured mounted soldiers of Gergely Selypi) permit the conclusion that the stipend of heavy cavalry was 3 *forints* a month, while their *sallarium* (salt supply) equalled that of the *hussars*.<sup>40</sup> The increase in the number of infantry is conspicuous, and the almost complete disappearance of heavy cavalry is striking.<sup>41</sup> Each of the two captains-in-chief received money for the pay of 1,500 light cavalry from February 14, 1522. Since the treasury was empty, Gáspár Ráskai and István Werbőczy, as the country treasurers, borrowed 3,760 *forints* worth of gold articles, weighing 407 marks, from the king on February 24, to pay the 3,000 cavalry troops of the two captains-in-chief until tax was collected.<sup>42</sup> From the accounts, it is known that out of his 1,500 (more exactly 1,554) light cavalry, the palatine sent 1,250 to Temesvár and 304 to Futak. In Futak, 211 additional mounted soldiers were paid.<sup>43</sup> The palatine employed 500 infantrymen in Szőrény and 200 in Titel on the pay of the country treasurers.

In addition, other soldiers were hired as well. Mihály Podmaniczky recruited 1,000 infantrymen in Nyitra and Trencsén counties, Pál Ártándi

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<sup>39</sup> Out of the surviving accounts we can take into consideration Dl. 26272 and 26273, and Litt. orig. No. 29. The testimony of these are assessed here; the data on Temesvár and Futak are detailed in Litt. orig. No. 267. In the final amount it lists 200 more soldiers (504) in the case of Futak than Dl. 26272 (304). These documents will not be quoted separately below. For the conditions in 1522, the letter of the king leaving for Bohemia, from March 24, to the palatine-regent, is very interesting, in which he approves of the personnel changes among the captains in the border area and also the fact that he sent 200 infantrymen to Titel; see Pray, *op. cit.*, Vol. I. 150.

<sup>40</sup> Some features in common can be pointed out with the system of payment after Mohács. On this, see János J. Varga, *Szervitorok katonai szolgálata a XVI-XVII. századi dunántúli nagybirtokon* [The Military Service of the Servitors in the Great Estates of Transdanubia in the 16th-17th centuries]. Unpubl. Ph.D. Thesis. I would like to thank the author for kindly permitting me to read his study.

<sup>41</sup> Only the 6 mounted soldiers paid by Selypi and the 18 mounted soldiers kept by the royal treasurer Kanizsai were heavily armoured: Litt. orig. No. 29 and Dl. 26273.

<sup>42</sup> Dl. 47441.

<sup>43</sup> Litt. orig. No. 267.

took 50 light cavalry and 400 infantry into his service, Péter Kosztka employed 400 foot soldiers. Others also recruited soldiers in different numbers: from six to one hundred. So the number of soldiers paid by the country treasurers in 1522 was 3,757 cavalry and 2,500 infantry, altogether 6,257 men: the ratio of cavalry to infantry was 6 to 4. The majority of the soldiers were obviously placed in border fortresses. However, it has to be added that our accounts are fragmentary, they do not reflect the data concerning the total Hungarian military force; the whole Croatian-Bosnian border area is missing, for example. In the remaining fortresses of the Lower Parts, the size of the military force was increased. In Transylvania and the Lower Parts, in the 1510s there were 3,890 cavalry, 400 infantry, and 1,100 boatmen, altogether 5,390 men. Almost 1,000 more soldiers were now recruited, and this number did not include the boatmen who had not been reorganized up to that time. The structure of the military force was reformed as well. The ratio of infantry surpassed even the earlier Croatian figures. The necessity to increase the number of infantry was crystal clear to the country treasurers: on February 14, 1522 they obtained a loan "for the employment of infantrymen to defend the country and its border fortresses".<sup>44</sup> The total expenditure in the fragmentary accounts is also high. In the account of Werbőczy there is a cost of 44,586.5 *forints*,<sup>45</sup> in that of Ráskai this amount is 35,086.29 *forints*,<sup>46</sup> and in the least complete one of Kanizsai there is a sum of 2,107.5 *forints*.<sup>47</sup> So the total cost can be calculated as amounting to a minimum of 81,780 *forints* and 29 *denarius*, since the account of Kanizsai covers less than two months and the account of the fourth treasurer is missing.

These expenditures mostly refer to three, sometimes to six months, as the stipend and *sallarium* (salt supply) for three months of the 3,000 cavalry troops of the two captains-in-chief was altogether 25,500 *forints*, that is it would have been 102,000 *forints* for a year. The soldiers could not have been paid throughout the year, because the treasury did not have so much money. And indeed, there were only part-time soldiers. The 1,000 infantrymen of Podmaniczky received pay for less than one

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<sup>44</sup> Dl. 39819

<sup>45</sup> Litt. orig. No. 29.

<sup>46</sup> Dl. 26272. According to his own summary 34,622.24 *forints*.

<sup>47</sup> Dl. 26273.

and a half months, and the 400 infantry troops of Kosztka were paid for two and a half months.<sup>48</sup> The 1,250 cavalry troops of Temesvár served from February 14 to September 24 in such a way that 710 mounted soldiers started to serve, but during the last six days only ten of them were paid. 710 horsemen served for seven months, 396 for five months, 52 for four months, 42 for three, and 50 for two months. Some of the 515 cavalry troops of Futak started their service somewhat earlier, on January 6, and finished it on September 17. For eight and a half months there were 200 cavalry troops, for seven months 211, and for five months 104 soldiers in service. That meant that all the 1,250 cavalry troops in Temesvár were in service only for 47 days, from July 13 to August 28. Futak was in a somewhat better position as the 515 cavalry troops served there for five months, from April 13 to September 25. The surviving treasury accounts did not provide information on the salary of all the garrison soldiers—it is sufficient to refer to the missing documents on Croatia. Of the above mentioned 710 mounted soldiers, the account explains that they were the palatine's former *familiares* (noble retainers), who were now paid by the treasury. Up to that time, they had obviously been kept by the high sheriff of Temes county on his own salary and the income from his office as his official *banderium*. (He was legally obliged to keep only 400 persons.) They must have belonged to the constant garrison troops of the fortress and presumably they continued serving for some time after September 11, when their contract with the country treasurers expired, and they were paid from other sources.<sup>49</sup>

It can be seen from the fragmentary data that, knowing the financial situation of the country,<sup>50</sup> the majority of soldiers serving in Transylvania and the Lower Parts in the summer of 1522, could not possibly have been paid throughout the year, and, unlike the Croatian-Bosnian fortresses, they served for shorter periods. Apparently, larger forces were needed mainly in summer and early autumn. However, when Futak, Titel, and Pétervárad were transformed into front-line fortresses after 1521, their fortification must have placed a heavy burden on the treasury. The

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<sup>48</sup> Litt. orig. No. 29.

<sup>49</sup> Litt. orig. No. 267.

<sup>50</sup> Zsuzsánna Hermann, "Államháztartásunk és a pénz értéke a Mohács előtti Magyarországon (Megjegyzések Thurzó Elek költségvetési előirányzatához) [The State Budget and the Value of Money in Hungary in the Period Before the Battle of Mohács (Remarks on the Budget Proposal by Elek Thurzó)]," *Századok* 109 (1975) 301-334.

expenses increased, which were not covered by the tax handled by the country treasurers. Indeed, the fortresses were left almost unguarded in the spring of the following year.<sup>51</sup> No doubt, the palatine did his best to fulfil his tasks. At the beginning of November, 1522 he still stayed in Futak (as his letter to János Kállai Vitéz, the *ban* of Szörény proves it).<sup>52</sup> His presence there was indispensable, because Bali *bey*, the new commander of Belgrade, had attacked the country several times.<sup>53</sup> Polish mercenaries had rebelled in Pétervárad (then their commander was executed in Futak). The news came that they wanted to pass Pétervárad into the hands of the Ottomans.<sup>54</sup>

All this raises the question whether, not taking the increase in the number of infantry into consideration, the structure of defence had changed in the Lower Parts after 1521 at all, for most of the soldiers served in the fortresses for only short periods as earlier. But the former

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<sup>51</sup> See the letter of János Bornemissza to the Imperial ambassador Andrea dal Burgo, March 2, 1523: "quibus avariciis, superbiis et favoribus maliciosis regnum relinquerunt cum vili presidio". The same person to the same addressee on March 3: "consideretis ex omnibus confinis Thurcorum, quid iam operabuntur, singulis diebus desolabunt totam Boznam, Dalmaciam, Croaciam, Sclavoniam et partes Hungarie, quocumque penetrare poterunt, qui adhuc ex nostris, videlicet aulicis regie maiestatis in illis partibus sunt, pro defensione illius terre nulle sunt". That is only the royal *banderium*, the 'aulicus', stationed on the border, which is a little exaggerated, but near the truth. The letters of Bornemissza are appendices to the report of Burgo sent to Prince Ferdinand on March 14, 1523. Wien, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv [hereinafter HHStA], Grosse Correspondenz [hereinafter Gr. Corr.] 25. a. (From now on I do not give the name of the ambassador and addressee when citing the reports of Burgo, only the place of storage and the date. The reports sent to Prince Ferdinand: Gr. Corr. 25. a, the reports sent to Salamanca, the minister of the Prince: Gr. Corr. 25 b. Gr. Corr. 25 a. May 5, 1523: "paucissime gentes Vngare sunt ad tutandum confinia".

<sup>52</sup> Frigyes Pesty, *A szörényi bánság és Szörény vármegye története* [The History of the Banate of Szörény and of County Szörény]. Vol. III. Budapest, 1878, 172-173.

<sup>53</sup> *Ludovici Tuberonis Commentariorum de rebus suo tempore... libri XI*, in J. Schwandtner, *Scriptores rerum Hungaricarum*. Vol. II. [Vienna], 1746, 379, 381. Bánlaky, *op. cit.*, Vol. XII. 151. (It was at that time that Orsova in south-east, and Scardona and Osztrovica at the Croatian-Bosnian border fell.)

<sup>54</sup> *Memoria rerum quae in Hungaria a nato rege Ludovico ultimo acciderunt, qui fuit ultimi Ladislai filius*, in Verancsics, *op. cit.*, Vol. II. 18. Cf. the letter of Bornemissza from March 2, 1523 (see note 51): "timendum est inprimis de Petro Waradini et de Titulio. Audietis a Maylath, quomodo prodere voluerunt castrum Pether Waradya...". Louis II excused himself to the Polish king Sigismund, his uncle, for the death of the Polish mercenary captain executed for the crimes he committed in Pétervárad, though he remarked that it was not without reason: Stanislaus Górski, *Epistole, legationes, responsa, actiones, res geste serenissimi principis Sigismundi ... Acta Tomiciana*. Posnaniae, from 1852, Vol. XI. 248 [hereinafter *Acta Tomiciana*].

troops were like a *militia*, they lived and worked around the forts and they could be mobilized at any time in return of their pay if the need arose. Principally, the soldiers stationed in the castles and paid for a year or so may have been worth more than the former peasant-like *hussars*, but the treasury simply could not afford to bear the burden of paying them. Most of the soldiers placed in the fortresses in 1522 were unlikely to have had any previous military practice, and they started to learn the occupation only then. Where could the 1,000 infantrymen recruited in Nyitra and Trencsén counties by Podmaniczky have gained experience? And similar questions come to mind when reading that Ferenc Forgách was employed with 50 mounted soldiers for two months from July 13, 1522 in Temesvár.<sup>55</sup> Forgách also was a nobleman from Upper Hungary and his undertaking the service for a short period presumably refers to the fact that he recruited soldiers from the region where his estates were situated and not professional ones with experience in border warfare. The structure itself did change, the proportion of the infantry increased, the peasant-soldier layer disappeared and was replaced by paid soldiers, but apparently neither money nor experienced mercenaries were at the disposal of the military leadership to be able to act according to the new structure.

#### THE MILITARY STRATEGIC PLANS OF THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT IN 1522-1523

It was obvious that the kingdom of Hungary could not afford either financially or militarily to maintain the weak southern border defence system against an Ottoman attack. The fall of Nándorfehérvár proved that those with the most pessimistic opinions were correct, since the country was unable to defend even its strongest fortress. However, the government, though inconsistently and sometimes clumsily, followed a clearly distinguishable conception whose 'spiritus rector' was the chancellor László Szalkai and probably queen Maria.<sup>56</sup> The essence of this

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<sup>55</sup> Litt. orig. No. 267.

<sup>56</sup> Below I follow my study "A magyar állam belpolitikai helyzete Mohács előtt [The Internal Situation of the Hungarian State Prior to the Battle of Mohács]," in *Mohács (Tanulmányok a mohácsi csata 450. évfordulója alkalmából)* [Mohács. Studies Commemorating the 450th Anniversary of the Battle of Mohács]. Ed. by Lajos Rúzsás and Ferenc Szakály. Budapest, 1986, 59-99. The sources are detailed there, I cite only the most necessary ones here.

concept was the following: royal power had to be strengthened with regard to the Ottoman threat, the most powerful aristocrats defying the ruler had to be removed from the government, the properties of the crown had to be regained, appropriate financial and military aid had to be acquired from the other provinces of the king and at the same time, soldiers had to be sought from the Holy Roman Empire through diplomatic channels, and finally a campaign had to be launched in a Polish-Austrian alliance against the Ottomans. It would be difficult to believe that they thought about the total annihilation of the Ottomans; apparently, they had the restricted goal of recapturing Nándorfehérvár and all the other fortresses in mind.<sup>57</sup> Although the implementation of these plans was not facilitated by reasons of foreign policy either,<sup>58</sup> the fulfilment of certain points was in fact hindered by the news of the Ottoman attack in 1523.

The king wanted to restore order in Bohemia first. He managed to replace the Bohemian government, which consisted of aristocrats, and regain the possessions of the crown, which caused heated discussions throughout Hungary as well.<sup>59</sup> The Bohemian<sup>60</sup> and Moravian<sup>61</sup> diets

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<sup>57</sup> This limited plan is included in the decision of the royal council at the beginning of July, 1523, in which they rejected the idea of making peace with the Ottomans, but they also considered it impossible to launch a serious Hungarian attack. Such an attack was also regarded as one with restricted purposes: "de offendenda autem hec estate hoste in iis, que tenet, et particulariter de oppugnanda Nandoralba pariter nullam esse spem, stantibus rebus Vngaricis et externis in terminis statis notis...", Gr. Corr. 25 a. July 3, 1523, see note 82 below. This limited plan is referred to by the instruction given by Louis II to his ambassador sent to the Imperial diet on September 29, 1522: Béla Iványi, *Adalékok a nemzetközi jog történetéhez a Jagelló-korban* [Data on the History of International Law Under the Jagellons]. Budapest, 1906, 79.

<sup>58</sup> For the situation of foreign policy, see György Székely, "A török hódítók elleni védelem ügye a Dózsa-parasztháborútól Mohácsig [The Cause of Defence Against the Ottoman Conquerors from the Peasant Revolt Led by Dózsa up to Mohács]," *Századok* 86 (1952) 137-140.

<sup>59</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 b. March 6, 1523; *ibid.*, 25 a. March 7 and 14, 1523. See the letters of Bornemissza above in note 51. Chancellor Szalkay to the Polish king Sigismund: "Deus deposuit potentes regulos de sede... oppressit eos, qui regem opprimebant", *Acta Tomiciana*, Vol. VI. 249. The instructions of Louis II to his ambassador to Poland: *ibid. cit.*, 238-248, 278-284.

<sup>60</sup> They voted for 2 *forints* after the income of 1,000 *forints*, that is an income tax of two thousandth; they also ordered the collection of tax arrears with those taxes that were to be collected to cover the expenses of the Ottoman war and the king's stay in Bohemia. They wanted the king to use this money to field as many soldiers as possible. According to some estimates, this amount of money would have been enough to pay a few thousand soldiers for half a year. If Hungary was attacked by the Ottomans, the whole country was obliged to rise up and defend the Hungarians: Gr. Corr. 25 a. March 17, 1523.

<sup>61</sup> 30,000 ducats were offered, and the payment of several thousand infantrymen for six months in addition. They also promised to mobilize the whole country in the event of an Ottoman attack: Gr. Corr. 25 a. April 12, 1523.

voted for serious financial and military aid against the Ottomans, in contrast to what has been stated by historians so far.<sup>62</sup> This was the aim of the Hungarian diet as well. The return of the alienated properties of the crown had already been ordered by the diet of Bács in 1518 and had partly been executed, but, for example, voivode Szapolyai still had such estates. The replacement of the government was prepared in Hungary, too. The imperial ambassador Andrea dal Burgo had already noticed from Prague in the middle of March that he foresaw in the Hungarian diet "... many changes and new dispositions and I believe that the palatine will be dismissed".<sup>63</sup> The voivode himself was afraid of being deposed, so he travelled to the king and renounced his office, though not that of the voivode, but that of the captain-in-chief of the country, which involved a lot of responsibility. The king did not accept it and postponed the discussion of the matter to the time of the diet.<sup>64</sup> During the diet, which opened in Buda at the beginning of May, the king threatened Szapolyai in the royal council and demanded he should return the properties on pledge, but the voivode did not yield.<sup>65</sup> He kept his offices and properties, but the palatine was deprived of all his offices, of being the palatine, the captain-in-chief of the country, and the high sheriff of Temes county. The latter post was given to János Drágffy.<sup>66</sup> The diet granted a significant tax for military purposes,<sup>67</sup> it ordered the royal, aristocratic and ecclesiastical *banderia* to set off for the border fortresses of Temes, the barons should employ one soldier by every ten tenures and the yeomen with gentlemen's rights (*nobiles unius sessionis*) should not be exempt from military service.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> See Pál Török, "A mohácsi vész diplomáciai előzményei [The Diplomatic Prelude to the Battle of Mohács]," in *Mohácsi emlékkönyv 1526* [Memorial Book on Mohács 1526]. Ed. by Imre Lukinich. Budapest, 1927, 186: The Bohemians promised to help fight the Ottomans, "if they should attack Louis II and his countries". So Török underlined the latter, though the king and his advisers considered the promise of the former a major result.

<sup>63</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. March 14, 1523.

<sup>64</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 b. April 6, 1523.

<sup>65</sup> The report of the Austrian ambassador Herberstein to Salamanca: Gr. Corr. 25 b. May 5, 1523. Cf. also the bad text in Elfriede Rensig, "Sigismund von Herberstein am Hofe König Ludwigs II. von Ungarn," *A Bécsi Magyar Történeti Intézet Évkönyve* 1 (1931) 87-88.

<sup>66</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 b. May 25, 1523; 25 a. May 30-June 1, 1523. Cf. also Szabó, *op. cit.*, 60-66. Rensig, *op. cit.*, 74-93, etc.

<sup>67</sup> Articles 23-27 of 1523. Kovachich, *Sylloge*, Vol. I. 334-336.

<sup>68</sup> Articles 13, 18, 19 of 1523. Kovachich, *Sylloge*, Vol. I. 331-333.

So the diet did not exactly follow the Bohemian procedure; from the point of view of the king it was only a partial success. The voivode retained his power. The diet completely abandoned the 1521 military structure and returned to the banderial form of warfare. It became obvious at the beginning of the summer of 1523 that the idea, which was the starting point of king Louis II's government and which he had in mind at the diets held in his countries, had fallen through partly or completely by the time of the Hungarian diet, or at least had been put off until the following year, as the most important part of the concept would have been help from the German imperial estates and the support provided by Austria and Poland. In this way, an offensive campaign could have been launched against the Ottomans with the joint forces of Hungary, Bohemia, and Poland, as the enemy was preoccupied with the siege of Rhodes in the autumn of 1522.<sup>69</sup>

A description of the prolonged talks is not the subject of this study. In December 1522, the imperial estates offered 4,000 infantry troops for six months and promised to send them to Sopron by May 25, 1523. The condition would have been the support of the Bohemians, and that the Hungarians would join the army with cannon and horses in Sopron. The king should have informed the imperial government about the acceptance of the conditions by March 15.<sup>70</sup> Louis II proposed the Earl Albert of Brandenburg, the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, as the commander of the army.<sup>71</sup>

The Bohemian diet agreed to the plan, but due to the replacement of the aristocrats, the negotiations ended only in early March.<sup>72</sup> That same month, the king wrote to the imperial government asking for 3,000 more soldiers in addition to the approved 4,000, and he added that the decision of the Hungarian diet came still waited for.<sup>73</sup> Although the March 15

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<sup>69</sup> The best and the most detailed account is that of Török, *op. cit.*, 155-178.

<sup>70</sup> Török, *op. cit.*, 166-168.

<sup>71</sup> The appointment of the Grand Master would have met with opposition both in Hungary and Poland. The king wanted to appoint him commander-in-chief "ut armis et consilio insignem", therefore through Burgo he secretly asked Ferdinand to arrange the whole thing as if it had been the wish of the Empire. Gr. Corr. 25 a. March 18, 1523; 25 b. March 18, 1523. For this case, see also Gernot Heiss, "Politik und Ratgeber der Königin Maria von Ungarn in den Jahren 1521-1531," *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung* 82 (1974) 122.

<sup>72</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. March 14, 1523.

<sup>73</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. March 22, 1523.

deadline had passed, Louis II urged the arrival of imperial aid in mid-April.<sup>74</sup> During the diet, Burgo, the imperial and Herberstein, the Austrian ambassador asked for a decision on the conditions laid down by the Empire and then envoys should be sent to Nürnberg for the assistance. In the meantime, Ferdinand of Habsburg suggested that the Hungarians should make peace with the Ottomans.<sup>75</sup> The king replied to the Empire's wishes and excused himself for the delay. He slightly modified the conditions in several points and besides the 4,000 men, he asked for 2,000 more.<sup>76</sup> As taxes were also slowly collected in the Empire, the Hungarian reply arrived late, and it did not fulfil all the conditions, so Hungarian envoys were rejected in July, no matter how strongly they protested.<sup>77</sup> So the military campaign to be launched against the Ottomans in the spring of 1523 could not be implemented and without German help, Bohemian-Moravian support could not be relied on either.

On several occasions, the Polish king advised that peace should be concluded with the Ottomans.<sup>78</sup> This made the life of the imperial ambassador more difficult, who had at first warned the Hungarians against signing a peace treaty without including the Habsburgs in it. He asked for immediate instructions.<sup>79</sup> Ferdinand of Habsburg, who was involved with the Ottoman affairs, due to the hereditary provinces that were endangered through the Croatian-Bosnian border fortresses, found it cheaper to make peace and he apparently instructed the ambassador of his brother accordingly. Burgo, on the contrary, emphasized the inclination of the estates towards war, though he doubted the possibility of war that year.<sup>80</sup> The

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<sup>74</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. April 16, 1523.

<sup>75</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. May 10 and 12, 1523. See note 80 below.

<sup>76</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. May 30–June 1, 1523.

<sup>77</sup> Török, *op. cit.*, 170.

<sup>78</sup> *Acta Tomiciana*, Vol. VI. 250-253.

<sup>79</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. April 5 and 10, 1523.

<sup>80</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. May 12, 1523. Ferdinand's instruction "declaravi regi et secreta aliquibus dominis et omnes probant sapiens consilium vestre serenitatis et pariter vident necessitatem ita agendi, sed difficultas stat, quia regnicole ab eo erunt aversi, dubitantes fore etiam hoc modo ruinam suam et pocius vellent insurgere nunc viritim, si haberent, qui juvarent, contra Turchum et hunc nunc tractant, sed ego non video modum, quod possint facere hac estate". With similar content: Gr. Corr. 25 a. May 5, 1523. In other places Burgo refers to Ferdinand's proposal, which seems not to have demanded the inclusion of the Habsburgs in the peace treaty. Gr. Corr. 25 a. May 14, 1523: "credo, quod secreta rex cum paucis concluderit, quod rex Polonie tractet et concludat, si poterit, de treugis cum inclusione omnium Christianorum, ac si non, saltem cum inclusione Serenitatis vestre, Caesaree (!) Maiestatis et pontificis, vel saltem eo modo, quo mihi Serenitas vestra scripsit".

ambassador personally did not believe the Ottomans would agree to peace, which was why he deemed it necessary for both Louis II and Ferdinand to prepare for war, thus putting pressure on the enemy, and if peace could not be made, they would be able to resist more easily. He believed that if the two countries did their utmost, not only would the Ottomans be unable to occupy them, but would suffer from the results of a possible attack. It is true, however, that the two countries would not be able to bear the burdens.<sup>81</sup> Finally, disregarding Burgo's protest, the eight most confidential privy councillors, under the direction of Louis II, decided against making peace with the Ottomans at the beginning of July. One of their arguments was that the Germans had promised 4,000 infantrymen, on the condition that they did not negotiate with the Ottomans. (Some days later the imperial government denounced this contract!) The royal council had already given up its great war plan for that year, but thought 15,000 men could still be mobilized in 1523, out of whom 4,000 would be the infantrymen promised by the Germans, 1,000 Moravians, 2,000 or 1,500 Bohemians and the rest would be Hungarians. This army would be supplied with cannon, ammunition, and food by the king and would be transported by ships on the Danube. The campaign would be launched in September-October with the aim of laying siege to the Ottoman fortresses along the Danube, since the Ottomans would not expect any attack at that time and would not be able to gather new troops. The real goal, however, would be the reconstruction of Szalánkemén, which could be made stronger than Nándorfehérvár. So the primary aim was to contain the enemy, while Szalánkemén was rebuilt. The real siege of Nándorfehérvár would be timed for the following spring.<sup>82</sup> This plan was feasible as long as German aid arrived. The strategic situation of Szalánkemén at the confluence of the Danube and the Tisza, at the eastern

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<sup>81</sup> The letter cited above: "quod interea nec rex, nec Serenitas vestra, nec alii, aliquid obmittant ad agendum nunc pro defensione presenti et pro futura defensione contra conatus, quos fecit turcus, quia si turchus (!) velet (!) prebere aures treugis, magis prebebit et inclinabit, si sentiet nos paratos, si etiam recusaret treugas, ut dubitandum est, non ita facile, ut forte sibi persuadet, opprimet Maiestates vestras, quia certum est, quod solis hic rex et Serenitas vestra cum subditis communibus, si essent parati quantum possint facere, certe non solum turchus non occuparet vestra, sed etiam vestre vires essent satis ad faciendum ei mala; non dico, quod diu possent sole due Maiestates vestre sustinere pondus".

<sup>82</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. July 3, 1523. This is the modified version of Werbőczy's plan from 1518. See note 31 above.

foot of the Fruška Gora, opposite Titel was really important, which was borne in mind by the sultan, when he destroyed it and rebuilt it in 1526, thereby delaying the advance of the troops.<sup>83</sup> As the German aid did not arrive, this plan fell through as well. The Polish king Sigismund justifiably regretted the failure of the plan.<sup>84</sup>

#### THE HUNGARIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AND OTTOMAN MILITARY OPERATIONS IN 1523

In July, 1523 even the modified military plans of the Hungarian government failed, for which the political situation can be held responsible, and the council of Louis II can only be blamed for not assessing the situation correctly. However, the political concept to strengthen the royal power elaborated in 1522-1523 was not influenced by foreign affairs, and as was apparent, the diet in May brought only partial results. This was a consequence of the startling news about the Ottomans, provided by the Hungarian intelligence service. Before presenting this news, a few words about the Hungarian intelligence service seem to be useful here.

It was Géza Perjés who recognized its significance and considered it very effective.<sup>85</sup> The spies were hired by the garrison commanders,<sup>86</sup> partly from among those living under Ottoman rule, while the commanders themselves also sent out spies, interrogated the refugees (the so called *pribeks*) or listened to the news of those Ottomans who at least seemingly sympathized with the Hungarians, or they questioned prisoners of war. On the arrival of an important item of news, it was

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<sup>83</sup> *Magyarországi pápai követek jelentései 1524-1526* [The Reports of the Papal Legates from Hungary 1524-1526]. (Vatikáni magyar okirattár [Hungarian Documents in the Vatican], II/1.) Budapest, 1884, 390, 395, 415, 420, 428. See also Thúry, *op. cit.*, Vol. I. 306 (the campaign journal of sultan Süleyman). The diet of 1525 in Rákos also returned to the plan of reinforcing Szalánkemén: *Magyarországi pápai követek jelentései*, 194.

<sup>84</sup> *Acta Tomisiana*, Vol. VI. 316-317.

<sup>85</sup> Géza Perjés, "A mohácsi csata (1526. augusztus 29.) [The Battle of Mohács (August 29, 1526)]," *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 23 [89] (1976) 436. As Perjés cites the data concerning 1526, I do not give the details here. Imre Nemes, "Hozzászólás Perjés Géza: A mohácsi csata című tanulmányához [Comments on the Study of the Battle of Mohács by Géza Perjés]," *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 24 [90] 1977, 115-116. He doubts the efficiency of the Hungarian intelligence service. I will present my standpoint below.

<sup>86</sup> See, for example, the conditions of appointment of György Móré and Albert Szokoli, the bans of Nándorfehérvár in 1495: Johann Christian von Engel, *Geschichte des ungrischen Reiches und seiner Nebenländer*. Vol. I. Halle, 1797, 128.

their duty to forward it to the court, supplemented with their own comments, and in the royal council all the news and reports received from the rest of the commanders or others were compared, evaluated and a decision was taken accordingly. This can be illustrated by the following two examples. On June 23, 1523 the commanders of Szörény sent a message to their *ban* János Kállai Vitéz that his spy living in Monostor on the other side of the Danube had informed them about the forthcoming attack by the Ottomans and the mobilization preparations. The commanders sent a servant of the *ban* called Dobravoj, a "*pribek* that is spy" to the Ottomans to find out if the preparations were against Szörény. The *ban* forwarded the letter to the court, where it was discussed when the council decided on the war. The report was evaluated in such a way that, although Szörény had been besieged four times recently, an attack was considered unlikely.<sup>87</sup> Kállai knew who his spy was on Ottoman territory, so his name was not written down lest his identity should come to light. The commanders wanted to check the news, so a 'professional' agent was sent out. The other case: A relative of Péter Krusith, the captain of Klissza, was taken as a prisoner of war and made a career with the Ottomans, but Krusith bribed and "corrupted" him with the king's money to get him to talk about the Ottoman intentions. According to these, the sultan wanted to attack Hungary and had sent Piri and Ferhad pashas to occupy the Bosnian fortresses and Croatia.<sup>88</sup> In evaluating the news, the royal council considered the reliability of the spy's earlier pieces of information, the probability of the news and other aspects as well. So, despite the numerous information reports, everything depended on the evaluation. The financial difficulties, however, also affected the intelligence service.<sup>89</sup> Still, the voivode could, for instance, hire very reliable spies. The problem was that the evaluation was often wrong.

The first bad news came about the fall of Rhodes. After more than half a year's siege, Süleyman marched into the centre of the Johannite

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<sup>87</sup> The copy of the letter enclosed with Burgo's report: Gr. Corr. 25 a. August 3, 1523.

<sup>88</sup> Appendix to Burgo's report: Gr. Corr. 25 a. April 16, 1523.

<sup>89</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. May 25, 1523: In connection with a spy's report he states the following about the informant: "dicunt consilii regi solitum esse referre vera." Burgo was forwarding news "ut regi referentur ab exploratoribus suis et ab transfugis et ab officialibus ex confinibus et aliquando sunt contraria, quia pauci sunt certi et veri exploratores". The reason for this was the financial situation.

Order on Christmas Day 1522.<sup>90</sup> At the same time, the king staying in Bohemia received news of the Ottoman preparations against Hungary, that they were sending troops to capture Pétervárad and other border fortresses.<sup>91</sup> From that time on, reports continually arrived about the sultan's preparations against Hungary.<sup>92</sup> There were, of course, contradictory ones, which mainly came from the voivode, whose spies had returned from Constantinople. Szapolyai was aware of the fact the Ottomans had suffered heavy losses at Rhodes and the majority of the Ottoman fleet had been destroyed by a storm and finally, that the plague had raged in the area.<sup>93</sup> This information was confirmed by other sources as well.<sup>94</sup> The royal council was divided; from the end of April the majority thought that, due to the above mentioned losses, an invasion by the complete Ottoman army was unlikely to happen. Others, however, were afraid it would.<sup>95</sup> The report of the Moldavian voivode from the end of May presented new aspects. According to that the Ottomans were recruiting a new army against Hungary. However, this army was weak, it could easily be defeated, so the king should equip troops and the voivodes of Moldavia and Wallachia should join these contingents; the Ottomans were in a hurry, because they knew the Hungarians were unprepared and wanted to occupy Wallachia.<sup>96</sup> On June 8, 1523 Szapolyai personally informed the royal court about the news coming from the Porte and acquired by one of his spies. This confirmed the reports about

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<sup>90</sup> Jorga, GOR Vol. II. 370-373.

<sup>91</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. March 22, 1523.

<sup>92</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. April 2, 6, and 10, 1523; May 5 and 10, 1523; June 9-11, 1523. This news was supported by the appendices of the reports, for example, the affair of Krusith (see note 88 above). The Voivode of Moldavia also reported that Ferhad pasha brought a huge army from over the sea to Europe and the *beylerbeyi* was gathering his army on the field near Plovdiv to march against Hungary. Gr. Corr. 25. a: appendix to Burgo's report on April 8, 1523. A Serb, allegedly wishing to return to Hungarian service, told Miklós of Macedonia, the vice-high-sheriff of the Lower Parts, that the sultan personally wanted to come to and winter in Hungary, he was only waiting for the harvest. For the moment he was sending troops to the border, where Bali *bey* was also ready to start. Appendix to the report of Burgo: Gr. Corr. 25 a. June 9-11, 1523. In the meantime, the voivode of Moldavia was commanded to supply the Ottomans with food in four weeks: Gr. Corr. 25 b. May 25, 1523.

<sup>93</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 b. April 16, 1523.

<sup>94</sup> The Voivode of Wallachia also reported on the losses of the Ottomans during the siege of Rhodes: Gr. Corr. 25 a. April 16, 1523.

<sup>95</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. April 24, 1523; May 25, 1523.

<sup>96</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. May 5, 1523.

the Ottoman losses and that the sultan would surely not launch a campaign that year, instead he wanted to harrass Hungary with ordinary border troops to be supplemented with fresh forces. As in the meantime the majority of the enemy had marched out of Wallachia that had been occupied by the Ottomans, the Transylvanian voivode recommended that one should try to place back the pro-Hungarian voivode and attack the Ottomans while they were in this situation. Burgo wrote the following: "and some here also share this opinion, others are against it."<sup>97</sup> Some weeks later, however, both the ambassador of the Moldavian voivode and the spies of he king, and Szapolyai himself, contradicting his earlier news, reported on the sultan's imminent attack. In the council there were still some who did not believe this.<sup>98</sup>

As for the background of the above proposal of Szapolyai: The Wallachian voivode (the pro-Hungarian Radu who had been placed back by Szapolyai after the expulsion of Mehmed *bey*) had already warned at the beginning of April that the Ottomans were preparing an assault on him and asked for help.<sup>99</sup> Hardly a week had passed when he sent news about the sultan's wish, according to which he had to visit him personally, had to pay taxes, renounce Hungarian protection, and join the Ottomans, otherwise he would be expelled.<sup>100</sup> By the beginning of May everything was over. The *boyars* accepted the conditions, the Ottomans occupied the country, and the voivode escaped to Hungary with a few retainers.<sup>101</sup> The Ottomans then appointed a new voivode and left the country. At the end of May none of them remained in Wallachia.<sup>102</sup> That is why Szapolyai suggested a new campaign to place Radu back.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. June 9-11, 1523.

<sup>98</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. June 24, 1523. Later on they also argued whether the sultan was coming or not. There were some who doubted the reports of the commanders of Szörény on the attack of the sultan (see note 87 above ). Gr. Corr. 25 a. July 3, 1523; cf. July 10, 1523.

<sup>99</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 b. April 6, 1523.

<sup>100</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. April 16, 1523: "retulisse ipsum Tyrannum dedisse responsum infra-scriptum, quod si ipse vauoda personaliter vadit ad prefatum Tyrannum et dat tributum sibi et dimittat Vngaros et eorum protectionem et assistat ipsis Turcis, tunc velit ipsum sustinere in villo vyauodatu, sed si illa non faciet, mittet ad expellendum eum. Et propterea petit, ut rex paret auxilia sibi mittenda".

<sup>101</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. May 10, 1523.

<sup>102</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. May 30-June 1, 1523.

<sup>103</sup> See note 97 above.

It is necessary to go into details about the Lower Parts. The above mentioned news about the Ottoman preparations to attack Pétervárad proved to be true, they besieged the fortress, but they had to withdraw. Bali *bey*, however, set up his camp in the field near Szalánkemén.<sup>104</sup> At the same time, the palatine informed the king 300 Ottoman ships lay at anchor on the Danube, and Piri pasha (incorrectly written instead of Bali *bey*) was only waiting for a captain with troops to attack Pétervárad or Szörény heading a huge army.<sup>105</sup> In another document it can be seen that Bali was waiting near Nándorfehérvár and was destroying certain places. Some counties called for an insurrection against him.<sup>106</sup> In the meantime a significant market town (unfortified town: *oppidum*, *Marktflecken*, *mezőváros*) opposite Temesvár fell into Ottoman hands.<sup>107</sup> Since the winter, the Ottoman border guards had regularly launched attacks and the news arrived that other reinforcements were approaching. In addition, one tower of Temesvár collapsed after being struck by lightning.<sup>108</sup> Five days later, more news arrived: Bali had set up his tents near the Sava, but had left his cannon on board the ships, and Klissza and Kruppa were besieged by the Ottomans on the Croatian-Bosnian border.<sup>109</sup> By August 25, it became known that Ferhad pasha had reached Niš with a new army. Some news reports claimed he had become the new commander of Belgrade. It was said he would arrive with twelve thousand cavalry, which in fact could only be 8,000 or 6,000.<sup>110</sup>

As there were significant Ottoman land and naval forces nearby on the Danube and there was nobody to defend the frontier, the peasants started to guard the shallows—as Burgo reported.<sup>111</sup> The nobles ineffectively took up arms, so the peasants were left to defend themselves.

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<sup>104</sup> See note 91 above. For the withdrawal and the camp of Bali *bey*: Gr. Corr. 25 a. April 2, 1523. News came to Poland about the siege of Pétervárad and the burning of Szeged as well. The letter of Piso, Hungarian ambassador to Poland, to Burgo from space March, 28 and 30, 1523: appendix to Burgo's report, Gr. Corr. 25 b. April 8, 1523.

<sup>105</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. April 8, 1523. The new commander was Ferhad; see note 92.

<sup>106</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. April 24, 1523. There is no information about the insurgency, i.e. for the *banderia* of the counties.

<sup>107</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 b. April 25, 1523. Unfortunately the report does not give the name of the market town (*oppidum*).

<sup>108</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. May 5, 1523.

<sup>109</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. May 10, 1523.

<sup>110</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. May 25, 1523.

<sup>111</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. May 27, 1523: "rustici Vngari insurgabant, ut custodirent vadum, postquam non erant, qui providerent". Everybody was fleeing.

Some days later in the court they heard about 30,000 Ottomans standing near Szendrő and Nándorfehérvár. In the latter place, 3,000 mounted soldiers had crossed the river Sava and devastated 40 villages on the estates of earl Lőrinc Újlaki. The commander of Újlak, who set out to reconnoitre with 40 horsemen, was killed together with most of his men.<sup>112</sup> Most of Valkó county was reported to have been ravaged.<sup>113</sup> At the end of June, spies reported that roughly 30,000 Ottomans were camped between Nándorfehérvár and Szabács, and were guarding the shallows so the Hungarian spies could not get through. The leadership in Buda could only guess whether they were waiting for the harvest or for the sultan.<sup>114</sup> Finally, it was discovered from Ottoman fugitives that the plague had raged in Szendrő and Nándorfehérvár, and that was why Ferhad pasha waited outside the walls with his fresh troops.<sup>115</sup> For a long time, no news arrived, then finally, at the end of August, Tomori sent some prisoners of war who said that "Pheri" pasha (Piri and Ferhad combined, they meant the latter one), the brother-in-law of the sultan, had been appointed the new commander of Belgrade, and he had not occupied his office, because of the plague. He had nine *voivodas* in his company, who put up tents on this side of the Sava and they set out at the end of the month, but their destination was unknown.<sup>116</sup> A few days later, the messenger of the archbishop arrived: fifteen thousand Ottomans are at the border, their commander is Ferhad who "came to capture men, not rabbits", but it is unknown where he is going.<sup>117</sup> This was the last report of Burgo, who in the meantime was recalled. By the time Tomori's messenger had arrived in Buda, the battle of Szávaszentdemeter was over.

On the basis of the above presented, so far unknown items of news which were received by the court about the Ottoman preparations, I opine

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<sup>112</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. May 30–June 1, 1523. On June 17, in Kraków they knew about the devastation of more than twenty villages: *Acta Tomiciana*, Vol. VI. 290.

<sup>113</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. June 9–11, 1523. See also the script serving as an appendix to the letter written to Miklós of Macedonia, note 92 above. Voivode Szapolyai presented his spy's letter at the same time; see note 97.

<sup>114</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. June 17 and 24, 1523.

<sup>115</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. July 10, 1523.

<sup>116</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. August 6, 1523.

<sup>117</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. August 9, 1523: "habemus multos hospites in confinibus hastatos et scalatos ad quindecim millia, archiepiscopus Colocensis significavit hoc mane, cursor ivit ad regem, dux belli est Perhath, venit ad capiendum homines, non lepores, quo sint ituri turci et quid acturi ignorant".

that it is possible to agree with Géza Perjés, who alleged that the Hungarian intelligence service worked effectively. The spies of Szapolyai were of special importance as they acquired news from the sultan's court as well, which later turned out to be accurate. However, some reactions of the Hungarian military leadership in connection with the intelligence service can be interpreted as a failure. The evaluation of the news, according to the reports of the imperial ambassador, was not of an appropriate standard. Although the financial difficulties also affected the intelligence service, undoubtedly the leadership in Buda was informed about all the events and the Ottoman military operations. However, the royal council, was unable to distinguish between the contradictory pieces of news, or reach a unanimous point of view. Imre Nemes correctly emphasized how late the court realized the direction of the Ottoman invasion in 1526.<sup>118</sup> The analogy of 1523 allows me to think the situation was similar before the battle of Mohács: The Hungarian military leadership was unable to sift out the fake news, though there were certain methods to do so. Burgo quoted some items of news—later proven to be true—several times, which could have been accepted by some members of the royal council, but the others did not believe them. I suppose the politicians of the royal council, who had never been soldiers, interfered in the assessment of the news, consequently very often it was not the opinion of the soldiers that mattered. As could be seen, the soldier Szapolyai not only had good spies but, with the exception of one, he evaluated the news correctly and suggested acting accordingly, but his proposals were not taken into consideration.

The rumours about the sultan's arrival clearly affected the diet in Buda in May, the activity which was only partly successful from the king's point of view. Only the palatine was dismissed, the voivode remained in office and did not return the royal estates either. This decision is understandable: during an invasion it was impossible to dismiss two persons, the palatine and the voivode, at the same time, as they were the most qualified military leaders. And in contrast to the 1522 attempt, they returned to the old-fashioned banderial system, which could be mobilized in case of danger even if the treasury was empty.

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<sup>118</sup> See note 85 above.

Independently of a possible attack by the sultan, preparations were made inevitable by Bali's constant assaults, then by Ferhad's approach and the arrival of the Ottoman reinforcements. Louis II and his court did their best, all the more so as the borders were practically defenceless, and the tax from the previous year had been spent.<sup>119</sup> Therefore, on May 5, on the second day of the diet, the royal council decided to send the ecclesiastical and aristocratic *banderia*, 1,500 soldiers there.<sup>120</sup> However, this was not accomplished. On May 14, they again discussed the issue that the *banderia* should be sent there. Finally the king ordered them to march to Temesvár and Pétervárad, but there are no data about the accomplishment of this order. In the meantime, talks continued in the diet about the need to send 2,000 fighters to Transylvania for the summer, 4,000 soldiers to the border area of Nándorfehérvár, and 2,000 to the Croatian frontier.<sup>121</sup> After receiving the news about Ferhad pasha's arrival in Niš, a decision was taken to send the Archbishop of Kalocsa, "who is a good captain and whom the soldiers like", to Pétervárad and he was ordered to stay there with 1,000 foot soldiers, 1,400 mounted soldiers, and 2,000 boatmen, for whom a sufficient number of small boats were to be made. Archbishop Pál Tomori went there the following day (May 26), but with only half the necessary soldiers, as he had no money to recruit more fighters. It was again deemed necessary to supply Temesvár and Croatia with troops and to field such an army with which the voivode could invade Wallachia. 10,000 people were thought to be enough, although some suggested recruiting 15,000. At the same time, the pay for the garrison soldiers was estimated at 32,000 *forints* for three months, not counting those already paid.<sup>122</sup> With some difficulty, the king got 15,000 *forints* to cover the pay of the 500 mounted soldiers, the 500 infantrymen, and the 2,000 boatmen marching to Pétervárad with the Archbishop of Kalocsa. There was no money, however, for the voivode's campaign, the provision of Jajca and for ammunition either.<sup>123</sup> Later the treasurer Elek Thurzó gave a loan of 27,000 ducats, most of which was consumed by

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<sup>119</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. May 5, 1523: "paucissime gentes vngare sunt ad tutandum confinia, quoniam auxilia promissa in alia dieta ante recessum regis ex Vngaria sunt finita".

<sup>120</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>121</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. May 14, 1523.

<sup>122</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. May 15, 1523: "Conclusum est, ut pro nunc subito archiepiscopus Colocensis, qui bonus est capitaneus et dilectus a militibus vadat in Varadinum Petri".

<sup>123</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 b. June 1, 1523.

the payment of Tomori's troops. The amount immediately needed for the upkeep of the border fortresses was now estimated at 40,000 ducats and they hoped to obtain this from the papal legate.<sup>124</sup> Foreign soldiers first arrived in August: Burgo reported on August 6, that 1,000 Moravian infantrymen would arrive the following day, who were supplied with six months pay.<sup>125</sup>

The reports of the legates depicted a very sad picture about the condition of the Hungarian border fortresses in the spring of 1523. Almost all the soldiers had left, who were recruited in the spring of 1522 from the tax granted at the end of 1521. Pétervárad, the most important fortress stood practically unguarded. The awful situation of the treasury was reflected in the budget as well. It is interesting that the treasurer Thurzó strongly underestimated the costs to be spent on the border garrisons in the budget presented to the 1523 diet. His budget contained 82,000 *forints*, to which he added the pay of 1,000 boatmen, 2 *forints* per month, that is 24,000 *forints* for a year, so he altogether calculated 106,000 *forints*.<sup>126</sup> The budget prepared by his successor Pál Várdai on December 8, 1523 was more realistic: it contained 150,600 *forints*. (This represented a rise of 17.5% compared to the year 1511.) He counted 1.5 *forint* pay for boatmen, the already known 2.83 *forints* for horsemen (24 *forints* a year and 10 *forints* worth of salt [*sallarium*]) and 2 *forints* for infantrymen. In addition to the 1,000 boatmen, 500 infantrymen were listed in Pétervárad, and the 500 *hussars* and 300 infantrymen of the Archbishop of Kalocsa with annual pay.<sup>127</sup> Thurzó's inaccuracy is shown by the higher figures he gave in connection with the boatmen. In fact, the data of Burgo's reports support Várdai's payment system.

The budget of Várdai, which calculated with the minimum cost of defence, clearly showed what had already been mentioned in connection with the situation in 1522: the defence system changed, there was a greater need for paid soldiers and more foot soldiers, but there was no money for that. The structure of defence was further modified in 1523. The defence of the Lower Parts concentrated in Temesvár seemed less useful after the fall of Nándorfehérvár. In the system developed under

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<sup>124</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. June 24, 1523.

<sup>125</sup> Gr. Corr. 25 a. August 6, 1523.

<sup>126</sup> Hermann, *op. cit.*, 304-305, 330.

<sup>127</sup> Hermann, *op. cit.*, 331-334.

Matthias' rule (1458-1490), the warding off of direct attacks was the task of the strongholds of the outer defence line and during the struggles there the troops of the internal defence line could be mobilized. Now, however, Temesvár, which used to be the centre of the internal chain of fortresses, had become a border castle, just like Titel, Futak, and Pétervárad. After 1521, the palatine Báthory endeavoured to fulfil the assignment in his capacity of captain-in-chief of the Lower Parts. His removal and the appointment of the also experienced Drágffy, the high sheriff of Temes, resulted in a new situation. Although Drágffy still held the title of the captain-in-chief, as a matter of fact this office was separated from that of the high sheriff of Temes. The newly appointed Archbishop of Kalocsa, Pál Tomori became the new captain-in-chief of the Lower Parts.<sup>128</sup> Tomori's appointment to be the archbishop had already been decided on as the Pope accepted the king's nomination at the consistory of February 4, 1523.<sup>129</sup> Tomori may have served in border fortresses, but that fact cannot so far be proved. His command in Fogaras and service in Buda, where he took part in crushing antifeudal movements, resembled the activity of a 'policeman'.<sup>130</sup> He was undoubtedly an experienced soldier, though rather at the level of a good cavalry officer, but it was more important that the soldiers on the border liked him.<sup>131</sup> His appointment to be the Archbishop of Kalocsa was necessary, because the holder of that title was the landlord of Pétervárad, which had been promoted to be a border fortress, the income from his estates could be spent directly on defence, and he guaranteed he would really do so. He was obliged to keep one contingent (*banderium*) that is 400 cavalry as an archbishop and 200 as the abbot of Pétervárad according to Article No. 20 of 1498.<sup>132</sup> The reorganization of the Lower Parts was facilitated by the replacement of the palatine: the archbishop was in charge of the area west of the river

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<sup>128</sup> There is a wide range of literature on Tomori. See e.g. Vilmos Fraknói, "Tomori Pál élete [The Life of Pál Tomori]," *Századok* 15 (1881) 289-312, 377-396, 723-746. He left the convent at the beginning of May, 1523 (*ibid.*, 312), and was appointed captain-in-chief during the diet (*ibid.*, 379).

<sup>129</sup> Fraknói, "Tomori Pál", 746.

<sup>130</sup> See Székely, *op. cit.*, 142.

<sup>131</sup> See note 122 above.

<sup>132</sup> Dezső Csánki, *Magyarország történelmi földrajza a Hunyadiak korában* [The Historical Geography of Hungary in the Hunyadi Era]. Vol. II. Budapest, 1894, 233. For the reason for the appointment of Tomori, see Ferenc Szakály, "Tomori Pál emlékezete [The Memory of Pál Tomori]," *Új Írás* 1976, September, 97-98.

Tisza as a captain-in-chief, with the fortress at Bács serving as his headquarters. It is beyond the scope of this study to go into details, but it seems probable that the Banate of Szörény and presumably the border area around Temes county were placed under the military control of the voivode instead of the captain-in-chief, which seems quite logical.

The new captain-in-chief immediately marched down with his troops to guard the fortresses left without soldiers. The most significant result of his activity was the reorganization of the fleet, which had been disbanded in 1521.<sup>133</sup> Two thousand men were alleged to be mobilized, although the budget included only 1,000. It is striking that, as opposed to the cavalry and infantry, their pay increased to 18 *forints* a year, though the boatmen were not full-time soldiers, but craftsmen, merchants, and partly peasants. It is feasible that the petition of the boatmen in which they demanded privileges similarly to those in Nándorfehérvár is really from 1523, as it was dated in its preservation place. According to it, they would have lived free of almost all feudal obligations "as real noblemen", and this freedom would have extended to their relatives with whom they lived on undivided tenures. They required judicial prerogatives and a certain kind of asylum. (If at least two boats [*sajka*] and one gun-boat [*naszád*] were anchored in one port, the voivode of the boatmen was in charge of any case involving a villain seeking refuge there.) Such a privilege could not be granted by a feudal state, still most of the demands were fulfilled and granted as privileges by Louis II in 1525 at Tomori's request.<sup>134</sup> So the boatmen were apparently supported.

#### THE BATTLE

Süleyman sent his brother-in-law Ferhad pasha as commander-in-chief to the Hungarian front. The assignment of the third vizier, the person who crushed the Gazali rebellion in 1520, reveals how important the sultan con-

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<sup>133</sup> Ivics, *op. cit.*, 689.

<sup>134</sup> The petition: Litt. orig. No. 239. The dating from 1523 is supported by the fact that the king was asked to prepare new ships, as the old ones had rotted. It can be seen that the ships were indeed equipped at that time. The letter of privilege from 1525 was published by Jenő Szentkláray, *A dunai hajóhadak története* [The History of the Danube Fleets]. Budapest, 1886, 369-372 and by Gyula Alapi, *Komárom vármegye levéltárának középkori oklevelei* [Medieval Documents from the Archive of Komárom County]. Komárom, 1917, 131-134.


sidered the campaign against Hungary.<sup>135</sup> According to Burgo's reports, the Ottomans carried out three major attacks on the Danube front in the spring of 1523. In March, Bali *bey* attacked Pétervárad, and then stayed put there for nearly two months to devastate most of Valkó county at the end of May. Finally, after a relatively long break, strengthened by the troops of Ferhad, he started an invasion again in August. Obviously he did not move in April and May, because the horses had to be grazed.<sup>136</sup> In the early summer they waited for the harvest, but then remained in their camps due to the plague, after which they finally set off. Contemporary sources unambiguously estimated the number of troops of Ferhad and Bali at 15,000.<sup>137</sup> This figure obviously comes from Tomori's report and gives a higher number

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<sup>135</sup> The reports of the ambassadors quoted above also refer to the fact that Ferhad was the brother-in-law of the sultan. Istvánffy still regarded him the pasha of Bosnia. Nicolaus Isthuanfi, *Historia regni Hungariae*. Viennae, 1758, 65-66 [hereinafter Istvánffy]. He was followed by military historians, for example, Kupelwieser, *op. cit.*, 210 and Bánlaky, *op. cit.*, Vol. XII. 156. Ferhad joined his brother-in-law besieging Rhodes after crushing the Gazali-revolt, and not much later he started against Hungary. Hammer, *GOR* Vol. II. 19, 25-27, 31 (but he followed Istvánffy by saying that another Ferhad fought at Szávaszentdemeter: *op. cit.*, 47) and Jorga, *GOR* Vol. II. 357-358. The Croatian historians long ago realized that the Ferhad, who lost the battle at Szávaszentdemeter, was the brother-in-law of the sultan and came from Asia Minor. Cf. Meszics, *op. cit.*, 346-347. See also note 137 below, and more recently Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, "Neuf lettres de Ferhâd Paşa (1515-1521)," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* 10 (1990) 69-70.

<sup>136</sup> See the study of Varga cited in note 39. This can be verified by data from 1524. Cf. the report of the Imperial ambassador Hans Schneidpöck (the successor of Burgo), Gr. Corr. 25 a. April 11, 1524: "De Turcis hic nil aliud fertur, nisi quod sint apparatu suo contra Hungariam et quamprimum equi eorum herba ista estivali, ut consuetudo eorum est, refici possunt, expeditionem contra Hungaros facere tentabunt".

<sup>137</sup> See note 117 above. The next data is the report of the Venetian ambassador from August 11: Lipót Óváry, *A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Történelmi Bizottságának oklevél-másolatai* [The Copies of Documents of the Historical Committee of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences]. Vol. I. Budapest, 1890, 268: No. 1173. An English report referring to a letter from August 24: Lajos Kropf, "Adalék az 1523. évi török portyázás történetéhez [Contribution to the History of the Ottoman Expedition in 1523]," *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 27 (1914) 132. (In the same place, another letter is published from the beginning of 1524, which also mentions about 15,000 soldiers.) On August 30, Louis II officially informed his uncle Sigismund, the Polish king about his victory over Ferhad, the sultan's brother-in-law and Bali *bey*. He also put the number of the enemy at 15,000 (*Acta Tomiciana* Vol. VI. 311-312). Finally, the secretary to the Venetian ambassador Massaro gave the same number of soldiers in his final report on October 5, 1523 (Balogh, *op. cit.*, 55). A Hungarian chronicle states about 17,000 men (*Memoria rerum*, in Verancsics, *op. cit.*, Vol. II. 19). Istvánffy mentions 15,000 mounted soldiers and 1,000 infantrymen (*op. cit.*, 65).



than the actual one. Still, the number of Ottoman troops must at least have totalled 10-12,000 men.<sup>138</sup>

The Hungarian troops fielded to withstand the advance of Ferhad's troops cannot be stated so accurately, as the sources differ in this respect: they mention 2,000, 3,000, 3,500, and 4,000 men.<sup>139</sup> This latter figure seems the most reliable, since even according to this, the Hungarians won over superior numbers, the ratio being 1 to 2.5 or even perhaps 1 to 3. It is necessary to also take into consideration the troops led there by Tomori, the ecclesiastical and baronial *banderia*, which might have numbered 1,500 cavalry and though they were late, they at least partly participated in the battle. In addition, there were former garrison soldiers, nobles from the neighbouring counties and peasants who took part in the fighting.

The place of the battle is also of significance, since conclusions can be drawn from it concerning the intentions of the Ottomans. Although

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<sup>138</sup> The data mentioned above referred to about 30,000 Ottoman soldiers, which is obviously an exaggerated number. The document mentioning 3,000 Ottomans devastating Valkó county, however, seems to be credible (see note 112 above), as Bali *bey* had at his disposal the garrisons of Szendrő, Belgrade, Szabács (Böğürdelen), and of minor garrisons and the Serbian irregular forces. Even Tomori was able to field a higher number of soldiers than that, so his financially better off Ottoman opponent could easily surpass him. The garrison of Szendrő in the 1480s first consisted of 700 *azabs* and 300 janissaries, whose number was increased by 1,400 *azabs* and 1,000 janissaries. Consequently, the *sipahis* and *martaloses* (marauders) are not included here; see György Hazai, "A Topkapu Szeráj Múzeum levéltárának magyar vonatkozású iratai [The Documents Concerning Hungary in the Archives of Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi]," *Levéltári Közlemények* 26 (1955) 289-290; *idem*, "Eine Urkunde zur Geschichte des Ungarisch-Türkischen Grenzgebietes (Ende des 15. Jahrhunderts)," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* 76 (1986) 129-132. In 1522 the Croatian *ban* defined the number of the garrison of Semendire at 2,200. He did not mention *sipahis* either; see Thallóczy-Horváth, *op. cit.*, 340. In 1516, there were 433 marauders in Szendrő, 79 in Galambóc (Güvercinlik), 40 in Gradistye (Gradiška), 10 in Haram (Hram), 23 in Kulics (Kuyluç), and 10 in Soko, altogether 595. Vidin can be listed here, where under Mehmed II (1451-1481) there were 206, and Belgrade, where 390 marauders were registered in 1563; see Milan Vasić, *Martolosi u jugoslovenskim zemljama pod turskom vladavinom*. [Martoloses on Yugoslavian Lands Under Turkish Rule]. Sarajevo, 1967, 57. Adding the *sipahis* and the garrisons of Belgrade and Szabács, Bali *bey* was able to mobilize 5-6,000 men without leaving the castles unguarded (in ca. 1524, in one of his reports Bali *bey* stated the mobilized troops from Bosnia and Hercegovina amounted to 10,000 men (3,000 cavalry and 7,000 infantry); see Pál Fodor, "Ottoman Policy Towards Hungary, 1520-1541," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 45 (1991) 335. Ferhad's army was estimated at 12,000, which may only have been 6-8,000 (see note 110 above). In this way, we are left with altogether 10-12,000 men.

<sup>139</sup> 2,000: the English report; 3,000: Massaro, but he does not give the number of the insurgent peasants; 3,500: the chronicle *Memoria rerum* published in Verancsics; 4,000: Louis II and the data from the beginning of 1524 (references in note 137 above).

our data seem to be contradictory, after consulting the maps, these contradictions can be resolved. Some pieces of evidence refer to the bank of the river Sava, Száva-szentdemeter (Mitrovica)<sup>140</sup> and the field around Nagyolaszi (Mangjelos).<sup>141</sup> Eventually, in a document, in 1524 Louis II awarded Miklós and Mihály Inkei Lóránth for their merits in the fighting against Ferhad pasha and Bali *bey*, who set out to destroy the Syrmium. This mentions that one of Miklós Lóránth's eyes was knocked out during the siege of Rednek (Vrdnik) and his brother was also seriously injured.<sup>142</sup> Nagyolaszi is 13 km away from Száva-szentdemeter as the crow flies and Rednek is 23 km away, while the distance between Nagyolaszi and Rednek is 16 km, so the battle or battles took place in a relatively confined territory. The north-eastern part of the Syrmium up to Szalánkemén, that is to the lower Danube, is covered by Fruška Gora Mountain, and so it is difficult to travel towards the north there. As a result, the Ottomans either had to advance in the Danube valley to the north, but there were several fortresses there, among them the new centre of Pétervárad, which stood in the way (in 1526 Süleyman had to fight his way through this area), or go along the southern slopes of the mountain, cutting the curve made by the Danube, to reach the Danube in the north-west (see the attached map). The route there ran somewhere along Száva-szentdemeter and Nagyolaszi. There was no choice there either, because the road was hampered by the mountains from the north, by the vast forests in the valley of Bosszut from the south-west and the west, and by the marshes in the territory flanked by the Danube and Sava rivers from the north-west. The best route was to cut along the western slopes of the Fruška Gora, west of Berekszó and reach the Danube somewhere around Szata. During his campaign in May, Bali *bey* could only follow this road, when he was devastating Valkó county. The fortresses and mansion houses of the area became numerous in the central section of the southern slopes of the Fruška Gora, at its western foot, and also along the Bosszut. The Ottomans had to safeguard this route in the Syrmium by all means, so

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<sup>140</sup> *Acta Tomiciana*, Vol. VI. 311-312. Szerémi György emlékirata Magyarország romlásáról 1484-1543 [György Szerémi's Memorandum On the Decay of Hungary 1484-1543]. (Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Scriptores, 1.) Published by Gusztáv Wenzel. Pest, 1857, 107.

<sup>141</sup> *Memoria rerum*, in Verancsics, *op. cit.*, Vol. II. 19.

<sup>142</sup> Miklós Komjáthy, "A somogyi konvent II. Lajos-kori oklevelei az Országos Levéltárban [The Documents of the Convent of Somogy from the Period of Louis II in the National Archives]," *Somogy Megye Múltjából. Levéltári Évkönyv* 1 (1970) 51.

Ferhad pasha's aim could be to capture or destroy the minor fortresses, which the Ottomans had failed to do in 1521, in order to reach the Danube and cut the most important supply line of the Hungarian border fortresses: the river Danube. The next step could have been to capture these major fortresses to avoid the danger of being attacked from the rear, while using the shorter road in the Syrmium. As this was not accomplished, the sultan was impelled to take the longer road along the Danube in 1526. While the Ottoman ruler was preoccupied with the construction of Szalánkemén and with the siege of Pétervárad, the *bey* of Ízvornik was given the task of capturing the castles in the Syrmium, which Ferhad failed to do. It was at that time that Ireg, Rácsa, and Berekszó fell into Ottoman hands.<sup>143</sup>

According to most sources, due to his illness, Tomori did not participate in the battle.<sup>144</sup> It is feasible, but more probably this reason was only given as an explanation for the captain-in-chief's absence. His presence, however, would have been even stranger, since Tomori's message informed the people of Buda only on August 6, that the Ottoman troops were camped on this side of the Sava. His messenger arrived on August 9, with the news that 15,000 Ottomans were at the border ready to move, but their destination was unknown.<sup>145</sup>

The captain-in-chief's duty was the mobilization of the troops in the neighbouring castles, and the observation of the Ottoman camp. He also had to ensure that defence was organized if they should turn into an unexpected direction. It can be concluded from later events that Ferhad might have stayed between Szávaszentdemeter and Árki, closer to the previous one, by the Sava river. From this place, he could set off into two directions: towards the above-mentioned north-western road or towards the north-east, in the direction of Szalánkemén and the Danube by cooperating with the Danube fleet to attack Titel or Szalánkemén. There is a reference, not supported by contemporary sources, that during the battle of Szávaszentdemeter, the boats setting out to besiege

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<sup>143</sup> Thúry, *op. cit.*, Vol. I. 214, 219, 230 (Kemalpaşazade). It was no coincidence that Süleyman, during his five campaigns after Mohács, marched along the route through the Syrmium following the route of the advance in 1523, instead of coming along the Danube. Bánlaky, *op. cit.*, Vol. XII. Appendix XII/1.

<sup>144</sup> Kropf, *op. cit.*, 132. *Memoria rerum*, in Verancsics, *op. cit.*, Vol. II. 19. Szerémi György *emlékirata*, 108. Tomori was present only according to the unreliable Istvánffy, *op. cit.*, 65.

<sup>145</sup> See notes 116-117 above.

Pétervárad were destroyed by Tomori's boatmen.<sup>146</sup> The deployment of the river fleet to engage the Hungarian troops as a diversion is possible, but until it is supported by source material it can only be accepted with reservations. Undoubtedly, however, without having exact information about the direction and the date of the Ottoman attack, the captain-in-chief had to organize defence from his headquarters.

Not much time was left. As already mentioned, Tomori's messenger from Pétervárad arrived in Buda on August 9. The road from Pétervárad to Buda on the land between the Tisza and the Danube was 100 km shorter, but it was relatively less frequently used, because of the marshes, etc. All sources mention the road running along the west bank of the Danube through Eszék, Mohács, and Tolna to Buda. It was roughly 380 km long. The news of the battle of Mohács (1526) was received in Buda on August 30,<sup>147</sup> that is some 30 hours after the event. The distance between Mohács and Buda is approximately 200 km, so proceeding at the same speed, Tomori's messenger must have arrived at the court after a 57-hour journey. As he was not a refugee fighting for his life, we can calculate 16 hours of travel a day, so he could cover the distance in three and a half days. He must have left Pétervárad on the 5th in the afternoon or on the 6th in the morning. Tomori must also have received the news about the departure of the Ottoman troops obviously on the 4th or 5th, and the battle took place on the 6th, or according to other sources on the 7th.<sup>148</sup> So a maximum of three days passed between the deployment of the Ottoman troops and the battle. But more probably it was only two. This meant that the forces mobilized by Tomori were in a state of readiness. They were aware of the Ottoman intentions, so they could engage the enemy in battle under favourable conditions.

In the battle, Tomori was replaced by István Bárdi, who might have been an officer in the royal *banderium*, probably a captain of the court

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<sup>146</sup> Szentkláray, *op. cit.*, 85. See the enclosed map prepared by Zsuzsa Kuczogi on the basis of Joannes de Lipszky, *Mappa generalis regni Hungariae...* Pest, 1806.

<sup>147</sup> *Magyarországi pápai követek*, 452.

<sup>148</sup> August 6: *Acta Tomiciana*, Vol. VI. 311. August 7: Kropf, *op. cit.*, 132. Massaro gives the date of the 12th, but this is mistaken (Balogh, *op. cit.*, 55), as victory was reported from Buda already on August 11: Óváry, *op. cit.*, Vol. I. 268: No. 1173.

*hussars*.<sup>149</sup> The participating Hungarian corps can be assessed from György Szerémi's chronicle, in which he reported that Tomori had sent letters to Jakab Bánffy in Boroh, to István Bárdi, to Bosics Radics (Bošić Radić), the lieutenant of the Bishop of Pécs, to Ferenc Drégi and finally to Ferenc Bodó. The sixth unit belonged to him and it was commanded by Ferenc Kis. Bánffy, who was one of the most powerful landlords in the area, possessing the castle of Boroh on the Ottoman route of advance and known as a good soldier, apparently commanded his own contingent in the battle.<sup>150</sup> The other *banderium* belonged to the Bishop of Pécs.<sup>151</sup> Radics was the captain of the boatmen, though it is difficult to understand what they were doing there, as it is almost inconceivable that they could have sailed along the Sava from Pétervárad beside Nándorfehérvár. As Radics's participation in the battle is mentioned by several sources, and what is more, Serbian heroic songs commemorate him, it can be presumed that either the boatmen were sent by Tomori against the Ottomans as infantry troops or Radics defeated the Ottoman fleet if it really attacked Pétervárad at the time of Ferhad's onslaught.<sup>152</sup> Ferenc Bodó was a famous captain who fought the Ottomans, but it is not known in what capacity he participated in the battle. As in 1525, he received arrears of pay as the former commander of Batka (Barka correctly), it is presumable that he held the same office in 1523. After the fall of Szabács,

<sup>149</sup> The sources call him Bárdy, Bardia, and Bardus. For his leadership, see Kropf, *op. cit.*, 132. Cf. Szerémi *György emlékirata*, 108. *Memoria rerum*, in Verancsics, *op. cit.*, Vol. II. 19. Istvánffy, *op. cit.*, 65. He must have been a royal captain, as he commanded the Hungarians and not the experienced lord Jakab Bánffy who also participated in the battle.

<sup>150</sup> Szerémi *György emlékirata*, 108. Csánki, *op. cit.*, Vol. II. 269, 366. See the data of another Hungarian chronicle: "At the same time (1523) Jakab Bánffy, who had often won battles over the Ottomans, and who was later poisoned in Buda, made an attack". *Memoria rerum*, in Verancsics, *op. cit.*, Vol. II. 18. The poisoning is also described by Szerémi, *op. cit.*, 84-88.

<sup>151</sup> According to Article 20 of 1498, it consisted of 400 mounted soldiers. Ferenc Régi (not Drégi!) looked after the incomes of the Bishopric of Pécs in 1518: MOL. Fkgy. The archives of the family Révay. De iuribus fam. Revay per familiam Gyulai, fasc. XI. No. 31. The only trouble is that he belonged to the servitors of bishop Szatmáry, who became the Archbishop of Esztergom in 1522. When in 1524, after the death of the archbishop, the four most confident *familiares* were interrogated, one of them was Régi (Dl. 23941). Of course, Szerémi's data is not necessarily mistaken, as the successor of Szatmáry, Fülöp Móré was appointed to Pécs only in 1524, so the primate may have enjoyed the income of his former bishopric for a while and had Régi administer it. See György Bónis, *A jogtudó értelmiség a Mohács előtti Magyarországon* [The Legally Trained Professionals in Hungary Before the Battle of Mohács]. Budapest, 1971, 317.

<sup>152</sup> *Memoria rerum*, in Verancsics, *op. cit.*, Vol. II. 19. Szerémi *György emlékirata*, 108. Istvánffy, *op. cit.*, 65. Meszics, *op. cit.*, Vol. II. 346. Ivics, *op. cit.*, 689-690.

Barka was the easternmost Hungarian border fortress south of the river Sava. If Bodó did serve there at that time, it confirms the fact that Tomori collected not only the *banderia*, but the guards of the neighbouring fortresses, too.<sup>153</sup> The chronicler Miklós Istvánffy mentions others as well, but most of them cannot have taken part in the battle. It can only be accepted that the *banderium* of earl Lőrinc Újlaki, the most powerful landlord of the Syrmium, was also present at Száva-szentdemeter.<sup>154</sup> Apparently there were no other participants in the battle, apart from the collected garrison troops, the *banderia* of a couple of landlords and border counties, and the armed peasants.

The battle can be reconstructed in the following way.<sup>155</sup> The Ottoman army set out on August 4 or 5, and marched divided into three parts, after having left some troops to guard its boats on the Sava. (They are unlikely to have built a bridge across the river, because there is only one

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<sup>153</sup> Fraknói, "II. Lajos király számadási könyve", 57, 59, 194. *Szerémi György emlékirata*, 82, 84, 106. Istvánffy, *op. cit.*, 65. Bodó, as a matter of fact, fought with the Ottomans in the service of Szapolyai as well. I wrote about his political role in the Memorial Book on Mohács (see in note 56).

<sup>154</sup> Istvánffy, *op. cit.*, 65. He mentioned János Kállay, who, however, as the *ban* of Szörény, could not have gone there (see note 87 above) and Pál Bakics, who entered Hungarian service only in 1526. Ivics drew attention to this mistake in the place cited above. Regarding Albert Borotty and Ferenc Varjassy mentioned in the *Memoria rerum*, the first one was a landlord in Bodrog county (Csánki, *op. cit.*, Vol. II. 214), so he may have been the officer of Tomori or another lord, or of the *banderium* of Bodrog county. There is a report about Varjassy (and about the battle as well) by Tamás Szentmihályi in his letter of September 8, 1523. Szentmihályi was the marshal in Gyulafehérvár of Ferenc Várdai, archbishop of Transylvania and a landlord in Bács county. He left Transylvania to go home, because he was engaged in litigation with Varjassy. He informed his lord in a letter that he was unable to resume his office because Varjassy "was given a letter of postponement due to his constant occupation in the defence of the country and also because they always expect the Ottomans, who have come out recently and have been defeated". Now "Varjassy, with István Bárdy and Imre Nagy, went to the king with the prisoners of war and other presents looted in the battle fought against the Ottomans". He was unable to conclude the law-suit, although he would have liked to have reached an agreement with Varjassy. Szentmihályi also provided the bishop with recent news: Archbishop Pál Tomori ordered the nobles to take up arms in the county (Bács or Bodrog?) as he received news of the Ottomans gathering (Dl. 82612). The report by Szentmihályi supports the major role of Bárdy and at the same time illustrates that Varjassy (and Imre Nagy, possibly the later vice-palatine) must have played an important role in the battle, otherwise the captain-in-chief would not have had them take the loot to the king. It is characteristic of the situation and of Tomori's cautiousness that he wanted to prevent a possible Ottoman expedition by calling the nobles to arms when he heard about the preparations of the defeated Ottomans.

