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Both Muslim and European

Diasporic and Migrant Identities of Bosniaks

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1 The lexically correct plural of the word *fatwa* in Arabic language is *fatāwa*. For the sake of simplicity we have used throughout the book *fatwas* for the plural of Islamic legal opinions.

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Introduction: Bosniaks as European Muslims and Their Experience with Migration and Diaspora

Dževada Šuško

The study of Bosniaks who have the historic and cultural experience of being Muslims and Europeans at home in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as in different countries all over Europe and the globe, is a still neglected field of research. Until now, some research on the Bosniak diaspora has been done focusing on economic and historic aspects of migration but not that much on the religious and cultural component of their diasporic experience.[1] According to Behloul, few migration studies deal with culture and religion and especially the question of the role of religion among immigrants from Bosnia-Herzegovina has, thus far, attracted little attention among migration scholars.[2] Hence, research on the Bosniak experience as migrants, the gradual development of a diaspora and the role of religion and culture is still fragmented into various fields of study as a side aspect of other issues.

The present volume puts the migrant and diasporic experience of Bosniaks into focus, from a historical, ethnic, cultural, religious, sociological and transnational perspective. It is the outcome of an international conference entitled "Diasporic and Migrant Identities: Social, Cultural, Political, Religious and Spiritual Aspects" held in Sarajevo at the Gazi Husrev-bey Library (23–24 April 2015). It was organized by the editor of this volume and the Institute for Islamic Tradition of Bosniaks. A number of scholars from various disciplines were invited to discuss, both theoretically and practically, the problems which Bosniak migrants have faced throughout the last centuries of several migration

1 Marko Valenta and Sabrina Ramet, eds. *The Bosnian Diaspora. Integration in Transnational Communities* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2011). Nermin Oruč, "Remittances and development: The case of Bosnia," *Netzwerk Migration in Europa: www.migrationeducation.org*, accessed April 12, 2017, http://www.mhrr.gov.ba/iseljenistvo/Istrazivanja/default.aspx?id=1766&langTag=bs-BA; Armina Omerika, „Islam und Bosniakentum in Deutschland. Bestandsaufnahme des Diskursfeldes," in *Islam und Diaspora. Analysen zum muslimischen Leben in Deutschland aus historischer, rechtlicher, sowie migrations- und religionssoziologischer Perspektive*, ed. Reuf Ceylan (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2012), 317–333.

2 Samuel Behloul, "From 'problematic' foreigners to 'unproblematic' Muslims: Bosnians in the Swiss Islam-discourse," *Refugee survey quarterly* 26 (2) (2007), 22–36; Samuel Behloul, "Religion or Culture? The public relations and self-presentations strategies of Bosnian Muslims in Switzerland compared with other Muslims," in *The Bosnian Diaspora: Integration in Transnational Communities*, eds. Marko Valenta and Sabrina Ramet (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 301–318.

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waves, their dual cultural code "in between two worlds", issues of their connections with their (parents') homeland, their possible "return", the role of religion and culture in keeping the identity, and their attitudes and perceptions. Some of the guiding questions were: What are the historical experiences of Bosniaks regarding migration? What impact did migration have on the Bosniak identity? How have the Bosniaks interacted as a minority group with the majority society? What does it mean to be a Muslim in Europe? How have the Bosniaks organized themselves in the diaspora and what are the most important elements that they try to preserve abroad? What are the attitudes and perceptions of others towards the Bosniaks and their Bosnian Muslim identity? Have the Bosniaks imported the characteristics of Islam and life in Bosnia-Herzegovina to their adopted country and does this have an impact on their lives in a different setting? What are the challenges related to that in today's Europe troubled by its multicultural issues and its "diversity in unity" orientation? In dealing with questions of this kind the participants attempted to scrutinize some new aspects of Bosniak history and identity and connect it to their experience of migration, either forced or due to economic reasons.

Generally, matters of cultural and religious adaptation-yet-continuity are foremost on the agendas of most diasporic groups. So, the relationship between immigrant religious background and culture comes to the forefront, and it is especially so with the second and third generations. Through theoretical and field work this book looks, in different ways, into all three dimensions which according to Vertovec define religious and cultural conditions of migrants: the awareness of a religious identity/background, the existence of communal organizations and the persistence of relationships with the homeland. However, the diaspora is still very important when it comes to strengthening the Bosniak identity, political mobilization, and establishing organizational units, such as Islamic centres in Europe.

1 Bosniaks: The Role of History and Politics in Forming Their Muslim and European Identity

Regarding the ethnonym Bosniak, sources reveal that from medieval times the inhabitants of Bosnia-Hercegovina called themselves and were named as Bosniaks (*Bošnjak,* plural *Bošnjaci* or *Bošnjani*) in terms of belonging to a people and to a territory.[3] This term was used independently from religious belonging.

3 Smail Balić, *Das unbekannte Bosnien* [The unknown Bosnia] (Köln: Böhlau, 1992), 39–49. Mustafa Imamović, *Historija Bošnjaka* [History of the Bosniaks] (Sarajevo: Preporod, 2006).

On the other hand, for about 400 years within, the Ottoman Empire's societal system stressed the religious element among the population. Therefore, the people learned rather to identify themselves in religious terms (Muslims, Orthodox, Catholics, Jews). However, in the 19th century with the "Spring of Nations", i.e. nation-building processes and the emergence of nation states in Europe including the Balkans, Serb and Croat national ideologies succeeded in convincing the Orthodox and Catholics of Bosnia-Herzegovina to gradually declare themselves as Serbs and Croats respectively. Hence, the neighbouring countries also initiated a process of redefining the Catholic and Orthodox populations in Bosnia-Herzegovina into Croats and Serbs respectively. Thus, the term Bosniak remained for the Muslim population only. When Austria-Hungary, as a leading European power in the 19th century, received the right at the Congress of Berlin to occupy and administer Bosnia and Hercegovina, Bosniaks as an indigenous European Muslim society ceased to be an integral part of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, Bosniaks were at once confronted with different norms and values in the fields of politics, military, administration, economy, culture and education. In the framework of Austro-Hungarian monarchy and the Central European context, they went through an enormous modernization process launched already with the Tanzimat of the Ottoman Empire and continued during the Austro-Hungarian period from 1878 to 1918. Benjamin Kállay played an important role in reaffirming the Bosniak identity. Kállay thought that the Bosniak nobles were direct descendants of the medieval Bogumil aristocracy who accepted Islam to retain their predominance in the land. Thus, he was attracted by the independent spirit of the medieval Bosniak aristocratic elite and hoped to utilize the historical Bosniak consciousness in the interests of the Monarchy. Actually, he thought that the Bosniaks were the leading class and the core element of the Bosniak nation, representing the indigenous aristocracy and fighting for its existence and persevering for Bosnia-Hercegovina's independence and integrity. This was important due to the increasing Croat and Serb national movements inside and outside of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

With the end of World War I, Austria-Hungary lost the territory of Bosnia and the land was incorporated into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes which later changed its name to Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918–1941). For four years during World War II, Bosnia belonged to the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), a puppet state of Nazi-Germany. After World War II Bosnia ended up as a part of Socialist Yugoslavia (1945–1992). With the establishment of Yugoslavia, Bosniaks were not acknowledged but reduced to a religious minority. In addition to that, the Bosniaks as the previous landowners were impoverished through agrarian reforms and nationalization policies. A striking fact is that within Socialist Yugoslavia, the term 'Muslim' was introduced in a national sense. Hence, the Communists introduced a religious category

(Muslims) which was to be used in censuses as a national category. This paradox and somewhat disturbing categorization lasted until the 1990s. With the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the reestablishment of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina a debate about the 'Muslim' identity was launched. Eventually, in 1993 on a Congress of the most influential Bosniak intellectuals it was decided that the ethnonym Bosniak will be introduced again. At that time the war against the internationally recognized state of Bosnia-Herzegovina already started. Genocide and forced migrations against the Bosniaks caused the last huge migration wave. The Dayton Peace Agreement which contained as well the constitution affirmed the Bosniaks as a constituent people along Serbs and Croats.[4]

Bosnian Muslims in a national sense are Bosniaks which refer to an indigenous group that historically, geographically and culturally belongs to Europe and has lived in the multi-religious and multi-ethnic setting of Bosnia-Herzegovina for centuries. Their norms, values and identity were affirmed as European particularly when Bosnia-Herzegovina was incorporated into Austria-Hungary and the Central European concept in 1878.[5] However, Bosniak identity has undergone significant changes in its meanings, settings and definitions, and it had to be redefined and negotiated under different political and social circumstances and situations as well as several migrations throughout its history. When it comes to Islamic identity of Bosniaks or the Islamic tradition of Bosnian Muslims, it can be said that they are Sunni Muslims, belonging to the Hanefi madhhab and Maturidi theology. There have always been several Sufi tariqats. Bosnian Muslims belong to the Ottoman-Islamic cultural zone which can be identified through the Hanefi school of thought, institutionalisation of Islam (religious scholars/*ʿulamā*, endowments/*waqf*, education etc.), many Turkish as well as Arabic and Persian words in the Bosnian language, Ottoman architecture as well as urban lifestyle, and influences of Turkish cuisine. Furthermore, Islamic reformist thought developed intensely since the 19th century when religious scholars had to find responses to new socio-political circumstances and interpreted Islam according to contemporary challenges.

In many works the way how Islam in Bosnia is practiced, interpreted and taught is defined as a "European Islam", since its followers are indigenous and largely secularized Muslims. In the current political and social climate in the West, Muslim religion/background and the ethnic/religious markers

4 In this book Bosniak and Bosnian Muslim is used interchangeably.

5 Thus, Bosniaks are often perceived as bridge between East and West. However, during the war 1992–1995 they felt betrayed by Europe as no clear support was shown for the survival of Bosnia and Hercegovina and its citizens.

associated with Islam are probably highly important in everyday majority-minority interactions of migrants. Due to their European background, Bosnian Muslim immigrants are not perceived as culturally very distant by the native local population unlike other Muslim groups as they are religiously mostly "invisible".[6] Due to their European origin they do not stand out from the host nations in terms of colour or clothes unlike some other Muslim immigrants in Europe. This is why as Karić states the Bosniaks are, according to their Bosnian language, the colour of their skin, their Slavic origin and the territory they live in, Europeans.[7] Furthermore, they have an experience of being a religious minority in a secularized society preceding their arrival in Western Europe.

Generally, "the ethnic map of Europe at any time in its history is littered with the names of ethnicities that have disappeared virtually without trace, and that, as Gellner notes, only a few have 'survived' to give a language [and] a name to a modern nation-state."[8] In the European context, the relationship of language and ethnic or national identity is closely interwoven. To these diverse ethnicities belong the Bosniaks whom we can consider to represent the titular nation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Religion here should not be apprehended exclusively as faith or belief. As Cesari states sociological work has highlighted an increasing disjunction between believing, behaving, and belonging among followers of all denominations. She continues by stating that belonging is more relevant than believing in understanding the political dimension of religion. In fact, belonging is often strongly asserted even when migrants lack belief. The belonging identity is strengthened when religion is embedded within the national identity of the country of origin as is the case with Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bosniaks.[9]

2 Occupation & War: Migrating to Europe, Turkey or Overseas?

For the Muslim populations in South-Eastern Europe, a region often negatively perceived as the backward Balkans, the end of the Ottoman supremacy and the disintegration of Ottoman lands meant a period of forced migrations, ethnic

6 Marko Valenta and Zan Strabac, "The Dynamics of Bosnian Refugee Migrations in the 1990s, Current Migration Trends and Future Prospects," *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 32 (3) (2013): 1–22.

7 Enes Karić, *Essays* (*on behalf*) *of Bosnia* (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 1999), 89.

8 Elizabeth Tonkin, Malcolm Kenneth Chapman and Maryon McDonald, *History and Ethnicity* (Abingdon: Routledge, 1989), 18.

9 Jocelyne Cesari, ed. *The Oxford Handbook of European Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 10–11.

cleansing, genocide, expropriation, and new political systems.[10] Indeed South-Eastern Europe or the Balkans is located on the line of numerous demarcation lines between many different empires, political systems, cultures, and religions and is a region that has for centuries been significantly characterized by migration movements. When it comes to Balkan Muslims, migration is not a new thing either. Following the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from the Balkans, between 1,700,000 and 2,000,000 Muslim refugees settled in Istanbul and Anatolia between 1878 and 1913, with an additional 850,000 arriving between 1923 and 1945. These different migration waves correspond in time to various historical events affecting the Balkan Muslim populations, such as wars, campaigns of ethnic cleansing, land reforms, and overall economic and cultural marginalization.

Bosniaks feared with the occupation of Austria-Hungary they would lose their religious identity while living outside *Dar al-Islam* and in a non-Islamic territory (*Dar al-harb*). A vivid debate was initiated among Bosniak scholars in order to sort out whether to migrate to the Muslim world (Ottoman Empire) where the writ of of the Divine Law still applies or to stay under Austro-Hungarian rule where "infidel" courts operate. At that point of time Bosniaks had no experience living in a minority situation, nor were they sure how Islamic sources dealt with this issue.[11] The question was not only whether Muslims were allowed to live under non-Muslim rule, but if so, under what conditions. There were different answers given to different historical circumstances.

Shadid and Konigsveld crystallize three situations of intense encounter and coexistence of Muslims and non-Muslims: The first type of historical situation or precedence occurred in the pre-colonial era when individual Muslims or small groups such as merchants, diplomats or captives of war stayed in non-Muslim territories. At that time, Muslim legal scholars concluded that it is accepted to stay as long as Muslims could perform the basic religious prescriptions (the five pillars of Islam)[12] and as long as their lives were safe. Moreover, the classical scholars of Islamic legal thought explain that such Muslims are obliged to obey laws and the land in which they are residing. They also have the duty to respect scrupulously the condition under which the non-Islamic

10 Marija Todorova, *Imaginarni Balkan* (Belgrade: XX VEK, 1999).

11 Not only Bosniaks, but Balkan Muslims in general as well as Muslims in the Caucasus, Lebanon, India and Nigeria were seeking *fatwas* regarding their life in non-Muslim societies.

12 The five pillars of Islam are proclaiming that there is only one God and that Muḥammad is his messenger, praying five times a day, fasting during the month of Ramadan, giving alms, and performing the pilgrimage to Mecca.

state granted them safety during their stay in its territory.[13] The second type occurred with the conquest of Muslim territories by non-Muslim rulers where the indigenous Muslim population came under non-Muslim rule. Historical examples are Sicily (The Emirate of Sicily existed from 965 to 1072 and was conquered by Normans), Spain (Al-Andalus existed from 711 to 1492 when it was recaptured by Christian kingdoms) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Ottoman Empire ruled from 1463 to 1878 this province when the Congress of Berlin decided to surrender it to Austria-Hungary).

Until 1878, Bosniaks lived in a society whose structure and fundamental concepts were based on Islamic jurisprudence. But with the 19th century and the admiration of Western civilization by scholars such as Jamaluddin Al-Afghani (1835–1898), Muhammad Abduh[14] (1849–1905) and Muḥammad Rashid Rida (1865–1935), the concept of *Dar al-harb* was no longer that of a dangerous and uncertain territory, rather than a model for Muslim advance. These scholars formed the reformist school of thought *al-Manar* which tried to find new solutions (*iğtihad*) for the changing environment within Muslim societies on the basis of the Qur'an.[15] Muslims were supposed to use reason in order to keep up with changing times. Slowly the theological impediments to living in a dominantly non-Muslim country were removed and from the 19th century onwards Muslims started to examine the advantages of staying in and even migrating to non-Muslim countries. Legal scholars basically developed two opposing views: Many of them concluded that Muslims should leave home and move to the "Territory of Islam" (the remaining Ottoman Empire). However, in the case of Bosnia and Hercegovina, the Bosnian *Ra'īs al-'ulamā* Azabagić influenced by Rida was convinced that Bosniaks could stay in their dwelling places as long as they are not forced to abandon their religion and whilst they could perform their religious duties. In the article published in the journal *al-Manar* about emigration (*hiğra*) and how far it legally applies to the Bosniaks, Rida states:

13 Wasif Shadid and Sjoerd van Koningsveld, "Loyalty to a non-Muslim Government: An Analysis of Islamic Normative Discussions and of the Views of some Contemporary Islamicists" in *Political Participation and Identities of Muslims in non-Muslim State*s, eds. Wasif Shadid and Sjoerd van Koningsveld (Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1996), 86–87, accessed April 12, 2016, http://www.interculturelecommunicatie.com/download/loyaliteit.pdf.

14 Abduh commented about the West and dominantly Muslim communities as follows: "I went to the West and saw Islam, but no Muslims; I got back to the East and saw Muslims, but not Islam." (accessed on January 23, 2017, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/"Muhammad_Abduh").

15 This school of thought launched its influential scholarly journal al-Manar. There Muslims' awareness and unity tried to be raised. See more Enes Karić, *Tumačenje Kur'ana i ideologije xx stoljeća* [Interpretation of the Qur'an and ideologies of the 20th century] (Sarajevo: Bemust, 2002), 13–24.

> *Hijra* is not an individual religious incumbency to be performed by those who are able to carry out their duties in a manner safe from any attempt to compel them to abandon their religion or prevent them from performing and acting in accordance with their religious rites.[16]

Shadid and Konigsveld conclude: "Such views are tantamount to legitimizing the existence of Muslim communities under non-Muslim rules under certain conditions, and they are directly relevant to the present situation of Muslim minorities in the West".[17]

The third type of historical circumstance was more radical as it occurred when almost every country with a Muslim majority was occupied by non-Muslims, such as in the Colonial era. Again a severe discussion among legal scholars emerged, but this time, all over the Muslim world at the end of the 19th and early 20th century, different views developed about how Muslims should face this total replacement of their political and economic rule. The discussed topics were: whether a Muslim should continue with armed resistance or emigrate to an area with a Muslim ruler; to what extent can a Muslim adopt Western dressing habits (e.g. wearing a hat); whether it is allowed to study anything other than religious disciplines; whether a Muslim can adopt citizenship of the colonizing state etc.[18] Hence, throughout history and in Islamic thought, guidelines have been developed for the behaviour of Muslim minorities in a non-Muslim state. In the Bosnian context and among Bosniaks, similar questions arose which have challenged reformist thought and scholars in general: Is it allowed to live under non-Muslim rule?, If yes, how to preserve the religious identity?, Is it permitted to serve a non-Muslim military?, How to organize the religious community?, How to define the relationship between Islamic and European culture?, What about Islamic way of dressing particularly headscarf of Muslim women?, How to secure the position of religion in a secular democratic state? etc.

Interestingly, the migration directions of the Bosniaks have changed. While with the establishment of Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bosniaks moved dominantly to remaining Ottoman lands out of fear of keeping the religious identity, there was as well a migration to the USA

16 Rida, 1909: 410–415 quoted in Muhamed Mufaku Al-Arnaut, "Islam and Muslims in Bosnia 1878–1918: Two Hijras and Two Fatwas," *Journal of Islamic Studies* 2 (1994): 253.

17 Shadid and Konigsveld, "Loyalty," 87.

18 Shadid and Kongisveld, "Loyalty," 88. In the 1920s as a part of French assimilation policy, French authorities offered French nationality and citizenship to Tunisian and Algerian Muslims only if they accepted French civil law and abandoned Islamic law. This led to a fierce resistance from some Muslim legal scholars, and many equated the adoption of French citizenship with apostasy.

where Bosniaks established their Community *Džemijetul-hajrijje*. After Austria-Hungary, the next periods when Bosniaks migrated massively and were intensely confronted with "Western" norms and values was in the first years of establishment of socialist rule after 1945 when political migrants fled from the Partisans mainly to Austria, Germany and Australia. From the 1960s onwards, migration patterns of the Bosniaks reoriented themselves towards Europe and this is when a major turn in the migration patterns of the Balkan Muslims happened. Communist Yugoslavia allowed its citizens to travel and work abroad from 1963 and later framework agreements were signed with many countries in Europe to regulate the immigration of Yugoslav workers. Thus, Bosniaks settled in the West as *Gastarbeiter* due to the agreement between Tito and "capitalist" countries. In the 1990s, however, war and genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina have resulted in massive emigration of hundreds of thousands of Bosniaks to Western European countries, but as well to the USA, Canada and Australia. So, a large Bosnian Muslim diaspora is present in Western Europe. Today in the 21st century Bosnia-Herzegovina is facing brain drain migration towards Western European countries and family reunion after Bosniaks living abroad married local Bosniaks. Hence, migration had for centuries been an integral part of the historical experience of Bosniaks.

Thus, we can count several migration waves caused by the fragmentation of Ottoman territory, establishment of non-Muslim rule in Bosnia through Austria-Hungary, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Socialist Yugoslavia, and eventually the destruction, war and genocide in 1992–1995. These insecure times lead to mass migrations and are an interesting period to examine regarding how Bosniaks adapted to the new political, economic, societal and cultural systems particularly abroad in the diaspora. Throughout the whole adaptation process to these different political and societal systems (Austria-Hungary, Yugoslavia, migration destinations) it became clear that for the Bosniaks religion, Bosnian language and Bosnia-Herzegovina as their home country were the most important identity pillars. Hence, the largest concern was to keep the Islamic identity, Bosnia-Herzegovina as the home for the Bosniaks and Bosnian language. This has not been always successful as for example the issue with the Bosnian language which was replaced with Serbo-Croat language during the existence of Yugoslavia. Today Islamic centres, cultural organizations, Bosnian language schools are the strongest forms of keeping the link with the home country.

Bosniaks today make up the most numerous and globally most dispersed and very well organized migrants from former Yugoslavia. According to official data of the Ministry for human rights and refugees of Bosnia-Herzegovina about 1.7 million citizens live outside of Bosnia-Herzegovina, mainly in Western

countries (Europe, North America, Australia).[19] The reason for this high numbers of Bosniaks all over the world in approximately 100 countries is due to forced migrations which were the goal and consequence of the aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992–1995. Expelled from their homes, Bosniaks followed the pattern of similar refugee groups in modern history. They firstly formed themselves as a political diaspora for whom the continuity of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina was most important. Furthermore, the Bosnian diaspora organizes itself in specific ways usually through religious and national communities (Islamic-Bosniak/Catholic-Croat/Orthodox-Serb). The Bosniak diaspora displays a large number of *ǧamʿats*, Islamic cultural centres and/or mosques which care for religious needs and cultivate the cultural heritage. Thus, one can find these centres all over the Western countries in Europe, North America and Australia. Almost all of them consider the Islamic Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina which has its seat in Sarajevo as their headquarters. This link seems to be important to keep the Islamic tradition of Bosniaks.

3 Is There a Bosniak Diaspora?

The category of diaspora might not be applicable to the whole variety of Bosniak migrant experiences. On the one could talk of a diaspora as the Bosniaks in the 1990s fled from Bosnia due to forced migrations and genocide, established a specific form of collective identity of a deterritorialized group of people, maintained support for the homeland, and expressed the will to return should the conditions prove favourable (at least the first generation). On the other side, there are Bosniaks who left Bosnia-Herzegovina (former Yugoslavia) due to economic (*Gastarbeiter*) and political reasons (anti-Communist dissidents) and settled down in Europe and overseas. Not all of them left home for good and planned to stay in their new settings forever. Most of them hoped and hope until today to return to their hometowns as it is laid down in Annex Seven of the Dayton Peace Agreement which guarantees the right to return for all displaced people. Research has shown that the various forms of activities in their new places of dwelling reveal a strong wish to return home, at least be buried in their home town. There are voices among the Bosniaks that they should be called emigrants instead of diaspora in order to stress that they plan

19 Ministarstvo za ljudska prava i izbjeglice Bosne i Hercegovine, Pregled stanja bosanskohercegovačkog stanovništva [Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Overview of the situation of the population in Bosnia and Hercegovina] (Sarajevo, 2008).

to return home, that their life outside the country is only for a certain period of time and that they have not developed a distinct form of collective identity. [20]

4 Contributions

The following chapters are suited to reflect on and deepen our understanding of the Bosniaks, their lives and identity outside their home country Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is an interdisciplinary book whose scope ranges from a historical overview of Bosnian Muslim migrations, to their cultural, religious and ethnic identity (the role of Bosnian language, practice of Islam, cultural heritage etc.), their transnational or translocal identity as well as the challenges that are posed before the Islamic tradition of Bosniaks as a result of migrations. There are separate chapters on Slovenia, Switzerland, Britain, Germany, and examples drawn from Australia and the USA. The book is divided into three parts and ten chapters.

The first chapter written by Safet Bandžović elaborates in depth the demographic implications of the gradual withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from the Balkans – "crossroad of the worlds" – which he calls the de-Ottomanization process. He gives a long introduction into the context of that time regarding the Balkans in general and Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular. Within this process, Bandžović, a senior researcher at the Institute for History in Sarajevo, portrays the mass expulsions of Muslims, destruction of Islamic architecture, eradication of all material cultural heritage which reminds of Islam and Muslims as well as the massive presence of non-Orthodox rule. Thus he covers a period of two centuries (19th–20th) of repeating migration waves. These mass migrations of Bosniaks and other Muslims of different ethnic and linguistic origins from the Balkans had dramatic consequences for their identity. He stresses the importance of memorializing the experience of migration. Bandžović displays a broad knowledge of the sources from the Balkan region written in Slavic languages.[21] Thus the reader will get an insight in the sources and literature

20 Clifford, James. "Diasporas", Cultural Anthropology, 9 (1994): 302–338; Safran, William. "Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return," Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies 1(1), (1991): 83–99; and Vertovec, Steven. "Conceiving and researching Transnationalism", Ethnic and Racial Studies 22(2), (1999): 447–462. See Chapter 9 for a broader discussion.

21 All the titles in Bosnian and other Slavic languages are translated by the editor and put in square brackets directly after the title.

written about migration in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as the neighbouring countries.

The second chapter written by Xavier Bougarel conceives the diasporic experience of Bosniaks as a challenge to the Islamic tradition of Bosniaks. Bougarel, a scholar researching at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) in Paris, examines a variety of challenges to the Bosniak diaspora regarding the practice of Islam and confrontation with other Muslim communities. He claims that the Bosniak diaspora in its host countries is not as visible in the public sphere as it is with Muslims from Turkey and Arab countries. He claims that the Bosniak diaspora has played an active part in the affirmation of the Bosniak national identity after 1990. In a similar way, the Bosniak diaspora has experienced a rapid growth of its religious activity, but still has to define its place between the Islamic Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Islamic institutions of its various countries of residence. Therefore, the evolution of the religious life of the Bosniak diaspora contributes inevitably to the redefinition of the Islamic tradition of Bosniaks, and influences the perception of the links existing between this century-old tradition and the new presence of Islam in Europe.

Part Two goes more in detail and deals with migrants' ethnic, cultural and religious identities. Three case studies of Switzerland, Slovenia and Germany illustrate the topic of this part. Alen Duraković, who once served as an imam in a Bosnian mosque in Luzern aims at giving an insight into religious practice and ceremonies of the Bosnian Muslim community in Switzerland. He shows in the same time the insecurity in combining multiple identities, i.e. European, Muslim, Bosniak, Swiss etc. Ivana Jurišić explores the identity of Bosnian Muslim women in Berlin, Germany. She highlights the tension between the experience of war, forced migration, refugee status, uncertain future and the socioeconomic status in the host country as well as expectations regarding integration. This research is particularly interesting as it shows the issue of identity and integration from a women's perspective. Furthermore, it illustrates the multiple burdens of being a woman, wife and mother torn away from home and confronted with a new start in an unknown surrounding. Marijanca Ajša Vižintin, a researcher at the Intercultural Institute for Inclusive Education at the Slovenian Migration Institute, elaborates the importance of the Bosnian language as an identity marker for Bosniak immigrants. Her research includes 100 children form different cities and public schools in Slovenia. Furthermore, she claims that for a sincere and effective intercultural dialogue, the appreciation of the immigrants' mother tongue and culture in general, shall be provided and financially supported by the host country. Julianne Funk wrote the sixth chapter. She is a peace scholar-practitioner currently based in Switzerland. Her current research interests include faith-based conflict transformation

and the faith narratives of Bosnian Muslim women believers. She examines the concept of *sužívot*, an inherent characteristic of daily life between Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is the Bosnian concept of coexistence with other religious and ethnic communities and could be translated with coexistence, exchange, mutual life, encounter on a daily basis. It is impossible to think of *sužívot* in Bosnia-Herzegovina without Bosnian Islam and Bosniaks, whose heritage informs *sužívot* as a value and practice (e.g. *komšiluk* or neighbourly relations). According to her multiple-year qualitative empirical research in Bosnia-Herzegovina, *sužívot* includes ethno-religious interaction but identities and cultures remain distinct. She researches to what extent the concept of *sužívot*, i.e. multi-religious and multi-ethnic "taken-for-grantedness" in Bosnia-Herzegovina has survived in the diaspora among the migrants after the experience of war, genocide and forced migrations. This concept of *sužívot* implies that people of different identities live in the same place or with each other, whereby this might mean a life together or simply side-by-side. Throughout her research more concepts emerge that have been relevant in a Bosnian understanding of coexistence. These are hospitality, neighbourhood and mercy, all of which are important to the residents and diaspora for the sake of social cohesion. As such, this research compares the expressions and perceptions of *sužívot* in Bosnia-Herzegovina today with those in two different migrant contexts (Switzerland and the USA) in order to consider how the legacy of *sužívot* as a Bosnian cultural tradition has unfolded in the last two decades in various settings. The last chapter in the second part of the book is written by Enes Ljevaković, University Professor at the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo. Through a critical analysis of *fatwas* which deal with questions and problems of the Bosniak diaspora he gives an overview of the dilemma, needs and problems the Bosniak diaspora faces. Thus, he offers mechanisms for the Islamic Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina which is in charge of caring for the religious needs of the Bosniaks, to keep its role and task towards its diaspora. He starts with a rather theological approach to explain what Islamic jurisprudence (*fikh*) says about the legal status of Muslim minorities. Then he explains the specific problems, dilemmas, and needs of the Bosnian Muslim diaspora in the countries of Western Europe and abroad, such as religious practice, relations with religious institutions in Bosnia, loyalty, but as well citizenship.

Part Three deals with transnational and translocal lives of Bosnian Muslim migrants in their new communities. Hariz Halilovich, former refugee and migrant in Germany and Australia, is a research fellow in the School of Global, Urban and Social Studies and teaches cultural anthropology at RMIT University in Australia. His chapter is based on ethnographic research of Bosniak migrants in in three different diaspora contexts Australia, USA and Europe over a period of ten years. He explores how Bosniaks have developed often competing

identities in the country of settlement and country of origin. He describes the global profile and specific of the Bosniak diaspora as a deterritorialized part of the Bosniak people, and give insight in their ways of political activism aimed at preserving the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to create better conditions to return home. Similarly, Gayle Munro in the following chapter examines in which ways migrants from Bosnia act or behave transnationally. She analyses the extent and nature of economic, political and socio-cultural transnationalism amongst Bosniak migrants and explores the potential factors which could contribute to the presence (or absence) of transnational activities and identities. The qualitative study employed a grounded mixed-methods approach combining a survey of and interviews with migrants from Bosnia who had migrated to Britain over the period of 1953 to 2010. Thereby, she realizes that the loss of family members and friends during the war, the material loss of their housings, loss of family dynamics, opportunities and planned life-paths are still present. This is why "cultural beacons", as Munro names it, such as language and cultural heritage is important to cover these manifold losses. The last section in this part is written by Maja Savić-Bojanić, Sarajevo School of Science and Technology and Jana Jevtić, Central European University in Budapest. They deal with the issue of transnationalism and translocalism by looking at local adaptations of the Global Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions campaign, a grassroots campaign for solidarity with Palestine and Palestinian people in two locations: Tower Hamlets (London) and Stari Grad (Sarajevo). This comparative approach reveals differing perceptions of identity, faith-based participation, religion, and politics. Even if it does not look at Bosniaks outside Bosnia-Herzegovina, it does deal with Bosniaks' European identity and religious experience under conditions of globalisation. They argue that Islam, while providing an emotional bond that links local Muslim communities to an "imagined Ummah," has been gradually rethought of, redressed and reformed in the global age. Media and information technologies have played an important role in the creation of new public spheres in which multiple forms of authority and "authentic" Islam can emerge, ready to question the traditional view that Islam supposedly favours forms of individualization.

I believe this book bridges the existing gap regarding the knowledge about diasporal experience of Bosnian Muslims. It is intended for members of the academic community, for researchers and students of "Bosnian way of being Muslim" (cf. Bringa 1995) as well as migration and diasporas. It has an interdisciplinary character involving history, sociology, cultural anthropology, cultural studies and theology, so it could be used for a wide range of audience. It is suitable to be used as a text book as well. Also, I believe it will be of interest for the Bosniak diaspora itself.

PART 1

Bosniak Diasporic Experiences: A Historical Overview

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CHAPTER 1

History in a "Broken Mirror": Demographic De-Ottomanization of the Balkans and Identity Changes of the Refugees[1]

Safet Bandžović

1 Introduction

History is a polyphonic process, one of the finest barometers of the spiritual atmosphere in a society. It is also a complex connection between interpreting the past, perceiving the present, and hoping in an uncertain future. Even its superficial study, says Meša Selimović, may surprise us as to the number of "analogous or even identical situations to the time we live in … All the existential issues and troubles live in us as equally as they lived in our close and distant ancestors."[2] History, as the phrase goes, never repeats itself, literally, though some parallels are hard to avoid. All nations have their separate and important stories and dates. In his time, Guizot emphasized that there were hundreds of ways to write history. The same events may be presented in several ways with contradictory effects. Myths and misrepresentations mix with reality, thus conditioning social memory as well. The social consciousness of all nations contains layers of mythology as parts of collective identity. Historical references are as numerous as they are all-pervasive and selective. The identity

1 Editor's note: The author uses in his original text the Bosnian term for "refugee" or "expellee" "muhağir/muhağirūn" (sg/pl), which literally means refugee or a person who was expelled from his/her home. It is originally an Arabic word and linked to the history of Islam when the first Muslim community was forced to leave Mecca and settled in Madina. These Muslims were as well called *muhağirūn*. Throughout the Ottoman presence in Bosnia many originally Arab, Turkish and Persian words were adopted into Bosnian language and are used to this day. The term *muhağir* became relevant again during the forced migrations and expulsions in the War in Bosnia 1992–1995.

2 "A logical conclusion from this notorious fact is that everything around the human may change but the human essence either changes very slowly or does not change at all. Humans have always expressed love, hate, envy, frequent cruelty, rare nobleness, being dazzled by slogans, readiness to judge others, fear from others, fear of death, desire for false comfort, euphoric or anxious search for deities, regret and loss of illusions." Meša Selimović, "Roman i istorija," [Novel and History], in *Zbornik radova posvećen uspomeni Salke Nazečića*, (Sarajevo: Filozofski fakultet, 1972), 93–95.

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of an ethnic group is significantly conditioned by the living memory of its members, with both the positive and negative consequences this entails. Every national version of the past is rather compact, but it, at the same time, also radically differs from those neighbouring nations that went through the same experience, but from the perspective of a different ethnic group.

2 Time and Memorialization: Interpretation and the Necessity of the Past

Social processes often transcend local contexts and regional borders. Many developments are nearly impossible to observe if they are not discussed in a wider context. Geography is a setting for history, says Robert D. Kaplan, an American journalist and author. It is important for the destiny of every country. It defines its position on the map, as well as its limitations and opportunities. The geographical position of a country is much more determined by its history than by the way it is politically run. Maps defy the very idea of the equality and unity of humanity. They also show how each nation survives under different circumstances. Humans have tended throughout history to divide the world into regions, with actual or imaginary separation lines. Geographical boundaries follow "social, ethnic and cultural ones in an expected way."[3] By the 19th century, politicians and historians had, unlike geography had as a science, divided Europe along illusive lines of "civilization," or according to strategic relations and the distribution of power among major powers and their interests.[4] Understanding the history of the nations and life in the Balkans is primarily related to knowledge of a geographical nature of this part of Europe. According to the majority of contemporary researchers, it is mainly identified as having once belonged to the Ottoman Empire.[5]

The Balkans is an important civilizational crossroad, a cradle of various cultures, a region of contacts and contrasts between Christianity and Islam, between East and West, but also a metaphor for constant division and collision. It is a field of tension and unfinished history, of "ethnic cocktails" (Z. Brzezinski)

3 Edward Said, *Orijentalizam: zapadnjačke predodžbe o Orijentu* [*Orientalism: Western Concepts of the Orient*] (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1999), 73.

4 In his paper "The Government of Poland" of 1772, Jean-Jacques Rousseau writes, without drawing any significant difference between Catholicism and Protestantism, that Europeans are all those whose mind is shaped by Jesuit monks – see: Čedomir Popov, "Neke kontroverze o istoriji Prvog srpskog ustanka,"*Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju* 69–70 (2004), 12–13.

5 Ljubinka Trgovčević, *O istorijskoj promenljivosti Balkana kao političke metafore* [*On the Historical Variability of the Balkans as a Political Metaphor*] (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2007), 14.

and "imperfect political borders" (S. Huntington). Most of this space has been occupied by mixtures of nations and religions. It also includes a point where Islam, Orthodoxy, and Catholicism collide. The places where major religions meet and intertwine have enriched the Balkan spiritual space, but have also been the cause of divisions and schisms.[6] Eastern Orthodox Christianity is Byzantine, while Roman Catholicism is of Western Roman heritage. Islam in the Balkans is of Ottoman heritage. Each of these complex and ambivalent religious traditions has participated in preserving heritage of a wider cultural and civilizational importance.[7] Religions acted as powerful watersheds in the formation of South-Slavic national identities and nationalisms. They may be used as a powerful weapon in politics due to their ideological character, the fact that they represent a set of beliefs capable of motivating social action, and due to the possibility of employing them in various forms for promoting diverse political positions.[8]

The development of historiographical knowledge and critical interpretation in societies of dialogue open "new fields of the unknown," and this gives them their specific value. Every important event from the past in the Balkans may be perceived from several angles and be subject to different interpretations. Its heritages have also been interpreted as division lines that have given it a particularly unstable character. Heritages, however, are neither constant nor permanent. Emphasizing their characteristics along division lines between incompatible civilizations implies that the human being is reduced to fragmentation and relativism, "when heritages close in on and intertwine with one another, creating unique spaces linked to their historical heritage and their particular idiosyncrasy."[9] The Balkans should be viewed as a whole. A more objective understanding of the history of small nations and different regions

6 Ethnically clean cultures, claims Bogdan Bogdanović, do not exist: "The misconception that they exist is particularly pernicious in the Balkans, where the richness of models consists precisely of thousand-year old mutual permeation. To clarify, I will give yet another example: we, in Serbia, are rightly proud of stone cenotaphs, so-called roadsiders. Although they are distinctive of warriors, mostly those fallen in battles with the Turks, it is not difficult to establish that these memorials render the contours of Turkish gravestones that, in turn, have their distant origin in pre-Islamic Arabic, Phoenician, Hebrew *baetilus* … Would our roadside more or less inform us that it is an indigenous symbolic Serb form?" – as quoted in Bogdan Bogdanović, *Zavađene memorije*, in: *Druga Srbija – deset godina posle: 1992–2002* (Belgrade, 2002), 247.

7 Milica Bakić-Hayden, *Varijacije na temu "Balkan* [*Variations on the Theme 'Balkan'*]*"* (Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 2006), 160.

8 Radmila Radić, "Pripadanje bez verovanja i poznavanja," [Belonging Without Believing and Knowledge] in *Novosti iz prošlosti: znanje, neznanje, upotreba i zloupotreba istorije*, ed. Vojin Dimitrijević (Belgrade: Beogradski centar za ljudska prava, 2010), 111.

9 Andrea Maura Castilla, "Evropski imaginarni simbolizmi: kritički pristup izučavanju Balkana,"*Balkanija* 4 (2013), 32.

can only be gained within the wider geographical and historical context that encompasses them. Its ethnic and religious mosaicism has thwarted various calculations of simple categorizations and prevented simple solutions.[10] The history of any nation is the history of a process of prolonged duration. No space has ever been bestowed on a single nation forever, nor can any nation count on its own perpetuity.

Migrations are constant companions of the ethnic, political, cultural, and economic evolution of humankind. The movement of populations "change, and flow and movement" are as old as humankind itself. Movements and migrations across the planet have brought about changes to ethnic boundaries, changes to the territorial expansion of certain languages, and changes in dialects.[11] No study of ethnic groups, points out Jovan Cvijić, can be effectively undertaken without previous knowledge of the origin of the population.[12] If the Balkan past were written from the perspective of the history of movements, a much more realistic image would be gained. This would be closer to reality than that offered by distorted and extremely constructed national histories.[13] Migrations have radically changed the demographic map of the Balkan area – a "friction zone" – where the present phenomena of movement, migration, exodus, displacement, resettlement, and settlement have considerably affected the definition of ethnic, political, social, and cultural relations.[14] Beginning in

10 See Maria Todorova, *Imaginarni Balkan* [*Imagining the Balkans*] (Belgrade, 1999), 224; Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: Kratka povijest* [*Kosovo: A Short History*] (Sarajevo, 2000), 244.

11 Mladen Friganović, *Demografija: Stanovništvo svijeta* [Demography: The Population of the World] (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1978), 139.

12 Milica Sentić, „Značaj Cvijićevog rada za savremena istraživanja migracija," [The Importance of Cvijićev's Work for Contemporary Migration Research] *Stanovništvo*10–12 (1965), 241.

13 Holm Sundhaussen, *Istorija Srbije od 19. do 21. veka* [History of Serbia from 19 to 21 centuries] (Belgrade, 2008), 54.

14 Milisav Lutovac, "Migracije i kolonizacije u Jugoslaviji u prošlosti i sadašnjosti," [Migration and Colonization in Yugoslavia in the Past and Present] *Glasnik Etnografskog instituta SANU* 7 (1958), 1. Ivan Đurić claims that the Slavs who, in the 6th century, from the lower part of the Danube, attacked the Balkan borders of Byzantium began their long-term settlement within the peninsula in the early 7th century. Generally, modern Slovenians and the population of "Yugoslav" Macedonia may be said to be descendants of these Slavs having arrived within the first wave of settlement. It was only a few decades later that other Slavs – Croats and Serbs – arrived under different circumstances from so-called "White Croatia" and "White Serbia," thus separating the Slavs from the previous migration. Their homeland was situated in the south of the territory of modern Poland. In terms of "blood relations, the ones closest to the Slovenians are Macedonians and, as for the Serbs, their brothers are none other than the Croats themselves." See Ivan Đurić, *Vlast, opozicija, alternativa* [Power, Opposition and Alternative] (Belgrade: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2009).

the late 14th century, great migration movements "shifted all the population in the area from the Vardar Veles Gorge to the Medvednica mountain" (J. Cvijić). From the Dinaric region, migration flows crossed the Danube, Sava, Una, Kupa, and Drava Rivers to settle the Banat, Bačka, Baranja, Syrmia and Slavonia, Croatia, Styria and Carniola, "having crossed to a number of Adriatic islands, to Istria, the area surrounding Trieste, and there were even some weak flows to Gorizia. They came to Italy, particularly to the Venetian region and Abruzzo, then to Transylvania and Russia."[15] Abandoning the original environment resulted in great perturbations – changes to social relations, social groups, identities, norms of behavior, criteria, and values. Migrations were accompanied by conflicts and compromises that the individual and the community had to make with a new environment, as well as by discrimination and resistance, social disarray (xenophobia, nationalism, cultural shock), and periods of adaptation and assimilation.[16] The central and north-west part of the Balkans was ethnically dominated by South-Slavic peoples from the 15th to 19th centuries. They gained control of the east Adriatic coast, the estuaries of the Sava and Tisa into the Danube, and the main route across the Balkans along the Morava and Vardar Valleys.[17]

3 Contents and Instrumentalization of Stereotypes

Maria Todorova is not alone among her peers in her claim that five hundred years of Ottoman rule in the Balkans bought not only the main, but also the longest, period of political unity in its history. The history of the Ottoman state is also the history of all the nations that lived within it, regardless of their differences, and of their different memorized dates and stories. This neo-colonial

15 "These migrations considerably changed the dispersion of peoples in many regions of the Balkan Peninsula. One population was replaced by another, with different features, sometimes with a different language and often with a different dialect. This led to cross-breeding of the population, which mixed due to migration, as well as to various ethnic and ethnological processes that significantly altered the ethnic type of certain regions. It was frequently the case that the old regional and historical national type would disappear, with a new ethnic amalgam being formed," as quoted in: Jovan Cvijić, *Balkansko poluostrvo i južnoslovenske zemlje. Osnovi antropogeografije* [The Balkan Peninsula and South Slavic Countries: Fundamentals of Human Geography] (Belgrade: Narodna biblioteka Srbije, 1966), 129–130.

16 Ljubodrag Dimić, *Srbi i Jugoslavija* [The Serbs and Yugoslavia] (Belgrade: Stubovi kulture, 1998), 29 and 74.

17 Branislav Đurđev and Bogo Grafenauer, *Historija naroda Jugoslavije11* [History of the Yugoslav Nation] (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1960), 852.

empire was supranational, a symbiosis of Turkish, Islamic, Byzantine, and Balkan traditions. In terms of a multi-religious and multicultural space, literature defines the Balkans as part of Ottoman heritage as well. The Ottoman centuries of joint coexistence also created a shared heritage, present in numerous elements of its material and spiritual culture. Interpretations of Ottoman heritage in the Balkans are, however, different and, for quite a while, were defined by a high degree of ideologizing and politicizing within most post-Ottoman states. This resulted in restricted and selective interpretations, in "incoherence, unreliability, and contradiction" of a number of judgments and positions related to this topic. The history of the Ottoman state has not infrequently been interpreted with blurry vision, with many dominant ideas and prejudices, with disparaging and readily-made conclusions in European historiographies (and particularly in those of Balkan countries), ambitious and exclusive in local coordinates, and highly immune to counterarguments arising from contrary experience and knowledge.[18] The typical mode of expression was linked with politics. An additional problem with regard to studying the Ottoman period arises from ignorance, obsession with archaic views, and patterns taken over from the political milieu and literature of the past centuries. Deeply-rooted and simplified viewpoints are typical not only held by the non-professional public, but also by many professional communities that have put more effort in judging than in understanding. "Knowledge" of the past, defined in a specific way, is used to explain various ideologies, to justify "historical rights,"and to form collective and individual identities, which are fields that significantly affect different social situations in the contemporary age.[19]

For quite a while, the Ottoman state was necessary in science and politics as an internal landfill for European stereotypes and various forbidden passions so that the West could see itself as the better one in this context. The "Imaginary Turk" is the key "European Other" that triggers diverse associations. The Ottoman and Habsburg Empires supported and celebrated what the West feared most – a blend of life shared by insufficiently similar "characters" and lifestyles, "incompatible anthropological features, irreconcilable languages, and faiths." Such permeations are actually reflexes of mixing the East and the West. Religion in the Ottoman state was a matter of self-identification, which is the

18 Sanja Petrović-Todosijević, "'Nacionalno vreme' – okvir za samorecepciju građana Republike Srbije," ['The National Period' – A Framework for the Self-Reception of the Republic of Serbia's Citizens]. In *Novosti iz prošlosti: Znanje, neznanje, upotreba i zloupotreba istorije,* ed. Vojin Dimitrijević (Belgrade: Beogradski centar za ljudska prava, 2010), 73–74.

19 Vladimir Mihajlović, "Genius loci Balkani: recepcija prošlosti i konstruisanje akademskog narativa o balkanskom nasleđu," [Genius Loci Balkani: Reception of the Past and the Construction of the Academic Narrative on the Balkan Heritage] *Etnoantropološki problemi* 3 (2013), 780.

only true criterion of "nationality."[20] For an extended period, following simple clichés, Westerners treated the Balkan space as an unexplored and exotic zone dividing superior European civilization from the "mystical Orient." Creating its own myth, the West ascribed all positive features to itself, hence it had to identify and construct both the positive and the negative. The method of feeding "prejudice without guilt" is a long-known one. It goes back to the myth of the "wild man" during the discovery of the New World, which gave a framework for the European perception of "others."[21] "After all," writes Bernard Lewis, "on more than one occasion we of the West have projected our deepest hopes and fears onto strange peoples and distant realms." The history of relations between West and East can also be presented as a process where "the Orient was time and again orientalized by Westerners."[22] A number of travel writers from the 18th and 19th centuries found that the East began precisely in Belgrade. At the time when the Balkans was dominated by two great empires, the Ottoman and the Habsburg, whose borders were considered as a demarcation line between the East and the West, the West, until WWI, considered this part of the world as a "piece of Asia in Europe," or the Near East (*Proche-Orient*). Mostly negative images of Islam, Muslims, and the "Turkish occupation" are also present in the historical consciousness and collective psychological stereotype of Christian nations in South-East Europe. The Balkan states have a long-standing tendency towards neglecting their "Islamic past," i.e. towards speaking about it in negative terms only. It is also necessary to promote knowledge of the theoretical and methodological basis for studying Ottoman heritage, as well as for its more detailed scrutiny from the perspective of different humanities. The "Orientalist" baggage of many European researchers has been "travelling along with them till this day."[23] Edward Said's deconstruction of Orientalism as a discourse of Islamic otherness and that of Balkanism as a discourse of

20 Justin McCarthy, "Stanovništvo osmanlijske Evrope prije i poslije pada Carstva," [The Population of Ottoman Europe Before and After the Fall of the Ottoman Empire], in *Muslimani Balkana: "Istočno pitanje" u XX. vijeku*, ed. Fikret Karčić (Sarajevo: Centar za Napredne studije, 2014), 37.

21 Monika Milosavljević, "Divlji čovek kao mera drugosti,"*Etnoantropološki problemi* 3 (2011): 608.

22 Amila Kasumović, "Djelatnost konzulata u Bosni i Hercegovini u prvim godinama austrougarske okupacije 1878–1881. godine," [The Work of Consulates in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the First Years of the Austro-Hungarian Occupation, 1878–1881] *Godišnjak, Centar za balkanološka ispitivanja ANUBiH* 43 (2014), 248.

23 The idea of "Europe" as part of the very same tradition that created "Orientalism" – an image of "the Orient" as a European "other" that it also denied has reflected on anthropological research as well – see Tone Bringa, *Biti musliman na bosanski način* [*Being Muslim the Bosnian Way*], Sarajevo 1997, 18.

"incomplete otherness" or rather, of "an incomplete self, the dark side within" (in the work of Maria Todorova) represent encouraging achievements.[24]

Ottoman culture may only be analyzed with a distance from nationalist criteria. Critical science has largely rejected theses saying that the acceptance of Islam in the Balkans resulted from Ottoman state pressure. Islam developed gradually and evolutionally. By the 17th century, Muslims accounted for the majority of the population in Bosnia. Vladislav Skarić wrote long ago that it was incorrect to state that, in the Balkans, "Islam expanded rapidly and was officially expanded rapidly. I will only emphasize the fact that the 19th century would not have seen a single Christian or any church or monastery if Islam had been spread by means of government force. Islam expanded by virtue of opportunities and human circumstances."[25] Volumes of scientifically-based works, however, cannot change anything in the attitude towards history if social and political circumstances are such that they require a different "consciousness" and "culture of remembrance or memorialization." There are a number of scientific papers whose authors maintain the 19th century mental matrix. They champion the epic and Manichean interpretation of history, and too readily made judgments that, through inertia, became rooted as dogmas. The tendentiously caricatured Muslim Ottoman world was frequently accused of decadence, while the Ottoman state was treated as the "sick man of Europe," which many of its doctors and their assistants were inclined to kill rather than cure. If the Ottoman Empire were to be placed, against Europe or the West, as a reservation of stagnation, says Austrian Balkanologist Gunnar Hering, also implying that without the Ottoman pervasion, South-East Europe would have participated in the progress of enlightened Europe, such a position would then be untenable. The "zone of non-development" was not restricted only to the Ottoman Empire and its successor states; it also included a wide range from Russia to the central part of East Europe, the Balkan region and the Ionian Islands under Venetian and British rule, South Italy, Spain, and Portugal, hence once powerful communities, colonial states, and centers of Renaissance culture.[26]

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24 Svanibor Petan, "Balkanske granice i kako ih preći," [Balkan Borders and How to Cross Them]in *Lambada na Kosovu*, ed. Svanibor Petan, (Belgrade: XX VEK), 2010. Accessed April 4, 2017 http://www.e-novine.com/kultura/kultura-knjige/52116-Balkanske-granice-kako-prei.html.

25 Mehmed Handžić, *Islamizacija Bosne i Hercegovine i porijeklo bosansko-hercegovačkih muslimana* [The Islamization of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Origin of Bosnian Muslims] (Sarajevo: Islamska dionička štamparija, 1940), 28; Ramiza Smajić, "Odnos Porte prema vjerskoj strukturi stanovništva u Bosni i Hercegovini,"*Ljudska prava* 3–4 (2005), 171–172.

26 Smail Balić, *Bosna u egzilu* [Bosnia in Exile] (Zagreb: Preporod, 1995), 56.

4 Multi-Perspectivity and Historiographic Kaleidoscope

Balkan history is neither complete nor can it be studied without researching and acknowledging the fate of Muslims, whose brutal persecution in the region began as far back as the late 17th century. Of particular importance within the stratified historical and demographical problem is the issue of migration flows of the Muslim population that, as a long-lasting phenomenon, should be viewed within a wider regional perspective. Migrations are one of the most important features of Muslim history in the Balkans, and one of the fundamental symbols of their fate, whether in terms of the prolonged and exhausting period of Ottoman withdrawal from Europe that began in the 17th century – which caused a huge spatial and demographical recomposing of ethnic and religious communities – or in terms of the period of the late 19th and 20th centuries, when these flows took place in newly created conditions, in certain regions, and with a different intensity. The history of Balkan Muslims in the last decades of the 19th and in the 20th century, during the "age of extremism," is dominated by mass exodus, deportation, pressure to assimilate, undefined minority status within the Balkan states, covert or overt discrimination, repression, and uncertainty.

The "Eastern Question" in its narrow sense – a long-lasting historical "problem" – had, since the late 17th century, been present within the clash of Europe with the Islamic world, which also brought along Ottoman advancement into Europe and the occupation of major trade and military routes, which were the shortest Western connections with the East. During the Ottoman rise, it was a matter of survival for European powers threatened by Ottoman conquests. With the decline of Ottoman power, the "Eastern Question" would turn into a struggle for Ottoman heritage. The Great Turkish War (1683–1699) marked the beginning of the age of the general persecution of Muslims. The position that they are foreign to the European space is part of the mentality known precisely as the "Eastern Question," which arose in Europe in the last decades of the 17th century when Muslims were expelled from parts of Europe not subject to Ottoman rule. From this perspective, regardless of their ethnic background, they were considered "foreigners," from which the European territory was to be "cleansed."[27] Little is known about the grim fate of Muslims in

27 In a powerful counter-offensive during the period from 1684 to 1687, Austrians completely "cleansed" the Kingdom of Hungary from Muslims. In the territory surrounded by the Drava, Danube, Sava and Ilova Rivers alone, in the period around 1680 there were approximately 115,000 Muslims, 72,000 Croats, 33,000 Serbs, and 2,000 Hungarians. The *Eyalet* of Bosnia was to become a huge refugee center. Refugees from the Kingdom of Hungary and Lika rapidly spread across Bosnia. In the summer of 1684 and 1685, most of the southeast part of the Kingdom of Hungary, including Pest, was in the hands of the Habsburgs.

Herceg Novi, Knin, Osijek, Buda, Belgrade, Užice, and in the areas of Lika, Slavonia, and the Kingdom of Hungary. Muslims in the regions of modern Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Macedonia also faced a dreadful fate in the 19th and 20th centuries.

The expression "Eastern Question" first appeared in the diplomatic language of 1822 during the Greek Revolution.[28] Balkan Christian intellectuals educated in the West strongly opposed the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. Intellectual elites from the Balkan nations developed visions and aspirations that included as much territory these nations lived in as possible.[29] Nationalism originally formed among the Greeks and Slavic Christian peoples. If the Ottoman Empire had represented 'terra incognita' until the Greek Revolution of 1821, knowledge about it was based on "stories from *One Thousand and One Nights*" rather than on historical facts.[30] The purpose of the "Eastern Question" was, according to some authors, to disintegrate the multi-ethnic Ottoman state, since Europe had failed to understand its civilizational achievements, "particularly in the sphere

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Thousands of Ottoman *sipahis*, with many Bosniaks among them, left those regions. June 1686 saw the fall of Buda, the most important Muslim center north of the Sava and Danube Rivers. After the Venetian occupation of Dalmatia and coastal towns, according to some authors (Adem Handžić), approximately 130,000 refugees withdrew to Bosnia. In six decades during the 19th century, on several occasions, as a result of several internal and external military and political factors as well as of various forms of force, there were mass movements and emigration of Muslims from the *Sanjak* of Smederevo in different directions, particularly to the *Eyalet* of Bosnia. Ever since the late 17th century, this once numerous population was exposed to frequent calamities, expulsion, pauperization, and a number of other existential ordeals in this *sanjak*. The first migration movement rose after the Serb uprising under Karađorđe in 1804 and the general persecution of Muslims. After the uprising was quelled in 1813, some of them returned to their plundered homes. The acquiring of Serb autonomy and the process of developing Serb statehood in the territory of the *Sanjak* of Smederevo would soon lead to the gradual disappearance of the remaining Muslims. A new migration movement towards the *Eyalet* of Bosnia mostly included the rural population of this *Sanjak* during the period between 1830 and 1834, while the next and final one in 1862 included the urban population. Some Muslims came to Bosnia from areas that were given to Montenegro, particularly from Nikšić and Kolašin. For more information see Safet Bandžović, *Bošnjaci i deosmanizacija Balkana: muhadžirski pokreti i pribježišta "sultanovih musafira"* (*1683.-1875.*) [Bosniaks and the De-Ottomanization of the Balkans: Muhağirūn Movements and Refugees of "The Sultan's Guests" (1683–1875)] (Sarajevo: Self-Publishing, 2013).

28 Čedomir Popov, *Građanska Evropa* (*1770–1871*) [The Citizens' Europe (1770–1871)] (Novi Sad: Matica Srpska, 1989), 200.

29 Urs Altermatt, *Etnonacionalizam u Evropi* [Ethnonationalism in Europe] (Sarajevo: Svjetionik Sarajevo, 1997), 83.

30 Vuk Vinaver, "Tursko stanovništvo u Srbiji za vreme Prvog srpskog ustanka," [The Turkish Population in Serbia at the Time of the First Serbian Insurrection] *Istorijski glasnik* 2 (1995): 49. Dimitri Kitsikis, *Osmanlijsko Carstvo* (Belgrade: XX VEK, 1999), 6.

of religious tolerance, human rights, and multiculturalism."[31] The complexity of the "Eastern Question" is therefore evident, with its political essence being made of serious mutual confrontation among a number of stakeholders.

The European nation-building process in the late 18th century brought significant changes to relations between Christians and Muslims in the Balkans. The national movements of the Christian nations found themselves marked by "Europeanization" and "modernization," which Christians related to "erasing" the heritage of Ottoman rule, even though "European elements" were often superficial, visible in the elite culture, fashion, technology, and architecture.[32] The Ottoman Empire had long played the role of a "freezer," keeping Balkan nationalisms in a "solid" state. With the dissolution of this Empire in the 19th century, Balkan integrationist nationalisms, with the European powers' war trumpets, awoke from their slumber. Appreciating the primary role of empires in history, contemporary researchers treat them as complex and ambiguous phenomena that have left not only a negative but also a positive heritage, regarding them with respect rather than with judgment. One may, as one wishes, single out a lot of examples from the past in order to defend both imperialist and nationalist ideas. The only thing beyond doubt is that people face the hardest of times in transition periods, in times when an empire or a national state was being established. Mutual relations between an empire and a nation-state represent an aspect of the paradox found in relations between empires and modern states. The nation-state project, with its aspirations towards cultural and linguistic homogenization of the population, also matures within an empire. Such national projects in the Balkans are, in many ways, not merely a negation of the empire but are also fruits of imperial politics. In its ethnic kaleidoscope, the principle of nationality is primarily a "recipe for violence," particularly against Muslims.[33] Uprisings against the Ottomans in the 19th century, according to Ivo Banac, were both religious and national by definition: "therein lie the roots of deep fear of religious and national diversity." The trend of expelling Muslims

31 Džemal Sokolović, *"BiH je posljednje iskušenje nacionalne države,"* accessed April 5, 2017 http://www.e-novine.com/feljton/108302-BiH-posljednje-iskuenje-nacionalne-drave.html.

32 Ružica Čičak-Chand, "Kršćani, muslimani i međuetnička koegzistencija u jugoistočnoj Europ," [Christians, Muslims and Interethnic Coexistence in South-Eastern Europe] *Migracijske i etničke teme 4* (2009): 416. Božidar Jezernik, *Zemlja u kojoj je sve naopako: Prilozi za etnologiju Balkana* (Sarajevo: Bemust, 2000). Božidar Jezernik, *Divlja Evropa: Balkan u očima putnika sa Zapada* (Belgrade: XX VEK, 2007).

33 Olivera Milosavljević, "Jugoslavija kao zabluda," in *Srpska strana rata*, ed. Nebojša Popov (Belgrade: Samizdat, 1996), 60. Marija Todorova, *Imaginarni Balkan* (Belgrade: XX VEK, 1999), 300. Mark Mazower, *Balkan: Kratka povijest* (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2003), 125.

was present in the 19th century history of the Balkan national states, which tended to apply "solutions" so as to eliminate rather than regulate the "Muslim Issue." The Muslim population was regarded as one of the unwanted segments of Ottoman heritage. Calling all Muslims by the name "Turks" was certainly not a consequence of ignorance, but rather of a specific attitude.[34] This yet unresolved state of mind in the Balkans was termed a fascinating "circle of Turkish magic." The "Turkish yoke" is here, like some sort of historical indulgence, something that in advance justifies any action of the "nation," something that is amnesty a priori. It seems, says Dubravka Stojanović, that "if someone were to 'take Turks away' from us, we would be forced to face ourselves and our own omissions."[35] A stern and antagonizing position regarding the recognition of ethnic and cultural differences within one's own national and state territory in the unstable Balkan region led to aspirations towards homogenization. They took on a specific shape in numerous border reviews, forced assimilation, expulsion, organized resettlement, ethnic cleansing and wars, restoration, and the creation of so-called "ethnically cleaner" state communities. The essential dimension of relations among different ethnic and religious communities is the relationship of equality or, rather, inequality.

Christian inhabitants of the Balkans tried to "become Europeans" by brutally destroying Ottoman heritage, uncritically emulating Western models, and accepting the restricting form of national states.[36] Almost everywhere in Europe, one's own state was ascribed with a divine nature. Achieving national goals, regardless of their content, was considered a "holy" duty. Europe was inflamed by nationalism, which was a transnational and trans-territorial phenomenon. Through the destruction of the Ottoman system and its demographic pattern – a mixture of religions and peoples – and through the acceptance of the form of the national state as well as through the fragmentation of historical consciousness, the study and valorization of Islamic/Ottoman/Oriental cultural heritage remained susceptible to the influence of ethnocentricity and the parceling of one common history, by means of recasting and constructing a decreed national past.

34 Darko Tanasković, "Srbi turskog zakona" ili "Turci srpskog jezika," ['Serbs of Turkish Law' or 'Turks of Serbian Language'] in *Serbia i komentari*, ed. Živorad Stojković. (Belgrade: *Zadužbina Miloša Crnjanskog,* 1991), 215.

35 Dubravka Stojanović, "U ogledalu 'drugih,' [In the Mirror of 'Others']" in: *Novosti iz prošlosti: znanje, neznanje, upotreba i zloupotreba istorije*, ed. Vojin Dimitrijević. (Belgrade: Beogradski centar za ljudska prava, 2010), 27–28.