<sup>155</sup> The sources cited in note 137 and *Szerémi György emlékirata*, 106-110. The most reliable source is that published by Kropf, the least reliable is Istvánffy.

item of information.) They carried their light cannon with them as well. On the basis of this and a document about the struggles at the fortress of Rednek, it can be concluded that they wanted to occupy the militarily weak castles of the Syrmium. The direction of their advance was the north-east, but they could not leave the fortresses of Rednek and possibly Ireg in their rear. The troops of Bárdi, who was quite well-informed about the Ottoman movements, first raided the Ottoman fleet anchored near Szávaszentdemeter, where they managed to surprise and defeat its guard. The three Ottoman units were informed about this and withdrew afterwards. Mention must also be made of the intervention by the peasants from the Syrmium, which was touched upon in several sources. Massaro, the secretary to the Venetian embassy, talked about the peasants rebelling, because of the devastation of their vineyards; they were defeated by the Ottomans, then the Hungarian army arrived and crushed the enemy. Szerémi was informed in such a way that a voivode of Tomori called Pál attacked the Ottoman cavalry with infantry and his troops were annihilated. Finally, mention was made in the most trustworthy source of the Hungarians' drovers and servants, who frightened the enemy with the noise they made. The first two data clearly refer to the same thing, but they can be connected with the third piece of information. The armed peasants from the Syrmium, probably former peasant-soldiers defending the border, who had already undertaken the defence of the shallows of the Sava, seem to have really attacked the main body of the Ottoman army. It resembled the ambush-like warfare of later struggles against the Ottomans. Bárdi and his troops defeated the first Ottoman army that was slaughtering the vanquished peasant soldiers, as the Hungarian leadership aimed to crush the enemy in parts and not as a whole. Afterwards the Hungarians attacked and defeated the second Ottoman army as well. In the meantime, the third unit of the Ottomans received the news of the Hungarian successes, so they had time to prepare and managed to make an assault on the Hungarians, who were preoccupied with their previous victory and disorganized in their battle array. Although the Hungarians were victorious in the battle, they suffered heavy losses. They cut off the Ottoman retreat, so many of them were caught, killed, and some were drowned in the Sava, while they were trying to escape. Not counting the attack on the ships, the battle consisted of three separate clashes, therefore, it is feasible, though not mentioned in the sources that it was fought on more than one day, so the dating of

both the 6th and the 7th is correct. It took place in the triangle bordered by Szávaszentdemeter, Nagyolaszi, and Rednek.

Losses were serious on both sides. The first report by the Venetian ambassador estimated the Hungarian toll at 3,000, out of whom 700 were Tomori's soldiers, and the same source talked about the death of 8,000, the drowning of 4,000 and the capture of 300 Ottomans. The official report of Louis II gave an account of a toll of 700 Hungarian soldiers. The final report of Massaro talked only about the Ottoman losses, which corresponded to the earlier report of the Venetian ambassador. A letter from the beginning of 1524, also estimated the Hungarian toll at 700 and mentioned that they seized several war symbols, cannons, and prisoners of war. The fact that 700 Hungarian soldiers fell in the battle seems acceptable. The numbers referring to the Ottoman losses certainly appears to be exaggerated, but it is probable the majority of the army and mainly the equipment were destroyed or disabled.

The Hungarian leadership, either acting on the basis of a previous plan or more probably sizing up the situation, undoubtedly proved equal to the task. Having knowledge of the area and supported by the inhabitants, they forced the enemy into a battle in which its advantage in number and artillery could not gain the upper hand. There is no information available about the Ottomans' sending artillery into action, and no data about whether the Hungarians had artillery or not. Tomori's main merit lay in organizing the mobilization. When praising the Hungarians, the mistakes made by the Ottoman military leadership should not be overlooked. The Ottoman commander-in-chief, Ferhad pasha was not familiar with the battle tactics at the border. Szerémi's description of his dispute with Bali *bey* (erroneously called Mehmed), the advice of the latter to be careful and that the sultan's brother-in-law did not listen to it, seems to be quite believable.<sup>156</sup> He was faced by Hungarian officers, however, who were well-versed in the Ottoman tactics and were able to cooperate.

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<sup>156</sup> Szerémi *György emlékirata*, 107-109. It has to be remarked that Ferhad did not fall in battle as Istvánffy mentioned (*op. cit.*, 66), but returned to Constantinople later on, where sultan Süleyman had him executed on the charge of committing atrocities in Asia Minor and blackmail: Hammer, *GOR* Vol. II. 42-42, 48-49 and Jorga, *GOR* Vol. II. 358. In Hungary, however, the news spread (and there must be some truth in it, as he was appointed the commander-in-chief in Hungary after his bloody actions in Asia Minor) that he had been killed on the charge of losing the battle in the Syrmium: Theiner, *op. cit.*, Vol. II. 641.

The battle put an end to the excitement that had lasted for months: and the pressure was relieved for a short time in the Lower Parts. The victory in August, however, did not compensate for the delay, hesitation, and political cautiousness that was caused by the news about the Ottoman invasion expected in the spring. The Hungarian losses were not very heavy, 700 soldiers, but apparently most of them came from among the élite troops of the garrisons and did not belong to the barons' contingents. So the 1,000 Moravian infantrymen arrived in vain, because they were fit to fill the garrisons, but not to make use of the victory by launching a campaign. Despite all that, Tomori gained some breathing space and in the next few years he managed to pull the border defence system in the Syrmium together, which had fallen apart before. The lost battle was instructive for the Ottomans, too. They did not attempt a frontal attack in the middle of the country until 1526 and instead of choosing the shorter route running along the western foot of the Fruška Gora, sultan Süleyman led his army along the Danube, as he always did later on.

The mistakes of the Hungarian military leadership, especially those made by the royal council in Buda as the main military council, cannot be concealed, nor the fact that, despite the victory, the loss of the élite troops caused serious damage. This is well expressed in a letter from the royal secretary Miklós Gerendi to the Polish chancellor Krzysztof Szydłowiecki: "This victory caused a huge loss of blood to the Hungarian army. His Royal Highness has to be industrious if he wishes to make up for it in a short time. We know that the Ottomans outnumber our troops and they are better prepared, they have an intact army as big as in the previous campaign."<sup>157</sup> Ferenc Szakály rightly wrote about this: "This qualification is nothing else but the degrading judgement of a courtier who clearly understood the situation over the whole Hungarian military organization. What kind of military value and force could the barons' contingents and other mobile troops represent, if the loss of a few hundred experienced soldiers resulted in fears of the collapse of the whole defence system and in foretelling bad luck in the forthcoming battles?"<sup>158</sup>

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<sup>157</sup> *Acta Tomiciana*, Vol. VI. 319-320. For the quotation and assessment of the data, see András Kubinyi, "Die Auswirkungen der Türkenkriege auf die zentralen Städte Ungarns bis 1541," in Pickl (ed.), *Die wirtschaftliche Auswirkungen der Türkenkriege*, 212.

<sup>158</sup> Szakály, *A mohácsi csata*, 75.



## THE MILITARY REVOLUTION IN HUNGARY

JÓZSEF KELENIK

The latter half of the sixteenth century witnessed radical changes in Europe. Major transformations had begun and went on in thinking, economy, society, settlement structure, state organization, etc. One of the areas affected by this transformation was the conduct of war. The first two to systematize the peculiarities of the change having taken place in military affairs, together with their generalized features which manifested themselves nearly at the same time in several European regions, were Michael Roberts and Geoffrey Parker, who advanced the theory of the military revolution.<sup>1</sup>

According to Parker's comprehensive, but in several points disputable theory, three closely interrelated phenomena revolutionalized the military affairs of Europe :

- a. the introduction of the principles and practice of the defensive system of bastions or the 'trace italienne';
- b. the spread of firearms on a mass scale and the increased reliance on the artillery, and
- c. the massive increase of the number of troops.<sup>2</sup>

These phenomena and their effects, however, characterized a wider area than just the South and West of Europe in the second half of the sixteenth century, as listed by Parker.<sup>3</sup> Parker regards the emergence and use of the 'trace italienne', the fortification with bastions, as the main determinant of the military revolution. In his view, the castles built by the rules of this school of defensive systems mark the boundaries of the areas affected by the military revolution.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Michael Roberts, *The Military Revolution, 1560-1660. Essays of Swedish History*. London, 1967. Geoffrey Parker, "The 'Military Revolution' 1560-1600 – a Myth?" *Journal of Modern History* 48 (1976) 195-214. Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution. Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800*. Cambridge, 1988.

<sup>2</sup> Parker, *Military Innovation*, 3.

<sup>3</sup> These include Italy, Northern France, the Low Countries, the region of the Rhine, and the Spanish-French border area.

<sup>4</sup> Parker, *Military Innovation*, 24.

Since the majority of the sixteenth-century fortresses of the Hungarian Kingdom were built or reconstructed in line with the principles of 'trace italienne', the Hungarian war theatre that bore the burden of the anti-Ottoman defence also belongs, by virtue of this criterion, to the areas that launched the military revolution. This is convincingly proven by the representations of the main Hungarian fortresses (see illustration attached).

The radical rise in the number and significance of firearms, the second of Parker's principles, just as demonstrable here as in Western Europe, also supports the assumption that the military revolution took place in Hungary, too. What is more, during the so-called 'Long' or 'Fifteen Years' War' against the Ottomans in Hungarian territory between 1593 and 1606 the Christian forces had proportionally greater fire power than those of the Low Countries after the tactical reforms of the princes of Orange.

The war histories of both Western Europe and Hungary suggest that it was the constant increase of the number and significance of hand-guns that resulted at first in a slow quantitative change in warfare in the latter half and a rapid qualitative change towards the end of the sixteenth century. The use of simple muskets could be quickly learnt by anyone, so troops could be equipped with cheap but effective arms. It was the mass use of firearms that brought something revolutionary new compared to the previous forms of warring. It only underlays this phenomenon that, in our view, the degree of efficiency of the small arms was higher than formerly presumed.

On the one hand, this paper aims to present explanatory data in support of this assumption, on the other hand, it attempts to prove that the 'trace italienne', together with the military tactics relying fundamentally on the mass fire of small arms, namely the two criteria of the military revolution, were not only features of certain West European regions but became everyday routine in warring in the Hungarian war theatre by the end of the sixteenth century.

#### THE INFLUENCE OF SMALL ARMS UPON THE EUROPEAN ART OF WAR IN THE LATTER HALF OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

A peculiar duality or contradiction has been registered by both earlier and more recent researchers concerned with the influence of small arms upon the strategy of the sixteenth century. One group of authors claim

that the spread of firearms further enhanced the value of the infantry,<sup>5</sup> some of them stating that firearms decisively influenced the development of strategic techniques from the mid-sixteenth century.<sup>6</sup>

Though acknowledging the revolutionary influence of small arms, another group of historians reconstruct a picture of the whole of the sixteenth century in which the subordinated role of the handgunners is stressed throughout, although it was actually true only of the first third of the 1500s.<sup>7</sup> No doubt, at that time the main job of gunners was the protection on the march, the occupation and defence of roads, bridges, heights, advance- and rear-guard actions, covering space and securing time for the deployment of troops in battle order. However, their role and weight started to increase gradually and unostentatiously at the beginning and accelerated from the middle of the sixteenth century onwards.<sup>8</sup>

The process can best be retraced through the rise of the number of gunners. In 1495, among the Swiss mercenaries of Charles VIII, only 10 per cent had guns (the rest being pikemen), but, 2,500 of the 10,000 Swiss mercenaries of the Papal court were equipped with firearms in 1511 (4:1).<sup>9</sup> However, in the first third of the century the 7:1 ratio was typical, naturally to the benefit of the pikemen.<sup>10</sup> In this period, this ratio was

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<sup>5</sup> Ferdinand Purschka, *Rückblicke auf die Entwicklung des K.u.K. Österreichischen Heeres*. Lemberg, 1852, 50.

<sup>6</sup> *Kurzer Arbriss der Militärgeschichte von den Anfängen der Geschichte des deutschen Volkes bis 1945*. Berlin, 1974, 63: "Die gesteigerte Waffenproduktion und die verbesserten Feuerwaffen wirkten verändernd auf die Organisation und Taktik der Söldnerheere". Dudley Pope, *Feuerwaffen*. Bern und München, 1965, 55: "Durch die Einführung der Arkebusen wurde die Kriegführung noch starker revolutioniert als durch die Entwicklung der Belagerungsgeschütze". Christian Beaufort-Spontin, *Harnisch und Waffe Europas*. München, 1982, 120: "Im zweiten Drittel des 16. Jahrhunderts den Pikenieren noch weitgehend untergeordnet, war ihre Anzahl seit zirka 1570 ständig im steigen Begriffen. Analog dazu wurden die Pikeniere zahlenmäßig vermindert, und so wechselte allmählich die offensive Rolle innerhalb des Fußvolkes auf die Muskatiere über". Maxime Weygand, *Die Geschichte der französischen Armee*. Berlin, s. a., 132.

<sup>7</sup> Wilhelm Rüstow, *Geschichte der Infanterie*. I. Gotha, 1857, 323.

<sup>8</sup> Herbert Schwarz, *Gefechtsformen der Infanterie in Europa durch 800 Jahre*. München, 1977, 95: "Die Schützen betätigen sich mit der Vorbereitung des eigentlichen Nahkampfes, sie unterstützen dann den Angriff der Nahkämpfer". Max Jähns, *Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaft vornemlich in Deutschland*. I-II. München und Leipzig, 1890, 876-877. Max Jähns, *Handbuch einer Geschichte des Kriegswesens von der Urzeit bis zur Renaissance*. II. Leipzig, 1880, 1066-1067.

<sup>9</sup> Rüstow, *op. cit.*, 240-241.

<sup>10</sup> Schwarz, *op. cit.*, 114.

better only in the Spanish troops, with 1,000 gunners among 6,000 soldiers (6:1).<sup>11</sup>

The real breakthrough occurred at the beginning of the 1560s. It were the French who were marching at the head of this development in 1560 with battalions of 200 containing 109 pikes and 82 shots in addition to the officers.<sup>12</sup> Another source claims that this contingent consisted of 100 pikemen, 50 arquebusiers and 50 musketeers, but 'battalions of gunmen' also appeared in which 250 firearms went together only with 50 thrusting weapons.<sup>13</sup> During the wars of religion it was not infrequent to meet infantry units organized of gunners exclusively.<sup>14</sup> Though averse to firearms, François de la Noue also counted 750 shots to 1250 pikes (5:3).<sup>15</sup>

In the war of Schmalkalden, one-third of the German infantry adhering tightly to the old traditional use of the pike, were gunners.<sup>16</sup> In his work *Zug und Schlachtordnung der Knecht* (1553) this proportion was recommended by Scipio Nolano, too.<sup>17</sup> It became increasingly obvious in the 1560s that the traditional Maximilian tactics of the imperial army was outdated by the advance of the firearms.<sup>18</sup> In 1563 *ex-Landsknecht* Christoph Bayrlin wished to arm an infantry battalion with "... 80 double(-paid) gunners with pauldrons and helmets, 60 medium(-paid) gunners with helmets, 60 single(-paid) ordinary gunmen with long guns, 80 double(-paid) pikemen with pikes, 60 medium(-paid) pikemen also with pikes and 60 single(-paid) pikemen and 70 also with pikes..."<sup>19</sup> Of the 470 warriors thus 200 were gunners (42.5%) and 270 pikemen. One of the most important documents of the spread of firearms in German

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<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 119.

<sup>12</sup> Bertram Gatti, *Allgemeine und Kriegs-Geschichte*. (Österreichische Militärbibliothek, XI-XIII.) Wien, 1866, XIII. 336.

<sup>13</sup> Jähns, *Handbuch*, 1209.

<sup>14</sup> Schwarz, *op. cit.*, 126.

<sup>15</sup> Jähns, *Geschichte*, II. 728.

<sup>16</sup> Theodor Fuchs, *Geschichte des Europäischen Kriegswesens*. I. Wien, 1972, 189.

<sup>17</sup> Quoted by Jähns, *Geschichte*, II. 716.

<sup>18</sup> This is also indicated by the fact that the *Reichstag* also discussed the reform of the military. From 1565, a greater role was intended to be assigned to firearms in the armament of *Landsknecht* battalions. "Die Nothdurft erfordert, gut Verordnung zu thun, daß die Fähnlein mit wohlgeübten, erfahrenen Knechten und tauglichen Rüstungen und Wehren, sonderlich aber mit guten Schützen, daran jetziger Zeit merklich viel gelegen (vornemlich fremde Nationen sich viel damit abgeben)..."; see *Illustrierte Geschichte der K.u.K. Armee*. I. Wien, 1898, 247-248.

<sup>19</sup> Quoted by Sándor Kató, *Idegen katonaság Magyarországon I. Ferdinánd alatt 1540-1564* [Foreign Troops in Hungary During the Reign of Ferdinand I]. Győr, 1908, 13.

territories can be found among the resolutions of the *Reichstag* of 1570. The ordinance regulates the armament of the infantry battalions 400 men strong in detail. 100 double-paid pikemen, similarly to the 50 halberdiers, had to have full armour (*volle Rüstungen mit ganzen Armschienen*) as well as a pistol. The rest included 50 pikemen without armour and 200 gunners.<sup>20</sup> The regulation having required 350 out of 400 soldiers to bear firearms possibly remained on paper, yet it is highly illustrative of the proportions the military high command regarded as optimal in theory.

In the 1580s, the rapid and even growth of the number of small arms came to a halt. By that time it had become obvious that the most stable, static elements of the battle array, the pikemen were still needed, because, even if the small arms had their advantages, their rate of fire and range were restricted.<sup>21</sup>

Although in practice, the number of firearms was jointly decided by the character of the theatre of war, the armament of the enemy, the national particularities, and the financial resources, gunners outnumbered pikemen nearly everywhere in the last two decades of the century.<sup>22</sup> In the Flemish plan of deployment, generally accepted as the best at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a slight excess of gunners can also be observed.<sup>23</sup> Johann Jacobi von Wallhausen's oft-quoted work on military science, *Kriegskunst zu Fuss*, based on sixteenth century experiences, was written in 1605. Though in theory the author pronounced for the identical number of the two arms, his battle arrays for practical use, involved twice as many shots as pikes.<sup>24</sup> The tactics of the Spaniards, the legendary warriors of the

<sup>20</sup> Johann Christian Lünig, *Corpus Juris des heiligen Römischen Reichs*. Leipzig, 1723, 76.

<sup>21</sup> Emil Daniels, *Geschichte des Kriegswesens*. IV. Leipzig, 1911, 79.

<sup>22</sup> Domenico Mora, *Il soldato*. Venedig, 1570 in Jähns, *Geschichte*, II. 726. Fuchs, *op. cit.*, I. 190-192.

<sup>23</sup> Schwarz, *op. cit.*, Zeichnung 22. Jähns, *Geschichte*, II. 734.

<sup>24</sup> Johann Jacobi von Wallhausen, *Kriegskunst zu Fuß*. Oppenheim, 1615, 80-82 and 97-98. The sudden upswing in the number of firearms is indirectly attested by the works of contemporary military writers interested in the art of war. In the 1560s and 1570s famous and experienced soldiers, such as Blaise de Montluc, Weit Wulff Senftenberg, François de la Noue raised their voices against the excessive spreading of firearms. They denounced the high number of gunners as wrong and even detrimental. Although the rate of firearms surpassed that of the cold weapons nearly everywhere by the end of the century, the aggressive diffusion of firearms did not stop. By way of evidence, one can refer to the military theoreticians of the 1590s, such as Bernardino Mendoza of Spain or Roger Williams of England, who were forced to emphasize the importance and usefulness of the pike and the lance in the cavalry. These opinions of the contemporaries were often uncritically adopted by some later experts. Then they built their evaluation upon these ideas, often condemning the influence of firearms on tactics as pernicious, stressing that the rise in the number of gunners forced the high command to replace an offensive conduct of war by a defensive, stonewalling tactics.

sixteenth century, was also influenced by the spread of firearms. In May 1571, in the four Spanish *tercios* of the army of Flanders there were paid 596 musketeers, 1,505 arquebusiers, and 4,958 pikemen, and in 1601, already 9,476 gunners were combined with 11,058 pikemen. Taking into consideration the high rate of desertation (10-11%) among the poorly paid gunmen, these figures support the statement that by the end of the century even in the Spanish units, fond of close combat, the rate of firearms had doubled.<sup>25</sup>

In the following we will examine how did this process begin and what were the factors which effected it.

#### THE CAUSES OF THE SPREAD OF FIREARMS

##### A. Social, economic, and human factors

The socio-economic changes launched by the great geographical discoveries had matured by the middle and latter half of the sixteenth century. The achievements of European industrial development, the technical and technological innovations, the renewed organization of work had created an economic background for the mass production of cheap but effective firearms.<sup>26</sup> The social fermentation propelled by the economic transformation and the demographic changes had produced masses of have-nots necessary for the mercenary armies, in addition to the cheap armament used on a mass scale.<sup>27</sup>

When a mercenary entered service without arms, he had to purchase the equipment mostly from the recruiting officer at exorbitant prices amounting to the pay of one or two months. Therefore, those who were forced to make a living by warring fared better when they could get their armament themselves. Since the infantry was usually recruited from among the poorest strata, it is easy to understand that the combatants could only afford relatively cheap firearms, if any at all.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>25</sup> Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567-1659*. Cambridge, 1984, 276.

<sup>26</sup> Volker Schmidtchen, *Bombarden, Befestigungen, Büchsenmeister*. Düsseldorf, 1977, 42. *Pollard's History of Firearms*. General editor Claude Blair. s. l., 1983, 61.

<sup>27</sup> Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System. Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*. New York, 1974.

<sup>28</sup> A calculation of costs dating from the late 1590s shows that the armament of a pikeman costed 8 *guldens* and 26 *kreutzers*, while that of a gunner costed only 3 *guldens* and 55 *kreutzers*. Hans von Zwiedeneck-Südenhorst, *Kriegsbilder aus der Zeit der Landsknechte*. Stuttgart, 1883, 275-276.

However, the volunteers were not only deterred from pikeman service by the expensive equipment alone. In the battlefield, a gunner was allowed to move, to respond to the attack, to return the fire. Not the pikeman! He was supposed to withstand unmoving, his pike couched, the attack of the cavalry, not moving when cannonballs were roaring about his head, and not leaving his post even when enemy gunners loaded their guns "at the tip of his pike" with the bullet meant for him. Thus, despite the higher pay, this service had little appeal owing to the dangers it implied.

The spread of small arms was also largely promoted by the fact that the manner of fighting they required did not depend on as much physical strength, courage or endurance as close combat did.

### *B. Technical factors*

In addition to the above factors, the increased efficiency of these weapons was the real motive force behind the diffusion of small guns.

In the period under survey, guns were usually equipped either with a match-lock or a wheel-lock (or rarely with both). Although the first specimens of match-locks were to appear in the mid-fifteenth century, their simplest and most reliable version only crystallized around the early sixteenth century.<sup>29</sup> The principle of operation of this construction did not change at all in the sixteenth century or later, except for the spread of trigger between 1580 and 1600.<sup>30</sup>

People living in the age of automatic guns may find it odd why soldiers insisted on weapons with the match-lock for nearly two centuries, despite all their disadvantages. Specifically the match was "too sensitive to weather conditions; not only rain or snow, but also humid, foggy air moistened it, made it wet. In wind, by contrast, it glowed too fiercely, sending forth hosts of sparkles."<sup>31</sup> Besides, the gunner had always to take care that the match he was holding in his hand should not blow up the gunpowder during loading. When firing the match sometimes failed to reach the pan with the powder, and at other times, the ignited gunpowder

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<sup>29</sup> Jaroslav Lugs, *Handfeuerwaffen*. Berlin, 1973. Heinrich Müller, *Gewehre, Pistolen, Revolver*. Leipzig, 1979, 22.

<sup>30</sup> Moritz Thierbach, *Die gesichtliche Entwicklung der Handfeuerwaffen, bearbeitet nach den deutschen Sammlungen noch vonhandenen Originalen*. Dresden, 1866, 11.

<sup>31</sup> József Balázs-János Pongó, *Pisztolyok, revolverek* [Pistols, Revolvers]. Budapest, 1977, 15.

blew out or tore off the glowing end of the match.<sup>32</sup> Despite the listed difficulties, the match-lock weapons, due to their simplicity, reliability and cheapness, can be regarded as the longest used and most wide-spread firearms in the world so far.

The other common type of firearms had a more intricate and expensive lock, the so-called wheel-lock.<sup>33</sup> The considerably sensitive and complicated construction could easily go wrong, but, in spite of its weak points, it was suitable to equip the cavalry with proper firearms. For "...unlike fuse-operated arms, it was a weapon that, in theory, could be kept ready for firing for an unlimited duration and at any moment of time."<sup>34</sup> It spread so fast that in the 1550s-1560s the German cavalry based its entire tactics on this weapon.

After the lock constructions, let us see the most frequently used small guns of the second half of the sixteenth century. Though relegated to behind fortification walls and the carts of encampments, by the mid-sixteenth century, hook-guns continued to be the hand-guns of greatest fire-power.<sup>35</sup> These weapons of impressive dimensions were indispensable means of siege-warfare so frequent in the sixteenth century.<sup>36</sup> Their loading and aiming was done by one soldier, similarly to all hand-guns. But the increased range and penetrating force endowed

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<sup>32</sup> Eduard Wagner, *Ars bella gerendi aus dem Soldatenleben im Dreissigjährigen Krieg*. Praha, 1980. *Von Alten Handfeuerwaffen. Entwicklung, Technik, Leistung. Sonderausstellung im Landeszeughaus*. Graz, 1989, 28.

<sup>33</sup> Recent literature no longer tries to associate the place and time of its appearance, or the glory of its 'invention' to a single person or area. Several nearly contemporaneous documents from the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries bear out that this principle of construction was known in Southern Germany, Northern Italy, and even Hungary prior to the presumed date of invention in 1517 in Nürnberg. Frederick Myatt, *The Illustrated Encyclopaedia of Pistols and Revolvers*. London, 1980, 10. Jan Durdik-Miroslav Mudra-Miroslav Sada, *Alte Handfeuerwaffen*. Prague, 1977, 43-44. Howard Blackmore, *Guns and Rifles of the World*. London, 1965, 19-21.

<sup>34</sup> Balázs-Pongó, *op. cit.*, 17.

<sup>35</sup> A hook-gun is a heavy hand fire-arm with a projecture on the barrel to stay the kick; its operation requires a single gunner of average skills. For firing, the weapon had to be placed on a support and the hook had to be firmly fixed. For the definition, see József Kelenik, "Szakállas puskák XVI. századi magyarországi inventáriumokban [Hook-guns in Sixteenth Century Inventaria in Hungary]," *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 35:3 (1988) 491.

<sup>36</sup> Hook-guns in the latter half of the sixteenth century were usually fit for shooting lead bullets weighing 3-4 ounces. The barrel measured about 4-7 feet or 1.2-2 metres.

it with an advantage over the rest of the small guns. In regard to efficiency, the hook-guns hardly lagged behind the light falconettes.<sup>37</sup>

In sixteenth-century sieges the military operations usually took place within some 200-300 metres of the walls, in the effective range of small arms. (Whenever possible, battering guns were also positioned at this distance.) Within this distance, the advantages of hook-guns were undeniable. When an infantry attack was launched, their range of 400-500 metres enabled them to open fire at the advancing columns parallel with the cannons. From a distance of 100-150 metres their missiles penetrated the 10-15 cm thick covers of deal planks or beams which resisted the bullets of hand-guns.<sup>38</sup> When using lighter iron or stone bullets, the hook-guns could open fire at smaller targets—groups pursuing technical work, the personnel of the siege-guns, too. The only notable drawback of the hook-gun was its great kicking force, the staying of which required a firm support.

While the sieges of the period featured the gun with the hook as the most powerful hand weapon, the battlefields were increasingly predominated by the musket. The early muskets deriving their fame from the battle of Pavia could shoot a lead bullet of 2 ounces (about 57 g) from a distance of 300 steps with such a force that, as the historian Paulus Jovius noted, it often laid two horses, or two warriors low at a time.<sup>39</sup> Though incomparably more effective than any other hand weapon so far, the musket assumed an important role only in the 1560s-1570s. By the 1590s, however, it completely predominated the battlefields. This was evidently facilitated by the protraction of War in the Low Countries, the French war of religion and the Fifteen Years' War, as they promoted the technical improvement of weapons. This trend is reflected in the rapid decrease in the weight of firearms. In the mid-sixteenth century, a musket

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<sup>37</sup> With a horizontally held barrel, the shooting range of a 3-pounder *culverin* was 260 steps, that of a 6-pounder *1/8 carthaun* was about 650 steps. Luis Collado, *Platica manual de Artilleria*. Venedig, 1568 in Jähns, *Geschichte*, II. 671. Johann Jacobi von Wallhausen, *Archilley Kriegskunst*. Hanau, 1617, 30. The range of hook-guns is determined at 600 steps by Hermann Meynert, *Geschichte des Kriegswesens und der Heerverfassungen in Europa*. I. Wien, 1868, 416.

<sup>38</sup> For penetrating force, see the measurement results on p. 128.

<sup>39</sup> Quoted by Hans Delbrück, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte*. IV. Leipzig, 1920, 59.

weighed 8-10 kg, in the 1590s 6-7 kg, and only 4-5 kg on the average in the first decades of the seventeenth century.<sup>40</sup>

The length and calibre of weapons also decreased. It was facilitated, on the one hand, by the development of metallurgy and gunpowder production, and by the defeat of the armour by firearms on the other. Within a distance of 90-100 metres, muskets penetrated even the heaviest wearable steel.<sup>41</sup> The thickness of breast-plates therefore began to be adjusted to the penetrating force of the the pistol, the most dangerous of close-combat weapons. And the bullet of even the reduced-size musket managed to hit through these plates within the given distance.

The arquebuses comprised another major group of weapons lighter than muskets and requiring no support or gun-rest. The variety of frameworks, lengths, calibres, and locks resulted in a medley of variations. The only common feature of all these types—be they called haken, arquebus, caliver or petronel—was that they could be fired free-handed, without need of rest.

In the middle and latter half of the sixteenth century between lighter hand-guns and muskets there were only differences of size.<sup>42</sup> The typical weapon of gunmen was the 1.2-1.5 m long match-lock gun weighing 2.5-4 kg with a calibre of 14-18 mm.<sup>43</sup> The main weapon of the cavalry of the period was the wheel-lock pistol weighing 1.5-2 kg. However these weapons of 50-60 cm in length and with a calibre of 11-14 mm remained the means of man-to-man fighting first of all.<sup>44</sup>

During the second half of the sixteenth century, the described weapons, playing originally subordinate role in the battlefields ascended to be the decisive factors of the battles and determinants of the entire

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<sup>40</sup> C. B. Rogers, *Weapons of the British Soldier*. London, 1960, 43. Fred und Liliane Funcken, *Rüstungen und Kriegsgerät der Ritter und Landsknechte, 15.-16. Jahrhundert*. München, 1980, 50. *Wörterbuch zur deutschen Militärgeschichte*. II. Berlin, 1985, 663. Werner Hahlweg, *Die Heeresreform der Oranier und die Antike*. Berlin, 1941, 33.

<sup>41</sup> *The New Cambridge Modern History*. III. Edited by R. B. Wernham. Cambridge, 1968, 188-189.

<sup>42</sup> John Hewitt, *Ancient Armour and Weapons in Europe*. III. Graz, 1967 (reprint), 679. Funcken, *op. cit.*, 56.

<sup>43</sup> For sizes, see, e.g. Rogers, *op. cit.*, 49. *Das Deutsche Soldatenbuch*. Herausgegeben von W. Deiss. Leipzig, 1926, 59. *Von der Luntentmusketen zum Sturmgewehr. Katalog zur Sonderschau der Entwicklung der Hand- und Faustfeuerwaffen im österreichischen Heer*. Bearbeitet von Erich Gabriel. Wien, 1967, 37.

<sup>44</sup> For the specifications of pistols, see, among others, Müller, *op. cit.*, 54. *Katalog der Dresdener Bühnenmacher, 16.-18. Jahrhundert*. Herausgeber: Staatliche Kunstsammlungen Dresden. Dresden, 1975, 17-36.

tactics. In spite of this fact, some experts of the period regarded—and still regard—them as cumbersome, primitive weapons of low efficiency.

Special literature often quotes the fact that a well-trained archer shot ten arrows in a minute at a distance of 200 m.<sup>45</sup> Despite this 'magnificent' result, with the exception of England, the arrow had disappeared from the battlefield by the end of the fifteenth and the first decades of the sixteenth centuries.<sup>46</sup> Its place was occupied by the allegedly cumbersome hand firearms requiring a long time to reload and having an efficiency within a mere 100 m.<sup>47</sup> This contradiction—replacing an effective weapon with a more primitive one—is usually explained in the following way: the skill of handling the bow competently required a special flair and a practice of long years. A gunner, by contrast, could be sent to war after a few days' drill.<sup>48</sup> Although unquestionably true, this statement cannot fully explain the complete disappearance of archers. If the bow has indeed been so excellent and the firearm so awkward and impracticable as alleged, the two weapons should have existed side by side, on a supplementary basis for a long time. But it was not so.

The probable reason was that the rivalry had been decided by the early sixteenth century. Even if their ranges did not differ too much, the bow lagged far behind any firearms in penetrating force.<sup>49</sup> Relying mostly on theoretical assumptions, experts usually estimate the effective range of pistols at 25-30 m, of rifles at 120-150 m, and of muskets at 200-250 m.<sup>50</sup> Most regrettably, the terms of effective range and carry have been muddled up over the times. The above figures signify the distances within which shots could be fired at point targets with the respective weapons, instead of the maximum carry of weapons.

Few know that muskets were able to inflict a deadly wound from over a distance of 200-250 m. "It is believed that the horizontally held musket carries at a distance of 300 steps (235.42 m). However, ... we have experienced at two or three occasions that aiming from 400 steps (313.9 m) away, counting two and a half feet for a step, the bullet shot with the normal load pierced the target and penetrated into the pole behind it.

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<sup>45</sup> Mentioned e.g., by Parker, *Military Innovation*, 17.

<sup>46</sup> Schwarz, *op. cit.*, 103. Rogers, *op. cit.*, 51. Daniels, *op. cit.*, III, 117.

<sup>47</sup> Rogers, *op. cit.*, 47-48. Parker, *Military Innovation*, 17.

<sup>48</sup> Parker, *Military Innovation*, 17.

<sup>49</sup> Fuchs, *op. cit.*, I, 250.

<sup>50</sup> Schwarz, *op. cit.*, 148.

Retreating another 100 steps (392.37 m), the bullet penetrated the board a foot below the set target. From a distance of 620 steps (486.42 m) the bullet was found to have no force whatsoever," as experimentist Johann Boxel stated in January 1670.<sup>51</sup> The famous soldier Philip Strozzi was killed by a musket shot fired from a distance of over 500 steps (350-390 m) at the siege of Thionville.<sup>52</sup> A musket used in an experiment in 1930 had 20 g gunpowder to send a lead bullet weighing 39 g at a distance of 510 m.<sup>53</sup>

Today, thanks to the research-fellows of the *Zeughaus* in Graz, exact figures are available. In 1988, they examined the range and efficiency of several original sixteenth-seventeenth-century weapons under laboratory circumstances.<sup>54</sup> The following results were achieved:

TABLE 1

	Smooth-bore hook-gun	Musket	Match-lock gun	Wheel-lock arquebus	Wheel-lock pistol
Date	1580-1590	1595	First quarter of the 17th c.	1593	1620
Origin	Styria	Augsburg	Styria	Suhl	Nürnberg
Full length of weapon	224.5 cm	136 cm	105 cm	92.5 cm	69 cm
Length of calibre	165.5	100 cm	76 cm	64.5 cm	48 cm
Weight of weapon	18 kg	5.48 kg	2.5 kg	2.9 kg	1.59 kg
Calibre of weapon	20.6 mm	17.8 kg	15.1 mm	13.2 mm	12.3 mm
Weight of missile	49.14 kg	30.06 g	17.38 g	10.84 g	9.56 kg
Weight of powder charge	20 g	11 g	6 g	5 g	6 g
Thickness of steel plate pierced from 100 m	4 mm	2 mm	1 mm	1 mm	-
Depth of penetration into dry fir-wood from 100 m	189 mm	80 mm	93 mm	84 mm	-
Thickness of steel plate pierced from 30 m	-	3 mm	2 mm	2 mm	2 mm
Depth of penetration into dry fir-wood from 30 m	-	190 mm	146 mm	132 mm	121 mm

<sup>51</sup> Boxel's experimental results are quoted by Thierbach, *op. cit.*, 26.

<sup>52</sup> Weygand, *op. cit.*, 127.

<sup>53</sup> The experiment is described by Thomas Jakobsson, *Lantmilitär Beväpning och Beklanad under äldre Vasatiden och Gustav II. Adolfs tid*. Stockholm, 1938, 108-109.

<sup>54</sup> The conclusions of the experiments are summarized in *Von alten Handfeuerwaffen*, 49-55.

As the above experimental data will have hopefully proven, sixteenth-century firearms can be counted as powerful and effective weapons of their age. The theoretical ranges of the mentioned weapons (at an angle of elevation of 33.75°) calculated from the measurements are as follows:

Smooth-bore hook-gun:	1,278.5 m
Musket:	1,094.8 m
Match-lock gun:	956.9 m
Wheel-lock arquebus:	834.3 m
Wheel-lock pistol:	811.5 m

As it can be seen, computing the maximal shooting range produces astonishingly high values. These figures can, however, only be handled as theoretical points of departure. In practice, there must have been several factors that decreased the efficiency of these weapons considerably. In the heat of battles, soldiers did not always have the opportunity to caulk the powder thoroughly and carefully or measure it out precisely. When the charge was not compressed enough, choked badly, or the gunpowder was less than one-third of the bullet-weight, the range could be considerably reduced.

Taking these counteracting factors into consideration one can safely state: the results of the experiments convincingly prove that the firearms of the period were far more effective than presumed before. Records surviving from the period also provide ample evidence. One of them tells that in the battle of Coutras, for example, armoured cavalymen hit from a distance of 15-20 m were literally hurled from the saddle by the force of musket shots.<sup>55</sup> It was a weapon whose "ball almost an inch in diameter (2.54 cm) crushed flesh and shattered bones in a way no arrow ever could, and the force of its blow was almost certain to knock a man down, even if he receive only a flesh wound."<sup>56</sup>

In the knowledge of the power of these weapons, one may venture the assumption that musketeers may have opened fire from a distance of 300-350 m, despite the reduced probability of hitting home. A mass salvo fired at other masses certainly caused considerable losses among troops without armour. With the decrease of distance, firing became more

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<sup>55</sup> Schwarz, *op. cit.*, 142.

<sup>56</sup> Harold Peterson-Paul Hamlyn, *The Book of the Gun*. Singapore, 1969, 53.

and more devastating, since from a distance of 150 m a musket always hit through a deal of about 5 cm in thickness.<sup>57</sup> The hit probability must also have increased, every other of a smooth-bore muzzle-loading gun hitting home from a distance of 100 m.<sup>58</sup> Anyone hit by a musket shot had better die immediately, for the soft lead bullets of immense impact inflicted a far larger wound than their size. Attending wounds like that with the medical instruments of that time was utterly hopeless.

The effect of these formidable weapons could be enhanced by increasing the rate of fire.<sup>59</sup> The fact that muskets were muzzle-loading, had a great and unsurmountable obstacle for the age. The musketeers put the bullets in their mouths, set the chokes to their hats, stuck the rammer in their boots to be at hand, but all in vain: they were unable to reduce the time of loading below 1.5-2 minutes. The lighter rifles could be handled somewhat faster. The prominent military theoretician of the age, Sir Roger Williams noted: "... the calivers may say they will discharge two shots for one, but cannot denie that one musket shot doth more hurt than two calivers' shot."<sup>60</sup>

Since the level of industrial development did not yet allow for the production of breech loading guns, the rate of fire could only be increased with tactical means. Drawing the battle orders apart, the rotation of the lines of gunners (countermarch) ensured a better utilization of fire-power. This, also an attestation of the decisive role of firearms, proves that nearly the whole of the conduct of war was adjusted to the efficiency and possible uses of firearms.

#### FIREARMS AND FOREIGN TROOPS FIGHTING IN THE HUNGARIAN THEATRE OF WAR IN 1593-1605

The Austrian, German, Walloon, French, and Italian troops which fought on the territory of Hungary during the Fifteen Years' War against the Ottomans were the main carriers and mediators of the innovations of the military revolution. Their armament and battle process could be

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<sup>57</sup> The experiment verifying this was described in Müller, *op. cit.*, 47.

<sup>58</sup> *Von alten Handfeuerwaffen*, 69.

<sup>59</sup> David Chandler, *The Art of the Warfare on Land*. Feltham, 1974, 103.

<sup>60</sup> Hewitt, *op. cit.*, III. 679.

investigated with the help of *Bestellungen* preserved in the *Kriegsarchiv* in Vienna.<sup>61</sup>

Through the prescriptions and prohibitions these documents afford an insight into the finances of the army, the ideas and expectations of the high command. Although a part of the requirements remained dead letters, the strengths, the proportions of the arms, and the armaments, because of frequent abuses, were strictly and regularly controlled. Therefore in connection with the most important data concerning our theme, the relatively full compliance with orders is more than likely.

#### A. Mounted arquebusiers (Archibusier zu Ross)

To demonstrate the mounted arquebusiers of the Fifteen Years' War, 27 various *Bestellungen* were used covering a total of 33 units. The difference here, and in other cases, derives from the fact that several persons were often assigned the job of recruiting identical units at the same time, but only a single document was filed in the archives, with the addition of the names of delegates given the same task.

There are minor divergences between the offensive and defensive weapons of arquebusiers, depending on their nationality. Besides the swords, at the beginning of the war (1593) the Germans were required to have "... a gun and two pistols, helmet, and the equipment customary with mounted troops such as back- and breast-plates and pauldrons..."<sup>62</sup> Slight modification of this equipment can first be documented from 1595 in Upper Hungary among the gunners of Christoff Teuffenbach. Then, with the armour and the rest of the weapons unchanged, only "... one long and one short fire-arm" was required.<sup>63</sup> Despite its seeming insignificance, the modification—namely that from 1596 to the end of the war a single pistol was required—suggests that the role of the arquebus

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<sup>61</sup> Kriegsarchiv Wien, Sonderreihe des Hofkriegsrates. *Bestellungen* 1593-1605. (Hereinafter Bst.). *Bestellungen* are documents of appointment issued by the monarch or less frequently by the Austrian or the Imperial Estates by which professional soldiers were assigned the task of recruiting mercenary units of various sizes. They are actually contracts of levying troops containing the name, rank, and function of the contractor together with several stipulations. They fix the size of the troops, their nationality, equipment, and armament of the soldiers, the place and date of recruitment. They also set the tenure of mercenary employment, the organization of the units, the number of officers, their posts and pay. They also list carefully the kinds of allotments besides the pay, detail the duties, rights, and tasks of the soldiers and the commanders.

<sup>62</sup> Bst. 1593/451.

<sup>63</sup> Bst. 1595/484.

was decisive in fighting. Another indication to this end is the step taken to introduce the gun among the black cavalry<sup>64</sup> traditionally equipped with pistols before.<sup>65</sup>

The Walloon or Flemish gunners, when first mentioned in 1596, were armed with "... a good helmet, steel gorget, full armour, and cloak ... as well as a powerful long fire-arm and a short pistol, and a heavy cavalry sword...".<sup>66</sup> The order issued to Count Salm in the summer of 1601 proves without fail that the Walloon arquebusiers who fought in Hungary were provided with the customary armament of their homeland, namely "a morion helmet..., back- and breast-plates, gun hanging on a shoulder strap, and a pistol attached to the saddle...".<sup>67</sup> The appointment issued to George Basta a year later also indicates the presence in Hungary of the equipment used in the Low Countries and France.<sup>68</sup>

The only Italian unit of which information is available was also armed upon the Flemish model.<sup>69</sup>

Thus, foreign mounted gunners who took part in the fights in Hungary were armed with one or two wheel-lock pistols, and a short wheel-lock gun. A reliable and strong sword enabled them to fight in hand-to-hand combat. Their protective armour (the open helmet, gorget, lobster-tailed pauldrons, back- and breast-plates) gave enough protection in combat without curbing their swiftness and agility.

### *B. German or black cavalry*

The armament of the black cavalry involved in the Fifteen Years' War was surprisingly unified. Apart from the sword, their main weapons were "... at least two good wheel-lock pistols...".<sup>70</sup> Only once, when 4,000 cavalymen were hired from Prince of Lüneburg, a different armament was required. The relevant *Bestallung*, besides the two pistols, stipulated a "... long or carabined gun".<sup>71</sup> That, however, was an exception, for guns were not typical or constant components of the armament of German

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<sup>64</sup> The black cavalry earned its name for their peculiar black armour. To reduce production costs, their armour was coated with a thick black varnish.

<sup>65</sup> Kriegsarchiv Wien, Alte Feldakten (hereinafter AFA) 1599/5/3. AFA 1600/2/1.

<sup>66</sup> Bst. 1596/505.

<sup>67</sup> Bst. 1601/697.

<sup>68</sup> Bst. 1602/721.

<sup>69</sup> Bst. 1597/533.

<sup>70</sup> Bst. 1593/458; 1594/473; 1597/528; 1599/626, etc. Bst. 1593/460.

<sup>71</sup> Bst. 1593/460.

mounted soldiers. Only on two occasions, in 1599 and 1600, are black cavalymen mentioned as being equipped with guns: every sixth of the "German mounted soldiers" of Silesia was required to have an arquebus as well.<sup>72</sup>

The appearance of their armature was even more static. The requirements of the 1560-1570s practically remained unchanged. The armour of the black cavalry of the Fifteen Years' War consisted of "... the skirt and pauldrons, gorget, breast- and back-plates, helmet, and gauntlets" up to the end of the war.<sup>73</sup>

### C. *Cuirassiers*

These soldiers of the late sixteenth century, equipped with the heaviest armament were possibly successors to the heavy, knightly cavalry fighting with lances, who had abandoned their main weapon, namely the heavy lance of the knights by the 1590s.<sup>74</sup> But they retained two pistols, a heavy and strong sword, and their heavy armour, the cuirass. Upon the Netherlandish pattern, this consisted of a closed helmet, gorget, breast-plate with long lobster-tailed tassets, back-plate with a skirt and full pauldrons for shoulders and arms.<sup>75</sup>

The armament of the few cuirassiers detectable in the Fifteen Years' War did not differ from the West European model in any way; on the contrary, the *Bestallungen* prescribed adherence to this model positively: they were to have a long and a short firearm, "... a good heavy cavalry sword", helmet, full cuirass including a gorget, back-plate with pauldrons, breast-plate, and knee-length tassets.<sup>76</sup>

### D. *Dragoons*

In December 1602, in Hungary, Archduke Matthias requested the deployment of a unit of 400 dragoons from Tilly's Walloons. The official appointment for Laurentio de Rame, Charles de Argentea, Guillome de Waux and Mercure de Marilof to head 100 Walloon dragoons each was

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<sup>72</sup> AFA 1599/5/3, and AFA 1600/2/1, resp.

<sup>73</sup> See e.g., Bst. 1593/458.

<sup>74</sup> Lance-using cavalymen disappeared from Flanders around 1589-90, from the Spanish army around 1595, from the French heavy cavalry at the turn of the century, and from the German areas in the 1610s. Beaufort-Spontin, *op. cit.*, 45-47.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 50.

<sup>76</sup> Bst. 1598/587.

dated on December, 29. Their armament included a sword, a long wheel-lock gun on a shoulder-strap, and a pistol in the belt or on the saddle.<sup>77</sup> No mention was made of any protective equipment, armour, but the reason for this is easy to understand; the aim was to set up a lighter and more mobile unit than the German mounted gunners, experienced in infantry gun-battle.

As it can be seen, Hungary began to set up more or less identical units of dragoons armed in the same way and nearly at the same time as the Low Countries and France in the vanguard of the military revolution.

### *E. Infantry*

By the second half of the sixteenth century, the term *Landsknecht* used in the sense of an infantry soldier had disappeared, giving way to *Schützen* 'gunner' and *Spiesser* 'pikeman'.<sup>78</sup> The two different denominations, however, imply only a seeming separation of the infantry. Actually there was a massive unification that took place all over Europe, together with a decrease in the number of different weapons. In the last years of the sixteenth century, the halberd was only used by senior and junior officers, and the broadsword completely vanished, especially from the Western regions of Europe.<sup>79</sup> Pike was the only weapon of the infantry that was not using firearms.

Our sources indicate that at the beginning of the war even the double-paid soldiers sent to Hungary were if possible equipped with the full infantry armour by the 'European standard' (helmet, gorget, breast-and back-plate, lobster-tailed pauldrons covering the outer part of the arms).<sup>80</sup> A memorandum of 1595 in connection with the war in Hungary, however, was of the opinion that "the armour of double-paid soldiers must be abolished. A bullet-proof breast-plate, a gorget, and a helmet are enough, the rest only tires the person whereas they do not give real protection against shots or thrusts. Against this enemy (i.e. the Ottomans) everything must be based on fastness".<sup>81</sup> We do not know whether the advice of the anonymous writer was acted upon or not, but it is a fact

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<sup>77</sup> Bst. 1602/727.

<sup>78</sup> *Illustrierte Geschichte*, I. 231.

<sup>79</sup> Parker, *Military Innovation*, 17.

<sup>80</sup> AFA 1594/2/16.b.

<sup>81</sup> AFA 1595/13/1.

that the infantry armours purchased in Nürnberg for the campaign year of 1601 were all half-armours, having no pauldrons or tassets any more, just like in the Low Countries.<sup>82</sup>

The extant documents of arms purchases prove that the armours required for the Hungarian campaign were bought in the towns of the Empire famous for weapon production such as Augsburg, Nürnberg, and Dresden; or they were imported from Magdeburg, Braunschweig, and Hamburg, Lübeck in Brandenburg, as well as Lüttich and Köln; the cheaper Flemish market was also proposed in 1601.<sup>83</sup> The full infantry armour (7-7.5 kg) of the period between 1590 and 1601 was completed with an open helmet weighing 0.7-1.5 kg.<sup>84</sup> For comparison, it is worth noting that the weight of the armour of a pikeman armed upon the pattern of the Low Countries was 15.5 *Pfund* or about 8.5 kg, together with the helmet.<sup>85</sup>

In the German regiments sent to Hungary at the beginning of the war, about 12-13 pikemen existed for each broadswordsmen who wore gauntlets besides the infantry armour.

According to a memorial of November 1595 summarizing the experiences of two years of belligerence, the most practical match-locked musket should have "... a pan-cover opening automatically when the gun is fired, the gun-barrel sending off the lead weighing three-quarters of an ounce (about 28.5 g) should be 6 pounds (3.36 kg) without the stock, stretching 3 feet 3 inches (about 102-105 cm) in length..."<sup>86</sup>

*Halbhaken*, *Schützen Rhor*, *Halbmuskete* were the names of firearms lighter than the musket and requiring no rest. The above-mentioned memorandum claimed that a gun like that "... should have a narrow lock-plate and a barrel weighing 5 pounds (about 2.8 kg) and having a length of 3 feet 1 inch (about 97-98 cm)"<sup>87</sup>

The mounted gunners of the imperial and royal army mostly fought with wheel-lock guns. These 'carabines' of 80-120 cm in length were not carried on a shoulder-belt, but hung on the saddle-bow or kept in a leather case.<sup>88</sup> The multitude of the form, weight and length of these

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<sup>82</sup> Bst. 1601/672.

<sup>83</sup> Bst. 1601/672.

<sup>84</sup> Franz Pickler-Meran, *Das Landeszeughaus in Graz*. I-II. Leipzig, 1880.

<sup>85</sup> Jähns, *op. cit.*, II. 1005.

<sup>86</sup> AFA 1595/13/5.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>88</sup> Pickler-Meran, *op. cit.*, II. 129.

weapons produced a kaleidoscopic variety. However the weights and dimensions remained within certain limits, which enabled the cavalrymen to fire with one hand.

The more or less standard weapon of foreign cavalrymen was the pistol. Luckily, there are hundreds of pistols in Graz even today that were purchased in the mid-1590s in towns which have been the main suppliers of the imperial armies. The calibre of *Puffers*<sup>89</sup> of Nürnberg and Augsburg is normally 14 mm, and they weigh 1.6-2 kg.<sup>90</sup>

It is worth noting that various cartridge holders and pouches were entered into the cashbooks of the *Zeughaus* in Graz from the mid-1570s on. They are not too many to the end of the century, amounting to items of a few hundreds. These figures suggest that prefabricated cartridges increasing the rate of fire were no longer rare in these war theatres at the end of the sixteenth century.<sup>91</sup> The bandolier, however, cannot have been widespread among musketeers in Hungary, for it is mentioned on a single occasion among arms purchases.<sup>92</sup>

In Hungary, the armament of both gunners and musketeers included a sword and a light gunner's helmet, the *Schützenhaube*. It is peculiar because in Western Europe, e.g. in the Low Countries, musketeers wore no helmets at that time. By contrast, in Hungary all the soldiers equipped with firearms were regularly supplied with helmets during the Fifteen Years' War. And that was no trifling expenditure, for at times tens of thousands were needed. It seems to have been such an important item of equipment that neither the costs nor the difficulties of transportation could deter the high command from procuring them.<sup>93</sup>

In short, the armament of the foreign soldiers of the Fifteen Years' War and that of other mercenary armies, for example, the Flemish, was practically identical in the period under survey. It often happened in those years that the same officers and soldiers wielded the same weapons in 'backward East' as in the 'advanced West': German, Walloon, and Italian mounted gunners in the Low Countries, German, Walloon, and Italian mounted gunners in the Hungarian Small Plain; the Lorrainese

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<sup>89</sup> A typical German wheel-lock pistol with a large ball-shaped pommel.

<sup>90</sup> Pickler-Meran, *op. cit.*, II. 139-140.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, II. 143-144.

<sup>92</sup> The *bandolier* was a leather shoulder belt three or four inches wide holding 10-11 small leather-covered wooden cases with lids, each containing a change of powder. Bst. 1601/672.

<sup>93</sup> See e.g., AFA 1594/2/16.b; AFA 1594/4/7; AFA 1595/11/4; Bst. 1601/672.

cuirassiers of Duke Mercury in the French wars of religion, and the same troops under the walls of Kanizsa; black cavalry hired by the Catholic League, the Huguenots, or by the United Provinces, and black cavalry in the armies in Hungary; rebellious Walloons in the garrison of La Chapelle, Châtelet, Lier, and Diest, and rebellious Walloons a thousand kilometres to the East, in the fortress of Pápa.

The numerous similarities make one curious to inquire whether the Hungarian theatre of operations lagged behind the military development of Western Europe, and if it did, in which fields and to what extent. The following section on the equipment and conduct of war of the Hungarian armies attempts an answer to this question.

#### NUMBER AND SIGNIFICANCE OF FIREARMS IN THE HUNGARIAN THEATRE OF WAR

##### *Artillery*

The state of sixteenth-century artillery stationed in Hungarian fortresses can be learnt from a nationwide register taken in 1577.<sup>94</sup> The data reveal that an artillery powerful enough to effectively counter the battering guns during a siege was stationed only in strategically significant, hence the largest and best fortified strongholds. Only the heavy guns of Szatmár, Eger, Kassa, Komárom, and Győr enabled the defenders of the castles to ward off the battering guns.

The task of smaller or medium-size fortresses and palisades (*palankas*), such as Kálló, Végles, Tata, Palota, Veszprém, etc., was to secure certain areas or to protect strategically salient forts and those were equipped with small-calibre pieces only. The modest power of their artillery, in view of the relative significance of these forts and the equipment of the major strongholds, was still satisfactory. Kálló's 15, Végles's 11, Tata's 30, Palota's 11 siege pieces, most of them 'culverins', compared to the arsenal of cannons in Eger (34) or Győr (43) cannot be considered as insignificant, even if we take the quality differences into consideration.<sup>95</sup>

<sup>94</sup> AFA 1577/13/3.

<sup>95</sup> For the figures of the register and the summary table of them, see József Kelenik, "A kézi lőfegyverek jelentősége a hadügyi forradalom kibontakozásában. A magyar egységek fegyverzete a tizenöt éves háború időszakában [The Significance of Small Arms in the Ascendancy of the Military Revolution. The Armament of the Hungarian Units During the Fifteen Years' War]," *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 104:4 (1991) 19-20.

In the lack of extensive comparative research data it is difficult to say whether the sixteenth century gun stock of Hungarian fortresses was outdated or underdeveloped in comparison with other theatres of war in Europe. Available data suggest that the number of siege-pieces was not high in West European forts, either. In 1552, the French could only deploy 30 guns in the siege of Daimvillers, and 52 when battering the walls of Yvoy.<sup>96</sup> In the same year, 60 pieces were stationed in the trenches under Metz.<sup>97</sup> In the encounters of the French Huguenot wars, the antagonists rarely put more than 4-8 guns into action at a time.<sup>98</sup> The defence of extended Brescia was provided by 65 various pieces in 1589.<sup>99</sup> During the Low Countries' War the besiegers had 14 guns under Haarlem (1572), 24 at Deventer (1591), 40 at Steenwijk (1592), 16 at Grol (1595), and 22 at Hertogenbosch (1601).<sup>100</sup>

In the light of these figures, the number of various light guns—15, 11, 30 and 19 for the secondary forts of Kálló, Végles, Tata and Magyaróvár—does not appear insignificant. The less so, as it has to be remembered that the military task of these minor fortresses and palisades was frontier defence, guarding of territories in peacetime and the prevention of the incursions. These forts were only expected, and able, to ward off the raids and limited attacks of local Ottoman units stationed in Hungary.

Medium size fortifications, such as Tata, Pápa or Palota, were in possession of enough artillery to repulse the sieges of limited Ottoman troops who were stationed in Hungary. However their fortification would not have been sufficient to hold up the main body of the Ottoman army even if they had had twice as many guns. That task was assigned to forts of large basic area surrounded with massive walls and supplied with adequate fire-positions, such as Győr, Komárom, Érsekújvár, Eger, and Nagyvárád. Only these forts, accomodating heavy artillery, were capable to withstand a systematic siege laid with large forces.

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<sup>96</sup> Christopher Duffy, *Siege Warfare. The Fortress in the Early Modern World, 1494-1660*. London and Henley, 1979, 51.

<sup>97</sup> Jähns, *op. cit.*, II. 588.

<sup>98</sup> Gatti, *op. cit.*, XII. 326. *The New Cambridge Modern History*, II. 195.

<sup>99</sup> M. E. Mallet-J. R. Hale, *The Military Organization of a Renaissance State. Venice c. 1400 to 1600*. Cambridge, 1984, 402.

<sup>100</sup> Rudolf Schmidt, *Die Entwicklung der Feuerwaffen und andere Kriegswerkzeugen*. Schaffhausen, 1868, 57. Duffy, *op. cit.*, 82. Parker, *Military Innovation*, 18.

That strong artillery was needed in the Hungarian theatre of war abounding in fortresses and strongholds was clearly seen by the members of the administration in charge of military decisions. The general statute issued to the commander-in-chief of the imperial and royal army in February 1594 prescribed the deployment of a field artillery consisting of 48 heavy and 204 lighter field guns as necessary.<sup>101</sup> This powerful artillery was not a mere day-dream of the high command; they were able to throw in 48 siege or heavy guns any time in the later phases of the war. It was far easier to acquire lighter pieces, for the gun-foundries of Vienna, Prague, and the rural areas were busy working. In January 1595, 150 *Scharffentindls*, field guns of the lightest category, were delivered by the *Püchschmiedts* of Khinberg to the War Council (*Hofkriegsrat*).<sup>102</sup>

An arms register of November 1595 only features 30 heavy and 72 field guns, as well as 16 howitzers (*Haubitz*) as necessary for the field-army.<sup>103</sup> No doubt this arsenal was available to the army in 1596. According to the register, 59 heavy, 168 medium-size and light guns, as well as 7 howitzers, were at ready in Vienna. Deducing from these numbers the 44 heavy and 106 light guns allegedly required for the defence of the city, the army seemed to have considerable deficiencies, but before the beginning of the fights, the missing amount of guns was put on the road in Prague in April 1596.<sup>104</sup> Thus it can be stated with certainty that at least 117 (31 heavy and 86 light) guns took part in the campaigns of that year.

An especially high artillery concentration was necessary to lay siege to strategically significant fortresses. In 1598, the Christian forces began the siege of the castle of Buda with 15 mortars, 58 heavy siege guns and 67 other pieces.<sup>105</sup> Let it be noted that the transportation of the guns also required a sizeable capacity which was not easy to provide. During the siege of Esztergom, between May 5 and June 6, 1594, for example, the weight of cannonballs shot at the fort, together with the powder and

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<sup>101</sup> The following pieces were regarded as necessary (AFA 1594/4/6a.): "... dreissig Doppelte Cartaunen, das aine von vierzig bis fünffzig Wiener Pfundt schuß, Zwelfff Singering, sechs Notschlangen, Vierundzwanzig falckonen, Vierzig doppelte falckonetl, zwanzig halbe Schlangen, Dreissig ainfache falckhonetl, Ain hundert Scharfedindl, etliche Mörser zum Feuerwerck...".

<sup>102</sup> AFA 1595/1/5.

<sup>103</sup> AFA 1595/11/4.

<sup>104</sup> AFA 1596/4 ad.8.

<sup>105</sup> Hieronymus Ortelius, *Chronica des Ungarischen Kriegswesens*. Nürnberg, 1604, 420.

matches used, amounted to nearly 274 tons. The unused ammunition also weighed 234 tons.<sup>106</sup> The ammunition supply of the artillery alone meant more than 500 tons to be moved. Counting 20 Viennese quintals or 1,120 kg for a cart, this amounted to 453 cartloads, which would have needed 1,812 horses to be drawn. A register of 1600 says that 628 horses were needed to draw 58 partly medium-size, partly heavy guns. Another 453 carts and 1,834 horses were used to carry the gun-carriages, various accessories and the ammunition.<sup>107</sup> In 1601, the transport of 48 guns required 537 carts and 2,938 horses.<sup>108</sup>

In Nagyvárad, that was one of the key strongholds in regard to the outcome of the war and the fate of the country, 11 heavy siege guns, 18 medium and 2 light field guns, 5 howitzers, and 2 mortars were enumerated.<sup>109</sup> Győr was defended by 59 different guns.<sup>110</sup> The more or less fortified walls of Kanizsa were protected by 9 heavy, 51 medium and light pieces.<sup>111</sup> The artillery armament of the major forts—unlike the palisades—seems to have been relatively powerful and up-to-date.

Occasional concentrations, losses, frequent reinforcements of a few pieces, in short the permanent redeployments of the guns, make it difficult to precisely determine the strength of the imperial and royal artillery. Cautious estimates, however, put the annual number of different guns having been at the disposal of the army in the Hungarian theatre of war at 100-150, in addition to the pieces in the fortresses. In regard to the number of guns, the artillery of the imperial and royal army must therefore be regarded as having been abreast of the times, for a key reformer of the army in the Low Countries, Johann Nassau only saw one gun for 1,000 infantrymen as necessary.<sup>112</sup> This proportion was not only achieved by the artillery of the army in Hungary during the Fifteen Years' War but at least doubled in almost every campaigning year.

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<sup>106</sup> For a statement of the use of ammunition, see AFA 1592/5/1. The weights are given in *centner* and *libra*. One *centner* was calculated with 56 kg, one *libra* with 0.56 kg.

<sup>107</sup> AFA 1600/6/12.

<sup>108</sup> Bst. 1601/672.

<sup>109</sup> AFA 1604/5/1 1/2.

<sup>110</sup> Ortelius, *op. cit.*, 236.

<sup>111</sup> *Beschreibung der Belagerung der Canischa*. Országos Széchényi Könyvtár, Kézirattár. Folio Germanica 1408, 76.

<sup>112</sup> Schwarz, *op. cit.*, 178.

*Small arms*

The increase of the number and significance of small arms in Hungary at the end of the sixteenth century—besides the accounts of historiographers and contemporaries—is attested by fortress inventories and registers. However, apart from the fact of growth, what one can reconstruct on the basis of the available data is that the simplest and fastest way of strengthening defence in both the directly and the potentially threatened fortresses was to increase the number of small arms.<sup>113</sup>

The rapid and general diffusion of small arms in the areas menaced by the Ottomans is also proven by the significant expansion of the arsenal of the *Zeughaus* in Graz between 1568 and 1590. In the storehouses of the armoury, the number of firearms in 1568 (1,049) became quadrupled by the last 'peace year' of 1590 (4,312). The growth is most conspicuous in regard to light small arms. As against 406 in 1568 and 663 in 1581, there were 2,763 pieces registered in 1590. The rise of the number of heavy hook-guns used in fortresses was more moderate, with 621 in 1568, 663 in 1581, and 852 in 1590 entered into the register.

Though the southern frontier belonged to the secondary theatres of war, the number of arms kept rising; from 5,454 in 1594 to 5,661 in 1598.<sup>114</sup>

THE RATE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF SMALL ARMS IN THE ARMAMENT OF  
HUNGARIAN AND FOREIGN TROOPS DURING THE FIFTEEN YEARS' WAR

*Foreign troops and firearms*

"Last night, Signor George Bastha had shipped across the Danube to our redoubt 300 cuirassiers, 1,000 musketeers on foot, 500 pikemen of the infantry, and 1,000 Heiducks who attacked the Ottomans' entrenchment at 11 o'clock on September 26, and drove the janissaries out of the trenches. The Ottomans in their camp saw it and all the mounted old infantry from the camp rushed to their assistance. They were facing each other, they had such a fight, there were so many shots, that the mountains and the castle of Esztergom fumed with all that smoke as if they had

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<sup>113</sup> For the relevant data and tabular summary, see József Kelenik, "A kézi lőfegyverek," 21-29.

<sup>114</sup> The moderate increase in the number of hook-guns was because the Croatian and Vend fortresses supplied by the Graz arsenal had the highest demand for this weapon type. For the figures, see Pickler-Meran, *op. cit.*, I. Supplements II-IV.

been burning."<sup>115</sup> This account depicted a battle in which firearms incontestably had the leading part.

As it has been seen, the armament of foreign troops involved in the fights of the Fifteen Years' War and that of the contemporary armies in Western Europe were practically identical. The proportion of firearms amounted in the armament of foreign military units has great significance to the present topic, too. One indication of their magnitude and importance is that the imperial officials purchased 3,035 different kinds of firearms from the arsenal in Dresden in February 1594.<sup>116</sup> An estimation dating from September or November 1595, set the requirements of the prospective army of 24,000 for the campaign of 1596 at 8,000 guns and 8,000 muskets. In addition, it advised to form a reserve of 2,000 from each type of weapon. It recommended 1,000 hook-guns for the defence of Vienna, 400 for field use, and a total of 500 for the frontier fortresses.<sup>117</sup>

These figures are undoubtedly very impressive. Their value, however, cannot be fully estimated as long as the number of firearms is not compared with the number of other weapons in use. In February 1594, the delegates of the emperor arrived in Dresden to buy weapons for 4,500 people, one and a half infantry regiments. After the purchase of the prescribed stock (armament for 1,575 double-paid pikemen and 2,835 firearms), the remaining 1,000 guildens were also spent on arms. They bought 10 armours and halberds, as well as 200 different hand-guns. The purchase thus sufficed to arm 1,585 soldiers fighting with cold arms and 3,035 gunners. The ratio between the two weapon types is two to one to firearms.<sup>118</sup> In another regiment consisting of 4,000 men, 2,800 musketeers and gunners were only joined by 1,200 pikemen, halberdiers, and broadswordsmen.<sup>119</sup>

That these figures are not accidental and cannot be applied only to particular regiments or smaller units is also borne out by the mentioned register of 1595. The theoretical proportion it voices implies the combination of 8,000 pikemen with double pay with twice as many

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<sup>115</sup> Miklós Kubinyi, "Közlemények a Thurzó-levéltárból [Publications from the Archives of Family Thurzó]," *Századok* 5 (1871), 288: the letter of Benedek Nemes-Kürthy Pogrányi to Count György Thurzó. September 26, 1604.

<sup>116</sup> AFA 1594/2/16 b.

<sup>117</sup> AFA 1595/11/4.

<sup>118</sup> AFA 1594/2/16 b.

<sup>119</sup> Zwiedeneck-Südenhorst, *op. cit.*, 276.

shooters: 8,000 musketeers and 8,000 gunners. These figures authentically convey the views of the military leadership about the ideal proportions of weapon types even if in practice they were somewhat modified.

The further increase of the significance of firearms can be inferred from a register from 1600<sup>120</sup> similar to the one from 1595. It listed five-times as many small guns as armours. There was demand only for 4,000 new armours as compared to 19,000 hand-guns for the campaign of 1601, which means that the amount of firearms identical with the requirement of 1595 was only coupled with half as many sets of armour. In 1600, the demand for all types of weapon was smaller than in 1595, inclusive of the existing stocks—with the exception of firearms. In 1595, 10,000 armours, 4,100 halberds, 700 broadswords as well as 20,000 firearms were deemed necessary. The respective figures for 1600 are: 4,000 armours, 2,400 halberds, 500 broadswords, and exactly 19,000 firearms.<sup>121</sup>

So far, the probable rates of different arms were reconstructed on the bases of the stocks. The question is what the ratios of weapon types were in the fighting units.

As the thirty-three recruitment commissions from between 1593 and 1605 prove, the number of firearms exceeded that of the cold weapons in the infantry. To reconstruct the exact rate of firearms within the armament of the infantry, three proportions were set up. The first shows the ratio of gunners and non-gunners. Since, however, the *Bestellungen* issued for the German troops did not set the number of each weapon type precisely, distorted proportions might be obtained; the term 'double-paid mercenary' did not only mean the pikemen and halberdiers exclusively, but also the whole stock of the *prima plana*, including such non-combatant, unarmed persons as the chaplain, the scribe or the army doctor. Consequently, the effective and composition of the *prima plana* has been reconstructed wherever possible. The number of non-combatants was taken

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<sup>120</sup> Bst. 1601/672.

<sup>121</sup> That this truly reflects a rise in the growing rate of firearms is proven by the following considerations: 1. the Arms Office (*Zeugwartamt*) had a mere 600 sets of armour, hence a larger stock of reserve does not suffice to explain lower level of demand; 2. it is not presumable that firearms had a far higher rate of amortisation than armour because the quotas of the two types of weapons are calculated with equal expected losses in the 1595 proposition. To 2,000 sets of armour, 4,000 firearms (1:2) were planned to be set aside in reserve for security reasons; 3. a greater part of the armament with the troops and in the theatre of war had also consisted of firearms already before, so including them in the calculations would not improve the rate of cold weapons, either.

TABLE 2

	The name of commander	Nationality	Strength of battalion	Gunners	Troops other than gunners	Theoretical proportion of firearms and edged weapons	Prima plana			Proportion of gunners and troops equipped with edged weapon (second ratio)	Proportion of gunners and troops actually fighting with edged weapon (third ratio)
							Strength	Non-combatant	Fighting with edged weapon		
09. 12. 1593	Engelhardt Kurz	German	400	220	180	1:1,2	20	15	5	165:220=1:1,3	160:220=1:1,37
25. 11. 1596	Orpheo Galliano A	Walloon	300	275	25	1:1,1	17	8	9	17:225=1:16,1	8:275=1:34,3
	Orpheo Galliano B	Walloon	300	250	50	1:5	17	8	9	42:250=1:5,95	33:250=1:7,57
1597	Georg Bayer zu Boppart	French	300	250	50	1:5	17	8	9	42:250=1:5,95	33:250=1:7,57
1597	Orpheo Galliano	French	300	250	50	1:5	17	8	9	42:250=1:5,95	33:250=1:7,57
01. 03. 1597	Johan Baptista Pezzen	German	300	180	120	1:1,5	15	11	4	109:180=1:1,65	105:180=1:1,71
01. 03. 1597	Anonymous	Walloon	300	275	25	1:1,1	11	8	3	17:275=1:16,1	14:275=1:19,6
04. 04. 1598	Johan Pernstain	German	300	165	120	1:1,3	15	11	4	109:165=1:1,51	105:165=1:1,57
13. 04. 1598	Johan Friedrich von Mörsprung	German	400	270	130	1:2,07	20	16	4	114:270=1:2,36	110:270=1:2,45
13. 04. 1598	Bernhard Hieronimus Russwurm	German	400	270	130	1:2,07	20	16	4	114:270=1:2,36	110:270=1:2,45
18. 04. 1598	Karl Ludwig Sulz	German	400	250	150	1:1,6	20	16	4	134:250=1:1,86	130:250=1:1,92
20. 04. 1598	Georg Bayer zu Boppart	French	300	250	50	1:5	16	7	9	43:250=1:5,8	34:250=1:7,35
20. 04. 1598	Hans Reinhardt von Schönberg	Walloon	300	250	50	1:5	16	7	9	43:250=1:5,8	34:250=1:7,35
16. 04. 1599	Johan Batista Pezzen	German	300	175	125	1:1,4	18	14	4	111:175=1:5,7	107:175=1:1,63
28. 05. 1599	Gottfried von Riebitsch	Silesian	400	245	155	1:1,5	20	16	4	139:245=1:1,76	135:245=1:1,81
29. 02. 1600	Gottfried von Riebitsch	Silesian	400	245	155	1:1,5	20	16	4	139:245=1:1,76	135:245=1:1,81
24. 04. 1600	Henrich Lorraine	Walloon	300	250	50	1:5	16	7	9	43:250=1:5,8	34:250=1:7,35
23. 03. 1601	Adolf Althan	German	300	175	125	1:1,4	17	13	4	112:175=1:1,56	108:175=1:1,62
23. 03. 1601	Hans Preyner zu Stübing	German	300	175	125	1:1,4	17	13	4	112:175=1:1,56	108:175=1:1,62
23. 03. 1601	Pernhausen	German	300	175	125	1:1,4	17	13	4	112:175=1:1,56	108:175=1:1,62
15. 03. 1602	Hans Preyner zu Stübing A	German	400	200	150	1:1,6	13	9	4	141:250=1:1,77	127:250=1:1,82
17. 05. 1602	Hans Preyner zu Stübing B	German	300	200	100	1:1,2	13	9	4	91:200=1:2,19	87:200=1:2,29
10. 04. 1603	Johann Tschorkleas von Tilly	Walloon	300	270	30	1:9	17	8	9	22:270=1:12,2	13:270=1:20,7
10. 04. 1603	Leonhardt Ehrgott	German	300	200	100	1:2	13	9	4	91:200=1:2,19	87:200=1:2,29
12. 05. 1603	Lucas Römer	German	300	200	100	1:2	12	8	4	92:200=1:2,17	88:200=1:2,27
26. 05. 1603	Germancio Starsoldo	Italian	300	200	100	1:2	16	7	9	93:200=1:2,15	84:200=1:2,38
1603	Johann Baptista Pezzen	German	300	200	100	1:2	18	9	9	91:200=1:2,19	82:200=1:2,43
1603	Carl Ludwig Sulz	German	300	200	100	1:2	18	9	9	91:200=1:2,19	82:200=1:2,43
04. 1604	Capitulation über 1500 Knecht	German	300	200	100	1:2	13	9	4	91:200=1:2,19	82:200=1:2,43
28. 01. 1605	Walthin Schmidt von Wallenstein	German	500	400	100	1:4	13	9	4	91:400=1:4,39	87:400=1:4,59
29. 01. 1605	Maximilian graf zu Salm	German	300	250	50	1:5	14	10	4	40:250=1:6,25	36:250=1:6,94

from the number of the double-paid mercenaries. The second proportion was set up from figures thus obtained. As it is not certain that those regarded as combatants previously did really and actively take part in the operations with their cold weapons, the total of the *prima plana* was deduced from the size of the double-paid soldiers. In our view, this third proportion can be the closest to the real situation. This might provide the best approximation of the rates of the different weapon types involved in the fighting.

The table reveals that at the beginning of the war, the armament of the regiments set up in the Low Countries was far more conventional than e.g. that of the Walloon-French units. In Engelhardt Khurz's regiment, 160 cold weapons were combined with only 220 firearms in 1593. From the second half of the 1590s, however, financial difficulties and accumulating experience jointly began to increase the number of gunners in the German military forces, too. After 1601, all the available data show that firearms outnumbered cold arms more than twice. As early as in 1605, German regiments were ordered to be set up with a ratio of 1:4.59 and 1:6.94 to the benefit of firearms.<sup>122</sup>

This ratio is close to that of Walloon-French troops. In their regiments mostly recruited in the Low Countries pikemen and halberdiers together did not make up one-seventh of the gunners. In the fight in Hungary there were even some Walloon 'rifle regiments' in which only the officers and sub-officers bore cold arms. In the units commanded by Schönberg (1597) and Tilly (1602) one halberdier fell to 11 and 9 riflemen, respectively. Thus the presence of Walloon-French troops thus modified the overall composition of western infantry regiments significantly. The 2:1 proportion of firearms and pikes, regarded as theoretically correct, was developed by the military leadership, quite prudently by preserving the traditional armament of the troops of various nationalities. In the Austrian-German forces with *Landsknecht* traditions, the number of firearms hardly exceeded that of the cold arms at the beginning. By contrast, in the Walloon troops who were fond of firearms and had a Europe-wide reputation for being the best musketeers, pikemen were seven times fewer, if any at all, than gunners and played only a covering role.

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<sup>122</sup> For the figures used as basis of calculations, see Table No. 1

That the conclusions drawn from the data of the *Bestellungen* are valid in other than theoretical terms as well is testified, for example, by the muster of Wilhelm Mitrowitz's 'German' regiment. In addition to the *prima plana* of 180, there were 961 pikemen with double pay and 1,940 gunners (1940:961=2.018:1).<sup>123</sup> Concerning the proportions, a more convincing and more valuable register is the one made in November 1604 of imperial troops deployed in Upper Hungary. The six various infantry units amounted to a total of 9,434 men. 3,494 of them were pikemen with double pay and 5,940 were gunners.<sup>124</sup> The proportion of firearms and cold arms is 1:1.7 but if we deduct the number of the *prima plana* from that of the pikemen, the ratio modifies to 1:1.94.

To sum up, as it is confirmed by practical and theoretical arguments, in the foreign infantry units at least two thirds of the combatants were provided with firearms. As for the cavalry, all the western units involved in the war in Hungary based their tactics on the use of hand firearms. Not a single German, Walloon or Italian horse-soldier carried a lance or pike. On the basis of the above-detailed proportions, it can be stated that firearms were weapons used on a mass scale in the Hungarian theatre of war.

This fact, however, would not be sufficient to ascertain the presence of the military revolution in Hungary. The nature of military organization of the period allowed the purchase and deployment of the most up-to-date armament, the best-trained officers and soldiers, and thus the most effective battle processes in any theatres of war. In this sense, the presence of Walloon, Lorraine, and Italian mercenaries and their armament in Hungary would not be more than the renting of 'advanced western technology'. But the overwhelming majority of the armies involved in the Fifteen Years' War were always recruited from Austrian-German and Hungarian soldiers, or soldiers originating in the area of Hungary—inhabitants of areas which, in Parker's view, the military revolution did not as yet affect. The question is whether this hypothesis is true, for the rise of the number of firearms in the Hungarian theatre of war did begin in the mid-sixteenth century, simultaneously with similar developments in the West.

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<sup>123</sup> AFA 1605/12/1.

<sup>124</sup> AFA 1604/11/ ad.1.

## THE ROLE OF FIREARMS IN THE ARMAMENT OF HUNGARIAN MILITARY FORCES DURING THE FIFTEEN YEARS' WAR

As we have seen, the conception of 'one cold arm to two firearms' was achieved in the foreign infantry units. In the whole of the armies, however, firearms outnumbered cold weapons at least three or four times—and not only in the foreign units employed here. The number of firearms in the Hungarian armed forces was also considerably higher than in Western European armies. The acceleration of the transformation of the conduct of war from the second half of the sixteenth century is best characterized by the increase of the number and significance of firearms reaching its climax in Hungary in the years of the Fifteen Years' War.

There are innumerable accounts and reports about engagements which indicate the popularity and spread of firearms among Hungarian infantrymen. As the latter are regularly depicted as fighting with firearms, they all may have been gunners at the end of the century. The following description by Máté Szepesi Lackó on the battle of Hatvan-Tura is typical in this respect: "While the Ottomans fired their howitzers, the entire Hungarian infantry threw itself down on the ground and no harm was done in them by the field guns, then standing on their feet, they began fighting and shooting..."<sup>125</sup> This unusual manoeuvre testifies to Hungarian troops being equipped with firearms, for one cannot envision a unit of pikemen disposed for battle throwing themselves on the ground. In his description of the Christian troops lining up for the battle of Mezőkeresztes, the Ottoman chronicler İbrahim Peçevi used the terms Heyduck and gunner as synonyms: "There were some units of gunners, or Heyducks"<sup>126</sup>.

A piece of indirect evidence of Hungarian gunmanship is provided by a peculiar incident. On April 13, 1598, Johann Friedrich von Mörspurg received commission to set up a German infantry regiment of 4,000 men. As the order reveals, "the regiment was to contain ten battalions numbering 300 or 400 soldiers each... [marginal note] which, however,

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<sup>125</sup> Imre Mikó, *Erdélyi történelmi adatok* [Data on Transylvanian History]. III. Kolozsvár, 1855, 26.

<sup>126</sup> Imre Karácson, *Török történetírók III. 1566-1659* [Ottoman Chroniclers]. (Török-magyar-kori történelmi emlékek, 5.) Budapest, 1916, 136.

must not have Hungarians in their rows...".<sup>127</sup> The *Bestallung* of another German infantry regiment said: "We do not want to recruit, hire or keep soldiers of the Hungarian nation in our battalions...".<sup>128</sup> This is in complete harmony with the first clause of article No. 18 enacted in 1598, which stipulated that "His Majesty is strictly ordering the German captains that they shall not employ Hungarians and include them in the armies of Germans, and shall immediately dismiss those who have been hired and employed".<sup>129</sup> If there was need for legal regulation, there must have been a considerable number of Hungarians in the foreign regiments. In this case, however, they probably served only as gunners for the equipment was very expensive and the iron discipline and stoical behaviour required of pikemen were alien to the mentality of Hungarian soldiers.

Apart from the above mentioned, we have a row of direct proof which leave hardly any doubt that in the period under survey masses of professional Hungarian infantrymen used firearms as their main weapons. The infantrymen recruited by the counties upon the orders of the Diet were all gunners. The statute of Bars for 1602 said, for example, that the infantrymen drafted by households had to be equipped with sword, gun, 50 bullets, and half a pound of gunpowder.<sup>130</sup> As Willelm Dillich's *Hungarian Chronicle* noted, "The Heyducks ... use a short gun not much longer than a carabine; on their left they carry a sabre, on their right, in a ring fixed to their belt, there is an axe or pick-axe... If someone is not well-to-do enough, he uses a lance until he can afford a gun".<sup>131</sup> Authentic drawings of the Christian forces setting out for the aid of besieged Kanizsa show all the Slavonian, Croatian, and Hungarian infantrymen with guns.<sup>132</sup> On July 14, 1604, colonel Adolf Althan was ordered to recruit 6,000 Hungarian Heyducks. It was ordered that all of

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<sup>127</sup> "Das Regiment solle in Zehen gleiche Fandl und jedes auf 400 oder 300 Man (on the margin: darunder aber kheinen der ungarischen Nation sein soll)...", Bst. 1598/574.

<sup>128</sup> "Und unseren fandl wölln kheine knecht so ungarischer nation sein weder werben aufhalten noch unterhalten...", Bst. 1598/575.

<sup>129</sup> *Magyar Törvénytár 1526-1608* [Collection of Hungarian Laws]. Ed. by Dezső Márkus. Budapest, 1899, 841.

<sup>130</sup> András Borosy, *A telekkatonaság és a parasztság szerepe a feudális magyar hadszervezetben* [The Role of the militia portalis and the Peasantry in Hungarian Feudal Military Organization]. Budapest, 1971, 95.

<sup>131</sup> Wilhelm Dillich, *Ungarische Chronika*. Cassel, 1600, 28.

<sup>132</sup> AFA 1600/13/3.

them "... shall be provided with ... good cutting weapons and guns ... as is customary in the Hungarian nation".<sup>133</sup>

The use of firearms in the Hungarian military organization initiated such fundamental transformations that even the typical section of Hungarian forces with the most conventional armament and tactics, the Hussars failed to remain unaffected. A document dated on February 19, 1594 told that Siegfried von Kollonitsch was ordered to recruit 3,000 Hungarian infantrymen, 500 Cossacks and 1,000 Hungarian cavalrymen.<sup>134</sup> The passage relating to the Hungarian mounted troops was originally a *Bestallung* for German cavalry with interpolations, cancellations, and omissions. While the prescriptions regulating pay, organization, etc. were carefully modified, the regulation of the armament was left intact. It is not impossible that already at the beginning of the war, some Hungarian cavalry units were armed with firearms, following the German model. The high command had been consciously trying to raise the number of mounted gunners since 1577. In addition, when a Hussar replaced his pike with a gun and a pistol, his equipment satisfied the requirements of the armament of the German cavalrymen, at least in theory: the traditional armament of the Hussar included helmet and light back- and breast-plates, similarly to the German mounted gunners. What probably differed was at most the style and preparation of the different pieces, but prescriptions did not ban variations like these.

The first article of the 22nd statute of 1596 is also proof of the disruption of the unified armament of the Hungarian cavalry fighting traditionally with pikes: "... this year, no Hungarian, Croatian or Slavonian shall take pay and see service with foreign lords or provinces ... nor shall join to the cuirassiers (mounted gunners) or Cossacks".<sup>135</sup> A friend to the Hungarians, Siegfried Kollonitsch of Croatian origin, who lived in Hungary, was ordered in December 1596 to set up a unit of 700 German mounted gunners. The decree stressed that this contingent must consist of sons of the German nation, no others.<sup>136</sup> Kollonitsch, however, seems to have flouted these prohibitions, at least as the documents attached to the repeated order for 700 mounted gunners issued in

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<sup>133</sup> "... mit guetten streik überwehren und röhren wie es bey den ungarischen nation gebrauchig und herkhumen...", Bst. 1604/778.

<sup>134</sup> Bst. 1594/470.

<sup>135</sup> *Magyar Törvénytár 1526-1608*, 789.

<sup>136</sup> Bst. 1596/516.

December 1597 suggest it. The War Council obtained knowledge of the fact that despite the instruction, Kollonitsch had included Hungarians in the German calvary unit. The paymaster who was in charge of supervising the recruitment was immediately called on to report. He replied: "Your Excellency, 16 well-equipped Hungarian cavalrymen had already served under Colonel Kollonitsch earlier, who, as himself put it, are highly required in the vanguard. The following persons appeared for the muster of 600 mounted gunners and were mustered:

Janusch Ribanitsch with 4 horses

Janusch Comera with 3 horses

Mihal Satory with 2 horses

Mathe Ibrahni with 2 horses

Michlosch Schomogy with 3 horses

Janusch Spahy with 2 horses

His Majesty's (most) humble (servant): M(atthias) Boranitsch".<sup>137</sup>

It seems to have been a realistic 'threat' that Hungarians 'infiltrated' into the traditionally German units of the black cavalry of European reputation. Carl Ludwig Tettauer received a commission to set up 1,000 black cavalrymen who "without exception had to be of the German and no other nations, pre-eminently of no Hungarians...".<sup>138</sup>

However, Hungarian mounted soldiers could have the chance of getting acquainted with firearms not only in German or other foreign units. In Wilhelm Dillich's above mentioned work, the pistol is said to have been a typical item of the Hungarian Hussar's armament: "The Hussars wear open helmets and knee-length armour. On their left they have a sabre, under their right thigh, there is a dagger. In their hands they carry pikes... at the back, behind the saddle, a pistol is carried in a case".<sup>139</sup> During the war, several Hungarian cavalry units are mentioned whose main weapon was no longer the pike, but the firearm.<sup>140</sup>

The crisis of the Hungarian cavalry's tactics based on the use of lance during the Fifteen Years' War is borne out by the article No. 20 of the statute of 1596, which tried to throw in the severity of law to preserve

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<sup>137</sup> Bst. 1597/557.

<sup>138</sup> "... 1,000 Reutter welche alle (rectified on the margin: Teutscher und kheinen anderen nation insonderhait darunder kheinen der ungarischen nation...)", Bst. 1598/599

<sup>139</sup> Dillich, *op. cit.*, 26.

<sup>140</sup> Ortelius, *op. cit.*, 230. Kubinyi, *op. cit.*, 693.

the traditional weapons of the soldiers by ordering: "Each horseman who is paid after four or fewer horses is obliged to carry a lance, and so are his servants. If he is reluctant, the captain-general shall force him by beating or any other suitable means".<sup>141</sup> Oddly contradicting this is an order dated 1603 calling on Kollonitsch to draft 1,000 "Hussars" who should have been equipped "with two long arquebuses, and not with pikes...".<sup>142</sup>

The listed data prove convincingly that during the Fifteen Years' War, upon the influence of favourable experiences and the determined conception of the military leaders, the Hungarian military organization and tactics began to be transformed in adjustment to Western European patterns.

As it has been demonstrated, not only the foreigners but also the Hungarians fought chiefly with firearms in the Christian forces of the Fifteen Years' War. The high rate of firearms, however, is only the fundamental precondition for the emergence of a new art of war based on fire power, but it does not necessarily prove its existence.

By the end of the century, tactics was substantially changed by the use of firearms in the Hungarian theatre of war; it is shown by the fact that during the war the combat value of the infantry was often determined by their experience or routine in fighting with firearms. An intelligence report of 1593 on the janissaries, the mainstay of the Ottoman troops marching against Hungary said: "... there are ten thousand janissaries, children of tithe... an army who have never had guns in their hands before and those ten thousands are beaten by the infantrymen of Pápa, Veszprém, and Palota...".<sup>143</sup>

Sixteenth-century firearms have been mainly considered to be weapons suitable mostly for defence, but accounts on the events in the Fifteen Years' War reveal unambiguously that when deployed in the right battle formations, they were perfectly suitable for offensive actions as well. In the largest encounter of the war at Mezőkeresztes (1596), the imperial army easily controlled the battlefield relying on their fire power right up to their penetration into the Ottoman camp.<sup>144</sup>

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<sup>141</sup> Magyar Törvénytár 1526-1608, 789.

<sup>142</sup> "... 1,000 Hussarn so mit zween langen Archibuser Rhörn und nicht mit Copien gestaffiert und versehen sein sollen...", Bst. 1603/744.

<sup>143</sup> Budapest, Hadtörténelmi Levéltár, Törökkori Gyűjtemény 1593/6.

<sup>144</sup> Memoir of Archduke Maximilian on the Battle of Mezőkeresztes. January 27, 1597. Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Wien. Ungarische Akten, Allgemeine Akten Fasz. 130, 35-57.

The Christian troops, governed competently, had great enough fire power to open the road for them and protect their regroupings or ordered retreat even if the foe had two- or three-times as much strength. In October 1600, the Christian troops retreating from under Kanizsa were attacked incessantly by the Ottomans along their 4 km-long route, who did not manage to break through the barrage of the troops.<sup>145</sup> During the 16-day long battle next to Székesfehérvár (1601), the imperial and royal forces had to give up their camps or positions several times, but thanks to their fire-power, they carried out all the manoeuvres successfully without significant losses.<sup>146</sup>

Besides encounters and battles, the hardest tests of the war were the sieges. In siege warfare, the central weapons of both the defenders and the attackers were the firearms. By the mid-sixteenth century, one of the central factors in fortress defence were the gunners. And in the Fifteen Years' War, nearly the entire defence was relegated to the small arms. They could hinder entrenchment or mining work. But their main task was to repel attacks, for defenders were quickly exhausted by man-to-man fighting with a much stronger enemy. The only way to avoid close combat was to halt or decimate the attacking columns with their firearms. Otherwise it would be difficult to imagine how the garrison of 250-300 persons in Tata could repulse 22 (!) Ottoman assaults in a day.<sup>147</sup>

Unfortunately, there is no Ottoman documentary or narrative source available at the moment to reveal what defensive fire their fighters had to face when they started an attack. There are, however, several accounts by Western authors narrating the sieges of strongholds occupied by the Ottomans. These reveal that even well-prepared charges demanded severe losses. In the assault against the Waterside Suburb of Esztergom on May 12, 1594, more than 1,000 soldiers were killed or wounded by firearms and fire instruments.<sup>148</sup> In the first infantry attack against the walls of Hatvan (1596), the imperial and royal army lost 305 deaths and

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<sup>145</sup> Report of Bernhard Leo Gall on the battle. October 1600. Ungarische Akten, Allgemeine Akten Fasz. 138, 86-107.

<sup>146</sup> See the letters of Archduke Maximilian, October 15-28, 1601. Ungarische Akten, Allgemeine Akten Fasz. 140, 34-80.

<sup>147</sup> Ortelius, *op. cit.*, 374.

<sup>148</sup> Ortelius, *Continuatio des Hunngerischen und Siebenbürgischen Kriegswesens*. Nürnberg, 1604, 22.

702 wounded.<sup>149</sup> In May 1599, Adolf Schwarzenberg tried to take Székesfehérvár by surprise. The petard, however, was ineffective against the city gate. The Ottoman guards fired heavily, causing 10 deaths and 150 wounded.<sup>150</sup> In the storm against Buda on October 22, 1602 not even reaching the breaks, the dead and the wounded totalled 1,500.<sup>151</sup> It is horrifying to imagine what immense losses the Ottomans had to suffer by the imperial and royal troops of a far greater fire power during the sieges.

The esplanade of a Hungarian fortress looked exactly like that of Hertogenbosch in 1579, after the unsuccessful attack of the Spaniards: "It was a pitiful sight to see the men who had been maimed by the fire of the artillery, muskets, and arquebuses. Some lacked a leg, others an arm. Here there was a soldier whose guts were pouring from his body, and over there lay a man who had half his face torn away".<sup>152</sup>

The Fifteen Years' War bore stamp of the extremely fierce fusillades which György Thurzó, who fought in the siege of Esztergom, described in the following words: "Yesterday we went repeatedly against the second town where there was the moated castle... Truly I say I have never had greater luck in my life for more than a thousand rifles, hook-guns, and howitzers were shooting at me... both to my left and to my right, many people fell beside me...".<sup>153</sup>

## CONCLUSIONS

Our sources unanimously attest to the fact that at the time of the Fifteen Years' War, two-thirds of the foreign infantry fighting in Hungary and the whole of the cavalry went to war with firearms. This fire-power, never assumed to have been so considerable in this theatre of war, was further strengthened by the fact that Hungarian Heyducks and garrisons were practically wholly equipped with firearms. The forming of the units of Hungarian mounted gunners indicates that the traditional mode of

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<sup>149</sup> Gusztáv Gömöry, "Hatvan ostroma és bevétele 1596 [The Siege and Taking of Hatvan in 1596]," *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 7 (1894) 248-249.

<sup>150</sup> Ortelius, *Chronica*, 436-437.

<sup>151</sup> "Die Feldzüge von 1601 bis 1602," *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift* 2 (1820) 193.

<sup>152</sup> Duffy, *op. cit.*, 74.

<sup>153</sup> Ödön Zichy, *Gróf Thurzó György levelei nejéhez* [The Letters of Count György Thurzó to his Wife]. I. Budapest, 1876, 79.

fighting began to be transformed in the Hungarian cavalry as well.<sup>154</sup> In the Fifteen Years' War, besides the pikemen, only the Hungarian Hussars fought with lances although their armament already included a pistol or short rifle, too. At the turn of the century, at least 75-80% of the soldiers of the imperial and royal army regarded small arms as their main weapons. (During this time, both the infantry of Spain or Orange fighting in the Low Countries included an approximately 50-60% share of gunners!)<sup>155</sup>

The appearance in the Hungarian theatre of war of an army equipped so heavily with firearms could not have been without precedents. Indeed, the accumulation of firearms and the practice of using them in battle had already begun in the mid-sixteenth century. It was partly a natural consequence of the development of the defensive system of border fortresses, for by that time active fire exchanges had become a fundamental feature of siege warfare. Only, in the Hungarian theatre of war studded with fortresses, there were two active local factors apart from the universal tendency which considerably accelerated the spread of small arms.

One such feature was the conspicuously high number of fortified stone buildings, churches, small stockades, castles, minor fortifications. These tiny strongholds which practically served as frontier guards were not, and could not be, packed with artillery. At these places, therefore, the burden of defence almost wholly weighed on the small arms. These, however, met the requirements as they were of devastating effect and easy to operate. That, in turn, was an imperative because—to specify the other major characteristic of the Hungarian frontier zone—the Ottoman attackers always outnumbered the defenders. Firearms, however, proved to be an apt tool to reduce numeric superiority. A successful volley caused considerable losses to an Ottoman group taken in ambush. Thus it is not surprising that in the last third of the sixteenth century one of the typical features of the battle process of the frontier infantry was gun fight in loose array which, if need be, could be easily ended. This free manner of fighting was, incidentally, in complete harmony with the mentality of the infantry that came mostly from the peasantry.

In addition, one must remember that the Ottoman cavalry, not having firearms, was defenceless against the effects of fire. Yet their

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<sup>154</sup> László Nagy, *Hajdúvitézek* [Heyducks]. Budapest, 1986, 69-70.

<sup>155</sup> Parker, *Military Innovation*, 276. *The New Cambridge Modern History*, III. 192.

situation did not grow critical before the 1560s when tactics based on fire power began to be introduced. This tendency emerging all over Europe was especially efficient in the Hungarian theatre of war. In the West, volleys of increasing fire power were answered by similarly increasing firing capacities. It was different along the Hungarian borders where the Ottomans were unable (or perhaps did not even want) to respond with similar steps. Thus the Ottomans had but a single tactic left to silence the shooting: rushing into the fire. But, the more gunners leant over the butts, the more likely the attackers balked before reaching the goal, decimated and terrified. The process of the spread of firearms was self-generating. With the increase of the number and efficiency of firearms, the fear and losses of the Ottoman troops, unable to return the fire but forced to endure it passively, increased proportionally. Besides, the more successful the firearms proved to be, the more likely their number was raised. And the larger their number, the surer was the success. Hence, by the 1570s-1580s, the main stress had slowly shifted to small firearms in tactics both in Hungary and in Western Europe.

The emergence of this phenomenon can be described as local, indigeneous development even if it is known and acknowledged that the economic conditions underlying the new tactics based on fire-power had not been present in the area of the Hungarian Kingdom. That the distinctive marks of the military revolution emerged along the frontiers of Europe does not mean automatically that the economic preconditions for the innovations were worked out also in these areas.

Thinking of Parker's map of the territorial origins of the military revolution, it is difficult to imagine that the barren slopes of the Pyrenees, the corn fields of Sicily or Southern Italy, and Northern France, devastated by the wars of religion or the western frontiers of the empire had the industrial capacity for the production of hundreds of cannons, thousands of muskets, and tens of thousands of guns. These regions might probably more correctly be called the areas where the military revolution appeared in rather than originated from, for these areas were buffer zones sustained by the work, strength, and gold of the interested empire's millions of subjects.

Under the walls of Nagyvárad, Eger, Buda, Esztergom or Győr clashed two 'world powers'. The forts protected the remaining part of the country, and the country, in turn, defended the frontiers of the Empire. In this sense, Hungary was not more than the easternmost

frontier zone of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. And as such in the latter half of the sixteenth century it could fully rely on the industrial resources of a power who did not only have the potential and the intention, but also the interest to satisfy mass demands in firearms. The more so, as—to quote a 1577 decision of the War Council—“... for the time being, hand firearms are the main advantage of Your Majesty’s military over this enemy [i.e. the Ottomans]...”<sup>156</sup>

Although no thorough investigations of industrial history have been made, it can be stated with certainty that the capacity of war industry potentially available to the Habsburgs could easily supply the requirements of the army many times, not only in peacetime but also in wartime. As it was noted above, in 1595, the high command thought 1,900 hook-guns and 20,000 other small arms were necessary. Of this volume, the city of Suhl alone could produce 1,000 hook-guns, 4,000 muskets, and 2,000 guns.<sup>157</sup> And this amount was nearly one-third of the demand. Out of the 18,480 firearms still missing for the campaign of 1601, 5,000 were bought in Nürnberg alone. In addition to that, 3,000 out of the 3,400 armours were also bought there.<sup>158</sup> This means that Suhl and Nürnberg were capable of equipping some 14-15,000 soldiers, including nearly 11,000 gunners. The Habsburgs, however, had other industrial centres to reckon with as well: Hamburg, Lübeck, Bremen, Magdeburg for armour, Braunschweig for pistols, Lüttich, Köln, Ulm, and Augsburg for firearms, Passau for swords, Augsburg, Nürnberg, Regensburg, Vienna, Prague, Olmütz, and Breslau for gun powder, and Bavaria and Styria in general for their iron industry. This background involving all the major industrial centres of the hereditary provinces, the Bohemian Kingdom, and the Holy Roman Empire represented a capacity which could supply the Hungarian army easily. This is supported by the fact that peacetime production allowed for considerable accumulations. The *Zeughaus* in Graz disposed of the equipment of 13,800 people in 1590 and 19,600 in 1594.<sup>159</sup> The imperial commissioners purchased the equipment of 3,035 gunners and 1,585 armoured fighters from the Dresden arsenal alone in February 1594.<sup>160</sup>

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<sup>156</sup> AFA 1577/13/3. István Geőcze, “Hadi tanácskozások az 1577-ik évben [Military Deliberations in 1577],” *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 7 (1894) 658.

<sup>157</sup> AFA 1593/11/4.

<sup>158</sup> Bst. 1601/672.

<sup>159</sup> Pickler-Meran, *op. cit.*, I. 90.

<sup>160</sup> AFA 1594/2/16 b.

To sum up: in our view, the main characteristic of the military revolution, the conduct of war based on the mass fire of firearms emerged in the Hungarian theatre of war

- as a local demand of the frontier region derived from its singular and specific characteristics;
- rooted in the fighting experiences of the armed forces of Hungary and of forces of other nationalities deployed in Hungary;
- in harmony with the battle process typical of the indigenous infantry, with the exploitation of the deficiencies and shortcomings of the enemy;
- partially adjusting the up-to-date Western European battle processes to the local circumstances;
- and relying on the material resources, the technological foundations of the empire.

Therefore, the belligerence of the imperial and royal army in the Fifteen Years' War being founded on its fire-power, resulted from the characteristics of the Hungarian theatre of war, and not from simple imitation or purchase of state-of-the-art Western European battle processes. Consequently, it can be stated that the mass use of firearms, the second most important condition of the military revolution, derived from local military requirements and as such, was the outcome of domestic development in Hungary.

Moreover, as both facts and researches prove, the primary condition of the military revolution, the 'trace italienne', was also present in this theatre of war.

The verification of the third condition, the rise of the numerical strength of the armies, would require further research. On the one hand, very few reliable data are available about effective forces prior to the Fifteen Years' War. On the other hand, the value of the comparison would also be reduced by the fact that battles comparable in magnitude to the Fifteen Years' War had never been waged before.

Even if the verification of this condition is still uncertain, there can be other phenomena listed which characterized the military revolution and are demonstrable in late sixteenth-century Hungary. For example, like all classic conflicts in the period of the military revolution, the Fifteen Years' War was also long protracted, a war that tested financial and economic strength rather than military power.<sup>161</sup> In addition, in the 1590s

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<sup>161</sup> Parker, *Military Innovation*, 43 and 61-62.

the military leadership tried to introduce all the military reforms in the Hungarian theatre of war that turned the troops of the the United Provinces into the best-organized army in Europe. Proposals, memoranda, statistics were made nearly every year, all arguing for the setting up of a standing army.<sup>162</sup> Soldiers and economic experts made recommendations as how to control the manufacture of arms, standardize arms, and arm the units from central depots.<sup>163</sup> In theory, even the most problematic issue of provisioning and food supplies was solved: a chain of bakeries and constantly refilled storehouses was designed along the routes of deployment and march.<sup>164</sup> Establishment of permanent and field hospitals to tend to the wounded and ill soldiers was also considered.<sup>165</sup> However, while these and similar innovations were translated into practice in the Low Countries, in Hungary, for lack of the necessary financial resources, they remained on paper, or came to be realized lopsidedly.

Despite the partial failure of the logistic reforms, the military leadership stubbornly insisted on renewing tactics. At the core of this aspiration was the idea of scoring victory based on a fire power much in excess of that of the enemy who at least doubly outnumbered them. That explains why in the Europe of the 1590s, the imperial and royal army had the highest rate of firearms apart from the Huguenot troops.

At the end of the century, the tactics of the imperial and royal army displayed features besides, and in part superseding, the reforms of Orange, which were only to appear some 20-25 years later in the army of Gustav Adolph. Most experts list the prefabricated charges, lighter muskets, a massive rise in the number of gunners, the emergence of regiments of gunmen without pikemen, the cavalry attacking at a gallop, and the substantial improvement of the field artillery as the main elements of the Swedish reforms.<sup>166</sup> When one comes to think of it, however, all these features, except for the use of infantry field-pieces, already took shape in the Fifteen Years' War. On the basis of the above mentioned, it is perhaps no exaggeration to claim that the Hungarian theatre of war at that time was among the regions where the military revolution originated or first appeared.

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
<sup>162</sup> For the presentations, see Eugen Heischmann, *Die Anfänge des stehenden Heeres in Österreich*. Wien, 1925, 11-52.

<sup>163</sup> AFA 1595/13/5.

<sup>164</sup> AFA 1598/8 ad 9.

<sup>165</sup> AFA 1597/2/1.

<sup>166</sup> Parker, *Military Innovation*, 23. Beaufort-Spontin, *op. cit.*, 28-29.



**THE PLAN OF THE CASTLE OF ÉRSEKÚJVÁR**  
by Ottavio Baldigara  
taken from the Appendix of a report of 1583



PART TWO  
THE OTTOMAN FRONTIER



## THE OTTOMAN NETWORK OF FORTRESSES IN HUNGARY

KLÁRA HEGYI

Out of the medieval fortresses in the Hungarian Kingdom, sultan Süleyman I first conquered the ones in the corner of the rivers Danube and Sava in 1521. The most valuable acquisition of this campaign was the key stronghold of Hungary's southern defence line, Nándorfehérvár (called Belgrad-i Ungurus in Ottoman Turkish documents). In addition, Szabács (Bögürdelen), Kölpény (Kupinik), Szávaszentdemeter (Dimitrofça) along the Sava, and Zimony (Zemin) and Szalánkemén (Islankamen) along the Danube, together with Ireg (Írig) between the two rivers were also conquered. Five years later, during the Mohács campaign the Ottomans further strengthened their position in the Szerémség (Syrmiium/Sirem) region by occupying Pétervárad (Varadin), Újlak (İlok), Valkóvár (Vukovar), and Erdőd (Erdöd) along the Danube, putting garrisons in the forts of Titel and Bács (Baç) north of the Danube, and probably capturing and renovating Eszék (Ösek), a crossing place on the Drava. In 1529, the sultan, heading for Vienna, took Racsá (Raça) and Németi (Nemçe). Until 1537, the Ottomans captured all the castles in the Syrmium and Eastern Slavonia which remained in Hungarian hands one after the other: Marót (Morovik), Brod, Kaptol, and Pozsega (Pojege) became Ottoman forts.<sup>1</sup>

Thus in the 1520s-1530s,<sup>2</sup> the chain of fortresses based on the rivers Drava, Danube, and Sava, which had defended Hungary in the fifteenth century, was converted into the northern defence line of the Ottoman Empire well packed with soldiers. It became an open gate for the Ottoman troops to march into Hungary any time.

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<sup>1</sup> A brief survey of the history of fortresses along the Drava-Sava-Danube in the Ottoman age is offered by Olga Zirojević, "Turska utvrđjena mesta na području današnje Vojvodine, Slavonije i Baranje," *Zbornik za istoriju* 14 (1976) 99-143.

<sup>2</sup> In the months prior to the occupation of Buda, in the spring of 1541, 5,249 paid troops (together with an unknown number of soldiers who were granted *timars* instead of pay) were stationed in the 15 castles and 2 fortified towns of the defence line extending from Semendire to Ösek. ÖNB Mxt. 567. (The abbreviations used in the notes: ÖNB: Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Wien; BOA: Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Istanbul; MM: Maliyeden Müdevver.)

Having seized Buda (Budun, Budin), the capital of the Hungarian Kingdom and its sister town beyond the Danube, Pest (Peşte) in 1541, the Ottomans' next task was to establish the communication between the seat of the newly created *vilayet*, Buda, and the southern regions of the country. By the spring of 1543, the Ottoman troops had occupied a small strip on both sides of the Danube. Possibly still in 1541, garrisons were placed in Mohács (Mohaç), Szekszárd (Seksar), and Szekcső (Sekçöy) on the right bank of the river, and before the spring of 1543, in Kalocsa (Kalaça) on the left bank. By the summer of 1543, Szabadka (Sobotka) between the Danube and the Tisza, and Szeged (Segedin) on the Tisza, fell to the Ottomans.

In the period between 1541 and 1566 which is labelled as the 'age of castle wars' in Hungarian history, the Ottoman army occupied the central one-third of Hungary forming a triangular shape. The sultan's campaign of 1543 subdued several major and minor medieval Hungarian fortresses in the eastern zone of Transdanubia, Siklós (Şikloş), Pécs (Peçuy), Fehérvár (İstolni Belgrad), and Esztergom (Estergon) being the most important ones. In 1544-1545 the local forces of the *vilayet* of Buda continued the conquests. South of the Balaton in Transdanubia, Koppány (Kopan), Simontornya (Şimontorna), Tamási (Tomaşin), Ozora and Endréd (Endrik) were captured, while northeast of Buda Vác (Vaç), Visegrád (Vişegrad), Nógrád (Novigrad), and Hatvan were taken. In 1552, Hadım 'Ali pasha, the *beylerbeyi* of Budun, continued expanding in that direction. Among other places, he subjugated Drégely (Diregel), Szécsény (Seçen), Hollókő (Holloka), and Buják (Buyak). The second vizier Ahmed pasha approaching from the south conquered areas east of the Tisza. His major acquisitions included Temesvár (Temeşvar), Pancsova (Paņçova), Lippa (Lipova), Facset (Façet), Arad, and Csanád (Çanad). The united armies of Ahmed and 'Ali took Szolnok (Solnok), but sustained a defeat at Eger (Eğri).

The conquests in the Trans-Tisza region in 1552 created a closed, contiguous Ottoman province defended by frontier strongholds. The events of the subsequent two decades further enlarged the occupied territory. In the north, Füleki (Filek) and Salgó (Şalgo) yielded to the Ottomans in 1554, while Divény (Divin) and Kékkő (Keköy) in 1574. On the western edges, Kaposvár (Kapoşvar) went over to the Ottomans in 1555, Szigetvár (Sigetvar) and Babócsa (Boboçsa) in 1566, and Berzence (Berzenç) in 1567. While the Ottoman troops headed by the sultan were engaged around Szigetvár, an other army under the commandership of

second vizier Pertev pasha captured the fortresses of Jenő (Yanova), Gyula (G'ula), and Világos (Vilagoş) beyond the Tisza.

The territory carved out of the middle of Hungary was divided into two provinces in 1552, the larger *vilayet* of Budun and the smaller *vilayet* of Temeşvar, which were separated by the lower stretch of the Körös and Tisza rivers. In the last decades of the sixteenth century, the *vilayet* of Budun contained fifteen *livas* north of the Drava. Their seats were the major castles: Budun (*paşa livası*), Novigrad, Sečen, Filek, Hatvan, Solnok, Segedin, Estergon, İstolni Belgrad, Kopan, Seksar, Şimontorna, Sekçöy, Peçuy, and Sigetvar (the *livas* of Peçuy and Sekçöy were originally called the *liva* of Mohaç; occasionally the three denominations were used interchangeably). In the same period, the *vilayet* of Temeşvar was divided into six *sancaks*: those of Temeşvar, Çanad, Lipova, Modava, G'ula and Yanova (exchanging the name of G'ula for Arad, Yanova for Pankota sometimes).

Both *vilayets* also included areas in the North-Balkans which were further enlarged in the seventeenth century. Around 1570-1580, the *livas* of Semendire, Sirem, and Pojega also belonged to Budun, at least in financial administration. Vidin, Alaca Hisar, and Vulçitrin were attached to Temeşvar. The reason for doing so was military; the *beylerbeyi* of Temeşvar also had authority over the armed forces of these districts. In the mid-seventeenth century, the Balkan territories of the *vilayet* of Budun stretched to Üsküb and Eastern Bosnia. Since, however, all the administrative documents referring to castles drew the borderline of the Hungarian provinces along the Drava and the Lower Danube, the present survey is forced to stop with these two rivers due to the lack of more ample information, although the Symium and Eastern Slavonia, as well as the fortresses on their territories belonged to the Hungarian Kingdom until 1520, and again after 1699 (and 1718).

Warfare became perennial in Hungary in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. As one result, all three parts of the disintegrated country—the Hungarian Kingdom of the Habsburgs, the Principality of Transylvania, and the Hungarian provinces of the Ottoman Empire—needed up-to-date defence systems. Hungary's medieval royal and private castles, however, did not conform to the new territorial division or the technical requirements of defence. A chain of modernized fortresses had to be established on the frontier of the respective dominions to provide protection without cracks. The building of castles began in the

Kingdom and the Ottoman parts—far less in Transylvania—in the decades of the ‘castle wars’ when the military situation dictated where to erect a new fort or fortify an old one, and by whom. After the peace of Adrianople (Edirne) in 1568, castle construction was given far more thought: both the Aulic War Council (*Hofkriegsrat*) in Vienna seeing to the military affairs of the Kingdom, and the Ottoman high command worked out comprehensive plans to strengthen the frontier defence and modernize the castles.

Up to 1568, two trends can be discerned in Ottoman castle construction, both of them aiming to protect Budun. One was to defend the line of the Danube, the waterway for ammunition and provisions transportation and the important route of advance along it, with riverside strongholds and harbours which were not farther than one day’s march from one another. This purposeful strengthening of the zone along the Danube started in the 1540s and still went on in the 1660s. The first fort was erected in the southern corner of Csepel Island in the second half of the 1540s.<sup>3</sup> It received an Ottoman name: the pay-rolls named it Korkmaz, the narrative sources preferred the form Cankurtaran. The armed protection of the customs places south of this point was also quickly organized after the fall of Budun. From April 1542 on, in the ports of Tolna, Paks (Pakşa), and Földvár (Fedvar) Ottoman leaseholders collected the toll, and Ottoman scribes entered them into the registers,<sup>4</sup> which can hardly be imagined without the protection of troops. The castles of these localities were, however, completed with some delay; Ottoman garrisons of Fedvar and Pakşa were first mentioned in the pay lists of 1568/69.<sup>5</sup> (Tolna was not fortified before the early seventeenth century.) Prior to 1552, Báticasék (Batasek) also on the right bank of the river was provided with a fortress and a garrison.<sup>6</sup> It was after the peace that troops came to be stationed in Hamzabey sarayı in the southern foreground of Budun. Records of its garrison can be traced back to 1579.<sup>7</sup> On the left side of the Danube an Ottoman fortress was erected in Baja (Baya), referred to as complete in 1557.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The first known mention of its garrison is from 1549: ÖNB Mxt 562, 67-68.

<sup>4</sup> ÖNB Mxt 630, 9.

<sup>5</sup> ÖNB Mxt 617, 4, 10.

<sup>6</sup> ÖNB Mxt 643, 47-50.

<sup>7</sup> BOA MM 498.

<sup>8</sup> ÖNB Mxt 614, 214.

The other goal of Ottoman fortification policy was to surround Budun, the seat of the *vilayet* and Peşte, which constituted a military, administrative, and economic unit with Budun, by several protective rings of castles. This defensive network was also based on the occupied Hungarian forts, but in unprotected spaces new fortresses had to be constructed. The above mentioned Hamzabey sarayı and Korkmaz south of Budun on the Danube also became parts of this defensive ring. West of the river, the fortification chain had Ístolni Belgrad as its centre with several smaller and larger forts attached. Csókakő (Çoka) and Gesztes (Gesteş) had been taken from the Hungarians, whereas the Ottomans built Zsámbék (Canbek, 1549), Vál (Val, 1550), and Battyán (Bak'an, 1568). Completing the chain Kızılhisar was erected in the early 1570's along the road from Budun to Estergon in the Pilis mountains.<sup>9</sup>

The string of castles protecting Budun from the west turned back to the Danube at Estergon. After Budun, Estergon's was the most important fortress in the *vilayet*, as it controlled the water and land routes leading to Vienna on the border of two parts of the country. It took decades to enlarge and fortify it. As a first step, Ciğerdelen was rebuilt across the river in the latter half of the 1540s, which turned Estergon into a double fortification like Budun-Peşte. The riverside stronghold (*kale'-i ab*) was also reinforced, and in 1605, a third castle called Tepedelen was built east of Estergon.<sup>10</sup>

In the Danube bend, Vişegrad and Vaç were the guarding forts, with the castles dispersed in the mountains of Novigrad keeping control north-northeast of them. Most of them were of Hungarian origin, but the Ottomans built some castles to complement them. Medieval Drégely, occupied in 1552, was so small and outdated that a completely new fort was erected by the Ottomans on the bank of the Ipoly as their Diregel.<sup>11</sup> Böğürdelen was built near Novigrad. Its precise site is unknown, waiting for archaeological exploration. Well after the conclusion of the 1568 peace treaty, in the early 1580s the medieval castle of Damásd was rebuilt under

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<sup>9</sup> Their first occurrences: Canbek: ÖNB Mxt 562, 62-66. Val: Jenő Gagyi, "Az 1546. évi fegyverszünet és a gyöngyösi tárgyalásokra vonatkozó adatok [The Armistice of 1546 and Data about the Gyöngyös Negotiations]," *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények* 1911, 317-318. Bak'an: ÖNB Mxt. 617, 11. Kızılhisar: ÖNB Mxt 626, 92-96.

<sup>10</sup> First mention of Ciğerdelen is from 1549: ÖNB Mxt 562, 89-90; that of Tepedelen from 1613: BOA MM 4000, 155-156, 182-196.

<sup>11</sup> The garrison of reconstructed Diregel was first included in the pay list of the *vilayet* of Budun in 1557: ÖNB Mxt 614, 96-101.

the name of *Derbend* on the bank of the *Ipoly*.<sup>12</sup> *Hatvan* marked the eastern end of the northern semicircle of the defensive ring. Its fortification was also largely, but not entirely, the work of the Ottomans.

*Budun* and the entire *vilayet* was to be protected from the northeast by *Eğri*. The siege of 1552, however, ended with an Ottoman defeat, and the castle remained in Hungarian possession until 1596. There was an immense gap in the Ottoman defences between *Hatvan* and *Solnok*: this area belongs to the plains where no Hungarian castles existed in the Middle Ages. To bridge the gap and substitute for *Eğri*, the fortress of *Canfeda* was built on this frontier section in 1568.<sup>13</sup> The easternmost fort of the ring around *Budun*, *Solnok*, was south of *Canfeda* along the *Tisza*.

The fortification works aimed at securing the riverway of the *Danube* and *Budun-Peşte* began in the decades of the 'castle wars' and lasted on until the 1580s. Most of the forts erected after 1560 were located at the edge not only of the ring defending *Budun*, but also along the entire Ottoman dominion; in the decades of peace the empire could be protected by an evenly spaced chain of fortresses. This was the third aim of Ottoman fortress constructions also brought to bear against the vassal of the Ottoman Empire, the Principality of *Transylvania*. Along the *Transylvanian* borderline, the new forts were erected in flat areas: *Szentmiklós* (*Senmikloş*) across from *Solnok* on the other side of the *Tisza* in the 1550s, *Szarvas* (*Sarvaş*) on the *Körös*, *Erdőhegy* (*Erdöheg'*) and some minor forts the names of which were only preserved in Hungarian sources.<sup>14</sup>

Most Ottoman castles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were built of beams and stamped earth, differentiated from the conquered stone forts also by terminology. The stone forts were called *kale'* in Ottoman however insignificant (e.g. *Gesteş*) or converted from a fortified manor or church (e.g. *Canbek*), or again, found as useless ruins and completely rebuilt (e.g. *Derbend*). Their own fortified buildings were termed by either of two international loanwords of German origin used

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<sup>12</sup> First mention of *Böğürdelen* comes from 1579: BOA MM 498, that of *Derbend* from 1588: ÖNB Mxt 615, 85-86.

<sup>13</sup> In April 1568, *Canfeda* was still being built: L. Fekete, *Einführung in die osmanisch-türkische Diplomatie der türkischen Botmässigkeit in Ungarn*. Budapest, 1926, 28-29. The earliest extant list of the garrison: ÖNB Mxt 617, 4.

<sup>14</sup> The earliest list of the garrison of *Senmikloş* dates from 1557: ÖNB Mxt 614, 139-143. The first pay list of the castles in the *vilayet* of *Temeşvar* is from 1591: *Egyetemi Könyvtár*, Budapest, Cod. Orient 8.

all over Europe, *parkan* or *palanka* (stockade),<sup>15</sup> even if they played a salient role in their defensive system with garrisons of several hundreds (e.g. Ciğerdelen, Canfeda, Korkmaz). (Diregel was an exception. The utterly obsolete fortress shot to ruins during the siege was abandoned and a completely new *palanka* was built somewhat removed from it, but recorded as *kale'-i Diregel* with reference to the medieval stone fort. However, the mode of construction is preserved in the modern name of the locality Drégelypalánk where the Ottoman fort stood.)

The Ottoman defence system—the chain of fortresses—completed by the 1580s did not live long in the form conceived of by the Ottoman high command. It was soon transformed by the military events at the turn of the century. The Habsburg-Ottoman war lasting nearly 15 years shifted the frontiers at several places and restructured the administrative division of the Ottoman province as well.

In the north, the Ottomans lost the *livas* of Novigrad, Filek, and Seçen. Their seats and other forts such as Divin, Buyak, Keköy, Şomoşka (Somoskő), Aynaçka (Ajnácskő), Diregel, Derbend, and Böğürdelen returned to the Kingdom of Hungary. For 25 years, Vaç belonged to the Hungarians and was recaptured by the pasha of Budun only in 1620. In the war, the fortresses along the eastern frontier also changed owners several times, and in the final analysis, the *vilayet* of Temeşvar also sustained painful losses. Together with a few insignificant forts, two of its key fortifications, Yanova and Lipova, went back to the Principality of Transylvania, although the latter only until 1616.

The losses were, however, compensated by precious gains. The Ottomans took Eğri in the north in 1596 and Kanizsa (Kanija) in the west in 1600, and turned them into the seats of two new *vilayets*. Since no considerable territory was carved out of the Hungarian Kingdom, their areas were mostly taken from the *vilayet* of Budun. The *livas* of Sigetvar and Peçuy were added to Kanija, as well as Pojega south of the Drava. Eğri received the *livas* of Hatvan, Solnok, and in principle, Segedin. In practice, however, the latter's fortresses were registered in Budun and their troops were paid from the same treasury. The virtual *liva* of Filek was also subsumed under Eğri, while the *livas* of Seçen and Novigrad were still subjected to Budun, with the latter's seat being transferred to

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<sup>15</sup> For the origin of the two words, see *A magyar nyelv történeti-etimológiai szótára* [The Historical-Etymological Dictionary of the Hungarian Language]. III. Editor-in-chief Loránd Benkő. Budapest, 1976, 68, 108-109.

Vaç. Although the three formerly Ottoman *livas* were under the suzerainty of the Hungarian Kingdom and royal troops were stationed in their fortresses, the majority of villages remained tax-payers of the Ottoman *timar*-holders, recorded in the *vilayet* centres.<sup>16</sup>

The two new *vilayets* also received most of its fortresses from the province of Budun. Apart from Eğri and Kanija, only some minor forts were captured by the Ottomans during the war, e.g. Sirok (Şiroka), Szarvaskő (Sarvaška), and Cserép (Çerep), all the three situated around Eğri.<sup>17</sup>

After a period of peace lasting about half a century, considerable changes took place in the wake of rekindled warfare in the late 1650s along the eastern borders and in 1663-64 in the north-western marches of the Ottoman province. During the punitive Ottoman campaigns against Transylvania, Yanova was recaptured, Karánsebes (Şebeş) and Lugos (Lugoş) were taken in 1658. In 1660, Várad (Varad) fell to the Ottomans. The main stronghold protecting Transylvania from the west became the seat of a new *vilayet* within which only two separate *sancaks*, namely those of Varad and Szentjobb (Senk'ob) were created.<sup>18</sup> In addition to Varad, a few minor fortresses were also taken, such as Papmező (Papmezö), Belényes (Belenös), and Sólyomkő (Şolongi). In 1663, Köprülü Ahmed conquered Újvár (Uyvar), the strongest fort in north-western Hungary, and recaptured Novigrad. The sixth *vilayet* in Hungary was established around Uyvar (without being divided into *livas*), with the troops being stationed in the centre, in Surány (Şuran), and Komjáti (called Gradiška by the Ottomans).<sup>19</sup> With these conquests, the Ottoman Empire had reached its largest extension in Hungary.

The wars at the turn and during the seventeenth century, the capture of Eğri, Kanija, Varad, and Uyvar strengthened the military position of the Ottomans along every section of the frontier, but weakened the defensive ring built around Budun in the sixteenth century. From the loss

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<sup>16</sup> BOA Kepeci 266, 12-17. Cf. Metin Kunt, *Sancaktan eyalete. 1550-1650 arasında Osmanlı ümerası ve il idaresi*. Istanbul, 1978, 182-198. The publication is incomplete as to the *vilayet* of Budun.

<sup>17</sup> The first known pay list and pay accounts of the fortresses in the *vilayet* of Kanija survived both from 1619: ÖNB Mxt 631 and BOA MM 2586. That of Eğri: BOA MM 704.

<sup>18</sup> Géza Dávid, "Nagyvárad," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. 7. Leiden, 1994, 900.

<sup>19</sup> The garrisons of the *vilayet* of Varad in 1660: BOA Bab-i defteri, Piyade mukabelesi kalemi 35139. Those of the *vilayet* of Uyvar in 1664: BOA Bab-i defteri, Başmuhasebe, Uyvar hazinesi kalemi 17082.

of Novigrad (1594) to the recapture of Novigrad (1664), that is, for seven decades, hardly anything protected Budun from the north; the capital and heartlands of the Ottoman province were open to the raids of the Hungarian troops. To the northwest, the triple fortification of Estergon–Cigerdelen–Tepedelen preserved, and even increased its significance. In the northeast, Hatvan, which had changed sides several times during the war and had been burnt down, was reconstructed and packed with troops again. Between the two, north of Budun, however, Vaç alone stood guard, but only from 1620. One would expect to see fervent reconstructing activity in Budun after the peace of Vienna (1606), but there is no trace of it. The protective ring was not restored—probably because there was no need for it. The antagonists bled to incapacity in the war strove to maintain the peace at all costs for the next fifty years or so. They all resigned themselves to the fact that not even a seemingly continuous defensive chain of border fortresses could prevent the pillaging of each other's territories and the burdening of each other's peasants with various taxes. Indeed, the *sipahis* taxed the population in an ever growing belt of the Hungarian Kingdom, while the Hungarian noblemen and soldiers extracted smaller and larger amounts of taxes in the entire Ottoman province during the seventeenth century; the two sides shared the revenues extractable from the population of the country. But both parties were loth to engage in repeated desperate fightings for the redistribution of the territory. Budun was not threatened by anyone.

This situation may explain why hardly any new fortresses were built by the Ottomans in the seventeenth century, with the exception of the waterways. The stations along the Danubian military route with ports were all fortified. The earthwork at Tolna was finished by 1613,<sup>20</sup> and in 1631 the pay of the garrison in the *palanka* of Ercsi (Erçin) was also listed among the expenditures of the treasury of Budun.<sup>21</sup> By the early seventeenth century, medium-scale forts had been erected on the southern shore of the Balaton. Bolondvár (Bolondvar) was completed in 1591, and Fok (Foka) to the east, in the mouth of the Sió, in 1613.<sup>22</sup>

In all, the system of Ottoman fortifications in Hungary as it existed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was shaped by several factors. The majority of fortresses belonging to it were the medieval strongholds

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<sup>20</sup> BOA MM 4000, 256-261.

<sup>21</sup> BOA MM 5193, 6.


<sup>22</sup> BOA MM 3762, 15; MM 4000, 333-342.

of the Hungarian Kingdom. This network was improved by the Ottomans as the defence of the province in the frontline and the advance route of the forces required.

The task and importance of the strongholds in Ottoman Hungary were determined by their location. After 1568, the troops in the fortresses of the border zone were not reduced to the extent in the rest of the province, where in the early seventeenth century no more than symbolic troops were stationed. In the defence of the borders, the *vilayet* of Kanija, facing hereditary Habsburg lands, played a salient role in the first half of the seventeenth century. All the fortresses in the western part of the *vilayet* were large strongholds (with garrisons over 500 men) or medium-sized ones (150-500 troops). Many fortresses in the centre of the *vilayet* of Budun can be cited as contrary examples whose protected position made the employment of large garrisons unnecessary. The changes, however, can best be exemplified by two strategically important fortresses whose position fundamentally changed due to the shifting of borders. One is Vaç. In 1544, 390 soldiers served here. In 1552, after the occupation of the forts in the mountainous area around Novigrad, the weight of frontier defence up till that time imposed on Vaç eased and the garrison dropped to 150, ranging between 100 and 130 men in the last three decades. When at the turn of the century, the forts around Novigrad were lost, Vaç recovered its former significance: from 1620 its troops again numbered around 450. The other example is that of Ístolni Belgrad. As a key fortification in the frontier area extending in the western foreground of Budun, it had a garrison of 3,095 troops in 1543. In the year of the peace of Adrianople (when the number of troops was considerably reduced), the garrison still amounted to 1,387 locally paid soldiers and an unknown number of janissaries of the Porte. With this contingent, it remained the third largest fortress of the *vilayet* to the end of the century. When in the 'Long' or 'Fifteen Years' War' Palota (Polata) west of Ístolni Belgrad fell to the Ottomans, its garrison plummeted to 500.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> The exact figures and archival references are attached below.



## INVENTORY OF THE OTTOMAN FORTS IN HUNGARY

The list contains Ottoman fortresses according to *vilayets* and *sancaks* in selected years (or in those that we have data about at all), indicating the number and composition of their garrison troops. The abbreviations used are as follows:

- A: *riü'esa ve 'azaban* (infantrymen)
- Ce: *cebeciyan* (armours)
- Cr: craftsmen
- F: *farisan* (other names: '*ulufeciyan-i süvari*, or *beşlüyan*: horsemen, paid mounted soldiers, 'fivers')
- G: *gönüllüyan* (lit. 'volunteers')
- H: *hademe-i cevami* (*cami* servants)
- Hu: Hungarian
- Ma: *martolosan* (marauders)
- Mü: *müstahfızan* (guards)
- T: *topçıyan* (artillerymen)
- Y: *yeniçeriyan* (janissaries)

## Vilayet-i Budun 1541-1688

The source material for the sixteenth century and the first decades of the seventeenth century is relatively rich, only the establishment of the total of the paid garrisons and of those with salary *timars* creates difficulties. Their numbers in the same or adjacent years are given together, but when they stem from very different dates, the number of soldiers with salary *timars* is placed in square brackets (in these instances it only serves for information, because it cannot be included in the total). In the second half of the seventeenth century (between 1662 and 1677), garrisons are mentioned only in the treasury account books (BOA Bab-i defteri, Budun hazinesi kalemi, 16727, 16728, 16729; MM 16005); however, their figures can be accepted as rough information only, because they repeat invariable amounts of incomes, expenditures, salaries, and garrisons.

*Liva-i Budun, paşa livası*

1. Budun, *kale'* (Hu. Buda)

1543 (Mxt 566): 2864 (2598 present) MüCeTGFACr + Y in unknown number

- 1568 (Mxt 617): 1655 MüTGFAcr + 1569 (MM 1561): 945 Y  
 1613 (MM 4000): 2361 HYMüCeTGFAcr  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 3361 HYMüCeTGFAcr  
 1662-1677: 5697 HYMüCeGACr at every date
2. Peşte, *kale'* (Hu. Pest)  
 1543 (Mxt 566): 1435 (1191 present) MüTAMaCr  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 939 MüTAMaCr  
 1613 (MM 4000): 572 MüTFAMaCr  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 740 MüTFAMaCr  
 1662-1677: 847 MüTFAMaCr at every date
3. Vaç, *kale'* (Hu. Vác) 1544-1595, 1620-1684  
 1544 (Mxt 590): 321 MüTFAMa  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 126 MüTFMa  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 473 MüTFAMa  
 1662-1677: 474 at every date (in 1674 it was registered together with Novigrad, but with a total unchanged)
4. Vişegrad, *kale'* (Hu. Visegrád)  
 1544 (Mxt 590): 342 MüTAMa  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 125 MüTA  
 1613 (MM 4000): 52 MüA  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 19 A
5. Korkmaz, the other name is Cankurtaran, *parkan*  
 1549 (Mxt 562): 108 (98 present) TFAMa + Mü with salary *timars* in unknown number  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 37 F + soldiers with salary *timars* in unknown number  
 1580 (Tapu 590): 32 Mü with salary *timars*  
 1613 (MM 4000): 122 MüTFA  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 117 HMüTFA
6. Fedvar, Födvar, *parkan* (Hu. Földvár)  
 1557 (Mxt 614): 38 (38 present) A  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 70 FMa + soldiers with salary *timars* in unknown number  
 1613 (MM 4000): 129 MüTFA  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 106 MüTFA
7. Erçin, *parkan* (Hu. Ercsi)  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 87 FA
8. Canbek, *kale'* (Hu. Zsámbék)  
 1549 (Mxt 562): 256 (228 present) MüTFAMa

- 1568 (Mxt 617): 151 MüTFAMa  
 1613 (MM 4000): 75 MüTFAMa  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 118 HMüTFAMa
9. Hamzabey sarayı, *parkan* (Hu. Érd)  
 1579 (MM 498): 31 F + soldiers with salary *timars* in unknown number  
 1594/95 (MM 3370): 54 FAMa + Mü with salary *timars* in unknown number  
 1613 (MM 4000): 68 MüFAMa  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 75 HMüTFAMa
10. Kızılhisar, *parkan*  
 1573 (Mxt 626): 170 (166 present) MüTFA  
 1594/95 (MM 3370): 88 MüTA  
 1662-1677: 36 A at every date
11. Gestös, Gesteş, *kale'* (Hu. Gesztes)  
 1557 (Mxt 614): 45 (45 present) Mü  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 49 Mü  
 1591 (MM 3762): 47 MüAMa
12. Tata, *kale'* (Hu. Tata) 1557-1566, 1594-1597  
 1557 (Mxt 614): 465 (445 present) MüTFAMaCr  
 1594/95 (MM 3370): 192 MüTFA
13. Vitan, *kale'* (Hu. Vitány)  
 1557 (Mxt 614): 38 Mü  
 No other data is available, the fate of the fortress is unknown
14. Derbend, *kale'* (Hu. Damásd) 1581-1594  
 1591 (MM 3762): 122 MüTFAMa  
 1594/95 (MM 3370): 129 MüTFAMa
15. Sonda, *kale'* (Hu. Szanda) 1544-1594  
 1546 (Mxt 583): 280 (252 present) MüTFAMa  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 31 Mü  
 1594/95 (MM 3370): 41 Mü
16. Canfeda, *parkan*, built in 1568, burnt down in 1594  
 1569 (Mxt 642): 446 (441 present) MüTFAMa  
 1579 (MM 498): 199 F + 1580 (Tapu 590): 99 MüA with salary *timars*

*Liva-i Estergon*

17. Estergon, Ostorgon, *kale'* (Hu. Esztergom)  
 1543 (Mxt 566): 3237 (2001 present) MüCeTFAMaCr  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 1317 MüCeTFAMaCr

- 1613 (MM 4000): 1094 HMüCeTFAMaCr  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 1069 HMüTFAMaCr
18. Ciğerdelen, *parkan*  
 1549 (Mxt 562): 71 (70 present) MüT  
 1557 (Mxt 614): 316 (314 present) MüTA  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 241 MüTAMa  
 1613 (MM 4000): 42 MüT  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 49 MüT  
 1662-1677: Estergon and Ciğerdelen together, 1166 men at every date

*Liva-i Novigrad*

19. Novigrad, *kale'* (Hu. Nógrád) 1544-1594, 1663-1685  
 1544 (Mxt 590): 212 MüTAMa  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 208 MüTFA  
 1579 (MM 498): 105 F + (Tapu 661): 95 MüTA with salary *timars*
20. Böğürdelen, *kale'*, end of the 1570s-1594  
 1579 (MM 498): 117 MüTF  
 1591 (MM 3762): 115 MüTF
21. Diregel, *kale'* (Hu. Drégely) 1552-1593  
 1557 (Mxt 614): 211 (209 present) MüTAMaCr  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 194 MüTAMa  
 1579 (MM 498): 71 F + (Tapu 661): 85 MüA

*Liva-i Seçen*

22. Seçen, *kale'* (Hu. Szécsény) 1552-1593, 1663-1683  
 1557 (Mxt 614): 256 (253 present) MüTFAMa  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 229 MüTFAMa  
 1591 (MM 3763): 158 FMa + soldiers with salary *timars* in unknown number  
 1580 (Tapu 590): 28 Mü with salary *timars*
23. Buyak, *kale'* (Hu. Buják) 1552-1593  
 1557 (Mxt 614): 30 (30 present) Mü  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 30 Mü  
 1580 (Tapu 590): 31 Mü with salary *timars*
24. Holloka, *kale'* (Hu. Hollókő) 1552-1593  
 1557 (Mxt 614): 24 (23 present) MüT  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 22 Mü  
 1580 (Tapu 590): 31 Mü with salary *timars*

25. Kekköy, *kale'* (Hu. Kékkő) 1574-1593  
 1589 (Mxt 615): 206 (180 present) MüTFAMa  
 1591 (MM 3762): 181 MüTFAMa

*Liva-i Filek*

26. Filek, *kale'* (Hu. Fülek) 1554-1593  
 1557 (Mxt 614): 321 (316 present) MüFA  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 252 MüTFA  
 1591 (MM 3762): 119 F + soldiers with salary *timars* in unknown number
27. Aynačka, *kale'* (Hu. Ajnácskő) 1566-1593  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 44 Mü  
 No other data is available
28. Sobotka, Sobotka-i Filek, *kale'* (Hu. Szabadka) 1554-1593  
 1557 (Mxt 614): 32 (31 present) Mü  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 113 MüF  
 1591 (MM 3762): 115 FMa + soldiers with salary *timars* in unknown number
29. Divin, *kale'* (Hu. Divény) 1574-1593  
 1579 (MM 498): 161 MüTFAMa  
 1589 (Mxt 615): 140 (135 present) MüTFAMa

*Liva-i Hatvan* (from 1596 on it belonged to the *vilayet-i Eğri*)

30. Hatvan, *kale'* (Hu. Hatvan)  
 1549 (Mxt 562): 535 (490 present) MüTFAMa  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 305 MüTFA  
 1591 (MM 3762): 324 FAMa + around 1590 (Tapu 675): 61 MüT with salary *timars*
31. Şalgo, *kale'* (Hu. Salgó) 1554-1593  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 38 MüMa  
 1591 (MM 3762): 19 Ma + soldiers with salary *timars* in unknown number

*Liva-i Solnok* (from 1596 on it belonged to the *vilayet-i Eğri*)

32. Solnok, Sonlok, *kale'* (Hu. Szolnok)  
 1553 (Mxt 643): 925 (589 present) MüTFAMa  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 355 MüTFAMa  
 1591 (MM 3762): 184 FMa + early 1590s (Tapu 568): 212 MüTACr with salary *timars*

33. Senmikloş, *parkan* (Hu. Szentmiklós)  
 1557 (Mxt 614): 234 (216 present) MüTFAMa  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 189 MüTFAMa
34. Çongrad, *parkan* (Hu. Csongrád)  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 129 MüTFMa  
 1591 (MM 3762): 56 F + early 1590s (Tapu 568): 46 MüT with salary *timars*
- Liva-i Segedin* (after 1596, in principle it belonged to the *vilayet-i Eğri*, but in practice it was registered as part of the *vilayet-i Budun* and its garrisons were paid from the treasury of Budun)
35. Segedin, *kale'* (Hu. Szeged)  
 1545 (Mxt 581): 360 MüTFAMa  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 217 FAMa + soldiers with salary *timars* in unknown number  
 1561 (Tapu 333): 148 MüTCr with salary *timars*  
 1613 (MM 4000): 191 MüTFMaCr  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 143 MüTFMaCr
36. Kalaça, *kale'* (Hu. Kalocsa)  
 1543 (Mxt 550): 201 (155 present) MüTAMa  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 39 Ma + soldiers with salary *timars* in unknown number  
 1561 (Tapu 333): 27 MüT with salary *timars*  
 1613 (MM 4000): 39 MüF
37. Tömörkin, *parkan* (Hu. Tömörkény)  
 1561 (Tapu 333): 25 MüT with salary *timars*  
 1565 (Mxt 612): 87 paid FMa  
 No other data is available, the fate of the fortress is unknown
38. Senkiral, *parkan* (Hu. Szentkirály)  
 around 1570 (Tapu 551): 70 MüTA with salary *timars*  
 in 1582 it was mentioned in a letter; after this date no data is available
39. Sobotka, Sobotka-i Segedin, *kale'* (Hu. Szabadka)  
 1545 (Mxt 581): 13 Mü  
 1557 (Mxt 614): 24 (24 present) MüT  
 in ca. 1570 (Tapu 551): 60 MüT with salary *timars*  
 1613 (MM 4000): 84 HMüFMa  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 44 HMüTFA

40. Baya, *parkan* (Hu. Baja)  
 1557 (Mxt 614): 52 (49 present) Ma + 1561 (Tapu 333): 21 MüT with salary *timars*  
 1613 (MM 4000): 110 HMüTFA  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 66 HMüTF
41. Martonoş, *kale'* (Hu. Martonos)  
 1613 (MM 4000): 34 MüT  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 20 MüT
42. Madaraş, *palanka* (Hu. Madaras)  
 1613 (MM 4000): 88 MüTF  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 88 HMüTF
43. Zonbor, *kale'* (Hu. Zombor)  
 1543 (Mxt 550): 51 (42 present) MüTF  
 1561 (Tapu 333): 18 Mü with salary *timars*  
 in ca. 1570 (Tapu 551): 12 Mü with salary *timars*  
 1613 (MM 4000): 7 T  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 7 T
44. Baç, *kale'* (Hu. Bács)  
 1543 (Mxt 550): 102 (72 present) MüTACr  
 1561 (Tapu 333): 32 Mü with salary *timars*  
 1613 (MM 4000): 25 TA  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 16 TA
45. Titel, *kale'* (Hu. Titel)  
 1541 (Mxt 567): 358 MüTAFMaCr  
 No other data is available for the 16th century  
 1613 (MM 4000): 49 MüTA  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 31 MüT
46. Futok, *parkan* (Hu. Futak)  
 1613 (MM 4000): 12 MüT  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 6 MüT

*Liva-i İstolni Belgrad*

47. İstolni Belgrad, *kale'* (Hu. Székesfehérvár)  
 1543 (Mxt 550): 3095 (2927 present) MüCeTFAMaCr  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 1387 MüTFAMa  
 1591 (MM 3762): 1273 MüTFAMa  
 1613 (MM 4000): 506 HMüTFAMa  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 632 MüTFAMa

1662-1677: 1079 at every date (in 1674 it was registered together with the other fortresses of the *liva*, but with a total unchanged)