36 Karl Kaser, Sukob religija i kultura na Balkanu: prošlost i perspektive [The clash of religions and cultures in the Balkans: past and perspectives], *Almanah* 15–16 (2001), 82–83. Stevan Pavlović, *Istorija Balkana* [*A History of the Balkans*], trans. Čedomir Antić (Belgrade: Clio 2001), 495–496.

Ethnic identity is created against and in relation to some other ethnic identities, as their opposition and as the "symbolic determination of one community in relation to others." Affiliation with a nation is a matter of determination, and not of genetic origin. Sociological and historiographical research from the second half of the 20th century shows that all modern nations are "artificial" or that, prior to the French Revolution, nations had not existed in the form they imply today. Nevertheless, if a certain group of people, sharing the same language, culture, religion, and geographical location – though not necessarily in this order or with all these "elements" present – feel they belong to one nation, then this nation thereby exists, regardless of the manner and time of its creation.[37] Every national identity comprises a number of nuances and differences that each national feels and expresses in his/her own way. People are not defined by language alone, notices Holm Sundhaussen, "as important as it may be." A nation includes the awareness of community and a name accepted by everyone. A number of authors show that national consciousness is formed through certain stages. Nations are shaped and they change through historical processes. A nation, as a whole, is not only an ethnographic or philological category, but also an international law, territorial and political, as well as a cultural and historical concept. The theory according to which the ethnogenesis of a people is a one-off action, performed once and for all, is completely ahistorical. A heterogeneous origin of large and developed ethnic communities is not an exception, but a rule. Though not the only one, the myth of Arminius within the German national identity is one of the good examples of a typically European identity mix relating to a certain territory and to a certain nation, its destiny, and its language. Standardization of a language leads to the creation of a linguistic community whose members recognize those not belonging to the community but, at the same time, also recognize one another as part of the same collective.[38] The French were created by blending the Celtic, Iberian, and German population, the English by blending Celts and Germans, while the Pelasgian, Etruscan, Celtic, and other peoples participated in the formation of the Italian nation. Communities that are called "ethnic" need not also be communities of blood-related people of the same origin. They may be, but they do not *have* to be. A "biological" relation is not a constant but a variable feature

37 Dejan Đokić, "Kritičko mišljenje i istorija," [Critical thought and history], *Republika* 221 (1999): 16–30.

38 A particularly illustrative example of the role of language in identifying its speakers is the word *Nijemac* (German) in almost all Slavic languages (Czech *němec*, Croatian *Nijemac*, Serbian *Nemac*…) and neighboring non-Slavic languages such as Romanian (*neamț*) or Hungarian (*német*). Its root is the term *nijem* – (stutter), i.e. unable to communicate. Jairo Dorado Cadilla, "Uticaj društvenih struktura Otomanskog carstva na lingvistički identitet u Bosni," *Balkanija* 4 (2013): 42–44.

of the ethnos and can, therefore, not be included in its "distinctive features."[39] Relativizing Serb ethnic authenticity, Ilarion Ruvarac claimed he knew from his own experience that "in the case of us, Serbs, and those among us who are Serbianized – Bulgarians, Vlachs, Aromanians, and Arbanasi – it is easier and more advantageous to believe and faithfully accept folk tales and imaginary stories, which many a learned and reasonable writer have taken as gospel truth."[40]

5 Processes of De-Ottomanization and "Balkanization"

The political geography of the Balkans was radically reshaped throughout history, most frequently within the play of major powers' interests, but the deep matrices of collective psychology of its peoples have changed far too slowly.[41] The "nation that became the substance of the Balkan states," points out Kemal Karpat, was essentially understood as a religious community and,

39 Dušan Bandić, *Carstvo zemaljsko i carstvo nebesko: ogledi o narodnoj religiji* [Earthly Empire and Celestial Empire: Essays on Folk Religion] (Belgrade: Cigoja štampa, 1997), 38–39.

40 Olivera Milosavljević, "Izbor ili nametanje tradicije," [The Choice or Imposition of Tradition] *Republika* 281 (2002): 16–31. There are a number of examples where the ethnogenesis of a people is not a one-off action. The so-called Bulgarians or Proto-Bulgarians – Asparukh's Bulgarians belong to the Turkic peoples. They settled in the Balkans sometime around 680, in the region situated between the Balkan massifs and the Danube River, in its lower course, downstream of the Đerdap Gorge. There they found the Slav population that had already settled there in the meantime. From the 680s until the first half of the 9th century, there was an ongoing process of blending the far outnumbered Bulgarians into the Slavic mass. When the Greeks staged their Revolution against Ottoman rule in 1821, it was met with support and approval in Europe. At the peak of great philhellenism, German Jakob Philipp Fallmerayer published his *History of the Morea Peninsula during the Middle Ages* in two volumes. He attempted to prove that the Greeks of his time – the revolutionaries – were actually not the Greeks they wanted to pass for and that they were in no way linked to Plato, Aristotle or Pericles. Rather, they had simply been too mixed in to their immediate history, primarily exposed to influences and migration to the Greek soil, among which the most prominent were the Slavic, Turkish and, somewhat later, Albanian components, in parallel with which there were also the Frankish, i.e. Latin, one. In this conglomerate of peoples, according to Fallmerayer, the Greek ethnos disappeared, so that it was pointless to refer to traditions of Classical Greek culture, which the Greeks of the 19th century had nothing to do with. This thesis won his work a permanent place in the so-called index of proscribed books in Greece. The underlying concept of his "exaggerated idea," says Ivan Đurić, was true: "It is a fact that the Greeks mixed with other peoples throughout their history," Đurić, *Vlast,* 64–65.

41 Ljubiša Mitrović, "Geopolitički i sociološki aspekti tranzicije jednog regionalnog prostora – od Balkana ka Jugoistočnoj Evropi," [Geopolitical and Sociological Aspects of the Transition of a Region – From the Balkans to Southeast Europe] *Srpska politička misao* 1–2 (2006): 120.

only subsequently, as a worldly and ethnolinguistic entity, despite a former acknowledgement of the latter concept. The hostile nationalist Balkan elites were a radical threat to Muslims. The geopolitical situation in the Balkans and its surroundings changed, but its mentality did not. In certain periods, they revitalized deep anti-Muslim prejudice, employing skillful manipulations to mutate them into transparent and aggressive projects of physical and cultural eradication. "Historical mentality," says Peter Dincelbaher, is "an ensemble of ways and content of thoughts and feelings defining a certain collective at a certain age." Mentality, as an identity, is formed in long-lasting processes and is difficult to change. It is manifested through actions. This, in a way, also implies the term *behavior* as the primary term in defining a "historical mentality." It is imbued with knowledge, expectations, fears, beliefs, and needs. Mentalities are not overly prone to changes. There is no nationalism without stereotypes about "others," since without them there is no stereotype about "oneself" either, nor are there interest manipulations. The fate of Muslims was not determined only by the way they behaved and thought about themselves, but also by what "others" thought about them. They are not the "favorites" of Balkan and European historiography. Having stayed in Bosnia in 1855, Massieu de Clerval (1820–1896) says with regard to the Bosniaks that "a great misfortune of this part of the Slavic race is that it is unknown, or that it is, at least, known only through reports of its enemies."[42]

Muslims were satanized following the scheme of mythic confrontation, and the antagonism between good and evil. After such demonization, violence appeared as a normal phenomenon. The overall ethnic and religious cleansing and persecution of Muslims have not been the consequences, but rather the primary goals of wars.[43] Sources from the 19th century document

42 Massieu De Clerval, "Putovanje u Bosnu 1855," [Travels in Bosnia, 1855], *Forum Bosnae* 5 (1999) : 321.

43 During and after the Crimean War (1854–1856), the period from 1859 to 1862 saw a huge wave of emigration of Tatars to the Ottoman Empire. In 1857, the Ottoman Porte passed a law promising to allocate land to *muhaǧir* families and to exempt them from taxation and military service for six to twelve years, depending on the location they settled in. Approximately 240,000 Tatars emigrated in the period from 1855–1862. In 1859, the Ottoman Porte set up a separate department within the Ministry of Trade – Committee for Refugees – in charge of taking care of the Tatar settlement. A large-scale migration process in the 1860s continued with the settling of the Circassians expelled from the Caucasus and, somewhat later, with that of Muslims from the Balkans. In the period 1877–1878, numerous Muslims from the lost Ottoman provinces headed towards the center of the Ottoman state, "whose attraction and importance grew in proportion to weakness of its periphery," following the unknown courses of their fate. Their acceptance posed a huge challenge for the Porte, which was already financially depleted. A considerable inflow of population opened a number of long-lasting problems in terms of food provisions, accommodation, and health care to hundreds of thousands of people that had swarmed into major cities. For

relations between the newly-created Balkan states and Muslims either poorly or unilaterally. Dramatic events in the period between 1875 and 1878 intensified de-Ottomanizing trends, and the persecution of Muslims. The accompanying territorial demarcation changed the religious and ethnic landscape of the Balkans. The Congress of Berlin in 1878 brought about the greatest division the Balkans had ever experienced. Following 1878, Ottoman Europe was reduced to a "stretch of land" from the Adriatic to the Black Sea, representing a challenge in terms of new conquests and parceling on the part of belligerent neighbouring states. Intent on asserting their claims, the Balkan states turned the "Eastern Question" into a demographic issue. Nationalism "precluded the possibility for different nationalities to ever live peacefully in one state." The Balkan nations were formed in the process of destroying the Ottoman political setup and its social and cultural heritage. Here, the "aspect of population" was certainly the primary one, which is unknown to the modern experience of West Europe. This feature specific to Southeast Europe consisted in the impossibility of national integration of those parts of the population that identified and were identified with the Ottoman regime due to their religious affiliation. Many of those who estimated the Balkan population and participated in a "war of statistics" were infected with racism. European calculations on the population of "Ottoman Europe" are irrelevant in terms of the total population. This is "partly a consequence of prejudice that Europeans included in their analyses." They failed to consult the primary population sources of Ottoman Europe – the Ottoman government's statistics. In doing so, they failed to acknowledge the fundamental principle of demography – that only those counting the population can know the true data. The Ottomans were the only ones carrying out a population census in the Empire. Balkan nationalists were often indiscernible from typical racists, convinced that a "people" or "nation" is determined by blood or national features of the soul. Everyone assumed that the population of the Ottoman Europe, regardless of the "defining colors," was precisely of their own nation. Racist beliefs are devastating to population counting.[44] Unlike European Christian apologists, the Ottomans never applied "racial" criteria to their censuses.

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more information, see Miloš Jagodić, *Naseljavanje Kneževine Srbije 1861–1880* [The Settlement of the Duchy of Serbia 1861–1880] (Belgrade: Istorijski institut SANU, 2004), 32–35; Safet Bandžović, "Muhadžirski pokreti u spisima i svjedočenjima savremenika tokom XIX i XX stoljeća," [Muhağirūn Movements in the Documents and Testimonies of Contemporary Witnesses in the XIX and XX Century] *Zbornik Sjenice* 14, (2003): 21–53.

44 McCarthy observes: "When a defender of one or another Balkan nation estimates the number of members of 'his own nation,' he frequently includes all those that have the required type of soul. It is not affected by the fact that such persons do not speak his

It appeared that few were particularly worried about the destiny of Balkan Muslim refugees. They could not count on Europe's sympathy for one simple reason: they were not Christian. Not all the victims were equal in their suffering. Those that were perceived as evil were neither spoken of nor thought about.[45] Although the Western world had long shown its concern for the position of Christians in the Ottoman Empire, only an insignificant portion was interested in the fate of Balkan Muslims. Owing to this neglect, one major demographic disaster remained undisclosed. Cultures of denial encourage collective blindness, failure to investigate crimes, and the treatment of crimes as something normal within the rhythm of everyday life. Numerous historians, who were themselves under the psychosis of the already established fateful matrices of the centuries-long shadow of the Ottomans, including the "fight of the cross against non-Christians," the "Turkish syndrome" and the politics of unprecedented nationalism, interpreted and justified the process of Muslim disappearance as a totally logical phenomenon. Switching the roles of victim and perpetrator and offering an implicit explanation of everything that befell Muslims, such researchers even contributed to delegitimizing the very existence of Muslims as a community. By dehumanizing them, they also delegitimized them as human beings. Anti-Muslim tendencies are part and parcel of "all modern ideologies." It is not the practice of politics and ideology to present reality "as it truly or approximately is but, rather, as they find it favorable and as they would like it to be." Those who killed, persecuted, and eradicated certain Muslim communities cannot, particularly not under the impression of "Turkish syndrome" and hatred towards Islam, represent valid and exclusive sources of studying the history of these very peoples. So-called "fair national history" presupposes the ability to "forget" anything that is not in its favor. The essence of morality lies in its universality. Considering the arguments of only one side, pursuing certain interests, and ignoring contrary results and interpretations have always posed a problem. The idea of a single truth is the basis of authoritarian thinking and totalitarianism.[46]

The attitude towards Muslims precluded tolerance and equality. Violent nationalism of "the majority" opposed any other political or ethnic and national model within these states that might jeopardize its exclusiveness and

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language, or that they belong to another religion or have even sworn to fight against him and his compatriots to death. They are Bulgarian (or Greek or Serb) whether they like it or not. It would naturally follow that all those people belong to the same country their racial brethren live in." McCarthy, "Stanovništvo," 31–32.

45 Jezernik, *Zemlja,* 316. Pavlović, *Istorija Balkana*, 495.

46 Dubravka Stojanović, „Istoričari nisu sudije," [Historians Are Not Judges] *Helsinška povelja* 89–90. (2005): 28–29; Latinka Perović, „Jedna prevratnička knjiga," [A Subversive Book] *Helsinška povelja* 95–96. (2006): 42.

complete possessiveness. Wars in which the "liberation" of one people results in the elimination of other peoples cannot have a liberating purpose. However, there are mythological mists and "triumphant truths" that neglect facts, discarding anything that might undermine an idealized image of the past, which should be given their necessary legitimacy in the function of "higher aims" of reality. The phenomenon of destroying the heritage of other peoples or religions is buried "somewhere deep inside history and human psyche," and it speaks not only of the insecurity of those that destroy but also of "their pathology and demented need to destroy everything around them." Approximately 1.5 million registered refugees left the Balkans from 1878 to 1918, not counting a considerable number of those having crossed the Ottoman borders illegally. The wars left long-lasting psychological traumas across the remaining Ottoman territory, particularly among the refugees. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the once single geographical region of Rumelia or Ottoman Europe was divided into several small and mutually distrustful states. The ethnic and religious homogeneity of these post-Ottoman non-Muslim states was achieved by persecuting a diverse Muslim population. European powers formally abhorred the crimes against Muslims but never failed to legalize the territorial conquests and consequences of ethnic and religious persecution. To the Muslim nations of the Balkans, they did open the possibility of a state, but only that of religious survival.[47] Muslim requests for self-determination were met with caution and reservations. Milorad Ekmečić states that "global science" long ago endorsed the view that persecution of Muslims from the European territory in all the wars that the Ottoman Empire lost until 1878 was caused by a lack of any provision of international law stipulating that "the Muslim minority in the liberated territory" has to be protected.[48] The established minority protection system was inadequate and did not include monitoring mechanisms for supervising the practical implementation of commitments. The international

47 Enes Karić, „Bosanske muslimanske rasprave za i protiv obnove i reforme u XX stoljeću," [Bosnian Muslim debates for and against reforms in the 20th century] *Beharistan* 5–6 (2002): 162.

48 Milorad Ekmečić, „Opažanje o Srbima u turskom časopisu," [Reflections on Serbs in Turkish journals] *Perceptions* 3 (2000):181. According to Ekmečić, the 1815 Congress of Vienna justified it as "the nature of Islamic wars." In accordance with different provisions, they do not end in peace but only a truce. All prisoners, should they wish to remain as Muslims with the "liberated side," have to change their faith, just as Christians on the "Turkish side." Following "the tradition ended only by the Congress of Vienna," says this historian in 2004, "when a sultan loses parts of European territory, the Muslim minority is not recognized under international law," – as quoted in: Milorad Ekmečić, "Srpski narod u borbi za nezavisnu državu," *NIN* (2772, 2004).

protection of minorities until WWI did not represent a general institute, but individual cases arising from the formation of new states, or from territorial rearrangements.

6 Refugee Movements and Destinations

The issue of emigration applies to all the Muslim communities on the periphery of the 19th century Muslim world. European colonial expansion introduced a new dimension into the relation between Islam and the states for a number of Muslim peoples. Muslims of the Balkans, the Caucasus, Lebanon, India, Nigeria, and Transvaal requested *fatwas* concerning life in a non-Muslim environment.[49] In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Balkan Muslims felt abandoned and surrounded.[50] According to Muhsin Rizvić, the period from 1878 to 1882 was a "time of suffering" for Bosniaks, as Bosnia-Herzegovina saw no book or epistle written and dated during these four years. It was truly a "discourse of silence" or a "discourse by silence," contradictory as it may seem. From 1882, Islamic discourse was reduced, in the case of a number of authors, to the dilemma of whether to leave (*hiǧra*) against the discourse in favor of staying (*vatan*).[51] Various forms of discrimination only made the dilemma more acute. Until 1910, the official names used for the Bosniaks were "Muhammadans," "Mahometans" or "Mohammedans." At that point, the provincial government ordered that the only name used for them had to be

49 Fikret Karčić, *Šerijatsko pravo – reformizam i izazovi, Hrestomatija tekstova i eseja* [Sharia Law – Reformism and Challenges: Chrestomathy of Texts and Essays] (Sarajevo: Biblioteka Savremeni islamski mislioci, 2009), 129.

50 The arrival of Austria-Hungary to Bosnia-Herzegovina was a civilizational shock for most Bosniaks in economic, political, religious, and cultural terms, which made many of them, from all social strata, decide to emigrate. The mass emigration had several waves and lasted until 1912. Psychological or religious and political motivation played an important role in their departure. Significant causes of their emigration could also be found in the sphere of economic and social relations established after 1878. According to data of the new government, 63,000 Bosniaks moved out of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whereas a number of researchers state that the figure of Bosniak emigrants ranges from 140,000 to 180,000.

51 Enes Karić, "Vidovi islamskog diskursa u BiH od druge polovine XIX stoljeća do danas – historijski pregled," [Types of Islamic Discourse in B&H from the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century to Present – A Historical Overview] in: *Islamski diskurs u Bosni i Hercegovini*, ed. Mehmedalija Hadžić (Sarajevo: Centar za napredne studije, 2011), 18.

"Muslim."[52] The Austro-Hungarian project of modernizing Bosnia-Herzegovina was based on European culture and practice as its referential framework. It had a number of similarities with the experience of other Muslim peoples under colonial rule: modernization came after military conquests, with the occupation authorities presenting their goal as a "cultural mission," where the project was justified by referring to the "dual identity" theory, according to which colonial authorities had the right to charge for their "cultural mission" by means of utilizing the natural resources of the country they ruled.

Bosniak emigration to the Ottoman Empire and subsequently to Turkey, particularly in the 19th and 20th centuries, as part of a long-lasting process of extensive Muslim departure from the Balkans, represented a massive emigration movement caused by direct effects of a number of political, social, economic, and other relevant factors. Emigration movements from the Balkan region towards Anatolian and other distant areas significantly changed its ethnic and religious composition. Emigration also meant the loss of a significant part of the Slavic population that, in the Ottoman-Turkish regions and in different circumstances, needed a long period of time to adjust to the new living conditions, being categorized as a "displaced people," and preserving the lore about its origin and its native region. Convoys of emigrants were also joined by numerous learned people, taking away with them a portion of history that cannot be interpreted in simplified terms. Therefore, literature was once again to substitute for history as a science.[53] Movements of people into the Ottoman Empire swallowed entire families. Following 1878, refugees received the right to settle in urban Ottoman areas. From this point, refugee settlements of different layouts and types began to grow in and around central Anatolian towns. Such is also the case of a Bosnian settlement in Ankara or several in Çorum, which

52 Alija Isaković, ed., *O "nacionaliziranju" Muslimana: 101 godina afirmiranja i negiranja nacionalnog identiteta Muslimana* (Zagreb, 1990), 282. Russian diplomatic representatives also noticed that, following 1878, the new occupation authorities made a series of mistakes with regard to Muslims. This primarily related to accommodating soldiers in their houses, turning mosques into warehouses and their desecration by bringing wine, spirits, and pork into them, unfair urban tax assessment, and the occasional unacceptable conduct of military and civil officers with regard to human rights and human dignity. See Ibrahim Tepić, "Uspostavljanje austrougarske okupacione vlasti u Bosni i Hercegovini u izvještajima ruskog konzulata u Sarajevu (1879–1880)," [The Establishment of Austro-Hungarian Rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Reports from the Russian Consulate in Sarajevo (1879–1880)] *Prilozi* 24 (1988): 125.

53 Literary author Husein Bašić, in his novel *Crnoturci*, writes the following: "Once a raven was asked if there was anything blacker than him. The raven answered: The refugee heart is blacker than me." Husein Bašić, *Crnoturci* [Black Turks: Dream and Script] (Podgorica: Udruženje pisaca Sandžaka, 1996), 15.

were built between 1881 and 1892. Refugees from the Balkans brought along their knowledge and sometimes even their capital assets. Their contribution was also significant at the intellectual level. Refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina dispersed across Sandžak, Kosovo, Albania and Epirus, all the way to Janjina, as well as across the Rumelian regions. The first settlements of Bosniaks in Anatolia were founded after 1878, in the region from Smyrna to Eskişehir, around Bursa, around Yenişehir, near Ankara, as well as in Istanbul, Karamürsel, İnegöl, Biga, Afium Karahisar, Ismid, and Hamidiye. In addition, a small number of Bosniaks settled in the Arabic provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Some even went as far as Palestine and settled in Caesarea near Haifa, on the Palestinian Mediterranean coast. A group of them settled in Janun near Nablus. Some refugees stopped in the territory of modern Albania, near Durrës, in a small town called Shijak, in the villages of Borake and Koxhas.[54] Bosniak refugees faced a number of problems in their new environments. The transition from one world to another was a terrible ordeal, with deep and traumatic consequences.[55] The authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina stated that the emigration movement was not so much caused by economic reasons as it was by agitation and that it occasionally spread like a disease. Kadira Beširević from the Cazin region in Bosnia, who emigrated in 1906, used to say she had heard about a

54 Previous historiography was mostly focused on the reasons behind Bosniak emigration following 1878, offering only certain suggestions as to the position of refugees in their new environment or the attitude on the part of the Ottoman authorities and native population. Historiography has skirted the destiny of Bosnia-Herzegovina refugees outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, their hardships, and new emigration and movements during the Balkan, world and other wars.

55 In early 1902, the Provincial Government sent a letter to all the county offices to interview returnees with regard to the reasons of their return to Bosnia-Herzegovina and to submit to the government the records of these interviews. Returnees mostly said that the climate – the air – in Asia Minor had not suited them, that they had been allocated barren land, small and inadequate houses, that they had to work hard for a meager wage, and that they received some financial assistance for their return from the Austro-Hungarian consulates in Istanbul, İzmir, Skopje, Niš, and Belgrade. Some even returned to Bosnia on foot. After 1912, a great number of Bosnian refugees, who had settled across Ottoman Balkan provinces, was forced to leave and withdraw deeper into the heartland of what had remained of the Ottoman Empire. A minor part of them returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Archives, in its section for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Provincial Government, has 296 files of such interview records in a separate folder entitled "Interviews with Emigrants to Turkey." Mina Kujović, "O bosanskim muhadžirima, povratnicima iz Turske u vrijeme austrougarske uprave," [About Bosnian refugees, returnees from Turkey during the Austro-Hungarian administration] *Gračanički glasnik* 22 (2006): 73.

decree issued by the Sultan inviting "whosoever is mine, come to me."[56] Facing the harsh reality and a new world dispersed all illusions, hopes, and dreams. Those who did not speak Turkish were particularly badly received.[57] In 1910, Jovan Cvijić wrote the following: "I have heard it from Bosnian refugees, who left for Asia Minor as young men and learnt Turkish there, just as a simple man going through the mill in Austria or Germany learns German, that every Ottoman can tell they are foreigners as soon as they utter a word and treats them as foreigners … One evening I went to talk with certain important Bosnian refugees from Bursa. It was difficult to see those decrepit and feeble men, mostly descendants of the several most famous and most powerful Bosnian families. All of them only whined and regretted having left their country, justifying it by the fact that under 'Boches,' it was impossible to live."[58] Visiting emigrants

56 With regard to his journey through Bosnia during the 1897 Greco-Turkish War, Stjepan Radić later expressed his impressions in a treatise entitled *Živo hrvatsko pravo na Bosnu i Hercegovinu* (1908): "If you had, at the time, entered any Turkish coffee shop or, even better, observe unnoticed, you would have seen our "Turks" avidly listen to war news, with their fervent eyes saying: Oh, if only we were there now to give our lives for the Tsar," – as quoted in Isaković, *O "nacionaliziranju" Muslimana;* 31.

57 Šaćir Filandra, ed., *Bošnjačka politika u XX. stoljeću* [Bosniak Politics in the 20th Century] (Sarajevo: Sejtarija, 1998), 30. A letter arrived from Sivrihisar to Bosnia: "I am alive, thank God, but it is getting harder every day and one can never get used to this. Nobody can find any work but if a Bosniak has got one yellow *yuzluk* or two, he goes to a village to buy something, they won't kill him but rather take his money and tell him: now go to the *Kaymakam* and sue us. By God, it's impossible to live here! The Turks look at us as if we were pigs. But, there are days that I can't cry but rather spend them in silence. I have no passport to run away nor do I have a single penny. I mustered this much, more than this I dare not write to you … The folk from Sarajevo are in Sivrihisar, in the Angora region, suffering and crying there." One *muhağir* wrote from Adapazarı: "We're all regretful and tearful. The Turks can't stand the sight of us and, as there can be no peace and harmony with them, as these people are bigoted and virulent, some of us Bosniaks are always before the court for a row and fist fighting or, unfortunately, for stealing as well, since man will reach for someone else's property when life presses him hard." A *muhağir* wrote from Ankara: "All our refugees would gladly return but the government here does not allow us to, and we have no means either. The Turks treat the Bosniaks worse than anyone can imagine." Bandžović, *Iseljavanje Bošnjaka u Tursku* [Emigration of Bosniaks to Turkey] (Sarajevo: Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i medunarodnog prava, 2006), 614–616.

58 Jovan Cvijić*, Govori i članci* [Talks and Texts] (Belgrade: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, 1987), 200–201. *Gajret* magazine published in Sarajevo, attempting to prevent emigration of the Muslim population from Bosnia-Herzegovina, wrote in early February 1910 that, in a foreign and unknown world, "not even the sweetest bite can be sweet and it always becomes bitter, turning sweet sugar into a bitter cup of gall. For, one easily becomes ridiculed and afflicted in a foreign world, among foreign folk, who have different customs and speak a different and unknown language. One easily becomes despised and rejected among foreign folk, who cannot understand your language in which you beg them to give you some work, but every misfortunate one that is forced to beg for a crust of bread is even lower than the most despised ones in the eyes of strangers and foreigners,

to the Ottoman Empire in 1910, Cvijić writes that immediately upon their arrival to malarial and marshy areas, almost one-third of them died, mainly children, attributing it to their sudden transition from fresh and chilly Bosnia to dry Anatolia. Those, however, settling in areas more like their native regions in terms of climate and morphology, like areas on the Marmara Sea coast (Karamürsel and the surrounding villages of Oluklu, Karabunar, Hayriye, Ihsaniye, etc.) where refugees from Herzegovina moved to, adapted more quickly and rather smoothly. Cvijić also states that descendants of such refugees would die out for the same reasons. In the 1970s, S. Smlatić established that this "prediction" did not come true and that, quite conversely, the emigrant birth-rate constantly grew. The first settlers had difficulties adapting, particularly the elderly who could not learn Turkish and who always felt they were perceived as foreigners.[59]

Muslims living on the periphery of the Ottoman Empire, faced with real threats to their survival and material security, rushed to rescue towards central and safer parts of the state, the attraction of which grew in proportion to the weakness of the periphery. Muslims in the Balkans, as its most numerous population, despite the fact that most of them lived on the border of the Islamic world and faced hostile relations on the part of the European-Christian world, had still perceived Islam as something apolitical until they became decimated. Their passive cultural and religious consciousness could easily turn into an impulsive Muslim identity when the circumstances so demanded. However, until the onset of emigration, the Islamic identity of these Muslims was mostly

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who angrily push him away, saying: "I've had enough of our own poor people, the last thing I need are some tramps creeping in from a foreign world," and so on. Yes, indeed, on one's own porch, in one's homeland, where people know one another, everyone can find someone who will understand him. You have someone to share your distress and affliction with, to complain about your troubles and problems to, you also have someone to borrow some money from if you need to; finally, you have someone to beg from if such misfortune befalls you. People know you and understand you, so they will not dismiss or reject you or, least of all, despise and scold you. Oh yes, it is indeed difficult and unfortunate wherever one does not have a brother or a next of kin. Yet, there are some brethren of ours who decide to make that fateful step that is called *hiğra*, yet there are some countrymen of ours who have left our country, this soil soaked with our grandfathers' blood, and left for a foreign soil "where they have no one, where they have no brethren." Still, some of our wretched brethren take this fateful path of guaranteed doom … Therefore, our emigrant cannot increase his property by emigrating; it is hence very stupid of those of our people who become greedy having heard some stories about "acres of land, oxen and liras" that the Tsar grants to refugees, and none should grasp greedily at such rumors."

59 Sulejman Smlatić, "Iseljavanje jugoslavenskih Muslimana u Tursku i njihovo prilagođavanje novoj sredini," [Emigration of Yugoslav Muslims to Turkey and their accommodation to the new environment] in *Iseljeništvo naroda i narodnosti Jugoslavije i njegove uzajamne veze s domovinom*. (Zagreb: Zavod za migracije i narodnosti, 1978), 249–256.

maintained through non-political rites and social practice. Migrants were utterly diverse in terms of their social, ethnolinguistic, and historical origin. Kemal Karpat holds that, in the place of their origin, they identified with Islam in terms of social behavior and rites rather than in terms of a political system. Before the migrations to the heart of the empire, a majority of these Muslims had identified with their tribe or ethnic group whereas Islam, in principle, had provided for the rules of social conduct and a secondary source of their identity. The migration process changed this relatively passive group Muslim identity, turning it into a more intense political consciousness and expanding its geographical and ideological framework. It not only changed the original group Muslim identity of migrants but also helped politicize the Muslim identity in the regions they arrived in. Movements and the circumstances causing them were a catalyst that changed the religious and cultural identity of migrants into a new dynamic political identity related to the new concept of a Muslim territorial state. They initiated changes to social and professional structures, demography, forms of settlement, and the landownership system of the Empire.[60]

The Balkan Wars of 1912–13 ended the process of eliminating the Ottoman government in most of the Balkans, which commenced in 1877–1878, transforming Muslims from the dominant element in terms of their number into a passive minority over which former Christian subjects of the Sultan would loom large.[61] The problem of the Balkan states having won these wars was that their peoples were a minority within the Ottoman Europe, where Muslims accounted for 51% of the population. The Balkan allies believed that the Muslim majority would be a constant threat to minority rule. The emigration and pogroms of Muslims appeared as a solution to this. The years of 1912

60 Kemal H. Karpat, "Hidžret iz Rusije i sa Balkana: proces samodefiniranja u kasnoj osmanlijskoj državi," [Migration from Russia and the Balkans: process of selfdefinition in late Ottoman state] in *Muslimani Balkana: "Istočno pitanje" u XX. vijeku,* ed. Fikret Karčić. (Sarajevo: Centar za napredne studije, 2014), 76–77.

61 After the 1912–1913 wars, Muslims were the undeniable losers in establishing new state borders. Their rights were completely neglected as the principle of self-determination did not apply to them. According to some foreign researchers, after having been exempted from Ottoman rule, the Balkans became a symbol of the desolate destiny of Muslims in Europe. Fanatic activities of de-Ottomanization were particularly successful in the material, perceptible, and public sphere. The most drastic sea changes were made to the general appearance of towns, architecture, and clothing. Out of 1,445,179 Muslims who no longer lived in the conquered area of the Ottoman Empire, 413,992 of them, according to Justin McCarthy, migrated to Turkey during and after the Balkan Wars. Between 1921 and 1926, 398,849 Muslims arrived in Turkey, mostly as part of a population exchange. Out of the total Muslim population in 1911, only 38 percent of them stayed back; see: McCarthy, "Stanovništvo," 52–53.

and 1913 saw the first massive instances of ethnic cleansing in 20th century European history. The shock at these crimes was even greater owing to the fact that they were committed only five years following the adoption of the Hague Convention of War on Land of 1907. The Balkan Wars marked the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in Europe.[62] The borders of the states formed on the Ottoman Empire's remains would often be challenged, proving that the division of this empire did not in itself lead to peace and stability.

The Great War (1914–1918) shook the foundations of Islamic Oriental civilization as well. In 1919, Orientalist Leone Caetani gave a warning about the effects of the war: "The entire Oriental world, from China to the Mediterranean, is now in turmoil. The hidden fire of anti-European hatred burns everywhere. Unrests in Morocco, uprisings in Egypt, Arabia, and Lebanon represent different manifestations of the same deep feeling and aim at instigating a riot of the Oriental world against European civilization. The main reason behind this warning is the realization that the Triple Entente wants to dismantle the Ottoman Empire, dividing its territory among the global powers and ceding Palestine to Jews."[63] Until the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, these populations had perceived themselves only as Muslims. Tekinalp (1883–1961) wrote that, in the years prior to WWI, the "Ottoman Turks" saw "themselves simply as Muslims and had never considered their nation as a nation with separate existence. Anatolian peasants interpreted the word 'Turk' as a synonym for '*Kizilbaş*,' i.e. a notion denoting not a nation but a man wearing a red fez, a

62 In 1913, reacting to resolutions of the academic community (Bosniak students in the West) and their position that "the failure of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkan War is not related to the failure of Islam, particularly not to that of Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina," as well as that "the Muslim academic youth holds that the hopes and ideals of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina must not be placed outside the boundaries of their people," Sakib Korkut gave the following response: "The above quotations represent neither more nor less than a 'wise' message that our millet should abandon the link with the Islamic caliphate and, adopting the ideal of nationalism, direct its gaze only to itself and its fellow tribesmen. The defeat, even (*me'azellah*) of the central element of the caliphate, the eradication of Muslims from the Balkan Peninsula, the slaughter of Islamic youngsters, women and the elderly, plundering their property and destroying their mosques, forced Christianization and other hardships of our brethren in Rumelia – all this should not concern us, all this should be a trivial matters to us – this is how our youth think, our self-proclaimed 'mainstay' – it is necessary and sufficient for 'heroic' Balkan Slavs to win, holding the cross in one hand and a firebrand in the other … I think that not even the Greek Patriarch himself would recommend any different sentiment to us:" Avdija Hasanović, *Rasprave o vjerskom i nacionalnom identitetu u časopisima štampanim arebicom,* [Debates on the Religious and National Identity in Journals printed in Arabic letters] (Sarajevo: Glasnik arhiva i Arhivističkog udruženja Bosne i Hercegovine, 2012), 223.

63 John Esposito, "Islam i Zapad: sukob civilizacija?," [Islam and the West: Clash of Civilizations?] *Beharistan* 3–4, (2001): 121.

"Red Head."[64] According to the decisions of the Versailles Peace Conference, the Ottoman Empire was to surrender its fleet to the winners, give up its Arab lands, and downsize its army to 50,000 men. Losing its Arab provinces, the Ottoman Empire was reduced to a small territory in Asia Minor, which was not exempted from further pillage either.[65] The Allies humiliated the Ottomans, allowing the Greeks to occupy parts of the Ottoman Empire, attempting to establish a Hellenic empire in the way of Alexander the Great.[66] Western powers harbored plans for dividing the oil and other resources of the Empire that was falling apart, not expecting any major resistance on its part. According to Egon Heymann, what was left of the Ottoman Empire was a "body without limbs." The Triple Entente forces, led by the British, entered the center of the Ottoman state in 1919, deeply convinced in the truth of propaganda that Muslims had killed millions of Christians for no reason whatsoever. In the view of the occupation powers, Muslims thereby lost the right to rule themselves, "which once more confirmed the supremacy of Western civilization over the Islamic one." National minorities tried to use the presence of the occupation army for their own goals, particularly the Greeks and Armenians. It was a prelude to the Greco-Turkish War and the war for independence of the new Turkish state led by Kemal Atatürk, who opposed the humiliating dictates of the Peace Conference.[67] The Atatürk army was joined by a number of refugees from the former Balkan provinces, which included Bosniaks. A significant number of

64 Miroljub Jevtić, *Islamsko-osmansko državno pravo u Srbiji* [Islamic-Ottoman State Law in Serbia] (Novi Sad: Matica srpska za društvene nauke, 2006), 276. Jevtić maintains that they were familiar with the expression "Turk," which they regularly used: "But its meaning had nothing to do with the nation. This clearly tells us that those whose mother tongue is Turkish and whom we call 'Turks' were actually quite distant from our belief that they considered themselves as Turks. They were not Turks although they might have been, as it meant nothing to them. To them, Islam meant everything." Đuro Bodrožić states that "Turks … avoided and were not fond of using their ethnic name. The word 'Turk' meant an Anatolian peasant to them." See Đuro V. Bodrožić, "Sociološko-pravne osnove srpskog identiteta," [Sociological-legal foundation of Serb identity] (PhD diss., Law Faculty Belgrade, 2012).

65 Čedomir Popov, *Od Versaja do Danciga* [From Versaille to Danzig] (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 1995), 139. Milorad Ekmečić, *Susret civilizacija i srpski odnos prema Evropi* [The encounter of civilizations and the Serb relationship to Europe] (Novi Sad: Fond za pomoć Srbima Toma Maksimović, 1997), 105. Safet Bandžović, *Bošnjaci i Turska: deosmanizacija Balkana i muhadžirski pokreti u XX stoljeću* (Sarajevo: Self-Publishing, 2014), 143–150.

66 Tom Reiss, *Orijentalista: rešavanje misterije jednog neobičnog i opasnog života* [Orientalist: solving the mystery of a strange and mysterious life], trans. Vladan Stojanović (Belgrade: Vulkan, 2006), 123.

67 Popov, *Od Versaja*, 139. And see Mirjana Teodosijević, *Mustafa Kemal Ataturk u jugoslovenskoj javnosti* [Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in Yugoslav public sphere] (Belgrade: NEA, 1998), 57–58.

them succeeded in making a distinguished military and diplomatic career.[68] Atatürk's army raised on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, after the Greco-Turkish War, and learning from the experience of multinational states that had collapsed – such as the Ottoman Empire – adopted the creation of an ethnically homogeneous state as its main principle. It inherited the vital core of the Ottoman state and its transformation from a monarchic regime into a republic was a logical score of "the interplay of forces that had previously transformed the traditional Ottoman state itself."[69]

An interstate population exchange is a euphemism for the collective expulsion of people who *de jure* and *de facto* became foreigners, with hypocritical explanations invoking national security, future friendly relations, and peace in the region. The states maintained that, pursuant to standard international law, they could decide on the destiny of their subjects. Numerous dramatic periods of recent Balkan history resulted from the fateful "Lausanne principle" of 1923 – the agreed population exchange common to interstate treaties in the first few decades of the 20th century. Following the Greco-Turkish War, the Lausanne principle legalized the practice of expelling ethnic communities – Greeks from Turkey, Turks and "Türk millet" – other Muslims from the Balkans. In fact, the principle defined the mandatory population exchange in the total of 1.3 million Greeks and 0.5 million Turks. In Lausanne, the great powers along with the Greek and Turkish governments defined the principle

68 Mehudin Pelesić, *Bošnjaci na svjetskim ratištima* [Bosniaks on world battlefields] (Sarajevo: Vojna biblioteka, 1996), 75–76. General Rifat Matardžija, originally from Ljubinje in Herzegovina, was a Turkish army commander in Eastern Thrace and later a gendarmerie commander. In 1923, he participated as a military expert in the Conference of Lausanne. Asim Gunduz, originally from Tuzla, was an army general, while Šukri Alibeg Fetahagić from Trebinje was a colonel and Chief of the General Staff Intelligence. There were a number of Bosniaks among officers and non-commissioned officers of the army and gendarmerie, as well as within politics and diplomacy. Mehmed Sulejmanpašić mentions a high-ranking officer and diplomat – Husrev-beg Stočević Rizvanbegović and diplomat Uzeir Zekari-beg Hadži Aliagić, originally from Gradiška, who, among other things, was a member of the Turkish peace delegation to Lausanne (1923). Diplomat Mehmed Munir-beg, originally from Central Bosnia and an expert in international law, played an important professional role during the Greco-Turkish negotiations on population exchange. He was also a standing Turkish representative to the International Court in The Hague. Also important for Turkish social life were, among others, Ankara Mayor Abdulah Nevzad Muderizović-Kurić, Lutfi-beg Resulbegović, Murat-beg Tafro, and Rušen Ešref-beg Smailkadić Vaizović.

69 The division of territories they inhabited and the appearance of a new and narrow definition of identity of the people caused a discontinuity and fragmentation of the consciousness of Muslims in the Balkans. Muslims perceived themselves only as members of separate religious and ethnic groups whose history was unrelated to other Muslims.

of preventive population exchange in Article 1 of the Treaty: "As from the 1st of May, 1923, there shall take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the Moslem religion established in Greek territory. These persons shall not return to live in Turkey or Greece respectively without the authorization of the Turkish Government or of the Greek Government respectively." The Treaty applied to all Greeks living in Anatolia and Thrace, except for the inhabitants of Istanbul prior to 1918, as well as to all Turks in Greece except for inhabitants of Western Thrace where, according to Turkish sources, out of 191,699 inhabitants, 129,120 of them were Turkish. The population exchange commenced as early as by the end of the war, when thousands of Greeks were transported from İzmir to Greece. This made the population of both states relatively homogeneous in ethnic terms. The application of the Greco-Turkish Treaty was supervised by the major powers, who considered the treaty as their own success. The ethics of forced resettlement were not heavily commented on. The harbors of Piraeus and Thessaloniki received Greek refugees arriving on all sorts of vessels.[70] Tens of thousands of refugees bent their backs under the load of their possessions or towed on loose carts "what was left of their lives."[71] "*Tourkosporoi*" was the word that the local Greek population used for refugees arriving from Anatolia. Across the Aegean Sea, "*yari gavur*" was the pejorative attribute for Muslims arriving from Greece. The disparaging names "*tourkosporoi*" (Turkish seed) and "*yari gavur*" (half-infidel) the indigenous population used for the exchanged people were only one of the lenses through which the micro effects of this population exchange may be observed. The exchange was disastrous at the individual level, i.e. for approximately two million individuals, but from the aspect of establishing the national states of Turks and

70 "On the deck stood a bunch of people pressed hard against one another, twitching and wriggling – a faithful image of true human misery. There was no place to sleep, there was no food, there was no going to the restroom. Many of those people, having been exposed to the rain and wind for four days, were soaking wet, were whipped up by the wind, and were sometimes even scorched by the midday sun. They reached the coast in rags, starved, sick, infested with parasites, with dark-ringed eyes, oozing the stench of human filth and hanging their heads low out of despair;" – this is how Henry Morgenthau, U.S. Chair of the Refugee Commission, described their condition, watching seven thousand men, women and children coming to the shore from a ship that, in normal circumstances, could hardly carry two thousand persons. Those were Greek refugees who were, in early 1923, unloaded like cattle from all sorts of vessels in the harbors of Piraeus and Thessaloniki. Filip Škiljan, "Međuratni period na Balkanu," [Interwar period in the Balkans] *Novosti* 464 (7 November 2008), http://www.snv.hr/pdf/464.pdf.

71 Misha Glenny, *The Balkans: Nationalism, War & the Great Powers, 1804–1999* (New York: Viking, 2000), 91.

Greeks and the stabilization of international relations in the region, it was seen as a positive action, at least on the part of its contemporaries. Something that is, as Neven Anđelić concludes, "quite certainly one of the gravest violations of fundamental human rights was thought to have brought peace and stability in the Aegean Sea region."[72] Numerous Greeks that came from Ottoman cities in 1923 looked at the provincialism of Greece with disdain. The number of Muslims deported from Greece ranged from 348,000 to 475,000. Before the exchange, Greece, according to certain data, had a total of around 650,000 Muslims, or 13% of its 4,900,000 inhabitants at the time. In addition, approximately 12,000 *dönmeh* were expelled from Greece to Turkey, i.e. members of a secret Judeo-Muslim sect who had, since the 17th century, lived in different cities, particularly in Thessaloniki, in Muslim clothes and under Muslim names. Although *dönmeh* claimed they were not Turkish, the Greek authorities denied their Jewish identity.[73] With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the trend of demographic de-Ottomanization became involved in the modern minority issue in general in the period of 1912–1923 when, in the still unstable international context, the states saw minorities as a threat to security or as a possibility of being held hostage, or both at the same time.[74]

7 Challenges and Consequences

The Republic of Turkey was established after WWI, as the last state on the remains of the Ottoman Empire. In late 1922, the sultanate was abolished – the last Sultan, Mehmed VI, left Istanbul and the Republic of Turkey was proclaimed in 1923, while the caliphate, in the person of the Sultan's relative Abdülmecid II, was abolished in 1924. For the first time in the history of Islam, religion was separated from the state. With Mustafa Kemal Atatürk assuming power, Turkey saw a dynamic stage of its development. This was a phase of reforms, with development and the abolishment of semi-colonial dependence. The military and bureaucratic elite led by Atatürk opted for a radical break with the Ottoman past

72 Neven Anđelić, *Kratka povijest ljudskih prava* [Short history of human rights] (Sarajevo: ACIPS, 2008), 91.

73 Only a small number of people that grew tobacco were allowed to stay. The Ataturkian secularization of Turkey would expedite the evolution of *dönmeh*. They would actively participate in the country's reconstruction, with "the new Turkey having no champions as fervent as they were." Olga Zirojević, "Pitanje islamizacije Jevreja," *Istorijski časopis* 43–43 (1995–1996): 60. Olga Zirojević, "Dönme," *Helsinška povelja* 81–82 (2005): 56–57.

74 Safet Bandžović, "Ratovi i demografska deosmanizacija Balkana [Wars and Demographic De-Ottomanization of the Balkans] (1912.-1941.)," *Prilozi* 32 (2003): 179–229.

and for the establishment of a modern state structure following the Western model. Kemalists identified industrialization as one of their priorities, as well as driving out foreign capital and the economic independence of the country built on its political independence. The reforms that followed can be defined as a comprehensive political, economic, social, and cultural transformation of the outdated Ottoman system into a modern pro-European state. The essence of reforms can be summarized in six main principles: republicanism, populism, secularism, reformism, nationalism, and statism. The goal of Atatürk's efforts was to introduce Turkey into the society of free end independent states and social communities. The effort to build a new identity meant that religion was proclaimed as separate from the state and that interfering with state politics was prohibited. Atatürk undertook an extensive process of Turkization, Westernisation, and secularization, which transformed language and history, religion and politics. In comparison to the Balkans, the Turks were the last community to develop their own nationalism. One of Atatürk's most popular mottos – "How happy is the one who says I am Turkish" ("*Ne mutlu Türküm diyene*") – from his famous speech (of 1927) in which he presented his state program, demonstrated both the goals and problems of such a vision. The secularization policy was symbolized by the prohibition of fez-wearing, which reduced the obvious difference between religious classes and represented an attempt to make people get used to wearing Western clothes: to "wear a hat" instead of a fez meant to "become Europeanized." Arabic script was replaced by the Western alphabet in Turkey, while history was reinterpreted so as to suppress its Arabic component. When the use of Arabic script was prohibited in favor of the Latin alphabet in 1928, it also meant a fierce fight against illiteracy. During a period of five years, as many as 1,247,190 citizens mastered reading and writing in so-called "popular schools." To a very high degree, Atatürk succeeded in developing a Turkish national awareness of the Western type within the ethnic melting pot of Anatolia. Islam became an integral part of national sentiment.

Turkey found it legitimate for Balkan Muslims to settle in its territory and enjoy their rights, just like its other citizens, which certainly corresponded with the emigration plans of Balkans states that had Muslim minorities. The Turkish Law on Emigration of 1934 opened the door wide open to persons of "Turkish origin" (ethnos) and "Turkish culture."[75] Turkey needed every immigrant, particularly for settling parts of it that the Greeks and Armenians had left, so it organized strong propaganda for the immigration of Muslims

75 Edvin Pezo, "Komparativna analiza jugoslavensko-turske konvencije iz 1938 i 'džentlmenskog sporazuma' iz 1953," [Comparative analysis of the Yugoslav-Turkish Convention in 1938 and the "gentlemen agreement" in 1953] *Tokovi istorije* 2 (2013): 115.

from the Balkans.[76] Atatürk used to say that refugees represented Turkish "national memories of the lands we lost." At the congress of European Muslims held in Geneva in mid-September of 1935, representatives of Muslims from Yugoslavia, of its southern parts, emphasized that, after the Balkan wars, a considerable number of Muslim intelligentsia, teachers, and religious instructors had emigrated, leaving the people without leaders, disoriented, and confused. They also stated that migration continued even after 1918, "particularly that of the learned class."[77] Following the Greco-Turkish population exchange, additional conventions between Turkey and Balkan states (Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia) regulated, between the two world wars, the emigration of new contingents of Muslims.[78] The agreed population resettlement cannot be treated

76 Avdija Avdić, "Opšti pogled na migraciona kretanja muslimanskog stanovništva na Balkanu od kraja XIX veka do zaključenja jugoslovensko-turske konvencije (11. jula 1938)," [General perspective on the migration movements of the Muslim population in the Balkans at the end of the 19th century until the Yugoslav-Turkish Convention (11 july 1938)] *Novopazarski zbornik* 9 (1985): 158. Unlike Sandžak, Kosovo and Macedonia, in the period between the two world wars Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the exception of the Cazin region to a degree, did not have a "boom of people" going towards Turkey, as was the case during Austro-Hungarian rule. This was partly because of a somewhat better position relative to that of Muslims in the "southern parts." Atatürk was also, says Šaćir Filandra, part of everyday awareness of the average Bosniak. Bosniaks knew of him, appreciated him, and loved him. Nevertheless, there was not much information about him "since he featured as a reminiscence of famous sultans, he also featured as the protector and leader of Muslims in the world. Little was known about the break-up with this representative and protective function of Istanbul or, perhaps, it was in someone's interest not to know. The average person knew even less about Atatürk's revolution, the changes he brought to Turkish society, the nature of these changes, and their scope and the circumstances under which they took place. Nonetheless, Atatürk was a respected figure;" Šaćir Filandra, "Bošnjaci između kemalizma i panislamizma," [Bosniaks between Kemalism and Pan-Islamism] *Odjek* 1 (2007): 17–21.

77 Izvještaj delegata IVZ Kraljevine Jugoslavije na Kongresu evropskih muslimana u Ženevi 12–15. septembar 1935 [Report of the delegates of the Islamic Community in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia on the Congress of European Muslims in Geneva 12–15 September 1935] *Glasnik Vrhovnog starješinstva IVZ Kraljevine Jugoslavije* 10–11(October-November 1935).

78 In 1937, with regard to the immigration of Balkan Muslims, the Turkish press stated that the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire had created a need for "commencing the immigration of our brethren of the same blood, who remained outside the borders of their true homeland, Turkey. It is a sort of debt that we have gradually started to pay off, thanking to budgetary loans that are every year granted for this purpose. Pursuing such an immigration policy is one of the most sensitive issues and the government pays all due attention to it. We must allow only an annual quota of immigrants that we are able to accommodate. The limited funds available, however, necessarily reduce the capacity for accommodation of immigrants. When can we, therefore, expect to accommodate 1.5 to 2 million of our brethren with the annual pace of accommodating 15 to 20 thousand of them? We are of the opinion that this issue should be resolved with the greatest enthusiasm possible

as voluntary, even though the destiny of resettled people does differ from that of people being forced to emigrate. The emigration of Muslims from the Balkans, encouraged by a number of social, political, and economic elements, would continue even after WWII.[79] By the 1960s, the idea of ethnic division spread to Cyprus and in the 1990s to the territory of the former Yugoslavia as well. In 1989, Bulgaria saw a "great outing" – driving several hundred thousands of Muslims out to Turkey. In 1992, Turkey would also admit part of the Bosniak refugees, accommodating them in the very camps that had previously been used to accommodate Bulgarian refugees.

Turkey pursued the policy of assimilating all immigrants in terms of language, culture, and politics.[80] The assimilation in social and political terms was complete, although immigrants in many settlements represented certain subculture or folklore groups or communities that preserved their mother tongue, albeit in a rather archaic form. Emigrants themselves mostly did not want any cultural and political autonomy or, even less so, any form of isolation from their new environment; quite conversely, they wanted to integrate into Turkish society.[81] However, their mother tongue played an important role. Even though some families moved to Turkey over one hundred years ago, making them the fourth generation of these emigrants, they, in addition to Turkish, still speak Bosnian, Macedonian or Albanian, which are the languages they use at home

within eight to ten years;" Avdija Avdić, "Jugoslovensko-turski pregovori o iseljavanju muslimanskog stanovništva u periodu između dva svetska rata," [Yugoslav-Turkish negotiations about the migration of the Muslim population in the interwar period] *Novopazarski zbornik* 15 (1991):123.

79 By moving to Turkey, emigrants from socialist Yugoslavia (mostly from Sandžak, Kosovo, and Macedonia) lost their Yugoslav citizenship, just as their predecessors in the previous periods lost, following the relevant treaties with Turkey, the citizenship of the Kingdom of Serbia, the Kingdom of Montenegro, and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Thus, many of them who failed to work their way up were not able to return to their native country due to the long and complex procedure of regaining citizenship. Unlike these emigrants, those emigrating from Yugoslavia to other countries did not have to renounce their original citizenship.

80 Mehmet Ali Kılıçbay, a Turkish economic history and politics specialist wrote, in 1997, that Turkey was more a product of the Balkans than of Central Asia: "Today, in our country there, certainly, are people whose ancestors came from Central Asia but there are also those whose ancestors arrived from the Balkans. Which of them are more numerous? Undoubtedly, the latter. This represents another inescapable and undeniable support of Turkish Europeanism. The Balkans left deep traces in the Turkish ethnic, cultural and social being." Darko Tanasković, *Neosmanizam: doktrina i spoljnopolitička praksa* (Belgrade: Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske, 2010), 88.

81 Mustafa Imamović, *Bošnjaci u emigraciji. Monografija Bosanskih pogleda 1955–1967* [Bosniaks in the emigration. Monograph of Bosanski pogledi 1955–1967] (Sarajevo: Bošnjački institut, 1996), 63–65.

and with their friends, or for correspondence with their friends and families in their native regions.[82] The language of emigrants is still preserved in the form that it was brought over in by refugees.[83] Older emigrants did not forget a wealth of linguistic folklore (folk epics, ballads, songs, quips, tales, riddles, etc.), which they brought with them from their native country. All those visiting them could hear it first-hand. Travelling across Turkey in 1966, Zufer Bešlić came across a number of emigrants and their descendants in İnegöl, a town 30 kilometres from Bursa, who had originally come from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sandžak: "It is interesting to note that, till this day, as we learn, there are many women and men who cannot speak Turkish although they moved in 50 or 60 years ago. They still jealously nurture our language and customs within their families."[84] Naila Valjevac maintains that the language of emigrants is preserved "essentially in almost the same form it was brought in from the homeland, while natural innovations are always indicative of its linguistic environment." Their language has been preserved to a high degree, with numerous archaisms, which can serve as a basis for establishing the origin of certain families. Some have preserved the original Ikavian dialect from West and Central Bosnia.[85] In villages where Ikavian and Ijekavian emigrants were mixed, Ijekavian became the dominant form. In 1991, Senahid Halilović stated that "in addition to our language, many emigrants can also speak Turkish. They mostly call their mother tongue Bosnian, while some call it Yugoslav or Yugoslavian." The language of emigrant groups has also incorporated some features of the Turkish language, which it was in contact with and the influence of which it was greatly exposed to, particularly at the lexical level. The influence of Turkish

82 A letter by Hajrudin Mehmedbašić, on behalf of the Main Board of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Emigrant Association to the SR Bosnia-Herzegovina Executive Council of 11 August 1970, on the occasion of a visit paid by Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel.

83 Alija Nametak, "Jezik naših iseljenika u Turskoj," [The language of our migrants in Turkey] *Glasnik, Rijaset IVZ u SFRJ* 3 (1990): 51. Nametak states that refugees turned certain Turkish words into Turkish loanwords that had not existed before. He offers the following example: "*Od ovoga trafika puna kazaja biva*" ("A lot of car accidents happen").

84 Zufer Bešlić, "Prva naučna ekskurzija članova Uleme u inostranstvo," [First academic visit of Muslim scholars abroad] *Glasnik VIS u SFRJ* 9–10 (1966): 530.

85 The vernacular of a family originally from Bihać has preserved the main phonetic features of the Ikavian-Shtokavian dialect from West Bosnia. Other emigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina preserve the Ijekavian dialect from East Herzegovina, while still others have the archaic accents of North-East Bosnia. The language of these emigrant groups has also incorporated some features of the Turkish language, which it was in contact with and the influence of which it was greatly exposed to, particularly at the lexical level. See more Alma Genjac-Nakićević, "Govor Bošnjaka u Turskoj: Fonetsko-fonološke osobenosti," [The vernacular of Bosniaks in Turkey: Phonetic-phonologic characteristics] *Bosanskohercegovački slavistički kongres* 1 (2012): 169.

can also be perceived at other linguistic levels and strata typical of bilingual communities, and Bosniaks in Turkey were indeed bilingual.[86]

In the early period, Bosniak emigrants and their descendants seldom married "Turkuša," as they called the Turks, or Kurds or members of other communities. There was a saying that emigrants and their descendants long abided by: "Whosoever marries a foreigner shall separate himself from his grandchildren." Asked why their girls would not marry Turks, a Bosniak emigrant replied: "Birds of a feather flock together." It was only recently that emigrant families, particularly girls, began to marry Turks.[87] The motivation behind such a custom is when a girl married an emigrant's son, the marriage still took its course within the family. It was a Turkish custom, however, at least in urban areas, that women found more appealing, for the young couple to separate from the community and live on their own.[88] Marriages between close relatives were allowed, which emigrants from Sandžak mostly opposed. They called it "a heathen custom" and refused to accept it. The practice of a "dual wedding," i.e. having both a civil wedding ceremony and then a religious one performed by an imam following the *Šarīʿa* rules, was transferred, through family and other relations, from Turkey into Sandžak as well. One could hear the opinion that Bosniak emigrants remained peculiar. Their circles were tightly closed and they married within their own community and helped one another, while continuing to jealously nurture their mother tongue and customs with envy. According to sources of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Emigrant Association from 1974, there were areas with graveyards where only Bosniak emigrants were buried.[89] In the

86 Nametak, *Jezik,* 49.

87 Safija Aktan, an elderly lady from Polatlı near Ankara, used to say: "Foreign people came into the house, children began to marry Turks and Ćurts and everything turned upside down. Children began speaking with them in a way we couldn't understand. My mother-in-law could not speak a word of Turkish. When someone began to talk, she would say: 'What are you talking about, I can't understand a single word!' See Almir Hodžić and Mirsad Kalajdžić, *Bošnjaci u Turskoj* [Bosniaks in Turkey] (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 2014).

88 In 2011, Filiz Sandžak explained the practice of asking the hand of a girl among emigrants and their offspring: "They would make everything the same, to the last detail, as over there in Bosnia and Sandžak. They go to ask for the girl's hand and offer a ring. Her future brothers-in-law kept the ring, and now we, just like the Turks, organize weddings. Once the bride is dyed with henna, she would be dressed in *şalvar*. Her friends would sing so she does not cry. If she cried, the bride would then spread her bridal veil and everyone would dance. That's it. The next day they go to make the bride's hair. Once it is done, they go home. The wedding procession comes to take the bride away. The bride goes out of the house saying the *takbīr*, she receives a copy of the *Qur'ān* and a loaf of bread, and then they go to get married." Bajro Perva, "Hisar džamija na obali plavog Egeja," [Hisar mosque on the shores of the blue Aegean] *Preporod* 16/954 (15 August 2011): 48.

89 Beširoglu, an engineer and a descendant of Bosniak refugees, wrote the following in the Sarajevo *Preporod* in 1972: "We have not lost our national distinctions here … There are

settlement of Küçükköy in Istanbul, there is a joint refugee graveyard where the buried emigrants from the territory of the former Yugoslavia are grouped according to their ethnic origin.

Refugees and their offspring have not forgotten the old native regions they originally came from. A particular form of expressing love of as well as cooperation and links with their old regions can be found in different gatherings, events and outdoor parties, special guest days, weddings, and *mawlids* organized in houses or farms of emigrants and their descendants. Such gatherings are almost exclusively the families of emigrants and their descendants, or families originally from other nationalities but which have family relations with them.[90] It is also interesting to note the practice of "Bosnian coffee," a gathering of mostly emigrants and their offspring. The love of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sandžak, Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia, as the native region, can be seen in a number of emigrant settlements and in small or large groups and individual families of these emigrants and their offspring, expressed in various ways. A strong connection of Bosniak refugees and their descendants with the old regions they originally came from have been obvious during critical periods as well. In WWII, they dispatched aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina. They made a significant contribution to accommodating refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly from the eastern parts, during the 1992–1995 war as well, also sending different forms of aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina.[91] Descendants of earlier refugees helped accommodate new refugees, whose arrival also revived grim old stories about hardships their predecessors were exposed to. It was as if Omer-aga from Herzegovina reappeared, a literary character created by S. Ćorović in the early 20th century, saying his famous sentence: "You'll all go there." Refugees

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people here from across Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sandžak and even from Kosovo and Macedonia. There are various people whose family names are Čengić, Ljubović, Mušović, Kapetanović, Filipović, Cerić, Beširović, Šahinpašić, Nanić, Barjaktarević, Selimbegović, Ferizbegović, Kučukalić, Hajdarević." *Preporod*, 49 (15 September 1972).

90 Bešlić, "Prva naučna ekskurzija," 530. According to data of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Economics and Information Bureau in Izmir from mid-2001, Muslims having emigrated from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sandžak as well as their descendants are quite numerous in some Turkish places: the village of Balkaya 3 000, immigrated 1971–1918; Istanbul 700 000, immigrated 1878–1918; Bursa 50 000, immigrated 1863–1918; Izmir 250 000, immigrated 1876–1918. According to the Bureau, Turkey had approximately 1 021 500 descendants of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sandžak that emigrated in the period 1878–1918. See Izet Šabotić, "Seobe Bošnjaka iz Bosne i Hercegovine u vrijeme austro-ugarske uprave," [Migrations of Bosniaks from Bosnia-Herzegovina during the Austro-Hungarian administration] *Zbornik radova sa međunarodnog naučnog skupa "Migracije u Bosni i Hercegovini"* (Sarajevo: BZK Preporod, 2011), 245.