48. *Çoka, kale'* (Hu. Csóka)
  - 1545 (Mxt 581): 32 Mü
  - 1568 (Mxt 617): 30 Mü
  - 1591 (MM 3762): 39 Mü
  - 1613 (MM 4000): 51 Mü
  - 1629 (Mxt 636): 47 Mü
49. *Bak'an, parkan* (Hu. Battyán)
  - 1568 (Mxt 617): 109 MüTFMa
  - 1591 (MM 3762): 140 MüFMA
  - 1613 (MM 4000): 67 MüTFMa
  - 1629 (Mxt 636): 59 MüTFMa
50. *Val, parkan* (Hu. Vál; in the sixteenth century, it belonged to the province of Ístolni Belgrad, and in the seventeenth century to Budun)
  - 1557 (Mxt 614): 113 (113 present) MüTFA
  - 1568 (Mxt 617): 111 MüTFA
  - 1613 (MM 4000): 84 MüTFA
  - 1629 (Mxt 636): 77 HMüTFA
51. *Besprim, kale'* (Hu. Veszprém) 1552-1566, 1593-1598
  - 1552 (Mxt 643): 345 (270 present) MüTF
  - 1594/95 (MM 3370): 506 MüFAMa
52. *Polata, kale'* (Hu. Palota) 159-1687
  - 1594/95 (MM 3370): 539 MüTFAMa
  - 1613 (MM 4000): 193 MüTFA
  - 1629 (Mxt 636): 190 MüTFA
53. *Vajon, kale'* (Hu. Vázsony) 1593-1598
  - 1594/95 (MM 3370): 51 MüT
54. *Tihon, kale'* (Hu. Tihany) 1594?-1601?
  - 1595/95 (MM 3370): 305 MüTFAMa

*Liva-i Şimontorna*

55. *Şimontorna, kale'* (Hu. Simontornya)
  - 1545 (Mxt 581): 165 MüFA
  - 1568 (Mxt 617): 134 MüTFAMa
  - 1613 (MM 4000): 215 HMüTFAMa
  - 1629 (Mxt 636): 136 HMüTFA

56. Endrik, *kale' /parkan* (Hu. Endréd)  
 1545 (Mxt 581): 73 MüFMA  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 78 MüAMA  
 1613 (MM 4000): 72 FA  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 56 FA
57. Tomaşin, *kale' /parkan* (Hu. Tamási)  
 1545 (Mxt 581): 133 MüFA  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 18 Ma + 1570 (Tapu 505): 46 MüT with salary *timars*  
 1613 (MM 4000): 49 MüTA  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 16 TA
58. Ozora, *Ozor, kale'* (Hu. Ozora)  
 1545 (Mxt 581): 93 MüA  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 42 Mü  
 1570 (Tapu 505): 42 MüT with salary *timars*  
 1613 (MM 4000): 26 MüA  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 17 MüA
59. Hidvig, *parkan* (Hu. Hidvég)  
 1570 (Tapu 505): 25 MüT with salary *timars* + paid soldiers in unknown number  
 1579 (MM 498): 47 F + soldiers with salary *timars* in unknown number
60. Anyavar, *kale'* (Hu. Anyavár)  
 1545 (Mxt 581): 19 Mü  
 No other data is available
61. Döbrekös, *kale'* (Hu. Döbrököz)  
 1545 (Mxt 581): 210 MüTFAMa  
 1557 (Mxt 614): 29 (29 present) A  
 1570 (Tapu 505): 30 MüT with salary *timars*  
 1613 (MM 4000): 37 MüT  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 22 MüT

*Liva-i Seksar*

62. Seksar, *kale'* (Hu. Szekszárd)  
 1543 (Mxt 550): 241 (159 present) MüTFAMa  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 30 A + 1570 (Tapu 505): 24 MüT with salary *timars*  
 1613 (MM 4000): 48 FA  
 No other data is available

63. Pakşa, *parkan* (Hu. Paks)  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 59 FMa + soldiers with salary *timars* in unknown number  
 in ca. 1590 (Tapu 652): 9 Mü with salary *timars*  
 1613 (MM 4000): 88 MüTFA  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 76 MüTFA
64. Batasek, Badasek, *parkan* (Hu. Bátaszék)  
 1552 (Mxt 643): 103 (98 present) FAMa + soldiers with salary *timars* in unknown number  
 1557 (Mxt 614): 105 (100 present) FAMa + soldiers with salary *timars* in unknown number  
 1565 (Tapu 353): 30 MüT with salary *timars*  
 1613 (MM 4000): 69 MüTFA  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 21 TF
65. Serdahel, *parkan* (Hu. Szerdahely)  
 1613 (MM 4000): 34 TA  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 15 TA
66. Tolna, Toğna, *parkan* (Hu. Tolna)  
 1613 (MM 4000): 106 MüTFA  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 63 MüTFA

*Liva-i Kopan*

67. Koppan, *parkan* (Hu. Koppány)  
 1557 (Mxt 614): 133 (133 present) FMa + soldiers with salary *timars* in unknown number  
 1565 (Tapu 353): 21 Mü with salary *timars*  
 1568 (Mxt 614): 115 MüFA  
 1613 (MM 4000): 264 MüTFAMa  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 227 MüTFAMa
68. Foka, *kale'* (Hu. Fok, Siófok)  
 1613 (MM 4000): 166 MüTFAMa  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 135 MüTFAMa
69. Karat, Karad, *kale'* (Hu. Karád)  
 1591 (MM 3762): 27 Mü  
 1613 (MM 4000): 50 MüTFMa  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 46 MüTFMa
70. Donbo, Donbol, *kale'* (Hu. Dombó)  
 1565 (Tapu 353): 46 MüT with salary *timars* + 1568 (Mxt 617): 49 FMa

- 1613 (MM 4000): 122 MüTFA  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 54 TAMa
71. Lak, *kale'* (Hu. Lak)  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 138 MüTFAMa  
 1591 (MM 3762): 165 MüTFAMa  
 1613 (MM 4000): 128 MüTFAMa  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 93 MüTFAMa
72. Bolondvar, *kale' /parkan* (Hu. Bolondvár)  
 1591 (MM 3762): 65 FMa + soldiers with salary *timars* in unknown number  
 in ca. 1580 (Sachsische Landesbibl. Dresden Eb 352): 15 MüT with salary *timars*  
 1613 (MM 4000): 107 FAMa

*Liva-i Sekçöy*, (for the other names of this *liva*, see p. 165 *supra*)

73. Sekçöy, *kale'* (Hu. Szekcső)  
 1543 (Mxt 550): 26 (20 present) MüT  
 1569 (Mxt 642): 42 (40 present) F + 1570 (Tapu 505): 46 MüT with salary *timars*  
 1613 (MM 4000): 27 MüT  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 20 MüT
74. Mohaç, *parkan* (H Mohács)  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 91 MüTAMa  
 1613 (MM 4000): 78 TFMa  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 30 TMa
75. Baranvar, *parkan* (Hu. Baranyavár)  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 16 Mü  
 1613 (MM 4000): 32 Mü  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 3 T + Mü in unknown number
76. Darda, *parkan* (Hu. Dárda)  
 1613 (MM 4000): 44 MüT  
 1629 (Mxt 636): 21 MüT

*Liva-i Peçuy* (from 1600 on it belonged to the *vilayet-i Kanija*)

77. Peçuy, *kale'* (Hu. Pécs)  
 1545 (Mxt 581): 875 HMüTFA  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 220 FAMa + 1570 (Tapu 480): 174 MüTCr with salary *timars*

- 1591 (MM 3762): 211 FMa + around 1590 (Tapu 652): 175 MüCeTACr  
with salary *timars*
78. Şikloş, *kale'* (Hu. Siklós)  
1545 (Mxt 581): 589 MüTFA  
1569 (Mxt 642): 100 (99 present) TA + 1570 (Tapu 480): 142 MüCeCr  
with salary *timars*
79. Nadaj, *parkan* (Hu. Nádasd)  
1570 (Tapu 480): 38 MüT with salary *timars*  
in ca. 1590 (Tapu 652): 25 MüT with salary *timars*
80. Sas, Saz, Sasi, *kale'* (Hu. Szászvár)  
1545 (Mxt 581): 249 MüFAMa  
After that date it was mentioned only in the seventeenth century
81. Malvar, *kale'* (Hu. Márévár)  
1545 (Mxt 581): 69 MüFMA  
No other data is available, the fate of the fortress is unknown
82. Şelin, *parkan* (Hu. Selény)  
1557 (Mxt 614): 22 (20 present) A  
No other data is available, the fate of the fortress is unknown
83. Göröşgal, Göröjgal, *kale'* (Hu. Göröşgál)  
1545 (Mxt 581): 105 MüFA  
1557 (Mxt 614): 84 (84 present) FMa + soldiers with salary *timars* in  
unknown number
84. Senlörinç, *parkan* (Hu. Szentlőrinc)  
1557 (Mxt 614): 36 (34 present) A  
No other data is available, the fate of the fortress is unknown
85. Senmartin, *parkan* (Hu. Szentmáron)  
1570 (Tapu 480): 26 MüT with salary *timars*  
in ca.1590 (Tapu 652): 22 Mü with salary *timars*
86. Kapoşvar, *kale'* (Hu. Kaposvár)  
1569 (Mxt 642): 282 (266 present) FAMa + 1570 (Tapu 480): 33 MüT  
with salary *timars*
87. Söçen, *parkan* (Hu. Szöcsény)  
1579 (MM 498): 36 F + soldiers with salary *timars* in unknown number  
1591 (MM 3762): 76 F + in ca. 1590 (Tapu 652): 45 TA with salary  
*timars*
- Liva-i Sigetvar* (from 1600 on it belonged to the *vilayet-i Kanija*)
88. Sigetvar, *kale'* (Hu. Szigetvár)

- 1568 (Mxt 617): 711 MüCeTFAMaCr  
 1570 (Tapu 503): 344 MüTAMaCr with salary *timars* + 1573 (Mxt 626):  
 140 (present 140) paid F
89. Barça, *parkan* (Hu. Barcs)  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 193 AMa
90. Şegeş, *kale'* (Hu. Segesd)  
 1591 (MM 3762): 325 MüFAMa
91. Boboŕça, *kale'* (Hu. Babócsa)  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 558 MüTFAMa  
 1570 (Tapu 503): 251 MüTA with salary *timars* + 1573 (Mxt 626): 203  
 (present 200) paid FMa
92. Berzenç, Brezenç, *kale'* (Hu. Berzence)  
 1568 (Mxt 617): 379 MüTFAMa  
 1570 (Tapu 503): 203 MüTA with salary *timars* + 1573 (Mxt 626): 249  
 (248 present) paid HFMa

### Vilayet-i Temeşvar 1552-1716

The parts of the *vilayet* north of the Maros river remained under Ottoman rule till 1694, and those south of the Maros, till 1716. The source material we have at our disposal is very poor, compared to that of Budun. The construction dates of the *parkans* and *palankas* are uncertain. The earliest surviving pay register of the garrisons originates from 1591 (Budapest, Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem Könyvtára, Kézirattár, Codex Orient 8), but it contains only a fragment of the supposed troops, the paid soldiers (the artillerymen, e.g., are enumerated only in a single fortress). There are two pay lists available from 1634, but their data are occasionally at variance. In one of them (ÖNB Mxt 616) some pages are missing, and the other (ÖNB Mxt 641) is also fragmentary, bound in mixed order. One thing is certain that the paid soldiers of the castles in the *vilayet* amounted to 3,748 men in 1634 (Mxt 616, 20). We have insufficient data on the garrison soldiers with salary *timars*, too.

#### *Liva-i Temeşvar*

93. Temeşvar, *kale'* (Hu. Temesvár)  
 1591 (Cod. Or. 8): 257 (254 present) FAMa + soldiers with salary *timars*  
 in unknown number

- in ca. 1555 (Tapu 298): 309 MüCeTCr with salary *timars*  
 1634 (Mxt 619): 1091 HMüTFAMaCr  
 1700 (Fodor 44):<sup>24</sup> 4262
94. Pañcova, *parkan* (Hu. Pancsova)  
 1636 (Mxt 616): 81 MüF (incomplete?)  
 1700 (Fodor 44): 169
95. Şemlik, the other name is Virşiç, *kale'* (Hu. Versec)  
 1591 (Cod. Or. 8): 23 (22 present) Ma + soldiers with salary *timars* in unknown number  
 in ca. 1555 (Tapu 298): 13 Mü with salary *timars*  
 1634 (Mxt 641): 119 HMüTFAMa  
 1700 (Fodor 44): 50
96. Bogça, *kale'* (Hu. Bogcsa)  
 1591 (Cod. Or. 8): 63 (63 present) FMa + soldiers with salary *timars* in unknown number  
 in ca. 1555 (Tapu 298): 23 Mü with salary *timars*  
 1634 (Mxt 641): 31 FMa + soldiers with salary *timars* in unknown number
97. Çakova, *kale'* (Hu. Csák)  
 in ca. 1555 (Tapu 298): 13 MüT with salary *timars* + paid soldiers in unknown number  
 1634 (Mxt 641): 40 MüFMa (incomplete?)
98. Şarad, *parkan* (Hu. Sarád)  
 Mxt 641: 14 Ma (incomplete?)
99. Façet, in 1700 the other name is Marjina, *parkan* (Hu. Endrőd, Facset)  
 1591 (Cod. Or. 8): 102 (97 present) FA + soldiers with salary *timars* in unknown number  
 in ca. 1555 (Tapu 298): 30 MüT with salary *timars*  
 1634 (Mxt 641): 54 HFA + soldiers with salary *timars* in unknown number  
 1700 (Fodor 44): 25
100. Felnak, Fenlak, *kale'* (Hu. Fenlak)  
 in ca. 1555 (Tapu 298): 29 MüT with salary *timars* + paid soldiers in unknown number

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<sup>24</sup> The data of the year 1700 are taken from Pál Fodor, "Das Wilajet von Temeschwar zur Zeit der osmanischen Eroberung," *Süüdost-Forschungen* 55 (1996) 44.

1634 (Mxt 641): 32 FMa (incomplete)

1634 (Mxt 616): 128 F (incomplete)

*Liva-i Modava*

101. Modava, *parkan* (Hu. Moldova)

1591 (Cod. Or. 8): 77 (40 present) AMa + soldiers with salary *timars* in unknown number

1634 (Mxt 616): 41 A (incomplete?)

1700 (Fodor 44): 32

102. Haram-i cedit, *kale'* (Hu. Haram)

1634 (Mxt 616): 40 MüTMa (incomplete?)

1700 (Fodor 44): 232

103. Irşova, *kale'* (Hu. Orsova)

1634 (Mxt 616): 164 MüTFAMa

1700 (Fodor 44): 205

104. Mehadia, *palanka* (Hu. Mehádia)

1634 (Mxt 616): 65 MüFAMa

1700 (Fodor 44): 37

*Liva-i Çanad*

105. Çanad, *kale'* (Hu. Csanád)

1591 (Cod. Or. 8): 76 (37 present) FMa + soldiers with salary *timars* in unknown number

1634 (Mxt 616): 161 MüTFAMa

1700 (Fodor 44): 40

106. Beçkerek, *kale'* (Hu. Becskerek)

There is only fragmentary data on the sixteenth-century garrison troops

1700 (Fodor 44): 40

107. Beşenova, *palanka* (Hu. Besenyő)

1634 (Mxt 616): 36 MüA + (Mxt 641): 18 Ma

*Liva-i Lipova*

108. Lipova, *kale'* (Hu. Lippa) 1552-1595, 1616-1716

1591 (Cod. Or. 8): 197 (189 present) FAMaCr + soldiers with salary *timars* in unknown number

1560s? (Tapu 356): 159 MüT with salary *timars*

- 1634 (Mxt 616): MüTFAMa; due to missing pages in the register, their number cannot be established  
 1700 (Fodor 44): 40
109. Şolmoş, *kale'* (Hu. Solymos)  
 1560s? (Tapu 356): 43 MüT with salary *timars*
110. Vilagoş, *kale'* (Hu. Világos)  
 1591 (Cod. Or. 8): 18 (18 present) A + soldiers with salary *timars* in unknown number
111. Varadya, *parkan* (Hu. Váradja)  
 1591 (Cod. Or. 8): 62 (58 present) FMa + soldiers with salary *timars* in unknown number  
 1634 (Mxt 616): 46 FMa (incomplete?)
112. Vizaiş, *Viziaş, kale'* (its Hungarian name and location are unknown)  
 1591 (Cod. Or. 8): 19 (19 present) Ma + soldiers with salary *timars* in unknown number  
 1560s? (Tapu 356): 21 MüT with salary *timars*

*Liva-i Yanova*

113. Yanova, *kale'* (Hu. Jenő) 1566-1595, 1658-1693  
 1591 (Cod. Or. 8): 337 (321 present) FAMa + soldiers with salary *timars* in unknown number
114. Totinç, *kale'* (Hu. Feltót)  
 1591 (Cod. Or. 8): 29 (29 present) Ma + soldiers with salary *timars* in unknown number  
 (1560s? (Tapu 356): 38 MüT with salary *timars*)

*Liva-i G'ula*, the other name is *liva-i Arad*

115. G'ula, *kale'* (Hu. Gyula)  
 1591 (Cod. Or. 8): 595 (578 present) HMüFAMa + T with salary *timars* in unknown number
116. Arad, *parkan* (Hu. Arad)  
 1591 (Cod. Or. 8): 34 (32 present) MüT
117. Erdöheg', *parkan* (Hu. Erdőhegy)  
 1591 (Cod. Or. 8): 267 (257 present) MüFAMa + T with salary *timars* in unknown number
118. Bekeş, *parkan* (Hu. Békés)  
 1591 (Cod. Or. 8): 248 (240 present) HMüFAMa + T with salary *timars* in unknown number

119. Sarvaş, *parkan* (Hu. Szarvas)

1591 (Cod. Or. 8): 203 (197 present) FAMa + soldiers with salary *timars* in unknown number

## Vilayet-i Yanık 1594-1598

120. Yanık, *kale'* (Hu. Győr) 1594-1598

There is only fragmentary data on its garrison troops

## Vilayet-i Eğri 1596-1687

Eğri was captured in 1596 and, from the *sancaks* of Hatvan and Solnok, separated from the *vilayet-i Budun*, immediately a new *vilayet* was organized around it. Eğri itself was not attached to any of these provinces. Only two lists stand at our disposal on the garrisons of the *vilayet*. The former (BOA MM 16286), compiled in 1596/1597, gives a full picture of the troops stationed in the castles, but the section on Eğri is incomplete. The second survey (BOA Tapu 704), conducted in 1605/1606, is complete.

121. Eğri, *kale'* (Hu. Eger)

1605 (Tapu 704): 1965 HYMüCeTGFAMaCr

*Liva-i Hatvan*30. Hatvan, *kale'*

1596 (MM 16286): 849 MüTFAMa

1605 (Tapu 704): 581 MüTFAMa

122. Sarvaşka, *kale'* (Hu. Szarvaskő)

1596 (MM 16286): 177 HMütFA

1605 (Tapu 704): 180 HMütFA

123. Şiroka, *kale'* (Hu. Sirok)

1596 (MM 16286): 112 HMüTA

1605 (Tapu 704): 120 HMüTA

124. Çerep, *kale'* (Hu. Cserép)

1596 (MM 16286): 70 MüTA

1605 (Tapu 704): 43 MüT

125. Heveş, *kale'* (Hu. Heves)

1605 (Tapu 704): 22 MüTA

*Liva-i Solnok*

32. Solnok, *kale'*  
 1596 (MM 16286): 339 FMa  
 1605 (Tapu 704): 253 MüCeTFAMa
33. Senmikloş, *parkan*  
 1605 (Tapu 704): 182 MüTFAMa
34. Çongrad, *parkan*  
 1596 (MM 16286): 59 F  
 1605 (Tapu 704): 59 Mü (sic!)

## Vilayet-i Kanija 1600-1690

Kanija was taken in 1600 and transformed into the centre of a new *vilayet* which was created with the *sancaks* of Peçuy and Sigetvar, both having been part of the *vilayet-i Budun* up to this time. Kanija itself was not annexed to any of these provinces. Information about the castle garrisons can be found in two registers of 1609. One is a detailed pay-roll including names of the soldiers (ÖNB Mxt 631) and the other is a treasury account book (BOA MM 2586), with totals very close to each other: 3,815 and 3,795 men respectively (i.e. with a difference of 12 men). Below we give the data of the pay-roll only (therefore the signature is not indicated).

126. Kanija, *kale'* (Hu. Kanizsa)  
 1619: 1372 HMüCeTFAMa

*Liva-i Peçuy*

77. Peçuy, *kale'*  
 1619: 246 HMüTA + FMa in unknown number
79. Nadaj, *parkan*  
 1619: 46 MüTA
80. Sas, *kale'*  
 1619: 55 F
86. Kapoşvar, *kale'*  
 1619: 309 TFAMa + Mü in unknown number
127. *Cisr-i Ösek* (the Bridge of Ösek, Hu. Eszék)  
 1619: 31 A

*Liva-i Sigetvar*

88. Sigetvar, *kale'* (ma'a neferat-i türbe-i şerif-i sultan Süleyman/including the guards of the tomb of sultan Süleyman)  
1619: 429 HMüTFA
89. Barça, *parkan*  
1619: 173 HMüTFAMa
90. Şegeş, *kale'*  
1619: 438 HMüTFAMa
91. Boboşçe, *kale'*  
1619: 359 HMüCeFAMa
92. Berzenç, *kale'*  
1619: 349 HFAMa + MüT in unknown number

## Vilayet-i Varad 1660-1692

A *vilayet* of small size was established around Varad, captured in 1660. Only a part of the area was divided into *livas*. We have data about the garrison troops in 1660 (BOA Bab-i defteri, Piyade mukabelesi kalemi 35139).

128. Varad, *kale'* (Hu. Várad)  
1660: 2034 HYMüCeTGFAMaCr
129. Papmezö, *kale'* (Hu. Papmező)  
1660: 150 HMüTFA
130. Balanoş, *kale'* (Hu. Belényes)  
1660: 120 HFA
131. Senk'ob, *kale'* (Hu. Szentjobb)  
1660: 140 HMüTFA
132. Şolongi, *kale'* (Hu. Solyomkő)  
1660: 59 HMüTA

## Vilayet-i Uyvar 1663-1685

Taken in 1663, Uyvar also became the seat of a *vilayet* without separate *livas*. We find only three castles on its territory. The number of their garrison soldiers is known in 1665 (BOA Başmuhasebe, Uyvar hazinesi kalemi 17082) and in 1675 (BOA Bab-i defteri, Büyük kale 32195). Here is the data of both sources.

133. Uyvar, *kale'* (Hu. Újvár)  
1665: 2546 HYMüCeTGFAMa  
1675: 1117 HMüCeTGFAMa + Y in unknown number
134. Şuran, *kale'* (Hu. Surány)  
1665: 42  
1675: 66 MüF
135. Gradiška, *kale'* (Hu. Komjáti)  
1665: 218  
1675: 463 TAMa



## THE COSTS OF THE OTTOMAN FORTRESS-SYSTEM IN HUNGARY IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES\*

GÁBOR ÁGOSTON

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the troops stationed in the provinces of the Ottoman Empire comprised two basic groups: the garrison soldiers of the border fortresses and the *timar*-holder *sipahis* living in the provinces together with their *cebelü*-soldiers. At first, the majority of the garrison soldiers were paid in cash. However, by the early sixteenth century lack of ready cash meant that payments were often behind and this was especially true in the newly occupied territories. For example, in Cairo the soldiers were dissatisfied with the delay and irregularity of payments as early as 1519.<sup>1</sup> By 1527-28 the Porte was paying nearly one third of the garrison soldiers not in cash, but with income from *timar* estates (*müstahfiz* or *gedik timarı*) situated around the fortresses or in far-away territories.<sup>2</sup> As most of the data at our disposal concern the salaried garrison troops in Hungary, this study will examine these troops, the cost of their payment, and the ratio of these expenses to local incomes.

The purpose of the first section of this study is to survey those sources which contain data by which the number of the Ottoman garrison soldiers in Hungary can be more or less accurately estimated. In the second section of the study I examine the financial costs of maintaining Ottoman fortresses in this faraway province. First, I shall look at salaries which make up the major part of total cash expenditures. Then, in the section entitled 'Other costs', I touch upon the food, weaponry, and

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<sup>1</sup> André Raymond, "Soldiers in Trade: The Case of Ottoman Cairo," *British Society for Middle Eastern Studies Bulletin* 18:1 (1991) 17.

<sup>2</sup> Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "H. 933-934 (M. 1527-1528) malî yılına ait bir bütçe örneği," *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* [hereinafter *İFM*] 15:1-4 (1953-1954) 282.

ammunition supplies and the costs of building and reconstructing the fortresses.

\*

After capturing Buda in 1541, sultan Süleyman chose the town as the centre of the first Ottoman province (*vilayet*) to be formed in Hungary, and appointed Süleyman pasha as its first provincial governor (*beylerbeyi*). The Ottomans wanted to establish themselves in Hungary in the same way as they had done in the Balkans. However, they were never able to consolidate their rule to the same extent that they succeeded in doing so in South-Eastern Europe. For one hundred and fifty years the Hungarian province remained what it was in 1541: the northernmost border area of the empire, a military zone, where one attempt at conquest failed after the other and where a bitter struggle raged for control of the land.

The organization of the new province must have caused a lot of difficulty for the Ottoman administration because the narrow strip of land lying between the Danube and Tisza rivers which the Ottomans did control in 1541, was not of adequate size for the purpose. This is why, besides the district (*sancak*) of Buda and the neighbouring *sancak* of Székesfehérvár (Ístolni Belgrad), such remote *sancaks* as Semendire, İzvornik, Alacahisar, Vulçitrin, Pojega (Pojege), Szeged (Segedin), Eszék (Ösek), and Mohács (Mohaç) had to be subordinated to the provincial governor of Buda.<sup>3</sup> In this way, the *hass*-possessions of the first two provincial governors of Buda lay more than 200 kilometers away from the centre of the province. With the expansion of the Ottoman territories in Hungary, more and more newly established districts were attached to

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<sup>3</sup> According to an undated document (probably from early 1543) the following *sancaks* belonged to Buda: Semendire, İzvornik, Alacahisar, Vulçitrin, Pojega, Segedin, the *liva* of Perini Petri, Erdel (Transylvania), and Temesvár (Temeşvar). Cf. Géza Dávid, "Incomes and Possessions of the *Beglerbegis* of Buda in the Sixteenth Century," in *Süleyman the Magnificent and his Time. Acts of the Parisian Conference. Galeries Nationales du Grand Palais 7-10 March 1990*. Ed. by Gilles Veinstein. Paris, 1992, 395: n. 3. In another list of the *sancaks* of the province of Buda of January 1545, the following *sancaks* were mentioned: Buda, Semendire, Ösek, İzvornik, Alacahisar, Vulçitrin, Segedin, Mohaç, Ístolni Belgrad, and the *liva* of Eger (Eğri). This latter one was abolished after the establishment of the *sancaks* of Hatvan and Nógrád (Novigrad), but in a register of Hatvan—prepared before the occupation of Eger in 1596—we can see a minor administrative unit called 'the *nahiye* of Eğri'. Cf. Gyula Káldy-Nagy, *A budai szandzsák 1559. évi összeírása* [The Cadastral Survey of the Buda *sancak* in 1559]. Budapest, 1977, 9: n. 17.

the *vilayet* of Buda with the result that the estates of the provincial governors of Buda became closer and closer to their posts.<sup>4</sup>

To defend the newly conquered territories, 2,653 soldiers were placed in Buda and 914 in the castle of Pest as early as 1541. To reinforce defence, a further group of 4,196 soldiers was transferred from Güvercinlik, Haram, Semendire, Belgrad, Szalánkemén (Íslankemen), Titel, Pétervárad (Petervaradin), Újlak (Ilok), Eszék, and Pozsega, etc. However, according to a pay register compiled during Süleyman pasha's governorship (September 6, 1541–January 17, 1542) out of the 7,763 soldiers only 5,893 men were present in the castles of the province.<sup>5</sup> During his campaign of 1543, sultan Süleyman raised the number of the garrison soldiers to 2,965 in Buda and 1,481 in Pest, which means that there were 4,446 soldiers in the two castles. At the same time, 2,978 men at arms were left behind for defending the newly captured Székesfehérvár, and another 2,775 for the defence of Esztergom (Estergon). In other words, the new province was guarded by more than ten thousand garrison soldiers.<sup>6</sup> According to the pay registers and the unpublished accounts of the Buda treasury, the number of mercenary troops in the Buda province was around 10-11,000 in the second half of the sixteenth century.<sup>7</sup>

It soon became apparent that the cost of so many troops was a great burden on the local treasury. Referring to İbrahim Peçevi (Peçuyllu), the famous seventeenth-century Ottoman chronicler,<sup>8</sup> Lajos Fekete was of the opinion that the province of Buda was dependent on considerable financial support from Istanbul. Peçevi stated that the tax from Egypt, allegedly 300,000 gold coins, had to be brought to Buda each year to cover the deficit.<sup>9</sup> Although Hungarian historians and Ottomanists alike have

<sup>4</sup> Dávid, *op. cit.*, 385-394. *Idem*, "Ottoman Administrative Strategies in Western Hungary," in *Studies in Ottoman History in Honour of Professor V. L. Ménage*. Ed. by Colin Heywood and Colin Imber. Istanbul, 1994, 31-43.

<sup>5</sup> Lajos Fekete, *Budapest a törökkorban* [Budapest Under Ottoman Rule]. Budapest, 1944, 125. Cf. also Káldy-Nagy, *op. cit.*, 7.

<sup>6</sup> Lajos Fekete, *Buda and Pest Under Turkish Rule*. (Studia Turco-Hungarica, 3.) Ed. by Gyula Káldy-Nagy. Budapest, 1976, 17.

<sup>7</sup> Gábor Ágoston, "A magyarországi török végvárak fenntartásának és ellátásának néhány kérdése [Some Questions of the Maintenance and Supply of the Ottoman Border Fortresses in Hungary]," in *Végvárak és régiók a XVI-XVII. században*. (Studia Agriensia, 14.) Ed. by Tivadar Petercsák and Jolán Szabó. Eger, 1993, 311-330. Klára Hegyi, "The Ottoman Military Force in Hungary," in *Hungarian-Ottoman Military and Diplomatic Relations in the Age of Süleyman the Magnificent*. Ed. by Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor. Budapest, 1994, 146-147.

<sup>8</sup> İbrahim Peçevi, *Tarih-i Peçevi*. I. İstanbul, 1864, 36.

<sup>9</sup> Fekete, *Budapest a törökkorban*, 250 and *Buda and Pest*, 63-64.

generally accepted Peçevi's claim concerning these subsidies from the Egyptian treasury as fact, archival sources, as Caroline Finkel has pointed out, have supplied hardly any evidence to support this idea so far.<sup>10</sup>

At the beginning, the province of Buda did in fact close each financial year with a considerable deficit. As early as the end of 1542 Tranquillus Andronicus, Ferdinand of Habsburg's envoy (*legatus*) to the Porte, reported the unprecedented news that the imperial central treasury was completely empty and that the Ottomans had failed to pay their garrison soldiers for two years, because the defence of Buda had consumed all the money.<sup>11</sup> In 1552-53, 22 million *akçe* that is 4,410 thousand gold coins had to be sent to Buda from the imperial central treasury.<sup>12</sup> The annual payment made to the 10,328 soldiers stationed in the castles of the province amounted to 23,062,862 *akçe* in 1558-59. As opposed to this, the income reached only 6,434,578 *akçe*. Although the incomes in the 1559-60 financial year increased to 8,833,839, the expenditure was still over 23 million *akçe* (23,497,626 *akçe*), i.e. the deficit was considerable in both years.<sup>13</sup> Calculated in golden florins the deficit in 1558-59 was 225,506 and in the following year 196,828.<sup>14</sup> In other words, the incomes of the province of Buda covered only 28% of the expenses in 1558-59 and 38% in the following year.

Although it was obvious from the report of Joachim von Sinzendorf, the Habsburg ambassador to Constantinople, quoted by Sándor Takáts more than fifty years ago,<sup>15</sup> that the province had become self-sufficient by

<sup>10</sup> Caroline Finkel, *The Administration of Warfare: the Ottoman Military Campaigns in Hungary, 1593-1606*. (Beihefte zur Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, Bd. 14.) Wien, 1988, 292.

<sup>11</sup> Pál Török, "A török birodalom pénzügyei Szolimán korában [The State of Finances of the Ottoman Empire Under Süleyman]," *Jahrbuch des Wiener Ungarischen Historischen Institutes* 2 (1932) 77. For the text of the report, see *Austro-Turcica 1541-1552. Diplomatiscche Akten des habsburgischen Gesandtschaftsverkehrs mit der Hohen Pforte im Zeitalter Süleymans des Prächtigen*. (Südosteuropäische Arbeiten, 95.) Bearbeitet von Srećko M. Džaja unter Mitarbeit von Günter Weiß. In Verbindung mit Mathias Bernath herausgegeben von Karl Nehring. München, 1995, 21-30.

<sup>12</sup> Antal Velics-Ernő Kammerer, *Magyarországi török kincstári defterek* [Ottoman Fiscal Defters of Hungary]. I-II. Budapest, 1886-1890, I. 73.

<sup>13</sup> See Lajos Fekete-Gyula Káldy-Nagy, *Rechnungsbücher türkischer Finanzstellen in Buda (Ofen) 1550-1580. Türkischer Text*. Budapest, 1962, 770-771.

<sup>14</sup> For the exchange of the *akçe* to golden florins, see Klára Hegyi, *Török berendezkedés Magyarországon* [Ottoman Administration in Hungary]. (História Könyvtár, Monográfiák, 7.) Budapest, 1995, 40.

<sup>15</sup> Sándor Takáts, *A török hódoltság korából* [From the Period of Ottoman Rule in Hungary]. Budapest, s. a. 141. See also Géza Pálffy, "A magyarországi török és a királyi végvárrendszer fenntartásának kérdéséhez [The Costs of the Ottoman and the Habsburg Border Castle Systems in Hungary]," *Keletkutatás* 1995 tavasz, 63.

the end of the 1570s, historians continued to argue that attempts to maintain Ottoman rule in Hungary inflicted heavy losses on the Porte.<sup>16</sup> The only exception is a short footnote by Lajos Fekete, in which he expressed his doubts that the Hungarian province could be regarded as showing a deficit throughout Ottoman rule. In his opinion, the situation might have changed by the time of Arslan pasha's governorship.<sup>17</sup> Since he could not present any archival evidence to support his view, Fekete himself emphasized again and again that the province produced considerable deficit.<sup>18</sup> Without denying that deficits were occurring in the Hungarian provinces, I would like to draw attention to some aspects which reveal that the question is more complex than has been supposed, and suggest that our former understanding should, at least partly, be revised.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> See for example the latest representative summary of the Hungarian Marxist historiography: *Magyarország története tíz kötetben. III. Magyarország története 1526-1686* [The History of Hungary in Ten Volumes. III. The History of Hungary 1526-1686]. Ed. by Ágnes R. Várkonyi. Budapest, 1985, 463-464. (Relevant part by István Sinkovics.)

<sup>17</sup> Fekete, *Budapest a törökkorban*, 155: n. 86.

<sup>18</sup> Géza Perjés, a military historian, even managed to base a provocative theory on the data, suggesting considerable financial deficits in the province. He argued that Süleyman knew what losses would be caused by the occupation of Hungary, and, because the sultan was also of the view that Hungary lay outside the *action radius* of the Ottoman army, he tried to avoid it by all means. In Perjés' opinion, Süleyman sought to force a vassal status on Hungary and to transform it into a buffer state between his empire and the Habsburgs. Cf. Géza Perjés, *Mohács. Budapest, 1979*, also *idem, The Fall of the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohács, 1526-Buda, 1541*. (Atlantic Studies on Society in Change, 56; War and Society in Eastern Central Europe, 26.) Boulder, Colorado, 1989. It should be noted, however, that Hungarian historians have almost unanimously rejected both the mechanical use of the *action radius* theory and the so called 'Süleyman's offer'. Cf. Pál Fodor, "Ottoman Policy Towards Hungary, 1520-1541," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 45 (1991) 271-345 and Gábor Ágoston, "The Boundaries of an Empire: the Action Radius Theory and the Ottoman Conquest of Hungary," (Paper presented at the "Ottoman and Russian Imperial Legacies in the Balkans" conference organized by the Turkish Studies Association of North America, May 10, 1996. McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada).

<sup>19</sup> To the best of my knowledge, it was Caroline Finkel who first studied the unpublished treasury accounts of the Buda province, and first drew attention to the considerable fall in the deficit in the 1570s (Finkel, *op. cit.*, 291-292). Her book and the long conversations with her during my repeated research in Istanbul from 1988 onwards had a considerable impact on the formulation of this study, for which I am indebted to her. I presented my results on the topic for the first time at a conference in 1991 (cf. "A magyarországi török végvárak fenntartásának és ellátásának néhány kérdése," see above in note 7), then I published them in several forms (*A hódolt Magyarország* [The Conquered Hungary]. Budapest, 1992, 82-91 and *Pannon Enciklopédia. A magyarság története* [The History of the Hungarians]. Budapest, 1994, 125-127). In the meantime, Finkel dealt with the costs of Ottoman warfare in a theoretical article, which also inspired the present study; see her "The Cost of Ottoman Warfare and Defence," *Byzantinische Forschungen* 16 (1990) 91-103.

## I. THE GARRISON SOLDIERS

Given the present state of research in the Turkish Archives relating to our topic, we only have fragmentary data on the number of the garrison troops in the Ottoman border fortresses in Hungary. Contemporary Christian sources do not make our task easier either since they are often unreliable and contradictory. The Aulic War Council in Vienna (*Wiener Hofkriegsrat*), the central administrative office of military affairs, for instance, put the number of regular Ottoman garrisons soldiers in their Hungarian provinces in the 1560s at 47,049. In the late sixteenth century, however, their number was estimated at about 23,200.<sup>20</sup> The discrepancy seems to be too significant to explain it with the fluctuation, which, obviously, must be taken into consideration as well. Indeed, it occurred on more than one occasion that major forces were transferred from the Hungarian front to the Eastern frontier of the empire. Referring to the report of Hans Rueber, the Upper Hungarian captain general (1568-1584), Di Cavalli, Venetian Ambassador to the Habsburg court in Prague, sent word as early as July 1579 that due to the Persian war (1578-1590) the Ottomans were withdrawing many of their soldiers from Hungary.<sup>21</sup> Two years later, on July 25, 1581, another Venetian ambassadorial report from Prague informs that the pasha of Buda himself complained to the Porte, because his troops were taken away to the Persian war. The pasha cited this development as the cause of the recent losses inflicted on his forces by the Hungarians in the province. He was of the opinion that if the Ottoman fortresses were not reinforced in time, Hungary could easily be lost.<sup>22</sup> Although Venetian and Habsburg ambassadorial reports have preserved invaluable information for us, we have to bear it in mind that, with regard to the history of the Ottoman Empire, they are merely external sources and therefore their reliability has to be checked, wherever and whenever possible, through an examination of internal Ottoman archival sources. In the present case, it is thought-provoking that the treasury accounts of Buda surviving

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<sup>20</sup> Ignác Acsády, *Magyarország három részre oszlásának története 1526-1608* [The History of the Division of Hungary into Three Parts]. Budapest, 1897, 440 and Imre Szántó, *A végvári rendszer kiépítése és fénykora Magyarországon 1541-1593* [The Establishment and Heyday of the Border Defence System in Hungary 1541-1593]. Budapest, 1980, 132: n. 457.

<sup>21</sup> Mór Kárpáthy-Kravjánszky, *Rudolf uralkodásának első tíz éve (1576-1586). A velencei Kir. Állami Levéltár császári udvarból való követjelentései alapján* [The First Ten Years of the Rule of Rudolf I. On the Basis of the Ambassadorial Reports of the Venetian Royal State Archives from the Imperial Court]. Budapest, 1933, 239: No. 71.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 243: No. 105.

from the years of 1579-81 contradict the Venetian reports, at least in respect of the data concerning the number of Ottoman salaried troops stationed in Hungary and paid for by the local treasury: the number of these troops in the period discussed, as will be shown below, appears to have been stable.

The uncertainty about the number of Ottoman garrison troops in Hungary is especially striking when it comes to figures for the seventeenth century. Historians have tried to overcome the lack of sources by giving sometimes feasible, sometimes hardly feasible estimates. These estimates have varied even in recent publications from 30 to 70 thousand, depending on how much the authors stuck to the published data or let their imaginations run free.<sup>23</sup> For the historian who is aware of the richness of the Ottoman archival sources it is astounding to see the confidence with which European historians talk about the Ottoman army and, in general, the history of the Ottoman Empire without disposing of even the most basic knowledge of the related sources and literature. And this remains true despite the fact that the Ottoman Empire is not as unapproachable and mysterious as it used to be fifty years ago.<sup>24</sup>

#### 1. THE PAY REGISTERS

To establish the number of paid soldiers in the Ottoman fortresses in Hungary, the pay lists, the so called *mevacib defterleri* are of great help. Several pay lists about the Ottoman castles in Hungary have survived and these include the names and pay of soldiers serving in a fortress or in several fortresses of a district. Hungarian historians of the nineteenth century discovered the value of the Ottoman pay registers kept in the *Österreichische Nationalbibliothek* in Vienna (mainly concerning the sixteenth century). Antal Velics published several of these registers sometimes translating the whole text into Hungarian and sometimes only summarizing the most important data (with some mistakes occurring in reading and translation).<sup>25</sup> Lajos Fekete also drew attention to the significance of the pay lists and briefly dealt with certain units of the garrison troops in his famous palaeographic work. He also published some pay

<sup>23</sup> *Magyarország története 1526-1686, 1589.* (Relevant part by Ágnes R. Várkonyi.)

<sup>24</sup> On this, see Rhoads Murphey's important review article on Kenneth M. Setton, *Venice, Austria, and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century* (Philadelphia, 1991) in *Archivum Ottomanicum* 13 (1993-1994) 371-383.

<sup>25</sup> Velics, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

lists himself.<sup>26</sup> Recently, Claudia Römer used some of the material and modified some of Fekete's definitions. She published detailed data on numbers of *müstahfizes*, *müteferrikas*, *topçıs*, 'azabs, *farises*, and *martoloses* in particular garrisons.<sup>27</sup> Unfortunately, a similar publication of the ample sources of the Istanbul archives has not been prepared yet, though several detailed pay *defters* are kept there which cover the fortresses or the periods that are not included in the material published by Velics. The most valuable documents of the Istanbul collection are those prepared in the seventeenth century since the majority of the sources found in Vienna are from the sixteenth century. Material on those fortresses which were situated at important strategic points is of particular interest.<sup>28</sup>

Such a fortress was Kanizsa (Kanija). This had been the gateway into Styria and Austria during Hungarian rule and was made the centre of a new *vilayet* right after its capture by the Ottomans in 1600. We know from the pay lists published by Antal Velics that 1,386 soldiers were on the pay-roll there in 1618 and 1,372 in the following year.<sup>29</sup> A great advantage of the unpublished Istanbul archival material is that it offers information on the distribution of soldiers and shows us the changes that had taken place after our last data available from the Viennese archives.

TABLE 1  
The number and distribution of Ottoman soldiers stationed in Kanizsa<sup>30</sup>

	02.12.1652.–21.11.1653.	22.11.1653–10.11.1654	31.11.1655–19.10.1656
anbarcı	7	7	7
çavuş	3	3	3
müstahfız	87	87	87
topçı	89	89	89
cebeci	25	25	25
mehter	6	6	6
faris	624	624	623
'azab	829	830	829
Total	1670	1671	1669

<sup>26</sup> Ludwig Fekete, *Die Siyâqat-Schrift in der türkischen Finanzverwaltung*. I–II. Budapest, 1955, I. 96–98 and the related tables.

<sup>27</sup> Claudia Römer, *Osmanische Festungsbesetzungen in Ungarn zur Zeit Murâds III. Dargestellt anhand von Petitionen zur Stellenvergabe*. (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-Historische Klasse, Schriften der Balkan-Kommission, Philologische Abteilung, 35.) Wien, 1995, 23–32.

<sup>28</sup> I started to collect the pay registers of Hungary in the Başbakanlık Arşivi, Istanbul, in 1988. Similar research was carried out at that time by Mark Stein. In the early 1990s, Klára Hegyi also began to collect together the pay *defters* of Buda; she is planning to prepare a publication of sources similar to that of A. Velics.

<sup>29</sup> Velics, *op. cit.*, I. 402–405.

<sup>30</sup> Istanbul, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi [hereinafter BOA], Maliyeden Müdevver Defterleri [hereinafter MM] 2113, 5–68. Another copy: MM 6188, 10–96; MM 4457, 8–94 and MM 2843, 8–94.

The detailed data show that in Kanizsa, contrary to the situation in most of the Ottoman fortresses in Hungary, only 37% of the soldiers were cavalry while nearly 60% were infantry and artillery.

It is not surprising that a similar number and distribution of soldiers can be found in the Hungarian border fortresses facing Kanizsa. The loss of this stronghold necessitated the reorganization of the south-western Hungarian border defence system and the establishment of a separate defence line facing Kanizsa.<sup>31</sup> In the border fortresses charged with the task of opposing Kanizsa (*Gegen Canischa werts Liegenten Granitzen*), that is in the castles of Körmend, Egerszeg, Pölöske, Kapornak, Egervár, Kemend, Lövdő, Magyarosd, Tótfalu, Kiskomárom, Zalavár, Szentgrót, Szentgyörgy, and Bér the number of soldiers was around 1,300 between 1633 and 1637, and roughly 1,500 between 1637 and 1640. These Hungarian garrisons were fairly similar to the Ottoman Kanizsa not only in respect of the total number of their soldiers but also in the division of the defending troops: 59-64% of the soldiers were infantry, 36-41% were cavalry.<sup>32</sup> The relatively high number of infantry in both Ottoman Kanizsa and the opposite Hungarian castles can be explained by the geographic situation of the fortresses and the marshy character of the region.<sup>33</sup>

The pay registers of the fortress of Várad (Varad) and the *palankas* belonging to it are equally interesting. According to the earliest known pay register of Várad, which contained payments for the period between October 4 and December 3, 1660, altogether 2,034 soldiers were paid 19,955 *akçe* daily. At the same time, in Belényes 120 people were paid with 1,189 *akçe*, in Szentjobb 140 persons with 1,463 *akçe*, in Súlyomkő 59 people with 549 *akçe* and in Papmező 150 persons with 1,432 *akçe* daily. Thus, the total number of soldiers in the newly formed garrison of Várad was 2,503 people with a payment of 24,588 *akçe* a day, their payment for

<sup>31</sup> See Géza Pálffy's article in the present volume.

<sup>32</sup> József Kelenik, "A nemzetiségi megoszlás, a veszteségek és a fluktuáció mértéke tizennégy Kanizsa elleni végvár helyőrségében (1633-1640) [The Nationality Division, Losses, and the Extent of Fluctuation in the Fourteen Border Fortresses Facing Kanizsa]," in *Végváarak és régiók*, 102 and *idem*, "A Kanizsa elleni végvidék katonai erejének változásai 1633-1638 [Changes in the Military Power of the Border Defence System Opposing Kanizsa]," *Zalai Gyűjtemény* 36:1 (1995) 5-51.

<sup>33</sup> For this, see József Kelenik, "A kanizsai védelmi övezet és természetföldrajzi adottságai a XVI. század 70-es éveinek végén [The Defence Zone of Kanizsa and its Geographical Characteristics in the Late Seventies of the Sixteenth Century]," in *Végvár és környezet*. (Studia Agriensia, 15.) Ed. by Tivadar Petercsák and Ernő Pető. Eger, 1995, 163-172.

three months (85 days) being 2,089,980 *akçe*, and their annual payment (340 days) 8,359,920 *akçe*.<sup>34</sup> The *defter* renders it possible to examine the division of the garrison, too.

TABLE 2  
*The garrison of Várad and its belonging castles in 1660*

	Várad	Belényes	Szentjobb	Sólyomkő	Papmező
cami-servants	15	2	4	3	3
janissaries	400				
gönüllü	400				
çavuş	30				
scribe, mehter	17				
kapudan	52				
müstahfız	180		26	25	20
topçı	80		8	6	10
cebeci	60				
faris	400	70	82		70
'azab	300	48	20	25	47
martolos	100				
Total	2034	120	140	59	150

Further detailed pay registers show that hardly a year after its capture there were only 1,199 soldiers in Várad and the fortresses belonging to it. In other words, the size of the initial garrison had decreased by more than a half, and, as a consequence, the annual payment hardly exceeded 4 million *akçe*.<sup>35</sup> The reason for the fall remains unknown for the time being, but registers prepared one year later reveal that by that time the number of garrison soldiers had risen to the same level as it had been at the beginning. In September 1662, 2,503 persons were paid again.<sup>36</sup>

The pay registers of Várad taken as examples are instructive from the point of view of source analysis. They show that the numerical data provided by Ottoman chroniclers and other narrative sources is to be treated with caution. Estimates based on an undiscerning acceptance of Evliya Çelebi's data (according to which the garrison of Várad consisted of ten thousands of soldiers) are doubtful. More realistic are the estimates

<sup>34</sup> BOA D-PYM (Piyade mukabelesi kalemi) 35139. The detailed but unfortunately fragmentary register of Várad including names from the period between 1 Rebiülevvel 1071 and 10 Muharrem 1092 (November 4, 1660–September 5, 1661): BOA D-BKL (Büyük kale kalemi) 32184.

<sup>35</sup> BOA MM 2563, 3-23.

<sup>36</sup> BOA MM 106, fols. 2r-22v.

of the nineteenth-century Hungarian historian, Vince Bunyitay who put the number of soldiers surrendering in Várad in 1692 at 2,000 (in addition to a similar number of civilians).<sup>37</sup> Taking into account the size of the castle, even this number would seem slightly high as, at least according to one researcher, it is unlikely that more than 2,000 people could be quartered in Várad.<sup>38</sup>

Other lessons can be drawn from the case of Érsekújvár (Uyvar) occupied in 1663 and made the centre of a new province right away. Evliya Çelebi asserted that there were nine thousand garrison soldiers: three thousand cavalry, the same number of infantry *'azabs* and *göniüllüs*, two thousand local janissaries, and one thousand artillerymen and gunsmiths. Historians were a little more cautious and put the number between four and seven thousand.<sup>39</sup> As opposed to this, according to the first known pay register of the castle, in the months of Muharrem–Safar 1075 (July 25–September 21, 1664) altogether 634 persons, and in the next two months 876 were paid.<sup>40</sup> However, it can be seen from the treasury account of the *vilayet* of Újvár that the pay register under discussion contains only those soldiers who were remunerated locally, and that there were altogether 2,546 persons in the castle, among them 1,430 janissaries, 204 *cebecis*, and 60 *topçıs* paid by the Porte.<sup>41</sup> This latter example illuminates the shortcomings of pay registers and fragmentary *defters* as well.

<sup>37</sup> Vince Bunyitay, *Nagyvárad a török foglálás korában 1660-1692* [Nagyvárad in the Era of Ottoman Rule]. Budapest, 1892, 88.

<sup>38</sup> Csaba Csorba, "A török várak ellenállási lehetőségei a felszabadító háborúk során [The Possibilities of Resistance of the Ottoman Border Fortresses During the Reconquest]," in *Végvár és társadalom a visszafoglaló háborúk korában, 1686-1699*. (Studia Agriensia, 9.) Ed. by Sándor Bodó and Jolán Szabó. Eger, 1989, 181.

<sup>39</sup> Mihály Matunák, *Érsekújvár a török uralom alatt 1663-1685* [Érsekújvár Under Ottoman Rule]. Nyitra, 1901. Even the Ottomanist József Blaskovics, who published the cadastral surveys of Újvár, thought that when the grand vizier Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed pasha set off from Újvár at the end of October 1663, he left behind a garrison of 4,000, and that this number could have risen to 5-6,000 later on. Cf. József Blaskovics, *Érsekújvár és vidéke a török hódoltság korában* [Érsekújvár and its Surroundings in the Era of Ottoman Rule]. Budapest, 1989, 16, 837. Without naming his source Uzunçarşılı estimated the number of initial garrison soldiers at 4,000; cf. İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*. III/1. Ankara, 1983, 407.

<sup>40</sup> BOA D–BKL 32187.

<sup>41</sup> BOA D–BŞM UYH (Başmuhasabe kalemı, Uyvar hazinesi) 17082, 8. Cf. Hegyi, *Török berendezkedés*, 117 and *eadem*, "The Ottoman Military Force," 146-147.

TABLE 3  
*The number of garrison soldiers in the province of Buda  
 in the second half of the sixteenth century according  
 to the treasury accounts<sup>42</sup>*

Year	Total number of garrison soldiers	
1556-57	10,402	–
1557-58	10,328	–
1558-59	10,353	–
1569-70	10,616	müstahfız, topçı and others 2,240, gönüllü 945, faris 5,567, re'is and 'azab 1, 982, martolos 1,586, janissaries 945
1570-71	10,681	gönüllü, faris, müstahfız, 'azab, topçı and others 9,745, janissaries 936
1571-72	10,786	müstahfız, 'azab, faris and martolos 9,587, gönüllü 298, janissaries 901
1572-73	10,872	müstahfız, topçı and others 2,272, gönüllü 301, faris 3,718, re'is and 'azab 2,035, martolos 1,598, janissaries 948
1573-74	10,843	janissaries 968, müstahfız, topçı and cebeci 2,238, gönüllü and faris 4,002, martolos 1,554, re'is and 'azab 2,051
1574-75	11,023	mülazim 13, janissaries 1037, müstahfız and topçı 2,284, gönüllü and faris 4094, re'is and 'azab 2,039, martolos 1,556
1575-76	10,834	mülazim 17, janissaries 929, gönüllü and faris 4,062, müstahfız and topçı 2,259, re'is and 'azab 1,985, martolos 1,582
1578	10,895	mülazim 12, gönüllü 300, janissaries 816, müstahfız, topçı, cebeci and kumbaracı 2,277, re'is and 'azab 2,031, faris 3,874, martolos 1,585
1578-79	10,753	mülazim 28, gönüllü 298, janissaries 817, faris 3,780, müstahfız, topçı, cebeci and kumbaracı 2,308, re'is and 'azab 2,061, martolos 1,461
1580-81	10,816	mülazim 15, gönüllü 298, janissaries 885, faris 3,779, müstahfız, topçı, cebeci, and kumbaracı 2,304, re'is and 'azab 2,070, martolos 1,466
1590-91	10,004	

<sup>42</sup> Data for the years 1556-59 were published by Fekete-Káldy-Nagy, *op. cit.*, 425-426, 570, 674. Data for the years 1569-78 are registered in BOA MM 1561 and were first published by Ágoston, "A magyarországi török végvárak," 327-328. Data for the years 1578-80 are from BOA MM 498. For 1590-91, see BOA MM 3762 and Hegyi, "The Ottoman Military Force," 139.

However instructive these detailed pay registers may be, they have one great disadvantage: the data they contain are rather limited both in time and space. They provide reliable information only about the salaried troops of a single fortress or a confined region over a relatively short period. Despite their limitations all the surviving pay registers concerning a fortress or a fortress district are worth collecting. Due to the extent of their volume these detailed pay registers are unlikely to be published, the publication of the summarized data obtained from them, however, makes it possible to examine the distribution of the soldiers, as well as the changes in their number and in their financial situation. The comparison of data between the Ottoman and the Hungarian border fortresses (as we have seen in the example of Kanizsa) renders it possible to draw further conclusions.

## 2. THE TREASURY ACCOUNTS OF THE *VILAYET*

Less detailed but very informative data can be found in the treasury accounts of the *vilayets*. The estimations concerning the strength of the Ottoman strongholds accepted by historians are mainly based on this second type of source material.

Recently, Klára Hegyi drew attention to the possible discrepancies between data found in the treasury accounts and those included in the pay registers. Of these the most conspicuous was to be observed in 1568-69. In that year the pay register (covering 39 castles, 14 *palankas* and one fortified town of the 15 *sancaks* of the *vilayet* of Buda) recorded payments being made to 12,428 soldiers in the first half of the year and 12,484 in the second, while the treasury account listed much less, only 10,616 persons.<sup>43</sup> The contradiction, however, is merely a seeming one.

First, the relevant smaller figure in the treasury accounts relates to the year of 1569-70, whereas the pay register contains data for the previous year. The treasury accounts, however, also indicate the fact that in 1568 and 1569 there were 12,428 and 12,484 soldiers respectively, paid by the local treasury.<sup>44</sup> Further, we are informed by a decree sent to the provincial governor of Buda on February 28, 1568 that following the occupation of Szigetvár, Babócsa, and other fortresses in 1566, the Porte

<sup>43</sup> Velics, *op. cit.*, II. 390 and Hegyi, "The Ottoman Military Force," 140.

<sup>44</sup> Above the number of 10,616 which relates to the year of 977/1569-70, the following note can be read: "in the previous year (i.e. 976/1568-69) 12,484 persons".

ordered the pasha of Buda to increase the number of salaried troops at his disposal to 12,500.<sup>45</sup> The higher figures in the pay register therefore reveal the fact that local authorities raised the number of soldiers in accordance with the imperial order. The number of salaried troops in the province, however, soon decreased to the previous level again, as is reflected in the figures relating to the year of 1569-70 and preserved in the treasury accounts.

From the combined figures of the pay registers and of the treasury accounts, it can be concluded that the number of soldiers in the fortresses of the province of Buda was generally about 10-11 thousand in the late sixteenth century.

Estimating the number of troops in the province of Temesvár, which was set up in 1552, at 4,000,<sup>46</sup> the number of salaried garrison troops in the two Hungarian provinces can be gauged at between 14-15 thousand persons. It should be emphasized once again that this figure contains only the garrison soldiers receiving their salary in cash and does not include the garrison troops paid by *timar*, and also excludes both the *sipahi* and the *cebelü* troops.

In the seventeenth century the Ottoman fortresses in Hungary were to be found in six provinces instead of the previous two: the Ottomans occupied Eger (Eğri) in 1596 and organized a new *vilayet* around it immediately. This was followed by the provinces of Kanizsa (1600), Várad (1660) and Újvár (1663). This makes the situation more complicated because we have very few sources at our disposal from the same period concerning all six *vilayets*. On the basis of the figures which have come to light so far, the number of salaried troops in the Ottoman border fortresses in the four *vilayets* of the 1610s can be put at 19,000 persons. By the second half of the century, there were 18,000 soldiers in the three provinces of Várad, Újvár, and Buda alone. Taking into consideration that our data do not include the garrison soldiers who were serving in the fortresses of the provinces of Temesvár, Eger, and Kanizsa, whose number in the 1610s had been 10,877, the figures for the years 1662-63 indicate a considerable rise in the number of salaried soldiers stationed in Hungary.

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<sup>45</sup> BOA Mühimme Defterleri [hereinafter MD] 7, p. 325. No. 934. Cf. also Römer, *op. cit.*, 33.

<sup>46</sup> Hegyi, "The Ottoman Military Force," 143 and Pál Fodor, "Das Wilajet von Temeschwar zur Zeit der osmanischen Eroberung," *Südost-Forschungen* 55 (1996) 35.

TABLE 4  
*The number of Ottoman garrison soldiers  
 in the Hungarian provinces in the 1610s<sup>47</sup>*

Name of the province	Date	Number of the garrison soldiers
Buda	1613	7,836
Temesvár	1613	3,679
Eger	1605-06	3,409
Kanizsa	1618	3,789
Total		18,713

TABLE 5  
*The number of the Ottoman garrison soldiers in the vilayets of Várad, Újvár,  
 and Buda in 1662-63*

Name of the province	Date	Number of the garrison soldiers
Várad <sup>48</sup>	1662	2,503
Újvár <sup>49</sup>	1663	2,806
Buda <sup>50</sup>	1662-63	12,734
Total		18,043

As we have seen, the treasury accounts of Buda recorded data both on local soldiers and on the janissaries of the Porte. Problems with the latter only arise in cases where these troops received their payment directly from the imperial central treasury and not from the local one. In such cases, these soldiers were not listed in the local treasury accounts. The annual accounts of the imperial central treasury in 1669-70 show that out of the 53,849 janissaries, who received their payment from the Porte, 14,379 men (26,7%) were serving in the border fortresses.<sup>51</sup> Out of the 14,379 janissaries, 2,299 men were stationed in the most important Ottoman fortresses in Hungary (i.e. in Buda, Székesfehérvár, Nógrád [Novigrad], Esztergom, Kanizsa, Újvár, Várad, and Eger).

<sup>47</sup> Hegyi, *Török berendezkedés*, 112-113.

<sup>48</sup> BOA MM 106, fols. 2r-22v.

<sup>49</sup> BOA D-BŞM UYH 17082.

<sup>50</sup> BOA D-BŞM BDH (Budin hazinesi) 16728, 16729.

<sup>51</sup> Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "1079-1080 (1669-1670) mâli yılına ait bir Osmanlı bütçesi ve ekleri," *İFM* 17:1-4 (1955-1956) 263.

## II. THE COSTS OF THE FORTRESSES

### 1. PAYMENT TO SOLDIERS

When underlining the huge deficits run up by the Ottoman border fortresses in Hungary, Hungarian historians tend to forget that the existence of such deficits was hardly an exceptional phenomenon. The consolidation of the conquests and the maintenance of border fortresses incurred a heavy burden everywhere in the period. During the regency of Margaret of Parma, Spain was obliged to send regular aid to the Netherlands to balance its budget, which throughout the period registered a considerable annual deficit. Between 1561 and 1567, Philip II sent an average of one million florins to his sister, Margaret of Parma, annually. In 1567, he had to support the duke of Alva with a further sum of 1.65 million florins. Between 1568 and 1571 8.25 million florins was sent from Spain to the Netherlands. Since Philip II became unable to support the Netherlands due to the immense costs of the Mediterranean struggles, Alva, by relentlessly collecting the strictly imposed new taxes, managed to achieve that the province became almost self-supporting by 1570 and 1571. The miracle only lasted for a couple of months, though. Being unable to bear the burden of the new taxes introduced without mercy, many of the Netherlanders broke down and in 1572 the dissatisfied crowd unanimously went to the aid of the enemy of the government, the Prince of Orange.<sup>52</sup>

Similarly, Spanish *presidios* in the Maghrib relied heavily on Spain. In the time of their creation it was supposed that they could act as a means of controlling the Saharan trade of the central and eastern Maghrib and that with the revenues from this trade they could become self-supporting. However, it soon became obvious that the cost of maintaining the *presidios* was much higher than the trade revenue from the region controlled by them. In most cases the *presidios* were dependent on Spain not only for the soldiers' pay, but for munitions and food supplies as well.<sup>53</sup>

However, we do not have to go so far to find similar examples. The extent of the costs incurred by the Habsburgs through the upkeep of their

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<sup>52</sup> Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567-1659. The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries' Wars*. Cambridge, 1990, 139-141.

<sup>53</sup> Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period*. Cambridge, 1987, 147.

border defence system in Hungary in the sixteenth century is well-known. Revenues coming from the shrunken territory of the Hungarian Kingdom in the late sixteenth century hardly exceeded 750,000 Rhenish florins, out of which at most only 375,000 Rhenish florins was spent on defence in the strict sense.<sup>54</sup> At the same time, the Venetian ambassador estimated the cost of defending the country at 600,000 Rhenish florins in 1555 and at 900,000 in 1563.<sup>55</sup> According to the calculations of the Court Chamber (*Hofkammer*) made in 1578, the cost of upkeep of the Hungarian border fortresses in peace-time amounted to 1,400,000–1,600,000 Rhenish florins, annually. The *Hofkammer* wished to cover this sum partly from the *Türkenhilfe* and partly from revenues from the Austrian and Bohemian provinces. The Chamber thought that only one tenth of the total expenses could be collected from Hungary.<sup>56</sup> In 1607, the Aulic War Council in Vienna came to the same conclusion: the annual pay of the 19,689 soldiers serving in the Hungarian castles was calculated at a total of 1,161,738 Rhenish florins with no increase in revenue from the Hungarian Kingdom.<sup>57</sup> So the maintenance of the Hungarian border fortresses in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries presented an annual burden of 1-1.5 million Rhenish florins on the budget of the Habsburg Empire. Furthermore, this sum includes only the costs of payment to soldiers; the maintenance and provision of the fortresses might have cost a further one million florins. On November 16, 1578, the *Hofkammer* reported that the accumulated debt had reached 10 million florins.<sup>58</sup>

Taking all this into consideration, the amount paid by the Porte to maintain its soldiers stationed in the Hungarian provinces does not seem to have been peculiarly large. Just the opposite: what strikes the eye is how much cheaper it was for the Porte to maintain fortresses in Hungary than it appears to have been for the Habsburgs.

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<sup>54</sup> Bálint Hóman–Gyula Szekfű, *Magyar történet* [Hungarian History]. III. Budapest, 1935, 125-137. Cf. also G. Pálffy's article in this volume.

<sup>55</sup> Pál Szegő, *Végyáraink szervezete a török betelepedésétől a tizenöt éves háború kezdetéig, 1541-1593* [The Structure of the Hungarian Border Fortresses from the Ottoman Occupation to the Beginning of the Fifteen Years' War, 1541-1593]. Budapest, 1911, 212.

<sup>56</sup> Hóman–Szekfű, *op. cit.*, 156. Kárpáthy-Kravjánszky, *op. cit.*, 43.

<sup>57</sup> Kálmán Benda, "A magyarországi végyári vonal fenntartásának költségei a XVII. század elején [The Cost of the Hungarian Border Defence System in the Early Seventeenth Century]," in *Magyarországi végyárak a XVI-XVII. században*. (Studia Agriensia, 3.) Ed. by Sándor Bodó and Jolán Szabó. Eger, 1983, 49-59.

<sup>58</sup> Kárpáthy-Kravjánszky, *op. cit.*, 43.

TABLE 6  
*The cost of Habsburg defence in Hungary*<sup>59</sup>

Year	Total pay for soldiers serving in the Hungarian border fortresses (Rhenish florins)	Percentage of soldiers' pay that could have been covered by revenues from Hungary	Percentage of soldiers' pay that could have been covered by the sums spent for military purposes
1554	544,161	100	69
1556	757,109	99	50
1556-57	695,752	100	54
1564	546,568	100	69
1572	1,064,839	70	35
1576	1,372,318	55	27
1577	1,056,084	71	36
1578	1,056,084	71	36
1582	1,067,232	70	35
1588	1,000,871	75	37
1593	1,038,421	72	36

As for the costs incurred by the Porte in Hungary, it should not be forgotten that the deficit of the years 1558-60 was not typical for the whole period of Ottoman rule. In any examination of the costs of maintaining the Ottoman border fortresses in Hungary in the sixteenth century, at least three phases should be discerned:

- a. the period in which Ottoman rule and administration was established, lasting until the consolidation of power;
- b. the era of consolidated power and of the 'peace-time' balance of power;
- c. the time of the long Habsburg-Ottoman war at the end of the century.

*The financial situation of the province before the consolidation of Ottoman administration*

The first phase closes in the early 1570s with the years of consolidation after the peace treaty of Adrianople (Edirne) of 1568. The frequently quoted data on the deficit of the Buda treasury pertain to this first period

<sup>59</sup> Pálffy, "A magyarországi török és királyi végvárrendszer," 82.

when the *hinterland* of the *vilayet* had not yet been established and revenue remained unstable.<sup>60</sup>

TABLE 7  
*The financial situation of the vilayet of Buda in 1558-60*<sup>61</sup>

Year	Local revenues	Support by Istanbul	Soldiers' pay	Percentage of pay covered by local revenue
1558-59	6,434,578 <i>akçe</i>	16,916,945	23,062,862	27,90
1559-60	8,833,839 <i>akçe</i>	18,200,000	23,236,931	38,01

Regular support was sent to Buda by the imperial central treasury in the early sixties as well,<sup>62</sup> and the province needed considerable support until the mid-1570s. Between 1567-68 and 1570-71 (975-978) altogether 753,234 gold pieces (*hasene*) were transferred from Istanbul to Buda. The value of this financial support at the exchange rate given in the account (1 gold=65 *akçe*) was 48,960,210 *akçe*.<sup>63</sup> Over four years, this means an annual transfer of 188,308 gold worth 12,240,052 *akçe*. This sum represents a smaller subsidy in relation to the amounts of 16,916,945 *akçe* provided in 1559 and 18,200,000 *akçe* in 1560. If we look at the annual amount of support coming from Istanbul to Buda, we can observe a steady and significant decrease:

975 (July 8, 1567 — June 25, 1568): 352,245 gold pieces (22,895,925 *akçe*)<sup>64</sup>;  
 976 (June 26, 1568 — June 15, 1569): 166,666 gold pieces (10,833,290 *akçe*);  
 977 (June 16, 1569 — June 4, 1570): 157,400 gold pieces (10,231,000 *akçe*);  
 978 (June 5, 1570 — May 26, 1571): 76,923 gold pieces (4,999,995 *akçe*).<sup>65</sup>

<sup>60</sup> This statement needs further refinement concerning certain territories and *sancaks*. In the *sancak* of Simontornya (Šimontorna), the financial situation was the best in 1565, later both in 1570 and 1580 there was a considerable deficit. Géza Dávid, *A Simontornyai szandzsák a 16. században* [The *sancak* of Simontornya in the Sixteenth Century]. Budapest, 1982, 75 ff. Needless to say, the situation of this small *sancak* cannot be generalized for the whole of the *vilayet* of Buda. This is shown by the accounts of revenue and expenses of the *vilayet* of Buda in the 1570s—to be analyzed in details below.

<sup>61</sup> Fekete-Káldy-Nagy, *op. cit.*, 770-772.

<sup>62</sup> BOA MD 6, p. 662, No. 1417 (July 19, 1565). MD 5, p. 159, Nos. 379, 380. (October 17, 1565).

<sup>63</sup> BOA MM 1561, 72-73.

<sup>64</sup> According to the financial account of the imperial treasury in 974-75, which comprises the period from *nevruz* to *nevruz*, that is from March 11, 1567 to March 10, 1568, and so it only partly covers the periods of the treasury accounts of Buda, only a sum of 12,266,665 *akçe* was sent from Istanbul to Buda. Cf. Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "H. 974-975 (M. 1567-1568) mali yılına ait bir Osmanlı bütçesi," *İFM* 19:1-4 (1957-1958) 309.

<sup>65</sup> BOA MM 1561, 72.

If we only had this information, we might make the hasty conclusion that the exclusive reason for the decrease in the subsidy provided by the central treasury was an increase in available local revenues. However, the Buda treasury accounts make it clear that it was also receiving assistance from the treasury of the neighbouring province of Temesvár. In the decade between 977 and 986 (1569/70-1578/79) 56,900,000 *akçe* was sent from Temesvár to Buda to balance the budget of the province of Buda.<sup>66</sup> The fall in the imperial subsidy, therefore, should partly be explained by the support from Temesvár, a province, in which, shortly before, the economic situation had become stable. While in 1567-68 the *vilayet* of Temesvár was still receiving an assistance of 2,400,000 *akçe* itself, its position had soon improved to such an extent that it was able to provide regular support to Buda.<sup>67</sup> For the imperial central treasury it was a great relief that this far away border area was less and less dependent on the support of Istanbul. The picture can be made more accurate by analyzing the financial situation of the province of Buda in the years 1571-1581. Relevant data are summarized in Table 8.

*The financial situation of the province during the consolidation of Ottoman administration*

The table clearly shows that by the early 1570s the situation had improved considerably and that local revenues covered 88% of the costs of payments. Naturally, this did not mean that problems ceased to exist. On July

<sup>66</sup> BOA MM 1561, 73. Cf. also Finkel, *op. cit.*, 291 and Fodor, "Das Temeschwarer," 32-33.

<sup>67</sup> Barkan, "H. 974-975 (M. 1567-1568)," 309 and Fodor, *loc. cit.*

<sup>68</sup> BOA MM 1561 and MM 498. The amounts are given in *penz* and in '*osmani*. As for the exchange rate, the account gives several rates. First it says that two *penz* are worth one '*osmani*, later that 5 *penz* were equal to 2 '*osmani*. Where the account gives the data in both currencies, it is clear that it followed the 5 *penz*=4 '*osmani* rate, which is also confirmed by a record relating to the account of 1578. In the mid-sixteenth century, the '*osmani* was worth 25 percent less than the *akçe*. Under the title 'other revenue rendered to Buda' I included such items as, for example, the revenues from the sale of grain and estates of the treasury, from the fifth of prisoners, from the *berat-* and *tezkere-*fees, or from taxes collected from the *Eflaks* of the *liva* of Sirem or Pojega. Undoubtedly, the most significant out of these was the latter one. The treasury of Buda received 1,412,510 *penz* in 1571-72, 1,140,080 '*osmani* in 1572-73, 1,153,520 '*osmani* in 1573-74, 1,221,483 '*osmani* in 1575-76 and 570,000 '*osmani* in 1578 from this source. After 1579, these items were included among the ordinary revenues of the province. From that time on, revenues rendered to Buda were called *emval-i müteferrika*, that is various incomes, such as the *beytümäl*, the *tapu-*fee, the profit deriving from the sale of grain kept in the stores of Buda.

<sup>69</sup> The register includes the pay for six months, that is 13,056,691 *akçe* which I divided into two, as the incomes of the *vilayet* were counted for three months and three days!

TABLE 8  
The financial situation of the vilayet of Buda in 1571-81<sup>68</sup>

Year	Surplus from previous year	Subsidy from Istanbul	Subsidy from Temesvár	Local revenues of Buda (A)	Other revenues rendered to Buda (B)	Soldiers' pay	% of soldiers' pay covered by local revenue (A)	% of soldiers' pay covered by the total revenue rendered to Buda (A+B)
1571-72	13,154,934 <i>penz</i>	1,740,000 <i>penz</i>	5,000,000 <i>penz</i>	21,561,114 <i>penz</i>	1,607,552 <i>penz</i>	24,567,941 <i>penz</i>	88	94
1572-73	11,682,883 <i>'osmani</i>	1,500,000 <i>'osmani</i>	4,000,000 <i>'osmani</i>	17,667,680 <i>'osmani</i>	1,195,615 <i>'osmani</i>	20,090,323 <i>'osmani</i>	88	94
1573-74	12,147,100 <i>'osmani</i>	5,000,000 <i>'osmani</i>	4,000,000 <i>'osmani</i>	18,375,861 <i>'osmani</i>	1,679,200 <i>'osmani</i>	19,930,160 <i>'osmani</i>	92	101
1575-76	9,697,468 <i>'osmani</i>	–	4,000,000 <i>'osmani</i>	17,893,576 <i>'osmani</i>	2,209,263 <i>'osmani</i>	19,912,088 <i>'osmani</i>	90	101
1578	6,198,480 <i>'osmani</i>	–	5,520,000 <i>'osmani</i>	15,252,114 <i>'osmani</i>	845,644 <i>'osmani</i>	19,805,160 <i>'osmani</i>	77	81
1578-79	5,426,898 <i>akçe</i>	–	5,000,000 <i>akçe</i>	29,375,187 <i>akçe</i>	2,284,419 <i>akçe</i>	26,781,205 <i>akçe</i>	110	118
1579-80	10,208,701 <i>akçe</i>	–	4,000,000 <i>akçe</i>	4,190,476 <i>akçe</i>	579,620 <i>akçe</i>	6,528,346 <i>akçe</i> <sup>69</sup>	64	73
1580-81	5,701,118 <i>akçe</i>	–	3,500,000 <i>akçe</i>	26,607,281 <i>akçe</i>	1,125,011 <i>akçe</i>	26,767,470 <i>akçe</i>	99	104

28, 1572, Antal Verancsics, the royal governor, reported from Pozsony that the Ottoman border fortresses were poorly equipped and that, consequently, the pasha of Buda had asked for reinforcements from Constantinople. Allegedly, Mustafa pasha went as far as to call on the Ottoman merchants to take their cash to Buda.<sup>70</sup> Nevertheless, towards the end of the seventies, Mustafa pasha succeeded in improving the financial situation of the province. The first significant change took place in 1575: it was the first year that no gold pieces were delivered to Buda from the imperial central treasury, although it is true that in 1574 an unusually large subsidy had been transferred there. In any case, it is remarkable that no further support arrived from Istanbul until 1581. The significance of this fact was recognized and duly recorded in the treasury account: "Previously 350,000-400,000 gold had been provided by the imperial treasury annually to cover the cost of payments in the *vilayet* of Budun. It is nine years since Mustafa pasha became governor of the *vilayet* and during this time he has brought order to the province so that revenue now covers expenses. The treasury of the sultan no longer gives any gold pieces; only 4 million *ağçe* are received from the treasury of Temesvár."<sup>71</sup>

An even more important and surprising fact revealed by Table 8, is that in the 1570s, the revenue of the province of Buda covered 89% of the payments made to the salaried troops in the Ottoman fortresses as opposed to the 28% in 1558-59 and 38% in 1559-60. Some decline can be seen in the last year of Sokollu Mustafa pasha's governorship (1566-78) when the local revenue covered only 77% of the payments. The situation was perceived in Istanbul as well. On October 27, 1578, Üveys pasha, the newly appointed provincial governor of Buda (1578-80), was ordered to survey the troops, weapons, and ammunition of the province and to send an inventory of items to Istanbul. The government required the inventory because it thought that the state property had been left unguarded and had suffered serious damage during the last phase of Mustafa pasha's governorship.<sup>72</sup>

Although Üveys pasha was reluctant to take on the responsibility for a province afflicted by economic problems (in the centre of which a

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<sup>70</sup> Ferenc Szakály, *Mezőváros és reformáció. Tanulmányok a korai magyar polgárosodás kérdéséhez* [Market Town and Reformation. Studies on Early Hungarian Civil Development]. Budapest, 1995, 261-262.

<sup>71</sup> BOA MM 1561, 156. Also quoted in Turkish by Finkel, *op. cit.*, 292.

<sup>72</sup> Tayyib Gökbilgin, "Kara Üveys paşa'nın Budin beylerbeyliği (1578-1580)," *Istanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi* 2:3-4 (1950-1951) 21.

gunpowder explosion on May 19, 1578 had caused such damage that—according to contemporary reports state—hardly any houses remained unharmed),<sup>73</sup> the measures he took soon resulted in positive changes. For the first time, the revenue of the province completely covered payments made to soldiers and there was even a small surplus. This might partly be explained by the fact that Üveys pasha had considerable financial and administrative experience which he obtained as *defterdar* to Prince Murad, then after Murad's succession to the throne, as the empire's finance director.<sup>74</sup>

The improvement in the province's financial situation was immediately noticed by Joachim von Sinzendorf, Habsburg ambassador to Constantinople (1578-1581). Shortly before Christmas 1580, he reported that Üveys pasha had been so successful in bringing order to the financial affairs of the province that, after paying the soldiers from the revenue of the provinces of Buda and Temesvár, he was able to send 32 horse-loads of *akçe* (i.e. 3,200,000 *akçe*) to Istanbul each year (*Veyz Bassa totius exercitus Budensis stipendia ex proventu Budensi et Themiswariensi numeraverat, et insuper 32 onera Asporum huc Sulthano singulis annis miserat*). Sinzendorf also reported that Üveys pasha's successor, 'Ali pasha (1580-83), requested that payments to the soldiers once again be covered by the imperial central treasury since local revenue was inadequate for this purpose (*Nunc vero Bassa Budensis (sc. Ali) petit stipendium hinc et proventus antedictos non sufficere scribit*). He then added, "As I hear, everything is in the same situation as it used to be in Mustafa's (i.e. Sokollu) time".<sup>75</sup> This latter remark by Sinzendorf can only apply to the period before 1575 when the province was really in need of help from Istanbul. Although the ambassador gained his information from "a reliable person" (*ain vertraute Person*), namely from a *kapıcı* of the Porte, who had accompanied two messengers to Istanbul via Buda, and who in return for 25 *thaler* received from Sinzendorf, had carefully checked down everything in the Seraglio, the report contradicts Ottoman archival documents and is somewhat misleading.

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<sup>73</sup> Gábor Ágoston, "Ottoman Gunpowder Production in Hungary in the Sixteenth Century: The *Baruthane* of Buda," in *Hungarian-Ottoman Military and Diplomatic Relations*, 158-159.

<sup>74</sup> Antal Gévay, *A' budai pasák* [The Pashas of Buda]. Bécs, 1841, 11-12: No. 16. *Gökbilgin*, *op. cit.*, 18.

<sup>75</sup> Quoted in original by Pálffy, "A magyarországi török és a királyi végvárrendszer," 63.

At Christmas 1580, Sinzendorf could only mention those financial problems which had already become apparent by the turn of 1579 and 1580.<sup>76</sup> Incapable of knowing that 'Ali pasha would close the financial year of 1580-81 nearly as successfully as his predecessor, Sinzendorf's statement suggested some kind of a sharp turning-point which, however, was only to occur later. It is also remarkable that, contrary to the information supplied by the imperial ambassador, there is no reference to support having been received from Istanbul either in the records for the short financial year of 1579-80, or in those for the whole of 1580-81. This reminds us, that information supplied by even the well-informed Christian ambassadors to Istanbul is often fragmentary. Therefore, in any examination of the financial situation of the empire and its provinces, the contents of such sources should always be compared with internal documents of the Ottoman administration.

*Reasons for the financial consolidation*

Apart from the continuous subsidy coming from the treasury of the neighbouring province of Temesvár, an increase in local revenue of the province of Buda also played an important role in the financial consolidation. The rise in local revenue can be explained basically by two factors: territorial expansion following the successful campaign in 1566, and consolidation and perfection of the Ottoman taxation.

As a result of the 1566 campaign, large territories, including Somogy and Békés counties, and the Nagykovács, fell under Ottoman rule. For a long time after this conquest no further territories in Hungary were brought under Ottoman sway. Considerable changes to the borders were made only by the Köprülü grand viziers one hundred years later. In the meantime, the territory under Ottoman rule formed a huge triangle in the middle of the country and extended over an area of almost 100,000-120,000 square km.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> For the time being we do not know why the treasury account indicated Ali pasha as the *beylerbeyi* of Buda as early as at this point in time, when all the other sources at our disposal claim that the province was governed by Üveys pasha until the end of May or the beginning of June, 1580. Cf. Gévay, *op. cit.*, 12: No. 17. and Fekete, *Budapest a törökkorban*, 216. Gökbilgin (*op. cit.*, 31) mentions the sultan's order sent to Üveys pasha on June 3, 1580, in which it was stated that he was replaced by Kalaylıkoz Ali pasha and was instructed to stay in his post until his successor's arrival.

<sup>77</sup> Ferenc Szakály, *Magyar adóztatás a török hódoltságban* [Hungarian Taxation in the Territory Under Ottoman Rule]. Budapest, 1981, 38 and Géza Dávid, "Demographische Veränderungen in Ungarn zur Zeit der Türkenherrschaft," *Acta Historica* 34 (1988 [1990]) 81.

Apart from achieving an expansion in territory, the campaign of 1566 also contributed to an increase in the revenue of the province of Buda by excluding two major castles, Szigetvár and Gyula,<sup>78</sup> from the system of Hungarian taxation and thereby indirectly increasing the number of potential taxpayers to the local Ottoman treasury. More important, from our point of view, was the huge gap which appeared in the Hungarian defence system as a result of the loss of these two strongholds. There was simply no force (at least temporarily) capable of preventing Ottoman taxation behind the Hungarian border fortresses.<sup>79</sup>

The extension of the Ottoman taxation in Hungary after the peace treaty of Adrianople in 1568 was the result of certain central measures and an increase in the efficiency of local administration. During the first decades of their rule in Hungary, the Ottomans collected poll-tax (*cizye*) only from those whose wealth had a value of at least 300 *akçe*. This meant that about 30% of the potential tax-payer heads were exempt from paying the *cizye*-tax. However, a deteriorating financial situation in the empire forced the government to collect the poll-tax from each taxation unit without regard for their circumstances. Thus, the threshold of 300 *akçe* was repealed. This new system was introduced to the *sancak* of Buda as early as 1562 and by the 1570s it had been extended to other Hungarian districts as well.<sup>80</sup> Consequently, the number of *cizye*-payers increased considerably as did revenues. While in 1558-59 only 1.5 million *akçe* poll-tax could be collected from the province of Buda, twenty years later this sum had increased by three and a half million to an amount of 5 million *akçe*.

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<sup>78</sup> Szakály, *Magyar adóztatás*, 59-98.

<sup>79</sup> For the role of the Hungarian border defence system in preventing the Ottoman taxation behind the Hungarian border fortresses, see Pálffy, "A magyarországi török és a királyi végvárrendszer," 67-77.

<sup>80</sup> Gyula Káldy-Nagy, "The Administration of the *Sanjāq* Registrations in Hungary," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 21 (1968) 193-195; *idem*, "Bevölkerungstatistischer Quellenwert der *Āizye*-Defter und der *Tahrīr*-Defter," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 11 (1960) 259-269.

TABLE 9  
*Revenue of the treasury of Buda from the cizye-tax  
 in 1558-60 and 1578-81*<sup>81</sup>

Date	<i>cizye</i> -incomes
1558-59	1,530,476 <i>akçe</i>
1559-60	1,797,539 <i>akçe</i>
1578-79	5,229,259 <i>akçe</i>
1580-81	5,373,138 <i>akçe</i>

The rise in revenue from the sultanic *hass*-estates, which in addition to the poll-tax, provided a significant part of the revenue of certain provinces, also exemplifies the extension of taxation. Measures taken by Üveys pasha played an important role in the increase of this source of revenue. He prevented the *zu'ama* and the *sipahis* from laying their hands on the *hass*-estates and causing a loss to the treasury by their action. He suggested preparing new *sancak* registers (*tahrirs*) as great changes had occurred since the last survey; abandoned places had been resettled, villages had developed, and land had been brought under cultivation. In other places, there were contradictory developments. Due to enemy attacks, inhabitants had left their villages and they had become deserted. The pasha was of the opinion that new registers should be made especially in the area of Fülek, Hatvan, and Szigetvár. He also proposed that the abandoned estates should not be distributed among the *zu'ama* and the *sipahis* but should be attached to the imperial domains.<sup>82</sup> Sources at our disposal relating to the *sancak* of Buda indicate that Üveys pasha's steps did bring about the desired results. While in 1559 there was only 2,338,530 *akçe* revenue from the *hass*-estates, in 1580 they yielded 9,076,530 *akçe*.<sup>83</sup> This rise of nearly 300% is considerable even though the value of the *akçe* had diminished in the meantime (though the great devaluation had not taken place yet).<sup>84</sup> In short, the main goal of the government, i.e.

<sup>81</sup> Data for the years 1558-60 are from Fekete-Káldy-Nagy, *op. cit.*, 770, those for the years 1578-81 are registered in BOA MM 498, 2 and 44.

<sup>82</sup> Gökbilgin, *op. cit.*, 25. For similar revenue-raising measures and for the conflicts between local authorities and representatives of the central government over tax collection, see Mark L. Stein, "Ottoman Communication: An Example From Újvár," *The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 20:1 (1996) 1-15, esp. 5-9.

<sup>83</sup> Hegyi, *Török berendezkedés*, 43.

<sup>84</sup> Şevket Pamuk, "Money in the Ottoman Empire, 1326-1914," in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*. Ed. by Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert. Cambridge, 1994, 959-960.

to diminish the cost of the Ottoman defence system built at the cross-roads of the Muslim and Christian worlds, was almost fully accomplished, at least for a short period, by the government and the local administration in the 1570s.

It is symptomatic that, in parallel with the consolidation of the Ottoman taxation, Hungarian taxation in territories under Ottoman rule also strengthened.<sup>85</sup> This means that, in the relatively peaceful years following the Habsburg-Ottoman peace treaty in 1568, agriculture on the Hungarian Great Plain revived. In this period of economic consolidation, Hungarian peasants living under Ottoman rule were able to pay the raised taxes of both sides.

Another sign of the strengthening economic situation was the fact that Hungarian cattle exports to the West reached their peak in the 1580s.<sup>86</sup> As most of the cattle sold in the West came from the territory under Ottoman rule, with the increased efficiency of the Ottoman administration, revenue from export duties began to rise and did so even before the increases in cattle exports occurred. In 1558-59, for instance, the *mukata'a*-revenue of Vác, of which an important part was constituted by the cattle duties gathered along the river Danube (Vác, Keve, Földvár, Paks, Tolna, and Bába), was 764,824 *akçe*. In the next year the treasury of Buda collected 1,295,869 *akçe* from this source of revenue, while in 1563-64 the cattle duties from Vác alone enriched the local treasury with at least 2,400,000 *akçe*.<sup>87</sup>

Even more significant was the increase in the most important revenue-source of the province, i.e. the *mukata'a* (tax-farm), which consisted of customs, duties, fair tolls, market fees, and monopolies, and formed 50-70% of the total revenue of the province in the period under discussion.

<sup>85</sup> Szakály, *Magyar adóztatás*, 99-139.

<sup>86</sup> László Makkai, "Der Weg der ungarischen Mastviehzucht vom Nomadismus zum Kapitalismus," in *Wirtschaftskräfte und Wirtschaftswege (Festschrift für Hermann Kellenbenz)*. Vol. 5. Ed. by J. Schneider. Stuttgart, 1978, 62. Othmar Pickl, "Viehhandel von Ungarn nach Oberitalien vom 14. bis zum 17. Jh.," in *Internationaler Ochsenhandel (1350-1750)*. 7th International Economic History Congress, Edinburgh 1978. (Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 9.) Ed. by E. Westermann. Stuttgart, 1979, 45-53. Győző Ember, *Magyarország külkereskedelme a XVI. század közepén* [Hungarian Foreign Trade in the Mid-Sixteenth Century]. Budapest, 1988. Ferenc Szakály, *Gazdasági és társadalmi változások a török hódítás árnyékában* [Economic and Social Changes in the Shadow of Ottoman Conquest]. Budapest, 1994.

<sup>87</sup> See, Fekete-Káldy-Nagy, *op. cit.*, 761 and Gy. Káldy-Nagy, "Statistische Angaben über den Warenverkehr des türkischen Eroberungsgebiets in Ungarn mit dem Westen in den Jahren 1560-1564," *Annales Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eötvös Nominatae. Sectio Historica* 11 (1970) 269-341. Cf. also Hegyi, *Török berendezkedés*, 46.

TABLE 10  
*The mukata'a-revenue of the treasury of Buda  
 in 1558-60 and 1578-81*<sup>88</sup>

Date	<i>mukata'a-revenue</i>
1558-59	3,437,910 <i>akçe</i>
1559-60	4,469,170 <i>akçe</i>
1578-79	18,240,131 <i>akçe</i>
1580-81	18,509,766 <i>akçe</i>

Significant factors behind the rise in the *mukata'a*-revenues were the measures taken by Üveys pasha in order to balance the books in his post. We know for example that the former finance director of the empire introduced certain restrictions in the field of customs. Cattle dealers, who may have previously avoided customs, were obliged to cross the customs points and pay the duties.<sup>89</sup> As the treasury accounts of Buda testify, Üveys pasha's successor, 'Ali pasha, continued the financial policy of his predecessor and was very proud of his achievements. This is apparent from the fact that, obviously under the instruction of Ali pasha, the person who prepared the accounts did not forget to compare revenues from his period with that of Üveys pasha's governorship, and it was always Ali pasha who won the comparison.

#### *Deterioration in the financial situation*

However, this favourable financial situation lasted for only a short while, and things began to change for the worse some time after 1581. For the time being, due to the lack of sources, we are unable to define either the exact date or the extent of the turn around. Transformation of the Hungarian royal border defence system introduced at the turn of the 1570s and 1580s must have played a role in it. As a result of these changes, Ottoman taxation in the territories behind the Hungarian border fortresses became significantly more difficult. Further research is needed to ascertain to what extent the regression of Ottoman taxation in the royal territories decreased the revenues and contributed to the general deterioration in the financial situation of the province. The structure of local revenues allows us to conclude that the main reason for the

<sup>88</sup> Data for the years of 1558-60 are from Fekete-Káldy-Nagy, *op. cit.*, 770, those for the years of 1578-1581 are registered in BOA MM 489, 2 and 44.

<sup>89</sup> Gökbilgin, *op. cit.*, 24.

difficulties of the Buda treasury is hardly likely to have been this Habsburg reorganization of the defence system, which, due to financial problems at the Habsburg side, soon came to a halt. Any regression of Ottoman taxation beyond the Hungarian border fortresses would have led to a modest decrease, and would have affected only the poll-tax revenues of the treasury which amounted to only 18% of the total revenues of the province in 1579 and to 20% in 1580-81. Moreover, the bulk of the poll-tax revenues came not from areas beyond the Hungarian fortresses, but from the territories under direct Ottoman rule within the province. Consequently, the dwindling of the small amount collected from areas outside direct Ottoman holdings could not have caused such serious financial problems as the local authorities faced in the 1580s and 1590s. So further research is necessary to find the real causes.

As the firman of October 14 indicates, by the end of 1588, financial problems manifested themselves in both the provinces of Buda and Temesvár. According to the order sent to the provincial governor and the *defterdar* of Temesvár, from the time of Murad III's succession to the throne (1574), besides being self-sufficient and covering the costs of payments made to local troops and officials, the local treasury of Temesvár had sent 50,000 *guruş* to Istanbul and 4-5 million *akçe* to the treasury of Buda, annually. After these transfers had been made, there had still been 2,000,000 *akçe* in the treasury of Temesvár. By 1588, however, the economic situation and financial discipline declined to a great extent. The provincial governor of Temesvár was reprimanded by the Porte for not having sent assistance to Buda for three years and for not having submitted the accounts to the centre. In the order, the pasha was instructed to pay off the debt of more than 10,000,000 *akçe* as soon as possible and to send the necessary amount of money to Buda and Istanbul.<sup>90</sup> Later on, the financial situation of the province of Temesvár consolidated again; in 1591, the revenue was 10,812,449 *akçe* and expenses were 7,520,020 *akçe*, out of which 6,271,931 *akçe* was spent on payments made to soldiers.<sup>91</sup>

The long Habsburg-Ottoman war at the end of the century brought a sudden change in the economic and financial situation of the Hungarian provinces. The gravity of the problem is shown by the fact that whereas

<sup>90</sup> MD 64, p. 145, No. 378.

<sup>91</sup> Fodor, "Das Temeschwarer," 33.

70-90% of the revenues of the province of Buda had been derived from local sources before the war, this was only 17% during the crippling and exhausting confrontation.<sup>92</sup>

As far as the seventeenth century is concerned, unfortunately we know relatively little, mainly because researchers do not have access to the treasury accounts of Buda for that period, which are generally in bad condition. However, it can be seen from the sources at our disposal that even at the beginning of the seventeenth century the Hungarian provinces were again dependent upon subsidies from Istanbul. In 1612, the imperial central treasury had to send 40,000 gold pieces for the payments of the garrison soldiers serving in the fortresses of the province of Buda, Eger, and Temesvár.<sup>93</sup> The *cizye* register of 1618-19 indicates that most of the poll-tax revenue of the Hungarian provinces came from the Balkans and not from Hungary. Out of the 38 districts subordinated to Buda, Kanizsa, Temesvár, and Eger, only 11 were situated north of the Danube-Sava line. These were the districts of Mohács, Koppány, Simontornya, Szekszárd, Buda, Esztergom, and Székesfehérvár belonging to Buda; the districts of Szigetvár and Pécs belonging to Kanizsa; and the district of Szeged belonging to Eger. The Hungarian territories included 23,700 tax-paying units (*hane*), that is 23% of the total of 101,420 *hanes*. If only the 14,850 *hanes* situated beyond the Danube-Drava line are counted, the revenue from them does not reach 15%. The proportions for the individual provinces are shown in Table 11.<sup>94</sup>

TABLE 11  
*Distribution of cizye-hanes in the Hungarian provinces, 1618-19*

Province	Number of sub-districts	Number of <i>cizye-hanes</i>	Out of these Hungarian	%
Buda	22	52,350	12,260	23,42
Kanizsa	8	30,300	9,800	32,34
Temesvár	5	11,720	–	–
Eger	3	7,050	3,000	42,55
Total	38	101,420	25,060	24,57

<sup>92</sup> Finkel, *The Administration of Warfare*, 290-291.

<sup>93</sup> Fekete-Káldy-Nagy, *op. cit.*, 772: n. 68.

<sup>94</sup> BOA D-CMH (Cizye muhasebesi kalemi) 26570. Hegyi, *Török berendezkedés*, 47, where somewhat different data can be found.

Similar conclusions can be drawn from an examination of the treasury account of the province of Buda for 1662-63. Most of the poll-tax revenue (16,990,662 *akçe*) forming 46% of the total revenue (37,312,411 *akçe*) was paid by families living south of the Danube-Sava line. The composition of the *mukata'a*-revenues, which constituted 40% of the total incomes, was similar, too; total revenue from the *mukata'as* under the treasury of Buda was 15,238,336 *akçe*. Yet only a little more than one third of this sum originated from the territory of the province. Two thirds of it was collected in the Balkans. Thus, the financial balance of the province of Buda was again dependent upon the mobilization of external resources. By that time, aid did not come from the imperial central treasury, but from certain Balkan revenue-sources subordinated to Buda. Admittedly, some of the troops in the Balkans were also paid by the treasury of Buda. Here, however, the situation was diverse; out of the 12,734 soldiers who were paid by the Buda treasury only 957 men (7.5%) were serving in the castles and *palankas* of certain Balkan *sancaks*, while the majority of the soldiers, i. e. 11,777 men (92.5%) guarded the Hungarian castles and *palankas*.<sup>95</sup>

## 2. OTHER COSTS

One of the deficiencies of the treasury accounts is that they only contain cash revenues. That is why pertinent registers show most of the expenses being incurred in the form of payments to soldiers. A further consequence is that in the Ottoman accounts we hardly find any items referring to the provision of the garrison, supplies to the castles, cannons or ammunition. This is true despite the fact that the provision of troops, the forage of horses, and the supply of ammunition each imposed a great financial burden on the state. When examining the costs of maintenance of the Ottoman border fortresses in Hungary, we should take into consideration such items as these which are not included in the treasury accounts.

In the case of food provision and war supplies, it would seem that the Porte strove to procure the necessary items from Ottoman territories in Hungary. At present, we are far from being able to give exact figures, but some data allow us to conclude that the Ottoman authorities were able to fulfill their intentions in this field. It is widely known that, whereas in the Balkans the Ottomans took off thousands of cattle for campaigns and controlled animal

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<sup>95</sup> BOA D-BŞM 16727, 16728. Hegyi, *op. cit.*, 47.

husbandry throughout, in Hungary they made no efforts to hamper cattle exports. It seems clear that if they had suffered from problems of food provision they would hardly have allowed the cattle dealers to take almost one hundred thousand cattle out of the country each year.

In 1571 the *emins* of Pécs, Zombor, Baja, and Kalocsa collected the grain tithe for the garrison of Buda from the southern areas equal to 575 tons of wheat. The sources do not mention whether grain was brought in from more distant territories. At the same time, the rapid and significant fall in the amount of wheat brought to and levied in Buda is remarkable. While in 1571, 437 ships brought 10,400 tons of wheat to Buda, in 1573 only the wheat of 87 ships and in 1586 the wheat of 56 ships was levied. The amount of wheat was 2,070 tons and 715 tons on the last two occasions. This substantial decrease reflected a situation in which it was not worth taking wheat to the Hungarian Plain since the merchants could not transport it on from Buda and local demand was being satisfied by local production. Among basic food items, it was only rice which had to be imported to Hungary: indeed, a certain amount of rice was brought in as treasury articles from Serbia and Bulgaria under favourable customs conditions.<sup>96</sup>

A similar situation prevailed in the area of war supplies. As the major gunpowder mills of the empire (Istanbul, Gallipoli, Saloniki, Belgrade, Bor, Van, Erciş, Cairo, Baghdad, etc.) were at an immense distance from the Hungarian frontier and transportation (mainly by land) was very expensive, the Porte wished to ensure that the fortresses' gunpowder requirements be met locally. There were favourable conditions for this because Hungary was rich in saltpetre beds, and production had been underway even before the onset of Ottoman rule. Almost every fortress prepared gunpowder in small amounts, but the bulk of production was carried out in the gunpowder mills (*baruthanes*) of Buda and Temesvár. The gunpowder production of Buda was between 1-3,000 *kantar* (54-162 tons) in the late sixteenth century.<sup>97</sup> This was a respectable amount. In the mills of Egypt, which comprised one of the major gunpowder centres of the empire, annual production did not exceed 4,000 *kantar* (216 tons) and, although the annual production of the sixteen powdermills in Baghdad reached 5,000 *kantar* (270 tons) in 1575-1576, in the following

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<sup>96</sup> Fekete-Káldy-Nagy, *op. cit.*, 716-717.

<sup>97</sup> Ágoston, "Ottoman Gunpowder Production in Hungary," 153-157.

year production fell back to only half of this amount.<sup>98</sup> In Istanbul, in the powdermill of Kağıdhâne, only 300 *kantar* was prepared monthly in 1571.<sup>99</sup> Owing to the favourable local conditions and efficient methods of production, the gunpowder mills in Hungary satisfied the needs of the local Ottoman fortresses. Indeed, gunpowder produced and accumulated in Hungary was even transported to other frontiers of the empire. During military campaigns, of course, the Hungarian front also needed additional gunpowder supplies. However, this was hardly unusual given that none of the powdermills in the empire was able to provide in full for the needs of major armies fighting closeby.

Finally, I would just like to remark that the expenses for the Porte were also diminished by the fact that the construction and reinforcement of the border fortresses was accomplished through the use of local building material and a local workforce. The building material was preferably collected in the form of a tax in kind. The costs of fortification were covered by the revenues of the local or neighbouring treasury. From the 1570s so-called extraordinary taxes were imposed with increasing frequency and represented an additional source of funds. In this way, the *re'aya* of the territory "usually give one *guruş* or *filori* for each *hane*". This sum was called the *ta'mir akçesi*, i.e. money for repairs.<sup>100</sup> Such a tax was imposed on the *re'aya* of the province of Buda, when one *guruş* was collected for each *hane* to repair the damage caused by the great gunpowder explosion of 1578. The tax collected in this way amounted to 2,850,000 *akçe*, which was a fair sum.<sup>101</sup> It is also known that craftsmen and day labourers came in from the Hungarian villages, too. Moreover, it seems that in some places the Ottoman authorities adapted themselves to local traditions and sent the peasants of the same village to work on the castle as had been working on it before Ottoman rule.<sup>102</sup>

The special features of the Ottoman financial administration preclude an itemized enumeration of these costs, which are not included in the treasury accounts. For this reason, these expenses have rightly been called

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<sup>98</sup> Gábor Ágoston, "Gunpowder for the Sultan's Army: New Sources on the Supply of Gunpowder to the Ottoman Army in the Hungarian Campaigns of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," *Turcica* 25 (1993) 89.

<sup>99</sup> MD 16, p. 375, No. 656.

<sup>100</sup> Pál Fodor, "Bauarbeiten der Türken an den Burgen in Ungarn im 16.-17. Jahrhundert," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 35 (1981) 66.

<sup>101</sup> BOA MM 1561, 73.

<sup>102</sup> Fodor, *op. cit.*, 78.

'hidden' by one of our colleagues.<sup>103</sup> Notwithstanding this, it is quite clear from the above that, however much it cost the imperial central treasury to secure the Hungarian frontier and to maintain the Ottoman border fortresses in this region, the burden placed on the Porte was smaller than that placed on the Habsburgs, who were struggling to finance their own border defence system opposing the Ottoman fortresses. It is also evident that the maintenance of border defence systems caused financial loss all over Europe in the period under discussion; only the extent of loss can be a subject for debate. It should also be remembered that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries people were less concerned with the financial effects of conquest than modern historians might think. In any case, either in Hungary or elsewhere, the expanding Ottoman power had to face up to this unavoidable problem.

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<sup>103</sup> Finkel, "The Cost of Ottoman Warfare," 95.

## MAKING A LIVING ON THE FRONTIERS VOLUNTEERS IN THE SIXTEENTH-CENTURY OTTOMAN ARMY

PAL FODOR

### I.

Recent research in Ottoman military history has made considerable progress in various respects. This is in part due to the fact that Ottoman historians became involved with themes and methods, which they adopted from their colleagues dealing with the medieval and early modern history of Europe. As a result they displayed an increasing interest in such questions as food and ammunition supplies, military technology, firearms, and mobilization, etc.; they not only outlined the problems of the timariot army, but also brought that of other troops and branches of the military service (e.g. the fleet) into the sphere of investigation.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Gyula Káldy-Nagy, "The First Centuries of the Ottoman Military Organization," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 31:2 (1977) 147-183. Caroline Finkel, *The Administration of Warfare: the Ottoman Military Campaigns in Hungary, 1593-1606*. (Beihefte zur Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, Bd. 14.) Wien, 1988. Gilles Veinstein, "Some Views on Provisioning in the Hungarian Campaigns of Suleyman the Magnificent," in *Osmanistische Studien zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte. In memoriam Vančo Boškov*. Hrg. von Hans Georg Majer. Wiesbaden, 1986, 177-185. *Idem*, "L'Hivernage en campagne. Talon d'Achille du système militaire ottoman classique. A propos des *sipâhî* de Roumélie en 1559-1560," *Studia Islamica* 58 (1983) 109-143, + V planches. *Idem*, "Du marche urbain au marche du camp: l'institution ottoman des *orducu*," in *Mélanges Professeur Robert Mantran*. Publ. par Abdeljelil Temimi. Zaghouan, 1988, 299-327. Gábor Ágoston, "Gunpowder for the Sultan's Army: New Sources on the Supply of Gunpowder to the Ottoman Army in the Hungarian Campaigns of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," *Turcica* 25 (1993) 75-96. *Idem*, *Ágyú és lőpor a 16-17. századi Oszmán Birodalomban* [Guns and Gunpowder in Sixteenth-Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Empire]. Unpublished Ph.D. Diss. Budapest, 1993. *Idem*, "Párhuzamok és eltérések az oszmán és az európai tüzérség fejlődésében [Analogies and Differences in the Development of Ottoman and European Artillery]," *Történelmi Szemle* 34:3-4 (1992) 173-198. *Idem*, "Az oszmán tüzérség és a magyarországi várharok egy kiadatlan 17. századi török krónika alapján [The Ottoman Artillery and Castle Sieges in Hungary Based on an Unpublished Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Chronicle]," in *Studia Agriensia* 5. Eger, 1985, 173-183. İdris Bostan, *Osmanlı bahriye teşkilâtı: XVII. yüzyılda tersâne-i âmiri*. (TTK Yayınları, VII/101.) Ankara, 1992.

All this notwithstanding, should someone ask how many soldiers the Ottoman state had in, say, 1552, or how large the Ottoman armies fighting the major Hungarian battles or sieges in the sixteenth century were, in most cases he would only gain hesitant estimates. A well-known example may serve to illustrate the situation: relying on the same sources, one scholar calculated the total of the *timar*-holder troops to be 70-80,000, and another about half of that, at about 45,000, in the first half of the sixteenth century.<sup>2</sup> Since there is no concensus among Ottoman historians even about such fundamental questions, it is not surprising that Ottoman armies numbering hundreds of thousands of combatants, and local clashes claim-ing tens of thousands of lives are mentioned in standard works.

Undoubtedly this uncertainty mainly derives from the specific nature of Ottoman source material. While the Ottoman bureaucracy usually kept separate records of various branches of the armed forces, only a few general registers had been preserved, on the basis of which it is possible to estimate with some accuracy the numerical strength of the entire regular army.<sup>3</sup> Consequently, if we want to ascertain the exact figures not only for those exceptional years, but for a longer period or a particular region, we have to gather the scattered data from the most diverse sources (central and provincial pay-lists, treasury accounts, and *timar defteris*, etc.) to be able to calculate the army of the entire Empire or a *vilayet* via complicated computations and corrections. But, even if we were fortunate to get access to all the *defters* that match in time and space (a very rare occurrence), we simply cannot find traces of some troops, no matter how meticulously we may search. Some auxiliary units, such as the *'azabs* outside fortress service, and *cerehors*, etc., were mobilized only occasionally (in an emergency or at times of major campaigns) and so resist precise quantification.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Ömer Lûtfi Barkan, "Timar," in *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*. XII/1. İstanbul, 1974, 287-290; Káldy-Nagy, *op. cit.*, 161-162.

<sup>3</sup> For such registers, see Ömer Lûtfi Barkan, "H. 933-934 (M. 1527-1528) malî yılına ait bir bütçe örneği," *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 15:1-4 (1953-1954) 251-329.

<sup>4</sup> In spite of that, in provinces better supplied with extant sources unexpectedly good results can be achieved. For example, Klára Hegyi established more precisely than ever before the strength and composition of the Ottoman army stationed in the *vilayet* of Buda in the sixteenth century: *Török berendezkedés Magyarországon* [Ottoman Rule in Hungary]. (História könyvtár. Monográfiák, 7.) Budapest, 1995, 81-117. *Eadem*, "The Ottoman Military Force in Hungary," in *Hungarian-Ottoman Military and Diplomatic Relations in the Age of Süleyman the Magnificent*. Ed. by Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor. Budapest, 1994, 131-148. See further the contribution by Gábor Ágoston in the present volume.

We are confronted by a further, and even more aggravating difficulty when endeavouring to find out how many of the theoretically calculated cadre were actually mobilized by the Ottoman high command for the campaigns. To quote a single familiar example: Although it is known in principle how many armed retainers (*cebelü*) a *timar*-holder was obliged to bring to war, we do not know exactly how many complied with this regulation. Some figures suggest that at times *sipahis* surrounded themselves with far larger retinues than could be expected on the basis of their incomes.<sup>5</sup> At other times, they either joined the army with far smaller companies than required or did not appear at all.<sup>6</sup> Although in theory, the ratio of the *timar*-holders actually deployed in a campaign could be ascertained with the help of muster or roll-call registers (*yoklama defteri*), they are of little practical use. This is in part due to the fact that we do not exactly know their coding system, and partly because when there is a muster register at our disposal, usually there are no sources against which its information could be verified. (In such cases we turn to the early seventeenth-century figures of 'Ayn 'Ali for assistance.<sup>7</sup>)

Despite these difficulties, *timar*-holding *sipahis* still have a distinguished place because their assembling on campaigns are far better documented than the mobilization ratio of other military formations. Although there are a relatively large number of extant central and provincial pay-lists of janissary troops, our knowledge about their registration and remuneration system is still rather limited. Consequently, the number of janissaries required to be present in the various operations is very difficult to estimate. Wartime registers (available mainly from the end of the sixteenth century onward) feature the word "campaign" (*sefer*) above the names of several janissaries, but the total of these only show

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<sup>5</sup> In the early sixteenth century, a certain 'Abdülkerim *sipahi* possessed a *timar* of 5,000 *akçe* in the *sancak* of Bosnia, but instead of the 2 people he was instructed by regulation to keep at his side, he had 12. This and several other cases can be found in Ahmed S. Aličić, "Popis Bosanske vojske pred bitku na Mohaču 1526 godine," *Prilozi za Orijentalnu Filologiju* 25 (1975) 171-202.

<sup>6</sup> Finkel, *The Administration of Warfare*, 49-63.

<sup>7</sup> Ayn-i Ali Efendi, *Kavânîn-i Âl-i Osman der Hülasa-i Mezâmin-i Defter-i Divân*. Önsöz: M. Tayyib Gökbilgin. İstanbul, 1979. Ahmed Akgündüz, *Osmanlı kanunnâmeleri ve hukukî tahlilleri*. 9. Kitap: I. Ahmed, I. Mustafa ve II. Osman devirleri kanunnâmeleri (1012/ 1603-1031/1622). İstanbul, 1996, 28-86. It is worth noting that only a few *yoklama defteris* have been published so far, see Vladislav Skarić, "Popis bosanskih spahija iz 1123 (1711) godine," *Godišnjak Zemaljskog Muzeja* 42:2 (1930) 1-99. V. P. Mutafčieva-Str. Dimitrov, *Sur l'état de système des timars des XVII<sup>e</sup>-XVIII<sup>e</sup> ss*. Sofia, 1968. Aličić, *op. cit.*

how many of the listed soldiers were ordered to take part in the campaign. There is no clue to determine how many janissaries stationed in fortresses—who at times outnumbered the other units of the corps—responded to the call of their *ağas*, or how the janissaries living or serving in different towns and villages could be mobilized.<sup>8</sup>

Due to the lack of sources it is also difficult to establish to what extent the permanent garrison soldiers in the fortresses joined the military operations. This is particularly detrimental, because in the Hungarian and Bosnian marches the garrisons numbered over ten thousand, thus their companies could substantially increase the strength of the moving armies. However, in the knowledge of the size of the garrisons and the dimensions of the encounters, one can at least estimate the highest number of these types of troops.

There was, however, another group of Ottoman warriors about whom not even that much is known: the volunteers. These soldiers mostly lived in the border areas and equipped themselves, and went to war mainly at their own expense. Their only goal was to be granted an estate or pay by the state (that is, to gain a secure livelihood) and to become officially acknowledged members of the Ottoman military establishment. Their services were always welcomed by the state when a venture on the frontiers lay ahead. The state encouraged volunteering by holding out the promise of *timars* and other posts for those who displayed their bravery and military values. For this reason, from time to time volunteers swelled the regular troops. Their numeric strength in the clashes, or their proportion as compared to the registered troops is, however, for the time being veiled by obscurity.

One of the impediments to our understanding their role is that the terminology of the Ottoman administration concerning the volunteers is not unambiguous. The volunteers invited and encouraged to join up by the high command were officially termed *gönüllü* (volunteer, willing, and

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<sup>8</sup> A typical example: in 1596, when the sultan advanced on Hungary ahead of his troops, 2,473 janissaries were paid, according to the central treasury account (Istanbul, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi [hereinafter BOA], Kepeci 1875, 27.) That may, however, merely indicate that during the campaign so many janissaries were staying in Istanbul, and the remainder accompanied the sultan, except for those stationed in castles or keeping watch, etc. As the treasury account kept in the camp has not been recovered, it is extremely difficult to estimate the number of janissaries who actually joined up. The journal of the 1543 campaign has survived, so there is exceptionally precise knowledge about the strength of the troops at that time. Mehmet İpçioğlu, "Kanunî Süleyman'ın Estergon (Esztergom) seferi 1543. Yeni bir kaynak," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* 10 (1990) 137-159.

courageous), *garib yiğit* (literally: strange, courious, stranger, homeless, destitute, poor men, and country bumpkin, etc.), *gönüllü garib yiğit* or simply *yiğit* (young man, lad, hero, and brave).<sup>9</sup> The word *gönüllü* is, however, in most cases an adjective of *garib yiğit*. Both this fact and other considerations permit the assumption that while *gönüllü* was the most general notion expressing volunteership (used to signify any of its various forms) and hence devoid of any concrete meaning, *garib yiğit* was used in a somewhat narrower and better delimited sense. We know for example that the term *garib yiğit* did not cover all forms of volunteering, since sons of the timariots, who appeared as volunteers in the camps, were never officially ranged with the *garib yiğits* (although they could be regarded as *gönüllüs*). There is no doubt that while certain volunteers seem to have had official employment earlier, the *garib yiğits* mostly (but not necessarily) went to war in search of their first job. When it is considered that the terms *gönüllü* and *garib yiğit* were also used to denote another two military formations, the problem is further complicated. The pay-lists of some fortresses of the Empire (these were really key fortresses) included an élite cavalry unit registered as *gönüllü* whose members usually topped the lists and received the highest pay.<sup>10</sup> For the time being we do not know whether they had anything to do with the volunteers to be discussed below (and why they were identically named). The relationship between two of the six salaried cavalry units of the court, the "left" and "right" *garib yiğits* (*gureba*) and the volunteers called by the same name is similarly obscure.<sup>11</sup> These questions are therefore not embarked upon here, the discussion being restricted to the *garib yiğit* outside the court, apparently the moot point for understanding the issue of volunteership. In order to more subtly differentiate the various

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Finkel, *The Administration*, 30.

<sup>10</sup> Halil İnalçık, "Gönüllü," in *Encyclopédie de l'Islam*. Nouvelle édition. Tom. II. Leyde-Paris, 1965, 1146. Hegyi, "Ottoman Military Force", 136-137.

<sup>11</sup> The origin of this formation of court troops is for the time being unknown. According to a fifteenth century source (Şerif Baştav, *Ordo portae – Description grècque de la porte et de l'armée du sultan Mehmet II*. [Magyar-görög tanulmányok, 27.] Budapest, 1947, 7, 11. ), the court *garibs* were recruited from among the sons of Muslims (perhaps in compensation for the advantages granted to the janissaries or offsprings of Christians). One-time janissary Konstantin Mihailović, however, tagged them mounted Tatars and interpreted their name as "orphans". (*Memoirs of a Janissary*. Transl. by Benjamin Stolz, historical commentary and notes by Svat Soucek. Ann Arbor, 1975, 160-161). On the basis of the latter information one may presume that originally the *garib yiğit* included volunteers who had come from faraway lands to fight under the Ottoman banner. While a unit struck root in the court (later incorporated into the cavalry emerging there), the name was retained to identify a certain group of volunteers.

categories and more exactly define the group of *garib yiğits* taken in the latter sense, it seems appropriate to review the resources of manpower that possibly yielded volunteers in the largest numbers.

### 1. Sons of active or militarily disabled timar-holders

Though it was a rule that upon their father's death the first two or three sons of a *sipahi* were granted *timars* "by hereditary right", the mobilization orders stimulated them to acquire *timars* in their own right, through their own bravery, instead of waiting their time out.<sup>12</sup> For younger sons not entitled to the inheritance and for the offspring of families cast into insecurity by the old age (sickness, etc.) of the father, it was a question of vital importance to avail themselves of these opportunities. A certain Seydi and an 'Ali of Menteşe belonged to these categories; the former was entitled, "in accordance with the regulation", to his *timar* assignment of 2,000 *akçe* as the third son of his father Budak, while the latter proved his merits by the side of his "aged and weak" father in the campaign of Nahçıvan (1553–54), and received his father's prebend in reward.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Klaus Röhrborn, *Untersuchungen zur osmanischen Verwaltungsgeschichte*. Berlin–New York, 1973, 29 ff. Julius Káldy-Nagy, "The 'Strangers' (*ecnebilir*) in the Sixteenth Century Ottoman Military Organization," in *Between the Danube and the Caucasus. A Collection of Papers Concerning Oriental Sources on the History of the Peoples of Central and South-Eastern Europe*. Ed. by György Kara. Budapest, 1987, 167. Inheriting is to be understood with the peculiar Ottoman reservations; on this see also Mario Grignaschi, "Das osmanische timar-Recht und der kanun Süleymans des Gesetzgebers," in *Armağan. Festschrift für Andreas Tietze*. Hrg. von Ingeborg Baldauf und Suraiya Faroqi, unter Mitwirkung von Rudolf Veselý. Praha, 1994, 123–136 (he concludes that by the end of the sixteenth century, timars had become hereditary estates). Scions of high-ranking officials often received prebends while their fathers were still alive. İskender and Hasan, two sons of Ulama *bey* of Pozsega, received an estate of 10,000 and one of 7,000 *akçe* respectively out of the 30,000 *akçe* increase (*terakki*) that was their father's reward for his bravery in the Persian (Nahçıvan) campaign. See İstanbul, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi [hereinafter BOA], Mühimme defterleri [hereinafter MD] 1, p. 217, Nos. 1256 and 1257 (November 24, 1554). Cf. İ. Metin Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants. The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550–1650*. New York, 1983, 38.

<sup>13</sup> MD 1, 76/410 (October 4, 1554) and 37/161 (September 21, 1554). Seydi's cause was also furthered by the death of his brother; his father had a *timar* of 3,000 *akçe*, and in theory only two of the sons of such an estate-holder could get *timars* worth 2,000 *akçe* each provided that the father died at home. If the latter lost his life in a military operation, one son could claim 3,000 *akçe* (the text suggests that Budak passed away at home). The relevant regulations are contained in Süleyman's decree of 1531: Akgündüz, *op. cit.*, 4. *Kitap: Kanunî Sultan Süleyman devri kanunnâmeleri*. I. Kısım: Merkezî ve umumî kanunnâmeler. İstanbul, 1992, 565, 571.

## 2. Ma'zul sipahis and their sons

The mobilization orders were often addressed to *sipahis* who had temporarily lost their benefices (*ma'zul*). If they, deprived of their living (or regular income), could not find an influential patron, they had no choice but to present themselves in the courts of *bey*s and *pasha*s, the gathering places of troops, or to join in the marches to again climb the rung of *timar*-holders by proving their martial virtues. The more so, as they were also expected to continuously confirm their claim to *timars*. A *ma'zul* *timariot* who failed to seek out the *bey*s and renew his claim for seven years, lost his right to benefice and sank to the rank of the *re'aya*.<sup>14</sup> It was for this reason that Kurd of Alaca Hisar or Ferhad of Sivas went to war: they joined sultan Süleyman on his Persian campaign as *ma'zul sipahis* and returned with decrees to be bestowed *timars* of 5,000 *akçe* each.<sup>15</sup> However, not every *ma'zul sipahi* was so ambitious. A certain Mehmed, whose former prebend had been recorded in the *sancak* of Yanya, failed to recover his due, so his son Süleyman had to save the family from disgrace by valiantly fighting in the above-mentioned war and being awarded an "initial" *timar* with an income of 3,000 *akçe*.<sup>16</sup> Sometimes the *ma'zuls* were forced by the state to fight on their own resources. In August 1595, the Imperial Council instructed the former *beylerbeyi* of Bosnia to be ready to defend the province with his own army, just as if he was still holding the governor's post.<sup>17</sup> It is to be noted that the court usually classified the applicants and those *ma'zul sipahis* who had remained longer on the waiting list enjoyed an advantage when the applicants outnumbered the allocations to be granted.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> The same decree of 1531 and the statute of 1536: Akgündüz, *op. cit.*, 4. *Kitap*, 566, 572, 577, 580-581. The latter was also published by Irène Beldiceanu, "La loi sur la transmission du timar (1536)," *Turcica* 11 (1979) 92-96; the relevant passage: 94. The same fate befell the underage son of a *sipahi* if he did not renew his claim after his father's death within a limited period of time, when he had come of age. Cf. Káldy-Nagy, "The First Centuries," 155-156. Röhrborn, *op. cit.*, 30-32, 52 ff., Grignaschi, *op. cit.*, 129-134.

<sup>15</sup> MD 1, 37/162 (September 21, 1554) and 24/78 (August 22, 1554). This also gave Kurd a raise of 1,000 *akçe*, as his earlier estates yielded only 4,000 *akçe*.

<sup>16</sup> MD 1, 35/148 (September 20, 1554)

<sup>17</sup> MD 73, 539/1178.

<sup>18</sup> MD 26, 116/300 (July 27, 1574, to the *beylerbeyi* of Rumelia).

### 3. *Servants, attendants of castle guards, and ma'zul members of fortress garrisons*

Although only indirect data are available, it can be presumed that the servants (relatives, etc.) of the commanders, senior officers, and well-to-do warriors in a castle garrison also took up arms, just as their masters did. A certain Gazi with the rank of cavalry commander (*seroda*) in Esztergom castle in 1549/50 had such a servant.<sup>19</sup> Fortress guards who lost their posts due to their own fault or for some unknown reason were constant figures in the "wars" (also) waged for estates. A former deputy commander (*kethüda*) of one of the fortresses in the *sancak* of Szendrő (Semendire), Seyfeddin, marched as far as Persia to prove with his deeds he deserved the sultan's bread. His efforts bore fruit: the Imperial Council assigned him a *timar* worth 4,000 *akçe* in lieu of the former one worth only 2,000 *akçe*.<sup>20</sup>

Pay-lists that survived from Ottoman castles in Hungary permit the astonishing conclusion that fortress garrisons probably played a far more prominent role in supplying volunteers than assumed earlier. Namely, there was a conspicuously high fluctuation among castle guards. The main reason why the guards replaced one another so rapidly was that large numbers of soldiers galore deserted or lost their posts, although they had previously fought for them with the utmost effort.<sup>21</sup> (The Ottoman high command always managed to recruit the missing fighters who were needed, although this involved considerable difficulties.) The deserters, however, usually did not vanish for ever, but soon reappeared in the retinue of a *sipahi* or a high dignitary.<sup>22</sup> They joined these parties to gain a better opportunity in the contest among volunteers to acquire prebends. Though possibly also attracted by the freer life there, they mainly expected greater weight to be given to their applications by their new masters, even though their own

<sup>19</sup> Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Türkische Handschriften, Mxt. 562, 93r-93v.

<sup>20</sup> MD 1, 141/821 (October 31, 1554); cf. MD 27, 218/499 (January 23, 1576, to the *beylerbeyi* of Temesvár).

<sup>21</sup> Ottoman scribes registered deserting as *terk-i kal'e*, resignation as *feragat kerde*.

<sup>22</sup> MD 26, 82/212 (July 13, 1574). Order to the pasha of Buda: The *beşlü ağas* of Esztergom made a complaint to the court, because while some of their troops only dealt with their own affairs, others went over to the *sipahis*, did not obey their *ağas*, and refused to do their duty. The governor was instructed to grant the posts of such persons to others based on reports by their *ağas* (...*haliya Estergon beşlü ağaları südde-i sa'adetüme mektub gönderüb ağalığa tabi' beşlü ta'fesinün ba'z-i hidmet-i lazimeleri eda etmeyüb ba'z kendü havasında, ba'z sipahi yanında durub ağalarına ita'at etmemekle...*).

combat value may have been average. However, a crucial motive was the negative attitude of the government towards the castle garrisons. An imperial order of 1544 expressly prohibited the bestowal of *timars* upon these guards.<sup>23</sup> (*Timar* in this context clearly means *kılıç* or *eşkiin timarı*, that is, prebends granted to *sipahis* on condition they went to war. So-called *müstahfiz timaris* given as pay were awarded to several members of the fortress guards.) One may speculate that at the beginning these soldiers entered service in the fortress garrisons, because they wanted to acquire the necessary military training and eventually make off with the weapons, without which they could not offer their services as volunteers (the possession of weapons, as will be discussed below, was one of the main prerequisites of hiring volunteers). Therefore, for many fortune hunters fortress service was "a training school" and a spring-board to get into the class of *timar*-holders, which promised better perspectives.

This does not mean that the majority of those in search of subsistence were unhappy to join a castle garrison. Pay-list entries reveal that even in higher circles it was not a detestable step forward to have a member of one's retinue or family replace a former castle soldier.<sup>24</sup> However, the tendency did exist, so it is possibly not an exaggeration to presume that a high rate of volunteers were former members of castle-guards.

#### 4. Sons and relatives of janissaries, ma'zul janissaries

Contrary to widely held views, it was not the period of Selim II (1566–1574) from when the janissaries took an interest, and were permitted to marry, they had founded families well before this time, too. Apparently, many janissaries of Christian origin did not break off links with their former families either. These soldiers did their best to have their sons and male relatives admitted into the corps. Initially the state disapproved of these attempts, but soon did less and less to hinder them, realizing that the offsprings (*kuloğlu*) and brothers (*kul karındaşı*) of janissaries were a handy bunch to replace the losses. From the second half of the sixteenth century, an increasing number of these enrolled in

<sup>23</sup> Quoted by Káldy-Nagy, "The First Centuries," 155: note 33, and *idem*, "The 'Strangers'," 168.

<sup>24</sup> Several examples can be found in Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Türkische Handschriften, Mxt 614 (Flügel 1297).

the janissary corps. (This consummated the process in which the *kuloğlus* gradually outnumbered the Christian boys levied by way of *devoşirme*.)

Janissary offsprings seeking employment, however, were often too impatient to wait out the time of graduation (*çıkma*, *kapuya çıkma* or *be-dergah* in Ottoman terminology). They often joined their fathers for a campaign or offered their services on their own so as to shorten the road to a much-desired military post.<sup>25</sup> For this reason, Mehmed, son of Rüstem, a *timar*-holder janissary in the *sancak* of Avlonya, accompanied the troops marching against Temesvár in 1552. He was lucky enough to have two fellows from his native town ready to testify to his prowess, which encouraged the *bey* of Avlonya to recommend him for a *timar*.<sup>26</sup>

No matter how astonishing it may sound, temporarily dismissed janissaries might also have been among the volunteers. As far as I am aware, research has been ignorant of the fact that janissaries of lower and middle rank were also afflicted by the *ma'zul* status. A pay-roll of 1590–91 listing the janissaries of the Porte stationed in Buda features the remark "dismissed" (*ma'zul şud*) both alongside ordinary janissaries and *ağas*.<sup>27</sup> An interesting entry in the *defter* mentions that Mehmed, the *ağa* of the janissary corps in Buda was discharged and replaced by Selim, son of Turgut, in accordance with the sultan's decree of February 21, 1590. As the *defter* explains, the latter had been *ma'zul* during the first three months of 998 (November 10, 1589–February 6, 1590) and as his dismissal letter (*ma'zulnamesi!*) dated January 1590 had also arrived, Selim was not recorded in the pay-roll for this three months' period. As the new order of appointment was received after pay-day, he was registered again only from the beginning of the next three month cycle.<sup>28</sup> This story reveals that when a janissary soldier or officer was relieved of his rank, he was,

<sup>25</sup> For in ordinary circumstances, *çıkma* was only carried out every 5 to 8 years. At times of longer wars or after major battles the waiting time of course shortened, and due to masses of losses, several thousand could be admitted at once.

<sup>26</sup> MD 1, 118/646 (October 16, 1554). Some data on *kul karındaşı*: on June 18, 1574, the *ağa* of the janissaries was commanded to conscribe and send to Egypt 800 *kul karındaşı* who could handle guns. A command of October 31 that same year orders that the *ağa* had to substitute 150 janissaries missing from Cyprus by just as many *kul karındaşı* (MD 26, 91/235, 298/869).

<sup>27</sup> Maliyeden Müdevver [hereinafter MM] 7190, 25 and 100.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 42: *Mezkûr Selim bundan akdem dokuz yüz doksan sekiz senesinin muharrem, safar, rebiülevvel mevâcibinde ma'zul olub yine sene-i mezburenün rebiülevvel evasıtı tarihiyle ma'zulnamesi gelüb ol zaman deftere kayd olunmadı. 'Ulufeden sonra emr gelmeğın, mevâcib ibtidasından kayd olundu.*

or could be, temporarily deprived of his pay. The officers must have had sufficient reserves to survive such periods,<sup>29</sup> but when the time of inaction and lack of pay dragged too long, they were probably forced to resort to volunteering to regain the confidence of the government.<sup>30</sup>

#### 5. Re'aya and members of semi-military (or auxiliary) organizations

Ottoman political thought divided society into two major functional categories: military (*askeri*) and tax-payer (*re'aya*). The leading apparatus insisted that the two groups should not mingle, to prevent the social equilibrium from being upset. In theory, the Ottoman leaders were never happy to see *re'aya* hankering after the military class, but until about the mid-sixteenth century this was reluctantly tolerated and after that time they could not prevent the *re'aya* from acquiring military positions and *timars*. Official declarations clearly reveal the ambiguous attitude of the government. While several decrees prohibited "foreigners" (i.e. *re'aya* and other persons of non-timariot origin called *ecnebis*) to bear arms and acquire estates with their help, other manifestations suggested that the government did not want to shut the door firmly in the face of such efforts. For instance, in his *Asaf-name* Lütfi pasha disapproved of the *re'aya* who changed class, but he did not preclude the possibility of *re'aya* becoming *sipahis* by their merits; he only warned against their relatives also sneaking into the society of *askeris* in their wake.<sup>31</sup> It is worth noting that the unknown person who copied and complemented Lütfi's work in early July, 1606 took a far more rigid stance. He proposed that "the *re'aya* who sit on a horse shall be punished severely by their *sipahis*. According to the regulation, the *re'aya* found with a sword, arrow, bow, gun or any other weapon used for fighting in their hand ... shall be sentenced to death. They shall be executed immediately. Moreover, even their village folk deserve severe punishment."<sup>32</sup> 'Ayn 'Ali, writing around the same time, also conveyed the position of the court saying: "The *re'aya* are

<sup>29</sup> Before losing his post, Selim was the *kethüda* of the janissaries in Buda, see MM 6208, 22.

<sup>30</sup> At first they tried to get new prebends via their social connections. For instance, Ayas, who resigned from his post as *yeniçeri ağası* of Baghdad, managed to secure just as large a *zi'amet* as he had enjoyed in his previous position, as *çavuş* (for the summary of the order dated November 15, 1552, see BOA, Kepeci 210, 25).

<sup>31</sup> Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu, *Lütfi Paşa Âsafnâmesi (yeni bir metin tesisi denemesi)*. İstanbul, 1991 (Prof. Dr. Bekir Kütükoğlu'na Armağandan ayırması), 98.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

prohibited to gird themselves with a sword and mount a horse." Some lines later, however, he seems to have forgotten this statement and embarked upon the circumstances under which *re'aya* might become *sipahi*: "Re'aya will deserve *timars* when their bravery (*yoldaşlığı*) and services for the benefit of the padishah have been witnessed. In imperial campaigns, the commander-in-chiefs grant them initial [*timars*], in peacetime the *beylerbeyis* of the marches report on their services and on this basis the order for initial [*timars*] is issued."<sup>33</sup> Should these statements, theoretical in a certain sense, fail to convince us, an order of 1552 confirms the impression that the government sometimes contradicted itself and admitted "unworthy" elements into the rank of the beneficiaries. On August 6, 1552, the Imperial Council authorized vizier Ahmed pasha, the conqueror of Temesvár to discretionally distribute an increase of 100,000 *akçe* among the *timar*-holders who had excelled in the fighting. In the last line of the decree, however, the *divan* warned that "ecnebis shall not penetrate among them". It is noteworthy that later, obviously under the pressure of hordes of volunteers (possibly including many *re'aya*), this line was cancelled due to the fear they would leave the army or enraged by their dispossession would do something thoughtless.<sup>34</sup>

*Re'aya* volunteers also included Christians who, in the hope of becoming *sipahis* or strengthening their positions, generally converted to Islam. In return for his services rendered in the capture of Orahovica in Pozsega, a *timar* with a yearly income of 5,000 *akçe* was bestowed upon a Christian warrior. He soon converted and received the name Mustafa.<sup>35</sup> The renegade called Hüseyin, who had served and distinguished himself in the Hungarian border areas, was recommended for a *timar* of 3,000 *akçe* by Derviş, the *sancakbeyi* of Mohács and Tuygun pasha, the *beylerbeyi* of Buda was ordered to assign it on December 16, 1554.<sup>36</sup>

There is ample evidence to presume that Christians faced fewer obstacles in their ambition to become *timar*-holders than the Muslim

<sup>33</sup> Ayn-i Ali Efendi, *op. cit.*, 72. Akgündüz, *op. cit.*, 4. *Kitap*, 65 and 84.

<sup>34</sup> The whole of the decree: İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Koğuşlar 888, f. 347a; the line at issue: *amma tevcih olunan kimesneler yarar olub haricden ve ecnebiden duhul etmiş olmaya*.

<sup>35</sup> MD 1, 183/1049 (November 15, 1554)

<sup>36</sup> MD 1, 236/1362 See also *ibid.*, 52/261, a new-Muslim called Hasan has a *timar* worth 10,000 *akçe* (September 26, 1554). For another Hungarian renegade of later times, see Géza Dávid, "Die Bege von Szigetvár im 16. Jahrhundert," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* 82 (1992) 75.

Turks. This is quite obvious among the marauders (*martolos*) mainly recruited from among the ordinary *re'aya* and Vlach (*eflak*) population.<sup>37</sup> All they had to do was to convert and then it was up to their skills at arms and manoeuvres in the benefice-hungry Ottoman society. Incidentally, the case of the marauders best clarifies the demarcation lines up to which the Ottoman authorities tolerated or encouraged the military involvement of the *re'aya*. Marauders, as mentioned earlier, represented the *re'aya* class in the castle garrisons. Undoubtedly, many of their Muslim Turk comrades serving in other garrison formations were also of *re'aya* origin. There is no evidence that these elements were ever called *ecnebi* or "alien" (to the system). The moment, however, that these soldiers acquired *kılıç* or *eşkün timaris* (and not *müstahfiz timaris*), they incurred the charge of being *ecnebis*. This happened to the renegade called Hızır, who received a *timar* yielding an income of 3,500 *akçe* in the *sancak* of Alaca Hisar. The *sipahi* Aydın, who had been *ma'zul* and hankered after a *timar* for a long time, denounced him at court, reporting: "Hızır is an *ecnebi* who acquired his *timar* by fraud." Aydın therefore asked for Hızır's estate to be confiscated and given to him in return for the allocation of 4,000 *akçe* he had long been unable to exchange for a *timar*.<sup>38</sup> This story confirms that the court, despite contrary declarations, did not object to the military service of the *re'aya* and renegades in itself (and did not exclude the possibility that in possession of a sultanic diploma [*berat*] they became members of the tax-exempt *askeri* class).<sup>39</sup> At the same time, the administration tried to set obstacles to curb their rise to the rank of *timar*-holding *sipahis*. The only way for *re'aya* to overcome these barriers (at least officially) was to satisfy the conditions listed by 'Ayn 'Ali: volunteering for the campaigns and proving their valour. In this sense, groups of *re'aya* or of *re'aya* origin were not precluded from the community of *sipahis* in theory, either. Only those were objected to who penetrated

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<sup>37</sup> Above the names of some Serbs registered as tax-paying *re'aya* in a *cizye defteri* of Becse-Becserek for the year 966 (October 14, 1558 – October 2, 1559) such remarks can be read: *Vukman doselac, mezkûr martolos kayd olunmağın yerine Raya Benik' kayd oluna; İstapan Raynik', martolos ber muceb-i berat. Be-cayeş Pavlo İstokvik'* (BOA, Bab-i defteri, Cizye muhasebesi 26562, 28 and 30.). See further Milan Vasić, *Martolosi u jugoslovenskim zemljama pod turskom vladavinom*. Sarajevo, 1967.

<sup>38</sup> BOA, Kepeci 74, 37 (June 16, 1564, instruction to the *beylerbeyi* of Temesvár).

<sup>39</sup> If only because in dire military situations, when replacement was uneven, it was forced to resort to mobilize *re'aya*. Cf. Finkel, *op. cit.*, 36-37.

the "closed" class of *sipahis* along another route than this "official" one. Consequently, *ecnebis* were probably the ones who tried to get around the officially controlled course and take some side path (bribing or protectionism, etc.) to *timar*-holding. This is suggested by the anonymous author of the sixteenth-century *Hırzû'l-müluk*, who asserted that vacant estates ought to be assigned first of all to worthy sons of *sipahis* and to those who had commands for *timars* in their hands (*eli emirli*); by the latter term he meant those who had acquired an order for *timar* allocation in the regular way, while *ecnebis* were qualified as swindlers (*ehl-i tezvîr*) who had obtained prebends with the aid of false witnesses.<sup>40</sup>

Among the volunteers we also find the members of the so-called "exempt and privileged" (*mu'af ve müsellem*) auxiliary troupes, who were situated somewhere between the *re'aya* and the military class on the social ladder. Their tax exemption, mostly from extraordinary taxes, was normally earned by some martial service. In Rumelia, they included the *akıncıs*, *müsellems*, *yürüks*, *voynuks*, and *çingenés* (Gypsies), to mention only the most important. Some of these semi-military organizations were governed by their own *sancakbeyis*. In Rumelia, for instance, the *çingenés*, the *çingene müsellems* of Kırkkilise and the *voynuks* (mostly *eflaks*) had their own *sancakbeyis* who, on the basis of their incomes, were the less prestigious *beys* among the Rumelian governors.<sup>41</sup> Their *sancaks* were not organized upon the usual territorial principle, but encompassed semi-military groups, which were widely scattered, thus extending beyond "ordinary" *sancak* borders. The *çingene sancakbeyi* was one of the *akıncı beys* and he commanded *akıncıs* as well,<sup>42</sup> and the *bey* of the *müsellems* of Kırkkilise was also a commander (*subaşı*) of the *yürüks* of Vize.<sup>43</sup> The *çingene sancakbeyi*, however, was only in charge of Gypsies who were not registered as *re'aya* belonging to the *has* or *timar* estates.<sup>44</sup>

Although remunerating services with *timars* was also used with these troops (to mainly pay officers: *subaşıs*, *çeribaşıs*, and *tovcas*, etc.), towards the

<sup>40</sup> Yaşar Yücel, *Osmanlı devlet teşkilâtına dair kaynaklar*. Ankara, 1988, 186. It is interesting that according to the author, an *ecnebi*, who had held a prebend for a period of ten years without being exposed, was no longer to be harrassed for possessing the *timar*.

<sup>41</sup> Barkan, *op. cit.*, 301-304.

<sup>42</sup> BOA, Kepeci 209, 71. és 137 (orders dated June 24 and December 7, 1550).

<sup>43</sup> M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, "Çingeneler," in *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*. III. İstanbul, 1988, 423. Gökbilgin regards the *bey* of the *müsellems* of Kırkkilise and the *bey* of the Gypsies as one and the same dignitary, although in Barkan's list (see note 41) they were entered separately.

<sup>44</sup> Ömer Lütfi Barkan, *XV ve XVI inci asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda ziraî ekonominin hukukî ve malî esasları*. I. Kanunlar. İstanbul, 1943, 249-250.

mid-sixteenth century the administration became increasingly reluctant to permit the soldiers of these units to rise to the rank of *sipahis* by acquiring *timars*. The above-cited decree of 1544 prohibited both the members of fortress garrisons and *müsellems* to be granted prebends.<sup>45</sup> The ambitious had only one choice: to gain possession of a *kılıç timarı* through services rendered as volunteers. After a time, Gypsies, however, were even deprived of this possibility, at least in principle. As an order despatched on September 20, 1567, reveals, the Imperial Council had several times instructed the Rumelian *kadıs* that "Gypsies shall not mount a horse, walk about with swords or other weapons, but stay quietly at their places". Despite repeated warnings, Gypsies continued to move around armed and committed several monstrous deeds, so a court *sipahi* called Mustafa was appointed to supervise the Gypsies. The divan issued a decree that *kadıs* should enter the ban into their judicial records (*sicil*) and Gypsies should be instructed that "they shall not mount a horse...".<sup>46</sup> As was customary in the Ottoman Empire, this regulation was not fully observed, but the tendency it indicates is worth noting. It reflects the same change in attitudes towards the *re'aya* that could be detected in the above cited statements: in the latter half of the sixteenth century, the formerly flexible social frontiers became more and more rigid, and the rift between notables and subjects, beys and ordinary soldiers gradually widened.

#### 6. *Retinues and men of beylerbeyis, sancakbeyis and sipahis*

*Beys* and *pashas* always kept a large retinue and hosts of servants around themselves, this being the background to their prestige and the source of advancement. When a *bey* or *pasha* was promoted or rewarded, the Imperial Council listed not only personal aptitude, but the "feeding of capable companions" (*yarar yoldaş beslemek*) to the credit of the celebrity. In a submission, vizier Ahmed pasha, the conqueror of Temesvár ranked the requirements to be met by *beys* in the border zones as follows: "It seems appropriate that the *beys* to be appointed in this border area shall be old ones who can deploy more companions [than prescribed], who know the situation of the foe and have earned fame by their valiancy."<sup>47</sup>

<sup>45</sup> Káldy-Nagy, "The First Centuries," 155: note 33, and *idem*, "The 'Strangers'," 168.

<sup>46</sup> MD 7, 79/215.

<sup>47</sup> Koğuşlar 888, 446a (September 19, 1552): *bu serhadlerde olan beğler ziyade yoldaşa kadir düşmen ahvalinden habir şeca'atle iştihar bulmuş eski beğler olmak münasibdür*. On July 25, 1552, the sultan's court awarded the robe of honour to 11 *sancakbeyis*, because they had distinguished themselves in the siege of Veszprém and "feed able comrades"; see Koğuşlar 888, 301b.

Although little is known of the retinues and households (*kapu* or *kapu halkı*) of military leaders,<sup>48</sup> some evidence does suggest that they probably often exceeded the size required by the official income of the governors. In ca. 1520 the effective strength of the Bosnian *sancakbeyi*'s army consisted of 1,040 armed men.<sup>49</sup> If the regulations promulgated around the turn of the sixteenth century for the timariot army still applied, then, in principle, the *bey* was only expected to deploy 147–148 mounted retainers from the revenues of his *has*. The contradiction between the two figures is striking.<sup>50</sup> And the official register possibly did not include a whole host of volunteers boosting the retinue: the relatives, the *ma'zul sipahis* who came to "queue up" to confirm their claims (this state was called *mülazemet* and the applicants and attendants were named *mülazim*), former or actual fortress servicemen, and vagabonds, etc., waiting for a *timar*, a post or just subsistence—i.e. nearly all the categories mentioned above.