91 In the period from 1992 to 1995, Bosniaks originally from Sandžak but living in Istanbul raised donations for Bosnia-Herzegovina in the amount of 45 million US dollars. See Safer Halilović, *Lukava strategija* [Smart strategy] (Sarajevo: Matica, 1997), 98.

from Bosnia-Herzegovina, arriving to Turkey in the summer of 1992, in all their suffering, discovered a huge world of displaced Bosniaks they had not known much about. They came across many of their countrymen who spoke the same language, whose ancestors came over a long time ago, within some of many refugee waves. The estimate that Turkey nowadays has more descendants of South-Slavic refugees, considering all the refugees movements during the 19th and 20th centuries, than those of the same origin in post-Yugoslav countries makes one deeply ponder the destiny of Muslims after Ottoman rule. We can ponder the fate of those who stayed, over the rest of the "displaced people," over the fact that each generation is exposed to wars and hardships and numerous ordeals.[92]

8 Conclusion

The turning points in the history of the Balkans should be presented from different perspectives, including that of the experience of Muslim communities. Balkan historiographies mainly present this history so as to minimize and marginalize the Muslim component. Owing to "the reduction of the totality," there is certain relativity in treating historical phenomena. Time makes many things disappear from memory and oblivion makes room for distorted interpretations. There prevails, not only in regional scientific circles, resistance to rational reconstructions and reviving "controversial" issues, as conserved images, previous ideological assessments, and dogmatic terminology perfectly suit certain circles. Many researchers, as well as average citizens, nowadays treat the Balkan past from narrow national positions, ignoring the history and achievements of other ethnic groups and the multinational societies and states they once belonged to. Separate models of collective memory still exist, with their different dates and stories within them. Prejudice is based on irrational factors and strong emotions. The rhetoric related to a negative attitude towards Ottoman heritage, with functional pseudo-mythical and widespread pseudo-historical networks, has long-lasting consequences in historiography, literary fiction, the media, and the emotionalization of the discourse. Rational knowledge about the Ottoman Balkans and its history should be developed

92 According to the 1965 census, Turkey had 240,469 emigrants originally from Yugoslavia. According to 1970 data of the Consular Head Office of the Yugoslav Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, there were 300,000 "*Göçmenler,*" post-war immigrants from Socialist Yugoslavia. Those who were disappointed with their life in Turkey faced considerable administrative obstacles in their efforts to return home. Only a small number of emigrants managed to overcome them.

with a necessary distance from nationalist categories, epics, stereotypes and tendentious images, while its history should be analyzed in terms of several dimensions, and should be critically recapitulated and redefined. Certainly, the task of eliminating prejudice is always a difficult one. Prejudice lives long and is hard to eradicate.[93]

History is a process with multiple meanings. Understood as a complexity, it cannot be valorized from a local perspective only. A one-dimensional and Manichean presentation of its character and the practice of firmly established stories still do not belong in the past. Viewing phenomena in continuity does not allow "either oblivion or prediction." This is certainly related to the issue of Balkan de-Ottomanization as well. Scientists say that "processes of prolonged duration" represent the slow courses of history that lie deep under the surface flows of political history. The destiny of Bosniaks should not be treated in isolation, but also in the context of the destiny of other Muslim communities in the Balkans. Wars, persecution, and emigration have left profound consequences on their history. Emigration took away their strength and overall capacities, leaving behind "skimmed milk" only, a vulnerable community with a fragmented consciousness – the erasure or abbreviation of entire blocks of memory. Territorial fragmentation has also caused the division or fragmentation of social consciousness and the position of "historical passivity" of the "eternal victim." Exposed to attacks from various sides, the Muslim world turned towards itself, ending up in a long-lasting state of introversion, defensiveness and oversensitivity, of voluntary and involuntary compromises and adaptations. Their experience is mostly uncondensed, preserved, and passed on through generations. The prolonged process of Balkanization has also created particulate consciousness.[94]

One principle remains undeniable, states Mirko Đorđević, "man is part of history and its course both individually and collectively." Studying the process of Balkan de-Ottomanization as well as the accompanying refugees' fate shared by generations of them through centuries remains a "constant effort," always an "effort in progress" with no end in sight. Research also reveals a long-suppressed and almost forgotten world of individual and family human destinies, a world of struggle for survival. Forced migration, persecution, exodus, and deportation on national and ethnic grounds have, as experience

93 Richard Holbrooke was right that the most popular of all the books on Yugoslavia in English in the US was Rebecca West's *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* from the 1930s. Her statements that "the Turks ruined the Balkans" and that "Muslims were racially inferior" influenced two generations of readers. Richard Holbrooke, *Završiti rat* [To End a War] trans. Nura Dika Kapić (Sarajevo: Šahinpašić, 1998), 22.

94 Karčić, *"Istočno pitanje,"* 26–27.

teaches us, deprived millions of persons of their civil rights and basic existence. The "cleansing" of certain ethnic groups is related to modern nationalism, the most powerful political force in the 19th and 20th centuries. Generally, "ethnic cleansing" may be understood as a term encompassing systematic and mass crimes. It is the persecution of an "unwanted" population from a certain territory due to religious or ethnic discrimination, strategic, or ideological reasons. Racial and ethnic projects, writes Simone Weil, that cause refugeeism are essentially directed at breaking the human being and the human soul. The needs of the soul and its rights are inseparable from the idea of existence. Human life always implies a certain framework in order to have meaning. Refugeeism is one of the most powerful ways to remove this framework and break a person. The need for roots may well be the most important and the least understood need of the human soul.[95] To be rooted out, maintains Hannah Arendt, means to not have a place in the world that others would recognize and guarantee.[96] Different migration phenomena (refugeeism, evacuation, deportation, exile as a voluntary choice, forced expulsion, interstate population exchange, etc.) in their content, as we can see from numerous examples throughout history, cause profound perturbation not only at the individual level, but also at that of families and wider social communities. The 20th century, as a century of refugees, shows that "persons without affiliation" or stateless persons are in constant and infinite danger.[97] Refugeeism is a complex phenomenon that has its economic, social, political, legal, and other dimensions. It is, in fact, a "moment

95 Refik Ličina, *Skonski epigrami* (Novi Pazar: Damad, 1997). The author claims that, in European countries, foreign emigrants happen to demonstrate an interesting linguistic change towards the end of their lives (most usually when ill). They completely forget the language of the host country and begin to speak in their mother tongue, although they may seem to have lost it.

96 Hannah Arendt, *Izvori totalitarizma* [*The Origins of Totalitarianism*] trans. Mirjana Paić Jurinić (Belgrade: Feministička izdavačka kuća 94, 1998), 483–484. Asked where exactly the homeland is, György (George) Konrád replies: "Wherever you will not be killed. Wherever I can be sure that my children are safe. Wherever human beings and the word are respected. Wherever I am a priori respected that I am as I am and that I think what I think;" quoted from *Politika,* Belgrade October 18, 2008, 3.

97 *Spheres of Justice* by Michael Walzer is a frequently quoted work in discussions about the ethics of immigration. His defense of membership restriction is the initial argument for the right of a state not to allow immigration. For Walzer, human society is a distributive community. The idea of distributive justice implies a fenced world within which divisions take place: a group of people committed to the division, exchange and distribution of social goods, primarily among themselves. This world is a political community. Its members divide power among themselves and, if possible, avoid sharing it with anyone else. Biljana Đorđević, "Etika migracije," [Migration ethics] *Godišnjak* 2 (2008): 241.

of social and civic death, the status of being deprived of fundamental rights and freedoms."[98] Emigration is considered a true life or existential crisis. Rooted out and displaced people in emigration necessarily faced the experience of an abrupt break of continuity in the course of their lives. Comparing the things that an emigrant leaves behind or is forced to leave behind with the things he searches for, we can create an image of homeland in their mind. De Montaigne wrote how difficult it would have been for him if someone had prevented him from visiting a certain place in the world, albeit the most distant one that he otherwise would have never thought of visiting. How difficult it must be, then, not to be able to return home. Myths of "the eternal return" are not infrequent, with their basic social function being to keep a community together and overcome the "fear of disappearance." A diaspora, however, is not immune to the influence of the dominant culture it lives within as a minority, and it is susceptible to identity mutations. The myth of diaspora may also be viewed as a version of the archetypal myth of the holy center and eternal return.[99]

A multidisciplinary approach to stratified issues makes the unfinished and complicated clearer, thus enabling a better understanding of contemporary times. The late 20th century saw a considerable change in the attitude of a number of states and ethnic and social communities towards their own past. This "short" century, the age of extremism and the "epoch of politics," generated truly the greatest hopes of humanity but also buried many of these. It was, according to E. Hobsbawm, the deadliest century in terms of the scope, frequency, and duration of its wars, as well as in terms of the scope of unprecedented human disasters these wars produced. They effect profound changes in people, also changing the understanding and perception of themselves as well as the way they perceive and experience others.[100] The final decade of the 20th century was, for many Muslims, similar to the final decades of the 19th century

98 Gordana Tripković, "Izbeglice – kulturni i socijalni izazov," [Refugees: A Cultural and Social Challange] *Sociološki pregled* 1 (2005): 41.

99 The myth of diaspora makes a small nation somewhat bigger, treating its inferiority complex. Homelands and their diaspora as a whole create an illusion that these are not "small countries" any longer. If we also add "the general influence of the Myth of Nation, which creates an illusion of organic unity of all the dead and alive members through centuries of the mythic past, the national pride and self-confidence begin to grow and frustrations are easier to tolerate;" – as quoted in: Vjekoslav. Perica, "Mit o dijaspori u konstrukciji novog hrvatstva i srpstva," [Myth about the diaspora in the construction of a new Croat and Serb identity] *Politička misao* 4 (2011): 120, 127.

100 Bringa, *Biti musliman,* 17.

in terms of its destruction.[101] Contemporariness affects the methodology and content of "sea changes in memory," challenging various "communities of memory," as well as the thorough reconsideration and reshaping of various layers of historical consciousness. It is only through interdisciplinary studies, which critically analyze different sides of action through a multi-perspective method requiring de-monumentalization of history and treatment from the perspective of different stakeholders, that a general picture be achieved. Without a very clear view of the past and knowledge "calling for caution," there can be no systems of values or breakthroughs in comparative historical research and comparisons in international terms.

101 The paradigm of attitudes on the part of major powers and Balkan Christian national elites towards Muslims, called "the Eastern Question," has threateningly survived, says Fikret Karčić. The existence of the Ottoman state and the formal closure of this issue in Lausanne in 1923 can be used as a referential framework for condensing and understanding the history of Balkan Muslims until the end of the 20th century. Karčić, *Istočno pitanje,* 13.

CHAPTER 2

The Diasporic Experience as Opportunity and Challenge for the Islamic Tradition of Bosniaks

Xavier Bougarel

1 Introduction

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, many social scientists have regarded globalisation as the major characteristic of the contemporary world. An important component of this process of globalisation is the migration – either voluntary or forced – of millions of men and women, and the ensuing formation of broad diasporas. Yet throughout human history, individuals and entire peoples have never stopped migrating, and the empires of the past also contributed to the circulation of goods, ideas and people. Thus, in the first part of this paper, I show that the globalisation that Islam in Bosnia-Herzegovina has undergone over the past three decades is not totally new and must be viewed as part of a long historical process. Then, I focus on the formation of a substantial Bosniak diaspora and will describe its role in the shaping of both the national Bosniak identity and the Islamic tradition of Bosniaks. Lastly, I show why the diasporic experience represents both a challenge and an opportunity for the Islamic tradition of Bosniaks, as defined by Fikret Karčić and other *ʿulamā* from the Islamic Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina.[1]

2 The Islamic Tradition of Bosniaks and the World

The concept of an "Islamic tradition of Bosniaks" is useful because it enables Bosnian Muslims to say which religious tradition they wish to be part of, but it obscures the fact that this tradition appeared not within a national context, but within an imperial and global one. I am not a specialist of the Ottoman

1 See, *inter alia*, Fikret Karčić, "Šta je to 'islamska tradicija Bošnjaka'?," [What is the Islamic tradition of Bosniaks?] *Preporod*, December 1, 2006, 14–15; Mehmedalija Hadžić, ed. *Zbornik radova naučnog skupa 'Islamska tradicija Bošnjaka': izvori, razvoj i institucije, perspektive (14–16 November 2007)* [Conference proceedings *'The Islamic Tradition of Bosniaks: Sources, Development and Institutions, Perspectives'*] (Sarajevo: Rijaset Islamske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini, 2008).

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Empire, so I do not speak at length about Islam in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the Ottoman period. But I would like to mention a few facts about that period: Bosnian Islamic institutions were linked to the *Shaiḫ al-Islam* of Istanbul, Bosnian *ʿulamā* went to study in the largest religious schools of the Empire, Sufi brotherhoods in Bosnia-Herzegovina originated in Anatolia and Central Asia, and the pilgrimage to Mecca already brought together believers from around the world. Thus, during the Ottoman period, the Islamic tradition of Bosniaks was not a closed-off universe, but instead part of a broader Ottoman tradition, animated by numerous global religious networks.

The Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878 was a major breaking point for Bosnian Muslims, on both a political and a religious level. But the creation of Islamic institutions peculiar to Bosnia-Herzegovina, organised around the *Raʾīs al-ʿulamā* and the *ʿulamā-maǧlis*, did not prevent Bosnian ʿulamā from going to study in the Ottoman Empire or from receiving religious literature in the Ottoman language. During the movement for the autonomy of religious institutions in the 1900s, one of the most important demands was for the *Raʾīs al-ʿulamā* to receive an accreditation (*manšūra*) from the *Shaiḫ al-Islam*. Thus, during the Austro-Hungarian period, Islam in Bosnia-Herzegovina remained largely Ottoman in nature. Moreover, the most important change was the arrival of reformist ideas in Bosnia-Herzegovina, brought in by intellectuals such as Safvet-beg Bašagić and Osman Nuri Hadžić, or ʿulamā such as Džemaludin Čaušević. Yet this Islamic reformism came not only from the Ottoman capital, but also from Egypt (with Muhammad Abduh) and the Russian Empire (with Ismail Gasprinski). Hence Bosnian Muslims slowly left the Ottoman sphere of influence, not to move into isolation, but to open up to other parts of the Muslim world.[2]

Admittedly, this process sparked sharp reactions from the political and religious elite. This was flagrant during the interwar period, when the Kemalist revolution and the abolition of the Caliphate in Turkey fuelled disputes about how Islam should be interpreted. The reformists – gathered around the *Raʾīs al-ʿulamā* Džemaludin Čaušević – insisted on the need to reform the waqfs and religious schools, considered it licit for men to wear hats and women to give up wearing the veil and showed interest in Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's modernisation project. Traditionalists, grouped together around the magazine *Hikjmet*

2 See, *inter alia*, Fikret Karčić, *Društveno-pravni aspekt islamskog reformizma* [Societal-legal aspects of Islamic reformism] (Sarajevo: Islamski teološki fakultet, 1990); Enes Karić, ed. *Prilozi za povijest islamskog mišljenja u Bosni i Hercegovini xx. stoljeća* [Contributions for the history of Islamic thought in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 20th century] (Sarajevo: el-Kalem, 2004); Amir Karić, *Panislamizam u Bosni* [Pan-islamism in Bosnia] (Sarajevo: Connectum, 2006).

("Wisdom"), opposed these reformist views and favoured an Islamic tradition that was not very different from the Ottoman tradition. Later on, led by Mehmed Handžić and the association of ʿulamā *el-Hidaje* ("The Right Way"), they developed a revivalist interpretation of Islam that was more assertive in nature. These debates between reformists, traditionalists and revivalists are reminiscent of debates in other parts of the Muslim world. While Čaušević had regular contact with representatives of the Indian *Ahmadiyya* movement in Berlin, Handžić was influenced by his contacts with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood during his studies at Al-Azhar. Here again, the religious debates underway in Bosnia-Herzegovina were not isolated ones, and must be viewed in a global framework.[3]

In this context, the Communist era stands out as the period when Islamic institutions were cut off from the outside world, and religious life was forcibly reduced to a few rituals in mosques or in the family circle. Yet this impression is partly inaccurate. On the one hand, the decline of religious life was not only a result of Communist repression, but also the reflection of a secularisation process affecting all of Europe. On the other hand, beginning in the 1960s, Bosnian Muslims restored some contacts with the rest of the Muslim world, with pilgrims leaving for Mecca, students studying at Al-Azhar and at other Arab universities, and students from non-aligned countries coming to Yugoslavia. Husein Đozo, the man who enabled the Islamic Community to meet the challenge of secularisation, also had a global background. A former student at Al-Azhar, he was influenced by the reformist thought of Egyptian Mahmud Shaltut, and his intellectual horizons extended well beyond Bosnia-Herzegovina to encompass all of Europe.[4]

3 After 1990: The Challenge of Globalisation and Pluralisation

By insisting on the global dimensions of the evolution of the Islamic tradition of the Bosniaks before 1990, I do not mean that this date has no importance in the political and religious history of Bosnian Muslims. For the Bosniaks, the

3 See, *inter alia*, Xavier Bougarel, "Farewell to the Ottoman Legacy? Islamic Reformism and Revivalism in Inter-War Bosnia and Herzegovina," in *Islam in Inter-War Europe*, eds. Nathalie Clayer and Eric Germain, (London: Hurst, 2008), 313–343; Adnan Jahić, *Hikjmet. Riječ tradicionalne uleme u Bosni i Hercegovini* [Hikjmet. The word of the traditional Islamic scholars in Bosnia and Herzegovina] (Tuzla: BZK Preporod, 2004).

4 See, *inter alia*, Omer Nakičević, ed. *Život i djelo Husein ef. Đoze.* [Life and Work of Husein Đozo] (Sarajevo: Fakultet islamskih nauka, 1998); Enes Karić, "Husein Đozo i islamski modernizam" [Husein Đozo and Islamic modernism], in Karić, *Prilozi*, 515–553.

1990s were the worst years of their history. The breakup of Yugoslavia, Serbian then Croatian military aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the genocide of the Bosniak people led to the deaths of 100,000 people, 66% of whom were Bosniaks (83% regarding civilian casualties). On a religious level, 107 employees of the Islamic Community lost their lives and 729 mosques were destroyed, i.e. more than half of all mosques in Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the same time, the Bosniaks became the focus of attention for the international media and major international organisations. This abrupt arrival at the heart of a globalised world also resulted in a tightening of ties with various governmental and non-governmental actors of the Muslim world.[5] Through the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and the UN General Assembly, Muslim states endeavoured to support Bosnia-Herzegovina, notably trying to lift the embargo on weapon sales. With the discreet support of the United States, Iran and other Muslim states supplied weapons to the Bosnian Army, and various Persian Gulf countries collected substantial amounts of money. These funds were used to equip the Bosnian army and reinforce the domination of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) in the regions that it controlled. This Muslim solidarity was not disinterested, and in the 1990s, Bosnia-Herzegovina became an important location for confrontation between Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Alongside states, various non-government actors arrived in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war, including Islamic humanitarian organisations and the *mujahideen*, or foreign Islamic combatants. These actors brought with them an interpretation of Islam often described as "Wahhabi," but that I would call neo-Salafist, and they attacked local religious traditions in the name of a global, ahistoric form of Islam.[6] The Islamic Community may not have understood the importance of this neo-Salafist phenomenon right away. After gladly welcoming the *mujahideen* and Islamic humanitarians in the early months of the war, the Islamic Community quickly came into conflict with them, but it believed that strong state intervention would be enough to re-establish its monopoly over religious life. The repression that followed the September 11 terrorist attacks revealed the limits of this view, as the neo-Salafist networks lost some of their main leaders, were weakened financially, and were divided

5 See, *inter alia*, Jérôme Bellion-Jourdan and Jonathan Bentall, *The Charitable Crescent: Politics of Aid in the Muslim World* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003); Harun Karčić, "Islamic Revival in Post-Socialist Bosnia and Herzegovina: International Actors and Activities," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 4 (2010): 519–534.

6 See, *inter alia*, Ahmet Alibašić, *Traditional and Reformist Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina* (Cambridge: Centre of International Studies, 2003); Eldar Sarajlić, *The Return of the Consuls: Islamic Networks and Foreign Policy Perspectives in Bosnia and Herzegovina* (Oxford: European Studies Centre, June 2010), accessed October 8, 2015, http://www.balkanmuslims.com/pdf/Sarajlic-Bosnia.pdf.

into advocates and opponents of violence. Yet they remained firmly implanted within a portion of Bosniak youth and even within the Islamic Community itself, and the latter was forced to recognise neo-Salafism as a lasting religious reality. The efforts made since 2006 to better define the Islamic tradition of Bosniaks reflect this shift of the Islamic Community from pure denial to an attempt at intellectual confrontation with the neo-Salafist religious margins in Bosnia-Herzegovina.[7] Beginning in 2012, this confrontation took again a dramatic tone, without fundamentally changing, as young Bosniaks left for jihad in Syria and Iraq.

The neo-Salafist phenomenon must be placed in a larger context. It is part of the globalisation of Islam in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but it is not its sole vector. Since the early 2000s, the most dynamic transnational Islamic actors in Bosnia-Herzegovina have no longer been neo-Salafist movements from the Arab world, but Turkish religious actors close to the official Presidency of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*) or related to neo-Sufi movements such as Fethullah Gülen's *fethullahcı*.[8] And, just as the Syrian civil war brought the jihadi issue back to the forefront, so has the fight in Turkey between Recep Erdoğan and Fethullah Gülen disturbed many believers in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moreover, neo-Salafism has contributed to a rapid rise of pluralism for Islam in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is also attributable to the restoration of political and religious freedoms after 1990. This pluralism inevitably challenges the monopoly previously held by the Islamic Community on the interpretation of Islam and organisation of religious life. Thus, since 1990, Islam in Bosnia-Herzegovina has undergone an accelerated insertion in a globalised world. Against this backdrop, I now focus on another aspect of this globalisation: the formation of a sizeable Bosniak diaspora.

4 From *gurbetçi* to *Gastarbeiter*: Bosnian Muslim Migrations before 1990

Already during the Ottoman period, many Bosnian Muslims moved around the Empire, whether as members of the Ottoman elite or as simple migrant workers (*gurbetçi*). During the Austro-Hungarian period, the *gurbetçi* was

7 See Ahmet Alibašić, "Pravci i elementi razvoja islamske tradicije Bošnjaka u bosanskom kontekstu," in Hadžić, *Zbornik radova*, 491–509; Ahmet Alibašić, "Kako pobijediti 'vehabizam'?,"*Preporod*, December 15,2006, 16 and 48.

8 See, *inter alia*, Kerem Öktem, *New Islamic Actors after the Wahhabi Intermezzo: Turkey's Return to the Muslim Balkans* (Oxford: European Studies Centre, June 2010), accessed October 8, 2015, http://www.balkanmuslims.com/pdf/Oktem-Balkan-Muslims.pdf; Ann Ross Solberg, "The Role of Turkish Islamic Networks in the Western Balkans," *Südosteuropa*, 4 (2007): 429–461.

replaced by the refugee, or *muhağir* (Bosnian *muhadžir*). It is worth noting that after the Austro-Hungarian occupation began in 1878, the first doctrinal debate among Bosnian ʿulamā was about the need for religious emigration (ar. *hiğra*, Bosnian *hidžra*). In 1884, Teufik Azapagić, the mufti of Tuzla, called on Muslims to remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina since their religious rights were respected by the new imperial power. This *fatwa* formed the basis for how Bosnian Muslims later defined their place in non-Muslim Europe, and is thus one of the founding moments of the Islamic tradition of Bosniaks.[9] However, between 1878 and 1918, around 100,000 Bosnian Muslims immigrated to the Ottoman Empire. Emigration to Anatolia continued during the interwar period, and for Sandžak Muslims, continues to this day. In Turkey, the Bosnian Muslim diaspora was controlled closely by the modernising state, and the Presidency of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*) held a strict monopoly on religious life. Today, Turkey is one of the few countries home to a substantial Bosniak community without the existence of corresponding Islamic religious institutions.[10]

In addition to this emigration to the East, beginning in the Austro-Hungarian period, there was emigration to the West. The primary destination was the city of Zagreb, as shown by Zlatko Hasanbegović in his book on this topic.[11] But during the Austro-Hungarian period, some Bosnian Muslims went much further abroad, even crossing the Atlantic. In 1906, a charity (*cemiyet ül-hayriye*) was founded in Chicago. The name of this charity shows that at that time, Bosnian Muslims identified themselves in religious rather than national terms, and it would be an anachronism to speak of a Bosniak diaspora at that time.[12] Following the Second World War, a new generation of Bosnian Muslim immigrants appeared in Western Europe, America and Australia. This group was made up mostly of former German Army soldiers or students from the University of Vienna. In the post-war context, these immigrants played a decisive role in forming local Islamic institutions such as the Spiritual Administration

9 See, *inter alia*, Muhamed Mufakual-Arnaut, "Islam and Muslims in Bosnia 1878–1918: Two Hijras and Two Fatwas," *Journal of Islamic Studies* 2 (1994): 242–253; Mehmed Teufik Azapagić, "Risala o hidžri," *Anali Gazi Husrev-begove biblioteke* (1990): 197–222.

10 See, *inter alia*, Safet Bandžović, *Iseljavanje Bošnjaka u Tursku* (Sarajevo: Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava, 2006).

11 Zlatko Hasanbegović, *Muslimani u Zagrebu 1878–1945* [Muslims in Zagreb 1878–1945] (Zagreb: Institut Pilar, 2007).

12 See, *inter alia*, Muharem Zulfić, *Sto godina Bošnjaka u Čikagu* [Hundred years of Muslims in Chicago] (Chicago: Džemijetul Hajrije, 2003); Senad Agić, ed. *Sto godina Bošnjaka u Americi* [Hundred years of Muslims in America] (Chicago: Bosnian American Cultural Association, 2006).

of Muslim Refugees (*Geistliche Verwaltung der Muslimflüchtlinge*) in Germany, led by imam Džemal Ibrahimović, or the Muslim Social Service (*Moslemischer Sozialdienst*) in Austria, led by Smail Balić.[13] In the 1950s, these Muslim immigrants tended to identify as Croats. However, disagreements with Croatian political emigration, along with the recognition of the Muslim nation in Yugoslavia, prompted Bosnian Muslim immigrants to stop identifying as Croats. Led by Adil Zulfikarpašić, these immigrants opted for a Bosniak national identity while the League of Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina promoted a Muslim national identity. This distinction was visible again in 1990 within the SDA, as Zulfikarpašić came into conflict with Alija Izetbegović and his allies.[14] At the same time, Smail Balić published the newspapers *Der gerade Weg* ("The Right Way") and *Islam und der Westen* ("Islam and the West"), wherein he advocated the idea of a European Islam, well before the intellectuals and ʿulamā of Bosnia-Herzegovina took on this topic.[15] Thus, during the Communist period, Bosnian Muslim emigration was a laboratory of ideas whose importance was fully felt after 1990.

The start of political emigration to the West announced a reorientation of Bosnian Muslim emigration, which beginning in the 1960s was no longer directed mainly towards Anatolia. During this period, a new generation of economic migrants made its appearance, emigrating to the West to find work, notably in Germany, Austria and Scandinavia, and therefore known as *Gastarbeiter*. These migrants, estimated at 60,000 in the early 1980s, kept their distance from post-war political emigration. They went to Turkish or Arab mosques, or created Yugoslav *ǧamʿats* (parishes or congregations, Bosnian *džemat*s) mainly attended by Bosnian Muslims and Albanians from Yugoslavia. Similar economic migrations occurred within Yugoslavia itself, leading to the opening of prayer rooms in various cities in Slovenia and Croatia. In 1987, a large mosque was inaugurated in Zagreb, symbolising the long-standing presence of the Muslim community there. The head imam, Mustafa Cerić, had studied at Al-Azhar, then been the imam of the Islamic Center of Chicago from 1981 to 1987, and therefore had direct experience with the diaspora. The Zagreb mosque, a

13 See, *inter alia*, Oliver Pintz, "Vom Moslemischen Sozialdienst zur Islamischen Glaubensgemeinschaft (IGGiÖ). Ein Beitrag zur Genese des institutionalisierten Islam in Österreich" (PhD diss., University of Vienna, 2006); Esnaf Begić, "Die bosnisch-herzegowinischen Muslime in Deutschland und ihre religiöse Organisation" (MA thesis, University of Bochum, 2009).

14 See, *inter alia*, Imamović, *Bošnjaci u emigraciji*; Šaćir Filandra and Enes Karić, *Bošnjačka ideja* [The Bosnizk idea] (Zagreb: Globus, 2002).

15 See, *inter alia*, Richard Potz and Nedžad Grabus, eds. *Smail Balić. Vordenker eines europäischen Islams / Mislilac evropskog islama* (Vienna: Facultas, 2009).

modern and dynamic Islamic centre, was already proof of the growing importance of the diaspora in the life of the Islamic Community.

5 The Diaspora, between a Shared Bosniak Identity and Different State Citizenships

Beginning in 1990, the issue of diaspora became radically different. The breakup of Yugoslavia meant that all Bosniaks living outside the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina became part of the diaspora. This was especially the case for Bosniaks living in Serbia (145,000 people according to the latest census), Montenegro (54,000), as well as Kosovo (28,000) and Macedonia (17,000). In Croatia (31,000) and Slovenia (21,000), where the presence of Muslims is more recent, independence accentuated the pre-existing semi-diasporic situation. Therefore, within the Yugoslav area, the term "diaspora" covers very different situations. Beginning in 1992, this was compounded by the consequences of the war and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Between 1992 and 1995, 1,200,000 Bosnian citizens, most of whom were Bosniaks, found refuge in Western Europe or North America. At the same time, the number of Bosniak refugees in Turkey or other Muslim countries was no higher than a few thousand. Thus, the humanitarian crisis of the 1990s did not change the direction of migratory flows observed since the 1960s. After the Dayton Agreement was signed in December 1995, hundreds of thousands of Bosnian refugees returned to Bosnia-Herzegovina, but an equal number of Bosnian citizens left the country for economic reasons. In 2012, the Bosnian diaspora was estimated at 1,200,000 people worldwide, the majority of whom being Bosniaks.[16]

While Bosniaks in Bosnia-Herzegovina were taking up arms to fight for their survival, the Bosniak diaspora was mobilising politically. The 1990s saw a sharp increase in the political engagement of the Bosniak diaspora. In the Sandžak, a branch of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) was created, as was a Muslim National Council, which called for autonomy for the region. The SDA also participated in politics in Croatia and Kosovo, and to a lesser extent, in Macedonia. In Western Europe, *ǧam'ats*, local sections of the SDA and various humanitarian associations mobilised to help refugees and the civilian population of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, this consensual mobilisation of the diaspora during the war should not overshadow the diverging trends that appeared after 1995. In the successor states of the former Yugoslavia, political divisions

16 See, *inter alia*, Marko Valenta and Sabrina Ramet, eds. *The Bosnian Diaspora. Integration in Transnational Communities* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2011).

multiplied, symbolised in Serbian part of the Sandžak by the confrontation between Sulejman Ugljanin and Rasim Ljajić, and in the Montenegrin part of the Sandžak and in Kosovo by an increase in the number of small Bosniak parties. Everywhere, Bosniak political leaders became part of the political system in their respective states. Two examples are the Montenegrin SDA's support for Mile Djukanović in the late 1990s, and Ljajić and Ugljanin becoming ministers in the Serbian government in the 2000s. In the Serbian Sandžak, Muamer Zukorlić, the mufti of Novi Pazar, presented himself as the only defender of Bosniak national interests, winning 70% of the Bosniak vote in the 2012 Serbian presidential elections. At the same time, new institutions were created to represent the national Bosniak minority in most former Yugoslav states, even while in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the SDA lost its dominant position and national institutions created during the war disappeared or stagnated. As for the Bosniak diaspora's massive mobilisation in the West, this gave way to voluntary associations that now only represent a vocal minority. Most Bosniaks living abroad have integrated their local societies, and their political identification with Bosnia-Herzegovina has weakened, as shown by their low level of participation in post-war elections. Everywhere, the strong political engagement of the 1990s gave way to feelings of disenchantment – similar to the feeling of disenchantment within Bosnia-Herzegovina itself.

Thus, the 1990s and early 2000s were a period for the Bosniak diaspora to redefine a shared Bosniak identity in different political contexts. Responses to this major challenge were different from one place to the other. Hence the Bosniak elite of the Montenegrin Sandžak supported Montenegro's move towards independence, whereas those of the Serbian Sandžak disagreed on whether they should recognise the legitimacy of the Serbian state. Likewise, population censuses have shown that the vast majority of Slavic-speaking Muslims in the former Yugoslavia now considered themselves to be Bosniaks, although a sometimes significant proportion continued to identify themselves as "Muslims" (22,000 in Serbia in 2011 and 21,000 in Montenegro the same year) or, in Croatia, to call themselves "Croats" (9,500 in 2011). Lastly, some political and religious leaders of the diaspora have attempted to influence the political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina itself. Thus, the Congress of North American Bosniaks initiated the World Bosniak Congress held in Sarajevo in 2012, and the Bosniak Academy of Sciences and Arts was founded in Sandžak with support from Muamer Zukorlić. These initiatives, supported by Mustafa Cerić, *Ra'īs al-'ulamā* from 1993 to 2012, came up against silent hostility from the political, intellectual and religious elite of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Hence nationalist overstatements by some actors of the diaspora fails to obscure the fact that the Bosniaks of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia and elsewhere have had to

adapt their practices to various political contexts, as seen also in the evolution of religious institutions in the Bosniak diaspora.

6 The Diaspora, between Religious Desocialisation and the Emergence of Islam in Europe

The breakup of Yugoslavia in 1992 led to the disappearance of the Islamic Community of Yugoslavia a year later. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Islamic Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina was created, forming "the one and only community of Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, of Bosniaks outside the homeland, and of other Muslims who accept it as their own,"[17] and incorporating the *mešihat*s of the Sandžak, of Croatia and of Slovenia. However, in reality, the creation of new Islamic institutions in the states of the former Yugoslavia coincided with many power conflicts. The Islamic Community of Montenegro declared its independence and gradually built up its authority in the Montenegrin Sandžak, at the expense of the mufti of Novi Pazar. *Raʾīs al-ʿulamā* Mustafa Cerić visited Podgorica in 2005, signalling recognition of the legitimacy of Montenegrin Islamic institutions. In the Serbian Sandžak, conflicts over participation in Serbian politics, relations with the *Raʾīs al-ʿulamā* of Sarajevo and Muamer Zukorlić's personal activism resulted in an Islamic Community of Serbia being created in 2007, as a rival to the Islamic Community in Serbia recognised by Sarajevo. The Islamic institutions in Croatia and Slovenia did not suffer such a serious crisis, but Dino Mujadžević has recently shown how, in Croatia, two conceptions – "ethnic Bosniak" and "civic Croatian" – coexist within the Islamic Community.[18] Lastly, the rapid growth and strong mobilisation of the Bosniak diaspora in the West has resulted in a surge in the number of Bosniak *ǧamʿats*: in Germany, their number rose from 14 in 1992 to 70 in 2012. This growth coincided with stronger institutionalisation. In 1994, a Union of Islamic Parishes of the Bosniaks was created in Germany (*Vereinigung islamischer Gemeinden der Bosniaken*, or VIGB). Thirteen years later, this became the Islamic Community of the Bosniaks in Germany (*Islamische Gemeinschaft der Bosniaken in Deutschland*) with its own mufti.[19] Ongoing debates in the

17 "Ustav Islamske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini," accessed October 8, 2015, http://www.rijaset.ba.

18 Dino Mujadžević, "The Islamic Community in Croatia: Between Ethnic Bosniak and Civic Croatian Identity," *Südosteuropa*, 3 (2014): 275–304.

19 See, *inter alia*, Mirsad Mahmutović, *Džemati Bošnjaka u dijaspori* [*Ǧamʿats* of the Bosniaks in the Diaspora] (Sarajevo: Rijaset Islamske zajednice, 2003); Begić, *Die bosnisch-herzegowinischen Muslime*.

Islamic Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina on redefining the ties with Islamic institutions of the diaspora must be resituated in this context.

Apart from these institutional challenges, the Bosniak diaspora is characterised in more than one way by a specific religious experience. Most Bosniaks living in the West are not religious or not very religious, and they do not attend Bosniak *ǧamʿats*. Thus, for a large number of Bosniaks, the diaspora is a place for religious desocialisation, and is therefore a major challenge for the Islamic Community in charge of transmitting the religious tradition to the younger generations. Likewise, the Islam practised by Bosniaks in the West is not very visible in the public sphere and does not make substantial demands,[20] whereas in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the Sandžak, Islamic institutions and symbols have re-entered the public area they had been evicted from in 1945. On the other hand, some of the most radical neo-Salafist groups have also appeared among young Bosniaks of the diaspora. However, this fact is not contradictory with the previous one: young neo-Salafists often have no prior religious education and are therefore more likely to be attracted to an extremist interpretation of Islam. Here again, the diasporic experience is a challenge for the Islamic Community, in a context where it lacks the institutional and social weight that it has in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

At the same time, however, the diasporic experience is an opportunity for the Islamic Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina and for the promotion of the Islamic tradition of the Bosniaks. Firstly, Bosniak *ǧamʿats* and their federations take part in the Islamic institutions of various European countries. Sometimes, they play an important role: thus, Bosniak imam Senaid Kobilica was the head of the Islamic Council of Norway from 2007 to 2012. In most cases, the Bosniak diaspora plays only a secondary role compared to the Turkish and Arab communities. This is notably the case for the Islamic Community of the Bosniaks in Germany within the Central Council of Muslims (*Zentralrat der Muslime*) or the German Islam Conference (*Islamkonferenz*). This direct interaction with the complex realities of Islam in Europe makes the Islamic institutions of the Bosniak diaspora a potential mediator between the Islamic Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Muslim communities of Western Europe. The diaspora institutions can contribute to a realistic approach that was missing from some initiatives originating in Sarajevo. For example, the "Declaration of European Muslims" made public in August 2005 by the *Raʾīs al-ʿulamā* Mustafa

20 See, *inter alia*, Xavier Bougarel and Dimitrina Mihaylova, "Diasporas musulmanes balkaniques dans l'Union européenne," *Balkanologie*, 1–2 (2005): 57–211; Nadje Al-Ali, "Gender Relations, Transnational Ties and Rituals among Bosnian Refugees," *Global Networks*, 3 (December 2002): 249–262.

Cerić claimed to speak for all European Muslims, without taking account of their diversity. It addressed EU institutions although religious policy is the responsibility of EU member states, and made claims that would be unacceptable to largely secularised European societies.[21] Through the Bosniak diaspora, other components of the Islamic tradition of Bosniaks could be promoted in Western Europe, especially what Fikret Karčić calls the "tradition of Islamic reformism" and the "practice of expressing Islam in a secular state".[22] A good illustration of this reality is the publication by Armina Omerika, a former delegate to the German Islam Conference, of texts by major Bosnian reformist ʿulamā of the 20th century.[23] But this circulation of ideas is not a one-way street, and if the diaspora represents an opportunity for the Islamic tradition of the Bosniaks, this is also because it allows this tradition to be enriched with new outside contributions, as has always been the case in the past.

7 Conclusion

For centuries now, emigration has been one of the ways the Bosniaks have interacted with the world around them. They have never stopped taking part in various migratory movements, as *gurbetçi* during the Ottoman era, *muhağir* in the Austro-Hungarian and interwar periods, and *Gastarbeiter* during the Communist period. Already during the 20th century, the diaspora played an active role in defining the Bosniak political and religious identity. Since the 1990s, the Bosniak diaspora has grown even more important. On the one hand, the Bosniaks of Sandžak, Montenegro, Kosovo, Croatia and Slovenia are now part of the diaspora, and must find their place within the various successor states of the Yugoslav federation. On the other hand, the Bosniak diaspora in Western Europe and North America has rapidly grown larger. The strong political mobilization sparked by the war between 1992 and 1995 has receded, but the Bosniak diaspora has formed its own local religious institutions, as shown by

21 Mustafa Cerić, "Deklaracija evropskih muslimana" [Declaration of European Muslims], accessed October 8, 2015, http://www.rijaset.ba. On the issue of the Islamic Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Islam in Europe, see also Christian Moe, "A Sultan in Brussels? European Hopes and Fears of Bosnian Muslims," *Südosteuropa*, 4 (2007): 374–394; Christian Moe, "Is Multicultural Man Circumcised? Bosnian Muslims and European Identity Discourses," in Monika Wohlrab-Sahr and Levent Tezcan, eds. *Konfliktfeld Islam in Europa* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007), 267–279.

22 Karčić, "Šta je to."

23 Armina Omerika, *Muslimische Stimmen aus Bosnien und Hercegowina: die Entwicklung einer modernen islamischen Tradition* (Freiburg: Herder, 2013).

the founding of numerous *ǧamʿats* around the globe. These *ǧamʿats* participate in the religious life of their host countries and therefore form an important link between the Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the rest of global Islam. Yet the religiosity of the Bosniak diaspora in Western Europe and North America remains low, and the younger generation's lack of religious socialization threatens the Islamic Community's authority and the transmission of the Islamic tradition of the Bosniaks (as defined by that same Community).

PART 2

Ethnic, Cultural, and Religious Identity

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CHAPTER 3

Bosniaks of the Balkans – European Muslims in Switzerland

Alen Duraković

1 Introduction

This chapter examines the life and work of Bosniak Muslims who live in Switzerland. It aims to provide insight into the state of Bosniak migrants through the organization of religious practice and rituals, their manner of self-representation, and the development of their cultural tradition and identity formation. Furthermore, it draws on my own personal experiences, which occurred while living and working in Switzerland (Luzern) during March-June 2014 and includes my general observations of this community. It represents a reflection on the life of Bosniaks Muslims in Switzerland from the perspective of a 'stranger,' who once lived the same way as these Bosniak Muslims and who came to Switzerland long ago (to the Cantons Luzern and Zurich). At that time, I made efforts to live as they do, along with all the advantages and disadvantages that this entails.

During my stay, I performed the duties of an Imam in a Muslim congregation in a suburb of Luzern. I had the opportunity to talk to people who had been living in Switzerland for decades. These people were trying to preserve the customs and traditions of the places they came from. Such efforts were primarily directed to family and children, and tended to be of a personal character. I could rarely observe an activity that brought together all Bosniak migrants in the form of an official project. I was in a position to communicate and work with the senior population (those who came to Switzerland in the 1980s), as well as migrants who came during the aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s. Finally, I also came into contact with children, i.e. second- and third-generation migrants, who were born outside the homeland of their parents.

The association consisted of migrants from Bosnia, Sanjak (Novi Pazar, Sjenica, and Prijepolje) and Montenegro (The River Lim Valley, Plav, Gusinje, Bijelo Polje, and Pljevlja). Therefore, we are speaking about a number of different mentalities (accounting for cultural and traditional variations in the Balkans) of Bosniaks who inhabit Switzerland and Europe. But one can also speak of the notion of collective identity.

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2 Muslims in Switzerland

When it comes to the official number of Muslims in Switzerland, the exact number is difficult to determine. According to the Federal Bureau of Statistics, the number of Muslims aged 15 and over was 341,572,[1] while the number of Muslims according to newspaper articles and research is something different. Their origin is diverse and it is categorized into Muslims who come from various countries all over the world. The total percentage of Muslims living in Switzerland is about 5% and most of them live in Zurich and in Basel (about 8%). Approximately 4% of that total population live in Luzern. Muslims come from the following places:

The Balkans	175,443
Turkey	62,698
North Africa	11,690
Middle East	1,831

Three-quarters of the Muslims living in Switzerland come from the Balkans and Turkey. Of the total Muslim population, 80% are Sunni of the following ages:

18–35 years	43%
36–60 years	38%
+60 years	19%

There are about 240 objects where people can conduct prayers, including the mosques in Geneva, Zurich, and Winterthur. There are approximately 13,000 Muslims in the Luzern Canton. Although they are of different origin, the majority come from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo, Turkey, and Albania, while only a small number come from the African continent.[2]

1 The Federal Statistical Office reported the religious demographics as of 2013 as follows (based on the resident population older than 15 years): total population of Muslims aged 15 or older: 341.572 (confidence interval of ± 1.8%, U ± 6150, based on a total (100%) of 6,744,794 registered resident population above 15 years).
This corresponds to 5.1% ± 0.1% of total (adult) population, accessed April 23, 2017, https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfsstatic/dam/assets/217311/master.

2 Thomas Bigliel, "Elf Fakten über Muslime in der Schweiz," *20 minuten*, February 5, 2015, http://www.20min.ch/schweiz/news/story/12178273, accessed February 8, 2015.

3 Organization of Muslims in Switzerland

Muslims in Switzerland are primarily organized according to religious grounds (in congregations), and to a lesser extent by associations, whose aim is to promote and preserve cultural heritage. Those associations are mostly of a "folkloric" character and primarily attract the younger population. The names of the associations are indicative of this and often also include the name of a country or specific region. They assist people from the countries of the former Yugoslavia in gathering together, most often at social events in restaurants that provide entertainment. Such associations are commonly cultural associations that cherish the tradition of folk dances and costumes.[3] Very often, the associations as such work within the congregation and the Islamic community of a specific place. In this study, I address the organization of Bosniak Muslims through a congregation, as the congregation is the most relevant platform for bringing together Muslims regardless of which state they come from. The Islamic Community of Switzerland is not unique in terms of gathering all Muslims into one organizational unit, yet the communities are divided based on their countries of origin.

Accordingly, there is a congregation of Bosniaks from Bosnia, a congregation of Bosniaks from Sanjak, a congregation of Bosniaks from Montenegro, and a congregation of Albanians. Regardless of their similarities, they operate independently without the existence of an "umbrella" organization. In terms of organization, the entity perhaps best positioned is the Islamic Community of Bosniaks from Bosnia, Sanjak, and Montenegro. However, in this particular organization one can observe serious misunderstandings regarding cooperation involving the congregation's organization and the work of its Imams. The congregation attracts all Muslims to the fullest extent, in the sense that is has access to almost all of them. Thus, it gives a clear picture of the number of Muslims, their status, social engagement, and positioning. However, it should be noted that the Islamic Community (congregation) does not have a list of all the Muslims in one place, but rather a list and data about the members who fulfill the obligation of membership fees (regular cash payments, monthly or annually in order to assist the functioning and needs of the mosque). When we talk about the organization of Bosniak migrants in some countries in Europe, it can be considered to be greatly problematic that lists of all Bosniaks living in certain countries or in particular areas do not exist. This lack of information in

3 Ministarstvo za ljudska prava i izbjeglice, "Organizacije u iseljeništvu," [Organizations in emigration], accessed December 25, 2014 http://www.mhrr.gov.ba/iseljenistvo/O_iseljenistvu/organizacije/default.aspx?id=822&langTag=bs-BA.

turn creates additional problems regarding the organization of Bosniaks in the diaspora. This population grew significantly during the aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unfortunately, the state as such does not place a priority on the formation or maintenance of diaspora communities in the form of programs aimed at the preservation of culture, or the traditions of Bosniaks – whether religious or national. One example of best practices can be seen in the activities of the Swiss Ministry for Refugees and Displaced Persons, which held a conference in cooperation with the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)[4] in Bern in December 2104. Countries of origin pay special attention to their respective diaspora through the work of specialized ministries, various educational programs, the preservation of language and linguistic culture, special media programs and shows on TV and radio, various projects financed by state budgets, student exchange programs, and the coordination of students in the diaspora. These activities are supported by the Ministry of Diaspora.[5]

A lack of clear concern or interest expressed by the state in which emigrants live brought about their self-organization and self-representation. In a significant way, they may make it so that they lose consciousness of their identity. In particular, we should look closely at awareness of identity among second and third generation Muslims. Here, I am referring to Muslims in general, and not only Bosniaks, who are born and educated in European countries. The state's policies and attitude vis-à-vis the diaspora brings about a weakened link between the country of origin and the diaspora. The consequences of this include permanent assimilation in the linguistic, cultural, traditional, and religious sense.

4 Religious Practice in Migration/Diaspora

4.1 *Daru-l-islam, Daru-l-harb and Daru-l-da'we*

Given that some Muslim scholars (those who represent and advocate for traditionalism and consistency) refer to Europe as daru-l-harb,[6] we can speak about Muslims who are (secretly) hampered in their implementation of their

4 Ministarstvo za ljudska prava I izbjeglice, "U Bernu održana konferencija bh. Dijaspore," [In Bern a Conference of B&H Diaspora was held], accessedDecember 22, 2014, http://www.mhrr.gov.ba/iseljenistvo/aktuelnosti/default.aspx?id=4921&langTag=bs-BA.

5 Ministarstvo spoljnih poslova, Uprava za saradnju s dijasporom i Srbima u region, "Konkursi," [Projects], Ministarstvo spoljnih poslova, accessed December 22, 2014, http://www.dijaspora.gov.rs/kancelarija-za-dijasporu-projekti/.

6 A country/territoryin which the majority of the populationis not Muslim and where the principles and rules of Sharia are not applied.

faith in the public and private spheres. Such situations occur when Muslims live together with non-Muslims, including people who might harm them and are hostile towards them, their religion, and their traditions. Other scholars, however, refer to Western Europe as daru-l-da'we or daru-l-ahd,[7] i.e. an area of 'calling to Islam' or a contractual space in which any Muslim is allowed to express his or her religion in public or in private. The application of *Šarićа* law, however, would still have to occur secretly, or on a personal and private basis, as it is non-binding in the society or environment where the Muslim lives. The life of Muslims in either of these states should be compared to those in the region known as daru-l-islam,[8] where the majority of the population is Muslim, there is a public application of *Šarićа* law in society, and Muslims are given a guarantee of safety and the protection of basic principles – *darurrāt* (life, religion, honor, property, posterity, and freedom).

First, we must note that all basic principles (*darurrāt*) that are guaranteed to Muslims in Muslim countries also exist and are guaranteed in the area of Western Europe where a non-Muslim majority resides. Second, Muslims in Western Europe have the same rights as local residents (at the very least, on paper). However, the problem lies within Muslim communities themselves. How capable are they of taking advantage of all the opportunities provided to them? According to Tariq Ramadan, Muslims and Muslim communities in Europe, i.e. Muslims who live in the West, are entitled to the following:

> [...]
> 1. Right to practice Islam
> 2. Right to knowledge and education
> 3. Right to self-presentation
> 4. Right to self-organization
> 5. Right to legal protection[9]

Third, Europe is much more advanced in scientific and technological terms than Muslim countries. Therefore, the opportunity for advancement of Muslims in Europe is significantly higher and achievable.

We are then faced with several key questions. Do Muslims and Muslim communities, and hence Bosniak Muslims in Europe, have the capacity and ability

7 A territory/state that is not under Muslim rule, but has signed contracts withMuslim states.

8 Darul-Islam is a country (or place) that applies Sharia, is ruled by Muslims, and in which the regulations of Islam are dominant.

9 Tariq Ramadan, *Biti Evropski musliman* [To Be a European Muslim] (Sarajevo: Udruženje ilmije Islamske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini, 2002), 172.

to take advantage of all those rights guaranteed by law in accordance with the principles of *Šari'a* law? Moreover, with all of these resources, rights, and obligations, are they able to articulate their identity – with all of its peculiarities and diversity?

If we, as Bosniak Muslims – an indigenous people of the European continent – have the opportunity to introduce our culture, tradition, and religion to others but fail to do so, then we have no right to ask others to do the same for us. The European area is an arena in which every existing culture and tradition fights for "one more follower". This is done using all means available, including political power and domination. One important question and dilemma that arises is whether Europeans (in the cultural, civilizational, and traditional sense) are closer to Muslim immigrants from Africa and Asia or to Bosniak Muslims from the Balkans. We must ask ourselves whether we, as Muslims, follow the instructions of the Prophet Muḥammad s.a.w.s. and the Qur'an's guidance in our lives. Do we present our faith in the best light? And do we, through our personal examples, show others and invite others to Islam? I am concerned that the frequent conversion of Europeans to Islam actually comes about as a result of personal knowledge of Islam and its perfection, rather than from Muslims who awakened such a desire in a convert via their personal example. Can we treat the life of Muslims living on European soil, in addition to trials of faith application, as a treasure of invitation into faith for all those who are not Muslim through our personal example and sincere intention to confirm our verbal testimony of tawhid with our deeds?

5 Applying Religion in Practice: Needs, Problems, and Challenges

The question of orthopraxy on European soil is regulated in such a way that everyone has the right to manifest and promote their faith without any threat or insult directed towards members of other religions. This may deviate a bit when it comes to Muslims because the Muslim population in Europe is significantly influenced by events in developing countries. This is why Islam and Muslims are presented as some kind of threat to safety and plurality in Europe. The recent burning of mosques in Austria and Sweden puts a dark shadow over plurality, freedom, and the safety of minority communities.[10] Religious practice in Europe was seen as a major issue during the aggression on

10 Al Jazeera Balkans, "Napadi na džamije u Švedskoj i Austriji," [Attacks on Mosques in Sweden and Austria], accessed January 7, 2015, http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/napadi-na-dzamije-u-svedskoj-i-austriji.

Bosnia-Herzegovina (for Bosniaks), and, in the sequence of events, became important for other immigrants who came from Turkey, Africa, and Asia.

In symbolic terms, religious practice can be monitored based on the development of facilities and spaces made available in which prayer can be performed. For example, the first Muslim immigrants asked for spaces for prayer in remote areas of the cities in which they lived. In most cases, these spaces were almost hidden given that they were in the basements of industrial or residential buildings. Initially, such spaces were a center around which the entire Islamic community functioned. As the community "matured," spaces for prayer came up out of the basements to the first floors of buildings. Today, large Islamic centers, which are several hundred square meters, are being and have been built in places like Austria (Graz and Vienna), Switzerland (Luzern, Aargau, and Geneva), Germany (Berlin, Frankfurt, Stuttgart), and in other European countries. Such Islamic centers also provide spaces for additional facilities such as restaurants, hostels, and markets. In this sense, the Turks are particularly active, and so are the Bosniaks and Arabs to a lesser extent.

The practice of religion focuses mainly on *maktab* classes (religious education for children and adults) and the observance of Friday prayers, or *ǧum'a*. Where common adoration (congregation) is concerned, the performance of other prayers can be observed at a lesser intensity. This is mostly due to employment, as those who work are unable to perform daily prayers in congregation. Most activities (*maktab* classes, lessons, promotions, celebrations, etc.) are held on the weekend.

6 Problems of Religious Practice

To begin with, I would like to address the problem of the construction of Islamic facilities[11] in a traditional manner (mosques with a minaret or fountains, for example). In certain countries, including Switzerland, the construction of mosques with a minaret[12] is not allowed, despite the fact that there are only four minarets in the entire country. Problems arise when traditional construction and the opportunities or limitations offered by European countries come

11 Islamska zajednica u Republici Sloveniji, "Džamija će koštati oko 35 milijuna eura" [The Mosque will Cost Around 35 Million Euros], accessed December 22, 2014, http://www.islamska-zajednica.si/si/arhiv/Vijesti/dzamija-ce-kostati-oko-35-miliona-eura.

12 Mirko Čubrilo, "Konačna odluka: Švicarska zabranjuje gradnju minareta" [Final Decision: Switzerland Forbids the Construction of Minarets],*Večernji list*, November 29, 2009, accessed December 22, 2014, http://www.vecernji.hr/svijet/konacna-odluka-svicarska-zabranjuje-izgradnju-minareta-58150.

into contact with one another. It is often the case that the culture of building and construction regulations are mixed. In addition to the problem of minaret construction, the public call to prayer from minarets (in the event that they exist) has been categorically rejected despite large numbers of Muslims. Many Muslims who live in Switzerland have expressed the wish to be buried in their homeland, in cemeteries with other family members following their deaths. However, second and third generation immigrants are not interested in this. Rather, they want to be buried in the country where they were born and live. Issues regarding Muslim cemeteries are currently being dealt with. Although action is slow here when compared to some other issues, it is important to state that the problem is being addressed.

For example, the town cemetery in Luzern may have plots allocated to them within the cemetery. In Germany, where a "golden population" of Muslim immigrants can be found, steps have been taken to solve the problems related to cemeteries for members of Islam.[13]

Since its founding, the Islamic community and its congregation have faced serious problems regarding funding. Although this issue cannot be considered to be within the domain of religious practice, it has a significant impact on the development of the congregation. It is a little known fact that the Islamic community operates largely on the basis of payment of annual and monthly membership fees, which provide funds for the normal functioning of mosques, facilities, etc. Such funds pay the Imam's salary, pay the rent for leased premises, cover the cost of utilities, etc. As membership is voluntary, the congregation's ability to function depends on the good will and consciousness of Muslims. As a result of the high tax base and expenditures, many congregation members engage their Imam only for the purposes of prayers and *maktab* lessons. Financial resources to meet all the needs of the state are sorely lacking.

The issue of Muslim women covering themselves in public is a major problem that receives widespread media and public attention. This issue has consequences on Muslim communities throughout Europe – and in Switzerland – on a daily basis. However, European plurality loses its vote when it comes to the clothing Muslim women wear according to Islamic regulations.[14]

13 Christian Ignatzi and Zorica Ilić, "Uskoro prvo muslimansko groblje u Njemačkoj" [Soon the first Muslim Cemetery in Germany], *Deutsche Welle*, August 20, 2013, accessed December 23, 2014, http://www.dw.de/uskoro-prvo-muslimansko-groblje-u-njema%C4%8Dkoj/a-17029633.

14 IslamBosna, "Zapadne zemlje potcjenjuju muslimanke" [Western Countries Underestimate Muslim Women], *Islambosna*, May 12, 2014, accessed December 22, 2014, http://www.islambosna.ba/zapadne-zemlje-potcjenjuju-muslimanke/.

Examples of the religious practices of Muslims in Europe demonstrate that this community is faced with everyday problems for which there are no easy answers. I can freely state that the question of fiqh of Muslim minorities in the West has been a burning topical issue since the arrival of the first Muslim immigrants on European soil. Unfortunately, the Islamic *ʿulamā* and Muslim scholars were educated in places far away from the challenges and problems faced by Muslims in Europe since they live in Muslim countries surrounded by other Muslims. Who is to take care of these Muslims who have been left on their own? Classic Islamic education cannot provide answers to many of the questions regarding the social and political life of contemporary Muslim communities living in Europe (financial affairs, medicine, nutrition, etc.). Madh'hab pursuit and favoritism very often complicate religious practice and compliance with *Šariʿa* law. Thereby, for no reason, individuals have a very difficult time performing their religious practice.

As an organizational unit of the Islamic community, the congregation depends – to a great degree – on the awareness of its members, particularly on members who are committed to the ability of the congregation to function in the performance of its activities. Problems associated with Vaktija (calendar, time schedule for the daily prayer) are also evident and tend to manifest themselves most clearly during the month of Ramadan. Due to inconsistency and the lack of a clear attitude on the part of the Islamic community, Muslims sometimes fast up to half an hour longer.

All of the issues described in this section only describe one part of the problem faced by Muslims in practicing their faith on European soil, and in Switzerland. Many of these issues are connected to the organization and self-confirmation of the Islamic community, while others are related to the lack of self-potential for making use of all the rights "given" to Muslims.

7 The Needs of Muslims

In Europe, generally, as well as in Switzerland, Muslims face a wide range of needs. Such needs are primarily connected to self-organization within their congregations and the Islamic community. Bosniaks living in Switzerland today must clarify the call towards silent assimilation that occurs hand in hand with industrialization and scientific and technological achievements. This silent assimilation does not care about origin, nation or religion, and determines value based only on the rate of development, profit, and the opportunity to contribute to society. Individuals consider the need for integration in the diverse European societies in which they live in accordance with their values

(traditional, cultural, religious) and their ability to express themselves in an original and authentic manner using the means provided by scientific and technological achievements. If society will not or cannot understand a different language and communication with its members, then they should seek the best way for Bosniak Muslims to be incorporated into the "European identity." I am calling for neither the complete rejection of all values and civilizational achievements in Europe, nor their blanket acceptance. Rather, I am speaking about a process of integration – a process with both broad and fine selection processes in accordance with one's personal religious, traditional, and cultural criteria.

The needs of contemporary Muslims in Europe, and therefore Bosniaks as well, are reflected primarily in the new concepts of the organization of the Islamic community. This institution is treated as the address for all problems related to Muslims in Switzerland, despite the fact that it hardly has control over "all Muslims." Allow us now to address these needs from the perspective of an ordinary member of the congregation.

For starters, there is a lack of literature in the language of the countries where Muslims live. A good deal of the available literature is actually translations of works from the last century. On the other hand, works that deal with everyday life today are lacking. There is a need for the quick and high-quality education of the employed population as these individuals have no time to study Islamic regulations or *Šarí'a* law. These individuals require clear answers regarding what is allowed and what isn't, and it's also important for them to know about certain limitations. An Imam's education must be in accordance with such needs and the time period in which he works. Allow me to give the example of Imams who visit congregations in the diaspora periodically. These Imams perceive of the life experiences of Muslims who've lived in Europe for decades in a manner very different from the way such Muslims perceive of themselves. An Imam should be a coordinator or rather a leader in an environment where the only support for Muslims and their needs are Muslims themselves, and not someone else. Education that will keep track of time and its challenges should be directed towards the movement of the congregation and aligned with the needs of the environment where they live. Today, Muslims in Europe expect their questions to be answered clearly and briefly and for their doubts to be put to rest. These Muslims want advices related to nutrition, medical treatment, banking and lending, education, political participation, and other daily issues. An individual with a question will not look for answers on his own. Rather, he hopes that the Imam from his congregation will know, or at least be able to suggest answers to his questions. Therefore, it is important that the Islamic community and its educational institutions train their students not only to be engaged and innovative in terms of the organization

of their congregation, but also to understand faith as a dynamic daily routine that should not be seen as a burden, but rather as a helpful tool in overcoming problems. Imams should assist their communities in articulating and incorporating their identity and image both at home and abroad.

Islam should not be understood as some form of fossilized information that can't be changed or harmonized. Such a view is damaging to Islam and Muslims. It is necessary to change one's mind and accept Islam. It should be understood as inclusive of everything that is good and not in conflict with the fundamental principles of faith, which do not violate the holiness of man and nature. This means to accept it deep in your heart and to apply it in time.

8 Why Bosniaks in the Balkans but Muslims in Europe?

Finally, I would like to examine the question of identity of immigrants in Europe. In this particular case, I am interested in the question of the identity of Bosniaks. Where is the line that erases their national identity and where does an identity void of centuries-old traditions and peculiarities begin? What is it that pushes everything in our home country, which we left, and everything that was important, including the subject of conflict with those different from us, into the background? These are the questions that interest me.

In developed Europe, why does the nation we belong to, and the traditions we inherit and cherish, matter? Contemporary Europe has realized that the economy, science, technology, and general prosperity know no cultural tradition or ideological difference that might jeopardize prosperity. Europe has quietly suppressed nations and nationality, all under the guise of freedom and democracy:

> The restructuring of the economy in Western Europe, in particular those social groups that have been marginalized otherwise are affected, and among them foreigners. The pressure that a gastarbeiter feels he wants to suppress. It is a feeling of constant control, a constant reminder that he was a foreigner, which causes him to conceal his identity and to suppress it – to 'get away from his identity.'[15]

Contemporary Europe is a market of over 350 million consumers from different cultures, traditions, religions, and ideologies. They are united by products, prosperity, jobs, and security – both economic and social. In this process, the identity of the Bosniaks, which is so important to us in the Balkans, has been

15 Pavao Jonjić, "Identifikacija 'Gasterbajtera,'" [I*dentification of the 'Gastarbeiter'*], *Migrcijske Teme* 4 (1988): 285.

lost. "National identities were established in contrast to the identities of others, usually neighbouring nations, but played an important role in the history of the emerging nations."[16] At this very moment, the Bosniaks of the Balkans have replaced their national identity with religious affiliation. Our need to present ourselves to others has been supplanted by the community of congregation. This is a society that, due to the impossibility of presenting themselves to others, works on presenting themselves to themselves. Bosniak Muslims from the Balkans who live in countries of Western Europe have become Muslims of Europe. These individuals are under the permanent burden of constantly hearing that they are foreigners. Their intention 'to return' to their country impacts the need for national representation and national edification in Europe. This must occur beyond the borders of their country.

When we speak of the second and third generation of Muslims generally, and hence the Bosniaks as well, the issue of preserving the existing identity of their parents remains open, i.e. one questions whether the transfer of understanding and determiners of identity on to the children of these children and their descendants is possible. Children born far from the homeland of their parents have no real sense of attachment to a "safe" home or a distant homeland. They want to achieve things for themselves in the country of their birth, and to create their own identities by selecting and "probing" what they want to become. In Europe's climate of identity formation, young immigrants are offered the chance to shape their identities for themselves. Plurality offers acceptance and rejection of the new members of the community. Sometimes, the rejection or acceptance of the home community is reflected in the ghettoization of immigrants. This is further marked by hostility towards integration into a new society. Beyond the fact that identity is partially inclusive and dynamic, the issue of a border that will not and should not be exceeded arises in the process of inclusion into a new community. No matter how hard we try to accept the customs and practices of the inhabitants of the new environment, our determiners – according to them – and consequently the process of them – to us – is still in how well they perceive us and what prejudices they have about us. In this case, time plays an important role because it provides an opportunity to adapt and integrate into society, as well as to incorporate a part of oneself into the "new identity of Europe."

> The policies of integration countries supervise migrants' reality more and more, entering partially into the utopia of a better life. So, by controlling his current reality, he is being offered the realization of his hopes,

16 Jan Such, "Nacionalniidentitet naspram europskog identiteta." [National Identity versus European Identity]. *Politička misao 4* (2000): 84.

> under their wing. What is being offered is a utopia based on personal ethics. One should carry out the obligations imposed, and the reward will come by itself.[17]

Current generations of Muslims have an opportunity to secure a place in Europe's identity and they should carefully rethink what kinds of guidelines they will place upon future generations. Maybe they will not have the opportunity to create their own reality, but they will be treated on the basis of present imaginary boundaries.

9 Conclusion

To conclude this article, the following question arises: How can Bosniaks secure their identity given constant denial, and to what extent will they accept Islam, which is part of their identity?

Perhaps we must seek the answer within ourselves, both individually and collectively. Changes in the way they think about themselves could represent the first step that can lead us to a better tomorrow. The common belief that we do not have many friends could lead us to a position of necessity and help us reorganize so as to prosper at all levels. At this time, it is necessary for the Islamic community to undergo some changes itself. The question here is whether to choose a different, appropriate model as opposed to the one currently in use, or to create a new model that will care for the needs of the Islamic community and the world around us in which we live. Today, we find ourselves recreating identity. Our identity is formed based on how others see and accept us, and the features they 'input' upon us.

We are expected to raise generations that will be flexible regarding the preservation of centuries-old religious traditions and customs. In the process of bending to the needs of time without a clear attitude and orientation, we can very easily lose the originality and legitimacy we have received over time. That originality mostly makes our identity. Without it we are shapeless, and without recognition. Without originality, we simply become a sort of plastic that, due to the clear or unclear circumstances of time, will form one's will and ideas. In such a case we can be anything, but the least we can be is what we are now or what we think we are – indigenous people, equal to the territory and premises, culture and traditions, equal to all in society in terms of all rights and of all those who surround us.

17 Pavao Jonjić, "Identifikacija 'Gasterbajtera'," 286.

CHAPTER 4

Bosnian Muslim Women's Identity and Self-Perception in the Integration Process in Berlin

Ivana Jurišić

1 Introduction

This chapter presents research that was conducted during 2008–2012 in Germany about the most important aspects of the integration process, such as the legal and socioeconomic status of immigrants, as well as the impact of laws and state policies on the lives of immigrants.[1] The examined group consists of Muslim immigrant women who live in Berlin and who are mothers.

They originally come from Bosnia-Herzegovina. The research focused on examining their role of women and mothers in the integration process , from the "bottom-up" perspective.

In order to clarify the overview of the chapter, I begin with addressing a specific problem. Integration – what does it mean; what does it stand for? One of the definitions of the term was given by the European Union administration in the Common Basic Principles on Integration, 2004. Integration is: "A dynamic two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of the European Union".[2]

The study "Muslims in Berlin", published by the Open Society Institute in 2010, also uses this definition in their research. In their text, the authors offer further explanation of this definition:

> In the Explanation to the EU Common Basic Principles on Integration 2004 (CBPS), 'Integration is a dynamic long term and continuous two-way process of mutual accommodation, not a static outcome. It demands the participation not only of immigrants and their descendants but of every resident. The integration process involves adaptation by immigrants,

1 This chapter has been extracted from my doctoral *dissertation "Feeling integrated, yet not accepted – integration process challenges of Muslim immigrant women in Berlin"* (Marburg: Tectum, 2014).

2 European Union Administration. "Common Basic Principles on Integration 2004". Accessed January 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/common-basic-principles-for-immigrant-integration-policy-in-the-eu.

 | DOI:10.1163/9789004394018_006

> both men and women, who all have rights and responsibilities in relation to their new country of residence. It also involves the receiving society, which should create opportunities for the immigrants' full economic, social, cultural and political participation. Accordingly, Member States are encouraged to consider and involve both immigrants and national citizens in integration policy, and to communicate clearly their mutual rights and responsibilities'.[3]

Both definitions indicate that integration is supposed to be a two-way process or a dialogue between the immigrants and the host society; the process in which both parties must fulfil their duties, as well as know their rights. Integration is not the same as assimilation. However, if a neutral observer were to look at the dynamics of the integration process, it would not really look like a two-way process between the aforementioned parties. It appears that integration is not regarded as a positive process by the host society, but rather as a problematic trend. There are also further difficulties – in the public discourse in Germany, Berlin is presented as an example of failed integration, especially in parts of cities such as Kreuzberg and Neukölln. Politicians particularly use Neukölln as a handy example to indicate how problematic and almost impossible it is to carry out the integration of immigrants. At the same time, they forget to take into account the social issues involved in the overall picture of failed integration.

I began my research with a prime interest in the "bottom-up" aspect of the integration process, as seen from the immigrant's perspective. Moreover, I was interested in the perspective of Muslim immigrant women. I was eager to portray the Muslim immigrant women and I hope to have gained a multifaceted insight into their lives. As the bottom-up perspective is rather private and individual, I was interested in learning how laws and policies affect the lives of these women and their families, and whether the integration tools provided by the state represent obstacles or if they facilitate the integration of Muslim immigrant women into the host society.

Another aspect of my research is learning about the self-perception of the women – how they see themselves in their host society, in their communities and in their families. I was eager to learn what role or mission, if any, they have given themselves in the integration process. How do they perceive themselves, as belonging or not belonging here; as being welcome or unwelcome in the host society? What do they want or expect from the society and what kind of contribution do they want to make? What does integration mean for them?

3 *Muslims in Berlin. At Home in Europe Project* (Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2010), 17.

What is their view of the official politics, of the measures that directly affect and shape their lives? All these questions were occurring to me as I was thinking about what direction to pursue in my research.

I was also very eager to learn about the identity of the Muslim immigrant women: their religious, cultural and ethnic identity, as well as their identity as women, mothers, workers or unemployed women. Do the women feel like foreigners and will it always be so? Do they feel that Berlin is their home? Do they feel they are truly Germans, Berliners, Kreuzbergers, etc? In cases of women who wear the hijab, what does it represent for them? What part of their identity does it stand for?

2 Research Question

I was primarily interested in examining the integration process as seen from the perspective of Muslim immigrant women; I wanted to learn what their difficulties were, as well as strategies regarding the integration process in their everyday lives. Hence prior to entering the field, my research question was: "Can women lead the integration process in their family and subsequently in their community, so that integration starts in the family as a 'bottom-up' process?"

Another important area of my interest was the women's self-perception, i.e. their sense of capability or incapability in making a difference in their lives and the lives of their families. I actually really wanted to find out if they are passive observers in the whole context, or if they are active and making an effort to improve their lives, yet are encountering hurdles too high to overcome. Thus, I extended my research question with the following sub-question: "Taking into consideration the status of women in their families, as well as their socio-economic and educational status, are women capable of performing the role of integration process agents and thus positively influencing other members of their family, especially their children, to integrate more successfully into the host society?"

When it comes to the research hypotheses, I assumed that the Muslim immigrant women were not hopeless victims, at least not the ones who would be willing to talk to me. I assumed my interviewees would be active and they would be making a significant effort towards improving their lives in the host society. In reality, I did not know this; my assumption was actually a projection of my own experience, since I can also qualify as an immigrant woman in German society. I did come to Berlin to complete my PhD, but I also supposed I would spend several years of my life living abroad. I was extremely motivated to achieve my goals and to organise my new life in a new country. Being a foreigner at first is not easy, even if one is motivated to make progress

in a new environment, and regardless of whether one is forced to enter the host society as a refugee/asylum seeker or one comes of their own volition and ambition. This was the reason why I surmised that Muslim immigrant women would be active, yet despite their enthusiasm there have been far too many structural obstacles impeding their integration, at least in the sense that the state authorities would want to see them integrated.

3 Research Field and Interviewees

In the course of consulting the scientific literature and writing my proposal, I heard from a fellow student about the project *Stadtteilmütter* (neighbourhood mothers).[4] I believe I could say that the practical part of my research effectively began when I contacted the Stadtteilmütter group that is active in Neukölln and through them reached the Stadtteilmütter who are active in Kreuzberg. The majority of my interviewees were part of the project in Kreuzberg.

The *Stadtteilmütter* project is a project supported by the *Diakonisches Werk*. The concept was taken over from the Netherlands and was initiated in Kreuzberg in 2007. The means for qualifying the immigrant women are provided by the European Social Fund, i.e. by the European Union. The project is conceived in the following manner: unemployed immigrant women undergo a six-month training (three sessions a week) and learn about different issues in the fields of education, children's rights, health care, and divorce issues. Immigrant rights are also covered, as well as information about services that provide assistance in the aforementioned areas. After the training, the women obtain a certificate and are qualified to work as the *Stadtteilmütter* – neighbourhood mothers. They go to families that are more isolated from the host society, i.e. communities where German is not spoken, or where the women and mothers have little German knowledge. The primary aim of the *Stadtteilmütter* is to provide support for children and parents in socially weak and vulnerable families to help with the raising and education of children. The aim is for the children to be encouraged to exit the vicious circle of isolation and dependence on social welfare and to make progress in their lives.

What makes the project special is that unemployed immigrant women obtain necessary training and qualification and visit other unemployed immigrant women and inform them of their rights and opportunities - information that they can use in the host society. What makes it even more special is that the *Stadtteilmütter* come from the same countries or cultural backgrounds as

4 Stadtteilmütter project, accessed January 2019, https://www.berlin.de/sen/wirtschaft/gruenden-und-foerdern/europaeische-strukturfonds/efre/projektbeispiele/artikel.367135.php.

their clients; thus there is an automatic trust established between the women, since they can often speak the same language or in cases where their clients speak German, they can share their common experiences as immigrants.

4 Multi-faceted Identity of Bosnian Muslim Women

In this section, I focus on the identity of Muslim immigrant women and also examine what Islam means for the women's identity and way of life. The concept of the "Other" is described and analysed in detail. The issue of the hijab is taken into account. The personal stories of the women are also given some attention as they are interwoven with their identity. One of the methods used is in-depth interviewing, which focuses on "women's daily life experiences".[5] The experiences within the host society that the Muslim immigrant women recount from their everyday lives serve as the basis for defining the concepts of identity, the role of women, etc. from their own perspective.

Emina from Bosnia was my very first interviewee, and I was very lucky that she was very interested in my topic. Emina was eloquent and willing to give me a lot of information. This helped me to not become overwhelmed by the interview itself, and to not worry about not obtaining detailed enough answers. Emina is 40 years old at the time of the interview. She is married and has five children. Her husband comes from Syria. I met Emina at the *Stadtteilmütter* center, as she also works on the project. When I first came to the *Stadtteilmütter* premises, Emina did not want to say that she comes from Bosnia-Herzegovina, so we spoke in German. She was rather skeptical towards me at first, but after my presentation to the other *Stadtteilmütter*, she consented to do the interview. I developed a closer relationship to her in comparison to my other interviewees. She also helped me find some of the other interviewees by asking two of her Bosnian friends to talk to me. Emina played an important role in my other research methods, such as the non-participant observation at the family café organised by the *Stadtteilmütter* at a Kreuzberg kindergarten. She also invited me to visit her at her home during the ʿĪd or Bayram festivities.

5 The Eternal "Other"

The interview with Emina was dominated by the concept of the "Other"; no other interviewee put so much emphasis on "Otherness". Emina also

5 John M. Johnson, "In-Depth Interviewing", In *Handbook of Interview Research*, ed. J.F. Gubrium and J.A. Holstein (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Inc., 2001), 110.

graphically presents how she feels as the Other and how the Other is perceived in the host society. Emina feels she is the Other mostly because of the fact that she wears the hijab and therefore draws negative attention. She feels she is treated differently, especially in public institutions: "… sometimes they say *do you understand* simply like *2*[6] they make some remarks on the basis of you wearing the hijab for example: 'Why can't it be taken off?' or like this or like that, 'like everybody else' Abc.[7]" From this statement it can be seen that Emina is expected to behave or dress like everybody else. Her Otherness is obviously found to be disturbing in public institutions. The issue of the hijab and of being the Other came up very often throughout the interview; whether the questions were directly related to discrimination or not.

Emina became tense as she explained:

> If I have my opinion, for example, I want to keep my opinion. If the hijab belongs to my personality, to my religion, Abc-, then I want to live like that, with that hijab, I don't want to do anything to anybody *2*, I don't know, * something bad with it. It is my part, I wear it on my head, I mean, there is no need that somebody else * feels bad about it. And that, for that reason, I mean, for example, it often happens * for example, if you don't want to sit down where people drink [alcohol] or you don't want to dance or I don't know what, you are not integrated. It can't be like that, I can Abc- * if someone wants to dance, he can dance, I don't have to dance. I shall dance when I Abc-* ((smiling)) in the circumstances in which I can dance. I can't dance if the men and women are together and like this and like that. I mean, this is my opinion. I think I have a right to have this opinion.

It seems that the concept of the Other permeates into so many spheres of life; from going to an institution, to having a different opinion from the host society, to what one should do in one's free time. Emina also linked the concept of the Other to assimilation, i.e. the host society does not require the immigrant or the Other to integrate, but to assimilate.

A conflict that is present within the Muslim immigrant women is their willingness and eagerness to integrate into the host society, yet also preserve their identity, especially the women who wear the hijab. It may be said that the host society sees the hijab as a symbol of identifying with the Other.

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6 The symbol *2* means according to interview transcription rules a two-second pause when speaking.

7 "Abc" according to interview transcription rules means breaking a sentence off without finishing the thought or the recounting.

The hijab is often seen as a symbol of oppressed women who are reluctant to integrate into the host society; thus, integration (as defined by the host society) does not take place.[8] On the one hand, women want to be accepted as members of the host society, but on the other hand, they want to retain their identity even at the price of being perceived as unwilling to integrate. They do not want to give up wearing the hijab, because for many of them it is a part of both their identity and their personality. The patronising approach of viewing women who wear the hijab either as victims or as refusing to integrate shows the arrogance of the Western, i.e. German society, as well as their attitude towards the Other. In his article, Lanz explains how the host society sees their values as superior to the values of immigrants and they demand that the immigrants adopt them:

> Die Mehrheitsgesellschaft steht dabei für Säkularität, Liberalität, Demokratie, Geschlechtergleichheit; die Einwanderer hingegen stehen für Islam, Tradition und Unterdrückung der Frau. Integration gilt hier als gelungen, wenn sich Einwanderer mit westlichen Werten identifizieren und diese in ihre vermeintlich homogenen „Kulturen" inkorporieren.[9]

Contrasting "us" and "them"; i.e. the bearers of Western and progressive values as opposed to the bearers of retrograde values, makes it easier to deny the Other their place in the host society, to exclude them and not acknowledge them as equal members.[10]

Aida, a Bosnian interviewee who does not wear the hijab, thinks that the German society shows how immature it is when women with hijab are looked down upon and not allowed to work in public service. In her opinion, women with hijab cannot even influence other people; they can do no harm to them.

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8 Dominic McGoldrick, *Human Rights and Religion: the Islamic Headscarf Debate in Europe* (Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2006), 16–18, 31–33.

9 "The majority society represents secularism, liberalism, democracy, gender equality; the immigrants on the contrary represent Islam, tradition and discrimination against women. Integration is regarded successful if the immigrants identify with Western values and if they incorporate these in their allegedly homogenous 'cultures'". Stephan Lanz, "In unternehmerische Subjekte investieren. Integrationskonzepte im Workfare-Staat. Das Beispiel Berlin", in *No integration?! Kulturwissenschaftliche Beiträge zur Integrationsdebatte in Europa*, ed. S. Hess, J. Binder and J. Moser (Bielefeld: transcript, 2009), 108–109.

10 Nira Yuval-Davis, "Ethnicity, Gender Relations and Multiculturalism", in *Debating Cultural Hybridity*, ed. P. Werbner and T. Modood (London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1997), 193–208. Arturo Madrid, "Diversity and Its Discontents", in *Intercultural Communication: A reader*, ed. L.A. Samovar and R.E. Porter (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1994), 127–131.

In his article "Diversity and its Discontents", Arturo Madrid gives a vivid description of what the Other is:

> Being the *other* involves a contradictory phenomenon. On the one hand, being the *other* frequently means being invisible. On the other hand, being the other sometimes involves sticking out like a sore thumb. What is she/he doing here? There is sometimes a darker side to otherness as well. The *other* disturbs, disquiets, discomforts. It provokes distrust and suspicion. The *other* frightens, scares.[11]

Madrid's description of the Other as invisible and yet sticking out can be applied to the perceptions of Muslim immigrant women by the host society. On the one hand, the women are clearly visible and stand out with their hijab, on the other hand, they are perceived as invisible, because the host society already has a fixed image of these women as powerless and silent.[12] The image of invisible, powerless women leads to the concept of victimisation.

In her article, Spielhaus mentions initiatives to support Muslim women that criticise the constant perpetuation of the role of Muslim women in the general public as discriminated against and exposed to domestic violence.[13]

6 The New Germans – *neue Deutsche*

A few of my interview questions concerned the identities of Muslim immigrant women and their children and addressed the concept of "new Germans" (*neue Deutsche*). This concept is explained in the article "Neue Deutsche, Postmigranten und Bindungs-Identitäten. Wer gehört zum neuen Deutschland?" written by Naika Foroutan.[14] Foroutan explains that this category of new Germans could comprise people who are both German citizens and have a history of migration, either in their generation or their parents.

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11 Ibid, 128.

12 Cengiz Barskanmaz, "Das Kopftuch als das Andere: Eine notwendige postkoloniale Kritik des deutschen Rechtsdiskurs". In *Der Stoff aus dem Konflikte sind: Debatten um das Kopftuch in Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz*, ed. S. Berghahn and P. Rostock (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2009), 361–386.

13 Riem Spielhaus, "Interessen vertreten mit vereinter Stimme: Der 'Kopftuchstreit' als Impuls für die Institutionalisierung des Islams in Deutschland", in *Der Stoff aus dem Konflikte sind – Debatten um das Kopftuch in Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz*, ed. S. Berghahn and P. Rostock (Bielefeld: transcript, 2009), 426–430.

14 Naika Foroutan, "Neue Deutsche, Postmigranten und Bindungs-Identitäten. Wer gehört zum neuen Deutschland?" *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 46–47 (2010): 9–15.

I was interested in learning about the identity of my interviewees, and whether they see themselves as partially German or if they think their children have or can have a "hyphenated identity".[15] The duality among the answers to this question was most interesting; the answers given by the interviewees were either a categorical "yes" or a categorical "no". However, none of the interviewees were indecisive or indifferent to this question. It was even more interesting to see that the women I would characterise as more traditional, such as Emina, made the claim that they are both German and Bosnian, and they made the claim that their children should be perceived as new Germans, i.e. people with hyphenated identities. This categorical division of the answers into a clear "yes" or clear "no" made me analyse the interviewees' circumstances in more detail and one of my conclusions is that the more excluded people are based on their legal and economic status, the more entitled they feel to a double identity, or the bigger claim they make that they belong to the host society. Both the socioeconomic and legal status of all the aforementioned women is precarious.

7 Identity versus Culture

Selma comes from Bosnia and has two daughters who were born in Germany. When I asked Selma whether she viewed Muslim immigrants as new generations of Germans, she explained that immigrants cannot take on an additional identity (in this case, a German identity):

> IP: In my opinion, this can never be so. For the reason Abc-, my opinion is like that, because we are simply not Germans. Another thing, we have a different culture, we were not born here. We lived under some other conditions, in some other country. Simply, even if we were Germans, if we had a German passport, our names are not ((accentuated)) German names and one can immediately tell some difference. * But I don't know, perhaps my child or even the younger ones, perhaps they become some new Germans tomorrow, but me, like me, who has her roots from Bosnia, I can never be German. I can tell, okay, Germany is a part of my homeland, because I live here, but my roots are not here, I cannot say, Germany is my homeland, Bosnia isn't. I can say, I am related to Germany, the same I am related to Bosnia. Perhaps my child will be more related to Germany than to Bosnia, because she was born here, she went to school here and all that, but I cannot say that for myself. Because I had my friends there,

15 Ibid.

> I had my childhood there, I went to school there. If there had been no war, perhaps I would have never come to Germany, so, I cannot say for myself I can be German, even I had a German passport.

It seems there is a conflict in Selma's statement. At first, she categorically says the hyphenated identity is not possible because the immigrants come from another culture and their names are different. As we talked about the integration process earlier in the interview, Selma spoke of a *Bezirksamt* (District office) clerk who is in charge of communicating with immigrants and who complained about the Muslim immigrants' unwillingness to integrate, since they do not give German but Muslim names to their children. It is important to mention here that Selma was shocked by this statement and she was hurt by the clerk's remark. However, it seems that Selma internalised this remark and thus she says that immigrants can never be Germans because they have non-German names.

Contrary to what she said at the beginning of the interview, Selma would like her daughters to have a hyphenated identity; to feel like they are both German and Bosnian, because as Selma explained, their roots are Bosnian. The Bosnian language is a part of their identity and her daughters speak Bosnian. So, Selma would be happy if they perceived themselves as both Bosnian and German. Therefore, she eventually does distinguish between first and second-generation immigrants and their ability to become new Germans. Selma made a distinction between her Bosnian identity and German culture:

> IP: Identity is mine, for example. Simply, I say, I would always say, it is mine, one knows where the roots are, but when it comes to culture, one thinks a bit differently. We didn't have Abc-, for example, if somebody comes as a guest, that your neighbour calls you and ask: 'Are you at home, would you like me to come and visit you, shall we have coffee?' She comes, you are at home, she knocks on your door and you sit down together. So through these appointments we adopted this thing of theirs, you call, make an appointment, see if that person can make it. Because we now live in another country, we all have things to do, especially when one has children who go to school, so that also has to be taken into consideration, so that people do not visit with each other until late in the evening, the children have to go to bed early if it is a workday…

For Selma, one element of German culture involves making appointments in order to meet with people. This is very different from the habits of people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who meet with each other spontaneously, especially if

they live in the same neighbourhood. As Selma explained, there, people do not call each other to see if they have time or if they are in the mood to socialise – one simply knocks at your door and comes in for coffee. It is also taken for granted that the host is in the mood and has time to socialise; it rarely happens that the host says he/she cannot do so at the given moment.

8 Claiming the Right to German Identity

Emina's husband comes from Syria and their children were born in Berlin. Emina speaks Arabic with her husband and speaks mostly German with her children. She says it is easier for her to speak German and not Bosnian with them. The children speak some Bosnian and practice it when they visit their relatives in Bosnia. When asked about the concept of "new Germans", Emina said the following:

> IP: Certainly, if they are given a chance to have * the same rights, so to say, the same rights, and the same Abc- so that they are not treated like me, for example ((speaking fast)), sometimes when I look for a job, you can because of your hijab, because of this, because of that. I applied for jobs for so many times and then how come, because of hijab you can't work. That is one thing, for example. And then, how can I feel German or how can I be accepted as a German. I mean, I can become German. I've lived here for twenty years, I've got nothing against being German, because my children are certainly more German than Bosnian or they are more German than Syrian. They live here. And I live here longer than in my country. So to say, and why wouldn't I be German?
>
> I: Yes, yes. You have spent more years living here than in Bosnia.
>
> IP: Exactly. And one certainly feels in a way * and so to say* a part of this country, one feels German, I am not German, I cannot say that I am German, I am not, but I feel something for this country, certainly as every German feels some love for this country. There is a feeling, certainly. And because of that it is possible; we can certainly be Germans, new Germans, especially our children.

A conflict can be observed in Emina's view of her own and her children's identities, however, the conflict does not come from her, but is conditioned by the actions of the host society. In Emina's opinion, immigrants can be "new Germans", but they have to be treated the same as other Germans and not discriminated

against because of their religious identity, as she is. Emina asked a legitimate question: How can she feel accepted by the host society when she cannot find a job because she wears the hijab? She is not German, but she claims her right to be German, for the simple reason that she has lived in this country for many years and she will probably continue to live here for a long time.

It is also interesting how Emina sees the identity of her children; they are more German than anything else. Later on, she said that her children's identity is dual in any case, as they can profit from being exposed to two, or in their case, three cultures. Emina thinks that one's identity necessarily changes when one lives in a new environment; it cannot stay the same. One automatically accepts some positive things from the new culture - that is unavoidable. Emina is grateful for her experience of living abroad; she is more open to people from other countries and to those who think differently from her.

> IP: I think it is silly when one doesn't Abc- that the things are always the same. I mean, I don't lose my identity, so to say. If I accept something positive from the others, what doesn't make me regress. If it is advanced, if there is progress behind that. I have my family, if that is really something that does good for both the society and my children, I would then accept it

It may be said that for Emina, identity is not a fixed concept. One has their own "basic" identity with which one is born; however, this identity is prone to change when one lives in another country. Emina is not afraid of the influences from the host society; on the contrary, if these new inputs can improve the quality of her life, she is open to change and to the host society.

9 National Identity as a Defence Mechanism against *Duldung* (Tolerance) Status

Azra is the only one of the Bosnian interviewees who has a very strong national identity; she emphasised it throughout the interview. The other interviewees used the term "Bosnian", which refers to all the inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina, regardless of their national or religious identity. Azra is the only one who constantly used the term "Bosniak", which precisely denotes the identity of Bosnian Muslims. At first, I found it a bit unusual to notice such an emphasis on her ethnic identity, compared to what the other Bosnian women said. Especially taking into account that all the interviewees except Emina had similar experiences with their arrival in Germany and their refugee status. However, Azra provided the explanation for her strong feeling of

national identity when she spoke about the identity of her daughter. The girl was three years old when her parents brought her to Germany.

> IP: I don't know * if affects you when one is Abc-, when we came at the beginning of the war * so you are so miserable, you are so humiliated. You come * in the 80s when I visited my brother here, I bought my clothes in the Berlin boutiques. When I came here [in 1992] I had nothing and I was forced and I was happy that anybody gave us something. I appreciated everybody who * thank God, if there had been no aid *3* anybody who can help should help. And through all that exactly * that defiance and what do I know, so all of that was reflected on the upbringing ((accentuated)). * Because I wanted her to preserve * her own [identity]. *And * I think I have succeeded at it, she is such a type, she has interest in it, she is friends with Bosniak youngsters and all that, I think she is even a bigger Bosniak than I am ((accentuated)), because she felt Abc- ((the end of tape)). So, that link with Bosnia is not cut off. Although we have no relatives down there. Only some distant relatives live down there.

In her account, Azra makes a comparison between her life before the war, when she came to visit her brother in Berlin in the 1980s. It is important to bear in mind what Azra said earlier in the interview about her life in former Yugoslavia. She worked in the administration of a mine. She told me that as a young woman she had a good job, more than enough money and her own car and she was very happy with her life. She got married, but soon after she got divorced, so she came to Germany as a single mother and a refugee and she suffered tremendously because of her *Duldung* (tolerance) status and the insecurity that was caused by it. So, in effect, in the 1980s she was a young lady who came to Berlin as a tourist and went shopping in the Berlin boutiques, and in the 1990s she was a *geduldete* (tolerated) refugee single mother who was afraid of being deported and was grateful for any donation of clothing. When she mentioned defiance, I made the assumption that her holding on strongly to her Bosniak identity and the pride of being Bosniak was her defence mechanism and somehow a spiritual support to preserve both her and her little daughter's dignity. These were the only tools available for her to be able to cope with her situation. Their national and religious identity is what gave them strength and comfort during their hardest days in Germany. When Azra talks about her own identity, she says:

> IP: * First of all I am Bosniak. I shall never be German. But I have [adopted] some elements, regarding Abc-, I cannot say I am very punctual

> ((laughing)). But I find it important * that if somebody agrees to something, let's say: 'I shall come at this and that time', but perhaps even the Germans are not anymore as they used to be. The others influenced them in a negative way ((laughing)). But I saw that Abc-, last year we were in Bosnia and some work had to be done, so some builders were supposed to come. Builders like builders, and I got annoyed and I phoned and said: 'You said you would be here at 7 o'clock, why didn't you come?' The man is at home, having his coffee ((laughing)) and when he finally comes, he says: 'What is the matter with you, you came from Germany, so you want to make order here Abc-?' And then I saw, there are some elements. Although I personally am like that, if I agree to do something, then I shall do it Abc-.

As was mentioned earlier in the text, Selma, another interviewee from Bosnia, also feels she has adopted some traits of German culture, such as making appointments, sticking to her time schedule, etc. Azra feels the same; she is Bosniak and her identity is undisputed, but there are also some German traits in her behaviour. When she spoke about the new generations of immigrant children, Azra said that she finds Bosniak children who were born and raised in Germany to be 90% German and 10% Bosniak, regardless of their names or ethnic origin. In her opinion, children of foreign origin are more German than they are thought to be. As an example, she mentioned young Bosniak boys and explained that there is no difference between them and German boys.

> IP: Most of them already are [new Germans]. *2* Most of them are. By their names they are not Germans. But for example, let's look at our children, 10–11-year-old boys; listen to what language they speak with one another. What language do they speak? German. Because it is easier for them. And they are not Germans. They don't even have a dual citizenship Abc-, perhaps they do, but they have to give up on it by the age of 18. They already are [new Germans]. They have adopted this way of life. *2* Naturally at school, first in the kindergarten, then at school * they learn * all as it is German. And now, if the family doesn't care so much about preserving the Bosniak identity, these children are more German than * 90% German, 10% Bosniak, perhaps.

Azra took into account that these children will perhaps have to renounce their German citizenship if they want to retain their Bosnian one, but even that will not make them any less German than the ethnic Germans.

10 Irrelevance of Identity

Another Bosnian interviewee Aida emphasizes her integrity and honesty; this has always been her approach towards the host society and she did manage to find people in society who appreciate these values. When she spoke about her daughters' identity, she again mentioned her contribution to society of raising her children with the principles of integrity and honesty. My assumption is that Aida perceives identity as something she cannot choose; she did not choose to be a Bosnian Muslim. However, she may choose to be honest and hard-working. She makes an effort to be a "good" citizen and to be acknowledged by society. That is actually the only recognition she wants to have:

> IP: I said a long time ago: 'I don't want to, I do not want ((accentuated)) to feel as a foreigner!' I am not a foreigner, I didn't come from another planet, I am just in another part of planet Earth, I moved from one part to another, I don't feel at all I'm a foreigner. I am among people, I am not among animals. I fight, I sometimes Abc-, somebody says: 'A foreigner'. I say: 'I am not a foreigner' ((serious, low voice)). And then sometimes they feel insulted when I say it like that. … I was trying to find a way ((loud)), for those people to pay attention to me as a person. So that they take me into account.

What Aida said is very much the claim of most of the interviewees; they seek acknowledgment from the host society. As Aida believes, identity is not important; what is important is that immigrants are regarded as people and not as foreigners who will never belong here. It can also be seen how much effort she makes in order to be visible in the host society. As we talked about the identity of immigrants in general in the German society, Aida emphasised the importance of one's own qualities:

> IP: I again start with integrity. For me anybody who has integrity, regardless of being Muslim, Catholic, Croatian or Jewish abc- If he has integrity, and he is honest in society where he lives, he deserves, he must be ((accentuated)) part of the society. This society must not miss out on this quality; they have to acknowledge the honest people. He will raise his children to be honest in the future and the society also gains from that, regardless of people's identity. In this case it is us the Muslims who had a bad luck to be a group of people that is not tolerated.

I told Aida about the experience of my Bosnian Muslim friends who went to Norway as refugees and how Bosnian Muslims are perceived as the most well-integrated group in Norway. Bosnian immigrants are present in all the walks of life there, ranging from cleaning ladies to bank managers to university teachers to members of parliament. Aida became so excited as I told her about this and exclaimed: "The society gave them a chance!" Thus, in Aida's opinion, the identity of immigrants per se is not so important, but they do have rights and they should have the right to be acknowledged by the host society on the basis of their qualities. However, this will never happen if there is no feedback from the host society. From the statements given by Aida, it can be seen that the only thing they want is to raise their children in a proper way, so that these young people become honest, hard-working and decent citizens. It is not important how they perceive themselves, if their identity is dual or not, nor if they feel that they are Bosnian, German or Tunisian. The most important thing is that they are good people. However, the host society must also acknowledge these people with similar feedback.

11 Religion versus Tradition

Several interviewees made a significant distinction between religion and tradition when they spoke about Islam. Emina's life has been rather hard because she wears hijab; she encounters various challenges in her everyday life because of this visible manifestation of her religious identity. When the issue of hijab came up throughout the interview, Emina talked about it in the context of tradition vs. religion:

> IP: I don't find tradition important. It can be like this or like that, but if it were tradition, I would have left it long time ago, what difficulties we're having Abc-. Therefore, I think, if it were not for religion, I wouldn't have kept my opinion the way it is. Because, for example, if I didn't have my faith, I would have never endured all the difficulties which I have, because of it.

It can be seen that the hijab constitutes a part of Emina's identity; she lives out her religion through it. Regardless of all the difficulties she endures because of the hijab, she is not willing to give up this part of her identity in order to make her life easier. When we talked about emancipated women within the context of Islam, Emina introduced me to a new concept - religion versus tradition

in Islam. As I was preparing for the research field, I really did not think about Islam in these terms. So for me, this was a novelty and it certainly changed my perspectives when reflecting on the treatment of women in Islam. In her statements, Emina explained her view of who it is that actually discriminates against Muslim women:

> IP: Certainly, because Islam as Islam, for example, who knows * what exactly Islam is, it actually gave the rights to the women. If we go back in history, when Islam appeared, what rights the women were then given, they had no rights. Neither in Europe ((accentuated)) nor anywhere else. I mean, we were certainly not denied our rights. But, I must say*2*, tradition plays * an important role in the contemporary Islam. Why Islam is backward, so to say the Islamic rights or * Islamic * attitude towards women, towards women's rights, is * a bit backward, so to say.
>
> Tradition came in the foreground. And then of course, men and their *, because they are stronger or they have more power, they interpret these traditional things the way they want. And then * it is often like that, they give the rights away from women, which were given to them by God and by Islam. The people have replaced Islam and Islamic rights with tradition and the outsiders then think that is Islam.

It was interesting to see how Emina talked about Islam from a historical perspective and said that it did not come into being with terrorist attacks. She wants to view Islam objectively and emphasised that in Europe during the 7th century, Christian women did not have any more rights than Muslim women. Muslim women are perceived as discriminated against, but from Emina's point of view, it is men and tradition that discriminate against women and not Islam. To her mind, men interpret Islam through tradition, which empowers them to consider themselves superior to women. Tradition supports this patriarchal structure, which in reality damages the reputation of Islam, denies women's rights and is of a discriminatory nature. Islam, on the contrary, does not tolerate discrimination. Emina makes a clear distinction between tradition and religion when it comes to discriminating against Muslim women, as well as to living out Islam in everyday life. My interpretation of her words is that tradition is localized; limited to specific times, places or people. It is not God-ordained or at least, it is not sacred. On the other hand, religion is universal and is ordained by God as the highest authority. Religion gives people the power and strength to endure challenges to preserving their religious identity. Emina perceives tradition as man-made, subjective, arbitrary, and patriarchal, whereas religion is God-ordained, objective, intellectual and positive. On the

basis of what Emina said, the following observations may be made: discrimination against Muslim immigrant women can be perceived as taking place on two different levels. The first level is the prejudices of the host society towards Muslim women, perceiving them *a priori* as discriminated against on the basis of their religion, way of life, etc., so the host society perpetuates the discrimination of women.

The second level is the discrimination of Muslim women which is a result of tradition and not of religion. Male dominance is approved of and emphasised by tradition. However, one has to be careful to not generalize this level of discrimination, because not all Muslim immigrant women are discriminated against by their husbands or by their brothers. Since I was rather interested in the topic of the differentiation between religion and tradition, I also conducted a short interview with Salem Dedović, the then Principal Imam of the Islamic Community in Mostar.[16] It was an informal conversation, since we know each other personally. I asked Mr Dedovic for his interpretation of the statements the interviewees made. He explained that people rely more on customs and tradition than on what really is prescribed by Islam. Lack of education can also be a big problem in interpreting or confusing religion and tradition. In Mr Dedovic's words, a woman's right to work and earn her own money is not at all disputed in Islam. Unfortunately, it often happens in families that discrimination against women, as well as the arrogance of male family members, is justified by the Qur'an. I found it useful to talk about these concepts with such a great expert on religion as Dedovic is. Our conversation also clarified my thoughts on Islam as a religion and a tradition, which varies from one country to the next.

12 Hijab and its Meaning

This discussion of rules for the clothing of Muslim women bring us to the hijab, one of the central elements of the identity of Muslim immigrant women, as well as the one of the most frequent causes of discrimination against women in the host society. The issue of hijab dominates many of the interviews, especially the ones conducted with women who wear the hijab. The questions I asked my interviewees centred around the meaning of the hijab for them personally, as well as how they see the ban on hijab in public service. The issue of hijab was very much present as we talked about the perception of Muslim immigrant women in the host society. When we talked about Islam and her

16 Interview with Salem Dedović, December 2010.

religious identity, Selma reflected on the concept of freedom in Islam, especially in regard to wearing the hijab.

> IP: I am religious and I practice regularly, constantly, always, so to say, so it is not only Abc-, it now depends on who represents [Islam], for example. I am of Islamic faith. And somebody perceives Islam, they say: *2* 'The woman covers herself, there is nothing, simply * no freedom, she doesn't decide for herself' and like that. That is not true. Because I say, if you are free, take your clothes off, take them off and walk in the street. They wouldn't do that. Well, if you are free, that is your freedom ((raised voice, tension)). You can also do it. If I cover myself, you can uncover yourself.

In her statement, Selma makes an important point about her freedom to cover her head and wear the hijab as being equal to anyone's freedom to take one's clothes off and walk around naked if one likes. Her statement can also be linked to Heide Oestreich's comment in the article "In der Bevormundungsfalle". The author comments on feminists who fight for female emancipation, i.e. women's rights to live freely: "…einen freien Geist in einem freien Körper" ("a free spirit in a free body").[17] She makes a remark that these very feminists forget that the freedom to uncover one's body is the same as the freedom to cover one's body.[18] From Selma's intonation, it may be seen how irritated she was by the issue of hijab, and why it is perceived as a problem in the host society. It seemed that she felt provoked by the general opinion that Muslim women have no freedom and that Islam denies them freedom. Selma advocated for her religion by saying the following:

> IP: And then I often say, Islam likes all that is beautiful and it rejects all that is bad. Through my behaviour, I as a Muslim woman need to present to people a nice image of Islam. When they see how I behave, then they can say: 'Oh, it is not like that'. Because there are different people Abc-, there is somebody who says: 'I am Muslim'. And so, one shouldn't get into these things. It is the same thing about integration, we are all guilty because of some individuals, and then sometimes I get angry, if it is a Muslim, then he is a terrorist, and if it is some other foreigner, then he has psychological problems, because regardless of how one is like, if

17 Heide Oestreich, "In der Bevormundungsfalle"., *Tageszeitung*, January 25, 2010. Accessed February 2019, http://www.taz.de/!47340/.

18 Ibid.

> I see he does wrong things, I immediately say it is not alright, no matter if he is a Muslim or of some other religion. I see them as people, what they do Abc

It may not be very clear from Selma's words, but she believes that many Muslims interpret their religion wrongly, which also may have influenced the host society's perception of immigrants. Selma feels responsible for representing her religion and she sees herself as an ambassador of Islam. This role also implies taking personal responsibility for tearing down the negative image of Islam that prevails in the host society and to stop people from generalising. It also hurts her how quickly and easily people apply the label of Muslim, or in extreme cases, terrorist, to explain problems. Selma has a proactive as well as political attitude. She feels she can make a difference with her behaviour and she also feels it is her duty to represent her religion in an objective manner.

When I asked each of the interviewees what the hijab represents for them, I obtained varied answers. When we talked about the meaning of the hijab, Selma repeatedly said that the hijab serves as a security and protection for women. In her opinion, women in general are beautiful and they should not show their beauty to men. Aida does not wear the hijab; she sees it as a manifestation of one's moral beliefs. She finds women who wear the hijab to be courageous:

> IP: I am not so courageous to wear it in this society, that headscarf. One has to be courageous to wear it. Because I chose this society to live in. … Somebody wears that with their heart ((excitement, raised voice)). For me that law on taking off the hijab is fine, for some people who were forced to wear it. That is fine. … but we forget the people who wear it with their heart. That is something … a deep faith that nevertheless contributes to the quality of society and it should be left in peace.

It may be assumed that by not wearing the hijab, Aida avoids having additional problems in the host society. It may be hard enough as it is without the hijab. Aida thinks she receives better treatment in state institutions than women who wear hijab. She said that she used to accompany a Bosnian woman who wore the hijab, in order to interpret for her. Since this lady was a refugee and on welfare assistance, the Job Centre in Neukölln was supposed to cover her rent and bills, however they failed to do that. The lady was threatened with a lawsuit by her landlord and needed pro bono legal assistance. When she went to the institutions in person with Aida, she was rejected. When Aida went alone to make the same request on the lady's behalf, she was granted legal aid.

Aida found this rather disappointing. She sees such treatment of hijab-wearing women as a sign of the immaturity of a society which is not able to accept the Other. Aida made the remark that women with hijab cannot even influence other people or their way of thinking.

Azra does not wear the hijab, but her daughter does. She was a bit confused by my question of what the hijab represents for her and she took time to answer it:

> IP: The fact that I don't wear the hijab has got nothing to do with my beliefs. I don't know, under the given circumstances, I consider it too serious and I am proud of my daughter that she has decided to wear it. From her own conviction and all that. What does hijab represent? *5* That is only an external sign, that * for other people, * I don't know why the hijab has to be now discussed at such length. The nuns wear their thing. *2* When did anyone ask them about it? It is only logical ((accentuated)) that they wear it, *2* and that, that* it is * a part of their clothing, a part of * an indicator to say to someone: 'I am a believer ((accentuated))'. *3* The hijab is also a protection *2*, a protection * for a girl, for a woman. Simply a protection when *2* the person sees it, he knows: 'Yes, that is it'. But he does not know what it is; the hijab has been so instrumentalised.

After explaining how she perceived the hijab, Azra asked me what I thought about the crucifixes displayed in Bavarian schools. I was quite surprised by that question, as the other interviewees did not ask me any questions. I answered that I supposed the Bavarians see no special problem in it as it is a manifestation of their religion. Azra asked why it is then a problem when somebody else manifests their own religion.

13 Ban on the Hijab in Public Service

When we talked about women who are not allowed to work in public service because they wear the hijab, most of the women agreed that this rule is discriminatory. Azra mentioned the case of Fereshta Ludin, a teacher who worked in Baden-Württemberg and was fired because of her hijab.[19] Azra pointed out

19 Schirin Amir-Moazami, *Politisierte Religion: Der Kopftuchstreit in Deutschland und Frankreich* (Bielefeld: transcript, 2007), 109–111. Dominic McGoldrick, *Human Rights and Religion: the Islamic Headscarf Debate in Europe* (Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2006), 16–18, 31–33.

that this lady has a university degree, yet "allegedly liberal Europe" forbade her to work. In Azra's opinion, this represents a breach of human rights. Selma was somewhat resigned when she commented that these are the rules of the state and immigrants cannot change them. She does not believe that immigrants or the women themselves can do much to change this rule, because it is imposed from above, by the state. She is optimistic though, and mentioned that the police have become friendlier towards immigrants, so perhaps this rule could change in the future, too. Emina does not see why the hijab should be perceived as such a problem in public service, because it cannot affect the efficiency or quality of somebody's job:

> IP: The hijab doesn't have to be an obstacle. If I wear the hijab or if I don't wear it, I shall always be the same, I shall do my job in the same way, the hijab doesn't make me any more intelligent or more stupid if I wear it. It is simply Abc-, as somebody has certain hairstyle, certain hair colour or a piercing, I don't know, it belongs to me. And I don't see any problem why I couldn't work with my hijab on, somewhere in public service or wherever.

She made an interesting comparison between the hijab and different hairstyles or piercings, thus putting it into a category of one's physical appearance and ascribing no special meaning to it. Also, when the statements of the interviewees who wear the hijab were analysed, I found that they do not see the hijab as a sign of political agency; these women are rather apolitical. They want to live out their religion, they do not hurt anybody with it or break the law, and they want to be left in peace. This is also their human right to freedom of religion.[20]

14 Perception and Self-Perception of Bosnian Immigrant Women

14.1 *Conflict between Acceptance and Rejection*

The primary feelings that most of the interviewees conveyed are the feelings of being integrated and wanting to belong to the host society, i.e. the women made the claim of being entitled to belong. However, it can be seen from numerous examples that the host society does not acknowledge their claim and thus the immigrant women feel rejected. I would like to bring attention to the inner conflict of claiming acceptance and being rejected as explained by the interviewees.

20 Ibid.

Aida's example is worth analysing regarding her struggle with her feelings about her place within the host society. In order to create a more complete picture of Aida's circumstances, it is important to bear in mind that she endured the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina for almost three years. Her home town was ethnically cleansed and occupied by Serb soldiers. I personally wondered how Aida and her mother and sisters had managed to survive the ethnic cleansing and live there for three years under literally unbearable conditions. Aida was identified as the Other during the war and it was sheer luck that she survived under the given circumstances. She was made to be the Other in her home town and in her homeland, only because her national identity was identified as "wrong" by the Serb soldiers who committed atrocities of ethnic cleansing against Bosnian Muslims. This explains the following statement of Aida's when she talked about the insecurity of her legal status and consequently her insecurity in the host society:

> IP: #abc# Well, I feel Abc-, one feels Abc-, every kind of limiting, making borders is scary. * It is scary, because we arrived with that fear, we arrived with that *3* feeling of less worth that somebody fixed it into you and that is *2* in some *2* ways also interwoven in this society. You constantly have to prove yourself, * you have to prove it, but there is no end to it, it is endless. It is too much *2*.

Aida repeated the word "fear" many times as we talked about the integration process. She said one feels frustrated and scared if they are rejected by the host society. One must always prove oneself to society and this is an ongoing situation that has no limits or end. When Aida's statements are more closely examined, it can be noticed that there is contradiction in her words. On the one hand, Aida said that she does not feel she is a foreigner; she does not want to be one. She belongs to the German society. On the other hand, she claims this is not her native society; she is a "newcomer" here, implying that whatever she has achieved so far is success, no matter how big or small. Being a "stranger", she is not entitled to complain about her situation.

It can be interpreted from Aida's words that she is apprehensive towards the host society and feels she must not expect too much from it. She does trust the German society, but she cannot fully rely on it since she is a foreigner and there is always somebody who can tell her to go away. She hopes this will never happen though. However, when Aida mentioned her integrity and honesty as her main contributions to the host society, she said she is accepted by a part of society, i.e. by the people, and I assume this to imply

not by the state or the state institutions. It seems there is a constant inner struggle between feeling accepted and feeling rejected in the host society. Perhaps it is also too frightening to think of being definitely rejected by the host society, as Aida has no other home but Berlin. There is nowhere she can go back to.

It seems that her unresolved legal status aggravates her war trauma and feelings of not being accepted. Aida was in danger when she was in Bosnia because she was a Muslim, and she is not acknowledged in Germany because she is a foreigner. Thus it seems she has a permanent feeling of displacement and she struggles against this feeling. There is also a feeling of resignation in Aida's account. She is trying to do her best to be an acknowledged citizen. She is at peace with her actions and behaviour because it is not her fault that society does not accept her. At a certain point, she said that one cannot change some things, one should accept them. Perhaps this statement is comforting to Aida, a way to keep from constantly struggling with both herself and the host society.

15 We Love You, Berlin

All the interviewees without exception love Berlin and identify with the city, but not with Germany. Attachment to Berlin was expressed very strongly by many of the interviewees, and some women also mentioned their attachment to Kreuzberg. Identifying with Germany as a country was almost never mentioned in the interviews. From my perspective, I understand the interviewees as I also identify with Berlin but not with Germany, although I cannot give a proper explanation for that. Foroutan explains the tendency of immigrants to identify with their city or region more easily than with the entire country.[21] As she says, the criteria for becoming a German national are rather high; however, one is not accepted as a part of the host society even after meeting the criteria of learning the language, learning about the country and renouncing their original citizenship (Ibid). On the other hand, it is easier to identify with Berlin, as is presented in the interviewees' statements. It is easier for the women who were born and raised in Kreuzberg or who have always lived in the neighbourhood to identify with Kreuzberg. I personally also feel attached to both Berlin and Kreuzberg, so I can identify with what my interviewees say.

21 Foroutan, Naika (2010) "Neue Deutsche, Postmigranten und Bindungs-Identitäten. Wer gehört zum neuen Deutschland?" *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 46–47 (2010): 9–15.

The following statements present different reasons why the interviewees feel attached to Berlin and why they love the city. The diversity of the city is often pointed out. Emina appreciates the ethnic diversity of both Kreuzberg and Berlin and she feels more accepted in such an environment as opposed to one with fewer immigrants:

> IP: You feel, you feel a bit more comfortable, because you are simply not alone in some bigger [towns] * as an individual, you don't feel so lonely. Because there are so many other people [foreigners], for example, it is very colourful, so it is easier to live, easier to live, than for example, I alone and all the others are Germans. … Then you feel even more, you often feel accepted, not always, but often. And how would it be for example ((laughing)) if I were alone somewhere?

Emina also took into account the advantages of a city as large as Berlin and all the possibilities offered regarding education and professional development for her children:

> IP: Yes, for their future. Because here they have got everything they need. They can learn so many different languages, there are so many different crafts and schools and universities, they do not need to go anywhere ((accentuated)), and all of that is in Berlin.

Emina's husband came from Syria to Yugoslavia in the 1980s to study engineering. I assume it was not easy for him to take this step; he probably had to sacrifice a lot. I made this assumption in relation to Emina's words that her children do not need to go anywhere in order to receive their education. They do not need to emigrate in order to study, which of course makes their life easier.

Aida has a very special connection with Berlin, because she managed to begin a new life after enduring the horrors of war for three years:

> IP: … my husband and I met here, we both escaped from Bijeljina, we got married in August 1997. Two years after we had escaped, he used some other routes to escape, I used some other routes and * so we found each other here in Berlin and * it meant so much to us. We have a common theme for as long as we live and that is our town. And we didn't plan it, neither did we Abc-, we thought that marriage and love were luxury compared to what we had been through. It was important to us that we stayed alive, * the rest was irrelevant, what had happened.

By getting married and having two daughters, Aida has in a way healed from her war trauma, although the consequences remain. She said that Berlin gave her normalcy back, despite all the legal difficulties.

> IP: I love Berlin. I was afraid to love it for a long time. Exactly because of such situations, because I liked the way we lived, the multiculturalism we lived, we got disappointed, because there was a group of people that destroyed everything. But I love Berlin. All the beautiful things that happened to me, the strength that I got after my war experience, all of that happened here. Whether they want it or not, I have got that love for them ((emotional)), our little girls were * born * here and I would always want, I wouldn't want to leave these people… I find it wonderful, so beautiful, when we sit on the [underground] train and people talk in different languages, and I feel so good at that moment Abc- then I think I couldn't live anywhere else. And somebody enters the U-Bahn and they play music and * some tourists from the Scandinavian countries and some from America, some from England, this city is * a state within a state.

Like the other interviewees, Aida enjoys Berlin's diversity and the energy of the city. No matter what challenges she encounters in everyday life, this is her home and she has no other.

Despite all the difficulties mentioned by the interviewees, it has to be said that these women have their sources of energy and they also point out the nice and positive aspects of their lives. The fact is many of them feel unacknowledged or unaccepted and struggle with their legal status, employment, or other issues related to their children's future, yet I find it commendable that despite all of that they take into account the positive things such as their affection for Berlin, feeling good about living here, and feeling at home despite structural barriers that do not allow them to feel completely accepted. This effort to make the best of one's life needs to be acknowledged and appreciated.

16 How Bosnian Immigrant Women see Themselves

As I was formulating the interview questions, I was interested in learning about how the Muslim immigrant women see themselves within the host society and how they perceive their role as mothers and women in the integration process. I was also curious to know their approach or opinion on the male-female dynamics in their relationships and how they saw themselves in relation to their husbands or partners. A general remark could be made about all the

interviewees that they perceive themselves as strong, active and productive women who want to make a difference in both their lives and in lives of their children. One of the results of the research is that women claim acknowledgement in the host society via the way they raise their children. The women see it as an asset to raise their children as future German citizens who will be decent people and tax payers who represent the future of this country. They demand to be respected and appreciated in return; they demand to be perceived as equal members of the host society. Muslim immigrant women see themselves as the leaders of the bottom-up integration process and they carry out this process through raising their children.

Before the role of mother is taken into account, I would like to begin the analysis of the interviewees' statements regarding their perceptions of male-female relationships.

17 "The House Does not Rest on the Ground, but on the Woman"[22]

When I attended the wedding of Emina's daughter, I met Aida, Emina's friend who later on consented to do an interview with me. As we were chatting about my thesis topic, Aida said that when the Bosnian refugees came to Germany, the women had no problem with taking badly paid and dirty jobs just to put food on the table, whereas the men had issues with taking these kind of jobs. By telling me this, she wanted to point out the role of women and mothers in the integration process and in adjusting to new circumstances. When Emina was asked about the role of women in the integration process, she pointed out the versatility of women in combining the aforementioned elements of the private sphere and the public sphere. Emina perceives women as active and men as passive. She recounted later on that men mostly concentrate on their jobs and they find this single activity quite overwhelming. They cannot help their children with homework because they are too tired when they come home from work. Men take no initiative in doing activities with their families. Emina finds women to be more open; they are in charge of social contacts and they introduce their children to the world, i.e. to the host society. In other words, women are in charge of making a bridge between their children and the host society, and they also bear the responsibility of integrating their family into the host society. As Azra discussed the role of women in the integration process, she quoted an old Bosnian proverb: "The house does not rest on the ground, but on the woman". In her opinion, mothers have the most responsibility for

22 A Bosnian proverb quoted by Azra.

raising their children, whereas fathers are more passive in this process; at least she finds it to be so in the Bosniak families. Azra also made a comparison between Bosniak women and other Muslim immigrant women. In her mind, Bosniak women are more open to the host society, as well as more educated, so it is easier for them to integrate:

> IP: … of course the women are the ones who have got the influence. … Unless it is for example * a too strong dominance Abc-, now I mean some other * there is some other background, since I also got to know some families where the husband's dominance is extreme ((accentuated)). … However, every woman, not every, but 90–95% says they are the *éminence grise*, the intelligent woman will say: 'You are the one who rules', but she is actually the decision maker.

The remark Azra made is rather interesting and it is also indicative of the male-female dynamics in Balkan families. What I observed in my native, predominantly patriarchal and traditional environment is that the women make it clear to their husbands that they are the *pater familias* – that is, that the husbands have the final say; however, it is actually the women who dominate from behind the scenes. As Azra said, they are the *éminence grise*; they exercise an influence on their husbands through their comments and suggestions. I would interpret Azra's words in the sense that she finds such women to be wise and pragmatic; they are not assertive, but they use their skills and at the end of the day they know better than men.

18 Strong Women

When I asked Emina how she sees herself in the host society, she began her answer by sighing, as if to imply that this would be a complex picture to paint:

> IP: ((sighing)) I see myself in society, how should I put it, as productive in any case, and I do everything and I do my best, in order to contribute to this society and to this life, so that we live together, or I don't know, I don't hide, I don't give up, so to say, whereas many people give up and say: 'At the end of the day we can't live isolated', because they can't stand that pressure. As I said, I am trying to raise my children in such a way that they contribute to this country and have a normal life, but *2* I'm not accepted the way I would want to be. I don't see myself accepted, as some other people, for example. Because there are certainly women and girls who are Muslim,

> without hijab and normally they look at them differently than at me. So, anywhere you go with hijab, they have a different attitude towards me.

Emina wants to be part of the host society; she claims her right to be an equally-treated member of society. She perceives herself as a self-confident, strong woman who is capable of coping with the challenges she confronts on a daily basis. These challenges include not being accepted because of her hijab, being dependent on welfare assistance, and not having a permanent residence permit and thus still not feeling completely rooted in the host society. As in many instances in the analysis, we arrive at the conflict between the claim for acceptance and rejection by the host society. One could also ironically look at the situation: if Emina and other women decided to be weak, passive, inactive, the host society would not accept them just the same. However, the women do not change their tactics despite the disappointments; they go on and continue making an effort. It is worth noticing how Emina said that she does not hide or give up, she wants to retain her identity and at the same time she wants to be a productive member of the host society.

19 Internalised Perception of Fragile Women

Selma had a rather strong reaction as she talked about the role of women in the integration process and about the strength of women in general. On the one hand, she says that women are fragile and emotional, but it seems as if this statement were imposed on Selma by somebody else.

> IP: … It all depends on how flexible and capable we are, what are abilities are. … we as women, not only Muslim women, but women in general, we are fragile. And we are more governed by emotions, and then we are somehow Abc-, but there are some women who simply throw that away, they are courageous, because it is clear that life is not the cradle as it once used to be, the cradle to lull you, but it can also shake you and you fall out and things like that.

When Selma talked about women and their capacity to be successful and when she talked about herself, her whole portrayal sounded quite contrary to the image of women as fragile. Selma bowed her head as she told me she was not married. She is a religious Muslim woman who wears the hijab; she has two daughters and she never married. Selma apparently does not feel comfortable with her single mother status. Perhaps she thought I would judge her, as we both come from the same patriarchal and traditional background. Selma explained

in great detail that she does not like socialising with Bosniaks too much, as they can be envious, gossipy, and pry into her life. My assumption is that her role as a single mother with two female children requires a certain behaviour which should come across as her feeling inferior or almost apologetic for her circumstances (she said that she is often asked many questions or is supposed to give some explanations), since the Bosnian society is rather conservative. Selma sees herself as a hard-working person. She repeatedly said that she regrets not having been able to go to university; however, her life circumstances were such that she could not afford to study. Selma finds it important that one is serious and responsible in regard to their job; then employers have more respect for such people. In addition to being financially independent, it is very important for Selma to be a role model for her children. I assume that Selma places even more accountability on her own shoulders, because her daughters have only her as a parent to look up to. She takes on her role very responsibly, since her children and their well-being are her utmost priority. When I look at Selma's statements on her self-perception or when I think of her life story, as well as of the impression she made on me, she would be the last person I would characterise as fragile. All this goes to say that sometimes women are not fully aware of their capabilities or their potential, they think of themselves as fragile, weak, exceedingly emotional beings, because somebody once told them that women are the weaker or the gentler sex. When it comes to the role of women in the integration process, the Bosnian interviewees including Selma believe that immigrant women are the most appropriate people to form a bridge between their communities and the host society, because they know both "systems" or cultures, i.e. the German one and the one from their home countries. Selma said:

> IP: I think it would be the best if the immigrant women were connected with an institution… for example, if I were in an organisation for Bosnian women… like it is here in the Südost [Südost Europa Kultur e.V.], then these women would open up more and they would be more successful compared with when it is a German woman, even if she is good and competent, she can't grasp that part Abc-. It is the same when they say here the Turkish clients want the Turkish Stadtteilmütter, because their German is not so good. Actually that is really not the reason, but they simply feel better when this is somebody who comes from the same culture, who better understands the situation… than somebody who is German.

Selma explained that her *Stadtteilmütter* colleagues who are German always have to ask additional questions when they visit immigrant families because they do not have an understanding of the families' culture. She believes the

same thing is reflected in the media's reporting on immigrants. In Selma's opinion, situations are never presented as they really are, because the people in the media do not completely understand the situation of immigrants, since they are not immigrants themselves.

20 The Mother as a Role Model

Selma, as well as several other interviewees, finds it very important to be a role model for her children.

> IP: First of all, I find it very important to continue my education, and second of all to find a job, to work, because it is also very important for my children, because they talk about it at school, whose mother works, you know, so it is Abc- and the child behaves differently, when she says: 'My mother does not sit at home, she works'. So, not only for my children, but also for myself, I need to be a person who represents something for her children… so I'm simply a role model for my children: 'Oh, look, my mother is sleeping and I am at school, why do I have to study, why do I have to do this?', but when she sees that I am also busy and I work, then it is also different for them, 'Oh, my mother is not at home'.

Selma pointed out that she wants to socialise only with good people, because her daughters are also with her and she does not want to be in bad company and negatively affect them. She does not like to comment on or talk about other people, especially not in front of her children, as they might also behave like that at school and she does not want that. Selma wants them to be polite and not criticise other children. It may be assumed that she finds it very important to raise her daughters to be responsible, hard-working, honest and polite, so that these qualities will help them make more progress and have a better life afterwards. Selma also mentioned the role model concept when she spoke about the interactions between immigrants and the host society:

> IP: … We [immigrants] are accepted if we behave politely towards them [Germans] and they will behave politely towards us, if we show the respect for these people. Some things Abc-, hold the door for somebody at the supermarket, when they see you have children and you help somebody like that, and then they say: 'So the children will also behave like that tomorrow. They have learned it from somebody'.

It is obviously important for Selma that her daughters are open to the host society and well-behaved. Like the other interviewees' children, Selma's children are raised to be decent future citizens of this country.

21 Being a Good Mother – an Asset in the Integration Process

Through raising her children, Emina makes a claim to the state to have both her legal and social status in the host society acknowledged. When I asked Emina about her legal status which is temporary, she had a strong reaction and made a claim four times in her account that her role as a good mother should be recognised and given credit:

> IP: I was trying, I am making an effort where I can, to work when I can, and for example, I am properly raising these children. They go to school, they are good at school. I mean, I don't see any reason, why they can't give me the permanent residence. But they insist on it: 'No, you must be independent of the state' ((tension, raised voice)), for example, that means, you have to earn certain amount of money, but everything else one does, as there are many positive Abc-, everything else that has a big value, that is not important. … But it is not important how much effort you make, what you do, there are also other things that are a big asset for this society ((tension, raised voice)). That they don't see, it's not all about the money. I raise five children, so these five children if they are good at school, if they are polite, if they abide by the laws, they are not criminals, isn't it more worthy than somebody who works and their children are in jail…

It seems that Emina's main asset or what she has to offer to society are her children. They are the most important; raising them and preparing them for life in Germany is of utmost relevance to her. Emina said that she makes a contribution to the society in the way that she raises her children to abide by the laws, go to good schools, and one day contribute to this country. She prepares her children to be good and productive German citizens. Emina repeatedly said that she wants to be acknowledged for her efforts and she does her best to be a good and active mother. Unfortunately, she feels that her efforts are not acknowledged; she does not feel accepted by the host society and she finds that rather frustrating.