The appeal of the pashas' and *bey*s' households did not merely lie in the better prospects of displaying one's aptitude or just earning a livelihood. What principally attracted volunteers was that the *beylerbeyis* had the right to allocate prebends to a certain limit and up to the end of the sixteenth century, the larger benefices were mostly granted by the Porte on the *beylerbeyis*' and *sancakbeyis*' recommendation. These spheres of authority naturally contributed to the development of networks of personal dependencies and made services rendered to pashas and *bey*s highly profitable. From the 1530s onward, the Porte was forced to rescind more and more of such spheres of authority, so as to prevent the emergence of local powers. In 1531, for example, the court prohibited the *beylerbeyis* from granting "initial" *timars*, and in 1554 deprived them of

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<sup>48</sup> Despite the fact that recently many have stressed the political and social significance of these groups. See Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants*, esp. 31–44. R. A. Abu-el-Haj, "Review Article: Metin Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants ...*," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* 6 (1986) 221–246. İ. Metin Kunt, *Bir Osmanlı valisinin yıllık gelir-gideri. Diyarbekir, 1670–71*. İstanbul, 1981, esp. 22–26 and 54–58 (excellent information on the household of a *beylerbeyi*—but from the end of the seventeenth century; at that time retinues might have considerably differed from those in the sixteenth century, for example, due to the appearance of the *sekbans*). Nejat Göyünç, "Wie ein Beğlerbeğ im sechzehnten Jahrhundert seines Amtes waltete," in *Armağan. Festschrift für Andreas Tietze*, 113–121, esp. 121.

<sup>49</sup> Aličić, *op. cit.*, 188.

<sup>50</sup> The computations are based on the following sources: Barkan, "H. 933–934 (M. 1527–1528)," 303: a list of the *bey*s of Rumelia and their incomes in 1520–22; *Code de lois coutumières de Mehmed II*. Édité par Nicoară Beldiceanu. Wiesbaden, 1967, 9r–10v and Aličić, *op. cit.*, 188.

the right to discretionally assign *timars* to the persons "worthy of grace".<sup>51</sup> However, provincial military leaders had many possibilities to give employment to their protégés, so the drift towards their courts never ceased. Some of the insiders could even benefit from the death of their patron: according to the regulations, 13 men (*adam* or *kul*) of a *vezir*, 11 of a *beylerbeyi* (or 8 if he died as *ma'zul*), 6 of a *sancakbeyi* were granted *timars* upon their master's death.<sup>52</sup> Another opportunity available for the volunteers derived from the fact that when a *bey's* man received a *timar*, the master, in principle, had to break connections with him and employ another person in his place. Related to this, the following instruction was sent to the *beylerbeyi* of Buda on August 23, 1552: "...It is not allowed to be said of *timar*- and other prebend-holders that they are the men (*adam*) of *beylerbeyis* and *beys*, and that they serve the latter. New servants (*nöker*) shall be put in the place of those who have received prebends, for those who have received pay and *timar* belong to my ordinary servants. All must render service in the location and the *sancak* where their prebends are and where their *timars* are situated... Do not allow this argument to be raised: 'We are the men of *beys* and we serve them, we have been ordered to render our services to them'. I refuse to consent to *timar*-holders hoisting a *beylerbeyi's* or a *bey's* or someone else's banner and serving them in all sorts of affairs. It is necessary that all [*beys*] shall have disposal over as many retainers (*cebelü*) and servants (*nöker*) as is prescribed in my exalted book of regulations..."<sup>53</sup>

Even though the ties between *beys* and their former dependants were not broken off (as attested by the above quotation), the compulsion to replace lost followers did absorb a portion of those attending a notable's household. War losses also enhanced the prospects of filling vacancies. But it was not indispensable to be among the closest men of a *bey's* household in order to receive a prebend or reward. On February 18, 1576, for

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<sup>51</sup> K. Röhrborn, *op. cit.*, 29 ff. Káldy-Nagy, "The First Centuries," 154 ff. As for me, I interpret the term *mahall-i himmet* as "worthy of grace".

<sup>52</sup> Röhrborn, *op. cit.*, 40-42, 70-73. Cf. İstanbul, Bayezid Devlet Kütüphanesi [hereinafter BDK], Veliyüddin Ef. 1970, 25a and BOA, Kepeci 209, 37. See further Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants*, 40.

<sup>53</sup> TSMK, Koğuşlar 888, 393a. Here the word *nöker* is the synonym of *gulam*. The text confirms the assumption that in most cases *gulam* or *nöker* was not a simple servant, but one who also fought. Important contribution to the problem of *nöker* or *nökör*: Mario Grignaschi, "Les guerriers domestiques dans la féodalité turque," in VI. *Türk Tarih Kongresi*. Ankara 20-26 Ekim 1961. *Kongreye sunulan bildiriler*. Ankara, 1967, 206-230.

example, the sultan's court reprimanded the *beylerbeyi* of Buda, because upon his certificates (*tezkere*) substantial increases of income (*terakki*) were granted to several *sipahis* who "lay in his house, and did not take part in campaigns and services". The pasha, therefore, was forbidden to raise the income of *sipahis* by more than 1,000 *akçe* or to make recommendations to this effect.<sup>54</sup> However, the court often yielded ground in view of the peculiar circumstances of the border zone and endowed the frontier *bey*s with rights that it denied to others. While from 1586 the *beylerbeyis* in general had no jurisdiction over vacant (*mahlul*) estates yielding over 20,000 *akçe* a year, the *beylerbeyi* of Buda, on the basis of a decree dated March 1592, was entitled to redistribute all vacated estates in the future.<sup>55</sup> He obviously received this concession, because losses could more quickly be replaced in this way than through the procedure involving the Porte. At the beginning of the Long War (1593-1606), the pasha of Buda (temporarily?) was again given nearly all the powers the *beylerbeyis* possessed in the first half of the century. With imperial orders bearing *tuğra*, he was permitted to grant *zi'amets*, *timars*, salary increases, initial *timars* and some (vaguely defined) garrison posts to those deserving and to the volunteers.<sup>56</sup> It was also due to the warlike atmosphere of the frontier and the enormous demand for estates that the *beylerbeyi* of Buda could afford to handle the temporal limits more loosely. A lengthy instruction sent to Sokollu Mustafa pasha in reply to his complaints informs us that in the marches several outstanding and experienced warriors had been compelled to leave the *timar*-holders' corps, because they failed to satisfy the regulations prescribing that a *ma'zul* could seek an estate for not more than 7 years, and the son of a *sipahi* for 19 years. Since their failures would deprive the state of its most valuable soldiers, the court consented that the *beylerbeyis* "shall keep a register of the *ma'zuls*, those taking part in the campaigns, those rendering service and the attendants, and when the granting of *timars* is to take place, they shall have a look at this *defter*, and those on the waiting list (*mülazemet*)

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<sup>54</sup> MD 27, 479/642. In 1579, the court passed a regulation stipulating that *kâtibs* and *çavuşes* could not receive a pay-rise on the basis of submissions from the provinces. The regulation also laid down that *kâtibs* and *çavuşes* whose income came up to 40,000 *akçe* were no longer entitled to *terakki*. See BDK, Veliyüddin Ef. 1970, 6a. It is another question that these orders were frequently not observed.

<sup>55</sup> The first decree is referred to by Röhrborn, *op. cit.*, 63, the second: MD 69, 41/23.

<sup>56</sup> MD 73, No. 639: *Seferde ve uğur-i hümayunda hizmetde ve yoldaşlıkda bulunan zu'ama ve erbab-i timara ve gurebaya kanun üzere ibtida ve terakki ve kal'eye müte'allik olan ba'z-i virgüler ve devlet-i 'aliyyeye ve sefer-i hümayuna lazım olan evamir-i şerifeye tuğrasın kendü çeküb...*

are to be granted *timars* even if the amount of time [set for acquiring an estate] has expired." Those, however, who do not keep besieging the *beylerbeyi's* court with *timar* applications (*beylerbeyi kapusin bekleyüb*) and failed to join the military operations, were not to receive posts or benefices under any circumstances.<sup>57</sup> Since, of course, the applicants were qualified and recorded by the *beylerbeyi*, this sphere of authority enabled him to build up a broad network of clientele in which the volunteers could also find their way.<sup>58</sup> It seems, therefore, justified to assume that several "outsiders" tried to strike oil in this environment and a considerable proportion of volunteers who joined the campaigns came from this circle.

## II.

Having reviewed the sources of manpower, the question arises: who those volunteers actually were whom the Ottoman bureaucracy termed *garib yiğit*. To my knowledge, the only real attempt at answering this question was made by K. Röhrborn. In his view, the *garib yiğit* (interpreted as "Aussenseiter") signifies the sons of rich *re'aya* for only they were able to acquire a horse, garment, and weapons, without which they were not employed.<sup>59</sup> Röhrborn arrived at this conclusion, because he correctly realized that the offspring of *sipahis* were not counted among the *garip yiğits*, and in addition, he inferred from 'Ayn 'Ali's treatise that this early seventeenth century author identified the *garib yiğit* with the *re'aya*. The relevant passage partly quoted above reads: "The *re'aya* are prohibited to gird themselves with a sword and mount a horse. The brave *garib yiğits* seek service with the soldiers, the *beylerbeyis* and *sancakbeyis*, stay in the border areas and acquire *timars* in the frontier zone (*serhad dirliğine geçüb*). When they have proved their worth in frontier service, the local

<sup>57</sup> MD 26, 119/307. The extension of 19 years granted to the sons of *sipahis* is surprisingly long. At the time of sultan Süleyman it was only 7, from 1536 on 10 years long, see Röhrborn, *op. cit.*, 30-31. Káldy-Nagy, "The First Centuries," 156.

<sup>58</sup> This tendency is also confirmed by the fact that some *beylerbeyis* in the border zones (e.g. that of Buda) enjoyed broader licences than customary, not only in assigning *timars*, but granting posts in fortress garrisons as well. From 1578-79 the pashas of Buda were entitled to fill the latter and obliged to inform the court of their decisions only afterwards. On this, see Claudia Römer, *Osmanische Festungsbesatzungen in Ungarn zur Zeit Murâds III. Dargestellt anhand von Petitionen zur Stellenvergabe*. (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse. Schriften der Balkan-Kommission, Philologische Abteilung, 35.) Wien, 1995, 59-67, esp. 64.

<sup>59</sup> Röhrborn, *op. cit.*, 89-95.

*beylerbeyis* and *sancakbeyis* make a report and put down in a *defter* their valiant deeds (*yoldaşlığın*) and they receive *timars* in return for their services from the assets in the border zone.<sup>60</sup> After a further sentence, this passage is followed by the discussion of the conditions under which *re'aya* might be given *timars*, which contains similar statements.<sup>61</sup>

'Ayn 'Ali's text does not seem to support Röhrborn's conclusions. 'Ayn 'Ali clearly distinguishes between *garib yiğit* and *re'aya*, even though he eventually defines the same way for both to acquire *timars*. This by itself would suggest that the *garib yiğit* were not only *re'aya*, although undoubtedly they might have included some *re'aya*. The same is borne out by a passage in the *kanunname* concerning the *timar* system written in the second half of the sixteenth century. This text defines the types of *kılıç timaris* and specifies a mere two categories of those entitled to initial (*ibtida*) *kılıçs*: *sipahi* sons and *garibs*.<sup>62</sup> From this it is obvious that the compiler of the text ranged all volunteers with the notion of *garib*, because he simply could not have ignored all the other categories of the ones mentioned above besides the *re'aya*. On the other hand, it is even theoretically inconceivable that the various groups of volunteers should not feature in the terminology of contemporary sources discussing access to prebends. Accordingly, it can be stated that the notion of *garib yiğit* may have encompassed all the volunteers that did not belong to the traditionally closed society of timariots (*kadimi sipahi*) and to the janissaries (or the court mercenaries in general) who were always handled separately.

This conclusion can also be ascertained by documentary evidence. In 1551-52, a new war broke out between the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires for the possession of Transylvania. In the spring of 1552, the mainstay of the Ottoman forces headed by Kara Ahmed set out to conquer the region around Temesvár (*Temesköz*, in Hungarian). At the same time, the *sancakbeyis* of Bursa and Teke were ordered to attack Transylvania from the east in cooperation with the voivodes of Moldavia and Wallachia in order to split the Habsburg-Hungarian defence forces. But this diverting manoeuvre was carried out rather half-heartedly and

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<sup>60</sup> Ayn-i Ali Efendi, 72. Akgündüz, *op. cit.*, 9. *Kitap*, 65 and 84.

<sup>61</sup> See above on pp. 239-240.

<sup>62</sup> Akgündüz, *op. cit.*, 4. *Kitap*, 487, 515. The publisher claims that this *kanunname* was the source of 'Ayn 'Ali as well. I have the impression, however, that the correlation of the diverse texts has not yet been convincingly clarified.

the actors soon left the theatre of operations. Nevertheless, it was sufficient to deprive the castles of the Temes region of reinforcements and they fell to the Ottomans by the end of July. The Ottoman and the auxiliary troops withdrawn to Moldavia and Wallachia were ordered by the Porte to raid Transylvania again and reinforce their strength by recruiting volunteers. The decree of August 10, 1552, declares: "Order to the *kadıns* of the *sancaks* of Silistra, Nicopol, Vidin, and other regions of Rumelia: I herewith order that the *sancakbeyi* of Bursa, Behram ... accompanied by the Moldavian soldiers, and Sinan..., the *sancakbeyi* of Teke accompanied by the Wallachian soldiers shall launch a raid (*akın edüb*) and burn down, destroy, devastate, ransack and subjugate Transylvania. I order that upon receipt [of the command] you shall announce it by town-criers in all your judicial districts that the brave young men who take delight in raiding and in the holy war (*akından ve gazadan safası olan yiğitlerden*) shall go either to Moldavia, to the above-named *bey* of Bursa, or to Wallachia, to the above-named *bey* of Teke, to gather, acquire a rich booty, devastate and pillage the country of the accursed infidel, and fight for the faith. Instruct them carefully and let them know that all the *akıncıs*, *cebelüs*, and others (*akıncılardan ve cebelülerden ve gayriden*) shall join either the *bey* of Bursa, or the *bey* of Teke, whichever is closer to their flank, march to fight and display valour (*yoldaşlıkda bulunalar*) at their side. The valiant lads who show their heroism in the noted campaign will be granted prebends (*dirlik*) as the sovereign's favour, upon the recommendation of the above-mentioned [*beys*]. Consequently, [the volunteers] shall join up equipped and armed (*yat ve yarağlarıyla*), and take part in the service and the holy war".<sup>63</sup>

If the *cebelüs* of the cited command are identified with the retainers of *beys* and *sipahis* in the broad sense (as outlined above) and we take the word "others" (*gayriden*) to also imply venturesome *re'aya*, there is sufficient ground to state that in Ottoman usage the term *garib yiğit* comprised the majority of the categories specified above. Conclusive proof of this can be found in a command despatched to the *beylerbeyi* of Temesvár on January 23, 1576. In this rescript, the Imperial Council reprimanded the pasha of Temesvár, because he kept submitting *ma'zul* members of castle guards (*ağas* and ordinary soldiers alike) for initial *timars*, justifying the claims by their *ma'zul* status, that is, temporarily

<sup>63</sup> TSMK, Koğuşlar 888, 363b. An order of nearly identical text had been sent to the *kadıns* of Silistra and Nicopol a day earlier, see *ibid.*, 360b.

having no employment. The *divan* condemned this procedure and instructed the *bey*: "henceforth you shall not recommend for initial prebends (*ibtidadan timara*) those who became *ma'zul* from *ağa* status and from salaried posts. When they have distinguished themselves in battle, count them among the volunteers (*garib yiğit kısmından biliüb*) and report on them for initial *timars* as such. Do not recommend them under the title of having become *ma'zul* from salaried soldiers."<sup>64</sup>

These words precisely reflect the stance of the Ottoman administration. In the eye of the court, all volunteers who wished to gain or regain admission into the imperial army were potential *garib yiğit* in contrast to the status group of the traditional *sipahi* class (including their sons and the *ma'zul sipahis*) and that of the janissaries (or broadly speaking the court mercenaries) and their sons who also constituted a separate legal category.<sup>65</sup> On the other hand, the *garib yiğit* system was not only an opportunity, but also an obligation for the volunteers who, from the mid-sixteenth century, could officially enter or return to the military organization only in this way.

With this device, the administration hit two birds with one stone. By holding out the promise of acquiring prebends, it could mobilize the extraordinary manpower reserves, which remained without employment and income, because of the oversaturation of the establishment. At the same time, by admitting large numbers of volunteers to join its "servants" mainly through this channel, in principle it ensured control over the process and the applicants' defencelessness towards the state. In theory only—because protectionism and personal relations always thwarted the court's ambitions (not least because the high dignitaries themselves regularly moulded their personal policies on the basis of patrimonial principles). By regulating remuneration in this way, i.e. by granting prebends first of all for voluntary military services rendered to the state, the central power gained access to the personnel and material reserves, required by the momentary situation, which the state could not have fully produced from its own resources.

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<sup>64</sup> MD 27, 218/499.

<sup>65</sup> This categorization is supported by a command of July 17, 1585, which enumerates the volunteers expected for a campaign in the following order: sons of *sipahis*, sons of court mercenaries, volunteers (*eğer sipahi zadeler ve eğer kapum kulları oğulları ve eğer dirliksiz garib yiğitler*); see Mustafa Akdağ, "Yeniçeri ocak nizamının bozuluşu," *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi* 5 (1947) 302.

Our knowledge concerning the enlistment of the volunteerers practically consists of what we have learnt from the above mentioned imperial commands. The instructions to this end were sometimes addressed to the commander-in-chief of the campaign (*serdar*), at other times to one of the *sancakbeyis*, and for the most part to the *kadı*s of the provinces bordering on the theatre of operations. The officials then sent out criers to notify the population of the opportunity and the gathering places where the volunteers were recorded in a register.<sup>66</sup> Those who wished to be enlisted had to possess a horse and the necessary equipment. Usually, the orders specified the requirements to be met by the volunteers as follows: they should be "fit for fighting, effective fellows able [to acquire] a horse and garment" (*cenge yarar ata ve tona kadir yarar yiğitlerden*).<sup>67</sup> In emergency situations, some of the preconditions such as the possession of a horse might have been dispensed with, but for short periods only.<sup>68</sup> Though the information regarding the weapons of the volunteers is very limited, as the above cited order revealed, they obviously could not be enlisted without possessing certain types of them.<sup>69</sup> This again indicates the fact that the bulk of volunteers might have come from the military strata or from groups attached to them, because they alone had the means to procure a horse, garments and arms, which cost considerable sums.

In order that the poor (and among them many *re'aya*) could also profit from the looting and fighting for the faith, the high dignitaries of the state themselves created religious foundations. In 1573, the influential pasha of Buda, Sokollu Mustafa endowed several hundred young mares of his stud-farms next to the village Bayram Şalu (district Rusi Kasri) and the town of Beçkerek/Becserek (*sancak* of Çanad/Csanád), in addition to many of his immovable and movable goods. The charter defines the

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<sup>66</sup> This is shown by the terms *yazub* (to register), *defter olunub* (to enter into a *defter*); see Finkel, *op. cit.*, 30 and MD 53, 602/213 (December 7, 1584).

<sup>67</sup> MD 53, 606/214 (December 7, 1584). It is worth noting that the order providing for the replacement of *akıncıs* set the same requirements for those who would take the place of the deceased and the aged: "*anların yerine ata dona kâdir akına yarar yoldaş yiğitlerden yazub teknil edesin*" (Akgündüz, *op. cit.*, 6. *Kitap. İkinci kısım. İstanbul, 1993, 392-393*; the age of Süleyman).

<sup>68</sup> Finkel, *op. cit.*, 30-31.

<sup>69</sup> This is confirmed by the instruction cited above (in note 65) which obliges the volunteers to possess weapons, besides the garment and a horse: it expects the joining of "*dirlikden ve 'uluşe ve timardan sefalu olan atlı ve tonlu ve müsellaḥ yiğitler*" for the Persian campaign; see Akdağ, "Yeniçeri ocak nizamının bozuluşu," 302.

aim of the *vakıf* in the following words: "... should one of the Muslim *gazıs* or the fighters of the faith have no horse and should he ask for a horse foaled by one of the foundation mares to be able to go to war against the infidels of bad stock, then the *kadı* and the foundation supervisor shall give him a good horse so that he could mount it and champion the holy war spreading the true faith... The name and description of the horse and the *gazi* who receives it shall be entered into the register of *gazıs*..."<sup>70</sup> Apart from such direct support, the government also facilitated the satisfaction of demand for horses by strictly prohibiting their export.<sup>71</sup>

The volunteers registered at the meeting places were headed on their march to the operational area by occasionally appointed commanders (*baş u buğ* or *serdar*). As some records show, they were then divided into groups comprising ten soldiers under the command of a *bölükbaşı* and distributed among the troops as needed. Valiant volunteers were recommended to the court together with the distinguished sipahis and other regular combatants. The recommendation for a prebend or income raise was termed 'arz, and the list of names submitted for reward was simply called *defter* or sometimes "register of companionship" (*yoldaşlık defteri*).<sup>72</sup> In Hungary, these documents were generally drawn up by *beylerbeyis* and *sancakbeyis*, while in the heart lands of the Empire (in the Balkans) by the *alaybeyis*.<sup>73</sup> The commander-in-chief of a campaign also had at his disposal (often imprecisely defined) quotas. In 1552, for example, as seen above, Ahmed pasha could make recommendations for income raises totalling 100,000 akçe, which the court consented to with minor alterations. The beys often did not wait out the end of a campaign to send their submissions, but despatched them to the court immediately. Sometimes one gains the impression that hardly had the horses been untied from the stable, when the beys began to compile and despatch their lists of the meritorious warriors (i.e. mostly their own clients). On

<sup>70</sup> İbrahim Ateş, "Vakıf ve vatan savunması," *Vakıflar Dergisi* 20 (1988) 173.

<sup>71</sup> It was prohibited to sell horses to Iran (November 27, 1565): Ahmet Mumcu, *Hukuksal ve siyasi karar organı olarak divan-ı hümayun*. Ankara, 1986<sup>2</sup>, 115: note 209. The Transylvanian envoys returning from Istanbul may not take horses, arms and other forbidden goods with them (October 31, 1574): MD 26, 291/843, 296/859.

<sup>72</sup> The latter: TSMK, Koşuşlar 888, 415b (September 2, 1552).

<sup>73</sup> Géza Dávid, *A Simontornyai szandzsák a 16. században* [The *Sancak* of Simontornya in the Sixteenth Century]. Budapest, 1982, 31-32. At times they were joined by the princes or high-ranking dignitaries of vassal states, e.g. the Prince of Transylvania, and the Tatar khan, etc. Hosts of submissions by the Tatar khan in 1600: BOA, Kepeci 255.

the other hand, fast action was justified by the need to replace the absentees and losses. During the campaigns, the lands of the absentees and the deceased were regularly taken away and given to others (further encouraging the ambition of volunteers).

The recommended volunteers were then rewarded by the court in diverse ways, in accordance with the previous promises. Some were given *müstahfiz timaris*, other were granted salaried posts in castle garrisons or initial *timars*, with the latter being the most characteristic remuneration form for martial virtues.<sup>74</sup> Though the annual yield of the initial *timars* of the *garib yiğits* theoretically varied in the great provinces, they averaged 3,000 *akçe* both in Rumelia and Anadolu for most of the sixteenth century. Due to their privileged position, ordinary janissaries received triple this amount, 9,000 *akçe* as an initial *timar*.<sup>75</sup> When necessary, the government did promise higher amounts than the usual rewards. In 1585, the volunteers gathered for the Persian campaign were fed with hopes of getting *timars* worth 3,000 *akçe* when they had a horse and *timars* worth 5,000 *akçe* when they had a servant as well, and of having an equal opportunity to gain access to *zi'amet* estates.<sup>76</sup> The beneficiaries, however, had to overcome many and ever more difficult obstacles until they could take possession of the land allotted to them. First, they had to obtain the "noble command" (*hük-m-i şerif*) from the court which specified the grant. This marked the beginning of the procedure of allocation (the first phase of which was that a summary of the command was recorded in the *ru'us defteris*). In order to get the *hük-m-i şerif*, it was advisable for the candidate to personally go to Istanbul, which was not only a costly venture, but also adversely affected the war discipline. When the first reply arrived from the *divan* stating a favourable attitude to the recommendations, the applicants tended to "rush" to the capital in masses to be the first to have their *hükms* put to paper. In 1552, the Imperial Council tried to stave off the confusion by instructing the *beylerbeyi* of Buda in the following manner: "you shall warn those listed in the *yoldaşlık defteri* to acquire

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<sup>74</sup> In the material I know there is no trace to indicate that warriors of outstanding merit were admitted to the court *garib yiğits* as Halil İnalçık writes; see "Gönüllü," in *Encyclopédie de l'Islam*. Nouvelle édition. Tom. II. Leyde-Paris, 1965, 1146.

<sup>75</sup> On the size of the *ibtidadan timars*: Akgündüz, *op. cit.*, 4. *Kitap*, 487, 515. The same with the janissaries: Akgündüz, *op. cit.*, 7. *Kitap/II*: II. *Selim devri kanunnâmeleri*. I. Kısım: II. *Selim devri merkezî ve umumî kanunnâmeler*. İstanbul, 1994, 247-248, 276-277. Six *garib yiğits* received allocations of 3,000 *akçe* each in Anatolia: MD 1, 21/59 (August 17, 1554).

<sup>76</sup> Akdağ, "Yeniçeri ocak nizamının bozuluşu," 302.

their *hükms*. But I forbid anyone to leave the troops and take to the road. Let them send a reliable person to procure their *hükms*, while they stay in service and in the army."<sup>77</sup> Those who had distinguished themselves in campaigns headed by the sultan or the grand vizier himself, seemed to have been more fortunate. The grand vizier also had the authority to get the scribes accompanying him to issue the *hükmi-i şerifs* on-the-spot. This was done, for example, by the grand vizier Sinan in Veszprém on October 4, 1593, when he instructed his secretaries to begin making out orders for the distribution of *timars* the holders of which had failed to arrive in the imperial camp.<sup>78</sup>

The receipt of a *hükmi-i şerif* merely meant that the volunteer was officially entitled to a prebend of 3,000 *akçe* confirmed by a document. However, he could not enter into actual possession until acting upon the sultan's decree the territorially competent *beylerbeyi* informed the Imperial Council in a certificate (*tezkere*) that he had found a vacant estate and granted it to the applicant. On the basis of the *tezkere*, the *divan* issued an imperial diploma (*berat-i hümayun*) in the name of the beneficiary (provided that he had applied for it within a period of six months), and the particulars of the grant (location, size, former owner, and date of assignment, etc.) were entered into the *timar ruznamçe defteri*. It was only then that the volunteer could actually take possession of the deserved prebend.<sup>79</sup> It was not easy, however, to arrive at this point, especially from the mid-sixteenth century when the demand for estates had exceeded the supply many times over. The volunteers, therefore, were in sharp competition with other groups, several of which had an advantage over them. While not being spared with *hükmi-i şerifs* for initial *timars*, the *divan* favoured court troops and *ma'zul sipahis* when the actual bestowal took place.<sup>80</sup> When there was a vacancy somewhere (and in the latter half of the century, practically only *düşenden*, i.e. "dropped" estates were

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<sup>77</sup> TSMK, Koğuşlar 888, 415b (September 3, 1552). The Ottoman combatants fighting in Bosnia in 1592 did indeed comply with this command: they entrusted Ramazan, *sancakbeyi* of Prizren to obtain the commands and sent the fees for the *berats* with him. Ramazan, however, failed to carry out the assignment and even embezzled his comrades' money, who launched a complaint against him at the *divan*; see MD 70, 156/306 (January 11, 1593).

<sup>78</sup> BDK, Veliyüddin 1970, 9b.

<sup>79</sup> Some stages of this procedure (taking place even more simply and less centralized in the first half of the sixteenth century, but never becoming quite unified) were described by Röhrborn, *op. cit.*, 34-40, 49-64. Cf. Römer, *op. cit.*, 59-67.

<sup>80</sup> MD 26, 116/300 (July 27, 1574).

available), veritable "armies" pounced on it, and those who had the appropriate personal background stood a chance of success. It is not surprising that sixteenth-century *timar* registers abound in "unsuccessful" attempts (*müyyesser olmayub*) to take possession of a promised allocation.<sup>81</sup>

This did not seem to dishearten the volunteers as they usually flocked in large numbers to join in various military operations. Particularly towards the end of a peace period they flooded the camps, hoping for a good fight and booty. As Peçevi reported, at the outset of the Long War (1593) war so many volunteers gathered that their number equalled that of the regular Rumelian troops.<sup>82</sup> The high command sometimes even modified the preliminary war plans to cope with the unexpected redundancy. After the capture of Temesvár in 1552, Ahmed pasha launched "two or three" raids into the vicinity of Szolnok and Várad, because "many *akıncıs* and volunteers have come".<sup>83</sup> Though these data are highly suggestive and suitable to elicit general impressions, they provide little precise information about the actual proportions of the regular and voluntary forces in the various campaigns. Obviously, participation was different at the beginning and the end of a war, in declared warfare and in official peacetime. However, there are hardly any sources that could be statistically quantified. This fact adds an extraordinary appeal to a submission of altogether four pages, which contains recommendations for the rewarding of Ottoman soldiers involved in the 1575 domestic strife in Transylvania.<sup>84</sup> With due caution, certain proportions seem to be inferable from this document. It also provides a glimpse into the functioning of the central administration and its method of rewarding martial merit. Before enlarging on the document, let us briefly recall the events leading to the Ottoman intervention in Transylvanian affairs.

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<sup>81</sup> Another indication of demand on a mass scale is that those rewarded were less and less able to acquire a *timar* at face value and had to be content with far smaller estates; see Dávid, *A Simontornyai*, 24.

<sup>82</sup> Finkel, *op. cit.*, 44.

<sup>83</sup> TSMK, Koşuşlar 888, 445b (September 18, 1552).

<sup>84</sup> BOA, MM 675, 1-4.

## III.

On March 14, 1571, John Sigismund, the last scion of the Szapolyai dynasty enjoying the trust of the sultan, died unexpectedly. There were two rivals for the vacant throne: István Báthory, captain of Várad, and Gáspár Békés, the adviser, confidant, and diplomat of the late monarch. Békés, who had acknowledged the suzerainty of the Habsburg ruler in a secret agreement signed in the name of his master in Speyer half a year earlier, was supported by Emperor Maximilian. Báthory was the Porte's candidate and the Imperial Council issued the letter of pact (*'ahdname*) in his name. The Transylvanian estates, who insisted on the freedom to elect their own prince, voted before the announcement of the *'ahdname*, but not daring to defy the Porte, placed Báthory on the throne. In accordance with the Speyer agreement, Báthory assumed the title of Voivode of Transylvania and swore an oath of allegiance to Maximilian in secret. The Ottomans also acknowledged him as the Voivode of Transylvania and made it clear that his power was dependent on the sultan's grace.<sup>85</sup>

Gáspár Békés was unable to acquiesce in the defeat. He rallied a party in Transylvania and Hungary, acquired the king's support and was determined to topple Báthory. Because of his fear of the Ottomans, Maximilian did not overtly take sides, but tried to bolster Békés's positions in Transylvania and shut an eye to his captains in Kassa and Szatmár giving financial and military assistance to the conspiracy. The conflict between Báthory and Békés led to an open confrontation in 1573. At first, the prince gained the upper hand, occupying Békés's major estates and sending him fleeing. But Békés did not give up. He even tried to obtain the consent of the Porte: in May 1574, he despatched, with Maximilian's approval, an envoy to Istanbul who promised to double the tribute so far paid by Transylvania to the sultan, as well as give 40,000 gold pieces and a valuable ring to the grand vizier, if the Porte acknowledged him to be the ruler of Transylvania. Though the Ottoman government had spectacularly committed itself to Báthory on several occasions (in 1572, for example, it accepted that the title of voivode should

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<sup>85</sup> Lajos Szádeczky, *Kornváti Békés Gáspár 1520-1579*. Budapest, 1887, 26-37. Sándor Szilágyi, *Erdélyi országgyűlési emlékek/Monumenta Comitum Regni Transylvaniae*. II. Budapest, 1876, 389-445. László Nagy, "Báthory István a magyar és az egyetemes történelemben [István Báthory in Hungarian and Universal History]," in *Báthory István emlékezete [In Memory of István Báthory]*. Budapest [1994], 20-22.

be hereditary in his family), it attempted to exploit Békés's offer by extorting an increase in the Transylvanian tribute. The grand vizier pretended to encourage Békés, and demanded that he should travel to Istanbul. The rebellious magnate refused to comply (fearing, with good reason, that he might be arrested and executed there), but he deduced from the Porte's replies to his envoy that the Ottoman statesmen would not eventually object to a military offensive against Transylvania. Though he had no written endorsement, in the spring of 1575 he mobilized his followers and in early June he marched upon Transylvania. At first his troops far outnumbered those of Báthory, who had tarried with the preparations, and in addition, Békés could count on the Seklers (Székelys) who were revolting against the central power.<sup>86</sup>

In this critical situation, the Porte, in keeping with the clauses of the sultan's letters of pact,<sup>87</sup> finally took a clear side in favour of the prince. Already on July 7, 1574, Selim II (1566-1574) reassured Báthory that Békés's machinations had forced him to issue a command: if he, the voivode, should ask, the pashas of Buda and Temesvár would rush to his assistance without any particular order. The sultan also permitted the voivode to recruit Ottoman mercenaries around Buda and Temesvár.<sup>88</sup> In spite of that, the Istanbul court (and Mustafa pasha of Buda) continued their double game, and as sultan Murad III (1574-1595) openly wrote to Báthory and the estates of Transylvania: he had dropped Békés, because the latter had relied on Vienna rather than the Porte, he had not come to Istanbul, and had set his troops in motion without his consent.<sup>89</sup> At

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<sup>86</sup> Szádeczky, *op. cit.*, 37-56. More recent information on the background to Békés's machinations: Ferenc Szakály, "Egy hódoltsági parasztpolgár, aki beleavatkozott a nagypolitikába. Nagymarosi, majd nagyszombati Trombitás János, 1559-1592 [An Affluent Peasant from the Territory Under Ottoman Rule Who Interfered with High Politics: János Trombitás of Nagymaros, Later of Nagyszombat, 1559-1592]," in *Mezőváros és reformáció. Tanulmányok a korai magyar polgárosodás kérdéséhez* [Market Towns and Reformation. Studies in the Early Hungarian Bourgeois Development]. Budapest, 1995, 219-222, 280-286.

<sup>87</sup> The *'ahdname* of sultan Murad III dated April 15, 1575, states: "If, attacked by the enemy, he (i.e. the voivode) should deem the help of our exalted court necessary, the pashas and *beys* of the marches shall protect Erdel and all its parts from damage either personally or by sending troops, and beat back the enemy without delay..."; see László Szalay, *Erdély és a Porta 1567-1578* [Transylvania and the Porte 1567-1578]. Pest, 1862, 202. Cf. Endre Veress, *Báthory István erdélyi fejedelem és lengyel király levelezése* [The Correspondence of István Báthory, Prince of Transylvania and King of Poland]. Vol. I. 1556-1575. Kolozsvár, 1944, 179-180.

<sup>88</sup> MD 26, 71/182 and 183. Partly the same: Szalay, *op. cit.*, 179-180.

<sup>89</sup> Szalay, *op. cit.*, 225-228. This tallies with the news spread by the ambassador of the Habsburgs to Istanbul asserting that upon certain conditions the Ottomans would have consented to the voivodship of Békés. Cf. Szádeczky, *op. cit.*, 54.

his point, however, the sultan firmly ordered the two pashas and the *beys* of the *vilayet* of Temesvár to send troops to Báthory, and if necessary, the pasha of Buda himself should defend "Transylvania, which was possessed by my ancestor and father, which is in my Empire now and the inhabitants of which are paying tribute to me."<sup>90</sup> At the same time, he instructed the Voivodes of Moldavia and Wallachia to hurriedly join Báthory "with 5,000 soldiers each".<sup>91</sup> The grand vizier also advised the prince to withdraw to a stronghold if he did not feel strong enough "until the help from Temesvár and Buda, as well as the two Wallachian reinforcements arrived."<sup>92</sup>

The forces of Báthory and Békés eventually clashed at Kerelószentpál on the bank of the Maros river, on July 8, 1575. The rebels suffered a complete defeat.<sup>93</sup> Because of the lack of reliable sources, we can only guess the respective strengths, estimating at least 3-4,000 soldiers on each side.<sup>94</sup> Békés's troops slightly outnumbered those of Báthory, since the latter only received about 200 lightly armed fighters from Wallachia and Moldavia, instead of the large contingents promised.<sup>95</sup> The question of the Ottoman assistant forces is again another moot point. Research literature usually claims that the Ottoman aid was symbolic, and their tiny company did not play any special role in the battle. Endre Veress asserts that apart from the above-mentioned, Báthory's forces "consisted of 150 Ottoman cavalrymen. The main reason why he had asked for their help was to show Békés's followers that the Turk was not patronizing their lord."<sup>96</sup> In contrast to that, the seventeenth-century chronicler Farkas Bethlen

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<sup>90</sup> Szalay, *op. cit.*, 225-228.

<sup>91</sup> Szalay, *op. cit.*, 227-229.

<sup>92</sup> Szalay, *op. cit.*, 228-229

<sup>93</sup> On the consequences of Békés's rebellion that almost led to an Ottoman-Habsburg war in early 1576, see Kemal Beydilli, *Die polnischen Königswahlen und Interregnen von 1572 und 1576 im Lichte osmanischer Archivalien. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der osmanischen Machtpolitik.* (Beiträge zur Kenntnis Südosteuropas und des Nahen Orients, 19.) München, 1976, esp. 87 ff.

<sup>94</sup> Endre Veress maintains (*Báthory István király [terror hostium]. Halálának 350-ik esztendejében* [King István Báthory. On the 350th Anniversary of His Death]. Budapest, 1937, 34) that Báthory had 3,000 selected warriors. This number, however, is easily made up of the troops listed by Farkas Bethlen, apparently not including the companies labelled by the chronicler as "a company of soldiers" or "not an insignificant company". See in *Báthory István emlékezete*, 92-93.

<sup>95</sup> Farkas Bethlen, in *Báthory István emlékezete*, 93.

<sup>96</sup> Veress, *Báthory István király*, 34. Cf. *Báthory István emlékezete*, 93: an editorial addition to Farkas Bethlen's text in the same sense.

wrote that "... a strong company of Turkish cavalymen arrived from the pasha of Buda with János Gyerőfi" in Báthory's camp at Hadrév.<sup>97</sup> The previously mentioned Ottoman submission appears to confirm the information about a "strong company" and also provides more exact data on the composition and leadership of the Ottoman troops. The commander-in-chief (*serdar*) of the Ottoman force that showed up at Kerelőszentpál was neither the pasha of Temesvár nor that of Buda, but the very Receb *bey* who a short while earlier (in the summer of 1574) had acquired the post of *sancakbeyi* of Jenő/Yanova upon the intervention of Báthory.<sup>98</sup> This explains why one finds a large number of soldiers in the army who served in Jenő, Lippa, or elsewhere in the *vilayet* of Temesvár. Apart from them, however, quite a number of fighters arrived from several provinces and castles—some from such remote areas that one would stand aghast, if one were unaware of the facts outlined above. Such a rare major military undertaking in peacetime that promised ample booty and promotion seems to have mobilized the armed forces not only of the provinces assigned to fight, but of nearly the entire area occupied in Hungary and the Northern Balkans. How else could one explain that the list of the candidates for reward (naturally not including all the Ottoman participants of the battle) featured the names of the following *sancaks*, castles, and palisades as the stations of the combatants:

*Sancaks*: Alaca Hisar (Kruševac), Buda, Csanád/Çanad, Gyula/G'ula, Hersek, Zvornik/Ízvornik, Jenő/Yanova, Küstendil, Lippa/Lipova, Moldova/Modava, Niğbolu, Paşa vilayeti (in Rumelia), Pécs/Peçuy, Szeged/Segedin, Szendrő/Semendire, Szolnok/Solnok, Temesvár/Temeşvar, Vidin, Vulçitrin.

Castles and palisades: Babócsa/Bobofça, Becskerek/Beçkerek, Erdőhegy/Erdevik, Facset/Façet, Gyula, Jenő, Koppány/Kopan, Lippa, Moldova, Pankota, Pécs, Szabadka/Sobotka, Szécsény/Seçen, Temesvár, Váradja/Varadiya.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>98</sup> MM 675, 1. Cf. the *loci* quoted in note 88, as well as Géza Dávid, "A magyarországi archontológiai kutatások lehetőségei (Arad-gyulai szandzsákbégek) [On the Possibilities of Archontological Research in Hungary (the *sancakbeyis* of Arad-Gyula)]," *Történelmi Szemle* 36:1-2 (1994), 116-117: note 33.

<sup>99</sup> A *defter* of recommendation by 'Ali, *bey* of Szigetvár displays a very similar picture: soldiers of 12 diverse *sancaks* took part in the attack against Kanizsa, see Dávid, "Die Bege von Szigetvár," 76.

The territorial dispersal of these places alone suggests that the Ottoman involvement was far in excess of the 150 combatants estimated by Veress. Moreover, the Ottoman commanders recommended altogether 291 persons for a reward. As there is no reason to presume that every (or every second) participant's name was forwarded, we are permitted to estimate the Ottoman forces at Kerelószentpál to be three- or fivefold the estimate, i.e. 1,000-1,500 men. The Hungarian sources are silent about the role of the Ottomans in the battle, which may hint at two things. Either the Ottomans considerably contributed to Báthory's victory and the Transylvanians hurried to forget this embarrassing fact; or (not precluding the former possibility) despite their large number, the Ottomans seized on this domestic strife among the Hungarians as a good opportunity for pillaging (there was again reason to keep tightmouthed about that). This suspicion is borne out by the contemporary chronicler Farkas Bethlen, too, who remarks only this much: "Having taken a lot of prisoners among the enemy and lots of booty, the Turks soon returned to where they had been invited from."<sup>100</sup>

The spoil and number of captives must have deeply impressed Ca'fer, the pasha of Temesvár, because as the troops returned from Transylvania, he had the submission for rewards written immediately upon the reports and testimonies of the commanders and warriors. He asked *timars* or increases (*terakki*) for Receb *bey*, 43 *zi'amet*- and 142 *timar*-holders, 6 *za'im* and *sipahi* offspring, 54 fortress cavalrymen (*farisan*), and 35 volunteers (*gureba*). The commander-in-chief of the campaign, Receb *bey* also made a shorter list, submitting 3 *zi'amet*- and 4 *timar*-holders, and 4 horsemen from castle garrisons for reward. The two dignitaries appear to have coordinated their lists and mutually supported each other's families. Receb probably "witnessed" the valiance of Ca'fer's son, Mustafa, who thus became registered as second in the pasha's list following Receb (Mustafa wished to gain admission to the corps of court *müteferrikas*). In return, Ca'fer did Receb the favour of recommending the latter's son 'Ali, who was a *timar*-holder, and his (Receb's) major-domo (*kapuçi başı*) to receive a *zi'amet* each, and his relative Hüseyin (sent to the Porte "with tongues") to get an increase. (Interestingly enough, Receb's *kapuçi başı* was also supported by a recommendation by Báthory himself. This is another indication that the voivode and Receb were on

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<sup>100</sup> Báthory István emlékezete, 96.

exceptionally good, even friendly terms. As mentioned above, Báthory acquired the post of the *bey* of Jenő for Receb, and again it was he who in early 1575, warmly recommended to the Porte that Receb be transferred to the post of *sancakbeyi* of Gyula.<sup>101</sup> In view of this it can hardly be accidental that Receb was the commander of the Ottoman auxiliary troops.)

In the court, the scribes of the *divan* made a summary (*telhis*) for the sultan from the submissions of the *bey* and the pasha, enclosing the two detailed lists (of which, regrettably, Receb *bey's* has not survived and only the summary informs us of his nominees listed above). Sometime in the summer of 1575, the petitions were read to the ruler who made the following decisions (possibly entered into the appropriate places of the *telhis* on-the-spot by a clerk, as the handwriting suggests): a post of *müteferrika* for Ca'fer's son, a *zi'amet* for Receb's son, an increase of 6,000 *akçe* for his relative, increases of 6,000 *akçe* each for 41 *zi'amet*-holders, of 3,000 *akçe* each for 3 plus 1 *zi'amet*-holders, of 1,500 *akçe* each for 140 *sipahis*, and of 2,000 *akçe* each for 4 *sipahis*. The ruler allotted *timars* to the sons of *za'ims* and *sipahis* "according to the regulation" (*kanun üzere*),<sup>102</sup> so-called *sülsan timaris* to the mounted castle guards (54 plus 4 people, each of the latter 4 worth 6,000 *akçe*),<sup>103</sup> and the following benefits were granted to the *garib yiğits*: 15 of them were promoted to the rank of cavalrymen in castle garrisons (the reading of the relevant entry is highly uncertain), and 20 were rewarded by initial *timars* worth 3,000 *akçe* each. Surprisingly, Receb *bey* probably did not receive the begged for "considerable increase" (*ziyadece terakki*), because there is no remark above his name. (It is, of course, possible the eminent *serdar* was rewarded separately, and for this reason it was not marked in the *telhis*.)

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<sup>101</sup> Veress, *Báthory István levelezése*, I. 309-310: No. 339. His request, however, was not fulfilled.

<sup>102</sup> This was regulated in detail by Süleyman's order of 1531; the grant also depended on the size of the father's estate, and the number of male offspring, etc. See Akgündüz, *op. cit.*, 4. *Kitap*, 565-566, 570-572. Cf. Káldy-Nagy, "The First Centuries," 155-156.

<sup>103</sup> *Sülsan timaris* were given to members of the fortress garrisons instead of pay; the size of such a *timar* was calculated on the basis of the pay: the daily pay was multiplied by 1,000 and divided by two-thirds (i.e. daily pay of 3 *akçe* resulted in a *timar* yielding 2,000 *akçe* a year. This meant that a soldier with 6 *akçe* received a *timar* of 4,000 *akçe*, and one drawing 9 *akçe* got a *timar* estate yielding 6,000 *akçe*). This is why such estates were called *sülsan* or "two-thirds" *timars*.

The pasha and the *bey* recommended a total of 291 warriors (plus Receb) in the two lists, but if the numbers in the *telhis* are added, it can be seen that another two persons dropped out, apart from Receb. The chancery marks (the so-called *resid* symbols) on the detailed list by Ca'fer pasha reveal that in the further procedures some others also befell this fate. The original number of Ca'fer's nominees was 280, but for various reasons 4 *za'ims*, 16 *sipahis* and 7 cavalrymen (or 8, if the fighter getting only a payrise instead of a *timar* is also added), totalling another 27–28 persons were cancelled. If it were possible to check how many applicants actually took possession of the grants conceded to them, the failures would probably number even higher.<sup>104</sup> This, in turn, permits the conclusion that at least 10–15% of the recommended warriors could be sure that they had risked their lives for nothing. (It is another question that that was the duty of the regular forces in return for their estates or pay.) A chance of 85–90%, however, was high enough to be appealing.

It cannot then be accidental that the nominees also included volunteers. The categorization of the combatants fully justifies what was said about the *garib yiğits* above: apart from *sipahis* and the members of regular fortress garrisons, all the others were ranged with them. The initial phrase recommending the volunteers in the detailed register is also meaningful: "His [majesty's] servants belonging to the *garib yiğits* who guard the frontiers without prebends and apply for an imperial command for an initial *timar*."<sup>105</sup> This wording also suggests that the volunteers might have been warriors of longer experience, rather than *re'aya* trying their hands at fighting for the first time. On the other hand, a study of the names refers us back to the *re'aya* (precisely the Christian *re'aya*) again; roughly the 30% of the *garip yiğits* listed here were sons of 'Abdullah, i.e. first generation renegades; nor can the Christian origin of some persons bearing genuine Muslim names be excluded. This perfectly

<sup>104</sup> There is, however, at least one actor whose success can be demonstrated: Mustafa, the son of Ca'fer, did become a *müteferrika*; see BOA, Ruznamçe defterleri 42, section of Temesvár, 36.

<sup>105</sup> *Garib yiğitlerden olub dirliksiz serhad bekleyen kullarıdır ki ibtidadan timara emr-i şerif rica ederler* (MM 675, 4). It is worth noting that a late sixteenth-century Christian account also declared: the Turks could quickly replace their losses because lots of people came in the place of those killed, going to war at private expense. Published in the Latin original and in Hungarian translation by Géza Pálffy, "Egy keresztény kortárs a török szultán bevételéről és kiadásairól a hosszú török háború (1593–1606) idején [A Contemporary Christian Account of the Ottoman Revenues and Expenditures from the Period of the Long War (1593–1606)]," *Keletkutatás* 1995 tavasz, 108, 111.

tallies with the ratios that experienced within the Ottoman forces of the border areas: a significant part of not only the castle garrisons, but also the *timar*-holders consisted of renegades.

Ca'fer pasha and Receb *bey* deemed 291 people deserving of reward for their valour displayed in the Transylvanian war, 35 of whom were volunteers, amounting to 12% of the nominees. Bearing in mind that family members, relatives, and former retainers, etc., were generally favoured by the dignitaries authorized to submit a report, volunteers appear to have been underrepresented in this and similar lists. Consequently, a 12% involvement of the *garib yiğits* in frontier military operations only marks out the minimum. If the sons of *za'ims* and *sipahis* also joining up on a voluntary basis (6 of them were recorded in the quoted list) are added, the total is 14%. Taking all factors and possible sources of error into consideration, I would say that the average rate of volunteers in the Ottoman armies can be put at 20% the lowest. Of course, they might have been considerably fewer at times, and more at others. It is beyond doubt, however, that they came incessantly and unendingly, so they cannot be ignored when seeking to determine the strength of the sixteenth-century Ottoman troops.



AN OTTOMAN MILITARY CAREER ON THE  
HUNGARIAN BORDERS  
KASIM VOYVODA, BEY, AND PASHA

GÉZA DÁVID

The purpose of this study is to describe the career of Kasım *bey*, a leading personality of the Hungarian border region in the sixteenth century. There are relatively few data on the early phases of his activity, and sometimes even his identity is doubtful. However, if my suppositions prove to be true, we will be encountered with a person who gradually advanced in the official ladder, with occasional downfalls, and whose career spanned over thirty years in Hungary. The lives of Ottoman officials of middle rank are almost entirely unknown;<sup>1</sup> a partial explanation for this phenomenon may be that due to their transfer to far away positions it is easy to lose sight of them. In the following we will see an example of how much information can be gathered about a person if his posts can be connected to more or less the same region. The reader should not expect a description of character or soul; the factual and concise documents left behind by the Ottoman state administration do not allow us to have a closer look at the man as he was. However, on the basis of several minor data a relatively detailed portrait can be drawn of him. Nevertheless, this study does not aim to describe all military or official activities of Kasım, the *voyvoda*, the *bey* and the *pasha*, but to survey his major posts and measures, and to pinpoint those special features which illuminate the milestones in his life including the people he worked with.

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<sup>1</sup> In the voluminous work by Markus Köhbach, we can find some career descriptions among the notes concerning office-holders excelling in the Hungarian border area: *Die Eroberung von Fülekk durch die Osmanen 1554. Eine historisch-quellenkritische Studie zur osmanischen Expansion im östlichen Mitteleuropa*. Wien-Köln-Weimar, 1994, 42-44: note 42, 44-46: note 44 (Ulama *bey/pasha*), 48-59: note 48 (Hamza *bey*), 71-73: note 75 (Tuygun *pasha*), etc. Another, more modest attempt: Josef Matuz, "Wesir Abdurrahman Abdi Pascha, der letzte Ofner Beglerbeg (Versuch einer Vita)," *Acta Historica* 33:2-4 (1987 [1990]) 341-350.

As so often in the case of Ottoman leading officials, we do not have irrefutable evidence of Kasım's origin. Only Nicolaus Istvánffy mentioned this in his history of Hungary, when in connection with the events of 1537 he wrote: the above mentioned, "leaving Buda, returned to Croatia, his homeland."<sup>2</sup>

The earliest reference to him can be found in the posthumous study of Gábor Barta, in which he referred to the 'voyvode' Kasım, the Ottoman military commander of Újlak (Ilok) in August 1528.<sup>3</sup> Though, compared to the original Latin text ("...Cazzon, qui prefectus est Uylak..."<sup>4</sup>) he called him voyvode a little bit arbitrarily, he was right to do so, as Kasım belonged to the retinue of Yahyapaşaoğlu Mehmed, the *bey* of Szendrő (Semendire), and as such he was granted the title of *voyvoda*, a rank of rather obscure nature at that time (even more than in the second half of the sixteenth century). It is somewhat difficult to interpret the word 'prefectus', as it could mean various military positions. For this reason I suggest that the translation should be "an Ottoman military commander from Újlak" instead of "the Ottoman military commander of Újlak".

On the other hand, about one hundred years after the events, İbrahim Peçevi gave an account of the reconstruction of Eszék (Ösek) that had been destroyed in the year of 936 (September 5, 1529–August 24, 1530), adding that "as the defence of Sirem (Szerém) and the border fortresses caused a lot of difficulty, 3,000 *kul* were placed in the castle of Ösek. The deceased Kasım pasha, who has a noble *camı*' in Peçuy (Pécs), was appointed *ağa* to lead five hundred 'azabs".<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Miklós Istvánfi, *Magyarország története, 1490–1606* [The History of Hungary]. Translated by György Vidovich. Debrecen, 1867, I. 248.

<sup>3</sup> Gábor Barta, "A Forgotten Theatre of War 1526–1528 (Historical Events Preceding the Ottoman–Hungarian Alliance of 1528," in *Hungarian–Ottoman Military and Diplomatic Relations in the Age of Süleyman the Magnificent*. Ed. by Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor. Budapest, 1994, 108–109.

<sup>4</sup> Barta, *op. cit.*, 109: note 43.

<sup>5</sup> *Tārīḫ-i Peçevi*. s. I. and a. I. 153. In another place Peçevi (*op. cit.*, I. 33) went into more details concerning his knowledge about Eszék: "The castle of Ösek had been captured while going to the battle of Mohács (Mohaç), it was made even with the ground. When the illustrious blessed padishah arrived at his happiness-favoured residence from his campaign of Beç (Vienna), he exclaimed that it was necessary to reconstruct the fortress of Eszék [in order to] keep the province of Sirem and the victorious border regions. Therefore it was again reconstructed, 3,000 people were placed in it, and the above mentioned (Kasım), being a brave man, was appointed *aga* as the head of 500 'azabs. It was from there that he kept looting the countryside around Peçuy, Tolna, and Seksar (Szekszárd)."

As opposed to this, thirty years later Evliya Çelebi, who is not always quite reliable, claimed that Kasım had been charged to repair Eszék in 1526: "Peçevili Kasım pasha ... started the renovation in 932 (October 18, 1525–October 7, 1526) and in the same year the castle of Eszék was rebuilt again; its district governorship (*mir-i livalık*) was granted to Peçevili Kasım pasha, who was commissioned to do the reconstruction."<sup>6</sup> Later on Evliya talked about a quarter (*mahalle*) bearing his name, about the Kasım pasha *cami'* in the middle castle, whose chronogram he even copied, about the *medrese* of Kasım pasha, and the school and the fountain (*çeşme*) associated with his name.<sup>7</sup>

The two contradictory stories can be partly reconciled. As for the date, the last digit of it could easily have been corrupted or mistaken, as the Arabic numbers two and six are reflections of each other. Peçevi's information is likely to be the more precise. The distinction made in the rank is of more significance; Peçevi seems to have been correct and Evliya somewhat exaggerated the facts or anticipated the future.

It is remarkable that both seventeenth-century authors considered it important to mention that later on Kasım served as the *bey* of Pécs. The fact that they attributed the rank of *paşa* to him in advance can be forgiven; afterwards he was *beylerbeyi* several times. It is of equal interest that a *mahalle* named after the mosque (*mescid*) of Kasım pasha was indeed mentioned in Eszék in ca. 1550.<sup>8</sup> So Kasım had a humble place for worship rather than a *cami'* built in Eszék, and it was beside this *mescid* that his *medrese* and lower level school could have been situated. His connection with the area is shown by the fact that he was the beneficiary of a meadow and a *çiftlik* within the *nahiye* of Eszék in 1546.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Evliya Çelebi *seyâhatnâmesi*. VI. İstanbul, 1318, 179.

<sup>7</sup> Evliya Çelebi, *op. cit.*, VI. 183–184.

<sup>8</sup> İstanbul, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Tapu defteri 1000, p. 3.

<sup>9</sup> Tapu defteri 437, pp. 33, 36. The pasture was registered with the following text: "Pasture of Kasım bey, *mirliva* of Mohaç. Next to the church of Söri/Sivri?, near the river Drava. The pasture abandoned by the Christians, was for long in their (in Kasım's) possession. Since, according to the exalted order, its *tapu*-fee has to be collected, he paid 30 *akçe tapu*-fee to the treasury, so it was registered in his name. Its income: 25 [*akçe*]." (In a survey from a couple of years later, this pasture was recorded under the name of Kasım, then pasha: Tapu defteri 1000, p. 14.) The description of the *çiftlik* is as follows: "The *çiftlik* of Kasım, *mirliva* of Mohaç. Among the belongings of Ösek there was a *çiftlik* called Vborya (?) and a desolate and ruined pasture in the vicinity of Ösek. Since the imperial occupation its *tapu*-fee has been paid, and as it is in their possession, it has [also] been registered in his name. Its income: 100 [*akçe*]."

Unfortunately, we still do not know exactly when Eszék was finally captured by the Ottomans. Gábor Barta wrote: "There is no direct data available regarding Eszék, but possibly it was already occupied permanently (in 1526)."<sup>10</sup> It has been much debated whether it had become a *sancak* centre or not. In contradiction with those who claimed that it had,<sup>11</sup> Nenad Moačanin argued for its being part of the province of Pozsega (Pojege).<sup>12</sup> This statement can be valid only after 1537 as it was only then that Ottoman dominion was extended to Pozsega.<sup>13</sup> Before that date Eszék could have belonged to the *sancak* of Szendrő–Belgrad or Szerém,<sup>14</sup> which was probably being organized at the time.<sup>15</sup>

Nevertheless we cannot forget that the envoys of Ferdinand, Nikolaus Graf Salm and Sigismund Freiherr von Herberstein, named Kasim *voyvoda*, the *sancakbeyi* of Eszék, as their companion from Esztergom, to the sultan in September 1541 ("...sein wir den 4. septembris zu Gran ankomen unnd alda den *Kassum Weyvoda*, *sansacken* zu *Esseckh* gefunden, welcher dahin durch den Kaiser uns zubeleiten geschickht worden, der

<sup>10</sup> Barta, *op. cit.*, 94. King Louis II was informed on August 16, 1526, that the Ottomans had occupied the town: "Intelligimus pro certo hostem iam Ezeek occupasse et fortasse eciam pontem fecisse." See Elemér Mályusz, "II. Lajos király levelei a herceg Batthyány-család körmendi levéltárában [The Letters of Louis II in the Körmend Archive of the Prince Batthyány-Family]," *Levéltári Közlemények* 4 (1927) 91, No. 11. Jenő Gyalóky indicates August 14 as the day of the capture of Eszék: "A mohácsi csata [The Battle of Mohács]," in *Mohácsi emlékkönyv 1526* [Memorial Book of Mohács 1526]. Budapest, 1926, 206. The most reliable Ottoman sources, the campaign journals, are much less detailed than Peçevi. In 1526 they only recorded that "the inhabitants of the castles of Erdöd (Erdöd) and Ösek ran away, and the keys of these were brought here by the servants of Yahyapaşaoğlu;" in 1529 and 1532 they mention stationing at the castles; the likewise very important *fethname* of 1526 touches upon Eszék among several southern fortresses as a place attached to the empire: *Török történetírők* [Ottoman Chroniclers]. I. Translated by József Thúry. Budapest, 1893, 311, 329-330, 351, 383. However the question still remains: was the castle captured definitively in 1526 or did the siege have to be repeated in 1529?

<sup>11</sup> Hazim Šabanović, *Bosanski pašaluk. Postanak i upravna podjela*. Sarajevo, 1959, 63. His supposition was taken over by several historians.

<sup>12</sup> Nenad Moačanin, "Osječki ili požeški sandžak," in *Zbornik Zavoda za povijesne znanosti Istraživačkog centra Jugoslavenske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti*. Vol. 12. Zagreb, 1982, 35-40.

<sup>13</sup> Nenad Moačanin, "Ratovanje i osnivanje upravnih jedinica u srednjoj Slavoniji 1536-1541," in *Vojne krajine u jugoslavenskim zemljama u novom veku do Karlovačkog mira 1699*. (Naučni skupovi Srpske akademije nauka i umjetnosti, knj. XLVIII, Odeljenje istorijskih nauka, knj. 12.) Beograd, 1989, 115-116; German summary: 124.

<sup>14</sup> The crux here is that the earliest mention of the *sancak* of Szerém has been put at 1543: Bruce W. McGowan, *Sirem sancağı mufassal tahrir defteri*. Ankara, 1983, lx.

<sup>15</sup> I have already raised the possibility of it: Géza Dávid, "A Dél-Dunántúl közigazgatása a török korban [The Administration of Transdanubia in the Ottoman Era]," *Zalai Múzeum* 4 (1992) 60: note 3.

auch auf unserm schef biß ins Kaiser hörr selb dritter gefaren"), and that they repeated this statement at the end of their report ("Man sagt im leger, der Kaiser wolle *Schokhlo* unnd *Walpo* am haimb ziehen belegern, hat alle des *Pereny Peter* guetter *Cassum Weida*, der von *Esseckh* gewesen, unnd jetzt ine zu ainen *sansackhn* alda gemacht.").<sup>15a</sup>

A *mühimme-defteri* entry from February 1, 1545 finally solves the question, where the *beys* of Eszék, Bali and of Mohács, Kasım are mentioned among those district governors who will get the same order from the sultan.<sup>15b</sup>

Some additional data on Kasım is furnished by György Szerémi, who is often considered rather unreliable. In June 1530, he wrote, rumours were going about that the 'Germans' i.e. the Habsburgs "wanted to attack king John... King John immediately sent his messenger to voyvode Momen (Mümin) in Belgrad to come as quickly as possible...". Kasım *voyvoda* was also ready to join the boatmen of Mümin with about 400 mounted soldiers and "he put up his camp in a village called Kisjenő, above Pest...". King John, who soon left for Transylvania, "posted three sentries: voyvode Momen (Mümin) on the water, secondly Kászon (Kasım) on the land and thirdly János Bánffy in the town of Buda."<sup>16</sup>

This corresponds to the things stated above. Whether Kasım was stationed in Újlak or serving in Eszék, he could easily be found in both places. Szerémi's information seems to have been precise this time (although it cannot be excluded that Istvánffy was right; see note 16). But

<sup>15a</sup> *Austro-Turcica 1541–1552. Diplomatiscche Akten des habsburgischen Gesandtschaftsverkehrs mit der Hohen Pforte im Zeitalter Süleymans des Prächtigen*. Bearbeitet von Srećko M. Džaja unter Mitarbeit von Günter Weiß. In Verbindung mit Mathias Bernath herausgegeben von Karl Nehring. (Südosteuropäische Arbeiten, 95.) München, 1995, 5, 16, No. 2. — We have to touch upon one more part of the above cited document, namely the reference to the possessions of Péter Perényi. This is corroborated by an early Ottoman list of the *sancaks* of the *vilayet* of Buda, which includes "the *liva* of Perini Petri" as well: İstanbul, Âtf Efendi Kütüphanesi 1734, f. 203v.

<sup>15b</sup> İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi, D. 12321, f. 82v. (I am grateful to Gyula Káldy-Nagy for this important reference.)

<sup>16</sup> György Szerémi, *Magyarország romlásáról* [On the Decay of Hungary]. Budapest, 1979, 248–249. Istvánffy's portrayal of the events is essentially similar to Szerémi's, though contradictory in some details. He found out that it was sultan Süleyman who left Kasım in Buda in 1529, who later went to besiege Sziget, then hearing about Roggendorf's attack, returned to the capital, where he was lucky to get in with the help of a certain Balázs Budai (Istvánfi, *op. cit.*, 199–201). — Here he is decribed as the commander of land forces, while the commander of the Ottoman fleet is called Numillo, who, with a little stretch of the imagination, can be identified as Mümin. Further on Istvánffy makes Kasım the chief of the fleet, and mentions him most of the time in this capacity: *op. cit.*, I. 207, 221, 275, 336.

Szerémi's description of the dissipation of the Ottoman troops in Pest is not free of contemporary clichés, and it is difficult to tell if it was really Bálint Török who finally punished them for their transgressions.<sup>17</sup> From the story, which becomes increasingly confused concerning dates, it is clear that king John turned to Kasım for help not much later, probably when under the command of General Wilhelm Roggendorf the Habsburg troops first besieged Buda (1530). According to Szerémi, on this occasion Kasım arrived with 600 "beshlia cavalry", one hundred of whom clashed with the Germans and with the Hungarian barons supporting them in the field of Logod.<sup>18</sup>

What is of importance is not whether Kasım really went to Buda twice or merely once in 1530, but that he did come to Buda in that year invited by King John and participated in its defence on the king's side.

Historians gave an account of a major invasion of the "country of Alaman" during the Vienna or Kőszeg campaign of 1532, which was led by a certain Kasım *voyvoda* and ended with a severe defeat; some even claimed that everyone was killed.<sup>19</sup> It would fit the picture if Kasım, though previously the commander of a regular army, had ventured to head a couple of thousands of *akıncıs* and risked his life in the hope of being promoted. If it was him and not somebody else by the same name commanding the raid, he must have escaped<sup>20</sup> from the battle fought by the river Enns.

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<sup>17</sup> Szerémi, *op. cit.*, 250-251. Nevertheless, the reference to abuses was not totally ungrounded, either. A document by the grand vizier in September 1531 ordered an investigation against Mümin (in the text Muni) *voyvoda* and his men, who, according to the charge, robbed and murdered German merchants in the vicinity of Buda: Ernst Dieter Petritsch, *Regesten der osmanischen Dokumente im Österreichischen Staatsarchiv. Band 1. (1480-1574)*. (Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs, Ergänzungsband 10/1.) [Wien], 1991, 26, No. 12.

<sup>18</sup> Szerémi, *op. cit.*, 252, 255, 257.

<sup>19</sup> The pertinent data were collected by Thúry, *op. cit.*, II. Budapest, 1896, 93: note 1. (See also Solak-zâde Mehmed Hemdemî Çelebi, *Solak-zâde tarihi*. Haz. Vahid Çabuk. Ankara, 1989, 166-167. He puts it to 1529.) Hammer points out that "Kasım was among the first to die," but he does not make it clear why is he so sure about this: *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*. III. Pest, 1840,<sup>2</sup> 116. — Recently Karl Teply has dealt with the topic and, while he admits that there are a lot of legendary elements in the story, he is not doubtful about the reality of the core of it: *Türkische Sagen und Legenden um die Kaiserstadt Wien*. Wien-Köln-Graz, 1980, 109-116, 149-150. — It is certainly worth considering that both the Austrian and the Ottoman tradition has basically the same version.

<sup>20</sup> Although certain European sources seem to know that the dead body was deprived of the golden helmet decorated with vulture feathers and enlaid with pearls, I do not regard this statement crucial — this 'scalp' was probably only needed by 'Austrian' national pride. (Cf. İsmail Hami Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı tarihi kronolojisi*. II. M. 1513-1573, H. 919-981. Istanbul, 1948, 151.)

Even if the above mentioned Kasim *voyvoda* should not be the same person that we are looking for, we still have some information about him from 1532. Nicolaus Istvánffy recalled a story in which the fleet of Kasim and Nomilla (Mümin?) fought with the Habsburg forces somewhere near Komárom. The same historian mentioned that Kasim was among the people to be sent to punish László Móré, a robber knight in Transdanubia, in 1533.<sup>21</sup>

Concerning the relationship of Mümin and Kasim, we have two decisive letters written in Pest on January 29, 1536, which corroborate the statements of Szerémi and partly of Istvánffy, too. One of the two letters of the same contents requesting free passage from Martin de Lascano, the commander of Komárom, for a messenger who was carrying the sultan's letter to king Ferdinand, was signed by "prefectus navalis exercitus Muumnyn Vaywoda", and the other by "prefectus besliarium Kazon Vaywoda".<sup>22</sup> Apparently, the two military officials closely cooperated and were invested with special authority in the matters of the border area. On the other hand, it is also clarified that Szerémi did hit the mark by calling Kasim the commander of *beşliüs*, which does not exclude the possibility that he had served as the head of 'azabs before. Finally, we are provided with an example of the flexible usage of the word "prefectus" here, which justifies our reservation about Kasim's position in Újlak.

The next useful piece of information comes from April 1537 when we hear that Kasim arrived in Buda with 3,000 men to support king John.<sup>23</sup> There is a letter from July of the same year in which Pál Bakics forwarded the report of the spy Demeter Velics to king Ferdinand. Velics acquired his information by managing to get on board a mailboat which was carrying the *voyvodas* Kasim and Mustafa back to Mehmed, the *bey* of Szendrő–Belgrad.<sup>24</sup>

According to a record in the Verancsics-annals (*Memoria rerum*) "Kászon *voyvoda* captured Szekszárd having set out from Pest..."<sup>25</sup> after

<sup>21</sup> Istvánfi, *op. cit.*, I. 207, and 221-222.

<sup>22</sup> Petritsch, *op. cit.*, 37-38, Nos. 48-49. — Mümin was in Pest also in 1535, this time probably without his faithful companion: *ibid.*, 34-35, Nos. 38-39.

<sup>23</sup> *A podmanini Podmaniczky-család levéltára* [The Archive of the Family Podmaniczky of Podmanin]. Ed. by Imre Lukinich. II. Budapest, 1939, 606, No. 245.

<sup>24</sup> *Enyingi Török Bálint*. Published by József Bessenyei. Budapest, 1994, 133-135, No. 184.

<sup>25</sup> 1504-1566. *Memoria rerum. A Magyarországon legutóbbi László király fiának, legutóbbi Lajos királynak születése óta esett dolgok emlékezete (Verancsics-évkönyv)* [The Memory of the Events Since the Birth of the Latest King Louis, Son of the Latest King Vladislav (Verancsics-Annals)]. Ed. by József Bessenyei. Budapest, 1981, 48.

February 24, 1538, but this was corrected to the period after August 29, 1541 by Ferenc Szakály.<sup>26</sup> The amendment would imply that Kasım was again near the capital city and also that he could have been present at the occupation of Buda.<sup>27</sup> The matter is further complicated by a passage in the same source (preceding the sentence quoted above) which reads as follows: "King John dismissed the Turks both in Pest and Buda, both the forces on water and Kasım *voyvoda* on land." This statement echoes Szerémi's description and definitely refers to the period before 1540.

If all the data listed so far can be considered trustworthy, Kasım went to or stayed in Buda and Pest eight times between 1530 and 1541: twice in 1530, once in 1532, once in 1536, once in 1537, once around 1538 and twice in 1541 (regarding the return from Esztergom as a separate trip). Of these dates, 1536, 1537,<sup>28</sup> and 1541 are certain, but the others are somewhat dubious. In my view, Szerémi is supported by his reference to Roggendorf, as Szapolyai could mobilize Ottoman forces against him only in 1530. If we change the date concerning the occupation of Szekszárd in the *Memoria rerum*, it is also possible to modify the date of dismissal to 1530 or even 1537, and in this case we would have to abandon his first stay in Buda after the Treaty of Várad (1538). At the same time the possibility cannot be excluded that the *Memoria rerum* mentioned the same event—before 1540—which would also allow for presuming that Szekszárd was not taken by Kasım, but by somebody else.

At the end of 1541 or at the beginning of 1542, Kasım, having served for quite a lengthy period in the Hungarian border area, received a great honour: he was charged with the administration of the *sancak* of Mohács, which was the first one north of the river Drava in the newly formed *vilayet* of Buda. He must have been appointed before March 11, as the *tezkere* of the provincial governor of Buda dates from the same day, in

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<sup>26</sup> "Az első dunántúli szandzsák és megszervezője, Kászim bég [The First Transdanubian *Sancak* and its Organizer, Kasım Bey]," *Keletkutatás* 1995 tavasz, 28.

<sup>27</sup> This is confirmed by Istvánffy, who also mentioned that Kasım crossed the Danube to go to Pest and found the city empty: *op. cit.*, I. 275. The report of the envoy cited in note 15 is decisive. The document passage quoted in note 29 below is also important, in which a cart camp battle is referred to; by this the Ottomans meant the clash fought at Mount Gellért in 1541 (Cf. Pál Fodor, "Így kezdődött a török hódoltság... [How the Ottoman Rule Began in Buda]," *Keletkutatás* 1995: tavasz, 94: note 9).

<sup>28</sup> Though for the second time it is not clear, from where the ship with Demeter Velics on board left.

which he proposed the bestowal of a *timar* on one of Kasım's men.<sup>29</sup> The pasha of Buda must have been Bali, as he had already sent a record to Istanbul between February 7 and 15, 1542.<sup>30</sup> It is not certain whether the appointment was carried out during his term of office or earlier, under Süleyman pasha.