It can be seen that there are mutual influences on mothers and their children. Mothers introduce their children to the host society, but through their children, they also learn about the offers and opportunities that exist in society

for both them and their children. Mothers and children affect each other by their knowledge and their needs. Emina meets new people through her children; she gets to know new institutions, and she learns about prospective offers for children. It also seems very important that children have good prospects for the future, that they have more chances than their parents had, so they can automatically achieve more than their parents. From this pattern it may be assumed that women can lead the integration process and be the bridge between their families and the host society. Their children seem to be the "tools" for integration, because through them and because of their well-being and their future, the women get to learn how the host society functions.

As it can be seen from Emina's example, the role of the mother in raising her children to be good, productive and law-abiding citizens is crucial for some of the interviewees. From analysing their interviews and their emotional involvement in the performing of this role, this seems to be either the only or the most important role they have and they do not want to fail in performing it. This fear of failure was also present in Aida's statements. There is a conflict between doing a job full-time and not earning much money, and missing out on quality time with their children – this seems to be an existential problem for the women. This conflict could be also connected to the women's claim for acknowledgment; if they fail to perform the role of good mothers, then they are not entitled to make this claim.

Aida sees mothers as bridges between their children and the host society. In her opinion, women are an important factor in both families and society; hence they can influence the quality of both. Aida expressed her doubts about entering the first labour market and how it would affect her role of mother. She has done training as a care worker and she is also qualified to work as a cashier. She explained that she concentrates on the second labour market in Germany, i.e. on the One-Euro-jobs. Aida is apprehensive of entering the first labour market for the following reasons:

> IP: Because of my fear Abc-, I get some of the job offers, but I am scared to accept them, because *2* I don't know how I'll manage to cover all the bills and the rent, to be able to say: 'Now I can work. I have completely integrated myself in the society, I have my job'. I can't, because I will have to ((quickly breathing in and out as if gasping for air)) work like a dog again, to run around and then I am not there for my children ((raised voice)). … And I say, I am scared, because I know some people, the woman … whose parents are old and they are on welfare, and both she and her husband work and they have two children.

> She says she borrows the money from her mother. Then I start to shiver; what am I to expect now? How am I Abc-, and then I prefer staying on the second labour market, and the second labour market is what your agency offers to you. And I stay there, because I am scared, I shiver, how am I going to integrate in the first labour market and what is awaiting me there?

Although Aida's daughters are 9 and 11 years old (at the time of the interview), i.e. they are not very small children, it seems that Aida does not want to fail as a mother. Perhaps she sees motherhood as her only role and she does not want to perform poorly. It is also interesting that Aida mentions "integrating completely" when entering the first labour market, implying that employment is one of the most important indicators of integration. Several important elements can be noticed in Aida's statement. On the one hand, Aida, like the other interviewees, is not thrilled with being dependent on welfare assistance; she has done several qualification trainings in order to have more options when searching for jobs. On the other hand, she is not very qualified and she knows her options are limited; i.e. she can only find a job that is not well paid. Then Aida's fear of not being able to cover all her expenses without the assistance of the state comes into play and she finds this thought frightening. Apart from not being able to pay all the bills and make ends meet, her daughters miss her when she has to work and she is afraid that she is not a good mother. From the hard choices Aida has to make, it can be seen that the role of mother is the most important for her. Regardless of the humiliating feeling she has from depending on welfare assistance (and also because her legal status is temporary), it appears that she chooses to be a "good mother" because she is positive she can perform this role in the best possible way. As it was mentioned earlier, her children are her best asset in the integration process. If she raises two decent, hardworking and law-abiding German citizens, she knows she has done a good job, on the basis of which she is at least entitled to make a moral claim to be acknowledged by the host society.

22 Several Observations

What I found rather remarkable in the interviews conducted with the Muslim immigrant women is that they do not have a "woe is me" attitude; they do not pity themselves and they do not want the society to pity them either

but they claim their right to be acknowledged. They are present in the society and they do not give up on their efforts to integrate. Each interviewee expressed her determination or ambition to succeed. It is worthy to mention Azra's professional development, which could be representative of all the interviewed women. Azra was 56 years old at the time of the interview. After coming to Germany as a refugee from Bosnia, she worked as a cleaning lady for several years. After she married a German national and obtained a permanent residence permit, she wanted to find a better job. She worked as an interpreter for a Bosnian lady who suffers from depression, and remained in the hospital department to work in the nursing service as a nursing assistant. Azra could not get a better job without the necessary qualifications, so after two and a half years she applied for funding to continue her education. Azra went back to medical vocational school at the age of 46 and obtained her qualification. She pointed out that one may succeed if one is determined to do it and ready to make sacrifices. Azra is happy that she completed her qualification to be head of the nursing service, so that she does not have to work as a cleaning lady anymore. Perceiving these ladies as discriminated victims would be more than disrespectful, considering how active and involved they are in various areas of life. It is clear in the text when an interviewee is being quoted and which statements come from which women. Their real names are of course not revealed, but the track of a single interviewee can be kept throughout the text. Nevertheless, their voices also come together as one; their statements (no matter how varied at certain points) seem to be made by one single Muslim immigrant woman. This impression may be ascribed to their common experiences with the German system, i.e. with the Immigration office, Job Centre and schools in Kreuzberg. In the end, their varied backgrounds are not important, since Muslim immigrant women are treated uniformly by the institutions, regardless of their level of education, German language skills or even their legal status in the country. The fact alone that they are asylum seekers, refugees or simply foreigners is not easy. The legal regulations in Germany make it even harder for people by denying them security in the form of permanent residence. Knowing this leads us to establishing another important fact - Muslim immigrant women are not allowed to live freely in German society. Those who wear the hijab are not free to look for a job. The examples from the text show that any job other than cleaning is almost impossible to get for a woman with hijab. By being denied permanent residence, these women have a constant feeling of insecurity and uncertainty. They do not know what will happen the next time they go to the Immigration office. They are simply not free to live out their religion or to manifest their religious identity, as seen from the many examples of

everyday discrimination and insults the women hear in the street. They are not free to access the labour market and provide better living conditions for their families. Muslim immigrant women are limited by legal regulations, by dependence on welfare assistance and by being rejected by the host society. These elements prevent them from making their own decisions as independent individuals within the society.

23 Changing the Image of Germany

Apart from the other immigrant communities, there are 200,000 Muslim immigrants living in Berlin.[23] These people will not vanish into thin air; they live in Berlin and in Germany – their home is here and their lives take place here. Most of the Muslim immigrant women I interviewed cannot even consider moving somewhere else or going back to their country of origin – this is not an alternative and they have no second home. The children and grandchildren of Emina and other Bosnian women will most probably live in Germany and make up a part of the German population. Hopefully they will not be called fifth or sixth-generation immigrants; I sincerely hope not.

The official German politics as well as the host society will have to change their perceptions of their own country and of both immigrants and the German people, because contemporary Germany represents diversity. Germany is wedding guests dancing to the sounds of drum and zurna in front of a house close to Görlitzer Bahnhof as the bridegroom is bringing out a bride wearing a white wedding dress and hijab, while a rainbow flag is sticking out from one of the windows in the house, Asian neighbours on the ground floor are watching the dancing, and an ethnic German lesbian couple is passing by and smiling at the wedding guests. All this is Germany on a Sunday afternoon in 2013. The sooner the self-image of Germany as a nation state changes, the better for both "sides" it will be. Research results have shown that Muslim immigrant women are more than ready to exercise their role of integration leaders in their families and in their communities. Furthermore, these women feel integrated and claim their place in the host society; however, the host society does not give them feedback that they are actually accepted.

The problems immigrants face need to be discussed; it makes no sense to pretend these issues are not there. However, they have to be discussed without

23 Beauftragte des Senats von Berlin für Integration und Migration on the figures of Muslim immigrants residing in Berlin. Accessed January 2019, http://www.berlin.de/lb/intmig/schlagwort_07.html.

the host society judging or accusing the Muslim immigrants of being backward and ignorant. As it can be seen from the integration debate in Germany, the negative emotions or overreactions coming from the host society create resentment and feelings of exclusion in the immigrants, and as a result, the gap between the immigrants and the host society widens. One such example is the problems at schools in Kreuzberg or Neukölln where the pupils are predominantly from immigrant families.

This issue was also discussed in a lecture organised by the newspaper *Tageszeitung*. One of the topics was the problem of male immigrant pupils and how they defy the authority of teachers, and a very shrewd and sensible remark was made by one of the speakers. A gentleman, an ethnic German, said that it was prime time for the society to stop talking about these children as "them", as "the foreigners" or "the immigrants". He pointed out that we, the society, should talk about them as our children, children who obviously have a problem. The cause of the problem should be identified, and a suitable approach and solution should be found. Simply labelling these children as immigrant children and blaming them for being undisciplined and disrespectful will not bring either the host society or the immigrant families very far.

The Carnival of Cultures (*Karneval der Kulturen*) takes place every May in Kreuzberg.[24] The feast goes on for three days and there is a big parade representing various ethnic communities and their associations; representatives of the most diverse nations that inhabit Berlin dress in their national costumes and perform their cultural dances. There is a lot of excitement every year surrounding the Carnival. People get together for three days under the motto "eat, drink and be merry" to celebrate the diversity of their city. The media report on the Carnival with pride and all of a sudden immigrants are portrayed as people who enrich the life and culture of the city and of the country. It would make a lot of sense if the same diversity celebrated at the Carnival were to be welcomed in the public service work force, and at *Gymnasiums* or other schools which offer good prospects for both immigrant and non-immigrant children. It would be commendable for the society on the whole if this diversity were not appreciated only during one weekend in May, but every day and in different contexts, be it at the hospitals, the Immigration office, the Job Centre or at the Academy of Fine Arts. The change from *"Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland"* (Germany is not an immigration country) to *"Deutschland ist ein Einwanderungsland"* (Germany is an immigration country) should be seen in all walks of life.

24 Karneval der Kulturen. Accessed January 2019, http://www.karneval-berlin.de/de/.

24 Problem with the Term "Integration"

As the writing of this thesis was coming to an end and I had to sum up my work and make some conclusions, I realised that the problem I had with the term or concept of "integration" had increased considerably since the beginning of my research. The initial research question was whether women are capable of leading the integration process as a bottom-up process within their families and communities. The answer is an absolute "yes"; however, it depends very much on the host society as to whether women will be allowed to exercise their abilities. If their abilities are not acknowledged, it is in practice all the same for them if they are active or passive. It would not matter if they are eager to improve their living conditions or if they could not care less which school their children attend and what prospects they have for the future. Hence, instead of insisting on integrating immigrants, I think the process would be more constructive if the focus were put on the immigrants' participation. The results would be better if state policies enabled immigrants to gain access to the non-material resources of society so that they could more actively participate in the host society.

25 Conclusion

We may draw the conclusion, in sum, that Muslim immigrant women have the capabilities to lead the integration process as a bottom-up process. They are able to act as a bridge between their families and the host society. Their children represent an asset in the integration process – by properly raising their children, they make a contribution to the host society. In order to introduce the host society to their children, the women also learn about the resources and possibilities offered to their children. By performing the role of good mothers and raising their children to be law-abiding, hardworking citizens and future taxpayers, Muslim immigrant women demand to be appreciated by the host society for their efforts. By discussing the issues of hyphenated identities, the women show how open they are to the host society. They want their children to feel as if they are both German and Bosnian. And they also want the host society to perceive them and their children as belonging in Germany. However, institutional discrimination in the form of financial dependence on the Job Centre, the perpetuation of temporary residence permits, as well as discrimination they encounter on an everyday basis creates considerable limitations for Muslim immigrant women. These obstacles do not permit them to actively participate in the host society or to improve their circumstances and thus act as leaders in the integration process.

CHAPTER 5

Bosnian Language Lessons as the Mother Tongue of Immigrants and their Descendants in Slovenia

Marijanca Ajša Vižintin

1 Introduction

Most of the immigrants that come to Slovenia emigrate from the area of the former Yugoslavia, approximately half arriving from Bosnia-Herzegovina. In total, they have established ten Bosnian cultural societies (in Ljubljana, Jesenice, Kranj, Velenje, Koper, Zagorje ob Savi, and Maribor), nine of which are connected to The Bosnian Cultural Association of Slovenia (BCAS), registered in 1997.

Since 2010, basic information about the Slovene educational system has been available to everyone who has access to the Internet on the webpage "Information for Foreigners" (2010). The information is available in Slovene, English, French, Spanish, Russian, Bosnian, and Albanian.[1] An important part of maintaining one's identity is his or her mother tongue. Slovenian primary school legislation provides immigrant children the possibility to have lessons on their mother tongue and the culture of the country of origin (hereinafter mother tongue lessons) in Slovenian primary schools. Many theoreticians emphasize the role and importance of the mother tongue in maintaining an individual's identity and culture, while linguists also emphasize its influence on learning all other languages.[2] In this chapter, I first present the starting points in Slovenia regarding support for lessons of the mother tongue lessons for immigrant children who are included in the Slovene educational system. Next, I describe the circumstances in Slovenia at the beginning of the 21st century related to the organization of the mother tongue lessons. In my opinion,

1 Information for foreigners [Informacije za strance], accessed October 19, 2015, http://www.infotujci.si/index.php?setLang=BA&t=&id=.

2 Nataša Pirih Svetina, [Slovenščina kot tuji jezik] (Domžale: Izolit, 2005). Lucija Čok, ["Poučevanje jezikov v otroštvu – sociološki in medkulturni vidiki"], *in* [*Učenje in poučevanje dodatnih jezikov v otroštvu*], ed. Karmen Pižorn (Ljubljana: Zavod Republike Slovenije za šolstvo, 2009), 136–151.

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the right to mother tongue lessons is strongly related to the development of intercultural dialogue in school).[3]

The main part of the chapter focuses on the organized Bosnian language and culture lessons, which were organized in 2012 and 2013 by the Bosnian Cultural Association of Slovenia (hereinafter the BCAS) via the project "Roots in Bosnia, the tree in Slovenia."[4] The focus of the chapter is also on the teaching material that was accessible after the end of the project. I researched where and in what way Bosnian language and culture lessons continued in the 2014/2015 school year. Interviews were conducted with Admir Baltić, the secretary of the BCAS;[5] Goran Popović, the headmaster of the only Slovene primary school where Bosnian language and culture lessons were held in the 2014/2015 school year;[6] and Dijana Harčević Batić,[7] a Bosnian language and culture teacher, and her pupils.[8] In the concluding section, I pose the question of who should finance Bosnian language and culture lessons in Slovenia. Additionally, I present the remedial lessons of Slovene language and culture with an emphasis on the implementation of lessons in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the lectureships and possibilities for studying the Slovene language abroad.[9] An interview with Barbara Hanuš, one of the Slovenian language and culture teachers in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was also conducted.[10]

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3 Marijanca Ajša Vižintin, ["Vključevanje otrok priseljencev prve generacije in medkulturni dialog v slovenski osnovni šoli"] (PhD diss., University of Ljubljana, 2013). Marijanca Ajša Vižintin, ["Model medkulturne vzgoje in izobraževanja: za uspešnejše vključevanje otrok priseljencev"], Dve domovini/Two Homelands 40 (2014): 71–89, accessed October 19, 2015, http://twohomelands.zrc-sazu.si/onlinejournal/DD_TH_40.pdf.

4 "The roots in Bosnia, a tree in Slovenia [Korenine v Bosni, drevo v Sloveniji] (2012–2013)," accessed October 19, 2015, http://kbds.bosnjak.si/.

5 Admir Baltić, Interview 2014, a secretary of the Bosnian Cultural Association of Slovenia. Slovenia, Ljubljana, 9th December 2014.

6 Goran Popović, Interview 2014, a headmaster of the Slovene Primary school Livada, Ljubljana. Slovenia, Ljubljana, 18th December 2014.

7 Dijana Harčević Ćatić, Interview 2014, a teacher of the Bosnian language and culture in Slovenia. Slovenia, Ljubljana, 9th December 2014.

8 The pupils, Interview 2014, attending the Bosnian language and culture lessons, Slovenia, Ljubljana, 9th December 2014.

9 Tatjana Jurkovič, "Information about Slovene lessons for the Slovenes and their descendants abroad" [Informacija o pouku slovenščine za Slovence in njihove potomce v tujini], accessed October 19, 2015, http://www.bern.embassy.si/fileadmin/user_upload/dkp_21_vbn/PDF_Files/Informacija_o_pouku_slovenscine.pdf. Mojca Nidorfer Šiškovič, "Slovene at foreign universities [Slovenščina na tujih univerzah]", accessed October 19, 2015, http://www.centerslo.net/l1.asp?L1_ID=2&LANG=slo.

10 Barbara Hanuš, Interview 2014, a teacher of the Slovenian language and culture in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Banjaluka, 21st November 2014.

2 The Role and Importance of Learning the Mother Tongue for Immigrant Children

Numerous theoreticians agree that the mother tongue has a key role in the development and maintenance of the culture of origin and identity. At the same time, it creates an important basis for the learning of foreign languages.

The first language (language of origin, mother tongue) has an important role in the life of each individual. It influences the formation of his or her personality in identification processes, whether as a means of his or her thinking and feeling, the interpretation and the transfer of thoughts, or as a lever of an individual's influence on the happenings in the outside world.[11]

It is characteristic of children who move to another language environment only to have the process of learning their first/mother tongue be interrupted. Therefore, maintaining the mother tongue is even more important for them, "especially if we take into consideration the meaning and influence of the mother tongue and its influence on learning all other languages (it is the basis on which an individual develops and builds the knowledge of all other languages among other things)."[12]

Advanced proficiency in the mother tongue is a precondition that enables other languages to be learned more easily. The awareness of one's own culture enables people to get to know new cultures without feeling threatened by them – we especially need to take that into consideration when we speak about those cultures (and languages) that coexist inside the same (state) borders.

In recent years, the European Union has tried to move its focus of argumentation and thematic focus from multilingualism and education towards the field of economy. The justification of multilingualism with economic benefits (since, among other things, multilingualism should guarantee us better employment possibilities) is therefore a politically and psychologically necessary and sensible step. However, it can become like "playing with fire" if it spreads to the extent that it extinguishes other important argumentative aspects, as well as those cultural and solidary ones that are not based on competition and competitiveness, but on cooperation and coexistence. The task of Slovene language policies, including educational policies, is to become aware and to harmonize both aspects of argumentation for the successful development of language competence in various languages – the economic-competitive aspect and the cultural-civilizational one.[13]

11 Čok, ["Poučevanje jezikov v otroštvu"], 141.

12 Pirih Svetina, [*Slovenščina kot tuji jezik*] (Domžale: Izolit, 2005), 9.

13 Marko Stabej, ["Protislovnost večjezičnosti"], in [*V družbi z jezikom*], ed. Simon Krek (Ljubljana: Trojina, zavod za uporabno slovenistiko, 2010), 105.

It is recommended that each European speak at least three languages: his or her mother tongue, the current lingua franca (in Europe, this is currently English), and one neighbouring language. However, in my opinion, multilingualism does not start with the knowledge of foreign languages, but rather with the mother tongue.[14] The first of the eight competences that each European should develop throughout his or her life for successful cooperation in European society is communication in the mother tongue. However, this seems to be (obviously) forgotten in the case of immigrants. I think it is not necessary for immigrants to give up this right and to change it in accordance with the language of the environment in the receiving country. Rather, both the language of the environment and the mother tongue (and other languages) need to be developed and learned.

3 The Organization of Immigrants' Mother Tongue and the Culture of the Country of Origin Lessons (Mother Tongue Lessons)

After their arrival in Slovenia and their enrollment, immigrant children are included in the Slovene educational system of primary schools regardless of their citizenship and the legal status of their parents or their knowledge of the Slovene language as the language of the environment. In 2014, "the Slovene language and culture lessons [were] provided for immigrant children, and in cooperation with the countries of origin, the mother tongue lessons [were] provided for them."[15] Since 2008, during the first two years following the immigrants' arrival, there can be adaptations in the assessment of their knowledge.[16]

The majority of European states support offering lessons for the learning of the mother tongue. Some countries, including Estonia, Greece, Lithuania, Austria, Finland, and Sweden, support it on the state level. In other countries, support depends on the initiatives of individual schools and local authorities (Spain, Italy, Hungary, the Slovak Republic, and Island). Two types of financing and organization are prevalent in European states. The first type is characteristic for Poland, Liechtenstein, and Slovenia (for children from the Former

14 *Recommendation* HYPERLINK "http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32006H0962:EN:NOT"*2006/962/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 on key competences for lifelong learning* [*Official Journal L 394 of 30.12.2006*] [*Priporočilo Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o ključnih kompetencah za vseživljenjsko učenje*] (2006), Uradni list Evropske unije 2006/962/ES.

15 *Primary School Act* [*Zakon o osnovni šoli* (ZOsn)] (1996), Uradni list RS, 12/1996.

16 *The rules on the assessment of knowledge and the advancement of pupils in primary school* (2008), Uradni list RS, 73/2008.

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), where mother tongue lessons are financed by embassies, consuls, or cultural associations from the country of origin, and teaching occurs on the school premises of the receiving state. In the second approach, the school system of the receiving country provides immigrant children with the right to learn their mother tongue and financing for this if certain conditions are fulfilled (i.e. if the staff for teaching the mother tongue is available as well as the minimum number of children – from five to twelve). Only Sweden and Estonia grant each person who wishes to learn his or her mother tongue or the culture of the country of origin the right to do so. In these states, no minimum number of pupils is defined. Teaching costs are divided between the signatory states. Both systems of financing are combined in Spain and Slovenia. Slovenia has signed bilateral agreements for learning the mother tongue with Austria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Germany, Montenegro, Russia, and Serbia. In Slovenia, the mother tongue lessons are usually taught as additional school lessons. These classes are often held in the afternoon after other lessons are finished.[17]

The awareness of immigrant parents and teachers in Slovenia about the importance of maintaining the mother tongue lessons is slowly increasing. However, financial conditions have a decisive role. They also influence the Bosnian language and culture lessons, which have been organized in Slovenia since 2012 (more about that is written in the third chapter). The viewpoint of Slovenia is based on reciprocity and interstate agreements: the Ministry of Education, Science, and Sport of the Republic of Slovenia (hereinafter MESS) in cooperation with the National Education Institute of the Republic of Slovenia (hereinafter NEIRS) finances the teachers of Slovene for Slovene emigrants and their descendants in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the basis of the signed bilateral agreement, Slovenia expects Bosnia-Herzegovina to cover the costs of teaching the Bosnian language and culture in Slovenia itself. Slovenia enables and supports the implementation of the mother tongue lessons in primary and secondary schools in such a way that it covers the costs of the use of the premises for a minimum of 60 lessons per school year, the purchase of teaching aids for pupils/students, and material costs related to the implementation of the program (in the 2014/2015 school year, MESS was willing to spend 45 € per each pupil/student).[18]

17 "Integrating Immigrant Children into Schools in Europe: Measures to foster communication with immigrant families and heritage language teaching for immigrant children," accessed October 19, 2015, http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/ressources/eurydice/pdf/0_integral/101EN.pdf.

18 "The invitation for primary and secondary schools to apply for co-financing of immigrant children's remedial lessons of the mother tongues and the cultures of the country of origin in the 2014/15 school year [Povabilo osnovnim in srednjim šolam k oddaji prošenj za

MESS does not cover travel costs or the costs of the teachers who teach the mother tongue lessons.

According to MESS data from the 2013/14 school year, eight mother tongues were taught: Albanian, Bosnian, Chinese, German, Dutch, Macedonian, Russian, and Serbian. The mother tongue lessons were organized in 11 schools in Hrpelje-Kozina, Koper, Kranj, Postojna, and in seven schools in Ljubljana. Croatian and Ukrainian were also taught, but not at schools. In my opinion, the mother tongue lessons are strongly related to the development of intercultural dialogue in school.[19] Moreover, I think that immigrant children's mother tongue lessons have a positive influence and encourage the development of intercultural dialogue in school.

4 The Development of Intercultural Dialogue in School

The development of intercultural dialogue in school is one of the seven fields of the intercultural education model that I developed in my doctoral thesis. In order to develop an efficient and successful intercultural education model, the goal of which is the successful inclusion of immigrant children, I recommend the following:

1. understand interculturality as a basic pedagogical principle;
2. develop systematic support for the inclusion of immigrant children;
3. hire teachers with developed intercultural competences;
4. be aware of multicultural society and develop this awareness in all school subjects;
5. develop intercultural dialogue in school;
6. cooperate with (immigrant) parents, and;
7. cooperate with the local community.[20]

We can speak about intercultural dialogue in school in regard to the following:

– pursuant to interculturality in school,
– cooperation with children and immigrant parents,
– the implementation of immigrant children's mother tongue and the cultures of the country of origin lessons,

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sofinanciranje dopolnilnega pouka maternih jezikov in kultur za otroke priseljencev v šolskem letu 2014/15]," accessed Januray 19, 2015, http://www.mizs.gov.si/.

19 Bronka Straus (2015), ["Pouk maternih jezikov na slovenskih šolah] (2010/11–2013/14)". Ministrstvo za izobraževanje, znanost in šport Republike Slovenije [The Ministry of Education, Science and Sport of the Republic of Slovenia, Urad za razvoj izobraževanja], e-mail to author, February 13, 2015.

20 Vižintin, ["Vključevanje otrok priseljencev"], 144; Vižintin, ["Model medkulturne vzgoje in izobraževanja"], 74.

– encouraging all pupils to learn the mother tongues of immigrant children,
– the organization of intercultural lessons and intercultural school events (arts, science, economy, culture etc.),
– the purchase of teaching material in the mother tongues of immigrant children for school libraries,
– the multilingualism in school is publicly visible (with the contributions in various mother tongues in a school bulletin, on the webpage, in exhibitions, etc.).

It is often the case that schools are intercultural only in general. For example, they invite guests to school who present their travels to foreign countries, pupils present various states in different subjects and projects; the states and foreign languages that they learn about in school are presented; in the school library, one can also find teaching aids in foreign languages that are taught at school, etc. There is nothing wrong with this. However, it is not sufficient for us to speak about intercultural dialogue if the interculturality actually present in schools remains anonymous, invisible, and overlooked.[21]

In order to develop intercultural dialogue, I recommend cooperation with children and immigrant parents in school, as well as via extracurricular activities, cooperation with the teachers of the mother tongues and the cultures of the country of origin, and with local immigrants' associations and active individuals who have their own experience of migration. This cooperation should be based on equal footing.

Immigrant children's mother tongue lessons are held additionally at schools, usually in the afternoon, or as optional subjects in the 3rd trimester. Pupils can choose from a range of additional subjects, including the mother tongues of immigrant children in Slovenia: English, French, Croatian, Italian, Chinese, Hungarian, Macedonian, German, Russian, Serbian, and Spanish. In looking at this list, one will observe that curricula for the Bosnian and Albanian languages are missing. Simona Bergoč[22] recommends that we encourage all pupils/students to learn the languages of immigrant children. In this way, we would create a situation in which immigrant children's mother tongues would become an equal alternative to English, German, and other languages with a high social status.[23] The question arises, however, as to whether this is truly a suitable format for teaching immigrant children's mother tongues and

21 Vižintin, ["Model medkulturne vzgoje in izobraževanja"], 83.

22 Simona Bergoč, ["Pismenost priseljeniških otrok: politika vključevanja?"], in [*Razvijanje različnih pismenosti*], ed. Mara Cotič et al. (Koper: Univerza na Primorskem, Znanstvenoraziskovalno središče, Univerzitetna založba Annales, 2011).

23 Klara Skubic Ermenc, ["Med posebnimi pravicami in načelom interkulturnosti"], *Sodobna pedagogika* 2 (2010).

the cultures of the country of origin because, while the mother tongue would be the first language of some pupils, it would be a foreign language for others.

An optional form for the lessons of immigrant children's mother tongues and the cultures of the country of origin, which are usually held after other lessons at some schools, does not present an ideal solution. However, it is one of the possibilities. I recommend that these lessons be equal to other optional subjects so that they can be assessed and recorded in a school report card (this would be similar to programs in music schools).

5 Why should We Care about Maintaining the Mother Tongues in the Processes of Inclusion?

Some schools have long-term experience with the inclusion of immigrant children. They are aware that immigrant children and their parents need to feel accepted and welcome at school. Such a feeling has a positive influence on the learning of Slovene, and it also contributes to the easier and quicker inclusion of immigrant children. If a school environment is a safe place for them, immigrant parents come to schools that offer them support and other advice (arranging permissions for temporary/permanent residence, health services, courses of Slovene for adults, etc.).[24] The feeling of safety and being accepted strengthens the respect for their mother tongue lessons. Some teachers noticed that multilingual children and children with excellent knowledge of their mother tongue do not have problems with learning another language:

> Let us take, for example, a girl from Bosnia enrolled in the 6th grade. She was very concerned about how she would begin school in Slovenia. However, at the end of the year she received a grade 4 (very good) in Slovene, and the next year she received a grade 5 (excellent). Nowadays, some children who come from Bosnia, Macedonia, Serbia etc., know the grammar of their own language and they learn Slovene quickly. It is all very different, it depends on the child. It also depends on the cultural environment from which a child originates and what his basic knowledge of the mother tongue is. We found that children from Serbia excel, even if their capabilities are average. They usually do not have any problems learning Slovene.[25]

24 More about that see Vižintin, ["Vključevanje otrok priseljencev"], 308–311, 415–418.
25 Vižintin, ["Vključevanje otrok priseljencev"], 320, 424.

Simultaneously, some teachers notice that immigrant children who do not have the opportunity to take lesson in their mother tongue lose vocabulary in their mother tongue:

> When children come from kindergarten, they know certain words in their language and we can say: 'In your country they say it like that.' We often encounter words that they were not able to get to know in their mother tongue and they never will get to know them. You come to the word 'skipping rope' and they have never spoken about it until they were 6 years old. Suddenly they come across words that they know only in Slovene. I look at them and think: 'Look, but you will not know this word in your mother tongue.' I do not say that to them, but it seems that when they improve their knowledge of Slovene, they enrich their vocabulary on the one hand but lose it on the other. And then they say: 'How do we say that in our language?' 'I do not know anymore…!' This happens to them very often.[26]

Finally, I wish to emphasize that it is less likely for children who are aware that they speak (at least) two languages and belong to (at least) two cultures to be proud of this fact and lost in self-questioning: they less frequently question who they are and where they belong. It is also less likely that they will drop out of both societies and not conclude their education, and thus end up without the opportunity for employment. If immigrant children grow up in a school and social environment that recognizes the value of the mother tongue as well as the value of the language and the culture of the receiving country, they have more opportunity to move in a sovereign way in both countries, i.e. in the country of origin and in the receiving country. In this way, they contribute to economic and cultural development in both societies as active citizens. Such children do not lack a sense of belonging anywhere and do not ask themselves whether they are, for example, Bosniak, Slovene, or a combination of the two. Instead, they can proudly say that they are both Bosniak and Slovene.

6 The Beginnings of Organized Lessons of Bosnian as the Mother Tongue Lessons in Slovenia

The Bosnian Cultural Association of Slovenia is an umbrella organization that connects Bosniaks' cultural associations in Slovenia. It was registered in

26 Vižintin, ["Vključevanje otrok priseljencev"], 424.

1997. In 2014, it united 9 associations: the "Ljiljan Society of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian and Slovenian Friendship," Ljubljana; the "Pearl Cultural, Artistic, and Sports Society," Jesenice; the "Sandžak Cultural-Arts Society," Ljubljana Medvode; the "Origin Society of Fellow Countrymen from Plav and Gusinje," Kranj; the "Sevdah Cultural-Arts Society," Ljubljana; the Velenje Bosniak Youth Cultural Association; the "Behar Cultural Artistic and Sports Association," Capodistria; the Zagorje Pearl Cultural Arts Association, Zagorje ob Savi; and the Maribor Bosnian Diamond Association.

They organize numerous cultural, sport, and educational activities and projects in order to preserve and foster Bosnian tradition, culture, and language (e.g. they have folklore, music, choirs, literature, theater, chess, football, and other sections). Among other activities, they publish the newspaper *Bošnjak* (Bosniak), prepare a radio program entitled *Podalpski selam* on Radio Student, and maintain a webpage – www.bosnjak.si – where you can follow their activities. Many societies have their own webpages and Facebook profiles where people can find information about their events and upcoming activities.

The BCAS is a founding member of the EXYUMAK Society of the Associations of Cultural Societies of the Constitutive Nations of ex-Yugoslavia (Albanians, Bosniaks, Montenegrins, Croats, Macedonians, and Serbs who live in Slovenia).[27] It actively contributed to the adoption of the Declaration of the Republic of Slovenia on the Position of National Communities of the Members of ex-Yugoslav Nations in the Republic of Slovenia in the Parliament of the RS on February 1, 2011. The BCAS has implemented more than 100 cultural and humanitarian projects.[28] The most recent success of the EXYUMAK is a television program called *NaGlas*, which has been broadcast since January 13, 2015 on RTV Slovenia 1 (each fortnight, every other Tuesday at 14.25). The host of the program is Aleksandra Banjanac Lubej, who cooperates with other individuals working on a contract basis from various national communities.[29]

For the purposes of this paper, I will focus on a project that enabled Bosnian language and culture lessons in primary schools in Slovenia in 2012 and 2013.[30]

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27 More about the endeavours for the constitutional recognition of the national minority status see Vera Kržišnik Bukić, ed., [*Kdo so narodne manjšine v Sloveniji*] (Ljubljana: Zveza zvez kulturnih društev narodov in narodnosti nekdanje SFRJ v Sloveniji, 2014).

28 "Co-culture/Sokulture," The Bosnian Cultural Association of Slovenia [Bošnjaška kulturna zveza Slovenije], accessed October 19, 2015, http://sokultura.si/wp/kdo-smo/o-nas/.

29 Aleksandra Banjanac Lubej, "NaGlas," RTV Slovenija 4, accessed October 19, 2015, http://4d.rtvslo.si/arhiv/naglas/174314081.

30 The schools of the Bosnian language had already existed: in the beginning of the nineties of the 20th century the so called "refugee schools" were established (in Ljubljana, Postojna and other towns). Teachers who lived in refugee centres taught in those schools. The

I will also provide information about how and where the project was implemented in the 2014/2015 school year, and what its future depends on.

7 "Roots in Bosnia, the Tree in Slovenia/Korijeni u Bosni, stablo u Sloveniji" (April 2012–June 2013)

In 2011, BCAS envisaged a school of the Bosnian language and culture for children and youth in the scope of the project "Roots in Bosnia, the tree in Slovenia." The project was supported by a grant from Switzerland through the Swiss Contribution to the Enlarged European Union. It was written by Danijela Gutić and led by Admir Baltić. Ivana Čančar was a professional counsellor, Jasmina Imširović taught Bosnian language and culture in Ljubljana and Velenje, and Edina Silić taught in Jesenice.[31]

The BCAS project "Roots in Bosnia, the Tree in Slovenia" addressed immigrant children as well as members of the majority culture: "The children of Bosnian-Herzegovinian immigrants will get to know the language and the culture of the country of origin and develop language skills. In this way, they will enhance learning competencies that are transferable to the second language. Additionally, they are also important for success in the educational system. They will start to evaluate their culture of the country of origin positively, they will construct their own cultural identity and develop a positive self-image, and they will spend their free time creatively through the use of various media and the promotion of positive aspects of the cultural and language versatility. The project will help the members of the majority and wider public to get to know immigrant communities' cultures. The project itself is oriented towards encouraging the development of the positive relation of the host community towards immigrants' mother tongue. The latter is important for the formation of self-confidence and identity of immigrant children and their families."[32]

Bosnian language and culture lessons were implemented on the premises of the Velenje Bosniak Youth Cultural Association (three age groups), on the premises of the Ljiljan Society in Ljubljana (one group), on the premises of the Livada Primary School, Ljubljana (one group), and on the premises of the

latter were organized in the cooperation of BIH and Slovenia (Baltić, Interwiew 2014). More about refugee centres in the beginning of the nineties of the 20th century in Slovenia see Natalija Vrečer, [*Integracija kot človekova pravica: prisilni priseljenci iz Bosne in Hercegovine v Sloveniji*] (Ljubljana: Založba ZRC, ZRC SAZU, Andragoški center Republike Slovenije, 2007).

31 Baltić, Interview 2014.

32 "The roots in Bosnia."

"Pearl" Cultural, Artistic, and Sports Society in Jesenice (two groups). More than 100 children and youth (6–19 years old) attended the lessons. In total, 400 hours of lessons were held. The first lesson was dedicated to theoretical knowledge and grammar, while the second focused on conversations, discussions, reading, and getting to know the culture of the country of origin.[33] A teacher, Jasmina Imširović, described the lessons with the following statement:

> We started to implement experimental lessons in April 2012. By September of the same year, we had tested the field and on the basis of this analysis, we prepared the teaching materials. These materials were adapted to youth in the Slovene environment and with roots in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Later on, we started to implement regular lessons in Ljubljana, Velenje, and Jesenice. In November, the Livada Primary School in Ljubljana started lessons. This school enabled its students to participate in mother tongue lessons. 130 children enrolled in the school of Bosnian language and culture, and 105 pupils successfully concluded the project (those were pupils who participated in the lessons for the entire school year or more and were part of the group that had already attended lessons in April 2012). The biggest turnout of children and youth was in Velenje, where three age groups of approximately 60 children attended the lessons.[34]

During the implementation of the organized Bosnian language and culture lessons (April 2012, 2013), it became evident that:

> We first needed to educate pupils to maintain an open attitude towards their mother tongue. We especially wanted to demonstrate to them that we would help them to get rid of possible feelings of shame that may occur in the environment when the mother tongue is used because this language is very often perceived as less valuable. Our main goal was, therefore, not the impeccable knowledge of the mother tongue but its destigmatization.[35]

In addition to the school of Bosnian language and culture, the project included the preparation of teaching material for remedial classes of Bosnian language

33 Ivana Čančar, [*Interkulturnost? Da: priročnik za interkulturno pedagogiko – opis področij in dobrih praks*] (Ljubljana: Bošnjaška kulturna zveza Slovenije, 2013), 11.

34 Čančar, [*Interkulturnost? Da*,] 12.

35 Admir Baltič, [Uvod] to [*Interkulturnost? Da: priročnik za interkulturno pedagogiko – opis področij in dobrih praks*], by Ivana Čančar (Ljubljana: Bošnjaška kulturna zveza Slovenije, 2013), i.

and Bosniak culture for the Slovene educational system, as well as video and film workshops. In the scope of the latter, pupils became acquainted with recording equipment and had opportunities to role-play, write scenarios and storyboards, and learn about producing and editing. The team of the Society for Soft Landing from Krško supported us with volunteers from Belarus, France, Portugal, and Spain, and performed in Velenje in the scope of its multimedia project. One of the topics for film recording focused on Bosnians and Herzegovians in Velenje, and they therefore invited the Bosniak Youth Cultural Association to cooperate with them. Thus the pupils of the Bosnian school had the opportunity to spend a day with the recording team and get some insights into the background of recording the film. From June 26th – 28th, 2012, the project "The days of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Slovenia" was implemented. Pupils of the Bosnian language school from Velenje attended these events. In Vila Bianca, the summer team from the Bosnian school became acquainted with traditional food from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Tasting this food was accompanied by traditional folk songs, called sevdalinke. They became familiar with old artistic crafts and arts works, they watched Ismet Mujezinović's film "Tuzla, a city on a grain of salt," and they viewed selected works from an exhibition of photographs. With the musical accompaniment of Selma Dizdarević (violin), Zrinka Andrejaš (piano), and professional Bosnian-Herzegovian actor Irfan Kasumović, they listened to interpretations of the works of Mak Dizdar, Aleksa Šantić, Antun Branko Šimić, Islam Žiga, and Nerzuk Čurak. As the concluding event, the organizers prepared Meša Selimović's monodrama "Derviš and Death," which was performed by Irfan Kasumović. During those days, the pupils of the Bosnian language and culture school had Bosnia-Herzegovina, their country of origin, in their direct vicinity and they were able to closely observe the culture, literature, and music of Bosnia-Herzegovina.[36]

8 Publications

In the scope of the project "Roots in Bosnia, the Tree in Slovenia," two separate teaching resources were published (in addition to promotional material and brochures about the project). The first publication (Imširović 2013)[37] presents teaching material that helps teachers to teach Bosnian language and culture independently, even after the end of the project. The teaching resource

36 "The roots in Bosnia."

37 Jasmina Imširović, [*Škola bosanskog jezika i kulture: čitanka i vježbanka*] The School of the Bosnian Language and Culture (Ljubljana: Bošnjaška kulturna zveza Slovenije, 2013).

consists of two parts: a school exercise book and a reading book. The school exercise book deals with the grammar of the Bosnian language and exercises, while the reading book consists of texts that are the basis for conversation. These are interesting texts that were adapted for youth and deal with Bosnian-Herzegovian culture, tradition, literature, arts, history, etc. The target group is older pupils. However, it is possible to use the teaching material for younger pupils with some adaptations. This resource is intended for pupils whose mother tongue is Bosnian and attend Slovene schools. It is harmonized with Slovene curricula. The other resource (Čančar 2013)[38] is a handbook, which can be described in the following way:

> It is intended for teachers who teach children who come from other cultural environments and who might encounter some problems in Slovene schools in the processes of their inclusion due to their lack of knowledge of the Slovene language and other personal circumstances (cultural-ethnic and religious belonging, socio-economic status, etc.). Consequently, this can affect their academic success, and, in the final phase, the realization of their own potential later in life.[39]

Both teaching materials remain available in printed forms. They will also be useful after the conclusion of the project. Therefore, they represent an added value of the "Roots in Bosnia, the Tree in Slovenia" project.

9 Bosnian Language and Culture Lessons in the 2014/15 School Year

In the 2014/2015 school year, Bosnian language and culture lessons were only implemented in one school (Livada Primary School, Ljubljana). Dijana Harčević Čatić, who became the teacher following Jasmina Imširović, started to teach lessons in September 2014.

10 The Livada Primary School, Ljubljana: Mother Tongues and the Language of the Environment

On the entrance door to the school, the following sign can be found: "The Livada Primary School, Ljubljana, a multicultural, multi-ethnic, multinational,

38 Čančar, [*Interkulturnost? Da*].
39 Baltič, [Uvod], i.

multilingual, contemporary, innovative, healthy, eco school." Each visitor who enters its premises encounters signs stating "Good afternoon" in various world languages, which are written on the floor and on the staircase. During the 2014/2015 school year, immigrant children's lessons for three mother tongues were held at the Livada Primary School: Bosnian, Macedonian, and Serbian. This was the third school year during which such instruction occurred.

In the 2013/2014 school year, the school also implemented Albanian language and culture lessons. Although Croatian lessons were offered, pupils were not interested in them.

Goran Popović is the headmaster of the Livada Primary School in Ljubljana. As an immigrant himself, Popović is a teacher with migration experience and moved to Slovenia from Belgrade in 1994. Each school year, approximately 20 new immigrant children are enrolled in the school. The come primarily from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and also from Serbia, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Albania. Two-thirds of the children come from the successor states of the former Yugoslavia, while one-third come from other states. Two children from Russia and Ukraine also attend the school. Also children who live in a nearby asylum home and are asylum seekers are included into this school, they are from Albania, Iraq, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and one of the children is an Albanian from Macedonia.

The school receives some additional funding (for teaching Slovene as a second language/language of the environment, interest activities and interstate exchange of pupils, e.g. with Serbia and Hungary) and it closely cooperates with the MESS and the Ljubljana Municipality. It applies for numerous projects in the scope of which it acquires additional knowledge and the possibilities for employment. At the same time, it transfers its experiences to other schools because in Slovenia it has been recognized as an example of best practices in the field of inclusion of immigrant children.

At this school, immigrant children and the descendants of immigrants represent the majority of the school population (97 to 98%). There are not many children whose mother tongue is Slovene (2 to 3%). Nevertheless, in recent years, the enrolment of Slovene children has increased. The school's situation, in which the vast majority of children do not speak Slovene as their mother tongue, consequently causes the school staff to intensively seek solutions regarding how to provide the efficient, successful, and pleasant learning of Slovene, which is a second language for them/the language of the environment. In their search for innovative possibilities, the school staff developed new ideas and found solutions. Headmaster Goran Popović explained that until this point, the school has already tested many models of teaching Slovene. They are currently using the third model that was developed:

The pupils attend additional lessons of Slovene each morning for one school hour before regular lessons start. Later, they join their regular classes. Such additional lessons are intended for pupils who have only been in Slovenia for a year or two. Students who have been in Slovenia for three years may continue with such additional classes if they choose to do so or if there is a clear need. In those groups pupils feel safe, they are all equal, and it is easier for them to communicate in Slovene. Pupils are divided into groups for beginners and more advanced speakers. Both of the teachers cooperate closely so that the transition from one group to the next is possible. The induction class[40] occurs during the last week in August, while the preparation class[41] takes place throughout the entire school year. Furthermore, we dedicate an additional five school hours to specific subjects (chemistry, biology, physics, etc.) so that the students can focus on important professional issues in greater detail.

Additional lessons and activities are also available to children during the one-week school holidays. This has proven to be the most efficient model up until this point; although that doesn't mean that we will not adjust this model or develop new models in the future. We have considered a one-month intensive course of Slovene. However, we currently face the obstacle that Slovene school legislation does not allow for this.[42]

11 Bosnian Language and Culture Lessons

In the 2014/2015 school year, a new teacher named Dijana Harčević Čatić taught the pupils whose mother tongue is Bosnian. She moved from Sarajevo to Slovenia nearly two years prior to taking on this position. She drives once a week to Ljubljana from Koper. Dijana Harčević Čatić wishes that Bosnia-Herzegovina would financially support Bosnian language and culture lessons: "Support us, take care of the diaspora as well, we are also still a part of this state."[43]

The former teacher, Jasmina Imširović, invited her to teach. A smooth transition took place since Imširović passed all relevant information on to Harčević

40 The induction class: the intensive course of Slovene is implemented at school the last week in August. Pupils get to know the school premises, the teachers, and the vicinity so that they feel safer in the new milieu.

41 The preparation class: various forms of systemic support in learning the language and inclusion which occur at school (at least) two school years (more about that see Vižintin, ["Vključevanje otrok priseljencev"], 150–157.

42 Popović, Interview 2014.

43 Harčević Čatić, Interview 2014.

Čatić, which made the beginning of her teaching experience in September 2014 easier. For her classes, she uses a resource entitled The School of the Bosnian Language and Culture.[44] Simultaneously, she adapts the lessons to the age group of pupils and their interests. She formed two groups: a group for older students (15 years old) and a group for younger students (8 years old). Eleven children attend the Bosnian language and culture lessons. For some of them, this was already the second year of lessons (they also attended the lessons when the teacher was Jasmina Imširović). The new teacher, Harčević Čatić, faced the difficult challenge of attracting new pupils to attend Bosnian language and culture lessons. This was the case because the majority of pupils were already in 9th grade during the 2013/2014, which meant that they went on to attend secondary school in 2014/2015. With the older group, Harčević Čatić makes use of theater activities and focuses on content they find attractive (sports, cars, etc.). The lessons are held once a week after the other lessons.[45]

With the exception of one pupil, all of the children who attend the classes were born in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The student who was not is a descendant of immigrants who was born in Slovenia. In some of the families, only the father worked in Slovenia. In other families, however, both parents worked in Slovenia. After several years of separated lives, the entire family moved to Slovenia. They enrolled in Slovene school in the second, third, seventh or eighth class. The children's mother tongue is Bosnian. They speak Bosnian at home, or a combination of Bosnian and Slovene. Some of them also understand Turkish, and they learn German and English. They learned Slovene during the preparation class (the last week of August) and for two school hours each day or one hour prior to lessons. Two of the older boys are active in the Ljiljan Society. They visit their relatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina every second or third weekend. Their other relatives live in other Slovenian towns, as well as in Austria, Germany or in Switzerland as a result of employment in those countries.[46]

Dijana Harčević Čatić says that the teachers at the Livada Primary School in Ljubljana are open and that cooperating with the school is a pleasure. She and her pupils feel welcome at the school. Harčević Čatić understands the children she teaches well because she herself has had experiences of migration:

> I share a similar destiny with these children. My father has always worked in Slovenia, since 1986. Every Friday he came home to Bosanska Krupa. He was in Slovenia during the war. When I went to study in Sarajevo, my

44 Imširović, [*Škola bosanskog jezika i kulture: čitanka i vježbanka*].
45 Harčević Čatić, Interview 2014.
46 The pupils, Interview 2014.

> mother joined my father in Slovenia. I moved to Slovenia when I got married. He is Bosnian, too. We live in Capodistria now.[47]

The Ljubljana Municipality and the Public Fund for Cultural Activities of RS cover the costs of teaching (a symbolic honorarium) and travel costs incurred during the school year. Dijana Harčević Čatić lectures at the Oton Župančič Library in Ljubljana, as well as in cooperation with BCAS on the history of the Bosnian language with a focus on the development of Bosniak literature. BCAS applies for new projects with the goal of enabling the teacher to have a 40-hour work week, and of course Bosnian language and culture lessons in more schools in Slovenia.[48]

Bosnian language lessons are implemented indirectly in other associations in the scope of other activities, for example in Velenje and Capodistria. Dijana Harčević Čatić is active in the Behar Society in Capodistria, too. Before her arrival, only a folklore dance group was available for the youth in this society in Capodistria. 15 youth cooperate in the drama group that she leads. Through the drama group, they also learn about Bosnian literature, which she tries to present to youth in an interesting way.[49]

12 How can We Go Forward?

Pupils in other Slovene primary schools are also interested in learning the Bosnian language and about Bosnian culture, which is available to the immigrants from Bosnia-Herzegovina and their descendants.[50] The main reason that the lessons are not implemented in more schools and towns in Sloveniais financial (i.e. the problem of who or which institution will cover the teaching and travel expenses for the teacher of the mother tongue). Admir Baltić, secretary at the BCAS, thinks that it would be right for the Republic of Slovenia to finance the lessons:

> The question of the possibility of learning the mother tongue should be related to the rights of children to learn their mother tongue. Some of these children are citizens of the Republic of Slovenia. Besides, each taxpayer, including immigrants from Bosnia-Herzegovina, contributes

47 Harčević Čatić, Interview 2014.
48 Baltić, Interview 2014.
49 Harčević Čatić, Iinterview 2014.
50 Baltić, Interview 2014.

> to the state budget regardless of whether they have Slovene citizenship. Namely, they pay taxes for each thing they buy, they pay contributions. We will not solve this question through a bilateral agreement. It is difficult for us as a voluntary organization to find a point of contact in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is a question of how to reach an agreement that everyone would agree on in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There is no Ministry of Education on the state-level in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Ministries of Education exist at the entity and cantonal levels, which makes agreement extremely difficult). Everything stops due to bureaucracy. We wish that Slovenia would support these lessons.[51]

Because the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina has neither provided the financial support for the Bosnian language and culture lessons up to now, nor has it assigned a teacher to Slovenia and sponsored him or her – and Slovenia relies on reciprocity and an interstate agreement – BCAS has no choice other than to apply for various (Slovene and international) projects. Our aim is to acquire the financial means for Bosnian language and culture lessons in Slovenia. The main problem with this (temporary) solution is time limitation since grants we receive for successful project applications have a set date of completion.

I think it would be wise to think about the co-financing of these lessons by immigrant parents, immigrant associations (maybe part of the membership fee or parents' donations) or perhaps entrepreneurs or individuals with a good economic status could be donors who were convinced of the value of such a financial investment.[52] We, the individuals who are aware of the role and the importance of maintaining the mother tongue lessons, are co-responsible for maintaining the mother tongue – if this is not a priority of the state or if both states transfer the responsibility from one state to the other state.

Admir Baltić has also given consideration to the teaching materials used, as well as the possibility of a teacher who could be assigned from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, he has suggested the following possible solutions:

> If a teacher from Bosnia-Herzegovina comes to teach children in Slovenia using the Bosnian program, this is not necessarily the best solution. At the level of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the country

51 Baltić, Interview 2014.

52 Albanian speaking immigrants face similar problems. Neither Kosovo nor Albania took over the financial responsibility for the Albanian language and culture lessons (the Albanian speaking immigrants come to Slovenia also from Macedonia and Monte Negro). The teaching material which is used by the teachers in Slovenia was prepared and published by the Albanian speaking immigrants in Switzerland.

published a textbook for mother tongue lessons in the diaspora. However, this textbook is just an abbreviated version of the regular textbook, and it is not adapted to a specific environment. It is not the same to teach the Bosnian language to a child in Slovenia or Germany or in America. Each country needs a different approach. The best solution would be to find a teacher who lives in Slovenia, who knows both cultures – the Bosniak and the Slovene one – because in learning the language, it is important to know both languages and cultures.[53]

13 The Attitude of the Slovene State towards Maintaining and Spreading Slovene Language Abroad

The Republic of Slovenia enables Slovene emigrants and their descendants to maintain Slovene as their mother tongue in the scope of so-called remedial classes of Slovene. The Slovene state, through its lectureships of Slovene (Slovene language, literature, culture, etc.) makes efforts to spread Slovene. These lectureships are available at 56 universities around the world, including various locations throughout Europe, in Japan, China, the US, and Argentina.

In Europe, there is a wide network of support, which is organized and financed by MESS in cooperation with the National Education Institute of the Republic of Slovenia (NEIRS). During the 2014/2015 school year, remedial Slovene lessons were held in 13 countries: Austria (2 teachers), Belgium (1), Bosnia-Herzegovina (3), Czech Republic (1), France (2), Croatia (3), Liechtenstein (1), Macedonia (2), Germany (6), the Netherlands (1), Serbia (5), Switzerland (3), and Great Britain (1 teacher). The attendance of remedial Slovene lessons is voluntary and free of charge. Lessons are held once a week in the afternoon.[54]

In addition to Slovene lessons, MESS also finances supporting and accompanying activities performed by the NEIRS: annual professional teacher training in the scope of seminars, preparation of textbooks and the purchase of teaching material for teachers, an annual summer school of the Slovene language in Slovenia for approximately 55 children (8–14 years old), and activities in addition to the lessons, including excursions in Slovenia, connections between schools, staying with peers in Slovenia, and the activities of Slovene cultural workers that are performed abroad, etc. MESS also provides grants for

53 Baltić, Interview 2014.

54 "Slovene for the Slovenes abroad [Slovenščina za Slovence po svetu]", accessed October 19, 2015, http://www.zrss.si/slovenscina/dopolnilni.htm.

the summer schools for youth, which is organized by the Centre for Slovene as a Second/Foreign Language.[55]

In 2014, three teachers taught Slovene in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Barbara Hanuš is employed full-time on a permanent basis. She teaches 22 school hours of Slovene per week in Banja Luka, Slatina, Teslić, and Prijedor. Hanuš was assigned to Bosnia-Herzegovina by NEIRS and MESS. She teaches more than 100 pupils in remedial Slovene lessons in 11 groups. The students are divided into groups for beginners and advanced speakers according to their knowledge of Slovene. An exception to this rule are the classes in Teslić, where one mixed group receives lessons.

In Banja Luka, where the majority of participants attend classes, the pupils are divided into three age groups (young children, adolescents, and adults). The teacher teaches Slovene lessons following three different curricula with adequate teaching materials based on the age of the group. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, two teachers are employed on a contract basis for the implementation of remedial Slovene lessons. They teach a smaller number of groups and pupils: Ana Pulko teaches seven groups in Sarajevo, Kakanj, and Zenica on a contract basis, and Slavica Pavlović teaches in Tuzla.[56]

Ten Slovene associations are active in Bosnia-Herzegovina.[57] "After 1991, maintaining Slovene language and culture became the main priority of the Slovene associations, which operate in the newly established states of the former Yugoslavia. This is written in their statutes and programmes."[58] Barbara Hanuš emphasized the decisive role of the association regarding possibilities for immigrants and their descendents to main their mother tongue, or the language of their country of origin. If a society supports mother tongue lessons, this creates a larger fluctuation of information and encouragement for the members, and thus the number of participants in language lessons increases.[59] The annual

55 Jurkovič, "Information about Slovene lessons."

56 Hanuš, Interview 2014.

57 There are 44 Slovene associations, which are active in 2014 in the area of the former common state Yugoslavia; 10 of them are in BIH, 16 in Croatia, 14 in Serbia, 3 in Macedonia, 1 in Monte Negro, see Janja Žitnik Serafin, "Organiziranost, delovanje in prihodnji izzivi slovenskih društev v drugih delih nekdanje Jugoslavije," *Dve domovini/Two Homelands* 37 (2013): 44, accessed October 19, 2015, http://twohomelands.zrc-sazu.si/onlinejournal/DD_TH_37.pdf.

58 Metka Lokar, ["Slovenski jezik med Slovenci v prostoru nekdanje Jugoslavije"], in [*Priseljevanja in društveno delovanje Slovencev v drugih delih jugoslovanskega prostora: zgodovinski oris in sedanjost*], ed. Janja Žitnik Serafin (Ljubljana: Založba ZRC, ZRC SAZU, 2014), 236.

59 Hanuš, Interview 2014.

meeting for pupils of remedial Slovene lessons and a quiz called Male sive celice (Small grey cells) are two of the common activities for all of the Slovene associations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Teachers of remedial Slovene and their pupils participate in such events.

In 2014, the 15th meeting for pupils of remedial Slovene was held in Klašnice near Banja Luka (on October 11 and 12). The meeting was organized by the Association of Slovene Societies "Europe Now." Pupils from Prijedor, Teslić, Tuzla, Sarajevo, Kakanj, and Zenica joined pupils from Banja Luka and Slatina. Guests from the Bežigrad Primary School in Ljubljana took part as well. On Saturday afternoon, the pupils attended creative literary, musical, dramatic, and arts workshops. Some of the workshops were led by Barbara Hanuš, Ana Pulko and Slavica Pavlović, the teachers of remedial Slovene lessons in Bosnia-Herzegovina.[60] The quiz Small grey cells which was attended by pupils of remedial Slovene lessons from Banja Luka, Slatina, Teslić, Prijedor, Sarajevo, Kakanj (Bosnia-Herzegovina), Novi Sad, and Niš (Serbia), occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina on October 18, 2014. Pavle Ravnohrib, the host of the show, came from Slovenia together with the show's author, Darko Hederih. Thus, the quiz Small grey cells, which is a very famous television show among primary school pupils in Slovenia, also lives among the descendants of Slovene emigrants in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The quiz receives added international value through cooperation with participants from neighbouring countries.

The Centre for Slovene as a Second/Foreign Language (University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Arts, Department of Slovenian Studies) plays an important role in the comprehensive spreading of Slovene abroad. This is primarily achieved via its program of Slovene at foreign universities:

> Our mission is the promotion of Slovene studies, Slovene science and culture, and all of Slovenia. We are responsible for organizing lectureships of Slovene and Slovene studies at universities around the world and initiating and maintaining contacts with professors and foreign universities with study programs of Slovene studies. Teachers of Slovene at foreign universities created various branches of networks of lectureships and studies of Slovene around the world. There are currently 56 lectureships and more than 2,500 students.[61]

60 Barbara Hanuš, ["Srečanje učencev dopolnilnega pouka slovenščine"], in [*Bilten: Društvo Slovencev Republike Srpske Triglav Banjaluka*] 14 (November 2014), accessed October 19, 2015, http://www.udruzenjetriglav.com/images/BILTENI/bilten%202014.pdf.

61 Nidorfer Šiškovič, "Slovene at foreign universities/Slovenščina na tujih univerzah."

I would also like to note that, in 2014, the book Pocket Slovene was published in 22 languages as part of the World Days program. Unfortunately, the book was not published in Bosnian, which is probably connected to the fact that in 2013 and 2014 there was no lectureship for Slovene in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, the Slovene societies in Bosnia-Herzegovina "wish that a lectureship for Slovene would be established in the universities there."[62]

14 Conclusion

In Slovenia, school legislation enables the mother tongue lessons for immigrant children who are included in the Slovene educational system. Such classes are held at their schools. In the 2013/2014 school year, these classes were available in Albanian, Bosnian, Chinese, German, Dutch, Macedonian, Russian, and Serbian. Unfortunately, schools rarely cooperate with the teachers who implement mother tongue lessons at their schools, although such cooperation essentially enhances intercultural dialogue. The staff of those schools who have long-term experience with the inclusion of immigrant children are aware that immigrant children and their parents need to feel that they are accepted and welcome at school. This positively influences their learning of Slovene and the inclusion of immigrant children. Some teachers have noticed that multilingual children and children with excellent knowledge of their mother tongue do not have problems learning Slovene. They have also noticed that immigrant children who do not have enough opportunities to learn their mother tongue and more about the culture of their country of origin lose vocabulary in their mother tongue. Taking responsibility for maintaining immigrant children's mother tongue in the processes of their inclusion into a new social environment is – in addition to learning the language of the environment – very important and brings numerous positive effects. The awareness that the children are the heirs of (at least) two languages and two cultures grows. They are proud of their hyphenated identity and multilingualism because it enables them to be active in both countries (i.e. in the country of origin and in the receiving country).

In 2012 and 2013, the Bosnian Cultural Association of Slovenia (BCAS) implemented a project entitled "The roots in Bosnia, a tree in Slovenia." The project envisaged a school of Bosnian language and culture for children and youth as its main activity. Lessons were implemented in Ljubljana, Velenje, and Jesenice. Two teaching resources continue to be made available in printed form even after the conclusion of the project. In the 2014/2015 school year, eleven children

62 Žitnik Serafin, ["Organiziranost, delovanje"], 46.

attend Bosnian language and culture lessons at the Livada Primary School in Ljubljana. Since Bosnia-Herzegovina does not cover the costs of teaching and travel costs for the teacher of Bosnian language and culture in Slovenia, and Slovenia relies on bilateral agreements between states, BCAS tries to find ways to finance the lessons. It applies for new projects with the aim of enabling its teacher a 40-hour work week because interest in learning Bosnian language and culture exists at other schools in Slovenia.

In the final section of this paper, I described the attitude of the Slovene state in terms of maintaining and spreading the Slovene language abroad.

In 2014, three teachers taught remedial lessons of Slovene language and culture in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Barbara Hanuš was employed full-time. In her interview, which took place in November 2014, she explained that she teaches Slovene in eleven groups (22 school hours per week for more than 100 participants in Banja Luka, Slatina, Teslić, and Prijedor). Ana Pulko teaches on a contract basis in Sarajevo, Kakanj, and Zenica, and Slavica Pavlović does the same in Tuzla. The annual meeting for pupils of remedial Slovene lessons and the quiz Small grey cells are two of the common activities of all the associations, the teachers of remedial Slovene lessons, and the participants in such lessons. The Republic of Slovenia has 56 lectureships around the world, and the members of the ten Slovene societies in Bosnia-Herzegovina wish that such a lectureship would be made available in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

15 Interviews

- Baltić, Admir, Interview 2014, Secretary of the Bosnian Cultural Association of Slovenia. Ljubljana, December 9, 2014.
- Hanuš, Barbara, Interview 2014, a teacher of Slovenian language and culture in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Banja Luka, November 21, 2014.
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All interviews were conducted by Marijanca Ajša Vižintin in Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

CHAPTER 6

Bosnian Diaspora Experiences of *Sužívot* or Traditional Coexistence: *Bosanski Lonac*, American Melting Pot or Swiss Fondue?