Apart from both the letter published by Ferenc Szakály and other documents, a report drawn by Kasım bey and preserved in an Ottoman chronicle<sup>31</sup> also supplies evidence concerning the fact that he had his headquarters in Szekszárd for a while. The report is about a Christian attack on Szekszárd and states: "then, having the assembled gazis on our side, we went out [from the castle], encountered them and there was fierce struggle and fight."

Kasım, who fought throughout the year 1543,<sup>32</sup> received Siklós and

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<sup>29</sup> Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Maliye defteri 34, f. 630r. — See our analysis of the text: Géza Dávid and Ferenc Szakály, "Újabb adalék Tinódi Sebestyén történetírói hiteléhez. Haydar bin Abdullah *timar*-birtoka. [New Evidence for Sebestyén Tinódi's Trustworthiness as a Historian. The *timar*-Holding of Haydar bin 'Abdullah]," *Irodalomtörténeti Közlemények* 1996:4, 481-489. Only the translation of the pertinent part is given here: "... [as] a noble order has recently arrived from the court, the Refuge of the Universe, commanding the distribution of *timars* to those persons whose braveness had manifested itself many times on those border areas and whose usefulness had become known, [the following case] had been submitted to the Threshold of Felicity: one of the men of His servant Kasım, the *sancakbeyi* of Mohács, a servant [called] Haydar bin 'Abdullah challenged an excellent soldier of the rebellious Virbóci Imre (Imre Verbőczy), the infidel Budaházínāōš (János Budaházi), and when facing each other under the castle of Szász they rushed on each other with swords and daggers several times, finally the infidel was wounded in many places, and weakening, fell off his horse upside down; when Haydar was about to cut off his head, a group of horsemen from among the miserable infidels interfered and rescued [Budaházi]. Besides this, earlier in the cart camp battle he cut off heads and accomplished different feats of arms, his courage and valour has been shown several times at the border; His servant is by all means worthy of the high imperial grace, that is why a *tezkere* has been given for the above mentioned *timar* according to the imperial decree on 24 *zilka'de* 948" (March 11, 1542). — Haydar bin 'Abdullah served as a *bölükbaşı* of the '*azabs* of Eszék in April 1541. He left his place in November of the same year, following in all probability his patron northwards. Cf. Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Türk. Hss. Mxt 567, fol. 77v (this document was kindly imparted by Klára Hegyi).

<sup>30</sup> Claudia Römer, "Einige Urkunden zur Militärverwaltung Ungarns zur Zeit Süleymans des Prächtigen," *Acta Orientalia Hungarica* 43 (1989) 40-41, No. 5.

<sup>31</sup> See Szakály, *op. cit.*, 23-24, and Muradi/Sinan *çavuş*: Thúry, *op. cit.*, II. 294-296.

<sup>32</sup> If it is true, he could have squeezed in his schedule a trip to Croatia before the sultan's campaign: Istvánfi, *op. cit.*, I. 294-297. In connection with this, the excellent humanist tells a story which highlights for a moment the personal characteristics of Kasım. Namely, after the successful siege of Rahóc, the castle of László Móré, some Christian prisoners were found in the dungeon, among others Farkas Batthyány, whom Kasım freed from his

Pécs<sup>33</sup> from the occupied territories of Transdanubia.<sup>34</sup> The latter statement means that both castles and fortresses were attached to his district. He probably moved to the episcopal see of Pécs sometime afterwards, and on February 17, 1544 he sent a letter from there to Katalin Pemfflinger, not too warm in its tone.<sup>35</sup> It was at that time that the Habsburg officials compiled a survey, listing the approximate number of soldiers in the Transdanubian castles captured by the Ottomans. They mentioned 200 Tartars as subalterns to Kasim, then later they added that he had garrisons in the fortresses of Waranawar (Baranyavár), Sauswar (Szászvár), Gireschgall (Görösgal), Tarpan (?), Sant Andrey (?), and Sacks (Szakcs).<sup>36</sup> So he had his soldiers in most castles even though it was not him who financed the whole contingent.

In addition to the military control of the area, the governor of Mohács must have had the important task of spying, due to the closeness of the border. Kasim seems to have met the requirements, which can be seen from two successive orders, slightly different in their texts, sent by the Porte on March 28 and 29, 1545, in which the information recently received was acknowledged and instructions to send new spies to reconnoitre Ferdinand's actions and plans were given.<sup>37</sup>

On the basis of Gévay's list of the pashas of Buda we have a good reason to presume that Kasim continued to be the *bey* of Mohács until the death of the third *beylerbeyi*, Yahyapaşazade Mehmed, that is up to the end of January 1548, when he was appointed the successor of the latter.<sup>38</sup> As opposed to this, Bernát Török informed Tamás Nádasdy much earlier, on 1 May, 1546, that "Another one of the castellan Márton's valets arrived at Antal Nagy yesterday noon with the secret message that he had a kinsman at Kasim's court who had sent word to him that the pasha of Buda had died and that the Emperor was replacing him with Kaszon-

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shackles, and supplying him with a horse, a sword, and money for the journey, he sent him to his brother Orbán, who had become his friend earlier in Buda, "with such fairness, which was quite unexpected from a barbarian" (*ibid.*, I. 296).

<sup>33</sup> Thúry, *op. cit.*, II. 314 (Muradi/Sinan *çavuş*).

<sup>34</sup> For his role in these see "Successus rerum Hungaricarum anni M. D. XLIII," in *Verancsics Antal m. kir. helytartó, esztergomi érsek összes munkái. I. Történelmi dolgozatok deák nyelven* (Monumenta Hungariae Historica. Második osztály: Írók II.) Pest, 1857, 234-238.

<sup>35</sup> *Enyingi Török Bálint*. 277, No. 308.

<sup>36</sup> Wien, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Finanz- und Hofkammerarchiv. Hofffinanz Ungarn. Rote Nummer Jan. 1590. ff. 1-4 (collected by Ferenc Szakály).

<sup>37</sup> D. 12321, ff. 174r, 187r.

<sup>38</sup> Antal Gévay, *A' budai pasák* [The Pashas of Buda]. Bécs, 1841, 6, Nos. 3-4.

beg and that he (Kasım) was ready to go there, but was waiting the *szandak*[*bey*] whom he could leave in his place in Pécs".<sup>39</sup> In my view, the accuracy of the information about Kasım *bey* cannot be doubted, so in principle he received his appointment of *beylerbeyi* in the spring of 1546. Whether because his successor to the *liva* of Mohács–Pécs was nominated with considerable delay,<sup>40</sup> or for some other reasons, his installation was postponed to the beginning of 1548.<sup>41</sup>

During his activity in Mohács, Szekszárd, and Pécs for at least five years, Kasım *bey* and his men tried to make the most of the possibilities offered by their positions. On the territory under Ottoman rule it meant that, apart from their regular pay, they obtained life-long or at least long-term rights to use small pieces of land, gardens, meadows, and mills. Two examples of this type of land-use in the region around Eszék had already been mentioned above. In the vast *sancak* of Mohács there were ample opportunities to enlarge one's fortune—it would have been foolish not to make use of these.

First, however, leaving aside the minor possessions of Kasım within the *sancak* of Mohács, I survey the villages that were registered as his pious foundation (*vakıf*). Here Peçevi has to be cited again. This time he provides seemingly unbelievable information when speaking about the

<sup>39</sup> Elemér Mályusz, "Az Országos Levéltár Nádasdy-levéltárának magyar levelei [The Hungarian Letters of the Nádasdy Archives in the Hungarian National Archives] (V. közlemény)," *Levéltári Közlemények* 4 (1927) 109.

<sup>40</sup> This is supported for example by the fact that he was called the *bey* of Mohács as late as on July 23, 1547: *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi*, Kepeci 208, p. 172. — It can be also added that he was consistently labelled as the *bey* of Mohács in the 1546 *defter* of this *sancak* (cf. *infra*).

<sup>41</sup> In connection with the time and place of the death of Mehmed pasha some trouble is caused by a *ruis defteri* entry (Kepeci 209, p. 37.), which reports that Yahyapaşaoğlu Mehmed, the former *beylerbeyi* of Buda, died as the *bey* of Szendrő. The date of the record is April 30, 1550, which is four years later than the information supplied by Bernát Török, and there is also a two-year difference compared to the date given by Gévay. In the practice of the court, it was rare to mention the deceased high officials years later, and it is all the more so improbable in this particular case because the text talks about the men of the late pasha, namely about how many of them could get a *timar*. So the Ottoman information does not help to clarify the date of Mehmed's death, but it draws it closer to 1550, rather than 1548. The other statement, i.e. that he died as the *bey* of Szendrő, must be taken seriously. Finally, we are left without any doubt, if we identify the sender of the *tezkere* concerning his clients as his own son, Arslan *bey*, who was then the *mirliva* of Hatvan (Kepeci 209, p. 36.). He, for one, had to know what kind of an office his father held before his death. So Mehmed may only have been suffering from a serious disease when his replacement was first determined in 1546. It was carried out only at the beginning of 1548, and he spent the rest of his life in a somewhat more peaceful area.

early phase of Kasım's career: "Moreover, he pretended to be friendly with the errant King (John), therefore [the King] presented him with three villages as hereditary estates (*mülk*) opposite Eszék, concerning which the padishah, the Refuge of the Universe, was gracious to give him an imperial *temlikname*. The evidence that [the King gave these villages] as hereditary estates is that in this country every village and wasteland (*mezra'a*) has an infidel owner (*sipahi*) who collects the taxes at the appropriate time. The King removed the above mentioned villages from the register (*defter*) of the country, for that reason they do not have an infidel owner (*sipahi*)."<sup>42</sup>

Not less is asserted by Peçevi than that John Szapolyai, the King of Hungary endowed Kasım *voyvoda* with three villages (probably for his help in 1530 or 1537). This is a serious statement. It would be an exciting task to ascertain whether there is any trace of this endowment in the documents from the time of King John, but this could not be performed this time. What is certain, the location of the allegedly granted villages was correctly defined by Peçevi. Daróc,<sup>43</sup> Kopács,<sup>44</sup> Bellye,<sup>45</sup> and Csákfalu<sup>46</sup> already listed as *vakıf* estates of Kasım *bey* in the *mufassal defteri* of 1546<sup>47</sup> were indeed situated near Eszék, on the other side of the Drava. So Peçevi was much better informed about a matter that took place one hundred years before his age than expected. (I would not attach great importance to the fact that we have four instead of three villages in the documents, as their number could increase in the meantime, and whichever settlement Kasım acquired later, it was not far from the other three.) At the same time, we have to be careful with the question of the royal grant until we find at least one parallel example.<sup>48</sup> The significance of the case

<sup>42</sup> Peçevi, *op. cit.*, I. 33-34; briefly repeated: I. 293.

<sup>43</sup> Dārōfça in the *defter*. (Cf. Dezső Csánki, *Magyarország történelmi földrajza a Hunyadiak korában* [The Historical Geography of Hungary in the Era of the Hunyadis]. II. Budapest, 1894, 479.)

<sup>44</sup> See Csánki, *op. cit.*, II. 498.

<sup>45</sup> Bellye in the *defter*. See Csánki, *op. cit.*, II. 472.

<sup>46</sup> Čăkfălva in the *defter*. See Csánki, *op. cit.*, II. 476.

<sup>47</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 242r-v.

<sup>48</sup> The behaviour in 1576 of Kristóf Báthory, the regent of the Transylvanian Prince, Stephan Báthory, towards Sokollu Mustafa, the pasha of Buda concerning two villages Bikács and Nagyradvány cannot be regarded as of wholly the same category: Gyula Káldy-Nagy, *Harács-szedők és rájók. Török világ a 16. századi Magyarországon* [Harac-Collectors and *re'aya*. Ottoman Rule in Sixteenth-Century Hungary]. (Kőrösi Csoma Kiskönyvtár, 9.) Budapest, 1970, 101-102.

is not diminished by the fact that these villages were practically under Ottoman rule anyway.

As regards Peçevi's remark on the sultan's reinforcing the possessions of Kasım with a *temlikname*, it was most rare for the sultan to reward officials with hereditary estates in Ottoman Hungary. Kasım's social prestige and the great importance of his previous services are demonstrated by the ruler's grace.<sup>49</sup> Neither a document certifying his title nor a copy of it has been found yet, but it must have existed, because without the *mülk* status the income from the above mentioned villages could not have been endowed in the foundation.

After 1546, Kasım's *vakıfs* were registered three times, namely in 1552,<sup>50</sup> in 1580,<sup>51</sup> and in 1590.<sup>52</sup> The total of taxes to be expected from the settlements increased significantly in the course of time and the number of registered residents grew considerably as well. In Daróc there were 32 householders in 1546, 48 in 1552, 63 together with 6 widows in 1580, 73 in 1590, and the taxes amounted to 1,413 *akçe*, then 1,455, 5,840, and 5,840 *akçe* respectively. In Kopács the figures for the same years are the following: 27, 29, 74 (8 widows), and 98 householders (3 widows), and 2,906, 3,710, 8,179, and 8,179 *akçe* taxes. In Bélye there were 23, 20, 66 (plus 10 widows), and 82 (and 12 widows) householders, and 1,130, 1,372, 9,607,<sup>53</sup> and 9,607 *akçe* taxes. Finally in Csákfalva there were 10, 11, 23 (plus 3 widows), and 34 householders, and 340, 910, 2,992 and 2,833 *akçe* taxes. Altogether the number of heads of families grew three times, while the sum of tithes and other regular payments increased by four and a half

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<sup>49</sup> See the text of the only *mülkname* so far published concerning Hungarian territories from the sixteenth century: Gyula Káldy-Nagy, *A gyulai szandzsák 1567. és 1579. évi összeírása* [The Registers of the *sancak* of Gyula from 1567 and 1579]. (Forráskiadványok a Békés megyei Levéltárból, 10.) Békéscsaba, 1982, 395-396. — A similar document can be found in the register of the *sancak* of Temesvár from 1554, issued for Mehmed *bey* in 1537: *Tapu defteri* 290, p. 287.

<sup>50</sup> *Tapu defteri* 443, f. 239r-v.

<sup>51</sup> *Tapu defteri* 593, ff. 83v-86r.

<sup>52</sup> *Tapu defteri* 632, ff. 81r-83v. — With some severe and several minor mistakes published by Előd Vass, "A Szekcső-Mohácsi szandzsák 1591. évi adóösszeírása [The Register of the *sancak* of Szekcső-Mohács in 1591]," in *Baranyai Helytörténetírás* 1977. Ed. by László Szita. Pécs, 1979, 78-81.

<sup>53</sup> This time the census-taker became attentive to one more *çiftlik* on the territory of the village: Melegal (Csánki, *op. cit.*, II. 507) was recorded as Meleg Gál (a form reflecting Hungarian folk etymology), a ploughland belonging to the village, with no listing concerning the amount of taxes.

times. The peaceful foundation villages seem to have attracted the population in the area. The people living in the four settlements were all Hungarians, with very few exceptions bearing foreign names.<sup>54</sup>

The purpose of the foundation is unknown. Some suspected that its owner established it "for maintaining the Kasım pasha *cami'* in Pécs founded by him as the pasha of Buda".<sup>55</sup> Since the four villages were registered as *vakıf* estates already in 1546, presumably the original purpose is to be searched for in connection with the construction and maintenance of the *mescid* of Eszék, the chronogram of which was given by Evliya Çelebi as 966/1558-59.<sup>56</sup> However, it also cannot be excluded that building activity on the *cami'* of Pécs started earlier, during his tenure of office in Mohács-Pécs. Former opinions differ about this; even Győző Gerő, who is well-versed in this topic, has provided different dates.<sup>57</sup> On the basis of the sources it can be added that there were five single-wheeled foundation mills established for the supply of Kasım bey's *zaviye* in Pécs in 1546,<sup>58</sup> and this was the case also in 1552.<sup>59</sup> So by 1546 at the latest the convent had been completed or at least it was near completion. This proves our supposition that the construction of the *cami'*, which fulfilled more important religious functions than the *zaviye*, cannot have been

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<sup>54</sup> (Vár-)Daróc and Kopács have retained their Hungarian majority population up to recent times (Zoltán Dávid, "Körbetekintés IV. (A szomszédos országokban élő magyarok 1992-ben) [A Look Round. The Hungarians Living in the Neighbouring Countries in 1992]," *Magyar Szemle. Új folyam* 2:7 (1993) 755, and *idem*, "Magyarok – határaink mentén [Hungarians – Living Beyond the Borders]," *Mozgó Világ* 1982 július, 40-41.), Bellye has become a village of mixed nationality (Zoltán Dávid, "Körbetekintés IV," 755.), Csákfalva completely disappeared much earlier.

<sup>55</sup> Előd Vass, "A Mohácsi szandzsák hatvannégy évvel a csata után [The *sancak* of Mohács Sixty Four Years After the Battle in 1526]," in *Mohács. Tanulmányok a mohácsi csata 450. évfordulója alkalmából*. Ed. by Lajos Rúzsás and Ferenc Szakály. Budapest, 1986, 365.

<sup>56</sup> Evliya Çelebi, *op. cit.*, VI. 183.

<sup>57</sup> Previously he spoke about a period of construction between 1543 and 1546: Győző Gerő, *Török építészeti emlékek Magyarországon* [Monuments of Ottoman Architecture in Hungary]. Budapest, 1976, 13. In his Ph. D. dissertation he dated it significantly later, the late 70s or early 80s of the sixteenth century: Győző Gerő, *Az oszmán-török építészet Magyarországon. (Dzsámik, türbék, fürdők)* [The Ottoman-Turkish Architecture in Hungary. (*Cami's, türbes, and Baths*). (Művészettörténeti füzetek, 12.) Budapest, 1980, 50. The latter assumption seems to be without grounding, as it is most improbable that construction of a *cami'* bearing the pasha's name was begun after his death.

<sup>58</sup> *Tapu defteri* 443, f. 8v.

<sup>59</sup> *Tapu defteri* 443, f. 10v. — In 1570 only this short comment was thought to be important: "the *vakıf* mills of the deceased Kasım pasha, 9 wheels, tax [left blank]". See *Tapu defteri* 1012, f. 2v.

started later. At the same time it is surprising that no documents mention the *cami* in the sixteenth century, or the staff of it; and even the street names, which are usually informative in this context, remained Hungarian in Pécs. The testimonies of the two seventeenth-century authors, however, do not leave any doubt that the edifice was erected on his initiative.

In connection with Kasım, ten more mills are mentioned in Pécs, all of which were single-wheeled operated.<sup>60</sup> He must have acquired them in the district Malomszeg (lit. 'hill-corner'), where "according to Miklós Oláh and Pál Gregorián there could have been about forty mills before the Ottomans' arrival".<sup>61</sup>

I am going to follow Kasım's other possessions as they are listed in the *defter* of Mohács from 1546. We know about the *çiftlik* Kis-Árpád recorded next to Nagy-Árpád<sup>62</sup> coming after Pécs in the *defter* that, "in return for paying its tithes", which amounted to 100 *akçe*, it was handed over to "Kasım *bey* governing the above mentioned *liva*" after he had paid its *tapu*-fee.<sup>63</sup> Near the village Berek,<sup>64</sup> on the river Kapos, he got hold of a larger, five-wheeled mill.<sup>65</sup> In the confines of the town of Siklós, he 'rented' a *çiftlik* to which a ploughland with an estimated crop of 100 bags and a vineyard of 20 hoers belonged.<sup>66</sup> The *mezra'a* Koha, which later became part of his foundation, was listed after Mihálykereke as being used by Kasım.<sup>67</sup> Finally, in the *nahiye*-centre of Pécsvárad, Kasım had a small mill and a *çiftlik*, whose tithes were only 200 *akçe*, but consisted of a ploughland of 60 bags, a pasture of 30 carts, and 5 vineyards.<sup>68</sup> The amount of tithes does not seem realistic,

<sup>60</sup> Tapu defteri 441, ff. 8v-9r, Tapu defteri 443, ff. 10v-11r. By 1570 some of these got into the hands of others: Tapu defteri 1012, f. 2v.

<sup>61</sup> Pál Zoltán Szabó, *A török Pécs 1543-1696* [The Ottoman Pécs]. Pécs, 1941, 91. — It is remarkable that in the *defter* of 1546 the Ottomans counted exactly 40 mills in Pécs.

<sup>62</sup> Csánki, *op. cit.*, II. 469; Gyula Káldy-Nagy, *Baranya megye XVI. századi török összeírásai* [The Ottoman Registers of Baranya County from the sixteenth Century]. (A Magyar Nyelvtudományi Társaság Kiadványai, 103.) Budapest, 1960, 14. No. 2.

<sup>63</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 9r.

<sup>64</sup> Csánki, *op. cit.*, II. 417: Ber(e)k; today Nagyberki in Somogy county.

<sup>65</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 60r.

<sup>66</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 107v.

<sup>67</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 173r.

<sup>68</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 188v. — A Hungarian document notes at the end of 1559 the two-wheeled mill of Kasım pasha in "Kemed" (according to the publisher, it is identical with Kéménd), where the priest of Görcsöny collected 10 forints: György Timár, *Királyi Sziget. Szigetvár várgazdaságának iratai, 1546-1565*. [Royal Sziget. Documents Concerning the Finances of the Castle of Sziget]. Pécs, 1989, 227, 229.

as it is most unbelievable that the five vineyards, though abandoned by their former owners, should have produced only 30 buckets of wine; furthermore the tithe of 2 *akçe* after the 30 carts of hay seems symbolic as well.

The above listed items are not of significant value, even if the income to be expected from the *çiftlik*s apparently was estimated in favour of Kasım. Naturally, we do not have to worry that Kasım as a *sancakbeyi* was short of anything; therefore it is most curious that he tried to profit from the modest material sources, too.

Not less interesting is that more than a dozen of Kasım's men, at least 14 persons turned out to have obtained similar holdings following the example of their boss. For them it was of more significance whether they were able to get hold of some abandoned property or not. It is impossible to say how fortunate the ones listed below were, but a similar example, the *dizdar* of Pozsega, proves that *çiftlik*s, held for a long period, occasionally assisted their clever users to accumulate considerable wealth.<sup>69</sup>

The *defter* in question is relatively consistent in defining the persons and their relationship with Kasım. Sometimes, however, it fails to indicate the personal ties or the rank of certain people. Nevertheless, we are at a loss with only one companion, though he is most frequently mentioned, Mustafa, who occasionally seems to double, and sometimes it is even doubtful whether he belonged to the clientelage of Kasım. First he is named as Mustafa *voyvoda*, the owner of a mill in Pécs.<sup>70</sup> He is called the same when his *çiftlik* near Belvárd-Gyula<sup>71</sup> is described, which consisted of a ploughland of 25 bags, a pasture of an estimated 20 carts, a vineyard and a two-wheeled mill, and from which the treasury expected to get a tax of altogether 175 *akçe*.<sup>72</sup> On the other hand, the beneficiary of the *çiftlik* near the town Pellérd (a ploughland of 20 bags, a pasture of about 4 carts, a vineyard of 10 hoers) was Mustafa, "the man of the *mirliva* of Mohács", according to the compilers of the *defter*.<sup>73</sup> Out of the two *çiftlik*s in the fields of Kisasszonyfalu<sup>74</sup> one was recorded as belonging to

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<sup>69</sup> Nenad Moačanin, "Hacı Mehmed Ağa of Požega, God's Special Protégé (ca. 1490–ca. 1580)," in *Hungarian-Ottoman Military and Diplomatic Relations*, 171-181.

<sup>70</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 9r.

<sup>71</sup> Káldy-Nagy, *Baranya megye*, 14, No. 4.

<sup>72</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 9v.

<sup>73</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 12v.

<sup>74</sup> Káldy-Nagy, *Baranya megye*, 24-25, No. 94.

"Mustafa *voyvoda*" (a ploughland of about 40 bags, a pasture of 40 carts, a garden and a two-wheeled mill).<sup>75</sup> Then he is named simply Mustafa; what is more, this time the reference to Kasım is also missing when his *çiftlik* in Terehid<sup>76</sup> is referred to, which contained a ploughland of about 40 bags, a pasture of 25 carts, 2 vineyards, and a garden.<sup>77</sup> On the basis of these examples we could conclude that we are encountered with two different persons, a certain Mustafa *voyvoda* and one of Kasım *bey*'s men of the same name. The situation is further complicated by the fact that, among the beneficiaries of the village Henye,<sup>78</sup> a tenant of a *çiftlik* was recorded as "Mustafa *voyvoda*, man of Kasım" in the *defter*.<sup>79</sup> We might think that the latter variant is a mistake. This is, however, contradicted by a *ruznamçe* entry of the *vilayet* of Buda during Kasım's second tenure of office as *beylerbeyi* on October 7, 1558 which concerns Mustafa *voyvoda*'s *zi'amet*-holding in the province of Pécs–Mohács worth 34,012 *akçe*, thus indicating his relationship with the *beylerbeyi* clearly. In addition, Belvárd-Gyula and Kisasszonyfalu were listed among his prebends, that is two villages where he had had interests.<sup>80</sup> Although it is somewhat discouraging to see in the 1546 *defter* of Pécs that, according to the last reference to Mustafa, the *tapu*-fee of the *mezra'a* of Ivancs<sup>81</sup> belonging to the village of Monostor<sup>82</sup> was paid by "Mustafa *voyvoda*, one of the *timar*-holders",<sup>83</sup> in the light of the decisive entry of 1558 it must, nevertheless, be concluded that Kasım had only one man called Mustafa, who served him in part as a *voyvoda*.<sup>84</sup>

<sup>75</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 31r.

<sup>76</sup> Káldy-Nagy, *Baranya megye*, 80, No. 614.

<sup>77</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 111r.

<sup>78</sup> Káldy-Nagy, *Baranya megye*, 108, No. 786.

<sup>79</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 163r. — One further mill and another half were also in his possession.

<sup>80</sup> Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Ehemalige Konsularakademie, Krafft, 284, photo No. 571. (I used the photocopy of this manuscript held at the Department of Turkish Studies, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest and as the folio indications are missing from them, I had to give the number of the photos, which follow the original sequence.)

<sup>81</sup> Káldy-Nagy, *Baranya megye*, 110-111, No. 804.

<sup>82</sup> In Csánki (*op. cit.*, II. 492) we find such forms under Ivánfalva and Ivanovcz, which could be equivalent with the *çiftlik* in question, but given the lack of a more accurate localization, the identification is not unambiguous.

<sup>83</sup> Tapu defteri, 441, f. 167r.

<sup>84</sup> According to Sebestyén Tinódi Lantos, Mustafa *voyvoda* died in the duel of Kozár in 1542, and therefore Kasım *bey* was very sad: Sebestien Tinódi, "Verbőci Imrehnec Kazon

Ca'fer *voyvoda* also obtained several properties in the *sancak*. In Helösfalu<sup>85</sup> he possessed a two-wheeled and a three-wheeled mill, and a small *çiftlik* (according to estimates a pasture of 30 carts, a ploughland of 30 bags and a vineyard.)<sup>86</sup> References to his *çiftlik* near Mecské<sup>87</sup> (a ploughland of 25 bags, a pasture of 6 carts, and a garden) omitted his rank, but it can be taken for granted that it was the same person.<sup>88</sup> In the description of the *çiftlik* in the vicinity of Murján<sup>89</sup> (a ploughland of about 31 bags, a pasture of 40 carts) his relationship with Kasım *bey* was not registered<sup>90</sup> but this cannot divert us either. We also encounter his name in connection with a *mezra'a*: Nadicsa<sup>91</sup> coming after the 'town' Babarc belonged to him.<sup>92</sup> What is really interesting about Ca'fer is that two of his men appear in the 1546 *defter* of Mohács, a fact which exemplifies the intricate system of inter-relationships, several elements of which can only be clarified in such a context. In the first instance we are encountered by Dursun who obtained a minor *çiftlik* near Szörén<sup>93</sup> (a ploughland of 10 bags, a pasture of 7 carts) and a mill.<sup>94</sup> His companion, Ahmed, operated a three-wheeled mill and owned a *çiftlik* in Kálmánca (a ploughland of about 24 bags, a pasture of 10 carts, and a garden).<sup>95</sup>

Ferhad *katib* or *voyvoda* is listed five times: first as a scribe taking over a little mill and a ploughland yielding approximately 10 bags and

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hadaval kozari mezőn viadalya [The Combat of Imre Verbőci with the Troops of Kasım in the Field of Kozár]," in *Cronica. Kolozsvár, 1554*, m 3. Facsimile edition by Béla Varjas. Budapest, 1959. — The above-mentioned data allow us to conclude that this client of Kasım survived the encounter. It is not out of the question—indeed it is quite feasible—that this person is identical with Kasım's companion, mentioned in the text preceding note 24, who was his fellow *voyvoda* in the 1530s and might have become the 'servitor' of his friend, who made a more successful career.

<sup>85</sup> Káldy-Nagy, *Baranya megye*, 24, No. 92.

<sup>86</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 30v.

<sup>87</sup> Káldy-Nagy, *Baranya megye*, 26, No. 102.

<sup>88</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 32v.

<sup>89</sup> Káldy-Nagy, *Baranya megye*, 26, No. 104.

<sup>90</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 33r.

<sup>91</sup> Vass's transcription (*A Szekescsői-Mohácsi szandzsák*, 48, No. 49) is Badoncsa without identification. However, Nado(j)csa and Nadicsa can be found in Csánki, *op. cit.*, II. 510.

<sup>92</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 186v.

<sup>93</sup> Káldy-Nagy, *Baranya megye*, 117, No. 848.

<sup>94</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 143v.

<sup>95</sup> Tapu defteri 441, 150r-v. — He must have been the same as 'Chaffer' *voyvoda* from Pest, who accompanied Markus Sinckmoser on his way back to Vienna in June 1550: Petritsch, *op. cit.*, 64-65, No. 133.

a pasture of 20 carts<sup>96</sup> in Mislen.<sup>97</sup> His function as a *voivoda* is cited in a description of two of his tenancies near Grgrofcsa.<sup>98</sup> One was again a *çiftlik* (a pasture, a garden, and some ploughland) and a single-wheeled mill, the other was the *mezra'a* Budmér,<sup>99</sup> whose taxes totalled 300 *akçe*.<sup>100</sup> A little further away, in Hencsence,<sup>101</sup> he was in possession of a major *çiftlik*, where he could collect 50 bags (c. 3000-5000 kg) of grain and 100 cartloads of hay.<sup>102</sup> Finally, in the vicinity of Romona<sup>103</sup> he could operate a small mill.<sup>104</sup>

Behram *voivoda* turns up in four different places. Near Diósherendi<sup>105</sup> he obtained a *mezra'a*<sup>106</sup> called Tarabos.<sup>107</sup> In the proximity of Bözdök<sup>108</sup> he acquired two *mezra'as*; Kесе<sup>109</sup> which came to be repopulated later, and Szent-Király:<sup>110</sup> both with a tithe of 200 *akçe*.<sup>111</sup> In Tód-Kékös<sup>112</sup> and

<sup>96</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 21v.

<sup>97</sup> Káldy-Nagy, *Baranya megye*, 20, No. 53.

<sup>98</sup> Káldy-Nagy, *Baranya megye*, 105, No. 769.

<sup>99</sup> Csánki, *op. cit.*, II. 473 (Bodomér).

<sup>100</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 159r.

<sup>101</sup> Káldy-Nagy, *Baranya megye*, 105-106, No. 771.

<sup>102</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 159v.

<sup>103</sup> Káldy-Nagy, *Baranya megye*, 76, No. 96.

<sup>104</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 200r. — Presumably this Ferhad *voivoda* accompanied Ferdinand's messengers, Zsigmond Posgay and Markus Sinckmoser to the Porte in April 1549: Petritsch, *op. cit.*, 57, No. 113.

<sup>105</sup> Káldy-Nagy, *Baranya megye*, 112, No. 815.

<sup>106</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 170r.

<sup>107</sup> Its identification is a little difficult because Darabosfalva mentioned together with Balonya in Csánki seems too distant: *op. cit.*, II. 479. — Its precise localization is provided by Lajos Nagy, "Adatok a Baranya megyei Batthyány uradalom kialakulásáról [Data on the Formation of the Batthyány-Estates in Baranya County]," in *Baranyai Helytörténetírás 1978*. Ed. by László Szita. Pécs, 1979, 38: note 64. He refers to a map from 1813 which contains a place called "Darabos" in the vicinity of Nagy Budmér. Diósherend was the neighbouring settlement.

<sup>108</sup> Káldy-Nagy, *Baranya megye*, 112, No. 818.

<sup>109</sup> Three *cizye*-payers were listed here in 1554: Káldy-Nagy, *Baranya megye*, 112, No. 819. In 1559 10 householders lived in the village: Vass, *A Szekcsői-Mohácsi szandzsák*, 69, No. 116 (misspelled as Keste).

<sup>110</sup> Vass identified it with Baranyaszentistván (today Petlovác): *A Szekcsői-Mohácsi szandzsák*, 89. On the basis of various other data, however, it can be concluded that this village was only founded in the eighteenth century.

<sup>111</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 170v.

<sup>112</sup> Csánki, *op. cit.* II. 495 (Kékes/d/)

Szorosad<sup>113</sup> his acquisitions included a single-wheeled<sup>114</sup> and a three-wheeled mill.<sup>115</sup>

A person with the rare name of Behmen can be recognised on three occasions as one of Kasım's men. First it is after Velén<sup>116</sup> that a *çiftlik* used by him comes up (a ploughland of about 24 bags, a pasture of 6 carts, and 2 vineyards),<sup>117</sup> then near the *mezra'a* Szarándok<sup>118</sup> a *çiftlik* (some ploughland and pasture, and two "eyes" [göz] of mill),<sup>119</sup> and finally, near Bán<sup>120</sup> another *çiftlik* (some land and pasture) and a three-wheeled mill.<sup>121</sup>

Hızır was one of the "chief gate-keepers" (*serbevoab*) of Kasım *bey*. He managed to get a humble mill<sup>122</sup> in (Kővágó-)Szöllös,<sup>123</sup> a *çiftlik* (a ploughland of 22 bags, a pasture of 8 carts, a vineyard, and a garden)<sup>124</sup> somewhere around Töttös,<sup>125</sup> and a little mill in the *mezra'a* Birén near Romona.<sup>126</sup>

We have already mentioned Haydar *voivoda* (see note 29). Apart from his *timar* in the *nahiye* of Uziçe, the *tezkere* of which was issued on March 11, 1542, he succeeded in obtaining a four-wheeled mill in Kölesd by 1546,<sup>127</sup> which, later, passed into the hands of the inhabitants of Tolna, but the ferry nearby continued to bear his name in 1565, 1570, 1580, and 1590.<sup>128</sup> Although the income from the crossing place was collected by the treasury, it cannot be excluded that Haydar received a share of the

<sup>113</sup> Csánki, *op. cit.* III. 453.

<sup>114</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 191r.

<sup>115</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 207r.

<sup>116</sup> Káldy-Nagy, *Baranya megye*, 23, No. 82.

<sup>117</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 28v.

<sup>118</sup> By 1554 this had also been repopulated: Káldy-Nagy, *Baranya megye*, 42, No. 254.

<sup>119</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 60r.

<sup>120</sup> Káldy-Nagy, *Baranya megye*, 110, No. 803.

<sup>121</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 166v.

<sup>122</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 13v.

<sup>123</sup> Káldy-Nagy, *Baranya megye*, 16, No. 20.

<sup>124</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 25v.

<sup>125</sup> Káldy-Nagy, *Baranya megye*, 21, No. 70.

<sup>126</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 200r. — The deciphering of the place-name is uncertain, consequently it cannot be identified.

<sup>127</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 99v, Tapu defteri 443, f. 145v.

<sup>128</sup> The data from 1565 and 1570 are taken from Géza Dávid, *A Simontornyai szandzsák a 16. században* [The *sancak* of Simontornya in the Sixteenth Century]. Budapest, 1982, 287/85, 305/87; for 1580, see Tapu defteri 676, f. 116v; for 1590, see Tapu defteri 632, f. 96r.

duties. Near the village Györe<sup>129</sup> he could have a *çiftlik* cultivated (a ploughland of 30 bags, a pasture, and 2 vineyards) after paying the *tapu*-fee.<sup>130</sup> It is worth noting that he also possessed a four-wheeled mill in Hidvég belonging to the *nahiye* of Anyavár in the *sancak* of Simontornya.<sup>131</sup>

Habib *voivoda* collected as many as 3 *çiftliks* in the surroundings of the village Versán,<sup>132</sup> which altogether contained ploughland of approximately 95 bags, pasture of 6 carts, and 4 vineyards.<sup>133</sup>

Kasım's other chief gate-keeper was called Yusuf. He had a *çiftlik* near Zók<sup>134</sup> (a ploughland of 6 bags, a pasture of 20 carts, and two pieces of vineyards).<sup>135</sup>

Hüseyin was simply 'a man' of Kasım, still his boss managed to get him the *çiftlik* belonging to the confines of Kőrös<sup>136</sup> (a ploughland of about 40 bags, a pasture of 23 carts, and a two-wheeled mill).<sup>137</sup>

Yahya *voivoda*, who is mentioned by Kasım in his above cited letter from 1543 as having been sent out together with Haydar *voivoda* to gather information,<sup>138</sup> found for himself a *çiftlik* near Szent-Trinitás<sup>139</sup> (a ploughland of 25 bags, a pasture of 30 carts, a vineyard of 40 hoers) and a three-wheeled mill.<sup>140</sup>

<sup>129</sup> Káldy-Nagy, *Baranya megye*, 65, No. 510.

<sup>130</sup> *Tapu defteri* 441, f. 105v, *Tapu defteri* 443, f. 153v.

<sup>131</sup> Géza Dávid, *A Simontornyai szandzsák*, 267/5, 275/5. It was mentioned both times that the person in question belonged to Kasım. — This mill was registered in 1580 as the possession of "the late [Sokollu] Mustafa pasha", see *Tapu defteri* 593, f. 38r.

<sup>132</sup> Káldy-Nagy, *Baranya megye*, 69, No. 531.

<sup>133</sup> *Tapu defteri* 441, f. 187v.

<sup>134</sup> Káldy-Nagy, *Baranya megye*, 22, No. 75.

<sup>135</sup> *Tapu defteri* 441, f. 27r.

<sup>136</sup> Káldy-Nagy, *Baranya megye*, 29, No. 124.

<sup>137</sup> *Tapu defteri* 441, f. 37r. — Some years later it was still in his hands; but in 1579 it was probably mistakenly called the *çiftlik* of Kasım *bey*: Gyula Káldy-Nagy, "Török adórajstrom Baranyából a XVI. századból [Ottoman Tax Register from County Baranya from the Sixteenth Century]," in *Szigetvári emlékkönyv. Szigetvár 1566. évi ostromának 400. évfordulójára*. Ed. by Lajos Rúzsás (A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Dunántúli Tudományos Intézete – Értekezések 1966.) Budapest, 1966, 153.

<sup>138</sup> Thúry, *op. cit.*, II. 295.

<sup>139</sup> Káldy-Nagy, *Baranya megye*, 78-79, No. 607.

<sup>140</sup> *Tapu defteri* 441, f. 109r.

The *timar*-holder Hasan also belonged to Kasım's trusted circle of men, and he possessed the *mezra'a* Lajmér<sup>141</sup> registered after Mohács.<sup>142</sup>

The similarly ranked Hüsrev established himself in the *mezra'a* Kis-Pereket, which can be regarded as part of Pereket,<sup>143</sup> the yearly income of which from tithes was estimated rather high, 500 *akçe*.<sup>144</sup>

The last in Kasım's 'political family' is Uruc, who, similarly to Hızır, managed to get two single-wheeled mills in the *mezra'a* Birén recorded after Romona, and he also obtained the *mezra'a* itself.<sup>145</sup>

By assembling these scattered minor data I wished to point out that, even in the seemingly austere, heavily centralized and over-bureaucratized Ottoman Empire of the sixteenth century, people could find those ways and methods through which a system of personal dependence could emerge and freer forms of possession promoting individual progress could come into being. The young and dynamic Kasım was very efficient in paving the way for his men and for himself at that time.

Kasım's first tenure of office as the pasha of Buda lasted until May 1551. The reason for his dismissal can only be guessed; he may have been blamed for interfering in the Transylvanian power struggle on behalf of queen Isabel in the autumn of 1550.<sup>146</sup> He cannot have fallen entirely out of grace, as he was kept in active service as the *bey* of Székesfehérvár (Ístolni Belgrad) instead of being put on the waiting list.<sup>147</sup> In this capacity

<sup>141</sup> Csánki, *op. cit.*, II. 501.

<sup>142</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 181r.

<sup>143</sup> Káldy-Nagy, *Baranya megye*, 76, No. 593.

<sup>144</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 199r.

<sup>145</sup> Tapu defteri 441, f. 200r. — Unfortunately, given the lack of the Mohács *timar defteris*, we cannot decide whether these persons had prebends or not. Later some of them turn up as *sipahis* in the *vilayet* of Temesvár and then in Buda, but most of them disappear.

<sup>146</sup> Imre Szántó, *Küzdelem a török terjeszkedés ellen Magyarországon. Az 1551-52. évi várható-riúk* [Struggle Against the Ottoman Expansion in Hungary. The Siege Wars of 1551-52]. Budapest, 1985, 46-47, 52. — Johann Maria Malvezzi must have played some role in it, at least according to his own words written down on May 16, 1551 "Io sollicito et insto quanto posso che il Sig.or levi *Kassum* Bassa de l'oficio de *Buda* et che metta un huomo della Porta sua el quale sia homo da bene, obediente, et che castigi gli ladri turchi." See *Austro-Turcica*. 588, No. 228. On June 19 his formulation was a bit different, he attributed the whole thing to the sultan: "...Sua Alteza ha deposto *Kassum* Bassa de *Buda* perché ha fatto massa de gente senza comisione de Sua Alteza et per li mali deportamenti in quelli confini..." (*ibid.*, 605, No. 235.). The latter quotation justifies Szántó indirectly.

<sup>147</sup> Gévay, *op. cit.*, 6, No. 4; the information is from scribe Adorján. For details about him, see Ferenc Szakály, "Egy magyar szpáhi a 16. században: a rejtélyes esztergomi 'Andreja deák' [A Hungarian *sipahi* in the Sixteenth Century: the Mysterious 'Scribe Andreja' from Esztergom]," *Keletkutatás* 1992 ősz, 127-138.

he possessed some settlements in the *sancak* of Koppány (Kopan).<sup>148</sup> A few months later<sup>149</sup> he was tasked with the creation of a new *sancak* centring on Becse and Becskerek (Beçe–Beçkerek), captured in September 1551. The existence of this short-lived administrative unit is testified by two sultanic orders, one dating from February 11, 1552, the other from March 13 of the same year.<sup>150</sup> The earlier *mühimme defteri* entry is of special significance because it ordered Kasım to take those of his men having *timars* in the *sancak* of Buda with himself to the border and forbidding anyone from thinking of their possessions while absent.<sup>151</sup> Previously, in his capacity as the *bey* of Becse–Becskerek he had sent a call for surrender to the inhabitants of Makó and Besenyő on February 1, 1552.<sup>152</sup> This command is interesting for us inasmuch it contains Kasım's statement according to which the regions east of the river Tisza did not belong to the *bey* of Szeged (Segedin) but to him.<sup>153</sup> Kasım needed to emphasize this because his fellow *bey* had urged the well-to-do town to pay its taxes to him.<sup>154</sup> In retrospect we can say that Kasım was right, as Makó, ranged with the *sancak* of Csanád (Çanad), later became part of the *vilayet* of Temesvár.

It is not quite clear how, at this time, Kasım could have been the superior of Hızır, the *bey* of Szeged, and how he could have received somewhat later the post of Hızır when the latter fell out of grace, as Ferenc Szakály wrote.<sup>155</sup> In connection with the first part of the question we can refer to Kasım's previous position and his retained pasha rank; but, as I am not aware of any hierarchical relationships among *sancakbeyis*,

<sup>148</sup> G. Dávid, *A Simontornyai szandzsák*, 15.

<sup>149</sup> On January 31, 1552 he was still spoken about as the *bey* of Székesfehérvár: İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Koğuşlar 888, f. 48v.

<sup>150</sup> Gyula Káldy-Nagy drew attention to them: *A Budai szandzsák 1559. évi összeírása* [The Register of the *sancak* of Buda from 1559]. (Pest megye múltjából, 3.) Budapest, 1977, 21: note 10.

<sup>151</sup> Koğuşlar, 888, f. 70v. (The orders concerning Temesvár preserved in the manuscript in question were used on the basis of the transcriptions by Pál Fodor.)

<sup>152</sup> Petritsch, *op. cit.*, 73-74, Nos. 165-166. — The first was published by János Reizner, *Szeged története* [A History of Szeged]. IV. [Szeged, 1900], 146, No. LXXIX. (Petritsch was unaware of it.)

<sup>153</sup> Reizner, *op. cit.*, IV. 146: "pro certo credatis insuper ipsi Zegedyensi a parte hac thurcj Thyze nullum negocium habent nec ab illis eomodo vobis erit cauendum vel timendum."

<sup>154</sup> Reizner, *op. cit.*, IV. 145-146, No. LXVIII; Ferenc Szakály, *Szeged története I. A kezdetektől 1686-ig* [A History of Szeged. From the Beginnings to 1686]. Ed. by Gyula Kristó. Szeged, 1983, 526.

<sup>155</sup> Szakály, *Szeged története*, I. 526, 530.

I would handle the matter with care, especially given the lack of actual textual references. There is no confirmation in the Ottoman archival documents concerning the other point either, nor is the quoted source unambiguous. On the one hand, there is no mention of Hızır in it, and on the other the text does not necessarily imply that Kasım was made the *bey* of Szeged; it only states that the scribe Ferenc was sent to him to the town the previous winter, that is in 1552.<sup>156</sup>

Owing to the acceleration of events, Kasım cannot have dealt too much with the organization of the *sancak* of Becse–Becskerek, since the occupation of Temesvár in July 1552 had resulted in a decisive change in the fate of the region and that of Kasım as well: now he was to establish a new *vilayet*.<sup>157</sup> We do not have any precise information on when he was appointed *beylerbeyi*. As the sultan and the grand vizier were not present in the campaign, the nomination might have taken some time. During this period it was the commander-in-chief Ahmed pasha who took control of events and submitted a suggestion for the post of pasha, as a passage in the *mühimme defteri* dated September 19, 1552, reveals.<sup>158</sup> However, the appointment had been decided upon earlier, as the Voyvode of Wallachia had been informed about it as early as August 22.<sup>159</sup> Since the same letter also states that Kasım had been left behind to reinforce Lippa (Lipova),

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<sup>156</sup> Magyar történelmi okmánytár a brüsseli országos levéltárból és a burgundi könyvtárból. [Hungarian Historical Documents from the National Archives of Brussels and from the Library of Burgundia]. Collected by Mihály Hatvani. III. 1553-1608. (Monumenta historica hungarica. Magyar történelmi emlékek I. Okmánytárak III.) Pest, 1859, 21, No. 271. ("Scriptis iam literis rursus durius inquisitus respondit idem Franciscus Literatus, Zegedynum hyeme praeterita se missum fuisse ad Kazzon passam, jinter ceteraque dixisset idem Kazzon, nuncium eius de factiosis verum esse, ex quo eodem tempore quattuor equites transilvanienses Melchioris Balassa fuissent capti ad ad ipsum passam adducti..." — Lajos Fekete goes one step further, stating that "Kasım is mentioned as the former pasha of Szeged in 1552" (*Bevezetés a hódoltság török diplomatikájába* [Introduction into the Diplomacy of the Ottoman Rule in Hungary]. Budapest, 1926, 10, No. 5.). However, I interpret his reference from March 7, 1552 differently, namely I infer that his former position in Buda and not in Szeged was alluded to in the passage in question: "Further, I can write to your Highness that the pasha (namely Hadım 'Ali, the actual *beylerbeyi* of Buda) is still here in Szeged, as well as the former pasha Kazin, together with all his folk" (cf. Lajos Szádeczky, "Magyar levelek a 16. század közepéről [Hungarian Letters from the Middle of the Sixteenth Century]," *Történelmi Tár* 1880, 599).

<sup>157</sup> It seems probable that for some time the *sancak* of Becskerek survived with Malkoç *bey* as the head of it: Petritsch, *op. cit.*, 88, No. 214 (without date, among the documents dating from between July and December 1552).

<sup>158</sup> Koğuşlar 888, f. 446r.

<sup>159</sup> Koğuşlar 888, f. 445v.

it is obvious that he cannot have returned to Temesvár before the middle of August. At the same time, in the sultan's order to Ahmed pasha on August 6, *beylerbeyis* and *sancakbeyis* were mentioned only in general, though the capture of the town had already been acknowledged.<sup>160</sup> So the decision on the person of the first pasha of the new *beylerbeyilik* must have been made some time between these two dates, i.e. between August 6 and 22. It was at that time that the size of his *hass*-possessions was fixed at 800,000 *akçe*.<sup>161</sup> This sum was lower than the revenues of the *mirmirans* of Buda, which were about 1,000,000 *akçe* in the 1540s and 1550s.<sup>162</sup>

The few works written on the pashas of Temesvár and widely neglecting Ottoman sources suggest that Kasım was deposed for a short period of time in 1554 or 1555, and that during this period Güzelce Rüstem was in charge.<sup>163</sup> This opinion cannot be justified by Ottoman documents; quite to the contrary, they apparently refer to a continuous tenure of office.<sup>164</sup> Their testimony is corroborated by the fact that in the *timar defteri* of Temesvár<sup>165</sup> prepared at the end of 1554<sup>166</sup> or at the beginning of 1555 at

<sup>160</sup> Koğuşlar 888, f. 347r-v.

<sup>161</sup> Koğuşlar 888, f. 446r.

<sup>162</sup> Bali pasha could collect 1,000,391 *akçe* in 1542-1543, 'Ali pasha was able to gather only 1,027,211 *akçe* instead of the 1,100,000 *akçe* principally due to him: Géza Dávid, "Incomes and Possessions of the *Beglerbegis* of Buda in the Sixteenth Century," *Soliman le Magnifique et son temps. Actes du Colloque de Paris. Galeries Nationales du Grand Palais. 7-10 mars 1990*. Publiés par Gilles Veinstein. Paris, 1992, 388, 394.

<sup>163</sup> Frígyes Pesty, "Temes vármegye főispánjai, a temesvári pasák, és tartományi elnökök [The High Sheriffs of Temes County, the Pashas of Temesvár, and the Governors of the Province]," *Magyar Történelmi Tár* 12 (1863), 238. He puts the provisional rule of Rüstem pasha at 1555 with the following argumentation: "since we know the names of all the pashas of Temesvár between 1552 and 1558 except for 1555 and 1558, Güzelce Rüstem could have been the pasha of Temesvár in one of these years." — László Fenyvesi, "A temesközi-szörénységi végvidék funkcióváltozásai (1365-1718) [The Changes of Function of the Border Area of Temesköz-Szörénység]," *Studia Agriensia* 14 (1993) 263: he puts Kasım's downfall between the end of 1554 and the autumn of 1555, unfortunately without justifying it.

<sup>164</sup> In April 1554, Kasım was definitely the governor of Temesvár, as demonstrated by the letter of Tuygun pasha to Ferdinand: Fekete, *op. cit.*, 16-17, No. 7. (According to Fekete Kasım held this office from 1552 to 1554: *ibid.*, 16: note 9.) His name was mentioned in this position on November 13, 1554: Köhbach, *op. cit.*, 152-153, and also on December 26: Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Mühimme defteri 1, p. 239 (257), No. 1468. For Ottoman data on his service in Temesvár in 1555, see Kepeci 213, p. 117 ( an entry on May 1), Kepeci 214, p. 28 (December 1).

<sup>165</sup> Tapu defteri 298. In this defter, the earliest date added after the completion of the register stems from the second half of January 1556: p. 38.

<sup>166</sup> The parallel *tahrir defteri* was completed some time between November 26 and December 5, 1554: Tapu defteri 280, p. 1.

the latest, we can find some *sipahis* who were characterized as the men of Kasım, while the name of Rüstem pasha never comes up in such a context. Out of the people listed earlier, Behmen had become a *kethüda* by this time and had struggled his way up to the group of *zi'amet*-holders, though his income of 20,230 *akçe* counted as rather modest in this category.<sup>167</sup> Yusuf was registered as a *voyvoda* with a *timar* of 5,999 *akçe*.<sup>168</sup> Ferhad must have also followed his boss, as his *timar*-holding in the *nahiye* of Pécs, Baranya-vár, and Szász, worth 12,500 *akçe*, was transferred to somebody else in April 1555 with reference to his being assigned another prebend in the *vilayet* of Temesvár.<sup>169</sup> On the other hand, I do not think that Ca'fer *mira-hor*<sup>170</sup> disposing of places worth 10,162 *akçe* can be identical with the influential *voyvoda* with a similar name mentioned before. The pasha must have found a new protégé in Korkud *voyvoda*, possessing an income of 10,000 *akçe*, and İbrahim bin Musa with an income of 6,050 *akçe*.<sup>171</sup> Unfortunately the name of the *beylerbeyi* is not clearly indicated in the *defter* under discussion, only the sources of income allocated to him are mentioned, which totalled 780,966 *akçe*.<sup>172</sup> It is surprising, however, that, contrary to the situation in the *sancak* of Mohács, no mention was made of the minor possessions in the hands of Kasım or his men in the *tahrir defteri* of Temesvár from 1554.

The nineteenth-century Hungarian author, Frigyes Pesthy thought that a certain Halim (NB. there is no such independent name, only the compound 'Abdulhalim is known) replaced Kasım in 1556, not realizing

<sup>167</sup> Tapu defteri 298, p. 25.

<sup>168</sup> Tapu defteri, 298, p. 27.

<sup>169</sup> Krafft 284, photo No. 238. — In the *timar defteri* of the *sancak* of Lipppa Ferhad *voyvoda* is recorded with a *zi'amet* of 20,169 *akçe*: Tapu defteri 356, p. 13.

<sup>170</sup> Tapu defteri 298, p. 28.

<sup>171</sup> Tapu defteri 298, pp. 29, 30.

<sup>172</sup> Tapu defteri 298, pp. 7-16. — He was allocated 173,034 *akçe* in the *nahiye* of Temesvár; 50,994 in Iktár, 34,861 in Tergoviste, 43,511 in Semlik, 54,205 in Bogcsa, 51,989 in Csákova, 74,188 in Morzsina, 55,324 in Facset, 20,070 in Bozózvár, 31,729 in Bozsor, 40,692 in Furdia, 85,861 in Fenlak, to which 35,000 *akçe* were added from *niyabet*-fees. The listed sums amount to 751,458 *akçe*, but as some *nahiyes* are not mentioned at all, the difference might result from that. — It is noteworthy that nearly all *nahiye* centres became the *hass* possessions of the *beylerbeyi*, and he got hold of some districts almost in full: he acquired 6 out of the 8 villages of the *nahiye* of Bozózvár, 15 out of the 19 settlements of Facset, and 11 out of the 16 villages in the *nahiye* of Furdia.

that the person was qualified "Zanchiakus".<sup>173</sup> The idea is, however, not completely absurd, but the explanation has to be searched for somewhere else. The record from December 1, 1555 cited above in note 164 concerning Kasım pasha, contains a statement that is entirely in contrast with our previous knowledge:

"Kasım pasha, the *beylerbeyi* of Temeşvar sent a letter and reported that Lipova was a border province, and if the *beylerbeyi* lived there, it would be easy to keep up order and administer affairs on the marches, and the province would flourish. Therefore I command that he should live in Lipova and that Temeşvar should be handed over to Halil *bey*, the *bey* of Lipova, together with the post of the finance director (*mal defterdarı*) of Temeşvar".<sup>174</sup>

This means that, on the basis of Kasım's proposal, the administrative center of the *vilayet* of Temesvár was transferred to Lippa on account of strategic considerations, and the *sancak* of Temesvár was degraded to the level of an average administrative unit. Such a strange solution, i.e. that someone was a *sancakbeyi* and a financial official at the same time, could probably occur only in the confines. It is also possible to prove the implementation of the reorganization by other sources; some six weeks after the previous order, between January 12 and 21, 1556, "Halil, the *sancakbeyi* of Temeşvar, in charge of registering Temeşvar"<sup>175</sup> received another command. In addition, in July 1557 some changes in the province of Temesvár were introduced in the *ruzname* of Buda, quite unexpectedly but fortunately for us. The allocation of these *timars* was rendered possible by the

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<sup>173</sup> This person will be Halil, the *bey* of Lippa, who was referred to on June 14 (Kepeci 213, p. 134) and November 18, 1555 (Kepeci 214, p. 39).

<sup>174</sup> Kepeci 214, p. 28.

<sup>175</sup> Tapu defteri 298, p. 38. — As mentioned above, the *mufassal defteri* of Temesvár was completed by the end of 1554 on the basis of Halil's work, which was followed by the distribution of *timars* in 1555. In the decree on the page under discussion, he was ordered to create a prebend of "the empty and abandoned places, which reborn and flourished after the registration", and which had not been granted as *timars*. So, in this case, Halil was only commissioned to complete the survey but, quite unusually, many new names are listed on the subsequent pages (pp. 39-45) with persons who received prebend after the regular distribution, among others our "Petko *voyvoda*, the son of Badik" (p. 42).

surplus of "the *mirmiran* of Lipova".<sup>176</sup> Out of the 23 cases, the name of Lippa was once mistaken for Temesvár though it was later corrected, sometimes only the rank of the *mirmiran* was indicated, but they doubtless had the same person in mind. The new grants can be connected to Kasım's being appointed the leader of the *liva* of Mohács and Görözsgal (Göröjgal) on January 4, 1557, a post he received "as a *beylerbeyi*."<sup>177</sup> Consequently some of his estates in the *vilayet* of Temesvár could be conferred mainly to fortress commanders (*dizdars*) and their deputies (*kethüdas*) in Solymos (Şolmoş), Arad, Bogcsa (Boğça), Facset (Façet), Lippa, Csanád, Temesvár, Fenlak, Becskerek, Becse, and in other places. We do not know to what extent the *hass*-revenues of his successor diminished, but their size might have been influenced by another factor. Realizing that it would not be easy to assign Kasım pasha's prebends in Mohács and its surroundings, the following remark was attached to his above quoted appointment: "In return for his *hasses* in Temesvár he should be given the *hass*-revenues of the above mentioned *sancaks* and the *çiftlik*s in his hands; should he be short of possessions, they must be complemented from his *hasses* in Temesvár". It is more than probable that the collection of an income of about 780,000 *akçe* caused difficulties, but the sources so far known remain silent about whether they made use of the possibility of the curtailment of another province, which was not common practice elsewhere. The formula "in the form of a *beylerbeylik*", which is unprecedented in the period under discussion, must be interpreted in such a way that, although Kasım's function was practically that of a *sancakbeyi*, owing to his earlier merits he was allowed to keep his higher rank, but the territory under his control could not become a separate *vilayet*. Nevertheless, in one of the *ruzmançe* records the term "the *beylerbeyilik* of Mohács" is used,<sup>178</sup> which is all the more so thought-provoking because well-informed Hungarian border people had already heard that "he was put in charge of

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<sup>176</sup> Krafft 284, photos Nos. 456-458. — Unfortunately I am unaware of any sources that would clearly state how long the provisional replacement of the centres lasted. While on the one hand, we have references to the *sancakbeyi* of Temesvár from March–April 1558 (Krafft 284, photo No. 518.: Mustafa *bey*; photo No. 529.: the *sancakbeyi* of Temesvár), on the other hand, we see Arslan as the *bey* of Lippa on August 10, 1557 (Kepeci 216a, p. 28.). On June 18 and then on August 20, 1558 the sultan addressed Mustafa, the governor of Temesvár, pasha again: Petritsch, *op. cit.*, 130-131, Nos. 360, 362.

<sup>177</sup> Mühimme defteri 2, p. 207, No. 1878.

<sup>178</sup> Krafft 284, photo No. 501.

several *sancaks* so that he could be constantly on the alert".<sup>179</sup> The idea of setting up a Transdanubian *beylerbeyilik* can be traced back to this period, which then was embodied in the *vilayet* of Szigetvár (Sigetvar) and later in that of Kanizsa (Kanija). The Latin letter contains another interesting minor detail, stating that until Kasım arrived in Pécs he was substituted by Mustafa *voyvoda*. Mustafa was none other than Kasım's chief client about whose possessions and *zi'amet*-holding I have already gone into details above.

This temporary state of affairs in Kasım's life lasted for about seven and a half months. On August 19, 1557 he again became the provincial governor of Buda,<sup>180</sup> so the question of organizing a *vilayet* around Mohács must have been taken off the agenda. In the *ruznamçe* of Buda it was recorded a month later, on September 18, that a new section was started due to the replacement of the pasha.<sup>181</sup>

This time he spent more than a year in the former capital of the Kingdom of Hungary. Apparently not many of his earlier subordinates followed him there; only three of them belonged certainly to this group. His *voyvoda* Mehmed, who used to be a *sipahi* in the *sancak* of Lippa, received new holdings around Szalánkemén (Íslankemen); Şems *voyvoda* could try to squeeze out 5,999 *akçe* from the six weak *mezra'as* in the *nahiye* of Erdőd, instead of his prebend in the *vilayet* of Temesvár; Behmen *kethüda* was lucky because not only was his income raised by 1,000 *akçe* in reward of his brave fighting near Arad, but he received some more as well.<sup>182</sup> The person called simply Ca'fer *mirahor* in the *ruznamçe*<sup>183</sup> must have been his client as well—on the basis of the coincidence of the references to his rank and former holding in Temesvár. That a scribe called Süleyman also belonged to Kasım's retinue is even more difficult to find out. He arrived at Buda from the *vilayet* of Temesvár as a *zi'amet*-holder at the end of December 1557.<sup>184</sup> His relationship

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<sup>179</sup> Ferenc Szakály, "Egy végvári kapitány hétköznapijai. Horváth Márk szigeti kapitány levelezése Nádasdy Tamás nádorral és szervitoraival, 1556-1561 [The Ordinary Days of a Commander from the Frontier. The Correspondence of Márk Horváth, the Commander of Sziget, with the Palatine, Tamás Nádasdy and his Servitors]," in *Somogy megye múltjából* (Levéltári Évkönyv, 18.) Kaposvár, 1987, 95, No. 32. The original text attached to the abstract in question is as follows: "Kazon passa aliquot zanchakos sub potestate sua habebit, ex quo vt omni tempore promptus paratusque esse possit".

<sup>180</sup> Gévay, *op. cit.*, 6, No. 4.

<sup>181</sup> Krafft 284, photo No. 458.

<sup>182</sup> Krafft 284, photos Nos. 487, 491, 501. — I do not mention Mustafa, discussed above, as he remained in the area of the *vilayet* of Buda in the meantime.

<sup>183</sup> Krafft 284, photo No. 484.

<sup>184</sup> Krafft 284, photo No. 488.

with the *beylerbeyi* was only mentioned in the draft of the *tahrir defteri* of Buda, where he was referred to as the previous user of Etyek, Tápiószecső, and Szirák,<sup>185</sup> the first two of which are also included in the list of his holdings in 1557. It seems that the retinue of Kasım pasha greatly decreased. However, it is more plausible that it was only the scribes who attributed smaller significance to the regular indication of relationships.<sup>186</sup>

In November 1558 Kasım pasha—as the Habsburg envoy at the Porte reported—was again in a lower position: he became the leader<sup>187</sup> of the *sancak* of Bosnia (Bosna),<sup>188</sup> even if only for a few days. At this point Gévay stopped following his career and we also lose sight of him for a while. It may be suspected that he continued to stay on Hungarian soil since, after the death of Tuygun pasha in June 1559, he was among the possible candidates.<sup>189</sup> We know for sure, however, that a few days later, on June 19, 1559, he took over the post in Temesvár from Rüstem, who was appointed the pasha of Buda,<sup>190</sup> and that in 1560 he was several times sent central decrees.<sup>191</sup>

<sup>185</sup> Káldy-Nagy, *A budai szandzsák 1559. évi összeírása*, 56, No. 45, 84, No. 122, 239, No. 475. — Kasım pasha was twice referred to in this *defter*; once in connection with the meadows belonging to the citizens of Buda, the boundaries of which were designated with the knowledge of Mehmed, and then with that of Kasım (to one side of the meadows lay Kasım's garden, p. 33) once in the case of the *çiftlik* Alsókovácsi (71, No. 91). Both his interventions, if I am right, concern his earlier activity.

<sup>186</sup> We are somewhat unexpectedly encountered with a *sipahi* called İskender towards the end of October 1568, who was named as the "man of Kasım pasha": İstanbul, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Ruznamçe 25, section Temesvár, p. 102.

<sup>187</sup> In the *ruznamçe* of Buda, this change was also recorded with the date of December 4, 1558: Krafft 284, photo No. 585. The name of Tuygun pasha replacing him, appears here only on February 12, 1559 (photos 587, 588). Between the two dates no change is recorded.

<sup>188</sup> In Gévay (*op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*) the rank of the pasha of Bosnia is written, although this *vilayet* was established only in 1580.

<sup>189</sup> An anonymous source considered Hamza, Derwys (Derviş), Arzlam (Arslan) Banja (Bayram?) *bey*, and Kasım (Kasım) pasha to stand a good chance in the succession ("az bassasaghert elkewldetthenek" [were sent as pasha candidates]): Ágoston Szalay, *Négyszáz magyar levél a XVI. századból* [400 Hungarian Letters from the Sixteenth Century]. Pest, 1861, 329, No. CCCXXXVI. (Finally, none of them won it.)

<sup>190</sup> He also was instructed to go to his new station on June 19, 1559: 3 *numaralı mühimme defteri* (966-968/1558-1560) <özet ve transkripsiyon>. (T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, Yayın Nu: 12. Divan-ı Hümayun Sicilleri Dizisi, I.) Ankara, 1993, I. 5, No. 6. — The above-mentioned informer, making a mistake on June 12, was also wrong on September 9, when he thought that Kasım pasha was given Pécs: *Négyszáz magyar levél*, 340, No. CCCXLVIII. (He was also misinformed about the fact that the pasha of Buda became the *kapudan*, and that he was replaced by Haydar pasha. Since it is feasible that the author of the letters gathered his information at the Porte, this serves to warn us to be careful with other uncontrolled sources and "tip-offs" coming from there.)

<sup>191</sup> The latest one dates from September 28, 1560: 3 *numaralı mühimme defteri*, I. 679, No. 1571.

On October 15, 1560 he was again deposed<sup>192</sup> and it was only after a few months, on 20 January 1561, that he was able to get back to his first major place of office, Mohács, with a considerably high income of 500,000 *akçe*.<sup>193</sup> It is questionable whether he really left Temesvár or died there, as some subsequent, but not too trustworthy, compilations claim.<sup>194</sup> This is contradicted by documents containing his name, mainly in connection with events in Transdanubia. One important evidence was written on April 13, 1561 by a merchant called Bálint *literatus* from Kálmáncehi who reported to the palatine the following from Pécs: "that this Kazombassa was again removed from here Pech, and the begship was given to his son-in-law,<sup>195</sup> the son of Mwratt bek."<sup>196</sup> The information is correct in so far as Mahmud, the former *bey* of Szécsény, following Kasım in his post, was certainly placed in charge of the *sancak* of Mohács-Pécs on March 31, 1561.<sup>197</sup> In the same year, at Christmas, Kasım pasha is referred to again; it is stated that he had to know that a concentration of military power around Székesfehérvár had been planned.<sup>198</sup> We also hear about him on January 23, 1562, and this is my last reference about him for the time being, when he took Bálint *literatus'*

<sup>192</sup> He was replaced by the former tutor (*lala*) of Prince Selim, the *bey* of Pozsega at that time (Mühimme defteri 4, p. 131, No. 1332. Quoted by: Bekir Kütükoğlu, Mustafa pasha. In: *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*. VIII. İstanbul, 1987<sup>4</sup>, 733), Lala Mustafa: Mühimme defteri 4, p. 146, No. 1481. Afterwards the suggestions sent by Kasım to İstanbul were several times touched upon: *ibid.*, p. 150, No. 1528; p. 155, No. 1575; p. 156, No. 1582; p. 159, No. 1625; p. 162 No. 1667; p. 170, No. 1758; p. 172, No. 1788; p. 173, No. 1799; p. 176, No. 1837.

<sup>193</sup> Mühimme defteri 4, p. 175, No. 1825.

<sup>194</sup> Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i 'osmani*. IV. İstanbul, s. d. 48.

<sup>195</sup> If the designation son-in-law is correct, it would be really remarkable to see that the pasha's daughter married Murad *bey's* son. This Murad can be none other than Kasım's old companion, another key figure of the border area, who emerged from Hüsvrev *bey's* retinue to become the *bey* of Klissza in 1537 and of Pozsega on October 18, 1541: Maliye 34, f. 678r.

<sup>196</sup> Ferenc Szakály, *Mezőváros és reformáció. Tanulmányok a korai polgárosodás kérdéséhez* [Market Towns and Reformation. Studies on the Question of Early Bourgeois Development]. (Humanizmus és reformáció, 23.) Budapest, 1995, 130: note 117.

<sup>197</sup> Mühimme defteri 4, p. 200, No. 2085. — To make the life of posterity more difficult, this remark was crossed out and the following words were written in: "The palisade of Sekçöy (Szekcső). Recorded. The *beylerbeyi* of Budun (Buda) sent a letter, and since he informed that the mentioned palisade had become an independent *sancak*, and the *kapudan* of Budun (correctly: Danube), Mehmed, son of Bali *bey*, [would be worthy of it], it was ordered. With two hundred thousand." Simultaneously, the new nomination concerning the *bey* of Szécsény (Sečen) was cancelled, as this *liva* had been assigned to Mehmed first: *ibid.*, p. 200, No. 2103.

<sup>198</sup> *500 magyar levél a XVI. századból. Csányi Ákos levelei Nádasdy Tamáshoz, 1549-1562* [500 Hungarian Letters from the Sixteenth Century. The Letters of Ákos Csányi to Tamás Nádasdy]. Ed. by Sándor Óze. Budapest, 1996, II. 333, No. 449.

cart (who will be the very same person as the above-mentioned merchant) together with his horse and servant.<sup>199</sup> After this, the fatigued warrior could not have lived long, and when he died, it was not only a witness, but one of the most active participants of the great conquests who left this world. According to Evliya Çelebi, he was buried in Eszék. As he formulated it: "Here is Gazi Kasım pasha's place of pilgrimage, who is interred in the cemetery of the *cami'*, in a lead-roofed, magnificently domed mausoleum."<sup>200</sup>

Otherwise, he was slowly forgotten. His pious foundations, which he—as I understand it—took under unified control, were neglected. This struck the eye of someone a couple of years later and, as a consequence, the trustee of his *vakıfs* in Eszék, Pécs, and Temesvár was instructed to pay more attention to the intentions of Kasım and to keep the endowed goods in order.<sup>201</sup> We do not know how useful these warnings were, but the four villages around Eszék were—as we have seen—registered as *vakıf*-estates at the end of the sixteenth century as well. His *cami'* in Pécs is still standing, but his *mescid* in Temesvár was unknown already in the 17th century,<sup>202</sup> although the *mahalle* of Kasım pasha is sometimes referred to in the *sicil* of Temesvár, kept in the years 1652–1653,<sup>203</sup> and the district

<sup>199</sup> 500 magyar levél a XVI. századból, II. 351, No. 458.

<sup>200</sup> Evliya Çelebi, *op. cit.*, VI. 186.

<sup>201</sup> Mühimme defteri 30, p. 8, No. 18.

<sup>202</sup> Neither Evliya Çelebi (*op. cit.*, V. Istanbul, 1315, 388-396), nor Ottendorf (*Budáról Belgrádba 1663-ban. Ottendorf Henrik képes útleírása* [From Buda to Belgrade in 1663. The Illustrated Travelogue of Henrik Ottendorf]. Ed. by Egyed Hermann. (Tolna Vármegye múltjából, 7.) Tolna, 1943, 70-78) mentions it, although one of the three nameless suburban "small, makeshift wooden mosques, with low, also wooden, but open towers, so that the *mezein* (*müezzín*) can go round and shout at the time of prayer; one at the Asapi gate; the other by the river Temes near the Rác (Serbian) church; and the third at the end of the Sziget (Island)" alluded to by the latter author (*op. cit.*, 76) may be identical with the one we are interested in, as it was also built outside the castle. It is contradictory, however, since we would expect such an important personality to build a stone monument.