Julianne Funk

1 Introduction

The American melting pot is a well-known ideal or myth about the way people of various backgrounds come together to form a cohesive society through melting away differences into a common American soup. Less familiar is the story and style of coexistence called *sužívot*, which is nevertheless well known throughout the former Yugoslavia as a traditional way of socially relating across cultural differences, but particularly characteristic of Bosnia-Herzegovina due to its ethno-religious diversity. Both the literal translation 'co-life' and the standard translation, 'coexistence,' demonstrate the concept's lack of an inherent positive or negative value, but simply implies that people of different backgrounds or identities live in the same place and/or with each other. Whether this mutual life means a more integrated life together or simply life side-by-side varies from person to person and community to community within Bosnia-Herzegovina. *Sužívot* can also be related to other local practices such as *poštenje* (honesty or decency), *merhamet* (merciful charity), *gostoprimstvo* (hospitality) and *komšiluk* (neighborly relations), where one has a duty to treat others according to the golden rule.[1]

The purpose of studying this phenomenon of *sužívot* is its notable enhancement of social life in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the way it seems to strengthen interpersonal trust and social cohesion within a historically diverse population. A contextual look at the legacy of *sužívot* arising from Bosnia-Herzegovina's particular mix of religions and cultures shows the sense of sharing, even some sort of synergy, present in this ethos, which is generally perceived as a positive aspect of social and interpersonal life. The history of *sužívot* has evolved through the changing cultural and political climates, keeping some elements,

1 See Julianne Funk Deckard, "Religions at the interface of identity politics and political identities in Bosnia-Herzegovina," *Transitions* 51, no. 1–2 (2011): 131–151; Torsten Kolind, *Post-War Identification. Everyday Muslim Counterdiscourse in Bosnia Herzegovina* (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2008).

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while revising others. Bosnia-Herzegovina has a historic and passionate interplay between violent or competitive responses to conflict and more cooperative interactions and intentional relationality.

A narrative told by some about this region is one of tolerance and respect between ethno-religious groups. However, recent wartime events demonstrated a massive violent outburst contrary to the practice of *suživot*. Nevertheless, an undercurrent of opposition to ethno-national xenophobia was also noted during this time of upheaval. These recent events have influenced the idea and practice of *suživot* unquestionably. The tradition of *suživot* has been challenged by the attempt to separate ethno-religious (or national) groups, 'purify' spaces via ethnic cleansing, and generally see ethnic 'others' as a threat to 'our' group. Some have expressed this as a betrayal of Bosnia's 'spirit.'[2] Rather than support any particular narrative, however, this chapter seeks to decipher *suživot* as a normative framework for action and a social function.

There is a very limited scope of studies actually considering *suživot* as a cultural/social phenomenon in the postwar period, much less an application to diaspora realities. Besides my previous work,[3] sociologist Dragutin Babić is the primary scholar who directly refers to *suživot* in his publications about relations between Croats and Serbs in Eastern Croatia.[4] However, a solid body of related literature can be drawn upon from philosophy,[5] psychology,[6] anthropology,[7]

2 Rusmir Mahmutćehajić, *Living Bosnia. Political Essays and Interviews* (Sarajevo: Oslobođenje International, 1994); Rusmir Mahmutćehajić, *The Denial of Bosnia* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2000).

3 Julianne Funk, "Peace as Suživot: Legacy, Loss and a Look towards the Future." Paper presented at *The Constitution of Peace. Current Debates and Future Perspectives*, Zentrumstage, Center for Conflict Studies, Philipps-Universität Marburg, 2012; Julianne Funk, "Women and the Spirit of *Suživot* in Postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina," in *Spirituality of Balkan Women. Breaking Boundaries: The Voices of Women of Ex-Yugoslavia*, ed. Nadja Furlan Štante and Marjana Harcet (Koper: Annales University Press, 2013), 171–184.

4 Dragutin Babić, "Oprost i pomirenje kao pretpostavka suživota: proces koji je počeo ili utopijski izazov? (Slučaj Brodsko-posavske županije)" [Forgiveness and reconciliation as a prerequisite of coexistence: a process that has begun or a utopian challenge? (the Case of Brodsko-Posavska County)] *Revija za sociologiju* 33.3–4 (December 2002): 197–211; Dragutin Babić, *Suživot Hrvata i Srba u Slavoniji: (re)konstrukcija multietničkih lokalnih zajednica nakon ratnih sukoba* [The coexistence of Croats and Serbs in Slavonia: (re)building multiethnic local communities after the war] (Zagreb: Golden marketing-Tehnička knjiga, 2008); Dragutin Babić, English summary, *Suživot Hrvata i Srba u Slavoniji* [Coexistence among Croats and Serbs in Slavonia], 2011.

5 Mahmutčehajić, *Living Bosnia*, and *The Denial of Bosnia*.

6 Stevan M. Weine, *When History is a Nightmare: Lives and Memories of Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina* (London: Routledge, 1999).

7 Tone Bringa, *Being Muslim the Bosnian Way. Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Ivana Maček, *Sarajevo Under Seige.*

history,[8] political science and conflict studies.[9] The UNDP's 2009 Human Development Report about Bosnia-Herzegovina's social capital after the war, *The Ties that Bind*, is additionally helpful insofar as *sužívot* is conceived as positively linked to local social networks and inclusion. When *sužívot* contributes to social ties – through building relationships, trust, interconnectedness – it can be a resource for social capital, which Putnam defines as "social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them."[10]

Today, the tale of *sužívot* is ubiquitous, at least in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (one of the state's two Entities), where bringing two or three groups into mutual spaces is touted as multi-ethnic coexistence and reconciliation. On the other hand, there is the even more obvious fact of Bosnia-Herzegovina's postwar ethnic segregation. *Sužívot* may function like a myth – an unquestioned story – that evocatively interprets Bosnia-Herzegovina's historic reality, tying it to the present and seeking to bind those residents who identify with it into one society. Like a pop-cultural phenomenon, *sužívot* has been both lauded as an essential, traditional characteristic of multiculturalism in postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina and critiqued as a false construct – Abdulah Sidran is most notable for this. Before the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1990), Sidran addressed Sarajevo's intelligentsia, artists and others at an electoral rally and referred to *sužívot* by holding up a flower and saying "We all speak about *sužívot* now. May I ask you: is this flower a *su-cvijet* [co-flower]?" He questioned, even at that time, whether the idea of *sužívot* was being used to justify the new, ethno-nationally divided order. As a member of the diaspora in the USA expressed

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Anthropology in Wartime (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009); Cornelia Sorabji, "Managing Memories in Post-war Sarajevo: Individuals, Bad Memories, and New Wars," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 12 (2006): 1–18; Cornelia Sorabji, "Bosnian Neighbourhoods Revisited: lerance, Commitment and *Komšiluk* in Sarajevo," in *On the Margins of Religion*, ed. Frances Pine and João Pina-Cabral (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 97–112; and Kolind, *Post-War Identification*.

8 Ivo Banac, "Foreword," *The Denial of Bosnia*, by Rusmir Mahmutćehajić (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), vii–xi; Robert J. Donia and John V.A. Fine, Jr., *Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed* (New York; Columbia University Press, 1994).

9 Ioannis Armakolas, "The 'Paradox' of Tuzla City: Explaining Non-nationalist Local Politics during the Bosnian War," *Europe-Asia Studies* 63, no. 2 (2011): 229–261; Xavier Bougarel, "Bosnian Islam as 'European Islam': Limits and Shifts of a Concept," in *Islam in Europe. Diversity, Identity and Influence*, ed. Aziz al-Ahmeh and Effie Fokas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 96–124; Xavier Bougarel, Elissa Helms and Ger Duizings, ed., *The New Bosnian Mosaic. Identities, Memories and Moral Claims in a Post-war Society* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007).

10 Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 19.

similarly: "What is now[a]days referred to as '*sužívot*,' we used to call – *žívot* [life]." Ever-present and generally unquestioned, therefore, *sužívot* calls for further analysis, which is the focus of the second section of this chapter, based upon my initial research about the meaning of *sužívot* for residents of Bosnia-Herzegovina today.

The expression of *sužívot* as a phenomenon continues to evolve in the postwar context of Bosnia-Herzegovina where people try to rebuild a 'normal' society 'together.' However, because of the 1990s war, an estimated 1.4 million (approximately one third of all) Bosnians live outside the country,[11] where the concept and dynamics of *sužívot* are different. Some observe that social ties between the diaspora Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims/Bosniaks are weak, since many remain stuck in wartime antagonisms. However, others find that diaspora from Bosnia-Herzegovina mingle more easily outside the homeland, opening spaces for inclusion. Additionally, the concept of *sužívot* has potential implications for relations of Bosnian migrants within their adopted homelands and prompts questions of the relevance of *sužívot* in these new contexts.[12] As such, the third section of the chapter considers diaspora experiences, comparing the perceptions and expressions of *sužívot* in Bosnia-Herzegovina today with those in two different migrant contexts: Switzerland and the USA.[13] Thereafter, the fourth section briefly explores a significant diaspora critique of *sužívot*'s generally positive perception, an evolution particular to the postwar reality.

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11 Marko Valenta and Sabrina P. Ramet, "Bosnian Migrants: An Introduction," in *The Bosnian Diaspora: Integration in Transnational Communities,* ed. Marko Valenta and Sabrina P. Ramet (Surrey: Ashgate, 2010), 1–21.

12 For example, Behloul has explored the Bosniak assertion in the Swiss context that, as native European Muslims, they have nothing to do with extremist Islam. The reason for this essentially goes back to the legacy of *sužívot*: "the heavily weighted issues debated in the public Islamic discourse on the capability of integrating Islam into Swiss laws and values almost lead to a *reduction ad absurdum* on the part of Bosniak interlocutors through their allusions to Bosniaks having lived for centuries side by side with other religious communities, and having also learned to organize themselves under adverse political conditions… and to preserve their particular interpretation of faith" (Samuel M. Behloul, "Religion or Culture? The Public Relations and Self-presentation Strategies of Bosnian Muslims in Switzerland Compared with other Muslims," in *The Bosnian Diaspora: Integration in Transnational Communities*, ed. Marko Valenta and Sabrina P. Ramet [Surrey: Ashgate, 2010]. 315).

13 The author chose these two countries, however some diaspora living in Canada also responded to the online questionnaire and a few of their perspectives have also been included.

2 *Sužìvot* in Bosnia-Herzegovina – Historical Evolution

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, different nationalities have lived in close proximity for centuries and have established a specific model of coexistence that is somewhat archaic (it can be very religious and conservative), but at the same time inclusive and tolerant. This legacy of *sužìvot* is historically traceable: each period and set of influences contributed. The medieval kingdom of Bosnia-Herzegovina sustained three religious communities (Roman Catholics, Orthodox Christians and the indigenous Bosnian Church) despite the medieval principle of one religion for each territory ruled (*cuius regio eius religio*). The Ottoman Empire brought about the communitarian millet system, establishing mutual respect across groups via political representation and separate family law for each religious community, as well as establishing multi-ethnic cities filled with non-Muslim immigrants. As such, the ethnic communities lived cooperatively but separately. Later, the Austro-Hungarians (as Catholic rulers) not only protected Bosnia-Herzegovina's Muslims, but also assisted their integration into European society and the formation of an indigenous European Muslim identity by founding its institutional representation, the 'Rijaset' or the Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

After the Second World War, Tito's socialism significantly transformed *sužìvot* through the policy of 'brotherhood and unity,' which brought a new dimension to the old pattern of (communitarian) coexistence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. During this time, many and hybrid identities flourished, such as ethnically-mixed marriages and offspring. Bosnia-Herzegovina developed strong social cohesion during these years and was commonly recognized as the paradigm of Yugoslavia and a supra-ethnic yugoslavism, especially in the capital of Sarajevo. Many of the respondents in my empirical research commented on the connection of socialism with *sužìvot* or at least perceive a mutually beneficial relationship. Socialism is seen to have structured, even systematized *sužìvot* in daily life where emphasis was on the collective rather than on difference.

> Coexistence [*sužìvot*] was legitimised ideologically, on one hand through the conceptual paradigm that assumed the resolution of the national question in socialism, and on the other hand based on the specific contribution of the multiethnic antifascist tradition formed during World War II. In addition, the authoritarian and repressive nature of the socialist order, together with an absence of respect for some significant segments of human rights, by repressing certain facets of national identity and monopolizing interpretations of the nation and what is national, further

> influenced coexistence [*sužìvot*] between the nations (= peoples) of the former Yugoslav state.[14]

For some respondents, socialism swept conflict under the carpet. Certainly World War II, preceding Tito's institutionalization of socialism, was not dealt with in a systematic or fundamental way. The experiences of suffering and loss based on ethno-religious identity at the hand of those who subsequently became countrymen and -women remained unaddressed and is believed to be one factor leading to the eruption of violence in the 1990s.

This perception is evident from a recent history textbook created by a European association of history teachers: Yugoslav communism promoted "Massiveness, Uniformity, Discipline … [while the] [r]ights and position of an individual were subjected to [the] collective."[15] Tito was in the business of creating social networks and thereby social capital in the sense of solidarity and the reproduction of Yugoslavs as a group.[16] An example is his Pioneers, or the voluntary youth labor organization that built railroads and the Brotherhood and Unity Expressway between Zagreb and Belgrade. This expanded *sužìvot* beyond primary social networks – such as the invaluable relationships with next door neighbors (*komšìje*) – to regional connectedness, between ethno-nations.

Within this context of an active socio-political project to mix nations/peoples, the recent war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (like the previous World Wars) and the successes of ethnic cleansing struck a severe blow to the development of ethnic interaction and the existent social capital. The war itself denied and sought to destroy the interwoven cultural fabric and general spirit of each group's goodwill towards the 'others.' Today, most young people have minimal exposure to ethnic 'others.' The previously common experience of knowing one's neighbor's religion and traditions and celebrating with him/her on holidays, for example, is now rare. Many residents say *sužìvot* is disappearing or already gone. In addition, Bosnian tolerance has been blamed for increased victimization during the war – i.e. the one who hesitated to shoot the other (out of compassion or a personal sense of responsibility) would himself be shot first. A certain skepticism towards *sužìvot* can consequently be perceived. Babić nevertheless emphasizes the characteristic of *sužìvot*'s resistance to

14 Babić, English summary, *Sužìvot Hrvata i Srba*, 1

15 Mire Mladenovski, ed., *Ordinary People in an Extraordinary Country. Everyday Life in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia 1945–1990* (Skopje: EUROCLIO, 2008), 45.

16 Nan Lin, Karen S. Cook, Ronald S. Burt, eds., *Social Capital: Theory and Research* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2001).

ethno-nationalism during war, giving the example of Slavonia, which has plenty of parallels in Bosnia-Herzegovina:

> The latest armed conflict … confirmed the strength of primary social networks (i.e. networks of primary social relations), which, despite very destructive actions against them in some minor segments, managed to endure ethnonational attacks by helping others, even at the coast [sic] of personal endangerment. One should have no illusions: in difficult times, as was true during this war, there are surely many more examples … of destruction and aggression. World War II most radically revealed the degree to which a conflict between members of various peoples can escalate, accompanied by pogroms, murders and the persecution of Others/different people. However, it also showed that in the same war[,] common resistance and cooperation between members of different peoples is possible.[17]

Svetlana Broz[18] and many others have recorded these pro-active *sužìvot* stories to give voice to the multiple cases of 'shining humanity'[19] that persisted despite powerful forces pitted against it.

3 Conceptions and Experiences of *Sužìvot* in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Sužìvot is associated with strong social networks, which are valuable both as a basis for pursuing individual goals and as potential glue for social cohesion. Babić explains *sužìvot* as "the social situation" of "reciprocal tolerance" corresponding with the basic human need "to create pleasant and co-operative social relations with other people, regardless of their own (sub-) identificational characteristics (race, nation, gender, age, qualification, religion and similar)."[20] He conceives of these *sužìvot* social networks as both normative and functional in the way they, as local-level networks, are linked with a bigger system. By normative he means fitting into a socially accepted and institutionalized framework of values. Certainly Yugoslav socialism's institutionalization of valuing the collective would easily support normative *sužìvot*. But even

17 Babić, English summary, *Sužìvot Hrvata i Srba*, 1.

18 Svetlana Broz, *Good People in an Evil Time. Portraits of Complicity and Resistance in the Bosnian War*, ed. Laurie Kain Hart (New York: Other Press, 2004).

19 Zilka Spahić Šiljak, *Shining Humanity – Life Stories of Women Peace-builders in Bosnia and Herzegovina* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014).

20 Babić, English summary, *Sužìvot Hrvata i Srba*, 2.

before socialism, the Ottoman millet system seems to have upheld an actively tolerant life between groups. Functionally, on the other hand, *sužívot* eases integration into networks via economic ties – through "productive, commercial, service and similar linkages in everyday life"[21] – or what many of my respondents explained as mutual help or assistance. This is the practical aspect of daily life, where one's neighbors and neighborhood are trustworthy resources and the exchange – give and take – provides greater access to what one needs with more ease. In this way there are socio-economic benefits for both individuals and communities,[22] such that *sužívot* can be seen as a local example of Putnam's 'bridging social capital.'[23] Social capital both functionally captures the resources of social networks, but also supports solidarity as a norm.[24]

The most notable findings from my research[25] for conceptualizing *sužívot* in Bosnia-Herzegovina today were threefold. First, while a clear-cut definition of *sužívot* did not emerge, its most characteristic components did: tolerance and respect, with understanding being an oft-mentioned third element. The two most essential qualities of *sužívot* can be understood functionally, in terms of behavior, but also normatively, in terms of values. Respect and tolerance[26] denote a willingness to give space to the other and do not include the need to agree with or even appreciate the other. They provide some comfortable distance while also assuring the right to one's own ways. Almost as frequently mentioned, however, was the idea of understanding, which goes a step further towards the other. In trying to understand the other, there is deeper risk

21 Babić, English summary, *Sužívot Hrvata i Srba*, 2.

22 United Nations Development Programme. *The Ties that Bind: Social Capital in Bosnia and Herzegovina*. National Human Development Report, (Sarajevo: UNDP, 2009), 17.

23 Putnam, *Bowling Alone*.

24 Lin, Cook and Burt, *Social Capital*, 2.

25 My empirical qualitative research on *sužívot* in Bosnia-Herzegovina began as a joint initiative with Amra Pandžo (questionnaire), funded by the IPRA Foundation (2012) and continued alone in 2013 (via participant observation). The open-ended questionnaire, distributed via my various contacts in the country both electronically and hardcopy, asked about 'active *sužívot'* in Bosnia & Herzegovina and was collected from March through September 2012 all over the country, with responses from Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Tuzla, Bosansko Grahovo, Zenica, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Novi Grad, Pale, Konjic, Srebrenica, Livno, Bugojno, etc. Nearly fifty responses were gathered using the snowball technique from: men and women (ratio about 1:2), young and old (average age of 35, 14% born during or after the war), of all nationalities (30% Bosniak, 30% Serb, 7% Croat, 20% Bosnian or of Bosnia & Herzegovina and 13% other) and religions (apx 40% Muslims, 20% Orthodox, 20% who claim no religion and 20% other – Catholic, Christian, agnostic, etc).

26 These two were the most frequent answers to the question 'what are three essential things for active *sužívot*?'

of engagement but also the potential benefit of decreased anxiety or feeling threatened by difference, which may result from understanding.

Second, also notable were the two common behavioral expressions of *sužìvot* in respondents' lives: (1) good/close neighborly relations (irrespective of ethnic or religious belonging), known locally as *komšiluk*, and (2) sharing in one another's religious celebrations (e.g. Christmas, *Bajram*, etc.). In light of the former, *sužìvot* in Bosnia-Herzegovina is very clearly associated with a norm or duty of neighborliness: an everyday social reality of relating to and helping the other as the need arises. *Merhamet*, though seen as an Islamic faith practice, is nevertheless similar: "a duty of merciful charity or compassion towards those in need and is generally unconditional, without expectation of reciprocity."[27] As a result of these relations, one expects him or her to act with decency: 'goodness returns goodness' (*dobro se dobrim vraća*) as one respondent explained. War stories[28] frequently include poignant examples of both the neighbor who betrayed and the neighbor who rescued or saved those of another ethnic group;[29] the former causing astonishment or resentment because the most basic trust is broken, while the latter evokes wonder and respect for exceptional courage. With regard to the latter, before the war, it was common that friendships crossed ethno-religious lines and that friends would visit to celebrate each other's holidays. One tale goes that Christians would make sure to bake a halal cake at Easter for their Muslim visitors. This latter characteristic has widely been lost through ethnic cleansing and segregation.

Third, my initial research on the concept and practice of *sužìvot* today in Bosnia-Herzegovina raised the unexpected emergence of two seemingly contrary lines of argument about difference in Bosnia-Herzegovina's society. The variable of difference, or how one relates to the other, is essential when considering *sužìvot*. One line claimed there is actually no difference between people in Bosnia-Herzegovina (despite the prevalent image of opposing ethnic groups) – i.e. 'we are all the same.' The other narrative spoke of Bosnia-Herzegovina's diversity (for example, of religious traditions) as a treasure to be cherished. Despite the fact that both perspectives expressed support for (rather than critiquing) *sužìvot*, difference is perceived as negative in the first

27 Funk, "Women and the Spirit of *Sužìvot*," fn 7.

28 It is interesting to note that *sužìvot*, as a part of normal life, does not apply to wartime. In wartime, betrayal is shocking but so is rescue. One respondent commented on this situation: "In my surroundings, people stayed people. Fear governed, but it happened that some people helped each other regardless of differences for which reason other people with less love and knowledge started the war and spread hate."

29 This can be heard in daily life, but was also present in the answers to my questionnaire and accounts can be found in books such as Broz's *Good People in an Evil Time*.

perspective but positive or neutral in the second. This may be a reflection of the development of *sužívot* in Bosnia-Herzegovina: before the war, there were more reasons to consider difference positively; groups understood themselves often as not like the others (e.g. we celebrate *Bajram* and not Easter), which allowed interaction and learning about the other's habits and ways, giving clarity and social vitality, but somehow not exclusivity.[30] However the war and its continued politics have emphasized difference as exclusive and 'my' group's interests as more important than harmony within society and therefore difference is often experienced today as negative or undesirable. It could, however, also reflect the secularization process during communism, where religious traditions were de-emphasized and privatized while South Slavic identity was held as the common core.

With regard to the future of *sužívot* in Bosnia-Herzegovina, respondents were cynical, pragmatic and uncertain. The existence of *sužívot* is perceived as the only possible future for Bosnia-Herzegovina: "without *sužívot*, there is no Bosnia-Herzegovina"; "there is no other way to survive"; "we cannot go forward without it." Respondents say it is necessary for a peaceful future, one with a decent quality of life: "it is the only way that [Bosnia-Herzegovina] will succeed … because we cannot expel each other from our own homeland." On the other hand, the current homogeneity of communities throughout the country means there is no necessity, as before, for *sužívot*. As expressed by a local anthropologist, "this mechanism [*sužívot*] is no longer necessary for a functioning society."

4 Discoveries from the Diaspora

Social capital is described by Lin et al., first, as "access to and [the] use of resources embedded in social networks" and, second, as solidarity and the reproduction of the group.[31] In cases where *sužívot* fostered social capital, we can understand its loss as a result of the disappearance of the social networks existent in Yugoslav, Bosnia-Herzegovina's society, in part due to proximity to heterogeneity, but also the loss of South Slavic solidarity and group formation in lieu of ethnic belonging. Diaspora experiences of *sužívot* are potentially interesting due to the timing of the diaspora's displacement as well as their distance from the arena in which these social networks have changed. With the diaspora's migration during or soon after the war, there is a potential 'freezing in time' of diaspora associations with Bosnia-Herzegovina – e.g. ethnic hostility,

30 'Bringa, *Being Muslim*'

31 Lin, Cook and Burt, *Social Capital*, 5.

the custom of *sužìvot*, etc. As such, the research has asked whether diaspora recreate *sužìvot* in their new contexts between other Yugoslavs/Bosnians. If so, how does it compare to that which exists in Bosnia-Herzegovina today, where so much has changed with regard to ethnic coexistence? Does the legacy of *sužìvot*, as a presumed cultural norm of Bosnia-Herzegovina's diaspora, influence diaspora's capacity to integrate, to access the social networks in their adopted societies, where they themselves provide an element of difference and heterogeneity? Further empirical research informs the following sections.[32] In what sorts of solidarity and group reproduction are diaspora participants (co-Bosnian, local, both or neither)?

Many of my diaspora respondents expressed confusion regarding my reference to *sužìvot* in their adopted contexts, particularly since I had intentionally refrained from defining *sužìvot* in the questionnaire (in hopes of not influencing their responses about its meaning). I investigated further into the confusion through interviews and personal contact and observed that while the idea of *sužìvot* refers not only to South Slavic ethnic groups, since only they use this term with its connotations, applying *sužìvot* outside that sphere seemed to raise uncertainty. Is *sužìvot* coexistence with people not of South Slavic origins? I perceived ambiguity regarding the applicability of *sužìvot* outside the region. For example, in two cases of diaspora from Bosnia-Herzegovina who currently live in New York City, one reflected that *sužìvot* is not really relevant in the US while another said the US melting pot is for him the epitome of *sužìvot*.

5 Conceptualizing *Sužìvot* Elsewhere[33]

> If *sužìvot* means anything, then it is the idea that people of different (ethnic, religious, etc.) backgrounds can live together. Whether truly

32 I posed five open-ended questions in an online questionnaire in addition to gathering some basic demographic data about my respondents. Most respondents were from North America – targeting the US but Canadians unexpectedly responded as well. I was surprised that many respondents did not finish the questionnaire, so I sought direct feedback about the possible reasons for this from both Bosnian residents and diaspora (interviews and personal communication). One such reason was my (intentional) lack of clarity of a concept of *sužìvot* in the questionnaire. While this unanticipated challenge to the research means my data is less thorough and systematic than planned, I use it to make some basic observations plus pose possible hypotheses that deserve further exploration.

33 In this paper, diaspora respondents/interlocutors are referred to by gender, country of current residence, hometown in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the number of years living abroad. All translations from Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian language into English are by the author.

> 'together' (*miteinander*, in German) or side by side (*nebeneinander*, in German) is an open question.
>
> male, Switzerland/Sarajevo, 23 years abroad

> [*Sužívot* is] living with other nationalities … [and is described with the phrases] 'peace is most precious,' 'harmony without uniformity,' 'peace among all nations' and 'universal love and non-aggression.'
>
> female, Canada/Banja Luka, 20 years abroad

> [*Sužívot* is to] accept all people just as they are, … [to] adapt to life in a new country and circumstances but still preserve our own traditions and not forget where we come from.
>
> male, USA/Vareš, 15 years abroad

> This word to me means 'I live next to this person and I don't particularly like it, but there's no [other] civilised choice, [since] I don't support ethnic cleansing' rather than [meaning] 'it is so great, we hold hands and sip wine on each others' terraces.'
>
> female, Switzerland/Tuzla, 12 years abroad

In the responses gathered, describing *sužívot* for each diaspora respondent personally, the word 'tolerance' was the most repeated quality, which is consistent with the perspectives of current residents of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This could denote 'living with,' across a range of positive to negative views towards that life with the other. Second, 'openness' (towards others) was nearly as frequently repeated by my diaspora respondents, which is not the same as the Bosnia-Herzegovina residents' second characteristic, 'respect.' While openness does not specify its object, respect seems to imply some designation of what is respected.

Third, the diaspora referred to adapting/adjusting (*prilagoditi*), which was used both generally (without reference to the object of the adaptation) as well as more specifically in reference to the adopted culture (living within). In this sense, *sužívot* as adaptation or adjustment seems to include the willingness to deal with different ways of being. In some cases, this willingness to accept the difference is more like tolerance (pragmatically putting up with – as in the last quote, above), while in other cases, it goes a even further than respect, to an intentional prioritization of diversity (e.g. the second quote, above). While the degree of this openness varies from basic/civil to respectful to accepting, I observe this as degrees of guardedness, of (dis)trust. None of these are explicit references to understanding, as was a common third characteristic given by Bosnia-Herzegovina residents.

6 Practicing *Sužívot* Elsewhere: Relations with the Adopted Society and Other Diaspora

Whereas in the Bosnia-Herzegovina case, the 'other' is a relatively equal member of one's own society, diaspora experiences are inherently characterized by being the (unequal, minority) other in another's society. Therefore the experience of coexistence for diaspora is related to how much one is incorporated into or adapts oneself to the other's social setting. Although not generalizable to Bosnia-Herzegovina diaspora as a whole, my respondents in Switzerland were more negative about experiencing *sužívot* with people from the adopted culture than those in North America. According to a female diaspora member in Switzerland:

> I know very few Swiss people… we live next to each other I suppose, but here in Geneva meeting Swiss people is not easy… the Swiss avoid foreigners. Or so I am told. I have a Swiss neighbour who did not avoid us. He wrote letters to us to complain that our children cried too much.

The North American diaspora responses were more varied. Interestingly, positive responses to the question of experiencing *sužívot* in the adopted country context typically came with caveats. One diaspora man in the US clarified that *sužívot* exists "within the parameters created by this culture – [with its] much more private and secluded family life and far less frequent interaction – which is not how your regular Bosnian person would define *sužívot*."

Both examples give the impression that coexistence for these diaspora is not a passive practice (e.g. live and let live), but active, including meaningful contact. Indeed, the repeated use of the word interact/interaction appeared with regard to *sužívot* in North American cases. As one long-term diaspora woman in Canada expressed: "My experience in Canada is one of the best when it comes to coexistence. We interact on professional as well as on personal levels, which was all made possible with Canadian laws that promote multi nationalism." As such, diaspora seem to associate *sužívot* with an active form of coexistence, as noted especially in its absence.

While perhaps coexistence with adopted communities is different, do communities of diaspora nevertheless reconstruct *sužívot* between themselves in these alternative contexts? I noticed a theme of avoidance or a marked disinterest to find other diaspora from Bosnia. One diaspora man from Banja Luka living in the US claimed "we don't socialize together" and that the diaspora "are [even] greater nationalists than those [living today] in Bosnia-Herzegovina."

A diaspora woman from Tuzla living in Switzerland expressed how she "tend[s] to avoid Bosnians because you never know how they will be. They tend to judge me by [my] name, where I went to school, how I got my ostensibly fabulous job." This attitude seems to reflect a typically implicit but ever-present variable of distrust, which is a theme of the postwar period also affecting residents of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where this avoidance is typically carried out through segregation.

The research from Bosnia-Herzegovina showed that two key practices of *sužìvot* are mutual assistance and shared holidays. The only mention in my research with diaspora of a the norm of mutual assistance came from a young man in the US who generally thought *sužìvot* is irrelevant to US life, but did refer to his parents' intentional and good relations with their next-door neighbor (a Chinese woman, however, not Bosnian or even Balkan) when asked whether he had any experience of *sužìvot* in the US. There was more mention of sharing holidays, however. One female from Tuzla living in the US confirmed that while "[t]here are not many examples" of *sužìvot*, "we invite all BH friends to celebrate New Years, but not to celebrate religious holidays." Perhaps as part of postwar distrust, sharing holidays is still valued but limited: previously, different ethno-religious belonging prompted pro-active tolerance at holidays (e.g. the halal cake at Christian holidays), whereas in this example, such holidays are no longer shared, while holidays that do not make difference visible are more common.

My participant observation at a 2014 Christmas party with Bosnia-Herzegovina diaspora in Chicagoland provided me with further data on the subject. One woman insisted that the ethnically mixed group of friends at the party were really no different from each other. However, in almost the same breath she explained that 'we just don't talk about religion and politics' – demonstrating a desire to avoid topics which might raise the salience of existing differences between them. Sameness, or at least not disagreeing, seems to be prized, but this conflict avoidance behavior silences the plurality which is necessary for *sužìvot*. The host of the party expressed his view of *sužìvot* in the US this way:

> We have very strong friends from different nationalities and from different ends of our land and we enjoy this. *Sužìvot* is possible but everything is individual, everything is by/through upbringing and culture. If you find friends who respect your traditions and habits then *sužìvot* is indeed possible and even fun…. Everything is individual. We have friends who for example celebrate other holidays than we [and] have different habits and traditions than we, which makes our *sužìvot* seem really interesting.
>
> USA/Vareš, 15 years abroad

He believed one could not generalize about *sužívot* for whole groups, but must consider individual practices. The relation between individual and group coexistence seems significant, as considered below, in the fourth and last part of this chapter.

7 The Feasibility and Future of *Sužívot*

Despite differing degrees of distrust towards other diaspora and the challenges of relating to an adopted culture, most of my respondents were optimistic about the possibility to experience *sužívot* in their new settings, even with their Bosnia-Herzegovina diaspora compatriots. It is possible, said one, by assimilation "and the fact that we have learned new social 'skills' in our new countries, such as the acceptance of difference and privacy" (female, US, Tuzla, 19 years abroad). Another wrote "Coexistence is possible with anyone who wants to participate in making something out of life and working towards [a] higher goal rather than destroying and/or promoting hatred based on the 'self-imposed' beliefs such as color of skin, religion, wealth, intelligence etc." (female, Canada/Banja Luka, 20 years abroad).

The marked optimism for *sužívot* in diaspora contexts contrasts strikingly with the diaspora respondents' overall pessimism towards *sužívot* back in the homeland. Trust reappears as a crucial element:

> [I]t is not the same [today in Bosnia-Herzegovina]. As [for] everyone else, we are forged and re-forged by the events that took place in our lives. There is no … trust between the groups (ethnicities) or, more precisely, individuals interacting over there. … [Pr]evious society was insisting on [the] equality of us all, "unity and brotherhood" amongst the people, mutual respect, etc. It was taught in schools, reinforced through family upbringing (sometimes) and implemented in daily social interactions. Obviously, it still wasn't enough. Nowadays … the opposite things are being done systematically.
>
> male, USA/Konjic, 20 years abroad

> I doubt that anything will be ever the same as it was before the war! Others would have to demonstrate that they have changed to gain my full trust in them all over again!
>
> female, Canada/Banja Luka, 20 years abroad

> I don't think I would fit in Bosnia well after all these years.
>
> female, Switzerland/Tuzla, 12 years abroad

While residents of Bosnia-Herzegovina today are also pessimistic, they consistently mention the necessity for *sužívot* for a peaceful future. As such, their (in)vestedness appears to require their pragmatism, while diaspora are perhaps more pragmatic about their own (adopted) environments than Bosnia-Herzegovina. Given that a third of Bosnians live outside the country's borders and that massive remittances come from these displaced citizens, the influence such perspectives may have on those who remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be worthy of further research.

8 Remaining Questions Circling around Difference as Key to *Sužívot*

The research with residents of Bosnia-Herzegovina highlighted the issue of difference – some respondents asserted that everyone is the same, while others noted difference as cultural richness. Based on my years of observing social life and cultural perspectives in Bosnia-Herzegovina, my hypothesis is that the first assertion refers more to individual qualities while the latter refers to group (ethnic) belonging. Both sets of respondents – those noting difference and those saying 'we are the same' – still perceived *sužívot* as supporting positive experiences of diversity. However, *sužívot* was also critiqued in my diaspora research insofar as it necessitates group belonging as the sign of difference or multiculturalism. For my diaspora colleague in Switzerland and others who choose not to align themselves ethnically, *sužívot* today entrenches ethnic group identity, rather than providing a space for "multiple, flexible, cross-cutting and ever evolving identities."[34] He illustrated his critique through the common contemporary image for Bosnia's multiculturalism, the mosaic, made of many small but distinct colored pieces, rather than the varied shades of a painting. Are clear and distinct group affiliations ('us' and 'them') a condition for tolerant relations?

Considering *sužívot* in an interview in a hip New York café, a young Bosnian diaspora recalled two cases of inter-ethnic relations that, however, do not qualify, in his opinion, as *sužívot*. First, his parents' friendship with a Macedonian family in a US location where very few former Yugoslavs live is not *sužívot* because they are drawn together due to their similar heritage. In this context of the US, Macedonian versus Bosnian was not salient as difference but region of origin was a point of commonality. Second, he considered his friendships in Sarajevo, his family's hometown, with people from different ethnic affiliations than his own, but again he concluded that this cannot be called *sužívot* since he does not consider their ethnic belonging important; rather, he thinks of them

34 Nenad Stojanović, email to author, 1 February 2015.

as people who are very similar to himself. This quality of relating with the different other (because or despite of that difference) was, for him, key to *sužívot*. Does *sužívot* therefore exclude friends, rather focusing on relations with a different other who, thought not a friend, is still an active part of one's life?

Returning to the American melting pot image, which is about neutralizing differences, a diaspora man in the US commented: "I consider myself to be almost completely assimilated into this community. I consider this to be the normal life of a citizen." Assumedly, with no difference comes no necessity for tolerance. Is this still *sužívot*? The Swiss cheese fondue is yet another version of melting pot, however, with chunks of bread for dipping that almost vanish completely; it is hard not to compare this with the outlook for migrants in Switzerland. However, both of these examples are quite unlike the Bosnian *lonac* – a stew with many ingredients, which remain discernable. Does postwar *sužívot* cook a *bosanski lonac* or is it instead serving up another local specialty, the mixed meat grill, where clear categories do not overlap, even if they all sit on the same plate?

9 Conclusion

While Sidran critiqued the '*su*' in *sužívot*, preferring just *žívot*, life, the concept is not so easy to dismiss. The multicultural quality of life in Bosnia-Herzegovina was changed by the war's ethnic cleansing, on the one hand radically raising the salience of ethnic identity and, on the other, segregating the society into nearly homogenous areas. The former diversity is more memory than current reality, although memory continues to poignantly condition perceptions of reality.

It is evident that *sužívot* remains widely valued but is also regarded with much skepticism and devastated trust. The latter seems more present for diaspora than residents, who, despite their pessimism about their postwar reality, still need to find hope and to strive for a positive future, a future that necessitates *sužívot*. The diaspora's distance from Bosnia-Herzegovina may account for this difference. Diaspora pragmatism relates to adaptation to their current home countries, while relations with other diaspora or with Bosnia-Herzegovina itself are less essential to the good life. Nevertheless, tolerance, openness and positive interactions are still highly valued, though the qualities defining difference are changed and likely much broader in diaspora contexts.

The author is left with as many questions as when she began about *sužívot* as a social phenomenon. It is her hope that more research will explore the idea of active coexistence in comparative perspective so as to strengthen our understanding of it but also its development for an increasingly cosmopolitan world.

CHAPTER 7

Religious Needs and Dilemmas of the Bosnian Diaspora as Expressed through Questions and *Fatwas* (Islamic Legal Opinions)

Enes Ljevaković

1 Introduction

The Bosnian Muslim diaspora is broken up into separate diaspora communities in the countries of Western Europe, Scandinavia, USA, Canada, Australia, etc. These communities, due to their affiliation to Islam as a minority religion in these countries, have their own specific problems and dilemmas related to the preservation of religious identity through different forms of practicing religious rights, principles, values and Islamic religious teachings in the multireligious environment in which they exist and work.

Our (Bosniak) Muslim diaspora has a number of dilemmas, problems and challenges which are faced by other Muslim diasporic communities in Europe, America and Australia; but there are also some specific issues which are inherent to Bosnian diaspora. To a great extent, our Muslim diaspora is part of the Islamic community in Bosnia-Herzegovina and it functions through *ǧamʿats* (a basic organizational unit of an Islamic Community), which are conjoined in some form of associations whose work is coordinated by the chief imam and a relevant executive and representative body for the respective country. Riyasat of the Islamic Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina (the Community's highest executive religious and administrative organ) has a Directorate of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora. This directorate has a Diaspora Office which coordinates the activities of our ǧamʿats and communities in diaspora.

The *Šariʿa* legal issues of Muslim minorities are increasingly attracting the attention of contemporary Muslim scholars and researchers, in general, especially those dealing with *fiqh* (Islamic Jurisprudence) issues. At first, their attention was focused on solving individual issues and dilemmas. However, more recently their attention is increasingly directed towards the theoretical establishment and methodological framing of a new type or branch of *fiqh* that many refer to as "*Fiqh* issues of Muslim minorities".

This chapter addresses both groups of problems and issues in the field of *fiqh*. Namely, it reviews the theoretical background of the *fiqh* of Muslim

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minorities, the issues that are more or less common to the Muslim diaspora irrespective of their ethnic origin, as well as some of the issues in which our Muslim diaspora is, to a greater or lesser extent, different from other Muslim diasporic communities. These issues have been detected in the questions that Muslims have raised over the past few decades either individually or through their associations, *ǧamʿats*, religious and cultural institutions. The answers / *fatwas* (Islamic legal opinions) to these questions were given by individual scholars, but also by collective bodies specialized for this type of activity, the so-called "*Fiqh* Councils".

2 Preliminary Remarks on the Need and Reasons for the Establishment of "Fiqh of Muslim Minorities" and its Methodology

2.1 *The Nature and the Reasons for the Establishment of "*Fiqh *of Muslim Minorities"*[1]

Despite the fact that a significant number of Muslims in the world (almost one-third of them) have lived as a minority in almost all non-Muslim countries for centuries now, Islamic legal science and theory has not yet established a special branch of *fiqh* that is based on appropriate methodology (*uṣul al-fiqh*), which would be dedicated exclusively to the *fiqh* issues of the so-called Muslim diaspora. Indeed, a number of discussions about individual *fiqh* issues took place. Also, geopolitical, statistical, sociological, historical and other research and analysis on Muslim minorities have been conducted. Moreover, many *fatwas* which discussed current issues and problems of the Muslim minorities were given. However, only recently a systematical dealing with *fiqh* issues of Muslim minorities was noticed. Both, individual researchers and specialized institutions and *fiqh* Academies are making a noticeable effort to come up with a system of rules and foundations for delivering *fiqh* regulations. In other words, they are trying to formulate a methodology for *fiqh* of minorities that would regulate the process of finding appropriate *fiqh* solutions to new and emerging issues faced by Muslims living as a religious minority in non-Muslim countries and societies.

1 For more see Enes Ljevaković, "Fikh muslimanskih manjina: utemeljenje, kontroverze i dileme" [Fiqh of Muslim minorities: Foundations, controversies and dilemas], in *Zbornik radova Fakulteta islamskih nauka u Sarajevu*, ed. by Enes Karić (Sarajevo: Fakultet islamskih nauka, 2005), 145–163.

The term "*Fiqh* of Muslim minorities" was more intensively used in the eighties of the 20th century and at beginning of the 21st century in the discussions about the status and *fiqh* problems faced by Muslims in non-Muslim countries, in particular, in the West. Although, this term is used for a relatively short period of time, it has already caused certain disagreements, controversies and denies, especially in the context of the attempts to establish a special legal methodology (*uṣūl*) for this branch or type of *fiqh*.

It should be noted that contemporary Islamic jurists such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi,[2] Taha Jabir al-Alwani,[3] Abd al-Majid al-Najjar,[4] Ajeel Jassem al-Nashmi[5] and others made a significant contribution to the discussions on the "Fiqh of Muslim minorities". Also, a valuable book of Tariq Ramadan *To be a European Muslim*[6] (Biti evropski musliman) should be mentioned in this context. In this book the author actualizes the important legal and social issues and dilemmas that have appeared as a result of the increasing presence of Muslims in Europe at this time. The nature of current Muslim presence in the West, as Tariq Ramadan notes, is a new phenomenon in the history of Islam.[7] Muslims have certainly experienced a minority position over the course of their history, but it does not resemble in any way their presence that we witness today. Essentially, our contemporary European context is what changes things. Western civilization, with its system of values, has such powerful means that makes it difficult for everyone who lives in Europe to determine what he is or what he is not. Precisely this new nature of the Muslim presence in the West is the reason why the solutions to situations and problems from an earlier historical context cannot be literally copied and rewritten, but there is a need for new Ijtihad (independent reasoning) and reaching new solutions that are appropriate to the time and circumstances, or to the new nature of Muslim presence.

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2 See Jusuf el-Kardavi, *Fikh muslimanskih manjina – Kako biti musliman na Zapadu* [Fiqh of Muslim minorities – How to be a Muslim in the West] (Sarajevo: Libris, 2004).

3 See Taha Jabir al-'Alwani, "Madkhal ila fiqh al-aqalliyyat (Nazarat ta'sisiyah)" [Introdution to Muslim minorities jurisprudence (Foundational reviews)], *Islamiyat al-Ma'rifah*, 19 (1999): 9–29.

4 See Abd al-Majid al-Najjar, "Nahwa manhaj usuliyyin li fiqh al-aqalliyyat". [Towards the Islamic jurists' methodology of Muslim minorities], *Al-Majalla al-'ilmiyyah li al-Majlis al-Urubbiyy li al-ifta' wa al-buhuth* 3, June (2003): 43–63.

5 Ajeel Jassem al-Nashmi, "Al-T'aliqat 'ala bahth 'Madhal ila usul wa fiqh al-aqalliyyat'" [Commentary of research «Introduction to Principles and Fiqh of Muslim minorities»], *Al-Majalla al-'ilmiyya li al-Majlis al-Urubbiyy li al-ifta' wa al- buhuth* 7, July (2005): 17–63.

6 Tarik Ramadan, *Biti evropski musliman* [To be a European Muslim] (Sarajevo: Udruženje Ilmije Islamske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini, 2002).

7 Ramadan, *Biti evropski musliman*, 20.

In debating the reasons and needs for establishing a special branch / type of *fiqh*, two reasons are mainly stated.[8] The first reason lies in the doctrine that no one shall be exempted from the responsibility of applying *Šariʿa* obligations, except the one whom *Šariʿa* exempts from the obligation of application in certain cases and circumstances. That is the reason why *fiqh* of minorities is examined in the light of religious duty of Muslims to comply with the rules of their faith wherever they are: "And to Allah belongs the east and the west. So wherever you [might] turn, there is the Face of Allah. Indeed, Allah is all-Encompassing and all-Knowing". (Al-Baqarah, 115). "It is not for a believing man or a believing woman, when Allah and His Messenger have decided a matter, that they should [thereafter] have any choice about their affair..." (Al-Ahzab, 36).

The second reason is found in the fact that Muslims are a religious minority in non-Muslim communities, and the minorities are usually in an inferior position compared to the majority population. The inferior and the weaker one is always in a position of having to adapt to the will and actions of the more powerful one. The minority is jeopardized by the fact of only being a minority. Such a position is reflected on legal grounds as well. That is why democratic societies take steps to protect minorities and their rights, because it is obvious that there is a need to legally regulate this protection. Therefore, there is a need to adapt *fiqh* regulations in line with the position that Muslims have as a minority in non-Muslim societies in order to help their status and application of *Šariʿa* regulations that are applicable to their current situation. A precedent and justification for this kind of adaptation of the regulations, or some sort of a legal dichotomy, is found in the division of the prophetic era of Islam into two periods: Meccan, in which the emphasis is on doctrinal and ethical teachings of Islam, and Medinan, where the legal regulation of various spheres of individual and social life is more emphasized.

While debating the legal nature of the "Fiqh of minorities" two opinions dominate: the first opinion is that this sort of *fiqh* is not a part of *fiqh* as Islamic jurisprudence in terms of terminology. Rather, it is part of *fiqh* in the broader semantic horizon, which implies the understanding of the faith in general; the second opinion is that "Fiqh of minorities", in spite of some of its specific features, is only one branch of the general *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence in the narrow sense).

The first opinion holds Al-'Alwani who believes that "Fiqh of minorities" cannot be subsumed under the meaning of the term "Fiqh" in its usual terminological usage, i.e the *fiqh* branches (Fiqh al-furu'). Rather, it is more appropriate

8 El-Kardavi, *Fikh muslimanskih manjina*, 19.

to subsume it under the rubric of the term "Fiqh" in its broader sense which includes all aspects of the faith, namely, belief, ethic and behavior. That is the meaning that the Prophet, p.b.u.h., aimed at in the well-known Hadith: "When Allah wishes good for someone, He bestows upon him the understanding of the religion". (Bukhari and Muslim). This means that the "Fiqh of minorities" is a special type of *fiqh* that takes into account *Šari'a* norms and it corresponds with the circumstances and the environment in which the Muslim community lives. This is *fiqh* of a specific community living under specific conditions and with specific needs. Some regulations that do not apply to other Muslim communities apply to this one. Therefore, in case a question in the area of "Fiqh of minorities" is posed by an individual or a group, a contemporary mufti, as Al-'Alwani said, has to rise above the simplistic and simplified approach that limits the problem to the one who asks and the one who answers.

This is a non-scientific approach which we inherited from the era of "*taqlīd*" (following earlier religious authorities uncritically), the one that is enthroned by the ignorant masses who considered it the easiest solution. There is a need for scientific approach which will search for the backgrounds of the issues, the social factors that caused the problem to which the question refers; it is necessary to examine whether the question in the posed form is acceptable at all or whether it should be rejected or reformulated in the form of a *fiqh* issue, and then responded to in the light of a comprehensive approach that relies on Quranic norms and general *fiqh* principles while taking into consideration the general objectives and intentions of Islam at the same time. In this context we can understand the Quranic prohibition to ask the questions that could cause social problems by only being raised and responded to. That is because these questions were raised in and formed by negative social phenomena, and if the answers were given to them in such context, *fiqh* qualifications of these phenomena in form of *fatwas* or legal opinions could be reinforced and fixed. Also, Prophet's, p.b.u.h., reprimand of the phenomena "asking lots of questions" should be understood in light of this.

Al-'Alwani, hence, advises that if someone, for instance, asks a question such as: "Is it permissible for Muslim minorities to participate in the politics of the countries they live in, in order to protect their rights and promote the values of Islam in their host countries?" the *faqīh* (Islamic jurist) who is aware of the global dimension of Islam, the position of the *Ummah* as a global witness and the complexity of contemporary international relations, should reject a question formulated in such a way. Rather, he should shift the question with the formulation that includes facilitation (*ǧa'iz*) from the logic of passive qualifications to the logic of social responsibility and active attitude towards social obligations (*waǧib*) in accordance with the universal principles of *Šari'a* and

peculiarities of the Muslim community and Prophetic mission. This approach emphasizes the principles of belief, ritual, morals and some other general principles of faith, rather than insisting on the practical *fiqh* issues.

This understanding of the term "*Fiqh* of minorities" opens up a space for a more liberal interpretation of *Šari'a* regulations. At some point, it even marginalizes and suppresses *Šari'a* regulations. This arouses distrust and suspicion among the traditional Islamic scholars and even among the common people. Hence, this opinion is generally favored by pragmatic Muslim intellectuals and modernists.

However, the majority of the Islamic scholars believe that this is a branch of the general *fiqh*, even though they themselves use the term "*Fiqh* of Muslim minorities".[9] According to them, this branch of *fiqh* has its own uniqueness, topics and specific issues, though earlier *faqīhs* did not name it that way. In that sense, today we talk about medical, economic and political *fiqh*. If these terms have become common and widely accepted among the Muslims in diaspora, why wouldn't we have a "*Fiqh* of minorities" which would have the task of solving the issues of Muslim minorities and to answer their questions and doubts concerning their faith and practice. Even though the issues of this specific type of *fiqh* have their roots in the general *fiqh*, they are still not systematized and sufficiently elaborated separately from the general *fiqh* by previous authorities. On the other hand, the contemporary problems are different from the earlier ones, and it is not possible to address them by using ready solutions that have originated in different temporal and social circumstances. All this justifies the establishment of the *fiqh* of minorities as a specific branch of the general *fiqh*. Emphasizing that the "*Fiqh* of minorities" is part of the general *fiqh* implies a greater reliance on principles and methodology of traditional *fiqh* without pretensions to establish a specific methodology of *fiqh* of minorities.

Some Muslim authors who deal with issues of *fiqh* of minorities, such as Al-Nashmi,[10] advocate the substitution of the term "Fiqh of minorities" with a more appropriate term. What is disputable in this case is the term "minority", and not the term *fiqh*. The content of this type of *fiqh* is not debatable, but rather the use of the term "minority". It is claimed that this term is inappropriate because it does not reflect the essence of Muslim life in these countries. The term "minority", according to them, refers to the separation, being enclosed, social self-isolation and emotional ghettoization. Such approach encourages the expression of one's own identity by stressing the differences in appearance and rituals, causes inner frustration and complexes, and builds walls between

9 El-Kardavi, *Fikh muslimanskih manjina*, 41–42.

10 Al-Nashmi, "Al-T'aliqat", 21.

Muslims and other fellow citizens. It causes, among other things, a minority complex and the feeling of being a member of a marginalized social group. It is rather proposed to use an alternative term such as "Fiqh of Muslim coexistence in Europe", or "Fiqh of Muslim coexistence in America." The term "Fiqh of co-citizenship" is suggested as well. The term "coexistence" is appropriate for the following reasons:

– It reflects directly the goals that Muslims want to achieve living in these areas: coexistence, continuity and naturalization;
– It implies the involvement in the integration process, a positive attitude and interaction with other members of society, its institutions, cultures and structures, and also participation in the political, social, economic and other activities and programs;
– It rejects isolation, ghettoization, separation; it is understandable and acceptable to the wider community since it implies cooperation in reaching the common goals;
– It carries a direct political message about the Muslim equality with others; just as there is a coexistence of Christians and Jews, who are integrated into a society, present in all its institutions, and affect its political orientation; in the same manner the coexistence of Muslims should be built on the principles of equality, partnership, cooperation and inclusion.

The avoidance of the term "Muslim minority" and "Muslim diaspora" in describing the phenomenon of Muslim presence beyond the borders of Muslim countries is recommended by the Academy of Islamic law that is part of the Organization of Islamic Conference (now the Organization of Islamic Cooperation) at its 16th session held in Dubai – UAE from 30th Safar to 05th Rabi 'al-Awwal 1426H, which corresponds to 09th April, 2005. In the Decision No. 151 (9/16), among other things, the following was stated:

1. The term "minority" (*'aqaliyya*) or "immigrant colony" (*ğāliyya*) used for Muslims who live outside the borders of the Islamic world should be avoided, because these legal terms do not express the essence of the phenomena of Islamic presence that is characterized by comprehensiveness, authenticity, stability and coexistence with others in the society. The appropriate term could be, for example, "Muslims in the West" or "Muslims outside the borders of the World of Islam".
2. It is our duty to take appropriate measures to protect and preserve the Muslims who live outside the borders of the World of Islam and their rights to have their religious, civilizational and cultural peculiarity.
3. The effects that the status of the citizen in the West implies are not incompatible with the preservation of Islamic identity and practice of Islamic values.

2.2 *The Need to Establish a Methodology for "Fiqh of Minorities" / "Fiqh of Coexistence"*

It was mentioned earlier that contemporary Islamic legal thought began to tackle the position and problems of Muslim minorities in the West more intensively in the eighties of the last century. As a result of that interest, different literature that address different aspects of *fiqh* of Muslim presence in the West has appeared. Most of it was in the form of collections of *fatwas*[11] and research papers on various *fiqh* issues and dilemmas faced by Muslims in these countries. However, this already important *fiqh* production still lacks the fundamental link of *fiqh* activities, whose role is to direct the Ijtihad in addressing the issues of Muslim minorities. In other words, it lacks the theoretical elaboration and systematization of rules of deriving *fiqh* regulations to meet the needs of Muslim minorities in which the specific position of Muslims in western societies will be recognized. This methodology should be part of the general methodology of *fiqh* that regulates the derivation of general *Šari'a* regulations from Islamic sources that are not limited by changes in time and space. At the same time, it should take into account the specific position of Muslim minorities in the West and the positive legal regulations of the respective countries. In this way the shortcomings in the existing works of *Uṣūl al-Fiqh* will be eliminated and it will allow the emergence of "*Fiqh* of Muslim minorities" or "*Fiqh* of coexistence". This type of *fiqh* will go beyond all occasional *fatāwas* that address some separate aspects of the phenomena of Muslim presence in Europe, and it will be able to respond to the challenges of multicultural, multireligious and multiethnic social environment. This expected aim will not be achieved if the above-mentioned *fiqh* foundation is not built on the principles and rules that will guide the process of derivation of individual regulations by linking them into a coherent system and which will always begin from the specific position of the Muslim presence in Europe.

Although a complete version of this methodology still has not been composed, some authors[12] proposed certain *fiqh* principles and methodological rules that should direct and guide a Mufti who gives *fatwas* to Muslim minorities. They base their proposition on a thesis that this is a special branch / type of *fiqh* which has its specific content and form. However, their proposition is a framework for methodological-cognitive instruction rather than traditional Usul al-Fiqh rules for the derivation of regulations from individual normative

11 See for example Enes Ljevaković, *Fetve Evropskog vijeća za fetve i istraživanja* [*Fatwas* of the European Council for *Fatwa* and Research] (Sarajevo: Connectum, 2005).

12 See Al-'Alwani, "Madkhal ila fiqh al-aqalliyyat", 15–18.

statements. Hence, Al-'Alwani, among others, mentioned the following principles which he considers to be essential to every mufti who gives *fatwas* in this branch of *fiqh*:

1. Referring to the Quran as a unique totality and appreciating the Sunnah as a practical application of the principles and teachings of the Quran in a concrete reality.
2. The primacy of the Quran in relation to any other source, including the Sunnah, the statement of the companions, and so on. For example, when the Qur'an establishes a general principle, and we find something that clearly contradicts the above principle in the Sunnah or other traditional statement we will inevitably act according to the Quranic principle. Meanwhile, the Hadith or other traditional saying has to be interpreted in a proper way or it will be rejected if it lacks appropriate interpretation.
3. Keeping in mind the fact that the Qur'an has reaffirmed and incorporated into its teachings the overall prophetic heritage while removing from it all the corruption and distortions that have befallen it over the past centuries in order to serve as a unique authoritative source to all humanity.
4. Paying attention to Quranic ethical norms and principles that can be used to formulate laws that will protect human mind from distortions, drifts and deviations.

2.3 *General Attitude of Muslim Minorities towards Religious Practice in Everyday Life*

Muslims who live in the West today are subjected to political, social, cultural and media pressure because of their religious beliefs and practices. In their everyday life they're faced with the predicament of being part of a religious minority that is often stigmatized as foreign, different, radical, fanatic, fundamentalist, etc. Moreover, they are facing various difficulties in practicing Islamic obligations, as well. This constant pressure they are exposed to is leaving a mark on their thoughts and behaviors. That has resulted, as Tariq Ramadan[13] noticed, with a double phenomenon within Muslim communities.

The first phenomenon is reflected in the emergence of some sort of reactive attitude caused by difficulties related to immigration (for the first generation), which, accompanied by natural will to protect the Muslim identity, has led to the tendency of exaggerating the significance of some questions that Muslims have been faced with in general, such as the questions about food, building of

13 Ramadan, *Biti evropski musliman,* 147, 148, 151.

mosques, burial of dead and other detailed *fiqh* questions that have pushed aside the questions which concern the fundamentals of Islam and its essential teachings that surpass problems and characteristics of specific time and place in human history.

The second phenomenon is related to European view on this new presence often seen as a problem of its own. It seems as if the Muslims – under the pressure of social difficulties in the West and media propaganda – have been taken by the idea, as an "obvious" fact and "indisputable" evidence, that Islam is a problem in the West and that Muslims have problems with progress, democracy and modernity. In that way, having this vision, willingly or not, they have two possibilities: to become as less visible as possible and not let any Islamic peculiarities in everyday life or to spend all time explaining what Islam is and isn't, to patiently respond to criticisms on women rights, nature of Jihad, *Šari'a* punishments, "antidemocratic" inclination of Islam, etc. Pressure that they felt from the outside has resulted in having two different answers. One answer overstressed the importance of *fiqh* questions as a significant factor of maintaining Muslim identity, while ignoring the universal elements and principles of Islam that form foundations of Muslim identity. The second answer overstressed the importance of sentiment, spirituality, universal ethical messages of Islam, whilst minimizing the significance of practical principles and customs founded on those principles. The outcome of this approach is to become discrete and invisible, or in other words to become a Muslim without Islam. Without any doubt, both approaches and answers are one sided and wrong. It is necessary to find a middle path which will eliminate shortcomings and negative outcomes of both tendencies, and incorporate what is positive in them.

During the last two decades, there have been certain changes within Muslim communities in the so called diaspora. That was partially due to the second and third generation growing up in the West. Many of them wanted to emphasize their identity and live according to decrees of Islamic teachings. After a difficult childhood, they have rediscovered their roots and their religion. This process has been of great significance, so that in almost every country in the West, consistent tendency toward confirming Islamic identity and renewal of Islamic spirituality and practices has been fostered among young Muslims. Despite the broad opinion, this phenomenon is not exclusively an expression of opposite attitude towards the West and its values, but it is a positive confirmation of self confidence among young Muslim generations. As such, this phenomenon is an important factor for establishing a Muslim future in Europe. There is one more aspect that deserves to be emphasized, and that is that young people are coming back to an Islam that has been purified from its traditional readings. Islam in Europe and in the West in general – although

its fundamental principles and regulations have to be based on Quran and Sunnah – has to have specific and adequate implementation, and that is a message that young and middle generation are sending clearly. Bosnian Muslims from Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as other autochthonous Muslim nations in Balkans, have gone through more than a century of adaptation and accommodation into the European context that can be very useful and significant for painless process of integration of Muslims who are not of European descent into European societies. But at the same time the trap of assimilation and loss of Muslim identity can be avoided. If there is an actual will – and there is a will within Muslim communities, especially within autochthonous European Muslims – to see an end to negative and reactive opinions, then that clearly means that European Muslims, together with religious scholars (*ʿulamā*), have to face a new reality in a constructive way and with decisive state of mind. That means to define for themselves a clear direction and totality of precise Islamic regulations that will enable them to develop an Islamic identity in Europe that would be authentic and compatible with patriotism and feeling of responsibility towards citizenships whose blessings they enjoy. The formulation of the Islamic legal framework and Muslim European identity should be an interactive process between communities and religious scholars that will enable the latter to formulate appropriate *fiqh* answers to the questions that have been asked in light of a new environment. Identity is not just a unity of regulations, but rather, it is a mixture of sentiment, consciousness, knowledge, culture and customs. In order to understand the essence of one's identity it is necessary to live it, to be part of it. Consequently, every *faqīh* that wants to formulate specific rules for Muslims in Europe should use the contributions of numerous Muslims that have been living there, that is to listen to their questions and problems in a way that they themselves are formulating them.

3 Questions and Answers of Practical and Legal Nature

3.1 *Question of Nationality and Life in a Non-Muslim Country*[14]

This is one of the questions that has been interpreted differently in Muslim diaspora communities, depending on their origin. Unlike some other diaspora communities that, before immigrating to the West have not had the experience of living in multireligious societies or in non-Muslim environment in general, our Bosnian Muslim diaspora – neither on practical nor theoretical level,

14 The term non-Muslim country refers to countries where Muslims live as a religious minority.

individually or institutionally – did not, and continues to not ask the question of *Šariʿa* validity of staying and living in non-Muslim country/society.

In general, Muslims facing the challenge of living in non-Muslim country/society is not a new phenomenon, as some like to think, but it is something Muslims have experienced since the beginning with prophet Muḥammad's, p.b.u.h., mission in Mecca. Because of pressure, lack of freedom, oppression, torture and executions in Mecca, some Muslims were forced to ask for asylum in Abyssinia, and in a later period almost every Muslim was forced to leave Mecca and move to Medina, which at that time was predominantly a non-Muslim milieu and society. During the following centuries, Muslims who lived in the surrounding areas would often continue living in their lands under non-Muslim government for a short or long period of time when their neighbouring non-Muslim countries would conquer their areas. That was the case with communities on the eastern side of today's Anatolia, and in the area between Muslim territories and Byzantine. Specific problems and issues of Muslims that have continued living in the occupied territories were elaborated by Ibn Taymiyyah (writing in the second half of seventh century and first decade of eight century AH, or 13th century CE) in his "Mardin's questions" (Al-Masāʾil al-Marḍinīya). On the other side, on the far West of the then Islamic world, in Al-Andalus, Muslims have been faced with a similar phenomenon. Responses to difficult and complex questions of Muslim life under governance of Christian Spanish rulers in Al-Andalus, have been elaborated in detail by a Maliki *faqīh* al-Wanšārisī (1431–1508) in his collection of *fatwas* and *fiqh* opinions entitled "*El- Miʾjar al-muʾrib*". In more recent times, the question of Muslims living in non-Muslim countries has been emphasized and problematized by Muslims with a *salafi* provenance living in diaspora, and also, by the followers of "Party of Liberation" and members of movement "*Muhağirūn*". They base their opinion on *hadiths* that forbid living among pagans (polytheists). Thereby, they ignore the fact that those *hadiths*, under the assumption of their authenticity, are referring to concrete cases of war conflicts in the time of Prophet, p.b.u.h., which are drastically and essentially different from today's situation and the position of Muslims in diaspora. Hence, the analogy between them is unsustainable.

Bosnian Muslims in diaspora, even the small number that considered themselves as *Salafis*, have not had this kind of dilemma of living in non-Muslim countries and societies. During the aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992–1995, a large number of Bosnian Muslims that have been exiled from their homes chose to go into exile in Western European countries, Scandinavia, USA, Canada, and Australia, rather than in Muslim countries like Turkey or any of the Arab countries. We are certain that the reason is not only of economic

nature, but we should add the reasons of mentality, culture and education. Bosnian Muslims have long been accustomed to life in a multiethnic and multi-religious society. They solved this issue during Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina through the answers given Bosnian religious scholars, such as the *muftis*, and later the answers of Rais al-ulema Mehmed Teufik Azapagić (1838–1918), who wrote a tractate on *hiǧra*[15] in 1886. In his tractate he advocated the Muslim presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina even under non-Muslim rule, opposing, thus, the official fatwa of *Šaiḫ al-Islam* in Istanbul in which he invited Muslims of Bosnia to immigrate to Turkey since Bosnia wasn't any longer an Islamic territory. A renowned reformist Muhammed Rashid Rida gave a similar answer to Azapagić's when one Bosnian student from Travnik asked him about this issue.[16] Based on previous historic experience, adaptations and ability of acculturation in a multireligious environment, Bosnian Muslims have managed, with no major problems, to sufficiently integrate into societies in which they live as a religious minority while preserving their Muslim identity at the meantime.

3.2 *Muslims between Loyalty to Muslim Community and Countries they Live in*

To our experience and knowledge gained through contacts and dialogue with Muslims who live in the West, especially in Europe, we can certainly say that majority of traditional Bosnian Muslims in diaspora, as well as majority of other European Muslims, are loyal citizens of countries they live in and loyal members of Muslim community they belong to, based on their religious preferences. Even if some of them do something illegal, he doesn't justify it with religious reasons or arguments. However, there have been and there are still individuals and small groups who abuse their stay, whether permanent or temporary, in countries that have granted them citizenships or residence permits, justifying it sometimes, for reasons known only to them, with religious arguments. That should be regarded as their own choice and reflection of their personal moral profile and criminal character, or as consequence of brain washing by followers of extremist ideologies. Criminal acts cannot be generalized and identified with all Muslims and teachings of Islam. Every crime must be individualized. One who endangers the safety of a society, neighbours, fellow-citizens, terrorizes people and causes disorder, steals and destroys other people's property, cannot be a good Muslim even if he goes and

15 Fikret Karčić, *Bošnjaci i izazovi modernosti* [Bosniaks and the challenges of modernity] (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 2004), 110.

16 Karčić, *Bošnjaci i izazov*i, 113–114.

stays in a mosque or Islamic center and justifies it with religious arguments. Such a person with his staying in a mosque and with him emphasizing his Islamic identity discredits the religion itself and its institutions. In order to have dignity to ask for their legitimate rights from a country and a society, Muslims have to fulfill their duties toward them and the most important one is the safety of people and the safety of their property. "The Muslim- God's Messenger says- is he from whose tongue and hand other people are safe". "Whoever kills a person unjustly it is as though he has killed all mankind, and whoever saves a life, as it though he had saved all mankind", says Quran firmly in surah El- Maida, verse 32.

According with what has been said before, by being truthful to the teachings of Islam, Muslims can live in Europe and in the West, in general, with full respect of the laws of countries they are living in. That is not only constitutional and legal but religious obligation of Muslims living in diaspora that comes from accepting conditions under which their residence visa, asylum or citizenships have been granted. Accepting those conditions has the treatment of a contract whose regulations must be obeyed. Quran commands a respect of contractual obligations. Problems with respecting the implications of this contract can occur because of two reasons: first is not knowing or not respecting moral postulates of the religion, and second is not respecting the moral values of a society. One cannot find justification of any kind of criminal act or disorder in a society in the religious teachings. Perhaps one could doubt the possibility of reconciliation, or the conflict between these two loyalties: loyalty to the Muslim community and the religion and loyalty to the civil/secular country they live in. There is no reason for these kind of doubts since loyalty to the Muslim community, namely, loyalty to the Islamic teachings, means persistent fulfillment of conditions of the contract of residence and citizenship.

However, the problem is that there is not a small number of those that consider themselves and include themselves among Muslims that are not loyal or faithful to anyone or anything except to their narrow interests and passions. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise when they fill up crime pages and in that way discredit not only themselves but their community and the religion they say they belong to, but with which they don't have anything in common.

3.3 *Institutional Relations of Bosnian Muslims in Diaspora with the Islamic Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina*

One of the specific questions and important challenges that Bosnian Muslims in diaspora are facing today, and a question that will be even more

pronounced in the future, concerns their religious organizing through *ǧamʿats* and through the umbrella Islamic community in countries they are living in, and which will be institutionally connected with the Islamic community in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In other words, it will be its integral part as it is defined by the Constitution of Islamic community in Bosnia-Herzegovina (article 1.). This question was particularly emphasized in the context of efforts made by some European countries, such as the Republic of Austria to legally prevent or cut off the institutional relations of Bosnian Muslims with their Islamic community in the country they are members in. This has been done through legislation about Islam in Austria, which is more unfavorable than the one from 1912, (which was actually adopted thanks to Bosniaks – Muslims that have been at that time citizens – vassals of Austro-Hungarian monarchy). This institutional relation with Islamic Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina is directly connected with maintaining their religious identity in diaspora, especially that part of our identity concerning us belonging to the *Hanafi madhab*, following *Maturidi aqaid* and adhering to the Islamic tradition of Bosniaks. The constitution of the Islamic community in Bosnia-Herzegovina led by *Raʾīs al-ʿulamā*, is authorized with the special authorization for carrying out affairs as a head religious leader in Bosnia-Herzegovina (*manšūra*) given by the *Shaiḫ al-Islam*, who was representing the sultan-caliph in religious affairs. Later on, granting the *manšūra* was left to the authority of Muslim community. Through this institution, Bosnian Muslims have an uninterrupted *Šariʿa* and spiritual connection with the Messenger Muhammed, p.b.u.h., and with his successors-caliphs. This is also related to other doctrinal teaching in our *madhab* which has become inseparable part of Islamic tradition of Bosniaks, and that is conditioning the authenticity of the ritual practices, by which we primarily mean the ḫuṭba on Friday and for Eid, with the previous permission of Muslims religious authority, i.e. the Grand Mufti in the case of our Muslims. Therefore, for our Islamic community, for our Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina and diaspora it is unacceptable to disregard this important religious doctrine and legal fact during legal regulation of status of Muslims and their communities in European countries because that would mean violating their religious rights.

3.4 *Practical Problems in the Religious Practice of Bosnian Muslims in Diaspora*

Based on questions that Bosnian Muslims in diaspora are asking, it's evident that they, just like other Muslims in diaspora, are facing multiple practical problems in their religious practices. They start from questions concerning ritual practice, especially when it comes to possibility of performing *ǧumʿa* prayer for employees, then there are the problems concerning food preparation

according to the principles of Islam, fulfilling the duty of *qurban*, all the way to the difficulties in finding an adequate job, problem of workplace discrimination, media pressure, etc. These problems negatively reflect on their social position, religious freedom, quality of social and religious life, which causes certain frustrations and goes in favor of those who uphold some radical ideas and opinions. That is why it is necessary to make extra efforts to work on their inclusion and integration into social life while maintaining their religious identity.

4 Conclusion

Islamic legal issues of Muslim minorities are increasingly attracting the attention of the contemporary Muslim scholars and researchers, especially those dealing with *fiqh* (Islamic juridical) issues. It is believed that almost one-third of Muslims live as a minority in almost all non-Muslim countries. However, a systematical dealing with *fiqh* issues of Muslim minorities was noticed only recently. Both, individual researchers and specialized institutions and *fiqh* Academies are working to come up with a methodology for *fiqh* of minorities that would regulate the process of finding appropriate Islamic juridical solutions to a new and emerging issues faced by Muslims living as a religious minority in non-Muslim countries and societies. At first, this was done by solving individual issues and dilemmas. There are issues and dilemmas that are more or less common to the Muslim diaspora irrespective of their ethnic origin, but there are also some specific issues which are inherent to our (Bosniak's) Muslim diaspora. Bosnian Muslims in diaspora, just like other Muslims in diaspora, are facing multiple practical problems in their religious practices. They start from issues concerning ritual practice, especially when it comes to performing *ǧum'a* prayer for employees, then there are the problems concerning food preparation according to the principles of Islam, fulfilling the duty of *qurban*, all the way to the difficulties in finding an adequate job, problem of workplace discrimination, media pressure, etc. On the other hand, unlike some other Muslim diasporas, our Bosnian Muslim diaspora has never, neither on a practical nor theoretical level, individually or institutionally, asked the question of *Šari'a* validity of staying and living in a non-Muslim country or in a non-Muslim society. Moreover, Bosnian Muslims have a specific institutional relation with the Islamic Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is directly connected with maintaining their religious identity in diaspora, especially that part of their identity concerning their belonging to the *Hanafi madhab*, following *Maturidi aqaid* and adhering to the Islamic tradition of Bosniaks.

PART 3

Transnational and Translocal Patterns in a Globalized World

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CHAPTER 8

Bosnian Global Villages: (Re)Construction of Trans-Local Communities in Diaspora

Hariz Halilovich

1 Introduction

The recent media reports about the Syrian refugee crisis in many ways resemble the plight of the Bosnian refugees more than two decades ago. At the time, millions of ordinary people from across Bosnia fled their homes looking for safety in the European countries such as Austria, Germany and Sweden as well as beyond Europe. Since then, the "former" Bosnian refugees have become a distinct transnational migrant community, nowadays representing one of the largest, globally widespread and socially best organised migrant groups from the former Yugoslavia. According to the estimates, the Bosnian expatriate community—or Bosnian diaspora—includes about 1.7 million people, living in approximately 100 countries around the world.[1] In addition to regional, Western European, and Scandinavian countries, a large number of Bosnians settled in the so-called "third" countries, primarily in the United States of America (USA), Canada and Australia. Most of them became migrants as the result of forced displacement during the 1990s war of aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the emigration trend continued in the post-war period, generally through so-called "chain migration", up until 2003, after which the emigration from Bosnia subsided, but did not cease completely.

The aforementioned reasons for the massive emigration from the country, i.e. systematic persecution through politically-motivated violence involving ethnic cleansing and genocide, have also been the main factors involved in the rapid diaspora formation of Bosnian citizens in countries they found refuge in. In that regard, they followed the trajectories of similar refugee groups in modern history: they organised themselves primarily as a political diaspora, a

1 Valenta, Marko and Ramet, Sabrina P., "Bosnian Migrants: An Introduction", in *The Bosnian Diaspora: Integration of Transnational Communities*, edited by Marko Valenta and Sabrina P. Ramet. (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 1–23; and Ministarstvo za ljudska prava i izbjeglice Bosne i Hercegovine, *Pregled Stanja Bosanskohercegovačkog Stanovništva* (Sarajevo, 2008).

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transnational community of Bosnian citizens with clear translocal organisational patterns (usually initially emerging as *zavičajna udruženja*, or local community associations linked to larger Bosnian social clubs).

This chapter,[2] based on the ethnographic studies of Bosnian migrant communities in Australia, the USA and Europe, discusses some specific circumstances and conditions in which these communities came into being and (re) constructed themselves in the new socio-cultural environments, as well as the links these communities have established and sustained with their places of origin in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

When discussing the Bosnian diaspora in all its heterogeneity, it is important to reiterate that unlike some other diasporic communities, the Bosnian diaspora was not formed as part of a process involving a spontaneous or economically-driven migration, but due to forced displacement behind which was a clearly defined policy and the required mechanisms to implement it. As such, these forced migrations are inseparable from the politically-motivated violence and the war legacy in Bosnia-Herzegovina.[3]

Apart from the territorial ethnic homogenisation, massive population movements during the war and in the post-war period has also resulted in the demographic ruptures unseen in the recent history of the country and the region. While having clear ethnic patterns—in which the persecution of Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) in the occupied parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina was a dominant feature—one of the important facts relating to forced and politically influenced internal migrations, is that they have been almost exclusively from rural into urban centers. Internal displacement has not only revived and (re)territorialised the traditional local and ethnic identities within the country, but it has also produced new informal (and sometimes formal) moral categories around inclusion and exclusion, such as "stayers" and "leavers", "newcomers" and "old settlers", "defenders" and "deserters", "peasants" and "city dwellers", internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, and so on.[4]

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2 Sections of this chapter, as well as the theses elaborated here, are included in the co-authored publication: Čapo, Jasna and Halilovich, Hariz. "La localisation du Transnationalisme: Pratiques Transfrontalières Bosniaques et Croates". *Ethnologie française* 43(2), (2013) 291–301.

3 Halilovich, Hariz. "(Per)forming 'Trans-local' Homes: Bosnian diaspora in Australia", in *Bosnian Diaspora: Integration in Transnational Communities*, edited by Marko Valenta and Sabrina P. Ramet, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 63–81; Halilovich, Hariz. *Places of Pain: Forced Displacement, Popular Memory and Trans-local Identities in Bosnian War-torn Communities*, (New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2013a); Halilovich, Hariz. "Reclaiming Erased Lives: Archives, Records and Memories in Post–war Bosnia and the Bosnian Diaspora". *Archival Science*, 14(3–4), (2014): 231–247.

4 Stefansson, Anders. "Urban Exile: locals, Newcomers and the Cultural Transformation of Sarajevo", in *The New Bosnian Mosaic: Social Identities, Collective Memories and Moral Claims*

Most of those forced to abandon their homes hoped that their flight was of a temporary nature, until normalcy returned to their hometowns, villages, hamlets and neighbourhoods. To their disappointment, for most of them that was a vain hope: hundreds of thousands of people who might never have contemplated migrating even into a large local town, have become global nomads, refugees, migrants and settlers in many 'unusual' destinations across the globe. For instance, people from small Bosnian villages ended up in cities like Melbourne, St. Louis or Vienna.[5]

Apart from trauma, cultural shock and breaking of the social relations with people and places of origins, these dramatic shifts have resulted in a number of socio-cultural and demographic changes in both places of departures and places of arrival and settlement. The original places have lost people who made these places in social sense, while the places of settlement received new residents with different culture, way of life, language, dialect and sense of local belonging.

2 Retracing the Movements

The most recent massive emigration from Bosnia-Herzegovina was not a linear migratory process; it happened in two phases: during the war—especially in its first year—and then in the years after the war, mainly during the first five years (1995–2000). While the first wave of migration from Bosnia was perceived to be more of a temporary nature and often involved dramatic flights from violence, the second phase involved more deliberate plans for permanent emigration and settlement in a third country.[6] During the first phase, refugees looked for safety mostly in nearby European countries. In the second, most of those leaving post–war Bosnia-Herzegovina were migrating to USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand—usually associated for good, or permanent resettlement. There were also cases of migration within European countries—such as Bosnian refugees leaving Germany and migrating to Sweden—as well as exchanges of temporary refugee status in Europe for permanent residence in northern America or Australia. These migration movements from Bosnia-Herzegovina differ in many significant ways from the temporary labour migration before

in a Post-war Society, edited by Xavier Bougarel, Elissa Helms and Ger Duijzings, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 59–78; and Toal, Gerard and Dahlman, Carl T. *Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and its Reversal*, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

5 Halilovich, *Places of Pain*.

6 'Third' countries in migration studies refer to resettlement countries; with a 'first' country being the country of origin and the 'second' country of transit or temporary refuge.

the war that was dominated by men. One significant difference of the later war and post–war migrations from Bosnia-Herzegovina is that they included complete families—albeit predominantly women and children.

3 Becoming a Diaspora

While displaced Bosnians who settled in different countries and formed their distinct deterritorialised communities are seen and see themselves as part of a worldwide diaspora, on more than one occasion the diasporic character of displaced Bosnians has been questioned or even denied. For many Bosnian academics, politicians and ordinary people, accepting that more than a third of the Bosnia-Herzegovina population lives permanently overseas—in diaspora—is to accept the results of ethnic cleansing. Thus, the attempts to define and fix displacement of Bosnians is inherently a political issue in Bosnia—and goes directly to the heart of the Bosnia-Herzegovina "Dayton Accords" and its controversial Annex Seven, guaranteeing the right to return to all displaced people.[7] Without the return of refugees, the results of ethnic cleansing will be *de facto* legitimised in the form of "ethnically cleansed territories" and the division of the once multicultural country along ethnic lines.

Angered by those not returning "home", Professor Muhamed Filipović, seen by many as the leading Bosniak academic, clashed with representatives of the Bosnian diaspora at the Sarajevo roundtable "Days of Bosnian Diaspora", in July 2007. He insisted that displaced Bosnians should be called emigrants and not referred to as part of a diaspora ("not like the ancient Jewish or Greek diaspora"), suggesting the temporality of their displacement rather than displacement as a perpetual condition. He pointedly withdrew from the roundtable to demonstrate his disagreement with those using the term diaspora for exiled Bosnians. In an article subsequently published in *Nezavisne Novine* on 25 July 2007, he displayed some of the common stereotypes held by "homeland Bosnians" about Bosnians living in other countries, labelling them "unpatriotic, snobbish cousins and materialistic *dijasporci*".

Contrary to the Filipović school of thought that denies displaced Bosnians are diaspora, empirical research and a growing literature on the Bosnian diaspora by many migration scholars confirm that the Bosnians displaced across the globe have established themselves as diaspora of their own. In fact, as

7 Annex 7 of the Dayton Peace Accords states that people must be 'permitted to return in safety irrespective of ethnic origin, religious belief, or political opinion'. Cf. Annex 7: Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons, 1995, *The Dayton Peace Accords* [http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bosagree.html].

stated earlier, they represent one of the most widely dispersed communities from the Balkans, meeting the criteria of most of the commonly accepted definitions of the term diaspora. The point, however, is not to compare displaced Bosnians with "ancient Jewish or Greek diaspora", as Filipović does. As Stephen Castles and Mark Miller argue, the diasporic realities in the "age of migration" are intertwined with many other processes that profoundly impact upon processes of identity formation.[8]

Most diaspora scholars agree that mobility and migration do not necessarily result in the formation of a diaspora as a distinct form of collective identity of a deterritorialised group of people.[9] Throughout history, there have been many examples of temporary displacement and migration as well as complete assimilation of migrants into the mainstream culture of the host country. Many theorists of migration—like Avtar Brah, Anthony Cohen, James Clifford, Stuart Hall, William Safran, Gabriel Sheffer and Elazar Barkan and Marie-Denise Shelton—have all attempted to define what exactly constitutes a diaspora.[10] Safran's taxonomy, for instance, defines diaspora as a community with some of the following characteristics:

1) the original community has spread from a homeland to two or more countries; they are bound from their disparate geographical locations by a common vision, memory or myth about their homelands;
2) they have a belief that they will never be accepted by their host societies and therefore develop their autonomous cultural and social needs;

8 Castles, Stephen and Miller, Mark J. *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World*. New York: Guilford Press, 2003.

9 Clifford, James. "Diasporas", *Cultural Anthropology,* 9 (1994): 302–338; Cohen, Anthony. *Global Diasporas: An Introduction*, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997); Gilroy, Paul. "Roots and Routes: Black Identity as an Outernational Project", in *Racial and Ethnic Identity: Psychological Development and Creative Expression,* edited by Ezra H. Griffith, Howard C. Blue, and Herbert W. Harris, (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 15–30; Hall, Stuart. "Cultural identity and Diaspora", in *Identity: Community, Culture, Difference*, edited by Jonathan Rutherford, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1990), 222–237; Safran 1991, Safran, William. "Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return", *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* 1(1), (1991): 83–99; Sheffer, Gabriel, "A New Field of Study: Modern Diasporas in International Politics", in *Modern Diasporas in International Politics*, edited by Gabriel Sheffer, (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986) 1–15; and Vertovec, Steven. "Conceiving and researching Transnationalism", *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22(2), (1999): 447–462.

10 Brah, Avtar. *Cartographies of Diaspora: Contesting Identities,* (London: Routledge, 1996); Clifford, "Diasporas", *Cultural Anthropology;* Cohen, *Global Diasporas;* Gilroy, "Roots and Routes"; Hall, "Cultural identity and Diaspora"; Safran, "Diasporas in Modern Societies"; Sheffer, "Modern Diasporas"; and Barkan, Elazar and Shelton Marie-Denise. *Borders, Exiles, Diasporas*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).

3) they or their descendants will return to the homeland should the conditions prove favourable;
4) they should continue to maintain support for the homeland and therefore the communal consciousness and solidarity enables them to continue these activities.[11]

Safran's second and third characteristics of diaspora may be irrelevant to many contemporary diasporic communities. Even if there is a firm acceptance of migrants in the host country, many migrant communities opt to maintain stronger or weaker ties with their original culture, language and homeland. In most cases this does not, however, mean that "they or their descendants will return to the homeland should the conditions prove favourable". The majority choose to stay in their adopted homelands and successfully negotiate their new identities and differences created as a result of their diasporic experience.

Anthony Cohen broadens the definition of diaspora to include both voluntary migration and migration as a result of fleeing aggression, persecution or extreme hardship. He also defines different types of diaspora in relation to the main reasons behind migration as the "victim" (e.g., Jews, Africans and Armenians), "labour" (e.g., the Indian), "trade" (e.g., the Chinese and the Lebanese), "imperial" (e.g., the British) and "cultural" (e.g., the Caribbean) diasporas.[12] However, the new global context of living—including new technologies of communication such as the internet, satellite TV and mobile phones as well as the availability and affordability of international travel—has redefined the notion of homeland, which can no longer be apprehended as only a physical, territorial category.

What emerges from these recent additions to the debate on diaspora is that diasporic identities are not static but, rather, a constant work in progress; over time many diasporic groups change, adapting to new contexts. As Hall put it, "diaspora identities are those which are constantly producing and reproducing themselves anew, through transformation and difference".[13] So, for instance, a diasporic group may shift from "victim" to "trade" or "cultural" diaspora. Indeed, many former Bosnian refugees have become new guest–workers, businessmen and transmigrants, while many Bosnian humanitarian and refugee relief organisations in diaspora have turned into cultural associations. Moreover, both forced and voluntary migrations are very often present in the one diaspora; and an initial wave of forced migration might be followed by voluntary migration or vice versa. All these variations can be identified within the global Bosnian diaspora.

11 Safran, "Diasporas in Modern Societies", 83–84.
12 Cohen, *Global Diasporas.*
13 Hall, "Cultural Identity and Diaspora", 235.

Probably the most cohesive factor in displaced groups of Bosnians is their communal consciousness and solidarity that foster a sense of collective identity and shared responsibility to maintain support in the new countries for their original communities. Many displaced Bosnians I interviewed in the USA, Australia and Europe expressed their desire that one day they or their descendants will "return to the homeland should the conditions prove favourable". Articulation of such desires, and in most cases an imagined future return, is very often contrasted with setting a footprint in the new soil: building or buying houses in the countries of settlement, participating in the labour force, sometimes setting up their own businesses, and to varying degrees actively engaging or showing interest in political processes in the adopted countries.

The social mobility of the former Bosnian refugees has in most cases been seen as a measurable indicator of successful integration into their host countries. Those "who made it" have been regularly recognised, and their success celebrated, by their diasporic community as well as by the mainstream in both their adopted and home countries. The process of integration had also included the "adjustment" of political identities of Bosnians who acquired citizenship of their adopted countries, even if this, in some cases, meant that they needed to choose between their old citizenship and the new one. In the process of successful integration, the "former" Bosnians became "new" Swedes, Americans, Australians, Austrians, to name just a few new collective political identities in diaspora Bosnians. Other new, or (re)discovered identities, include racial (white) and European identifications, the first not uncommon among some members of the Bosnian community in places like St. Louis or Atlanta in the USA, the later often used by Bosnians in Australia and New Zealand. These identifications have also reflected in settlement patterns at the points of destinations (e.g. choosing to settle in predominantly "white" or "European" suburbs).

The trend of changing and adjusting identities clearly suggests that over the last two decades the Bosnian diaspora has moved on from a victim identity, increasingly showing many aspects of labour, trade and cultural diasporas as outlined by Cohen.[14] From disorganised groups of refugees dispersed across many different countries, displaced Bosnians have evolved into a global web of well-organised, interconnected deterritorialised communities in which a rich variety of social, cultural and economic exchanges takes place.

14 Cohen, *Global Diasporas*.

4 Origins of the Bosnian Expatriate Community

Whereas it was the 1992–95 war and its aftermath that brought an organised Bosnian diaspora into existence, it would be inaccurate to suggest that the history of the Bosnian diaspora starts with the most recent, and so far the largest, emigration from the country. Bosnians (and Herzegovinians) have a long history of migration. Over the last 150 years Bosnians and Herzegovinians of different ethnic groups have been migrating to different countries within Europe (and Turkey) as well as to faraway destinations in South and North America, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand. For instance, in May 2006 Bosnians in the U.S.A. celebrated 100 years of their community. Yet, a well organised and distinct Bosnian diaspora is a relatively recent phenomenon.[15] Before 1992 Bosnians—who were mainly labour migrants or guest workers living in Western Europe, North America and Australia—saw themselves either as a part of the Yugoslav diaspora or grouped around anti-Yugoslav religious and cultural societies.[16] There were, however, influential Bosnian/Bosniak dissidents, such as the Swiss businessman Adil Zulfikarpašić and the Austrian academic Smail Balić, who worked on promoting Bosniak (and Bosnian) national cause.[17]

In addition to the emergence of recognisable Bosnian diaspora communities in various countries where Bosnian refugees settled over the last two-and-a-half decades, an interesting phenomenon took place in Turkey, where the descendants of Bosnian (i.e. Bosniak) immigrants revived a dormant Bosnian cultural community, even successfully claiming a diaspora status. While the number of Bosnian refugees who migrated to Turkey during the 1990s was a relatively low, compared to other destinations, the war in Bosnia and formation of Bosnian diaspora in other countries, were the key factors behind the

15 Coughlan, Reed "Transnationalism in the Bosnian Diaspora in America", in *Bosnian Diaspora: Integration in Transnational Communities*, edited by Marko Valenta, and Sabrina Ramet, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 105–22; Halilovich, Hariz. "Bosanskohercegovačka dijaspora u vrtlogu globalnih migracija: šanse i izazovi za Bosnu i Hercegovinu". *Pregled,* LXXXVI (3), (2006): 193–220; Halilovich, Hariz. "(Per)forming 'Trans-local' Homes: Bosnian diaspora in Australia", in *Bosnian Diaspora: Integration in Transnational Communities*, edited by Marko Valenta and Sabrina P. Ramet, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 63–81; Halilovich, Hariz. "Trans-local Communities in the Age of Transnationalism: Bosnians in Diaspora". *International Migration*, 50(1), (2012): 162–178.

16 Franz, Barbara. *Uprooted and Unwanted: Bosnian Refugees in Austria and the United States*, (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2005).

17 Galić, Mirko. *Politika u Emigraciji: Demokratska Alternativa.* (Zagreb: Globus, 1990); Imamović, *Bošnjaci u Emigraciji.*

revival of Bosnian/k identity and emergence of an organised Bosnian diaspora in this part of the world.[18] Similarly, many Bosnians long-term residents or settlers in the countries created after the collapse of Yugoslavia, including some domicile groups in these countries (e.g. in Serbia, Kosovo, Croatia and Slovenia), have organised themselves as a diaspora and see Bosnia as their motherland (*matica*).

5 Reconstructing Local *zavičaj* Communities

As with other similar migration flows, every displacement ("deterritorialisation") from Bosnia was followed by a new emplacement ("reterritorialisation") in the host country. In the process of displacement/emplacement, the pre-migration socio-cultural factors played—and continue to play—an important role as well as socio-political conditions in the host countries and local host communities. Immigration policy, or lack of it, and the cultural characteristics of the local groups, significantly affected the social morphology of Bosnian communities in the diaspora. On the other hand, local identities played a crucial role in establishing migration trends: in choosing the destination for the migration, in the "chain migration", and the (re)construction of local communities in the country of immigration. These (re)constructed or "transplanted" local identities have resulted in the formation of distinctive translocal *zavičaj* communities in host countries and places—in Australia, the USA, Austria, Sweden and in many other countries.[19]

The concept of *zavičaj*, a barely translatable term, encompasses the wholeness of person-in-place and place-in-person, which in English translates as home, homeland, community, home country, and native place, as well as village, county, region, town, and city.[20] The sociological concept of *Gemeinschaft* comes close to *zavičaj*'s sense of community, social network and home, a social

18 Bandžović, Safet. *Iseljavanje Bošnjaka u Tursku*, (Sarajevo: Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i medunarodnog prava, 2006); and Voloder, Lejla. "Debating the Emergence of a Bosnian Diaspora in Turkey: Questions of Citizenship and Identity" (paper presented at the conference *Turkish Migration in Europe: Projecting the Next 50 Years*, Regent's College London, December 7–9, 2012).

19 Halilovich, *Places of Pain*.

20 Hariz Halilovich and Ron Adams, "People in Place-Place in People: The Global Contextualization of a Local Tradition as a Modality for Reconciliation", in *The Utility of Fratricide: Political Mythologies, Reconciliations, and the Uncertain Future in the Former Yugoslavia,* edited by Srdja Pavlovic and Marko Zivkovic, (Baden-Baden, 2013), 151.

reality and lived experience for discrete groups, as well as a metaphor for modalities that go beyond conventional state-based modes of social organisation. For many people in Bosnia—especially those who were forcibly displaced—the term *zavičaj* evokes deep feelings of belonging to and nostalgia for a place that is or was the intimate and ultimate home.[21] During my fieldwork in many diasporic Bosnian communities, I regularly come across little Višegrads, little Zvorniks, little Srebrenicas, little Prijedors, or little Brčkos—reconstructed and re–imagined communities with a clear local stamp from back home.

However, dominated by "ethno gaze" and still entrenched in "methodological nationalism", the transnational theory in migration studies, as advocated by Nina Glick Schiller, Steven Vertovec and other prominent scholars, often fails to recognise the (trans-)local organisational patterns within transnational communities,[22] even though local and regional ties or "identities from the bottom-up" appear as strong, or stronger, than the "identities from the top-down", i.e. broader national, ethnic, and religious identities. Of course, in many cases the relationships of "identities from the bottom-up" and "identities from the top-down" are intertwined and congruent, but the former are given priority as they are based on direct experiences and shared embodied memories, former social relations and statuses, dialect and manner of speech, sense of humour, local cuisine, and so on. To see others and be seen are the ways of maintaining the old identities and former statuses in the context of a new life in which the old social identities and roles often become redundant. For instance, when they meet, *Brčaci* living in various suburbs of Melbourne

21 Halilovich, Hariz. "Reclaiming Erased Lives: Archives, Records and Memories in Post–war Bosnia and the Bosnian Diaspora". *Archival Science*, 14(3–4), (2014): 231–247.

22 Cf. Glick Schiller, Nina et al. "Trans-nationalism: A New Analytic Framework for Understanding Migration", in *Migration, Diasporas and Trans-nationalism,* edited by Steven Vertovec, and Robin Cohen, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999), 26–50; Basch, Linda, Glick Schiller Nina, and *Szanton Blanc, Christina. Nations unbound: Transnational Projects and the Deterritorialised Nation-state*, (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1994); Glick Schiller, Nina. "Beyond Methodological Ethnicity: Local and Transnational Pathways of Immigrant Incorporation". *Willy Brandt Series of Working Chapters, 2/8,* (Malmö: Malmö University, 2008); Vertovec, Steven. "Conceiving and researching Transnationalism", *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22(2), (1999): 447–62; Conradson, David and Mckay, Deirdre. "Translocal Subjectivities: Mobility, Connection, Emotion". *Mobilities*, II (2), (2007): 167–174; Guarnizo, Luis E. and Smith, Michael P. "The Locations of Transnationalism", in *Transnationalism from Below,* edited by Michael P. Smith and Luis E. Guarnizo, (New Brunswick-London: Transaction Publishers, 1998), 3–34; Kearney, Michael. "The Local and the Global: The Anthropology of Globalisation and Transnationalism". *Annual Reviews Anthropology*, 25 (1995): 547–565; and Wimmer, Andreas and Glick Schiller, Nina. "Methodological Nationalism, the Social Sciences and the Study of Migration: An Essay in Historical Epistemology". *International Migration Review*, XXXVII (3), (2003): 576–610.

become "neighbours" once again, and the old titles and statuses from the *zavičaj* are respected regardless of their lack of actual value outside the *Brčaci* community. For example, mutual respect and addressing someone as "professor", "doctor" or "neighbour" have the full affective and social significance only among those who shared the past in which these titles were tied to a specific social position in the community. In many cases, this status is now largely symbolic because the social context has changed completely. In fact, many once prominent citizens of former Brčko now living in Melbourne are "on the dole" and depending on the Social Security benefits. Many of them are often unknown outside their community, unintegrated, and marginalised in the context of the wider Australian society. It can be argued that *Brčaci* in Melbourne, *Prijedorčani* in St. Louis or *Zvorničani* in Vienna, like members of similar translocal groups in diaspora, need each other not only to socialise with each other in the present and to confirm who they are now, but also to reaffirm, through shared memories, who they were in the past. The shared memories of home and *zavičaj*, back in the past, are complemented by the lived experiences of home—the new home, here and now, in the diaspora.[23]

Translocality is not exclusively a characteristic of the Bosnian war-induced emigration in the 1990s; however, it particularly seems that forced migration from ancestral homes and dramatic separation from spatial practices and identities are decisive factors in the establishment of translocal networks.[24] Homes and places of origin of forced migrants are often irreversibly lost, physically and/or in the sense that the migrants no longer feel "at home" in their places of origin. Additional factors of this alienation are related to the new political context of their places of origin now located in the "Republic of Srpska", a separate political entity within Bosnia-Herzegovina, established on the foundation of crimes of genocide and ethnic cleansing. Since the places of origin remain an important identity marker, forced migrants endeavour to recreate these social places in the new locations through memories, narration, enactment, and meetings with former neighbours, thus creating a "new home away from home", both similar and different from the one they had left. The attachment to the idea of the old place as home, as Ghassan Hage argues, should not be seen as a hindering factor for migrants and refugees in their new places of settlement. Rather, it provides them with a "sense of possibility" to (re)create their new home constructed around "[the] desire to promote the feeling of

23 Hariz Halilovich, "Translocal Communities in the Age of Transnationalism: Bosnians in Diaspora", *International Migration* 50(1), (2012), 162–178.

24 Halilovich, "Translocal Communities".

being there here".[25] After all, their *zavičaj*, or their *home back there*, no longer exists in the form they knew and remembered it, because *zavičaj* is not just a place—it is made out of people and social relationships; *zavičaj* is a familiarity and intimacy with both the physical environment, and the social and cultural setting.[26] The lost community and sense of belonging can be recreated only through the memories and stories that the former residents of *zavičaj* get involved in during the moments of relaxation among their former neighbours in the cities they live in today. These places, once making their *zavičaj*, are no longer located in the space *back there*, but in the *previous* time and in the space *here*.[27] Migrants, exiles, and other travellers are finding the new home in the routine, meetings with familiar people, in memories and stories of the times past, in the flavours and fragrances, or, as Leslie Van Gelder said, "people of diaspora do not root in place, but in each other".[28]

Several authors have dealt with the question of the importance of distance in translocal and transnational practices.[29] At first glance, distance is not unimportant, but it is not crucial. Bosnian migrants dispersed throughout Europe, America, and Australia remain thousands of miles away from their *zavičaj*. In the search for intimacy and security of the familiar, these migrant groups will become intensely immersed in the translocal and will strive to create and maintain social networks among former neighbours, regardless of their present place of residence and trips to the "old country". Therefore, the distance does not appear to be a decisive factor of translocality, especially in the era of digital telecommunication technologies such as the internet, mobile phones, and satellite television.[30]

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25 Hage, Ghassan "At home in the entrails of the West: Multiculturalism, 'Ethnic Food' and Migrant Home–building", in Helen Grace *et al.* (eds.), *Home/World: Community and Marginality in Sydney's West* (Annandale, 1997), 108.

26 Halilovich, "(Per)forming 'Translocal' Homes", 77.

27 Halilovich, *Places of Pain.*

28 Leslie van Gelder, *Weaving a Way Home: A personal Journey Exploring Place and Story* (Ann Arbor, 2008), 58.

29 See, for instance: Baldassar, Loretta. "Transnational Families and the Provision of Moral and Emotional Support: The Relationship Between Truth and Distance", 14 *Identities* (2007), 385–409; Portis-Winner, Irene. *Semiotics of Peasants in Transition: Slovene Villagers and Their Ethnic Relatives in America* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002); and Brickell, Katherine and Datta, Ayona. "Introduction: Translocal Geographies", in *Translocal Geographies: Spaces, Places, Connections,* edited by Katherine Brickell, and Ayona Datta, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 3–22.

30 Hariz Halilovich, "Bosnian Austrians: Accidental Migrants in Translocal and Cyber Spaces", *Journal of Refugee Studies* 26(4), (2013b): 524–540.

Finally, the translocality of the Bosnian diaspora can be realised as *bi*-locality; the relationship between two locations, and as *poly*-locality, the relationship between several locations. This difference is related to the forms of cross-border practices of these populations: separate family life, local endogamy and re-territorialisation.

6 Conclusion

While affirming the significance of the original places for many migrant populations, the concept of translocalism does not imply the essentialist, static view of the relationship between people, places, and identities. It does not suggest that the translocal diaspora communities are "fixed and unchanging" in their identities located in a previous time and place. Translocal practices rather demonstrate that the cultural place and embodied local identities transcend geographic space and chronological time, and that mobility and attachment to a place are not intrinsically contradictory but can be complementary processes.[31] They confirm the dynamism and fluidity of the complex relationships in which identity of place as a set of embodied practices transcends its original geographical location and becomes translocal or poly-local. In the new space of the diaspora, the migrants are *place-making*—in the sense that they adopt and appropriate it as a place of meaning and identity—through the *translocal process* that involves the intervention of other locations (of origin), networks, and activities from afar.[32] Since the sense of location in the context of migration is inevitably created and transformed within a translocal environment—which includes at least one *over here* and one *back there*—this process occurs not only in the areas of settlement, but also in the places of origin, during the visits and the return of the migrants.[33] Therefore, translocality covers a wide spectrum of practices and relationships in the articulation of distinctive (trans)local identities, both in the places of settlement and places of origin, revealing how these practices and relationships are reconstructed, adapted, and recreated in a mobile world on a daily basis.

The translocal practices and relationships, or migrants' social capital, can and do play a significant, yet widely unacknowledged role in the socio-economic

31 Halilovich, "Translocal Communities"; and Halilovich, *Places of Pain*.

32 Čapo and Halilovich, "La localisation du Transnationalisme".

33 Efendić, Adnan, Mickiewicz, Tomasz and Rebmann, Anna. *Diaspora and Development – Bosnia and Herzegovina* (Sarajevo: Ambasada Švicarske u Bosni i Hercegovini, 2014); and Karčić, Hamza. "One-way Ticket to Kuala Lumpur". Indonesia and the Malay World, 42(124), (2014): 400–417.

transformation and reconstruction processes in the local communities across Bosnia-Herzegovina, and have emerged as an important factor in fostering positive relationships between their country of residence/immigration and country of birth. More importantly, the reality of translocal life defies dichotomising home and exile, and displacement and emplacement, by redefining the concept of *zavičaj* and taking it from a fixed, local level to a more fluid, global level. Reconstruction of social networks and performative enactments of local identities continue to produce and reproduce the idea of *zavičaj* as an intimate and ultimate home, and in doing so defy the ethnic cleansing and genocide that sought to destroy it.

CHAPTER 9

Transnational Lives of Migrants from Bosnia-Herzegovina to Britain

Gayle Munro

1 Introduction

There are identified waves of migration from the different parts of the former Yugoslavia to Britain: migration driven by the catalysts of the First and Second World Wars and the more recent conflicts of the 1990s; the economic catalysts of labour migration, particularly during the 1960s and then later migration as a result of the social, economic and political conditions in parts of the region in the latter part of the last century and early 2000s. Despite Yugoslavia's position as a region of significant outward migration, there has been a dearth of literature on the experiences of migrants from the region, particularly to Britain.

The following chapter is based on doctoral research carried out on the diasporic and transnational practices of migrants from the former Yugoslavia to Britain.[1] The aim of the research was to explore the extent and ways in which migrants from the former Yugoslavia to Britain act or behave transnationally and to consider which variables may influence the presence or absence of any transnationalism. I used a twin approach of *diaspora* and *transnationalism* as theoretical lenses through which to analyse the activity, behaviour and expressed affiliation of migrants related to the country of origin as reported through interviews, survey, archival material and secondary sources.

The research project as a whole looked at the experiences of migrants from different parts of the former Yugoslavia, however this chapter will focus on the reported experiences of migrants from Bosnia-Herzegovina.[2] I begin with a brief discussion of the context of transnationalism and diaspora debates in the literature and an outline of the methods used, followed by a discussion of the different 'types' of transnational activity as reported by the research participants: namely economic and political and socio-cultural transnationalisms. I finish

1 The research on which this chapter is based was carried out 2008–2013 while the author was a doctoral candidate at University College London (Geography).

2 For a wider discussion of the experiences of those migrants from other parts of the region, see Gayle Munro, *Transnationalism, Diaspora and Migrants from the former Yugoslavia in Britain* (London and New York: Routledge, 2017).

 | DOI:10.1163/9789004394018_011

with a discussion of the articulations of loss triggered by the experience of migration and potential impact upon the transnational relationship.

2 Contextual Overview and Methods

The concept of transnationalism within the discourse around migration has developed mainly since the 1990s in the work of those who have sought a framework in which to site research findings highlighting significant cross-border connections between migrants in the new homeland and the country of origin. Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc outlined a definition of transnationalism and those who ascribe to the process:

> We define "transnationalism" as the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement. We call these processes transnationalism to emphasise that many immigrants today build social fields that cross geographic, cultural, and political borders. Immigrants who develop and maintain multiple relationships – familial, economic, social, organisational, religious and political – that span borders we call 'transmigrants.' An essential element of transnationalism is the multiplicity of involvements that transmigrants sustain in both home and host societies.[3]

Subsequent work by Portes and his colleagues attempted to 'turn the concept of transnationalism into a clearly defined and measurable object of research' through their definitions of conditions under which a migrant could be considered to be operating in a transnational sphere.[4] For those who advocate the Portes and colleagues' 'take' on transnationalism, it is the *sustained and regular contact across borders over time* which define a transnational activity as such. Such pre-requisites however lend themselves much more easily to the experiences of labour migrants (as highlighted by Al-Ali *et al.*, 2001) and would not be so easily applied to the lived experiences of those migrating with different motivations.[5] In developing an understanding of the experiences who may not

3 Basch, Linda, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc. *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects and the Deterritorialised Nation-States* (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1994), 7.

4 Alejandro Portes; Luis Guarnizo and Patricia Landolt, "The study of transnationalism: pitfalls and promises of an emergent research field," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22 no. 2 (1999): 218, DOI: 10.1080/014198799329468.

5 Nadje Al-Ali; Richard Black and Khalid Koser, "Refugees and transnationalism: the experience of Bosnians and Eritreans in Europe," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 27 no. 4 (2001): 615–634, DOI: 10.1080/13691830120090412.

have left their country of origin voluntarily then, others have applied a more nuanced conceptual lens.[6] In some cases, this has involved highlighting how some migrants may not be considered transnational according to the body of work developed by many scholars of the concept whilst simultaneously emphasising the complex and often intense nature of the relationship with the country of origin. Jansen, for example, in his study of Bosnian refugee men, labels those migrants as 'non-transnational' as they are not engaged in intense cross-border activity and whilst they may 'evoke and celebrate their place of origin with gusto [...] what they cherished was not a place that was still there but their place in a time-space context that had been wiped out.'[7] I would argue that employing certain prescriptive conditions to the transnational paradigm risks overlooking the experiences of those migrants who may not exhibit demonstrable measurable and regular activities which are economic in nature but who may still hold significant and complex ties to the homeland which are not captured by another paradigm of migration.[8]

3 Transnationalism and Diaspora: the 'Awkward Dance Partners'

Faist describes the concepts of diaspora and transnationalism as 'awkward dance partners.'[9] Scholars of migration have highlighted the waves and peaks in the number of studies on transnationalism as a way of illustrating the pattern of interest in the concept and subsequent debates as they developed during the course of the 1990s.[10] The table below shows the number of publications with the key words of 'transnational' and 'diaspora.'

The figures show a gradual increase in literature including the term 'transnational' as a keyword from about 1995 onwards with an apparent explosion of interest in the 2000s. At the time of writing, less than four years since the turn of the decade, there has already been over three times as many publications

6 Philip Jackson; Peter Crang and Claire Dwyer, *Transnational Spaces* (London: Routledge, 2004) and Nadje Al-Ali and Khalid Koser, eds, *New Approaches to Migration: transnational communities and the transformation of home* (London: Routledge, 2002).

7 Stef Jansen, "Misplaced masculinities: Status loss and the location of gendered subjectivities amongst 'non-transnational' Bosnian refugees," *Anthropological Theory* 8 no. 2 (2008): 182. DOI: 10.1177/1463499608090790.

8 For a more detailed discussion of the literature on transnationalism, see Munro (2015).

9 Thomas Faist, "Diaspora and transnationalism: what kind of dance partners?" in *Diaspora and Transnationalism: concepts, theories and methods*, eds, Rainer Bauböck and Thomas Faist (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010), 9.

10 Jorgen Carling, "The Transnational Theatre: conceptualisations of transnationalism in migration research" (paper presented at the Royal Geographical Society IBG Annual Conference, London, 1–3 September 2010).

FIGURE 1 Publications on transnationalism and diaspora[a]

Decade	Transnational	Diaspora
1950s	2	5
1960s	14	7
1970s	193	51
1980s	371	58
1990s	1,369	837
2000s	7,680	6,669
2010–2014	5,275	2,315

a A search was carried out in May 2014 using the keywords 'transnational' and 'diaspora' via the International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (ProQuest).

with the keyword 'transnational' as for the whole of the 1990s. The upsurge in interest could at least partly be explained by the increased flows of international migrants, the increased influence of globalised forces and the developments in ICT. As these factors are often referenced and highlighted in studies of transnationalism in particular, it would not be unreasonable to assume a correlation between global forces, increased interest in migration studies and the search for new ways to conceptualise both the escalation in flows and the intensity of trans-border ties. Both concepts are useful, I would argue, in providing frameworks in which to capture the non-linear state of migration as expressed by migrants from the former Yugoslavia, in that the trajectory of their journeys are not solely conceptualised as start and end points but encompass lives around the actual physical act of migration.

4 Methods and Challenges

The study employed a mixed-methods approach involving a survey of 179 migrants[11] from the former Yugoslavia resident in Britain; interviews with 46 individuals living in Britain at the time of the interview; discourse analysis of

11 I am using the word 'migrant' simply as a way of describing the condition of an individual who has moved from one place to another. The majority of those participants in the research from Bosnia-Herzegovina came to Britain fleeing the 1992–1995 war. Some individuals will a) have claimed asylum b) have never claimed asylum c) have made an original asylum claim which was not granted by the immigration authorities or d) after nearly 20 years no longer consider themselves to be 'refugees.' For that reason, I use the

archival material, media and parliamentary material, autobiographical contemporary fiction, material in cyberspace and ethnographic observation at events held (mainly in London) related to the former Yugoslavia. Recruitment strategies to engage potential participants were varied and attempted to avoid bias by including a mix of community group representatives and those not affiliated with any formal community group.[12]

One of the challenges in conducting research on migration based on the region is the lack of reliable data. The collection of quantitative data on migration in and out of the region of the former Yugoslavia has been politicised as the international community attempts to deny or minimise the apparent success of the deliberate 'ethnic cleansing' war aims of the nationalist instigators of the conflicts, with political leaders also manipulating demographic figures in an attempt to somehow 'prove' legitimacy in the ethno-nationalist struggle for localised power. The collection of migration data is a politicised area in any nation-state and we see prolific examples of that in Britain's immigration rhetoric. But migration statistics can play a particularly vital role in a geo-political region where ethno-nationalist conflicts and the ensuing attempts by international players to broker an accepted peace agreement led to the strategic manipulation of local demographic profiles and the establishment of micro, localised pockets of power. Halilovich has discussed, in the context of heated debates between Bosnian academics and Bosnian diaspora representatives around the subject of refugee return, how some elites within Bosnia-Herzegovina refuse to refer to those Bosnians who left as a result of the conflict in the 1990s as 'diaspora,' preferring instead to focus on the 'temporary' nature of their displacement, thereby avoiding any potential acknowledgement that the violence associated with the policies and practices of 'ethnic cleansing' may have resulted in the more permanent restructuring of Bosnian demography.[13]

Regional and international politics have also affected not just the reliability of the available quantitative data and studies on migration within and out of

word 'migrant' to describe someone who has been through the process of migration – be it forced, voluntary or on a continuum which has changed over time.

12 Respondents were mainly recruited through a snowball sampling technique, launched from a variety of 'sites' in an attempt to avoid sampling bias, including: targeted mailing of community organisations and wider refugee and migrant support groups; calls for participants via diaspora online discussion forums and hard-copy diaspora-targeted publications; flyer distribution at community centres, language centres, charity shops, libraries, newsagents and post offices; researcher attendance at community events; personal contacts.

13 Hariz Halilovich, "(Per)forming 'Trans-local' Homes: Bosnian Diaspora in Australia," in *The Bosnian Diaspora: Integration in Transnational Communities*, eds Marko Valenta and Sabrina Ramet (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), 63–82.

the region but may also have influenced some of the qualitative studies on migration from the region. In that sense, it is also interesting to explore the positionality of researchers involved in migration studies involving the former Yugoslav states. Public events related to events in the former Yugoslavia held in London – even 20+ years after the conflicts in the 1990s – can be heated with animated debates involving academics, journalists and migrants from the region, some of whom have professional positions related to or involving the former Yugoslavia. Pryke offers some reflections on how the positioning of the research participants themselves towards the recent history of the region impacts upon the research process itself and how it affected his interaction with his informants.[14] I would suggest that in much of the literature published within the post-conflict era related to the region, the author will have a certain stance or position on the events leading up to and during the conflicts which tends to 'flavour' the discussion, particularly in the context of the experience of migration (see Procter as an example).[15] Some migrants from the region who have left at different times have written about the experiences of their fellow compatriots within the diaspora and will have, as to be expected, a position of their own on the events in the region.

5 Migrants from the Former Yugoslavia in Britain

Those migrants from the former Yugoslavia who participated in my project arrived in Britain at different points over a period of 1953 to 2010. Originally from different parts of what constituted Yugoslavia, my research participants demonstrated multiple and complex motivations for moving to and then making their homes in Britain at different stages of the lifecycle and, depending on the period in which they made their journeys and the socio-political contexts in the country of origin and in Britain, would have different experiences along and throughout their 'stories' of migration.

The BBC in 2005 undertook a mapping exercise of immigration to Britain. Their 'Born Abroad' project was based on research conducted by the Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR) and Sheffield University's Social and Spatial Inequalities Research Group. The data is presented on the successor republics from the former Yugoslavia together as 'Ex-Yugoslavia' and is sourced from the

14 Sam Pryke, "'Some of our people can be the most difficult': reflections on difficult interviews," *Sociological Research Online* 9 no. 1 (2004): http://www.socresonline.org.uk/9/1/pryke.html.

15 Nicholas Procter, *Serbian Australians in the Shadow of the Balkan War* (Hants: Ashgate Publishing, 2000).

FIGURE 2 Census and Community figures

	Census 2011 country of birth	Figure cited at interview	Percentage difference
Bosnia-Herzegovina – Bosnians	7,595	10,000	24%
Croatia – Croats	8,199	10,000	22%
Kosovo – Kosovar Albanians	28,446	50,000	76%
Serbia – Serbs	8,161	80,000–100,000	880%
Slovenia – Slovenes	2,008	2,000–3,000	No difference

2001 Census. According to the results of the 2001 Census, residents in Britain (England, Scotland and Wales) from the former Yugoslavia represent the second largest percentage change in foreign-born residents between 1991 and 2001, after Albanians, with a percentage increase of +242.41 per cent.[16] Across the country as a whole, the percentage change over that time period varies by region with the largest percentage increases being in the North East (+ 524.07 per cent) and in London (+ 438.93 per cent).[17]

A review of the available quantitative data related to migration from the former Yugoslavia does not always correspond with the self-perceptions of community groups. During interviews with representatives from the different community groups, respondents were asked to share any data they may have on the numbers of residents in the UK from the region. All respondents stated that any figures they could provide would be 'guesstimates' only. The table below shows the figure cited by the community representative in the first column and the number of residents stating their country of birth in the most recent (2011) Census.[18]

16 BBC Born Abroad: an immigration map of Great Britain: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/born_abroad/countries/html/ex_yugoslavia.stm Last accessed 21 July 2014.

17 Such large percentage increases in these areas in particular are likely to be explained by a combination of the attraction of London as the capital city to new migrants, pre-existing communities (and therefore support networks) of migrants from the region at earlier times and the British government's dispersal policies of new asylum seekers to the north east of England.

18 Community group representatives from all groups, with the exception of Slovenians, reported higher figures than the 'official' Census number. In the case of Slovenians, the

The majority of participants in the research from Bosnia-Herzegovina arrived in Britain during the 1990s. Bosnians arriving in Britain during these years would have arrived as one of three main groups: those coming under the Government 1,000 project (a group of 1,000 refugees who formed part of the original agreement between the British government and the UNHCR to offer sanctuary to 1,000 individuals); medical evacuees; those making their way independently. Bosnia Project refugees were received into one of the reception centres set up to welcome those migrants on the programme before being offered local authority accommodation in one of the 'cluster areas' around the country.[19] This set the tone for the later policies around placing refugees under the Kosovo Humanitarian Evacuation Programme and wider government dispersal policies around asylum in general, ostensibly as a means of 'reducing the burden' on local services in and around London. This has also resulted in 'clusters' of Bosnian communities in parts of the country, including

accuracy may have been helped by Slovenian law which requires its diaspora to register with the Embassy. There are a number of possible explanations for the discrepancy between the figures. The most obvious one is that the community group interviewees were responding to the way the question was framed during interviews. Respondents were, in the main, quoting estimates they have for ethnicity, rather than nationality. The community representative estimate for Serbs for example would be referring to Serbs of all nations, not just the state of Serbia and would also include Serbs who were born in Britain but identify as Serb by ethnicity. The Census on the other hand is asking a much narrower question around country of birth. Some of the discrepancy could also be explained by response bias or the context in which the question is being asked. In completing a survey administered by a Serbian organisation, a respondent born in or with familial connections to Serbia is, we could assume, more likely to demonstrate that affiliation through his/her survey response. A Census response officiated by the British government may be more likely to attract a response demonstrating an affiliation with Britain or the respondent may be used to completing the ethnicity form, voluntarily completed when accessing so many public services in Britain, by ticking the 'White British' or 'White European' box. Some of the Serb organisations proactively tried to counter this with a campaign prior to the 2011 Census encouraging respondents from Serbia to identify as Serb by ethnicity. Statistics around 'country of birth' would usually be more straightforward than ethnicity. This is not actually the case with the territories of the former Yugoslavia which have undergone a series of continual boundary re-drawings and name changes. A resident of Kosovo, for example, which added to the geographical renaming of states has been involved in its own quest for independence, would have needed a new passport to be issued four times between 1992 and 2008 alone.

19 Vaughan Robinson and Caroline Coleman, "Lessons Learned? A Critical Review of the Government Program to Resettle Bosnian Quota Refugees in the United Kingdom," *International Migration Review* 34 no. 4 (2000): 1217–1244, DOI: 10.2307/2675980 and Lynette Kelly, "Programme, policies, people: the interaction between Bosnian refugees and British society," (PhD diss., University of Warwick, 2001).

Birmingham, Coventry and Derby. At the time, it was argued that because of the sheer weight of numbers, and presumably to appease potential negative public opinion around perceptions of waves of refugees arriving from Eastern Europe, the solution proposed was temporary protection as opposed to the more established route of claiming asylum. Observers have highlighted how the difference in treatment for those refugees arriving as part of established programme quotas and those arriving independently may have contributed to resentment and ill-feeling between the communities.[20] Kelly has documented the different experiences of those Bosnian refugees who were offered temporary protection via the Bosnia Project and those who arrived independently and may have claimed asylum via the more conventional route.[21] The impact of temporary protection policies offered to forced migrants upon the refugee experience in the host country and the associated feelings of disempowerment has been discussed within Europe[22] and wider context.[23] The experiences of those migrants surveyed and interviewed during the course of the research were extremely varied. It was certainly not always possible to categorise every individual migrant by a decision to migrate 'voluntarily' or not and the 'forced' vs 'voluntary' dichotomy was very much a false one when applied to this particular group. However, what was clear from listening to the different experiences of migration and the varied ways of negotiating through the maze of the British government's immigration system is that the enforced temporary nature of leave experienced by a large proportion of migrants from the region, not only those claiming asylum, resulted in significant levels of frustration, intense feelings of being 'in limbo' and the perception that years of their lives were being wasted whilst waiting for a decision on Home Office on immigration status.

Thus far, I have provided some of the context to migration from the region to Britain, the discussion now moves on to those transnational connections as reported by participants in the research.

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20 Alice Bloch, "Kosovan refugees in the UK: the Rolls Royce or rickshaw reception?" *Forced Migration Review* 5 (1999): 24–26.

21 Kelly, "Programme, policies, people," 2001.

22 Khalid Koser and Richard Black, "Limits to Harmonization: The 'Temporary Protection' of Refugees in the European Union," *International Migration* 37 no. 3 (1999): 521–543, DOI: 10.1111/1468-2435.00082 and Morten Kjaerum, "Temporary Protection in Europe in the 1990s," *International Journal of Refugee Law* 6 no. 3 (1994): 444–456, DOI: 10.1093/ijrl/6.3.444.

23 Peter Mares, *Borderline: Australia's treatment of refugees and asylum seekers* (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2001).

6 Economic and Political Transnationalisms

The survey and interview part of the research sought information from participants on their levels of economic and political engagement with the country of origin in terms of remittance sending, voting, ownership of property and holding of a bank account in the country of origin and participation in a petition or demonstration related to the country of origin.

The table below shows the data gathered from a survey of 179 respondents related to the activities as outlined above.

Concerning individual contribution to community-level economic transnationalism, the survey asked respondents whether they had contributed financially to a charity/club/society/organisation in the country of origin or in Britain related to the country of origin. Forty-three percent of total respondents answered positively to this question. The breakdown by country of origin is detailed in the table. Such donations however could be considered to be mainly 'one-off' in nature and as such, would not be considered to be transnational by any definition of economic transnationalism. It is therefore difficult to compare such figures with the data on transnational economic activity in the literature which focuses more on regular and sustained activity and demonstrates usually that such activity is rare.

Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Kosovo have all, at different times over the last ten years, featured in the World Bank's list of top-ten remittance-receiving countries globally. Regarding the most recently-available data however, contributions from the UK do not feature significantly amongst the more prolific remitters to the countries of the former Yugoslavia.[24] Respondents to the survey were asked whether they sent money to family or friends in the country of origin, just over half of respondents responded positively to this question with the majority of remitters being female.

Findings from my survey however showed that those respondents coming from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Slovenia were more likely to not remit than to remit with Slovenia demonstrating particularly low levels of remitting behaviour. Respondents from Croatia, Serbia and Yugoslavia were more likely to remit than to not remit. The majority of respondents in my research stated that their remitting was 'occasional' in nature and usually given in cash in person – either on personal visits to the country of origin or via returning family members/friends; just over half of those who remit reported doing so by

24 World Bank Bilateral Remittance Matrix 2012: http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:22759429~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html Last accessed 21 July 2014.

FIGURE 3 Economic and political transnational activity by country of origin

Country of origin	Contributed to charity in or related to country of origin (% of respondents)	Remitter to friends or family	Participated in election in country of origin	Participated in petition or demonstration related to country of origin	Holds bank account in country of origin	Owns property in country of origin
Bosnia-Herzegovina (total n=29)	36%	43%	7%	35%	14%	14%
Croatia (total n=40)	27%	60%	32%	0	50%	32%
Kosovo (total n=13)	75%	38%	16%	50%	50%	13%
Serbia (total n=44)	48%	60%	64%	36%	40%	48%
Slovenia (total n=12)	14%	29%	43%	0	71%	14%
Yugoslavia (total n=41)	60%	70%	44%	35%	45%	35%

way of payments in cash. Twelve percent of remitting respondents referred to making bank transfers and ten percent stated that they send money via Western Union. One Bosnian community representative in Birmingham estimated that as many as forty percent of their members maintain economic links with Bosnia-Herzegovina in the form of either property ownership or remitting, which is a high estimate compared with the findings of my survey, possibly reflecting the local community dynamics in Birmingham[25]

Observers have highlighted that acts such as maintaining a bank account and property ownership in the country of origin can be indicators of an intention to return at some point, a mark of the impermanency of the migration choice.[26] I found this to be the case to some extent with my respondents; for

25 Interview with community representative, 2010.

26 Richard Browne and Bernard Poirine, "A Model of Migrants' Remittances with Human Capital Investment and Intrafamilial Transfers," *International Migration Review* 39 no. 2 (2005): 407–438, DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-7379.2005.tb00272.x.

example only ten percent of those who reported keeping a bank account in the country of origin and fifteen percent of those who owned property in the country of origin had made an asylum claim whilst in Britain.

Those respondents who had claimed asylum were significantly less likely to indicate that they wished to return permanently to their country of origin in the future. Very few Bosnian respondents responded positively to having a bank account in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which again corresponds to migration status. Higher proportions of Slovenians and Croatians had maintained a bank account and in the case of Croatians, even those who indicated that they had no intention of returning permanently to Croatia had kept a bank account. This may be explained by the frequency of travel to Croatia to visit friends/families and on holiday, keeping a bank account thereby facilitating ease of access to funds whilst in the country.

Regarding property ownership, respondents from Serbia were more likely than others to report having a property in the country of origin, very few respondents from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Slovenia kept a property, again possibly reflecting intentions to return or in the case of respondents from Slovenia, the relatively young age of the participants (being mainly students in Britain). In the case of respondents from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo the majority of those respondents fled their home countries as a result of conflict, claiming asylum in Britain and arguably those who intend to return would already have done so.