<sup>203</sup> Cf. the *sicil* of Temesvár, p. 30, No. 28; p. 37, No. 30. (Based on the investigations of Klára Hegyi.) The *mahalle* in question was outside the city-walls, and was one of the most populous, with 96 listed Muslim males in 1569 and with 147 in 1579; see Tapu defteri 364, p. 17 and Tapu defteri 579, pp. 22-23, respectively.

named after his *mescid* within the castle of Lippa figures in the sixteenth century *tahrir defteris* of this *sancak*.<sup>204</sup> Otherwise, only some historians found him worthy to mention from time to time.<sup>205</sup>

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<sup>204</sup> Tapu defteri 457, p. 12 and Tapu defteri 578, p. 11.

<sup>205</sup> After I had finished the manuscript of this paper, Prof. Dr. Feridun M. Emecen kindly provided me with the relevant pages of an interesting list, containing several surprising details (which cannot be mentioned here). Kasım pasha figures three times in this register; first as "the previous *bey* of İstolni Belgrad (!) Kasım pasha" who became the *beylerbeyi* of Buda on December 15, 1547, while his successor 'Ali pasha followed him on May 17, 1551: Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, A-RSK (=Bab-ı Asafi, Ruûs kalemi), 1452, part Buda, p. 1. The second note states that he went (or on the basis of the first reference: returned) to Székesfehérvár on May 17, 1551 (*ibid.*, part Buda, p. 6). The third record suggests that Kasım was appointed to govern the *liva* of Lippa on October 25, 1551—some days after its first conquest lasting until November 28, 1551 only, while the *sancak* of Csanád, Becse, and Becskerek was possessed by Ulama and then by Malkoç *bey* (*ibid.* part Erdel [!], pp. 6 and 4, respectively). For the time being, I can only say that while the first two assertions can be reconciled—even if with some difficulties—with the data cited above, the third does not harmonize with them.



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## INDEX

(Abbreviations: B: Bulgarian; Cz: Czech; G: German, H: Hungarian,  
It: Italian, O: Ottoman, P: Polish; R: Rumanian, S: Southern Slav,  
Sl: Slovak, Uk: Ukrainian)

- 'Abdulhalim, 290  
'Abdullah, 262  
'Abdullah, *bey*, 269  
'Ali, *bey*, 259  
'Ali of Menteşe, 234  
'Ali, pasha, Hadım, 164, 288-289, 297  
'Ali, pasha, Kalaylıkoz, 217-218, 222  
'Ali, son of Receb *bey*, 260  
'Ayn 'Ali, 231, 239, 241, 247-248  
Abaúj, county, 47, 68  
'Abdülkerim, *sipahi*, 231  
Adorján, 48  
Adorján, *literatus*, 286  
Adrianople, *see* Edirne  
Adriatic Sea, 6, 10-11, 21, 25, 28, 40,  
44, 57, 62  
Ahmed, man of Kasım *bey*, 282  
Ahmed, pasha, Kara, second vizier,  
164, 240, 243, 248, 252, 255,  
288-289  
Ahmed, pasha, Köprülüzade Fazıl,  
170, 205  
Ajnácskő (O. Aynačka), 169, 178  
Alaca Hisar (S. Kruševac), 165, 196,  
241, 259  
Alaman, 270  
Alba Iulia, *see* Gyulafehérvár  
Albert of Branderburg, 91  
Alsókovácsi, 294  
Alsórajk, 66  
Althan, Adolf, 148  
Altsohl, *see* Zólyom  
Alva, duke, 210  
Anadolu, *see* Anatolia  
Anatolia (O. Anadolu), 105, 114, 253  
Andronicus, Tranquillus, 198  
Antol, *see* Szentantal  
Anyavar, *see* Anyavár  
Anyavár (O. Anyavar), 182, 285  
Arad 164-165, 189, 292-293  
Arad county, 12  
Argentea, Charles de, 133  
Árki, 109  
Arslan, *bey*, pasha, 199, 275, 292, 294  
Ártándi, Pál, 84  
Árva, county, 46, 68  
Arzlam, *see* Arslan *bey*  
Asia Minor, *see* Anatolia  
Atyina (S. Voćin), 22  
Auersperg, Herwart von, 50  
Augsburg, 128, 135-136, 156, 202  
Avlonya, 238  
Ayas, *yeniçeri ağası* of Baghdad, 239  
Aydın, *sipahi*, 241  
Aynačka, *see* Ajnácskő  
Babarc, 282  
Babócsa (O. Bobofça), 30, 164, 186,  
192, 207, 259  
Baç, *see* Bács  
Bač, *see* Bács  
Bács (O. Baç, S. Bač), 80, 90, 104, 163,  
180  
Bács, county, 9, 12, 112  
Badasek, *see* Bátaszék  
Bag, 64  
Baghdad, 226, 239  
Baja (O. Baya), 166, 180, 226

- Bajcsa, *see* Bajcsavár  
 Bajcsavár, 52, 64-67  
 Bajon, 48  
 Bak'an, *see* Battyán  
 Bakabánya (Sl. Pukanec, G. Pukanz), 68  
 Bakics, Pál, 19, 112, 271  
 Balassa, János, 31-32, 39  
 Balassa, Melchior, *see* Balassa, Menyhért  
 Balassa, Menyhért, 288  
 Balathon, *see* Balaton  
 Balaton, lake, 24, 29-30, 32, 36, 38-40, 45, 50, 56, 164, 171  
 Baldigara, Ottavio, 159  
 Bali, *bey*, 72, 87, 96, 98, 101, 105, 107-108, 114  
 Bali, *pasha*, 273, 289  
 Bálint, *literatus*, 295  
 Balkans, 7, 10, 16, 165, 196, 224-225, 252, 259  
 Balog (H. Vámosbalog, Sl. Vel'ký Blh), 68  
 Balonya, 283  
 Bán, 284  
 Bánffy, Jakab, 111  
 Bánffy, János, 79, 269  
 Bánmonostor, *see* Monostor  
 Banoštor, *see* Monostor  
 Banoštra, *see* Monostor  
 Banská Bystrica, *see* Besztercebánya  
 Banská Štiavnica, *see* Selmecebánya  
 Banya, *bey*, 294  
 Baranvar, *see* Baranyavár  
 Baranya, county, 9, 45  
 Baranyaszentistván (S. Petlovac), 283  
 Baranyavár (O. Baranvar), 184, 274, 290  
 Barça, *see* Barcs  
 Barcs (O. Barça), 186, 192  
 Bárdi, István, 110-113  
 Bardia, *see* Bárdi, István  
 Bardus, *see* Bárdi, István  
 Barics, 80  
 Barka, 111-112  
 Bars, county, 46, 68  
 Basta, George, 132, 141  
 Bastha, George, *see* Basta, George  
 Bata, *see* Báta  
 Báta (O. Bata), 221  
 Batasek, *see* Bátaszék  
 Bátaszék (O. Badasek, Batasek), 166, 183  
 Báthory, András, 30-32  
 Báthory, György, 79  
 Báthory, István, 14, 80, 83, 103, 256-261, 276  
 Báthory, Kristóf, 276  
 Batka, *see* Barka  
 Batthyány, Farkas, 273  
 Batthyány, Ferenc, 20-21  
 Batthyány, Kristóf, 59  
 Batthyány, Orbán, 274  
 Battyán (O. Bak'an), 167, 181  
 Bavaria, 156  
 Baya, *see* Baja  
 Bayram (?), *bey*, 294  
 Bayram Şalu, 251  
 Bayrlin, Christoph, 120  
 Beç, *see* Vienna  
 Beçe, *see* Becse  
 Bečej, *see* Becse  
 Beçkerek, *see* Becskerek  
 Becse (O. Beçe, S. Bečej), 241, 287-288, 292, 297  
 Becskerek (O. Beçkerek, S. Zrenjanin), 188, 241, 251, 259, 287-288, 292, 297  
 Behmen, man of Kasım *bey*, 284, 290, 293  
 Behram, *bey*, 249  
 Behram, *voyvoda*, 283  
 Beiuş, *see* Belényes  
 Bekeş, *see* Békés  
 Békés (O. Bekeş), 189  
 Békés, county, 12, 218  
 Békés, Gáspár, 256-258  
 Bél, 48  
 Belenös, *see* Belényes

- Belényes (O. Belenös, R. Beiuş), 48,  
 170, 192, 203-204  
 Belgrad, *see* Nándorfehérvár  
 Belgrad-i Ungurus, *see*  
 Nándorfehérvár  
 Bellye (O. Belye, S. Bilje), 276-278  
 Beograd, *see* Nándorfehérvár  
 Belvárd-Gyula, 280-281  
 Belye, *see* Bellye  
 Bér, 66, 203  
 Bereg, county, 47-48, 68  
 Berek, 279  
 Berekszó, 80, 108-109  
 Beriszló, Bertalan, 73  
 Beriszló, István, 81  
 Berzenç, *see* Berzence  
 Berzence (O. Berzenç, Brezenç), 30,  
 36, 164, 186, 192  
 Beşenova, *see* Besenyő  
 Besenyő (O. Beşenova), 188, 287  
 Besprim, *see* Veszprém  
 Besztercebánya (Sl. Banská Bystrica), 23  
 Bethlen, Farkas, 258-260  
 Bethlen, Gábor, 56  
 Bicaci, *see* Bikács  
 Bihać, *see* Bihács  
 Bihács (S. Bihać), 12, 21-22, 24, 28,  
 37, 53-56, 64, 72  
 Bihar, county, 12  
 Bikács (R. Bicaci), 276  
 Bilje, *see* Bellye  
 Birén, 284, 286  
 Blagaj, 64  
 Bobofça, *see* Babócsa  
 Bocskai, István, 56  
 Bodó, Ferenc, 111-112  
 Bodrog, county, 9, 12, 112  
 Bódva, river, 53, 57  
 Bogça, *see* Bogcsa  
 Boğça, *see* Bogcsa  
 Bogcsa (O. Bogça, Boğça), 187, 290,  
 292  
 Bögürdelen, near Nógrád, 167-169,  
 177  
 Bögürdelen, *see* Szabács  
 Bohemia, 42, 84, 89, 91, 96  
 Bolondvár (O. Bolondvar), 171, 184  
 Bolondvar, *see* Bolondvár  
 Bon, Aluise, ambassador, 77  
 Bor, 226  
 Boranitsch, Matthias, 150  
 Bornemissza, János, 87, 89  
 Boroh (H. Boró, S. Borovo), 111  
 Boró, *see* Boroh  
 Borotty, Albert, 112  
 Borovo, *see* Boroh  
 Borsod, county, 47, 68  
 Bošić, Radić, *see* Bosics, Radics  
 Bosics, Radics, 111  
 Bosna, *see* Bosnia  
 Bosnia, 11, 64, 72, 78, 87, 105, 107,  
 165, 231, 235, 254, 294  
 Bosszut, river, 108  
 Botszentgyörgy, 66  
 Bovič, 55  
 Boxel, Johann, 128  
 Bözdök, 283  
 Bozók (Sl. Bzovík), 31, 36, 68  
 Bozóvár, 290  
 Bozsor (R. Traian Vuia), 290  
 Bradách, nobleman, 75  
 Branković, Djordje, 9  
 Bratislava, *see* Pozsony  
 Braunschweig, 135, 156  
 Bremen, 156  
 Brescia, 138  
 Breslau (P. Wrocław), 156  
 Brest, 55  
 Brezenç, *see* Berzence  
 Brezno, *see* Breznóbánya  
 Breznóbánya (Sl. Brezno, G. Briesen),  
 68  
 Briesen, *see* Breznóbánya  
 Brinje, 28, 64  
 Brkišovina, 55  
 Brlog, 28, 64  
 Brod, 163  
 Buda (O. Budin, Budun), 5, 13, 17,  
 22, 35, 61, 90, 99-100, 103,  
 109-111, 115, 139, 153, 155,

- 164-172, 174, 179, 181, 186,  
190-191, 196-200, 202, 206-209,  
213-227, 230, 236, 238-240,  
245-247, 251, 253, 257-259, 266,  
269-274, 276, 278, 281, 286-289,  
291, 293-295, 297
- Budački, 50, 64  
Budahāzīnāç, *see* Budaházi, János  
Budaházi, János, 273  
Budai, Balázs, 269  
Budak, *sipahi*, 234  
Budin, *see* Buda  
Budmér, 283  
Budun, *see* Buda  
Buják (O. Buyak), 24, 30, 164, 169, 177  
Bulgaria, 226  
Burgo, Andrea dal, ambassador, 87,  
90-93, 95-100, 102, 105  
Bursa, 248-249  
Buyak, *see* Buják  
Bzovík, *see* Bozók
- Ca'fer, *mirahor*, 290, 293  
Ca'fer, pasha, 260-263  
Ca'fer, *voyvoda*, 282  
Cairo, 195, 226  
Çakfalva, *see* Csákkalva  
Çakova, *see* Csák  
Çanad, *see* Csanád  
Canbek, *see* Zsámbék  
Canfeda, 168-169, 176  
Canischa, *see* Kanizsa  
Cankurtaran, *see* Korkmaz  
Caransebeş, *see* Karánsebes  
Carinthia (G. Kärnten), 14, 18, 20,  
23-24, 36, 42, 44  
Carniola (G. Krain, S. Krajina), 14,  
18, 20, 23-24, 36, 42, 44  
Carpathian, mountains, 10, 73  
Cassovia, *see* Kassa  
Cassum, *see* Kasım bey  
Castaldo, Gianbattista, 30  
Çazma, *see* Csázma  
Cazzon, *see* Kasım bey  
Cenad, *see* Csanád
- Çerep, *see* Cserép  
Cetin, 64  
Cetingrad, 64  
Chaffer, *see* Ca'fer *voyvoda*  
Charles, archduke, 51-53  
Charles V, of Habsburg, 17, 19  
Charles VIII, of France, 119  
Châtelet, 137  
Ciacova, *see* Csákova  
Ciğerdelen, 167, 169, 171, 177  
Cîmpani de Pomezou, *see* Pápmező  
Cirkvena, 64  
Clissa, *see* Klissza  
Çoka, *see* Csókakő  
Comera, Janusch, 150  
Çongrad, *see* Csongrád  
Constantinople, *see* Istanbul  
Coutras, 129  
Croacia, *see* Croatia  
Croatia 3, 11, 14, 17-18, 20-22, 24, 29,  
44-46, 53-54, 58, 64, 72-75, 78-79,  
86-87, 95, 101, 266, 273  
Csábrág (Sl. Hrad Čabrad'), 68  
Csák (O. Çakova, R. Ciacova), 187,  
290  
Csákány, 66  
Csákkalva (O. Çakfalva), 276-278  
Csákova, *see* Csák  
Csanád (O. Çanad, R. Cenad), 18,  
164-165, 188, 251, 259, 287, 292,  
297  
Csanád, county, 12, 80  
Csány, 66  
Csázma (S. Čazma), 11, 28, 79  
Csepel Island, 166  
Cserép (O. Çerep), 170, 190  
Csesznek, 24-25, 66  
Csobánc, 66  
Csóka, *see* Csókakő  
Csókakő (H. Csóka, O. Çoka), 167,  
181  
Csongrád (O. Çongrad), 179, 191  
Csongrád, county, 12  
Csurgó, 36  
Cyprus, 238

- Dabar, 64  
 Daimvillers, 138  
 Dalmacia, *see* Dalmatia  
 Dalmatia, 11, 87  
 Damásd (O. Derbend), 167-169, 176  
 Danube, river, 6-9, 11, 22, 24-25, 32, 35-36, 38, 40, 42, 45-46, 58, 60, 62, 93, 95, 98, 105, 108-110, 115, 141, 163-167, 196, 221, 224-225, 272, 295  
 Danubius, *see* Danube  
 Darábos, 283  
 Darabosfalva, 283  
 Darda, *see* Dárda  
 Dárda (O./S. Darda), 184  
 Daróc (O. Darofçe, S. Vardarac), 276-278  
 Darofçe, *see* Daróc  
 Derbend, *see* Damásd  
 Dernye (S. Drnje), 64  
 Dersffy, István, 31-32, 39  
 Derviş, *bey*, 240, 294  
 Derwys, *see* Derviş *bey*  
 Devecser, 25  
 Deventer, 138  
 Di Cavalli, ambassador, 200  
 Diest, 137  
 Dillich, Willelm, 148, 150  
 Dimitrofça, *see* Szávaszentdemeter  
 Diósherend, *see* Diósherendi  
 Diósherendi, 283  
 Diregel, *see* Drégely  
 Divény (O. Divin, Sl. Divín), 31, 50, 164, 169, 178  
 Divin, *see* Divény  
 Divín, *see* Divény  
 Djurdjevac, *see* Szentgyörgyvár  
 Dobó, István, 39  
 Dobrá Niva, *see* Dobronya  
 Dobravoj, servant of the *ban* of Szörény, 95  
 Döbrekös, *see* Döbrököz  
 Döbring, *see* Dobronya  
 Döbrököz (O. Döbrekös, Döbrököz), 182  
 Dobronya (Sl. Dobrá Niva, G. Döbring), 68  
 Dombó (O. Dombo, Dombol), 24, 30, 183  
 Donbo, *see* Dombó  
 Donbol, *see* Dombó  
 Drágffy, János, 90, 103  
 Drava, river, 11-12, 22, 24, 28, 32, 37, 45, 51, 57, 163, 165, 169, 224, 267, 272, 276  
 Dravus, *see* Drava  
 Drégely (O. Diregel), 24, 30, 164, 167, 169, 177  
 Drégelypalánk, *see* Drégely  
 Drégi, Ferenc, 111  
 Dresden, 135, 142, 156  
 Drežnik, 64  
 Drežnik Grad, 64  
 Drnje, *see* Dernye  
 Dubica, county, 12  
 Dursun, man of Kasım *bey*, 282  
 Ebersdorf, 32  
 Ecsed, 36, 48, 68  
 Edirne, 40, 49-50, 166, 172, 212, 219  
 Eger (O. Eğri), 25-26, 30, 36, 54-57, 68, 137-138, 155, 164, 168-170, 178-179, 190, 196, 208-209, 224  
 Egerszeg, 57, 203  
 Egervár, 203  
 Eğri, *see* Eger  
 Egypt, 197, 226, 238  
 Endréd (O. Endrik), 164, 182  
 Endrik, *see* Endréd  
 Endröd, *see* Facset  
 England, 127  
 Enns, river, 270  
 Erasm von Thurn, 21  
 Erçin, *see* Ercsi  
 Erciş, 226  
 Ercsi (O. Erçin), 171, 175  
 Érd, *see* Hamzabey sarayı  
 Erdel, *see* Transylvania  
 Erdel Belgradi, *see* Gyulafehérvár  
 Erdevik, *see* Erdőhegy

- Erdöd, *see* Erdőd  
 Erdőd (O. Erdöd, S. Erdut), 163, 268, 293  
 Erdöheg', *see* Erdöhegy  
 Erdöhegy (O. Erdevik, Erdöheg'), 168, 189, 259  
 Erdut, *see* Erdőd  
 Ernest, archduke, 50-51  
 Ernuszt, János, 79  
 Érsekújvár, *see* Újvár  
 Esseckh, *see* Eszék  
 Esterгон, *see* Esztergom  
 Esterházy, Pál, 59, 61  
 Eszék (O. Ösek, S. Osijek), 110, 163, 191, 196-197, 266-269, 273, 275-276, 278, 296  
 Esztergom (O. Esterгон, Ostorgon, G. Gran), 19, 22, 25-26, 79, 139, 141, 152-153, 155, 164-165, 167, 171, 176-177, 197, 209, 224, 236, 268, 272  
 Esztergom, county, 79  
 Eszterházy, Miklós, 48, 57  
 Etyek, 294  
 Evliya Çelebi, 204-205, 267, 278, 296  
 Ezeek, *see* Eszék
- Façet, *see* Facset  
 Facsád, *see* Facset  
 Facset (H. Facsád, O. Endröd, Façet, Marjina, R. Fäget), 164, 187, 259, 290, 292  
 Fägäraş, *see* Fogaras  
 Fäget, *see* Facset  
 Fedvar, *see* Földvár  
 Fehérvár, *see* Székesfehérvár  
 Fejér, county, 45, 66, 79  
 Feldbach, 57  
 Felnac, *see* Fenlak  
 Felnak, *see* Fenlak  
 Felsőbalog, 68  
 Feltót (O. Totinç, R. Tauç), 189  
 Fenlak (O. Felnak, R. Felnac), 187, 290, 292
- Ferdinand I, of Habsburg, 6, 14-16, 18-20, 22, 24, 30-33, 35, 87, 91-93, 198, 268, 271, 283, 289  
 Ferdinand II, of Habsburg, 54  
 Ferenc, *literatus*, 288  
 Ferhad, *katib*, *voyvoda*, 282-283, 290  
 Ferhad of Sivas, 235  
 Ferhad, pasha, 72, 95-96, 98-99, 101, 104-105, 107-109, 111, 114  
 Flakovo, *see* Filek  
 Filek, *see* Fülek  
 Filippo Scolari, *see* Pipó of Ozora  
 Fırdea, *see* Furdia  
 Fityeháza, 52, 64, 66  
 Fiume (S. Rijeka, G. Sankt Veit am Pflaum), 64  
 Flanders, 122  
 Fleugaus, Martin, 18  
 Födvar, *see* Földvár  
 Fogaras (R. Fägäraş), 103  
 Fok, 171, 183  
 Foka, *see* Fok  
 Földvár (O. Fedvar, Födvar), 166, 175, 221  
 Fonyód, 50  
 Forgách, Ferenc, 88  
 Forgách, Simon, 46  
 France, 117, 132, 134, 155  
 Franciscus, *literatus*, *see* Ferenc, *literatus*  
 Frangepán, Kristóf, 20, 72  
 Fruška Gora, 94, 108, 115  
 Fülek (O. Filek, Sl. Fil'akovo), 31, 36, 164-165, 169, 178, 220  
 Furdia (R. Fırdea), 290  
 Fürstenfeld, 57  
 Futak (O. Futok), 84, 86-87, 103, 180  
 Futok, *see* Futak
- G'ula, *see* Gyula  
 Galambóc (O. Güvercinlik, S. Golubac), 107, 197  
 Gall, Adam, 37-38  
 Gall, Bernhard Leo, 152  
 Gallipoli, 226

- Garam, river, 31  
 Gazali, Canberdi, 104-105  
 Gazi, *seroda*, 236  
 Gedő, 36  
 Gellért, mount, 272  
 Geréb, Péter, 80  
 Gerendi, Miklós, 115  
 Germany, 124  
 Gesteş, *see* Gesztes  
 Gestös, *see* Gesztes  
 Gesztes (O. Gesteş, Gestös), 167-168, 176  
 Ghymes, *see* Gimes  
 Gimes (Sl. Hrad Gýmes), 68  
 Gireschgall, *see* Görösgal  
 Glina, river, 54-55  
 Golubac, *see* Galambóc  
 Gömör, county, 32, 38, 47, 56, 68  
 Görcsöny, 279  
 Göröjgal, *see* Görösgal  
 Görösgal (O. Göröjgal, Göröşgal), 185, 274, 292  
 Göröşgal, *see* Görösgal  
 Göröşgál, *see* Görösgal  
 Görz, 36  
 Gradec, 64  
 Gradiška, *see* Gradistye, 107  
 Gradiška, *see* Komjátí, 170, 193  
 Gradistye, 107  
 Gran, *see* Esztergom  
 Graz, 5-6, 34, 51, 55, 128, 136, 141, 156  
 Great Plain, 221  
 Gregorián, Pál, 279  
 Grgrofcsa, 283  
 Groll, 138  
 Güssing, *see* Németújvár  
 Gustav Adolph, of Sweden, 158  
 Güvercinlik, *see* Galambóc  
 Gyarmat, 30  
 Gyerőfi, János, 259  
 Győr (O. Yanık, G. Raab), 5, 19, 26-27, 29, 32, 34-39, 45, 49, 52, 54, 57-58, 66-67, 79, 137-138, 140, 155, 190  
 Győr, county, 45, 66, 79  
 Györe, 285  
 Gyula (O. G'ula), 25, 27, 30, 36, 39, 54, 165, 189, 219, 259, 261  
 Gyulafehérvár (O. Erdel Belgradí, R. Alba Iulia), 112  
 Haarlem, 138  
 Habib, *voyvoda*, 285  
 Hädäreni, *see* Hadrév  
 Hadrév (R. Hädäreni), 259  
 Halbergescheid, *see* Sibrik  
 Halil, *bey*, 291  
 Hamburg, 135, 156  
 Hamza, *bey*, 265, 294  
 Hamzabey sarayı (H. Érd), 166-167, 176  
 Haram (O. Haram, Haram-i cedit), 107, 188, 197  
 Haram-i cedit, *see* Haram  
 Hardberg, 57  
 Hasan, renegade, 240  
 Hasan, *sipahi*, 286  
 Hasan, son of Ulama *bey*, 234  
 Hatvan, 22, 147, 152, 164-165, 168-169, 171, 178, 190, 196, 220, 275  
 Haydar bin 'Abdullah, *sipahi*, 273, 284-285  
 Haydar, pasha, 294  
 Heiligenkreuz, *see* Szentkereszt  
 Helösfalu, 282  
 Hencsence, 283  
 Henye, 281  
 Herberstein, Sigismund, Freiherr von, 92, 268  
 Hercegovina, 107  
 Hersek, 259  
 Hertogenbosch, 138, 153  
 Heves (O. Heveş), 190  
 Heves, county, 47, 68  
 Heveş, *see* Heves  
 Hidvég (O. Hidvig), 182, 285  
 Hidvig, *see* Hidvég  
 Hızır, *bey*, 287-288

- Hızır, renegade, 241,  
Hızır, *serbevvab*, 284, 286  
Holloka, *see* Hollókő  
Hollókő (O. Holloka), 30, 164, 177  
Hont, county, 46, 56, 68  
Hrad Čabrad', *see* Csábrág  
Hrad Krásna Hôrka, *see* Krasznahorka  
Hram, *see* Haram  
Hrastovica, *see* Hrasztovica  
Hrasztovica (S. Hrastovica), 53, 64  
Hresno, 64  
Hunyadi, János, 10  
Hüseyn, *kapuci başi* of Receb *bey*, 260  
Hüseyn, renegade, 240  
Hüseyn, man of Kasım *bey*, 285  
Hüsrev, *bey*, 295  
Hüsrev, *sipahi*, 286  
Hust, *see* Huszt  
Huszt (Uk. Hust), 36
- İbrahim bin Musa, *sipahi*, 290  
İbrahni, Mathe, 150  
İktar, *see* İktár  
İktár (R. İktar), 290  
İlok, *see* Újlak  
İlok, *see* Újlak  
İneu, *see* Jenő  
Inkei Lóránth, Mihály, 108  
Inkei Lóránth, Miklós, 108  
Ipoly, river, 167, 168  
Iran, 252  
Ireg (O. Írig, S. Irig) 109, 113, 163  
Irig, *see* Ireg  
Írig, *see* Ireg  
İrşova, *see* Orsova  
Isabel, queen, 286  
Isabor, 66  
Isebor, 66  
İskender, *sipahi*, 294  
İskender, son of Ulama *bey*, 234  
İslankemen, *see* Szalánkemén  
Istanbul, 10, 47, 49, 96, 114, 197-199,  
202, 213, 215-218, 223-224,  
226-227, 232, 253, 256-257, 273, 295  
İstepan Raynik', *martolos*, 241
- İstolni Belgrad, *see* Székesfehérvár  
Istvánffy, Miklós, 105, 109, 112, 114,  
266, 269, 271-272  
Istvánffy, Nicolaus, *see* Istvánffy,  
Miklós  
Italy, 3, 33, 117, 124, 155  
Ivancs, 281  
Ivánfalva, 281  
Ivanić, *see* Ivanics  
Ivanićgrad, *see* Ivanics  
Ivanics (S. Ivanić, Ivanićgrad) 53, 64  
Ivanovcz, 281  
Izačić, *see* Izacsics  
Izacsics (S. Izačić), 28, 64  
Ízvornik (S. Zvornik), 109, 196, 259
- Jajca (O. Yayçe, S. Jajce), 10, 12, 14,  
54, 72, 74-76, 78-79, 81, 101  
Jajce, *see* Jajca  
Jaksics, family, 75  
Jenő (O. Yanova, R. Ineu), 165,  
169-170, 189, 259, 261  
Jesenica, 64  
John I, Szapolyai, 16-17, 19-20, 22,  
47, 72, 83, 90, 96-97, 99-100,  
269-270, 272, 276  
John Sigismund, Szapolyai, 19, 31,  
47, 256  
Jovius, Paulus, 125  
Jurisics, Miklós, 21
- Kacorlak, 66  
Kağidhane, 227  
Kalaça, *see* Kalocsa  
Kállai Vitéz, János, 87, 95, 112  
Kálló, 48, 68, 137-138  
Kálmánca, 282, 295  
Kálmánca, *see* Kálmánca  
Kalocsa (O. Kalaça), 11, 80, 99,  
101-103, 164, 179, 226  
Kamonc, 80  
Kanija, *see* Kanizsa  
Kanischa, *see* Kanizsa  
Kanizsa (H. Nagykanizsa, O. Kanija),  
30, 36, 39, 45-46, 52, 54-57, 59,

- 66-67, 137, 140, 148, 152, 169-170,  
172, 184-185, 191, 202-203,  
207-209, 224, 259, 293
- Kanizsa melletti torony, *see* Kanizsa
- Kanizsai, György, 76, 84-85
- Kanizsai, László, 79
- Kapela, mountain, 11, 57
- Kapornak, 66, 203
- Kapos, river, 279
- Kaposújvár, *see* Kaposvár
- Kaposvár (O. Kapoşvar), 24, 30, 164,  
185, 191
- Kapoşvar, *see* Kaposvár
- Kapronca (S. Koprivnica, G.  
Kopriniz), 53, 64
- Kaptol, 163
- Karad, *see* Karád
- Karád (O. Karad, Karat), 183
- Karánsebes (O. Şebeş, R.  
Caransebeş), 12, 72, 78, 170
- Karat, *see* Karád
- Karlobag, 64
- Karlóca, *see* Karlovitz
- Karlofça, *see* Karlovitz
- Karlovac, *see* Károlyváros
- Karlovitz (H. Karlóca, O. Karlofça, S.  
Sremski Karlovci), 6, 60
- Karlstadt, *see* Károlyváros
- Kärnten, *see* Carinthia
- Károlyváros (S. Karlovac, G.  
Karlstadt), 53-54, 57-58, 62, 64
- Karpen, *see* Korpona
- Kaschau, *see* Kassa
- Kasim, *voyvoda*, 270-271
- Kasim, *voyvoda*, bey, pasha, 265-282,  
284-297
- Kassa (Sl. Košice, G. Kaschau), 19,  
26, 31, 34, 36, 38, 47-48, 53, 57-58,  
68, 137, 256
- Kassum, *see* Kasim bey
- Kassum, *see* Kasim bey
- Kaswn, *see* Kasim bey
- Kászón, *see* Kasim bey
- Kaszónbeg, *see* Kasim bey
- Katzianer, Hans, 17, 21
- Kazin, *see* Kasim bey
- Kazombassa, *see* Kasim bey
- Kazon, *see* Kasim bey
- Kazzon, *see* Kasim bey
- Keczer, András, 54
- Keglevich, Péter, 21, 28
- Kékes(d), 283
- Kékkő (O. Keköy, Sl. Modrý Kameň),  
31, 50, 164-169, 178
- Keköy, *see* Kékkő
- Kemalpaşazade, 109
- Kemed, *see* Kéménd
- Kemend, 66
- Kéménd, 279
- Kemendollár, 66
- Kerelőszentpál (R. Sînpaul), 258-260
- Keresztúr, *see* Murakeresztúr
- Kese, 283
- Keszthely, 66
- Kéthely, 66
- Keve (H. Ráckeve, O. Kuvin), 221
- Keve, county, 12
- Khinberg, 139
- Khurz, Engelhardt, 145
- Kielmansziget, 66
- Kilimán, 66
- Kinizsi, Pál, 72-73
- Kirkkilise, 242
- Kis, Ferenc, 111
- Kis-Árpád, 279
- Kis-Pereket, 286
- Kisasszonyfalu, 280-281
- Kishont, county, 47, 68
- Kisjenő, 269
- Kiskomárom, 30, 36, 40, 57, 66
- Kistapolcsány (Sl. Topol'čanky), 66
- Kisvárdá, 48, 68
- Kızılhisar, 167, 176
- Klis, *see* Klissza
- Klissza (O./S. Klis, It. Clissa), 12, 14,  
21, 72, 81, 95, 98, 295
- Knin, 12-13
- Koha, 279
- Kölesd, 284
- Kollonitsch, Siegfried, 149-151

- Köln, 135, 156  
 Kölpény (O. Kupinik, S. Kupinovo),  
     80-81, 83, 163  
 Komár, *see* Kiskomárom  
 Komarno, *see* Komárom  
 Komárom (Sl. Komarno), 19, 26-27,  
     34, 36, 40, 48, 66, 68, 137-138, 271  
 Komárom, county, 45, 66  
 Komját, *see* Komjáti  
 Komjáti (O. Gradiška, Sl. Komjatice),  
     68, 170, 193  
 Komjatice, *see* Komjáti  
 Königsberg, *see* Újbánya  
 Kopaç, *see* Kopács  
 Kopačevo, *see* Kopács  
 Kopács (O. Kopaç, S. Kopačevo),  
     276-278  
 Kopan, *see* Koppány  
 Koppány (O. Kopan), 164-165, 183,  
     224, 259, 287  
 Kopriniz, *see* Kapronca  
 Koprivnica, *see* Kapronca  
 Köprülü family, grand viziers, 218  
 Korana, river, 50, 53-54  
 Korbáviai, János, 74  
 Korkmaz (O. Cankurtaran), 166-167,  
     169, 175  
 Korkud, *voyvoda*, 290  
 Körmend, 56, 203  
 Körös, river, 165, 168  
 Körös (S. Križevci, G. Kreuz), 53, 64  
 Körös, county, 12, 45, 64  
 Körös, village, 285  
 Korpona (Sl. Krupina, G. Karpen),  
     31, 52, 68  
 Košice, *see* Kassa  
 Kostajnica, 37  
 Kőszeg, 270  
 Koszolnyik (H. Zólyomkecskés, Sl.  
     Kozelník), 68  
 Kosztka, Péter, 85-86  
 Kővágószőlős, *see* Szőlős  
 Kozár, 281  
 Kozelník, *see* Koszolnyik  
 Krain, *see* Carniola  
 Krajina, *see* Carniola  
 Kraków (G. Krakau), 99  
 Krassó, county, 12  
 Krasznahorka (Sl. Hrad Krásna  
     Hôrka), 56, 68  
 Kreuz, *see* Kőrös  
 Križevci, *see* Kőrös  
 Krupa, *see* Kruppa  
 Krupina, *see* Korpona  
 Kruppa (S. Krupa), 12, 98  
 Kruševac, *see* Alaca Hisar  
 Krusith, János, 32  
 Krusith, Péter, 95-96  
 Kulič, *see* Kulics  
 Kulics (O. Kuyluç, S. Kulič), 107  
 Kulpa, river, 53, 55, 57, 59  
 Kupinik, *see* Kölpény  
 Kupinovo, *see* Kölpény  
 Kurd of Alaca Hisar, 235  
 Küstendil, 259  
 Kutasi, Lukács, 80  
 Kuvin, *see* Keve  
 Kuyluç, *see* Kulics  
  
 L'ubietova, *see* Libetbánya  
 La Chapelle, 137  
 La Noue, François de, 120-121  
 Laibach (S. Ljubljana), 34, 64  
 Lajmér, 286  
 Lak, 24, 30, 184  
 Lascano, Martin de, 271  
 Ledenice, 64  
 Legrad, *see* Légrád  
 Légrád (S. Legrad), 57, 66  
 Lenković, Hans, 37  
 Lenti, 57  
 Léva (Sl. Levice), 24, 31, 36, 68  
 Levice, *see* Léva  
 Leysser, Ulrich, 17  
 Libetbánya (Sl. L'ubietova, G.  
     Libethen), 31, 68  
 Libethen, *see* Libetbánya  
 Lička Jesenica, 64  
 Lier, 137  
 Lipótvár, 58-59

- Lipova, *see* Lippa  
 Lippa (O./R. Lipova), 18, 164-165, 169, 188, 259, 288-293, 297  
 Liptó, county, 46, 68  
 Ljubljana, *see* Laibach  
 Logod, 270  
 Lónya, 28  
 Louis I, of Anjou, 7  
 Louis II, of Hungary, 14, 87, 91-94, 101, 104-105, 107-108, 114, 268  
 Lövd, 66  
 Low Countries, 117-118, 125, 132, 134-136, 138, 140, 145, 154, 158  
 Lower Parts, 11-12, 14, 27, 30, 39, 63, 72-77, 80, 83, 85-87, 96, 98, 102-103, 115  
 Lübeck, 156  
 Lübeck in Brandenburg, 135  
 Ludbreg, 64  
 Lugoj, *see* Lugos  
 Lugos (O. Lugoş, R. Lugoj), 12, 170  
 Lugoş, *see* Lugos  
 Lüneburg, prince, 132  
 Lütffi, pasha, 239  
 Lüttich, 135, 156  
  
 Macsó, *banate*, 9, 11-12  
 Madaras (O. Madaraş), 180  
 Madaraş, *see* Madaras  
 Magdeburg, 135, 156  
 Maghrib, 210  
 Magyaróvár, 55, 138  
 Mahmud, *bey*, 295  
 Makó, 287  
 Mala Kladuša, 64  
 Malkoç, *bey*, 288, 297  
 Malomszeg, in Pécs, 279  
 Malvar, *see* Márévár  
 Malvezzi, Johann Maria, 286  
 Mangielos, *see* Nagyolaszi  
 Márévár (O. Malvar), 185  
 Margaret of Parma, 210  
 Margina, *see* Morzsina  
 Maria, queen, 88  
 Marilof, Mercure de, 133  
  
 Marjina, *see* Facset  
 Maros, river, 6, 60, 62, 186, 258  
 Marót (O. Morovik, S. Morović), 163  
 Martinuzzi, George, 30  
 Márton, castellan, 274  
 Martonos (O. Martonoş, S. Martonoş), 180  
 Martonoş, *see* Martonos  
 Martonoş, *see* Martonos  
 Massaro, ambassador, 105, 107, 110, 113-114  
 Matthias, archduke, 133  
 Matthias Corvinus, *see* Matthias I  
 Matthias I, of Hungary, 10-13, 17, 30, 39, 56, 72, 77-78, 83, 103  
 Maximilian I, of Habsburg, 14  
 Maximilian, archduke and II, of Habsburg, 38, 40, 50, 56, 151-152, 256  
 Maylath, István, 87  
 Mecske, 282  
 Mehadia, *see* Mehádia  
 Mehádia (O./R. Mehadia), 188  
 Mehmed, *aga* of the janissaries in Buda, 238  
 Mehmed, *bey*, pasha, 97, 114, 266, 268, 271, 274-275, 277, 294  
 Mehmed II, 107  
 Mehmed, *kapudan*, son of Bali *bey*, 295  
 Mehmed, *ma'zul sipahi*, 235  
 Mehmed, *sipahi*, *vojvoda*, 293  
 Mehmed, son of Rüstem, 238  
 Meleg Gal, *see* Melegal  
 Melegal (O. Meleg Gal), 277  
 Mendoza, Bernardino of Spain, 121  
 Mercury, duke, 137  
 Metz, 138  
 Mezőkeresztes, 147, 151  
 Mihailović, Konstantin, 233  
 Mihálykereke, 279  
 Miklós of Macedonia, 96, 99  
 Miklósfá, 66  
 Mislen, 283  
 Mitrovica, *see* Szávaszentdemeter  
 Mitrowitz, Wilhelm, 146

- Modava, *see* Moldova  
 Modrus (S. Modruš), 64  
 Modruš, *see* Modrus  
 Modrý Kameň, *see* Kékkő  
 Mohaç, *see* Mohács  
 Mohács (O. Mohaç), 6-7, 14-16, 19, 22, 25, 29, 39-40, 43-44, 47, 55, 60, 63, 71, 76, 84, 100, 109-110, 163-165, 184, 224, 240, 266-267, 269, 272-275, 278-282, 286, 290, 292-293, 295  
 Moldavia, 96, 248-249, 258  
 Moldova (O. Modava, R. Moldova Veche), 165, 188, 259  
 Moldova Veche, *see* Moldova  
 Momen, *see* Mümin *voyvoda*  
 Monostor (H. Bánmonostor, O. Banoștra, S. Banoștor), 95  
 Monostor, village, 281  
 Montluc, Blaise de, 121  
 Moravia, 42  
 Móré, Fülöp, 111  
 Móré, György, 80, 94  
 Móré, László, 79, 271, 273  
 Morović, *see* Marót  
 Morovik, *see* Marót  
 Mörspurg, Johann Friedrich von, 147  
 Morzsina (R. Margina), 290  
 Moson, county, 45, 66, 79  
 Mrežnica, river, 54  
 Mümin, *voyvoda*, 269-271  
 Muni, *see* Mümin *voyvoda*  
 Mura, river, 45, 52, 57  
 Murad, *bey*, 295  
 Murad III, 217, 223, 257  
 Muradi, 274  
 Murakeresztúr, 52, 64, 66  
 Muraköz, region, 57  
 Muráň, *see* Murány  
 Murány (Sl. Muráň), 36, 68  
 Murján, 282  
 Mustafa, *bey*, pasha, 292  
 Mustafa, Lala, *bey*, 295  
 Mustafa, pasha, Sokollu, 216-217, 246, 251, 257, 276, 285  
 Mustafa, renegade, 240  
 Mustafa, *sipahi*, 243  
 Mustafa, son of Ca'fer *bey*, 260, 262  
 Mustafa, *voyvoda*, 271, 280-281, 293  
 Muumnyn, *see* Mümin *voyvoda*  
 Mwrat bek, *see* Murad *bey*  
 Nadaj, *see* Nádasd  
 Nádasd (O. Nadaj), 185, 191  
 Nádasdy, Tamás, 16, 28, 30-32, 34, 38, 274  
 Nadicsa, 282  
 Nado(j)csa, 282  
 Nagy, Antal, 274  
 Nagy Budmér, 283  
 Nagy, Imre, 112  
 Nagy-Árpád, 279  
 Nagyberki, *see* Berki  
 Nagyecséd, 68  
 Nagykálló, 68  
 Nagykanizsa, *see* Kanizsa  
 Nagykanizsa-Miklósfá, 66  
 Nagykapornak, 66  
 Nagykunság, 218  
 Nagyócsa, *see* Ocsova  
 Nagyolaszi (S. Mangielos), 71, 108, 114  
 Nagyradvány, 276  
 Nagyvárad, *see* Várad  
 Nagyvázsöny, 66  
 Nahçıvan, 234  
 Nandoralba, *see* Nándorfehérvár  
 Nándorfehérvár (O. Belgrad-i Ungurus, S. Beograd), 8-10, 12-14, 60, 72, 74-76, 80-81, 83, 88-89, 93-94, 98-99, 101-102, 104, 107, 111, 163, 197, 226, 268-269, 271  
 Nassau, Johann, 140  
 Nemçe, *see* Németi  
 Nemes-Kürthy Pogrányi, Benedek, 142  
 Nemet Uyuar, *see* Németújvár  
 Németi (O. Nemçe, S. Nijemci), 163  
 Németújvár (G. Güssing), 58-59  
 Netherlands, 210  
 Neuhäusel, *see* Újvár

- Nicopol (O. Niğbolu, B. Nikopol), 8, 249, 259  
 Niğbolu, *see* Nicopol  
 Nijemci, *see* Németi  
 Nikopol, *see* Nicopol  
 Niş, *see* Niš  
 Niš (O. Niş), 98, 101  
 Nógrád (O. Novigrad), 22, 31, 56, 68, 164-165, 167, 169-172, 175, 177, 196, 209  
 Nógrád, county, 46, 56  
 Nolano, Scipio, 120  
 Nomilla, *see* Mümin *voyvoda*  
 Nová Baňa, *see* Újbánya  
 Nové Zámky, *see* Újvár  
 Novigrad, Croatia, 64  
 Novigrad, *see* Nógrád  
 Novigrad-Podravski, 64  
 Numillo, *see* Mümin *voyvoda*  
 Nürnberg, 92, 128, 135-136, 156  
 Nyitra, county, 46, 68, 88  
 Nyitra, river, 53
- Očova, *see* Ocsova  
 Ocsova (H. Nagyócsa, Sl. Očova), 68  
 Ogulin, 53, 64  
 Oláh, Miklós, 279  
 Oláhújvár, 25, 36, 39  
 Olmütz (Cz. Olomuc), 156  
 Olomuc, *see* Olmütz  
 Ónod, 56  
 Oradea, *see* Várad  
 Orahovica, 240  
 Orange, 118, 154, 158, 210  
 Orbász, county, 12  
 Orsova (O. Irşova, R. Orşova), 12-13, 71, 87, 188  
 Orşova, *see* Orsova  
 Ösek, *see* Eszék  
 Osijek, *see* Eszék  
 Ostorgon, *see* Esztergom  
 Ostrovica, *see* Osztrovica  
 Osztrovica (S. Ostrovica), 87  
 Otočac, *see* Otocsác  
 Otocsác (S. Otočac), 21, 28, 64
- Ottendorf, Henrik, 296  
 Ozora, 164, 182
- Paks (O. Pakşa), 166, 183, 221  
 Pakşa, *see* Paks  
 Pál, voivode of Pál Tomori, 113  
 Pálffy, Miklós, 49, 53  
 Pallavicini, Sforza, 29, 31-32, 37, 45  
 Palota (O. Polata), 30, 36, 66, 137-138, 151, 172, 181  
 Pančevo, *see* Pancsova  
 Paņçova, *see* Pancsova  
 Pancsova (O. Paņçova, S. Pančevo), 164, 187  
 Pankota (R. Pincota), 165, 259  
 Pannonhalma, *see also* Szentmárton, 66, 79  
 Pápa, 25, 29, 36, 55, 66, 137-138, 151  
 Papmezö, *see* Papmező  
 Papmező (O. Papmezö, R. Cimpani de Pomezou), 170, 192, 203-204  
 Paşa vilayeti, Rumelia, 259  
 Passau, 156  
 Pásztó, 24  
 Pavia, 125  
 Pavlo Istokvik', *martolos*, 241  
 Peçevi, İbrahim, 147, 197-198, 255, 266-268, 275-277  
 Pech, *see* Pécs  
 Pécs (O. Peçuy), 22, 111, 164-165, 169, 184, 191, 224, 226, 259, 266-267, 274-275, 278-281, 290, 293-296  
 Pécsvárad, 279  
 Peçuy, *see* Pécs  
 Peçuylu, *see* Peçevi, İbrahim  
 Pekry, Lajos, 19  
 Pellérd, 280  
 Pemfflinger, Katalin, 274  
 Pereket, 286  
 Pereny, Peter, *see* Perényi, Péter  
 Perényi, Gábor, 31-32  
 Perényi, Péter, 196, 269  
 Perhath, *see* Ferhad pasha  
 Perini, Petri, *see* Perényi, Péter

- Persia, 236  
 Pertev, pasha, second vizier, 165  
 Pest (O. Peşte), 164, 167-168, 175, 197, 269-272  
 Peşte, *see* Pest  
 Pétervárad (O. Varadin, S. Petrovaradin), 11-12, 14, 72, 86-87, 96, 98, 101-103, 105, 108-111, 163, 197  
 Petervaradin, *see* Pétervárad  
 Petko, *voyvoda*, son of Badik, 291  
 Petlovac, *see* Baranyaszentistván  
 Petrinja, 55, 57  
 Petro Waradin, *see* Pétervárad  
 Petrova gora, 64  
 Petrovac, 64  
 Petrovaradin, *see* Pétervárad  
 Pettau (S. Ptuj), 57  
 Pheri pasha (= Piri and Ferhad pasha) 99  
 Philip II, of Spain, 210  
 Pilis, mountains, 167  
 Pîncota, *see* Pankota  
 Pipó of Ozora, 9  
 Piri, *bey*, 95, 98-99  
 Piso, 98  
 Plovdiv, 96  
 Podmaniczky, Mihály, 84-85, 88  
 Pojega, *see* Pozsega  
 Pojon, *see* Pozsony  
 Poland, 91, 98  
 Polata, *see* Palota  
 Pölöske, 66, 203  
 Posgay, Zsigmond, 283  
 Požega, *see* Pozsega  
 Pozsega (O. Pojega, S. Požega), 24, 163, 165, 169, 196-197, 214, 234, 240, 268, 280, 295  
 Pozsega, county, 11-12  
 Pozsony (O. Pojon, G. Preßburg, Sl. Bratislava), 5, 20, 27, 35-36, 39-40, 46, 58, 216  
 Pozsony, county, 46, 68, 79  
 Prague, 34, 55, 90, 139, 156, 200  
 Preßburg, *see* Pozsony  
 Prizren, 254  
 Ptuj, *see* Pettau  
 Pukanec, *see* Bakabánya  
 Pukanz, *see* Bakabánya  
 Putnok, 56  
 Pyrenees, 155  
 Raab, *see* Győr  
 Rába, river, 52, 56  
 Rača, *see* Racsá  
 Raça, *see* Racsá  
 Ráckeve, *see* Keve  
 Racsá (O. Raça, S. Rača), 109, 163  
 Radkersburg, 57  
 Radu, 72, 97  
 Rahóc, 273  
 Rajk, 66  
 Rákóczi, György I, prince of Transylvania, 56  
 Ramazan, *bey*, 254  
 Rame, Laurentio de, 133  
 Ráskai, Gáspár, 84-85  
 Raya Benik', *martolos*, 241  
 Receb, *bey*, 259-263  
 Rednek (S. Vrdnik), 80, 108, 113-114  
 Regensburg, 50, 156  
 Régi, Ferenc, *see* Drégi, Ferenc  
 Remetinec, 64  
 Rhine, 117  
 Rhodes, 71, 91, 95-96, 105  
 Ribanitsch, Janusch, 150  
 Ripac, *see* Ripács  
 Ripács (S. Ripac), 21, 28, 64  
 Roggendorf, Wilhelm, 269-270, 272  
 Romania, 64  
 Romlottvár, 66  
 Romona, 283-284, 286  
 Rudolf II, of Habsburg, 55-56  
 Rueber, Hans von Püchsendorf, 51, 200  
 Rumelia, 235, 242, 244, 249, 253, 259  
 Rusi Kasri, 251  
 Rüstem, pasha, Güzelce, 289-290, 294  
 Šabac, *see* Szabács

- Sacks, *see* Szakcs  
 Säcueni, *see* Székelyhíd  
 Ság, 24, 30  
 Sajó, river, 57  
 Sakmar, *see* Szatmár  
 Salamanca, 87, 90  
 Salgó (O. Şalgo), 164, 178  
 Şalgo, *see* Salgó  
 Salm, Eck von, 38  
 Salm, Niklas von, 25, 28-30, 132, 268  
 Saloniki, 226  
 Sanktgeorgen, *see* Szentgyörgyvár  
 Sanktpeter, *see* Szentpéter  
 Sant Andrey, 274  
 Sarád (O. Şarad), 187  
 Şarad, *see* Sarád  
 Sarkad, 48  
 Sáros, 19, 27  
 Sáros, county, 47, 68  
 Sárvár, 55-56  
 Sarvaş, *see* Szarvas  
 Sarvaşka, *see* Szarvaskő  
 Sas, *see* Szászvár  
 Sása, *see* Szászi  
 Sasi, *see* Szászvár  
 Satory, Mihal, 150  
 Satu Mare, *see* Szatmár  
 Sauswar, *see* Szászvár  
 Sava, river, 6, 9, 11-12, 21, 24, 28, 60, 62, 98-99, 108-109, 111-113, 163, 224-225  
 Saz, *see* Szászvár  
 Scardona, *see* Skardona  
 Schemnitz, *see* Selmezbánya  
 Schmalkalden, 120  
 Schneidpöck, Hans, 105  
 Schoklo, *see* Siklós  
 Schomogy, Michlosch, 150  
 Schönberg, 145  
 Schwarzenberg, Adolf, 153  
 Schwendi, Lazarus von, 47-48, 51  
 Sclavonia, *see* Slavonia  
 Şebes, *see* Karánsebes  
 Seçen, *see* Szécsény  
 Segedin, *see* Szeged  
 Şegeş, *see* Segesd  
 Segesd (O. Şegeş), 30, 186, 192  
 Segnia, *see* Zengg  
 Sekçöy, *see* Szekcső  
 Seksar, *see* Szekszárd  
 Selény (O. Şelin), 185  
 Selim, prince and II, 237, 257, 295  
 Selim, son of Turgut, 238-239  
 Şelin, *see* Selény  
 Selmezbánya (Sl. Banská Štiavnica, G. Schemnitz), 68  
 Selypi, György, 84  
 Semendire, *see* Szendrő  
 Şemlik, *see* Versec  
 Sempte (O. Sente, Sl. Šintava), 58-59  
 Şems, *voyvoda*, 293  
 Senftenberg, Weit Wulff, 121  
 Senj, *see* Zengg  
 Senk'ob, *see* Szentjobb  
 Senkiral, *see* Szentkirály  
 Senlörinç, *see* Szentlőrinc  
 Senmartin, *see* Szentmárton  
 Senmikloş, *see* Szentmiklós  
 Sente, *see* Sempte  
 Serbia, 226  
 Serdahel, *see* Szerdahely  
 Seydi of Menteşe, 234  
 Seyfeddin, *kethüda*, 236  
 Sibrik (H. Zsibritó, Sl. Žibritov, G. Halbergescheid), 68  
 Sicily, 155  
 Sigetvar, *see* Szigetvár  
 Sigismund, of Luxemburg, 8-10, 12, 19, 50, 72, 87  
 Sigismund I, of Poland, 94, 105  
 Siklós (O. Şikloş), 22, 164, 185, 269, 273, 279  
 Şikloş, *see* Siklós  
 Silesia, 133  
 Silistra, 249  
 Şimontorna, *see* Simontornya  
 Simontornya (O. Şimontorna), 164-165, 181, 213, 224, 285  
 Sinan, *bey*, 249  
 Sinan, *çavuş*, 274

- Sinan, grand vizier, 254  
 Sinckmoser, Markus, 282-283  
 Sîniob, *see* Szentjobb  
 Sînpaul, *see* Kerelószentpál  
 Šintava, *see* Sempte  
 Sinzendorf, Joachim von, 198, 217-218  
 Sió, river, 171  
 Siófok, 183  
 Sirem, *see* Syrmium  
 Širia, *see* Világos  
 Sirok (O. Široka), 170, 190  
 Široka, *see* Sirok  
 Sisak, *see* Sziszek  
 Sitno, *see* Szitnya  
 Sivri (?), 267  
 Skardona (It. Scardona, S. Skradin), 12-13, 71, 87  
 Skradin, *see* Skardona  
 Slankamen, *see* Szalánkemén  
 Slavonia, 3, 11, 17-18, 21-22, 24, 28, 44-46, 53-54, 72-73, 79, 87, 163, 165  
 Slovakia, 64  
 Slovenia, 64  
 Slunj, 64  
 Smederevo, *see* Szendrő  
 Smrčković, 64  
 Sobotka, *see* Szabadka, 164, 179  
 Sobotka-i Filek, *see* Szabadka, 178  
 Sobotka-i Segedin, *see* Szabadka, 179, 259  
 Söçen, *see* Szőcsény  
 Šoimi, *see* Solyomkő  
 Šoimuş, *see* Solymos  
 Soko, 107  
 Šolmoş, *see* Solymos  
 Solnok, *see* Szolnok  
 Šolongi, *see* Solyomkő  
 Solymos (O. Šolmoş, R. Šoimuş), 189, 292  
 Solyomkő (O. Šolongi, R. Šoimi), 170, 192, 203-204  
 Sombor, *see* Zombor  
 Somogy, county, 39, 45, 66, 218  
 Somogyvár, 24, 79  
 Şomoşka, *see* Somoskő  
 Somoskő (O. Şomoşka), 50, 169  
 Sonda, *see* Szanda  
 Sonlok, *see* Szolnok  
 Sopron, 91  
 Sopron, county, 45, 66, 79  
 Söri (?), 267  
 Spahy, Janusch, 150  
 Spain, 154, 210  
 Speyer, 47, 256  
 Sreberniçe, *see* Szrebernik  
 Srebrenik, *see* Szrebernik  
 Srednji Gradac, 64  
 Srem, *see* Syrmium  
 Sremski Karlovci, *see* Karlovitz  
 Steenwijk, 138  
 Steiermark, *see* Styria  
 Strozzi, Philip, 128  
 Styria (G. Steiermark), 14, 18, 20, 23-24, 36, 40, 42, 44, 128, 156, 202  
 Subotica, *see* Szabadka, 164, 179  
 Suhl, 128, 156  
 Süleyman I, 14, 22, 39, 54, 81, 94-95, 104, 108-109, 114-115, 163, 192, 196-197, 199, 234, 247, 251, 261, 269  
 Süleyman, *katib*, 293  
 Süleyman, pasha, 196-197, 273  
 Süleyman, son of Mehmed, 235  
 Şuran, *see* Surány  
 Šurany, *see* Surány  
 Surány (O. Şuran, Sl. Šurany), 68, 170, 193  
 Sveti Kri, *see* Szentkereszt  
 Sveti Petar Čvrstec, *see* Szentpéter  
 Svetica, 64  
 Syrmium (H. Szerémség, O. Sirem, S. Srem), 12, 17, 24, 80, 83, 108-109, 112-115, 163, 165, 214, 266, 268  
 Szabács (O. Böğürdelen, S. Šabac), 11-13, 72, 74-76, 81, 83, 99, 107, 111, 163  
 Szabadka (O. Sobotka-i Filek), 178  
 Szabadka (O. Sobotka-i Segedin, S. Subotica), 164, 179, 259

- Szabolcs, county, 47-48, 68  
 Szádvár, 56, 68  
 Szakcs, 274  
 Szalánkemén (O. Íslankemen, S. Slankamen), 74, 81, 83, 93, 98, 108-109, 197, 293  
 Szalatna, 68  
 Szalkai, László, 88  
 Szana, county, 12  
 Szanda (O. Sonda), 176  
 Szapolyai, family, 17  
 Szarándok, 284  
 Szarvas (O. Sarvaş), 168, 190  
 Szarvaskő (O. Sarvaşka), 170, 190  
 Szász, *see* Szászvár  
 Szásza, 68  
 Szászi (Sl. Sása), 68  
 Szászvár (O. Sas, Sasi, Sz), 185, 191, 273-274, 290  
 Szata, 108  
 Szatmár (R. Satu Mare), 48, 56, 68, 111, 137, 256  
 Szatmár, county, 47-48, 68  
 Százszentdemeter (O. Dimitrofça, S. Mitrovica), 71, 80, 99, 105-106, 108-109, 112-114, 163  
 Szécsény (O. Seçen), 24, 30, 56, 164-165, 169, 177, 259, 295  
 Szécsi, Tamás, 79  
 Szeged (O. Segedin), 18, 98, 164-165, 169, 179, 196, 224, 259, 287-288  
 Szekcső (O. Sekçöy), 164-165, 184, 295  
 Székelyhíd (R. Săcueni), 48  
 Székesfehérvár (O. Ístolni Belgrad) 22, 55, 79, 152-153, 164-165, 167, 172, 180-181, 196-197, 209, 224, 286-287, 295, 297  
 Szekszárd (O. Seksar), 164-165, 182, 224, 266, 271-273, 275  
 Szendrő (O. Semendire, S. Smederevo), 53, 56, 80, 99, 107, 163, 165, 196-197, 236, 259, 266, 268, 271, 275  
 Szendrő, in Upper Hungary, 57, 68  
 Szent-Király, 283  
 Szent-Trinitás, 285  
 Szentantal (Sl. Antol), 68  
 Szentgrót, 66,  
 Szentgyörgy, 203  
 Szentgyörgyi, Farkas, 79  
 Szentgyörgyi, Ferenc, 79  
 Szentgyörgyvár (S. Djurdjevac, G. Sanktgeorgen), 64  
 Szentjobb (O. Senk'ob, R. Sîniob), 170, 192, 203-204  
 Szentkereszt (S. Sveti Kri, G. Heiligenkreuz), 64  
 Szentkirály (O. Senkiral), 179  
 Szentlászló, 8, 12  
 Szentlőrinc (O. Senlörinç), 185  
 Szentmárton (O. Senmartin), 185  
 Szentmárton, *see also* Pannonhalma, 24, 29, 66  
 Szentmártonhegy, *see* Szentmárton  
 Szentmihályi, Tamás, 112  
 Szentmiklós (O. Senmikloş), 66, 168, 179, 191  
 Szentpéter (S. Sveti Petar Čvrstec, G. Sanktpeter), 64  
 Szepes, county, 47, 68  
 Szepesvár, 17  
 Szepsi Lackó, Máté, 147  
 Szerdahely (O. Serdahel), 183  
 Szerém, county, 9, 11-12  
 Szerém, *see* Syrmium  
 Szerémi, György, 111, 113-114, 269-272  
 Szerémség, *see* Syrmium  
 Sziget, *see* Szigetvár  
 Szigetvár (O. Sigetvar), 24-25, 27, 30, 32, 38-40, 45-46, 164-165, 169, 185, 191-192, 207, 219-220, 224, 259, 269, 293  
 Szigliget, 66  
 Szirák, 294  
 Sziszek (S. Sisak), 24, 28, 37, 55  
 Szitna, 68  
 Szitnya (Sl. Sitno), 68  
 Sztatina (Sl. Zvolenská Slatína), 68  
 Szőcsény (O. Soçen), 185

- Szokol, 28  
 Szokoli, Albert, 94  
 Szöllős, 284  
 Solnok (O. Solnok, Sonlok), 26, 30,  
 39, 164-165, 168-169, 178, 191, 259  
 Szörén, 282  
 Szörény (R. Turnu Severin), 8, 12-13,  
 71-72, 74-75, 81, 84, 87, 95, 97-98,  
 104, 112  
 Szorosad, 284  
 Szebernik (O. Sreberniçe, S.  
 Srebrenik), 12, 73-74  
 Szydłowiecki, Krzysztof, 115
- Tahy, Ferenc, 32, 45  
 Tamási (O. Tomaşin), 164, 182  
 Tápíószecső, 294  
 Tarabos, 283  
 Tarpan (?), 274  
 Tata, 9, 19, 22, 36, 55, 66, 137-138,  
 152, 176  
 Tauţ, *see* Feltót  
 Teke, 248  
 Temes, county, 9, 11-12, 72-73, 78,  
 86, 104  
 Temes, region, 74, 80, 103, 249  
 Temes, river, 296  
 Temesköz, region, 9, 12, 18, 60, 248  
 Temesvár (O. Temeşvar, R.  
 Timişoara), 8, 12, 18, 30, 72-78,  
 84, 86, 88, 98, 101-103, 164-165,  
 169, 186, 196, 208-209, 214-218,  
 223-224, 226, 236, 238, 240-241,  
 243, 248-249, 255, 257-260, 277,  
 286-296  
 Temeşvar, *see* Temesvár  
 Tepedelen, 167, 171  
 Terehid, 281  
 Tergoviste, 290  
 Tettauer, Carl Ludwig, 150  
 Teuffenbach, Christoff, 131  
 Thallóczy, Frankó, 9  
 Thallóczy, Matkó, 9  
 Theiß, *see* Tisza  
 Thelekessy, Imre, 38, 47
- Thionville, 128  
 Thonaw, *see* Danube  
 Thurzó, Elek, 101-102  
 Thurzó, György, 142, 153  
 Thurzó, Zsigmond, 73  
 Thyze, *see* Tisza  
 Tihany (O. Tihon), 24, 36, 66, 181  
 Tihon, *see* Tihany  
 Tijbiscus, *see* Tisza  
 Tilly, Charles, 133, 145  
 Timişoara, *see* Temesvár  
 Tinódi Lantos, Sebestyén, 281  
 Tisza, river, 6, 30-32, 39, 48, 56-57,  
 60, 62, 93, 104, 110, 164-165, 168,  
 196, 287  
 Titel, 86, 103, 109, 163, 180, 197  
 Titul, *see* Titel  
 Tód-Kékös, 283  
 Toğna, *see* Tolna  
 Tokaj, 39, 56-57, 68  
 Toledo, 17  
 Tolna (O. Toğna), 79, 110, 166, 171,  
 183, 221, 266, 284  
 Tolna, county, 45  
 Tomaşin, *see* Tamási  
 Tomori, Pál, 11, 14, 99, 101-105, 107,  
 109-115  
 Tömörkény (O. Tömörkin), 179  
 Tömörkin, *see* Tömörkény  
 Toplicski turanj, 28  
 Topol'čanky, *see* Kistapolcsány  
 Topolovac, *see* Topolovác  
 Topolovác (S. Topolovac), 64  
 Torna, county, 47, 68  
 Török, Bálint, 19, 270  
 Török, Bernát, 274-275  
 Torontál, county, 12  
 Totinç, *see* Feltót  
 Töttös, 284  
 Traian Vuia, *see* Bozsor  
 Trans-Tisza, region, 164  
 Transdanubia, 36, 40, 46, 164, 271,  
 274, 295  
 Transylvania (O. Erdel), 6, 12, 27,  
 30-31, 39, 44, 48, 51, 62, 72-76, 78,

- 85-86, 101, 112, 165-166, 169-170,  
196, 248-249, 252, 255-258, 260, 269
- Trencsén, county, 46, 68, 88
- Triest, 34
- Tržac, 64
- Tura, 147
- Turnu Severin, *see* Szörény
- Turóc, county, 46, 68
- Tuygun, pasha, 240, 265, 289, 294
- Ugocsa, county, 47-48, 68
- Újbánya (Sl. Nová Baňa, G. Königsberg), 68
- Újlak (O. İlok, S. Ilok), 99, 163, 197,  
266, 269, 271
- Újlaki, Lőrinc, 12, 99, 112
- Újlaki, Miklós, 11-12
- Újudvar, 66
- Újvár (H. Érsekújvár, Sl. Nové Zámky, G. Neuhäusel), 46, 53,  
56-58, 68, 138, 159, 170, 192-193,  
205, 208-209
- Ukrainia, 64
- Ulama, *bey*, pasha, 265, 297
- Ulm, 156
- Una, river, 21, 24, 28, 37
- Ung, county, 47, 68
- Ungnad, Hans, 21, 29, 37
- Ungvár (Uk. Užgorod), 68
- United Provinces, 137
- Upper Hungary, 19, 27, 49, 79, 88,  
52-53, 146
- Uruc, man of Kasim *bey*, 286
- Űsküb (S. Skoplje), 165
- Űveys, pasha, 216-218, 220, 222
- Uylak, *see* Újlak
- Uyvar, *see* Újvár
- Užgorod, *see* Ungvár
- Uziçe (S. Užice), 284
- Užice, *see* Uziçe
- Vaç, *see* Vác
- Vác (O. Vaç), 164, 167, 169-172, 175,  
221
- Vág, river, 58
- Vajon, *see* Vázsony
- Val, *see* Vál
- Vál (O. Val), 167, 181
- Valkó, county, 9, 11-12, 105, 107-108
- Valkóvár (O./S. Vukovar), 163
- Valpó (S. Valpovo), 22, 269
- Valpovo, *see* Valpó
- Vámosbalog, *see* Balog
- Van, 226
- Vanoviczi, János, 58
- Varad, *see* Várad
- Várad (H. Nagyvárad, O. Varad, R. Oradea), 19, 30, 36, 39, 48, 73,  
138, 140, 155, 170, 192, 203-205,  
208-209, 256, 272
- Váradai, Péter, 80
- Vărădia de Mureş, *see* Váradja
- Varadin, *see* Pétervárad
- Varadinum Petri, *see* Pétervárad
- Varadiya, *see* Váradja
- Váradja (O. Varadya, R. Vărădia de Mureş), 189, 259
- Varadya, *see* Váradja
- Varasd (S. Varaždín, G. Warasdin),  
28, 53, 55, 57-59, 62
- Varasd, county, 12, 45, 64
- Varasdin, *see* Varasd
- Varaždinske Toplice, 64
- Várdai, Ferenc, 112
- Vardarac, *see* Daróc
- Várdaróc, *see* Daróc
- Várday, Pál, 25, 30, 102
- Varjassy, Ferenc, 112
- Várpalota, 66
- Vas, county, 45, 66, 79
- Vázsony (O. Vajon), 66, 181
- Vázsonykő, 66
- Vborya (?), 267
- Végles (Sl. Vigl'aš), 68, 137-138
- Vel'ký Blh, *see* Balog
- Velén, 284
- Velics, Demeter, 271-272
- Venice, 77
- Verancsics, Antal, 216
- Verbőczy, Imre, 273

- Verőce, county, 12  
 Versán, 285  
 Versec (O. Šemlik, Viršič, S. Vršac),  
 187, 290  
 Veszprém (O. Besprim), 29-30, 55,  
 66, 79, 137, 151, 181, 243, 254  
 Veszprém, county, 45, 66  
 Veyz pasha, *see* Üveys pasha  
 Virböci, Imre, *see* Verböczy, Imre  
 Vidin, 7, 107, 165, 249, 259  
 Vienna (O. Beç), 3, 5, 16-17, 19-20,  
 22-26, 29-31, 33-38, 40, 43, 45,  
 49-50, 55, 58, 61, 131, 139, 142,  
 156, 163, 166-167, 171, 200, 211,  
 257, 266, 270, 282  
 Vigl' aš, *see* Végles  
 Vilagoş, *see* Világos  
 Világos (O. Vilagoş, R. Şiria), 165, 189  
 Viršič, *see* Versec  
 Visegrád (O. Višegrad), 164, 167, 175  
 Višegrad, *see* Visegrád  
 Vitan, *see* Vitány  
 Vitány (O. Vitan), 176  
 Vizaiş, 189  
 Vize, 242  
 Viziaş, 189  
 Vízvár, 36  
 Vladislav II, of Hungary, 14  
 Voćin, *see* Atyina  
 Vrana, 73  
 Vrbas, 11  
 Vrdnik, *see* Rednek  
 Vršac, *see* Versec  
 Vučitrn, *see* Vulčitrn  
 Vukman, *doselac, martolos*, 241  
 Vukovar, *see* Valkóvár  
 Vulčitrn (S. Vučitrn), 165, 196, 259  
 Wallachia, 12, 72, 96-97, 101, 248-249,  
 258, 288  
 Wallhausen, Johann Jacobi von, 121  
 Walpo, *see* Valpó  
 Waranawar, *see* Baranyavár  
 Warasdin, *see* Varasd  
 Waux, Guillome de, 133  
 Werböczi, István, 73, 78-79, 84-85, 93  
 Williams, Roger of England, 121, 130  
 Yahya, *voyvoda*, 285  
 Yanuk, *see* Győr  
 Yanova, *see* Jenő  
 Yanya, 235  
 Yayçe, *see* Jajca  
 Yusuf, *serbevvab*, 285, 290  
 Yvoy, 138  
 Zágráb (S. Zagreb), 79  
 Zágráb, county, 12, 45, 64  
 Zagreb, *see* Zágráb  
 Zala, county, 39, 45, 66, 79  
 Zala, river, 56-57  
 Zalabér, 66  
 Zalacsány, 66  
 Zalakomár, *see* Kiskomárom  
 Zalalövő, 66  
 Zalaszentgrót, 36, 66  
 Zalavár, 66  
 Zaránd, county, 12  
 Zay, Ferenc, 47  
 Zegedynum, *see* Szeged  
 Zemin, *see* Zimony  
 Zemplén, county, 47, 68  
 Zemun, *see* Zimony  
 Zengg (S. Senj, It. Segnia), 12, 21-22,  
 28, 53, 57, 72, 74-75  
 Žibritov, *see* Sibrik  
 Zimony (O. Zemin, S. Zemun),  
 12-13, 81, 163  
 Zók, 285  
 Zólyom (Sl. Zvolen, G. Altsohl), 31,  
 39, 52, 68  
 Zólyom, county, 40, 46, 68  
 Zólyomkecskés, *see* Koszolnyik  
 Zombor (O. Zonbor, S. Sombor), 180,  
 226  
 Zonbor, *see* Zombor  
 Zrenjanin, *see* Becskerek  
 Zrínyi, family, 57  
 Zrínyi, György, 45, 52  
 Zrínyi, Miklós, 28, 38, 46

Zrínyi, Péter, 58-59

Zsáka, 48

Zsámbék (O. Canbek), 167-168, 175

Zsibritó, *see* Sibrik

Zsitvatorok, treaty of, 56

Zvolen, *see* Zólyom

Zvolenská Slatina, *see* Szlatina

Zvornik, *see* İzvornik



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