In terms of community-level economic transnational engagement, some of the work of Bosnian community groups in particular appears to be focused on the needs of their resident members in the UK. Appeals for charitable assistance for instance from some of the community groups in Britain appear to be less transnational in nature in that instead of a focus on societal needs in the country of origin, the focus is on the needs of members of their community resident in Britain. During the period when I was carrying out fieldwork, there were numerous examples of short-term monetary appeals launched to raise money to assist individuals or families, usually those fleeing the conflicts, resident in the UK. Appeals were launched to raise money for funerals for example or, in some cases, to pay for specialist treatment for those suffering with ill-health which may involve travel. In some cases, campaigns were launched to raise awareness of the plight of families and loved ones left behind, usually focussed around named individuals, with the aim of persuading the authorities to issue a visa which would mean those concerned could travel to Britain. One possible explanation for the apparent lack of economic transnational activity on the community level on the part of those groups which were established in Britain to serve the needs of those fleeing armed conflicts and the aftermath

is that the founding members of such groups were often newly arrived in the country themselves. There was no established community into which the new arrivals would have been welcomed; no existing infrastructure of community support; little history of diasporic links between Britain and the country of origin built up over time as would have been the case with Serb community groups, for instance. The founders of the first community groups established in Britain in the 1990s to assist newly-arrived refugees would, in the main, have been recently going through the same process as those individuals and families who the groups had been set up to assist.

The Bosnian and Herzegovina Network (BH Network) for example is an umbrella organisation of Bosnian community organisations across the UK, which, at the time of my interview with the Birmingham local offices, also had branches in Guildford, Coventry and Derby. The BH Network appeared to be well-networked with Bosnians in different parts of Britain and also demonstrated extensive links with the Bosnian diaspora in countries other than Britain. It appears from interviews with their representatives, from their promotional material and associated literature that the principal targets of their work, in terms of their outreach services, are Bosnian migrants in their local areas in need of assistance. They do not appear to have the patronage of any members of the British elite, their board members are all Bosnians and much of their published material is in Bosnian with no available English translation. In that sense they would appear to be relatively 'inward-looking' in that both their membership and focus of activity are on their ethnic kin. Responding to immediate need as Bosnians sought refuge in Britain in the 1990s, their focus appears to be on practical concerns (and later cultural concerns) as opposed to any overt political aims.

Respondents were asked to rate the importance, in their opinion, of maintaining links of an economic nature with the country of origin. The responses show that the most common response in total, across all countries of origin and both genders was that maintaining economic links was 'neither important nor unimportant.' Respondents from Bosnia-Herzegovina however seem to be particularly indifferent to the importance of economic links, possibly reflecting the perceptions of the country of origin as an international protectorate, the entity structure, perceived levels of corruption, the dispersed nature of migrants fleeing the conflict or a combination of several of these factors.

The perception of corruption in the country of origin was a theme which ran through a number of interviews with respondents of all ethnicities. Pervasive corruption was credited by several interviewees for their lack of interest in political or economic events 'back home.' A 'what's the point'

attitude was particularly prevalent in younger respondents from Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. One survey respondent, a 34-year old Bosnian Croat illustrated her feelings of disillusionment with what she perceives to be the situation in her country of origin:

> I'd like to add that my lack of interest in any economic or political aspects of my country of origin are perhaps related to the fact that following the war my country as I knew it, in my opinion doesn't exist any longer and I feel that all this post-war Bosnian context has got nothing to do with me. After living in the UK for 17 years I do not see how I could be interested in politics and economy of a country that is plagued with corruption and lack of democracy.
>
> *Survey respondent, Bosnian Croat, age 36*

> I have no interest whatsoever in the politics/economics of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I have given up as don't believe in anything there other than family. Politicians are sucking out the life of everything in Bosnia – everything is so temporary.
>
> *Survey respondent, Bosnian, female, age 32*

In survey responses, approximately three-quarters of participants stated that they have the right to participate in elections in their country of origin with just under 20 percent stating that they do not know whether they have the right to participate or not. Kosovar Albanians and Bosnians were the most likely to respond that they did not know about their voting participation rights, with half all Kosovars and Bosnians responding in this way, very few Serbian nationals were not aware of their right to vote.

Approximately half of those who stated that they had the right to vote chose to exercise that right and have participated in an election in their country of origin since being in Britain. In terms of country of origin, respondents from Serbia and Slovenia were the most likely to state that they had voted in an election. Greater involvement by Serbs in elections in Serbia could potentially be at least in part attributed to activity by the Serbian Ministry for Diaspora which actively encourages diaspora voting. Lower levels of voting were expressed by Kosovars and Bosnians. It is interesting to note that women had much higher levels of voter participation, with two-thirds stating that they had exercised their right to vote. Immigration status is also a significant factor here – of those who said that they had voted in one or more election, no respondents had also made a claim for asylum in Britain.

During the course of my research it appeared that the Serb community groups in Britain were significantly more politically active and better politically networked than any of the other diasporic groups, something which has not gone unnoticed by other community representatives and indeed by even those migrants who are not active members of any formal community group. One Bosnian community representative stated:

> In comparison with other more-established communities, Serbs for example, we just don't have the infrastructure for such sophisticated lobbying. Serbs have connections with politicians, businesses, some really powerful people. We arrived with bags of dirty laundry and had to start from scratch.
>
> *Interview with Bosnian community representative*

A Croat community representative also commented:

> There is a very very strong Serb lobby here, very established with money for an office. We have nothing like that, Croats here are mainly students who couldn't get a visa for the US.
>
> *Interview with Croatian community representative*

One Bosnian migrant explained her position on the way that the different communities have organised themselves:

> Bosnians, we have just not got ourselves organised in the same way as the Serbs have. We haven't been starting from the same page have we? They've had all their groups here for years, all those coming after the Second World War running away from the Partisans, they've all been busy here sorting out their networks. It's been endemic, I would say. But I do think it's starting to get a more balanced these days.
>
> *Bosnian interviewee, female, age 38*

Community groups from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in particular would appear to be more concerned with addressing immediate physiological needs of their members and are, as time passes since the conflicts of the 1990s, moving towards wider areas of activity. Serb communities however, by virtue of having been resident in Britain over a longer period of time exhibit collective behaviour which would be more consistent with issues around group self-esteem and image. Such collective behaviour can be seen in the intensive lobbying of British parliamentarians on the part of Serb community groups which

can be seen to have two primary aims. The first is 'correcting' what they perceive to be popular misrepresentation of Serbs and Serbia as the guilty party in the conflicts within the former Yugoslavia and the second would be a more nebulous attempt at re-establishing what could be termed a 'damaged diplomatic friendship' between Britain and Serbia.[27]

7 Socio-cultural Transnationalisms

Wilding highlights how conceptualisations of 'culture' as associated with 'place' and 'group identity' are becoming increasingly challenged:

> In the past, "culture" has tended to have very strong associations with "place," as in the traditional anthropological focus on the 'culture' of a particular national, regional or village group. Yet, it has been recognized for some time that such notions of culture fail to properly represent the internal diversity and cross-cultural similarities that characterize contemporary symbolic worlds or practices.[28]

Transnational cultural spaces are characterised by such diversity and cross-cultural symbolism where the collision of influences and perspectives from different environments can lead to the kind of hybrid consciousness as observed by Hannerz.[29]

Itzigsohn and Saucedo have conceptualised the desire of migrants to participate in transnational practices but without necessarily having the financial or

27 Diplomatic ties between British and Serbian parliamentary elites and members of their respective royal families date back to pre-WW1. The longer history of migration from Serbia to Britain and the longevity of the existence of Serb community groups in Britain compared to other communities from the former Yugoslavia, combined with the historic respect afforded to Serbia by British parliamentarians may have contributed to an even greater collective hurt felt by those Serb communities in Britain when that hand of friendship seemed to be withdrawn towards the end of the conflict on Bosnian territory and then later in Kosovo. One way of interpreting the extensive political lobbying on the part of Serbs in Britain would be an attempt to re-establish old British-Serbian friendships.

28 Raelene Wilding, "Mediating culture in transnational spaces: An example of young people from refugee backgrounds," *Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies* 26 no. 3 (2012): 508, DOI: 10.1080/10304312.2012.665843.

29 Hannerz, Ulf. First published in Portugese as "Fluxos, fronteiras, hibridos: palavras-chave da antropologia transnacional," Mana (Rio de Janeiro), 3 no. 1: 7–39, 1997, "Flows, Boundaries and Hybrids: Keywords in Transnational Anthropology," Working Paper Series for the ESRC Transnational Communities Programme, WPTC – 2K – 02, University of Oxford, 1997.

temporal means to fulfil that desire as 'resource dependent transnationalism';[30] Al-Ali, Black and Koser describes this as *capacity* versus *desire*.[31] This kind of transnationalism could potentially apply across migrants regardless of their motivations for moving to a different country but we could reasonably assume 'resource dependent transnationalism' to perhaps be more applicable for those whose departure was unplanned, unexpected and not entirely voluntary at least during the early stages of their migration experience. It is interesting however to consider the resource dependent transnational argument in the light of not only financial capacity but also in a wider context of emotional resilience and the ability to cope with and respond to a situation which may be unexpected, unsolicited and unwelcome. A migrant who is moving with clear goals, expectations and plans for the future is likely to be operating within a different transnational space than an individual who has found him/herself in an alien environment possibly not understanding the language, without a means of supporting him/herself and any family members and where the migration experience may never have featured in any life plan. Some may react to such a status by actively choosing to take solace in the comfort of the familiar and surround themselves with reminders of 'home.' Others may, in response to any trauma experienced, decide to reject such symbolic reminders and experience pain with such association. These positions are of course not static and are likely to change over time as the status of the individual adapts and transforms, as the lifecycle progresses and as circumstances change in the country of origin. Emotional resources can therefore be equally as important in determining the transnational relationship as financial capacity. This can be illustrative of the ways in which some migrants have drawn on cultural and creative production as a means of both articulating their transnationalism and also as a way of coping and coming to terms with their status as a migrant and all that has contributed to that status.

In terms of the reporting of frequency of visits to the country of origin, those respondents from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo were less likely to report regular contact with their 'home' country. This could be attributed to a number of potential reasons: the circumstances in which they left the 'homeland'; the lack of a physical home to return to; the scattering of families across other

30 José Itzigsohn and Giorguli Saucedo, "Immigrant Incorporation and Sociocultural Transnationalism," *International Migration Review* 36 no. 3 (2002): 766–798, DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-7379.2002.tb00104.x.

31 Nadje Al-Ali; Richard Black and Khalid Koser, "Refugees and transnationalism: the experience of Bosnians and Eritreans in Europe," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 27 no. 4 (2001): 615–634. DOI: 10.1080/13691830120090412.

third countries and/or the reluctance to return to home areas which may have changed dramatically.

The length of time reported by some respondents in waiting for a decision on their immigration status could also be a potentially significant factor in the visits to the country of origin. For those who did not come with a work or study-related visa, there was an average of a seven year wait from the Home Office for a decision on applications for immigration status. The longest length of time spent waiting was thirteen years. For many this would have made travelling abroad difficult or impossible. Al-Ali, Koser and Kelly have also highlighted the reluctance and apprehension of those waiting for decisions on their immigration status to take any action which may result in a possible loss of that expected status.[32] Walsh, Black and Koser have discussed, despite the introduction of 'look-and-see' programmes for Bosnian refugees who were considering returning to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the hesitancy on the part of some to take up the offer, fearing that it would impact upon the Home Office's decision on their asylum claim.[33] Literature on transnational ties of refugees often focuses (understandably) on the impact that trauma may have had on any possible motivation for a migrant forced to flee their homeland to maintain a relationship with that home, but the practical reality of what day-to-day life might look like for a newly-arrived refugee, at least, in the beginning, is sometimes absent from the debate on transnationalism.

Despite the relatively-recent rise in cheaper ICT, at the time when the majority of those migrants from the former Yugoslavia resident in Britain today were arriving, use of the mobile phone was not as widespread as it is today. Digital mobile phone communication was introduced in Britain in 1992 with a 'tipping point' of mobile-phone usage being identified as around 1999.[34] This would have meant that the early-mid 1990s was not a time when mobile phones would have been in common use. Similarly, in 1998, fewer than 10 percent of households in the UK had access to the Internet at home.[35] Any such recent ICT-assisted transnational activity as evidenced by Bernal or Panagokas & Horst (2006) would not therefore have been a feature in the migration

32 Nadje Al-Ali and Khalid Koser, eds. *New Approaches to Migration: transnational communities and the transformation of home* (London: Routledge, 2002). Kelly, "Programme, policies, people," 2001.

33 Martin Walsh; Richard Black and Khalid Koser, "Repatriation from the European Union to Bosnia-Herzegovina: the Role of Information," in *The End of the Refugee Cycle?: Refugee Repatriation and Reconstruction*, eds Richard Black and Khalid Koser (Oxford: Berghahn, 1999).

34 http://www.mobilephonehistory.co.uk/history/mobile_phone_history.php Last accessed 01 June 2014.

35 http://www.internetworldstats.com/eu/uk.htm Last accessed 01 June 2014.

experience of the majority of those coming from the former Yugoslavia to Britain in the 1990s.[36] And for some, life on a day-to-day basis in the first months or years of their arrival was about addressing rather more fundamental levels of need, as illustrated by the following extracts from interviews:

> I left everything behind and I mean everything. I have some photos and that's about it. There's not much you can really fit into a small rucksack, that's all I brought with me and then my parents had to leave as well so they lost everything too. It doesn't matter, it's only stuff. I didn't really need any of it, but that's not the point is it? Am just trying not to feel bitter about it because I don't want the rest of my life and my children to be affected by it all as well. It was hard when we first came here, really really hard. I don't think I ate any fruit for two years or something. Thank fuck for the beans wars, do you remember those? When you used to be able to buy a tin of beans for 6p or something. Yeah, I remember those days well. And you know those shelves in the supermarkets where you can buy stuff that's about to be chucked in the rubbish. Yep, that as well. Good old Britain though – you could always get cheap alcohol.
>
> *Bosnian interviewee, male, age 38*

> I never had any money, nothing left after food. My clothes came from a charity and definitely no money for phone calls. So, I used to ring home and you know, in those days, in the phone boxes, you could call the number and there would always be a second or two after the other person answers before you put the money in. The other person can't hear you but you can hear them, so I used to ring my mum and she would answer, I would hear her voice for a second and then the phone would go dead. I couldn't talk to her but she always knew it was me and that way she knew I was ok and I got to hear her voice even for just a split second.
>
> *Bosnian interviewee, male, age 41*

We can see through the narratives of those who arrived with next to nothing and were forced to leave the majority of their material possessions behind how the 'capacity versus desire' or 'resource-dependent' dynamic of the

36 Victoria Bernal, "Diaspora, cyberspace and political imagination: the Eritrean diaspora online," *Global Networks* 6 no. 2 (2006): 161–179, DOI: 10.1111/j.1471-0374.2006.00139.x. Anastasia N. Panagakos and Heather A. Horst, "Return to Cyberia: technology and the social worlds of transnational migrants," *Global Networks* 6 no. 2 (2006): 109–124. DOI: 10.1111/j.1471-0374.2006.00136.x.

transnational paradigm as discussed earlier can have very real implications for the carrying out of transnational activity. If the choice is between enough to eat or a phone call home, then it is the baser need which is more likely to be addressed first. In these cases, the transnational social field is determined not so much by choice but by pragmatism. I maintain that in some of the literature on the refugee experience, academics have been so keen to counteract essentialist depictions of forced migrants as benefit-dependent, vulnerable and needy 'parasites' on the state, that an emphasis on the agency and empowerment of those seeking asylum has conversely led to an oversight of the difficult circumstances in which those who found themselves in the position of seeking asylum in Britain may have found themselves.

The British government's policy of dispersal of asylum seekers had a very real impact upon the lived experiences of those coming to Britain from Bosnia-Herzegovina and later from Kosovo.[37] Gibney has pointed out that in some areas of Britain, their first experience of those seeking asylum would have been through arrivals from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in the 1990s.[38] Gibney was referring to the local populations of those areas but the same could be said of the local authorities and voluntary sector support networks which at that time may not have been experienced in dealing with the needs of newcomers arriving in numbers to the area. Unlike in London, where it is possible for someone who is struggling to afford to eat to ping pong from one charity-led drop-in service to another (should they want to), other parts of the country would not have had similar support networks in place. It is also debatable (and this includes those migrants coming to London) to what extent those arriving in circumstances where their departure from the homeland may have been hurried and whose English language skills may not be sufficiently well-developed, could be expected to gain a full picture of any support available to them, especially in the immediate aftermath following arrival. This is where the existence of an already-established infrastructure of co-ethnic community support can help to engender transnational ties, through the provision of assistance helping to lighten the practical burden on new migrants which in turn 'frees up' some emotional space to dedicate to considering not just the immediate concerns of practical need.

Another tangible way in which governmental dispersal policies could be considered to have had a very real impact upon the diasporic dynamic has been

37 Bloch, "Kosovan refugees in the UK," 1999 highlights how the dispersal policies failed to discourage secondary migration to London.

38 Matthew Gibney, "Kosovo and beyond: popular and unpopular refugees," *Forced Migration Review* 5 (1999): 28–30.

in the enforced lack of agency in the formation of any potential grass-roots response to the experience of having been forced out of the home. Halilovich[39] has documented how Bosnians have reproduced diasporic *zavičaj* across the globe which could be considered an act of defiance against the genocidal aims of 'ethnic cleansing' thereby leading to his conceptualisation of such Bosnian diasporic sites as being trans*local* as opposed to trans*national* in nature.[40] In the engineering of asylum dispersal areas then and in the effective denial of forced migrants to self-select in terms of geographical resettlement and community formation, the diasporic dynamic is essentially shaped by governmental policy.

In areas across the UK where communities from the former Yugoslavia have settled, we can see multiple examples of cultural spaces designed to replicate a 'home from home,' representing in some cases physical or metaphorical spaces which have been destroyed or sites now inaccessible. One Bosnian organisation for example has fund-raised to build a *bosanska sećija* onsite along with an exhibition space and a well-stocked supply of Bosnian smoked meats and cheeses. The association of some such spaces with an ethno-national religion can mean, for some, that these spaces represent familiar but not always welcome connotations, depending on the individual's position on religion.

Other, more metaphorical examples of cultural articulation can be seen in the ways in which migrants appropriate the shared experience of language and music as a marker of identity. One Bosnian migrant to London who, together with his mother, performs *sevdalinke*, traditional Bosnian songs, described how he sees such performances as an antidote to the practice of cultural genocide against Bosnians and as a response to the mass-media espousal of 'turbo-folk.'[41]

> I used to sing in Bosnia too, I had the privilege once of singing at an event in 1993 in front of Radovan Karadžić, Ratko Mladić, Biljana Plavšić and Momčilo Krajšnik. If only I had had a bomb then, I could have saved thousands of lives. We had to leave in the end, they came to our house and told us we had 24 hours to get out. Our culture over years was being destroyed to the point of extinction, a kind of cultural genocide. It's not just about the music, it's about the whole cultural landscape, I have been working

39 Hariz Halilovich, "Trans-Local Communities in the Age of Transnationalism," *International Migration* 50 no. 1 (2012): 162–178. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2435.2011.00721.x.

40 Hariz Halilovich, *Places of Pain. Forced Displacement, Popular Memory and Trans-local Identities in Bosnian War-Torn Communities* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2013), 231.

41 See Catherine Baker, "The Politics of Performance: Transnationalism and its Limits in Former Yugoslav Popular Music, 1999–2004," *Ethnopolitics* 5 no. 3 (2006): 275–293. DOI: 10.1080/17449050600911075.

> with researchers to see how best to go about translating the material into English so that's accessible to more people. We need to not be ashamed of it, I am saying, this is mine, this is my culture and I am proud of it.
>
> *Bosnian interviewee, male, age 38*

Many of the communities have also made concerted efforts to protect their heritage through the formalisation of language teaching to the younger generation. Often held on a Saturday morning, these schools are focussed sites of diasporic engagement and form social spaces for the accompanying adults as well as places of language learning for their children. However, one interviewee, whose partner was expecting a baby at the time of the research, expressed his ambivalent feelings around language acquisition for his future child:

> Am not sure to be honest if I am going to speak with him or her in Bosnian. I haven't worked out yet how I feel about all that. It might be best they don't get tainted, you know? This is an opportunity for a fresh start for me.
>
> *Bosnian interviewee, male, age 37*

The citation above illustrates clearly the complex nature of the relationship between language and identity, reinforcing how choices made around language use, teaching and acquisition can form both bridges and barriers in the acceptance or rejection of heritage.

8 The Articulation of Loss

The discussion thus far has focussed around how transnational affiliations and expressions of being and belonging have been articulated in terms of more or less measurable terms and concrete, tangible manifestations of transnational connections. However, throughout the research process, less tangible, less definable articulations of the presence or absence of transnational connections were threaded through the narratives of those who engaged with the project. By far the clearest articulation by those participants from Bosnia-Herzegovina related to the country of origin was around the expression of 'loss': loss of the homeland, loss of the 'original' family dynamic and the loss of opportunity brought about by the experience of forced migration itself.

One of those refugees who came in the 'Government 1,000' group (forming an original quota of 1,000 Bosnian refugees agreed between the British

government and the UNHCR) highlighted the conditions under which he and his fellow '1,000' members were offered assistance:

> I had to sign to say that I would leave everything behind and that I wouldn't be coming back. I gave up the flat and everything. That was bad enough but then to be put into a situation of "temporary protection," I had nothing to go back to, they made me give all that up but didn't really offer any alternative.
>
> *Bosnian interviewee, male, age 55*

The situation alluded to by the interviewee above illustrates the extreme degree of uncertainty which enveloped and characterised the migration experience for some who, being made to feel as though they had little choice but to essentially surrender their homes, were then offered ambiguity and impermanence as a substitution. Certainly many respondents made reference to periods of limbo and uncertainty but it would be difficult to imagine a more intensely unsettling experience of migration than the realisation that the 'refuge' you are being offered from atrocities threatened against you and your family for being of a different ethnicity may not be a long-term possibility and at the same time the option of return to the life you have been made to leave behind is a physical (not to mention emotional) impossibility. Bosnian migrant Iva who came to London from just outside Sarajevo in 1993 as a 20-year old reflected on the shattering experience of leaving her life behind, starting again and thoughts of return.

> I can't tell you what that did to me in terms of confidence, totally destroying confidence I mean. I was just about to go to university, I had a boyfriend and then it was like I was basically being told, "no, that's not for you, that life. You don't deserve to have such a life, you don't deserve to have any life actually because you are nothing and nobody." I had to leave, my neighbour's daughter was raped, my mother was beside herself. So, we gave it all up and came to England and then it didn't end. First of all, people didn't even believe us. I had to explain it over and over again, it was like some kind of living nightmare and then when I was asleep the real nightmares would happen. So, yes, it was hell for 24 hours. I found out later that he had been killed – my boyfriend. I often wonder what would have happened if we had just been left alone to live our lives in peace. All those families which would have grown. But that's of course what they wanted, yes, to destroy all that. So much hatred. That's one of the things I take pride in

> now actually. I can say, "look at me, all that shit that happened to me" and yes, I have my dark days but I am not filled with hate. They didn't do that to me. That doesn't mean I will ever go back not properly.
>
> *Bosnian interviewee, female, age 43*

During his interview, Bosnian Faris asked to take a break following the part where he discussed his feelings towards the institution that was responsible for making a decision on his asylum claim:

> The Home Office. I have had dreams about that place. In my dreams they are all dressed in white jackets with clipboards and those little hats that chefs wear cackling and just flinging files about at random. And they wear those plastic goggles like chemists wear. The Home Office. What can I say? People talk about corruption in the Balkans. Well, the only explanation I can give for the total and complete inconsistency, illogicality and just general mess that seems to be all around the people making the decisions about asylum cases is somebody is paying them. And I don't just mean their salaries. Otherwise, how else do you explain how someone from the same village with practically the same background, they came the same way, arrived in the same week and one got asylum and one didn't. And it took seven fucking years for the geniuses to come up with that decision! Seven years!
>
> *Bosnian interviewee, male, age 44*

During the course of many hours of interviews and details being shared about emotional and traumatic experiences in the home country, the only point at which an interviewee expressed that they felt upset enough to take a break was in discussing his experience of the British migration system and, in particular, the effect that the Home Office as an institution has had on him. The following extract echoes similar feelings:

> I got my documents only after the amnesty. But it was a long wait. You wait for your post every day and nothing is coming. You wait every day, none, nothing is there. And then finally I got them, there. But it was a long wait. We are talking years and we are talking nerves. My nerves were worn out with these documents. And so, I am happy again, at least in the end, I am alive and I live to have them finally. I was close to believe that I would die before I got them.[42]

42 Interview recorded for the Evelyn Oldfield Unit Refugee Communities History Project and archived at the Museum of London.

Narratives of temporariness and the retellings of the effects of impermanency run through the voices of those who have made their homes in Britain at different times and who evidence multiple motivations for migration. At times, the strength of those voices articulating such insecurity evoke the imagery of shifting sands against which those experiencing such limbo are static and struggle to make progress whilst others around them move on relatively unimpeded. The consequences of such shifting sands for the migrant's relationship with both the homeland and the new possibly temporary home can be significant, the individual may not feel as though he/she has the sufficient status to challenge any of the status quo in the new environment whilst being made to feel as though return to the country of origin – even if undesired – may be imminent. Guarnizo argues that 'transnational living foregrounds migrants' agency' but I would suggest that would be a very optimistic view of entrepreneurial economically-empowered transnational migrants operating with the security of satisfactory immigration status.[43] Development of a transnational space against the shifting sands of a search for legitimacy can be an unhappy place, fraught with negativity, impotence and marked by an absence of empowerment. Within such a shifting sand analogy the ways in which migrants choose to conceptualise their own experience and specifically their migration status has implications for the formation and articulation of any transnational relationship.

In terms of their 'migration-related identity,' some respondents identified more strongly with the identity of 'exile' over 'refugee,' particularly in the way in which the condition of exile is closely associated with loss.[44] Respondents articulated their sense of loss as related to many aspects of their lives, specifically around the loss of opportunity, the loss of the life they would have enjoyed had their education, career, training not been (in some cases forcibly) interrupted. However, by far the strongest narratives of loss related not to the abstract of the 'homeland' but to the often painful expressions of damage that the act of migration had effected on the family dynamic:

> 'No more family as we knew family. No more Sundays with all the cousins running around. No more meeting my mum from work. No more walks with my sister and all the neighbour kids. No more Vrbas. No more coffee. You know what I mean by coffee, yes? Not exactly like here is it?' [interview was taking place in Starbucks].
>
> *Bosnian interviewee, female, age 38*

43 Luis Guarnizo, "The Economics of Transnational Living," *International Migration Review* 37 no. 3 (2003): 666–699, DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-7379.2003.tb00154.x.

44 Edward Said, *Reflections on Exile and other Literary and Cultural Essays* (London: Granta, 2000).

> I can't bear it actually, I refuse to allow myself to think about how my life would be now if it wasn't for the fucking war. Don't get me wrong, I am not saying it would be better. But it would be more me. More us. Less of trying to be a 'pig in Teheran.' Less of hearing about cousin so-and-so and their new baby who we are never going to meet in our lifetime.
>
> *Bosnian Croat interviewee, female, age 41*

The narratives of older women in particular were full of references to fractures in the familial dynamic. Expressions of grief over the loss of family members or enforced changes in family relationships were particularly strongly heard via the narratives of older female participants, echoing the 'loss' allegory, characteristic of the 'exile' migration discourse.

9 Conclusion

Of the reported experiences of migrants from the former Yugoslavia in Britain, it is the experiences of migrants from Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular which contribute to a call for the field of transnationalism to encompass a broader lens than 'just' quantifiable economic and political activity. Whilst the literature to date has focussed on relatively prescriptive cross-border activity, the voices of those who as part of their experience of migration have been navigating the complexity of the British immigration system are currently missing from the debate. Those whose experience of migration does not involve multiple return visits to the country of origin for example would be assessed as 'non-transnational' migrants by some scholars. And yet, that so-called non-transnational migrant's relationship with his/her homeland may be no less intense than one who makes frequent visits 'home.'

The lives of many Bosnian migrants in the UK, whilst perhaps not being as economically and politically active in the country of origin as some of their former compatriots from other former Yugoslav territories, are even more intensely intertwined with their previous lives: lives which were knocked off trajectories, leading to many still living with the physical loss of members of friends and family, the loss of the 'home' and the less tangible loss of family dynamics, of opportunities and of imagined life-paths.

Such loss is articulated by migrants in the ways in which they have developed physical and metaphorical spaces as a means of both welcoming those with whom they share the diasporic experience and as a way of asserting a common cultural identity within a new and different environment. Such spaces can either attract or repel others depending on a whole host of factors such

as the experience of migration itself, the dynamic with other members of the diaspora and the position of the migrant on the life course.[45]

Whilst recognising that a clear demarcation between a 'forced' and 'voluntary' migrant is usually neither possible nor welcome, the experiences of migrants from Bosnia-Herzegovina in Britain would suggest that the field of transnationalism would benefit from the development of a more nuanced approach to what could be considered 'transnational lives.' Such an approach could then encompass not only the experiences of the economically and politically active 'labour migrant' but could also hear the voices of those for whom the question of physical return to the country of origin may be complex but who are nevertheless no less intensely transnational in their identity.

45 See Munro (2017) for a conceptualisation of such spaces as 'cultural beacons.'

CHAPTER 10

Life Practices and the "Intergenerational Twist": Re-visiting Identity among Muslim Communities in Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad

Jana Jevtić and Maja Savić-Bojanić

1 Introduction

The present chapter pushes the discussion on transnationalism and translocalism further by looking at local adaptations of the global Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign in Tower Hamlets (London) and Stari Grad (Sarajevo). BDS is a grassroots campaign springing from Palestine itself and an international movement in which all can take part and show solidarity with the Palestinian people regardless of their location. Since its launch in July 2005, support for BDS has been increasing throughout the world.

In a rich plethora of boycott initiatives that have sprung up in London since 2005, some of the most creative calls come from Tower Hamlets and its Bengali Muslim commune, e.g., "Check the Label" and "Not in my Fridge". We do not wish to arbitrate high grades in virtue but rather to imply that especially following the 2008 global financial crisis new alliances have formed between previously separated actors that were working locally on a number of ad-hoc "identity" and "lifestyle" agendas. Whatever the term "neoliberal globalization" signifies, it now represents a common program that is both locally relevant as well as globally framed. This is noticeable in the case of BDS where Israel is often portrayed as a part of the North, while Palestine is depicted as a characteristically poor and dispossessed part of the South. Tellingly, in response to the Occupy Movement, which first received widespread attention in 2011, the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions National Committee (BNC) – the Palestinian steering committee of the BDS movement established in 2008 – issued a statement noting how proud it was to stand in solidarity with organizations fighting for a new world based on democracy, human rights and justice. The largest Palestinian civil society coalition suggested that the Occupy Movement provides "a much-needed reminder of something that Palestinians have always known – that another world, a dignifying one, is possible, and ordinary people can create it" (The Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions National Committee, 2011).

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Whilst the leaders of BDS in Tower Hamlets managed to integrate their efforts within a larger "counter-hegemonic" struggle for social and economic justice and new forms of democracy by presenting the campaign as a token of dignity against local discrimination and global imperialism, the movement spearheads in Stari Grad failed to make such a connection. Instead, in their mobilizing efforts, they focus on parallels between the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the 1990s war in which Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) were by far the most likely to be murdered, violently expelled or otherwise mistreated. Hence, in both Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad, the movement organizers link their BDS efforts to a global Muslim discourse of suffering with its focus on Palestine. However, this larger narrative is understood and communicated differently by different generations of Muslims living in these locales.

In Tower Hamlets, elderly Bengali Muslims, typically in their late fifties and sixties, connect their BDS efforts to their experience during the revolutionary independence war in 1971. Furthermore, attentive to citizenship and identity issues and positioned carefully in regard to the state, this group tends to limit BDS to the private realm. By comparison, a new generation of idealistic activists, typically in their twenties, develop distinctively Islamic perspectives that concern the emergence of intentionally political Islam but are also about what it means to act as a good citizen within contemporary British society. In this case, BDS emerges as a form of public participation in the name of Islam that is both compatible with the nation-state framework and rooted in a sense of belonging to an Islamic tradition.

The campaign also forms a part of the shifting configurations between the opposites of insider/outsider in Stari Grad. Our focus in this chapter is on the role of BDS in postwar struggles for power and authority as well as religious authenticity and legitimacy amongst those with allegedly rudimental rights to the city who wish to reaffirm their historical links to Europe. While aware that BDS initiatives are not limited to these groups only, we opt to look at, on the one hand, older Bosniaks – those in the forty-fifty age bracket – who typically support the idea of BDS as a form of participation that confines Islam within the private realm and, on the other, those in their twenties and thirties who perceive the campaign as an Islamic act that reforms not only the concept of Muslim political identity but also radicalizes connections between Bosniaks and Europe. Both groups built their efforts on the back of Europe's ontological relevance and express them in relation to two new categories of resident – the in-migrated Bosniaks from ethnically cleansed villages and a new wave of religious believers who embraced a version of Islam typically associated with Saudi donors and some of the Arabs who fought in the 1992–1995 war.

The present chapter draws from an ethnographic study of BDS conducted from spring 2009 to spring 2014. The first group of participants, a number of leading BDS figures in Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad, most notably members of Friends of Al-Aqsa (FOA) and Stand for Justice was reached with the help of friends and associates. Most interviews were tape-recorded. Frequently, an informal atmosphere prevailed which allowed for discussing issues beyond the limits of interview questions. Participants were interviewed in their homes, offices and universities, but also religious centers and coffeehouses as well as the streets of London and Sarajevo during protests, rallies and demonstrations. A portion of what we present henceforth – specifically the interview material from Tower Hamlets and three cases from Stari Grad (Nermina, Muhammad and Azra) as well as the more general conclusions regarding the competition within and around Islam driven by the intergenerational change that reverberates through BDS – is part of Dr. Jevtić's doctoral thesis on the local appropriation of the global boycott campaign in different locales of Muslim activism in Europe. Additionally, this work also includes interviews conducted in Stari Grad during summer of 2013. All the interviews with latter participants were conducted face-to-face. Interviews occurred in participants' offices or public places (mostly restaurants and cafés). All interviews were conducted in Bosnian/Serbian/Croatian and interviewees were briefed about the general terminology used by the researchers and its meaning. An on-line consent form was sent via e-mail and returned to researchers with a signature. In what follows, we draw from this larger body of work as we discuss the dynamics of Muslim identifications and practices in Tower Hamlets and Stari Grad.

2 BDS of the First Generation of Bengali Muslims: Individualized Politics in a "Foreign" Country

Asad (a pseudonym) arrived to London in 1977. His wife and children joined him in 1987. He recounts how there were times when he was earning twelve pounds a week. "If I went home, I would be rich, but I can't afford to go home now. My children study here. They'll work here. I had a difficult life but my children will have it much better". The interview exposes the pioneering spirit of predominantly male sojourners who intended to stay in Britain for a limited period of time and return to Bangladesh after amassing a certain amount of capital. However, as Ahmed shows, "the increasing demand for remittances and the inability to save as much capital as they would need to settle down to a comfortable life in Bangladesh meant that the temporary sojourners soon

became settlers".[1] This reflection on home and away is captured by Jabir (a pseudonym), a sixty-five-year-old retired cook from Brick Lane. "I belong to Bangladesh with all my heart", he says. "Nobody in England sees me as part of this country. I don't even want to be integrated if it means giving up who I really am. I want to retain my identity and go back home with it some day". Jamal (a pseudonym), a sixty-one-year-old who runs several corner shops thanks to, as he declares, "years of perseverance, hard work and canny business sense", expresses his identification with Bangladesh in similar terms. He says, "I'd like to belong to Bangladesh, but it's necessary for me to be here for economic reasons. Staying is not what I want but it's something I have to do. I belong to Bangladesh but I live here where I don't belong".

Nine interviews conducted with first-generation Bengali Muslims who had remained in Britain into old age revealed that for most their experience in Britain is isolating and beyond their original expectations. An increased commitment to Islam of the homeland appeared to play an important role in the mediation of cultures of "here" and "there". It also stimulated the preservation of familiar customs and rituals in an attempt to uphold some kind of equilibrium in the lives of the first generation. Ahmed shows that "the large and close-knit nature of the community in London offered individuals a safe environment in which to express and practice their faith, and allowed this type of social reproduction to flourish collectively across the community".[2] Jamal describes Brick Lane, and its adjoining streets, as "the heart of a community" and one building, in particular, as a symbol of Bengali settlement in London. The Huguenot chapel became the Jamme Masjid (the Great Mosque) in 1976. Throughout the 1980s, the mosque altered its sites in order to accommodate larger congregations. Today, it serves the largest concentration of Bengali Muslims in Britain. All sermons are delivered in Sylheti Bengali and follow the traditions of Syed Ahmad Shaheed who called for a return to an original Islamic purity and preached adherence to the *Sharia* (Islamic law) rather than spiritual union with God. Jamme Masjid, a place Jamal calls "second home", is the domain of elderly men. Otherwise, "new leaderships have emerged, with much greater representations of the British-born generations".[3] Rather than treating this as a sign of political "emancipation" amongst younger Bengali Muslims,

1 Ahmed, Nilufar, "Tower Hamlets – Insulation in Isolation", in *Muslim Britain: Communities Under Pressure*, ed. T. Abbas (London: Zed Books, 2005.), 195.

2 Ibid, 199.

3 Geaves, Ron, "Negotiation British Citizenship and Muslim Identity", in *Muslim Britain: Communities Under Pressure*, ed. T. Abbas, (London: Zed Books, 2005.), 67.

it is more likely that the first generation is more cautious of citizenship and identity issues.

Unlike the British-born generation that portrays BDS as a spartan political movement that radicalizes mainstream views through forms of deliberately political Islam, elderly Bengali Muslims engage in less visible ways. The campaign is confined to "safe zones" – individual households or community spheres where it fits within the story of like-minded people who give each other mutual support against the trend of anomic experiences. Abra (a pseudonym), a fifty-four-old housewife who arrived to London in the early 1980s, says, "There are not a lot of places here that feel like home. You are at home when you are with your family, but otherwise the feeling of 'closeness' comes from being around people who are just like you and feel the same way you do. BDS gives me that feeling of a close-knit commune". She believes that the boycott is a part of Bengali culture, and seems aware of the country's involvement in the earlier Arab League initiative. She says, "Bangladesh prohibits its citizens from travelling to Israel. Did you know that? There's a stamp [in the Bangladeshi passport] that says you are not allowed to go there. It also imposes the primary boycott". Abra then asks, "Why not boycott here… in London"? Shrugging her shoulders, she declares, "Everyone is doing it".

BDS cuts across ethnic, religious and age divides. Its "unproblematic" nature, as Abra suggests, is found precisely in its broad appeal. This was also highlighted by Amirah (a pseudonym), a fifty-five-year-old housewife from Blackwell. She says that she has been boycotting well before the BDS campaign was even started. "We never drank Coca-Cola at home or consumed any products from the occupied territories. It's something I learned from my parents, and I've done my best to pass it on to my children". Amirah goes on to say, "I see all kinds of folks boycotting. That's a good thing. I think it makes the fact that so many Muslims are taking part a lot less suspicious, if you know what I mean". She does not wait for a response and instead declares, "We don't want anyone to call this an Islamic movement. That would cause problems for us here". Delicately poised in relation to the state, with the risk that their political allegiance to the British nation may be called into question, Abra and Amirah prefer to show support for BDS within individual homes and other realms "relegated" to women. Abra goes shopping every Friday, always to the same store where no Israeli goods are sold. She states, "I used to take my daughters with me. They are mistresses of a household now and they go to the same place. When I'm grey and old, they'll do my shopping for me". The boycott, in this case, appears to be a tradition passed on from one generation to the next. At the same time, the process can be reversed as children assume leadership roles when, as Abra puts it, elders turn "grey and old".

Another interesting aspect that emerged from the interview data was a shared understanding that the proliferation of satellite technology and a diverse choice of channels such as Al Jazeera and Bangla TV made it possible to show support for the boycott in a way that was not possible before for instance during the first and second Palestinian uprising. Support for BDS reaches a fever pitch at home, in front of the TV. Lama (a pseudonym), a fifty-eight-year-old seamstress from Brick Lane, tells me that watching the news is "a family event". She explains, "We gather in front of the TV and discuss the situation in Gaza. It's a custom now, but I didn't have that experience when I was younger". Lama also notes that she does not comprehend how anyone who watches the news can purchase Israeli products or products from companies that support the Israeli state. "Information about Gaza is everywhere. It's impossible not to know what is happening. If you don't boycott you have no heart or sympathy for those in need. Simple as that", she declares. Lama connects her identity as a BDS enthusiast to discourse of empowerment. She cares about oppressed people living in far-away places and issues from which she may never profit. Like in the case of Abra, Lama considers BDS a natural progression of a long-lasting effort against Israel that has always been individual and required no formal organization. Ethnography of the first generation shows that when discussed publicly BDS is mediated and managed in a specific British Bengali politics.

Many of those interviewed referred to legacies of Bangladeshi nation-building when discussing BDS. The violent repression of democratic nationalism by the Pakistani army in the 1971 war led to massive and putatively genocidal slaughter. "Many involved in the losing side of the nationalist struggle fled above, some inevitably to London".[4] Jabir was of them. When interviewed about the boycott of Israel in a café on Bow Road, he said, "Monsters in Bangladesh who engage in savagery and intimidation in order to destroy the independence of the country must be brought to justice, just like those fiends from Israel who kill innocent people in a pursuit of their Zionist agenda". Similar mediation was evident in the case of Naaz (a pseudonym) and Omar (a pseudonym), a couple in their sixties. "We had a hard time today", Omar sighs when approached at a local supermarket. "We don't know this store so we didn't know what products it stocks. Normally we go to our local market on Fashion Street but it was closed today". BDS stickers have practically overtaken the urban communal space in Tower Hamlets. Entire areas are deemed "boycott friendly zones", as strings of businesses involved in the campaign have labels on their doors and windows letting the public know they support the campaign. The store Naaz and Omar

4 Back, Les et al., "Islam and the New Political Landscape: Faith Communities, Political Participation and Social Change", in *Theory, Culture and Society* Vol. 26 No. 1 (2009.): 8.

were shopping at had no such label. "Shopping took longer today, but it's worth it", Naaz asserts. "We are the victims of the independence struggle. People in Gaza are victims of their fight for sovereignty and basic human rights. This makes it worth our time". BDS, therefore, reflects traces of migrant history, but it equally reverberates Islam and diasporic sensibility.

Back et al. demonstrate that when speaking about the East End in general and London in particular it becomes very hard to think of "a civil society that has ever been entirely secular".[5] In the late 19th century, for instance, concerns over health and sanitation raised questions regarding physical and moral welfare of people living in the district. At the turn of the 20th century, the issue was taken on by an array of Christian missionaries and the Salvation Army. More recently, "a number of social reform movements and voluntary sector organizations around housing, health, alcohol and substance abuse were either driven by the church or had a faith-based root to their activity".[6] We do not wish to suggest that all reform movements are inherently religious but rather that faith-based community activism has always played an important role in the borough. Historical blueprints and settlement of Jewish and Irish immigrants and the impact of religion on their political mobilizations and discussions about the forms of local and global alliances are well documented.[7] Although such pathways into mainstream politics remain less recognized, available data suggests that to categorize Islam as characteristically problematic in terms of relationships between state secularism and faith-based community mobilization would be incorrect.

"Politics at both local and national levels are marked by the results of debates that question both the theological ethical prerogatives of moments of governance and the faith-based natures of forms of mobilization".[8] Contemporary Islamic mobilization must be set within that context.

First-generation Bengali Muslims developed an intensely defensive, at times non-compromising, approach against the admittedly compound backdrop of tensions between host and immigrant communities in the recent history of London. Unlike Bengali Hindus who show quite high levels of social mobility and integration, those we quote in this chapter who come from the same ethnolinguistic group, migrated at approximately the same time from the same region, have the same socioeconomic origins and settled in the same social housing in East London, often stated that they did not know what they are

5 Ibid, 7.

6 Ibid, 7.

7 Fishman, William J., *East End Jewish Radicals* (London: Duckworth, 1978.); Gidley, Ben, "Ghetto Radicalism: The Jewish East End", in *New Voices in Jewish Thought*, ed. K. Harris (London: Limmud Publications, 1999.), 50–70.

8 Back, Les et al., "Islam and the New Political Landscape: Faith Communities, Political Participation and Social Change", in *Theory, Culture and Society* Vol. 26 No. 1 (2009.): 8.

doing in "the foreign world which causes so much pain and whether it would not have been better to stay at home".[9] They repeatedly expressed this feeling by criticizing the "coldness" of Europe.[10] Here, "a religious orientation helps to deal with this question, even if not to completely answer it".[11]

The first generation's religiosity has a distinctly defensive touch in that they focus on the preservation and protection of their own standards and life schemes in a foreign environment. An increased commitment to Islam of the homeland simultaneously reduces interaction with wider society to a minimum in an effort to keep these "authentic" identities "untainted". Jamal believes that any deeper connections with "the Brits" will "poison the community with ideals that disagree with own thoughts of who we are". Asad likewise considers the community to be exposed to customs that "little by little erase our sense of self". Rahil (a pseudonym), a fifty-nine-year-old who runs a family restaurant in Brick Lane, expresses concerns over threatened values – such as parental authority or sanctions on marriage choice – by stating, "If a girl steps outta line, just threaten to send her to Bangladesh". Jabir focuses less on "foreign" influences and more on potential solutions. He says, "Even after living in Britain for decades, I hold onto familiar values and customs. My mosque brought in an *imam* [worship leader] I knew from home. We grew up together. It felt like I was given a place to call my own". These and similar attitudes make any notion of a homogenous, local BDS movement impossible. The campaign's broad appeal allows first-generation elders to describe they involvement as "unproblematic" in relation to citizenship but, at the same time, they do not engage in conferences, meetings, rallies or any type of organized activity. For them, BDS is a private effort that reflects the past battle for independence, but it is just as shaped by the present struggle of living in a foreign country and trying to protect the community that is seemingly under attack.

3 BDS of the British-Born Generation: Faith-Based Participation in Tower Hamlets

In contrast to the first generation of Bengali Muslims, the British-born generation typically puts forth forms of community politics that openly and actively merge global Muslim concerns with issues like welfare, housing and education.

9 Schiffauer, Werner, "From Exile to Diaspora: The Development of Transnational Islam in Europe", in *Islam in Europe*, eds. A.A. Aziz & E. Fokas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.), 72.

10 Ibid, 72.

11 Ibid, 72.

Fardeen (a pseudonym), a twenty-year old who had been accepted to do a biology degree at the London Metropolitan University, highlights the plight of Muslims in detail. He talks about Palestine, Bosnia and Chechnya, before turning his attention to contemporary Britain and Muslims position within it. Fardeen states that Muslims suffer bullying in schools. He also suggests that, although they go to the same universities, the unemployment rate for Muslims is over twice the national average when compared to their non-Muslim counterparts. For this reason, Fardeen claims, "they're not capable to flourish as individuals in Britain, which is the only home they know". He concludes that the government needs to deal with discrimination and provide young Muslims with equal opportunities instead of constantly pioneering dead-beat initiatives.

The religious politics that construct the new spaces of the political articulate suspicion of mainstream local political institutions, but they also express "a suspicion of the putative co-option of Bangladeshi community politics".[12] In this regard, the sustained popularity of a number of youth-driven BDS organizations in Tower Hamlets, most notably FOA, reflects the failure of community leaders to address what Rajnaara (a pseudonym), a twenty-two-year-old student of Biochemistry at KCL, and a FOA volunteer since 2006, calls "the moments of injustice". She says, "Our leaders have let us down. They're so preoccupied with the 1970s that they fail to address the issues that are important to Muslims today". By joining FOA, the British-born generation transforms itself from an "oppositional other" into "a beleaguered [...] minority against which the majority culture/system has sinned".[13] To atone, the system must reorganize its own collective identities in order to make room for Islam and Muslims in it. An isolationist position of the first generation is deemed useless in this pursuit. As a new generation of idealistic activists demands that Britain takes on a more inclusive definition of itself, they simultaneously assemble "a more inclusive definition of what it means to follow Islam and be a Muslim".[14]

Young supporters of FOA bypass the "culturally blinkered interpretation of Islam held by members of the older generation", as well as "extremist understandings of the faith".[15] Faraz (a pseudonym), a twenty-year-old student of Politics at SOAS who joined FOA in 2009, says that he is daily confronted with the highly popular *Hizb ut-Tahrir* (Islamic Liberation Party) – an organization

12 Back, Les et al., "Islam and the New Political Landscape: Faith Communities, Political Participation and Social Change", in *Theory, Culture and Society* Vol. 26 No. 1 (2009.): 14.

13 Moll, Yasmin, "Beyond Beards, Scarves and Halal Meat: Mediated Constructions of British Muslim Identity", in *Journal of Religion and Popular Culture* Vol. 15 No.1 (2007.): 8.

14 Ibid, 8.

15 Ibid, 8.

that seemingly controls Muslim student societies at London's colleges and universities. In the BBC Newsnight special, aired on August 27, 2003, Hizb's spokesperson argued that, "there is no such thing as a British Muslim". He described Islam as an anti-nationalist, transnational and global reminder for Muslims in Britain to take "a long, hard look at themselves and decide what is their identity". He challenged them to examine whether they are British or they are Muslim, concluding that, "We [Hizb] are Muslims. Where we live, is irrelevant". Radicalization of Muslim youth in the borough cannot be laid decisively on the door of *Hizb*. In fact, such limited approach, fails to recognize that the anger against "the West" has a much broader context. The real issue here is that for young members of FOA, just as Muslims are victimized, Islam is also a "victim" of the distortion of its "true" message of "peace, justice, and equality".[16] Faraz says, "Just because *Hizb* is active in East London and works on issues that are relevant to FOA, it doesn't mean we're anything alike. People still confuse us". Consequently, young member of FOA are presented with "the special role of constantly having to explain themselves, mostly in order to say who they are not".[17] Farez says, "They [*Hizb*] are radical. We're not". To illustrate this point, he speaks about FOA's collaboration with Jewish and Christian organizations.

Young supporters of FOA frequently declared that a "real", moderate, Islam forms an integral part of their British Muslim identity. The tilt towards such an interpretation of Islam was explicit in a collective understanding of BDS. Faraz says that the campaign mirrors the "official" discourse of tolerance, inclusivity and pluralism in Britain, which allows him to partake more fully in the body politic. Rupna (a pseudonym), a twenty-three-year-old student of History at SOAS, similarly declares that BDS makes her feel like she is an active member of the society. "I think that for young Muslims, BDS is a great way of asserting who we are as a community, what we stand for and believe in. It is also about being a good citizen. By that I mean, exercising your right to be political without endangering or bothering anyone else". This demonstrates the important ways in which "majority norms are appropriated by a minority for its own counter-hegemonic project".[18] The idealized notion of Islam embedded in BDS forms part of the projective identity discourse in that it "turns on its head the dominant imagination of Islam as an exclusivist, intolerant and repressive religion. Instead, it talks of tolerance, inclusion and pluralism. This allows British

16 Ibid, 9.

17 Klausen, Jytte, *The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.), 1.

18 Moll, Yasmin, "Beyond Beards, Scarves and Halal Meat: Mediated Constructions of British Muslim Identity", in *Journal of Religion and Popular Culture* Vol. 15 No.1 (2007.): 12.

Muslims to not only transform conceptions of themselves, but also transform the overall structures of society by appropriating the official model of a pluralist nation-state and Islamizing it".[19]

In conclusion, against the backdrop of tensions between host and immigrant communities in the modern history of Tower Hamlets, elderly Bengali Muslims developed an isolationist approach concerned with preserving homeland values and customs. Watchful of citizenship and identity issues and positioned cautiously in relation to the state, the first generation encloses BDS within the private realm. By contrast, the British-born generation sees in BDS a token of their inclusion in Britain. Young supporters of FOA, who demand that Britain makes room for Islam and Muslims in it, simultaneously produce a more general explanation of what it means to be Muslim by referring to concepts of equal rights, inclusivity and freedom. Their perception of BDS, therefore, cuts across identity lines and enables connections because of the very nature of Islam as active, intelligible and accepting. In what follows, we ask how our findings on the localization of the transnational BDS campaign in Tower Hamlets compare to the case of Stari Grad.

4 BDS of "Civilized Europeans": Longevity and Urbanity as Status Symbols in Stari Grad

In the previous section we introduced two different generations of Bengali Muslims living in Tower Hamlets and argued that their varying interpretations of BDS are driven by the competition within and around Islam. Now we ask how these formulations apply to four neighbourhoods located in Stari Grad – Bistrik, Vratnik, Logavina and Kovaci.

Ismet (a pseudonym) declares himself as a Bosnian, an identification "category" of "others" according to the Bosnian constitution[20] and one that yet widely used as source of identity among both believers and non-believers. Ismet also accentuates that he is a Muslim, but "one that does not go around telling others that they should also live according to Islamic principles". He says, "I wear a suit on the first day of *Eid*, that's how others can guess that I am

19 Ibid, 8.

20 The Constitution is based on the principle of ethnic constituency or the principle of "constituent peoples", which implies that each "constituent group" has equal rights to governing the state. Thus, the Constitution does not deal with the term "citizen", but instead divides the people living in Bosnia-Herzegovina into three "constituent groups" – Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. The Constitution also mentions a non-constituent group of people, referred to as "Others".

a Muslim". Ismet grew up in Kovaci where he still lives with his wife and his mother. He is a doctor who stayed in Sarajevo during the siege and claims that during the war he witnessed his friends' suddenly switching to Islam. "There were some [younger] colleagues at work who, all of a sudden, started reading the Qur'an, which was fine, but connected to that came a change in their behavior towards other colleagues who were either non-Muslim or Catholic, Orthodox, whatever. Their approach changed and they became more business-like. That's, at least, how it seemed to me". But the war, in Ismet's opinion, did not only cause this identity shift among the young Bosniaks, as many of his friends and colleagues, mostly doctors, joined the ruling parties (namely Stranka Demokratske Akcije – SDA) and became aggressive in their understanding of Islam. "I kept telling them that religion had nothing to do with politics, that I grew up as a Muslim, only to be asked 'why, then don't you join SDA". "It sounded like they were talking of the latest fashion trend, like being a Muslim was *u modi* (in style)", Ismet laughs. "They became hard-core Muslims, yet they loved taking money and presents from their patients and their families. What are we talking about here?" In Ismet's words, religion in Bosnia-Herzegovina not only penetrated into the everyday life in a way that is supposedly unusual for the country, but also changed the perception that people had of it. "You are believer if you say that you are a Bosniak and an even bigger believer if you belong to SDA". Religion in Bosnia is so tightly connected to politics that it is hard to "prove" that you are a believer if you only practice for yourself. Born in 1961, Ismet was so disappointed in his friends' and colleagues' that he lost touch with many of them. "If you are going to judge me because I drink a glass of beer or *rakija* once in a while, telling me I am not a real Muslim, than please let's not be friends. At the same time, it's OK to take money from a woman undergoing a C-section…that's more noble than drinking, I guess".

"If you are religious you are cool…people say 'he is such a nice fellow (*dobar momak*)", he goes to the mosque each Friday… No matter what you do, if you commit to your religious community you are perceived as a good boy" starts Ramiza (a pseudonym) whilst sipping coffee in her garden in a family house in Kovaci. She is sixty and is working as a dentist in a privately owned business. Her husband is a retired chemist, while her three sons reside in the United Kingdom. They left when they became "of age", each brother pulling the other along, but come back each summer to visit their parents. Ramiza grew up in a well-educated, upper middle class family in Bistrik, but moved to Kovaci when she married Enver (a pseudonym). "I am from Stari Grad" she proudly declares, making it clear that she derives a certain social standing from this. "It seems to me that nowadays people are become religious because they believe it will bring them some kind of better social standing. It's like they hope to earn

money or gain respect through it. What strikes me is how they go about it… people leave their workplace early on Friday because they have to go to *ǧum'a* [Friday prayer], but don't return. They behave like they should be awarded for that. And when you say something about it, you're an Islamophobe. That's what gets on my nerves". Educated Sarajevans who come from typically well-off, urban families tend to posit "privatized" Islam against profiteers and corrupt elites, on the one hand, and the in-migrated villagers and a new wave of religious believers, on the other. This turns BDS into a moral force for those who are aware that their situation is better than that of most Bosnians; yet seem more preoccupied with what they have lost than with what they currently have. Broken relationships, lost ambitions, over-association with the postwar business-political elite and feelings of entrapment in the country that Jansen calls the EU's "immediate outside"[21] are lasting sorrows of the war that shape the Bosniak middle class.

Before the war, Mahir (a pseudonym) owned a music studio in Sarajevo. He had a good life as a musician, playing all over Yugoslavia and diaspora. "We had a good life. We had enough money to fly to Pula or Dubrovnik each year for vacation". Then, in April 1992, his life was shattered. He was forced to leave his family home in Bistrik when his wife and daughters fled to Amsterdam. Mahir was mobilized as part of the Bosnian army and spent the entire war on the first defense line. "If I only knew that it would last for so long…four years away from my family. And for what? Now we behave like we are the center of the world, still saying 'oh, poor us, we had a war'. The war has become our justification for everything that we are incapable of doing". In 1998, Mahir reopened his studio, but business is not as good as before. "I try to earn money, but how can I do it when most of these young talents come to my studio with their fathers and beg to record a song, so that he/she can launch her career. I cannot live by doing favors, and I am sorry, but I cannot do this out of *sadaka* [charity]. I have to earn my bread too and provide for my family". Mahir becomes inpatient and infuriated as he goes on about *sadaka*. "People believe that they get points for the afterlife if they keep doing favors, but then go about trashing your name if you don't do it for them. This is typical of these newcomers and new believers. They go about behaving like they own the place, preaching around but easily forget where they came from". Mahir believes that Islam in Bosnia turned to the worse after the war. "People became Muslim overnight. It was their answer to being a Serb or Croat. They learn *Fatiha* [the first chapter of the Qur'an] by

21 Jansen, Steff, "After the Red Passport: Towards an Anthropology of the Everyday Geopolitics of Entrapment in the EU's 'Immediate Outside'", in *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* Vol. 15 No. 4 (2009.): 818.

heart, fast during Ramadan and use Turkish words, but that's where Islam ends for most of these *novokomponovani* (new) Muslims. Greed, money, corruption have all become the center of their world, but camouflaged with Islam, they appear as good guys and I am called *hejter* (hater). Islam is not something we wear, yet people make sure that you see that they are Muslim. Girls, who until yesterday, wore mini-skirts and looked like carnival dolls with all the make-up, wake up with a scarf on their head and all of a sudden they are Muslim. But, this is not what being Muslim is. It's not in a scarf or a long skirt".

Senada (a pseudonym), a fifty-seven-year-old university professor, proudly states, "I come from an old Sarajevo family". She defines herself through the idiom of *dobra, stara porodica* (good, old family). Part of its significance is derived from longevity, which suggested that the family in question predated socialism. This bestowed prestige because longevity was seen to imply the restraint and contextualization of socialism within an older and deeper moral tradition that, from the Bosniak perspective, also "contained Islamic piety".[22] This understanding of Islam as a moral system made it possible for Bosniaks of *dobra, stara porodica* to bring it closer to other systems. Combined with longevity, the family gained its status from urbanity. Contempt felt by urbanities for rural dwellers meant that many Sarajevans whose parents had moved to the town from villages did not advertise this "image-tarnishing fact".[23] Disdain took on a more serious dimension in 1992 as urbanities began to speak of a "rural aggression" and blamed *seljaci* (peasants) for the violence. As the shelling of Sarajevo intensified, they held onto a belief that they were too refined for hostility and "would remain calm and reasonable in the face of it all".[24] From a distinctively Muslim standpoint, such approach was in accordance with not only the Islam of rationality and civility but also Europe – seen as cosmopolitan, middle class and controlled. The attacks on Sarajevo thus easily fitted within the metaphors of "barbarian *seljaci*" attacking "civilized Europeans".

When used in a discourse that generates a complementary and coherent value system, "Europe" and "Islam" create an interesting symbolic setup, "strongly intertwined with the politics of identity, power and political legitimacy".[25] This is precisely what is happening today as the Bosniak middle class continues to

22 Sorabji, Cornelia, "Managing Memories in Postwar Sarajevo: Individuals, Bad Memories, and New Wars", in *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* Vol. 12 No. 1 (2006.): 4.

23 Ibid, 4.

24 Ibid, 35.

25 Sarajlic, Eldar, "Europe as a Media Myth: The Case of Bosnian Muslims", in *Mutual Misunderstandings? Muslims and Islam in the European Media; Europe in the Media of Muslim Majority Countries*, eds. K. Oktem & R. Abou-El-Fadl (Oxford: European Studies Center, University of Oxford, 2009.), 53.

participate in an emblematic interplay between the notions of "Europe" and "Islam". Older generation of Sarajevo-born Muslims perceive Europe as something to be attained and deserved. It is a standard to be reached in any given area and a symbol of the ultimate good. It represents freedom of expression. It offers choice. BDS is their window to Europe. It is a channel for the reproduction of middle class or, at least, for the expression of European aspirations and democratic and cosmopolitan will.

The campaign builds its authority on the basis of the fact that it is presented as "European". Moreover, many of those interviewed see in BDS a modern-day token of their long-lasting ties to Europe and a rejection of those who allegedly do not fit within this chronicle. Ismet declares, "I have nothing against people who walk around and say they are Muslim. OK, I know for myself that they are just primitive show offs but fine. If they don't hurt me, they can rave about it as much as they want to". The same ironic and somewhat resented tone is present among many older Bosniaks, and some even go as far as calling these people *seljaci* (villagers) who descended down from the mountain, sold old their cows and sheep and now claim religious authority and legitimacy. But their criticism of "new Muslims" is not nearly as pronounced as condemnation against radical believers who turn towards "foreign" manifestations of Islam. The Bosniak middle class, and particularly those close to the prewar *dobra*, *stara porodica* end of the spectrum, perceive a version of Islam derogatively dubbed "Wahhabi" as an attack on Bosniak national identity, familiar values and practices, and their own sincerity as believers and "legitimacy as religious authorities".[26] Senada states that she gets scared when she hears stories of Wahhabi villages in Central Bosnia, "their training camps, multiple marriages… all of that is so abnormal to me. It's almost like they are utterly mad". Those interviewed typically agreed that Wahhabism is not close to Bosnian Islam and that it has "nothing to do with Bosnia". These feelings denote a certain dose of fear that "alien" Islamic practices threaten to undermine the "European" identity of Bosnian Muslims.

In a sense, not much has changed since before the war when one of Sorabji's informants told her, "It's modern to be Muslim".[27] Attempts to reconcile Islam with Europe continue today, but these "bridging" metaphors now exist within very different socioeconomic contexts that facilitate them even more intensely. The boycott is directly exposed to these issues. In the case of older generation of well-educated Sarajevans from Stari Grad, the campaign is seen as progressive, European and, above all, supportive of individual, rather than

26 Sorabji, Cornelia, 4.
27 Ibid, 116.

collective expressions of Islam. Next we ask how these findings relate to a new generation on Bosniak activists gathered around Stand for Justice.

5 BDS of Stand for Justice: Faith-Based Mobilizations, Social Network Awakening and the "Intergenerational Twist"

Nermina Karacic is the founder of Stand for Justice. Pretty blonde in her late twenties, explains that the youth network was created rather spontaneously. "In November 2012, one *novokomponovani* 'believer', who *do juce* [until yesterday] was stealing cassette players out of cars, told me that posting Rihanna videos on my Facebook wall on the day when a massacre occurred in Gaza made me a 'non-Muslim'. This got me thinking. First of all, I didn't have a clue that this slaughter happened. There were no local media reports about it. Secondly, had I known, I wouldn't have been posting songs online. I was irritated by a rash and prejudiced comment from someone that didn't even bother to ask me if I had heard about the situation in Gaza. And, on top of that, he allowed himself to judge whether I'm a believer or not". Frustrated, Nermina began thinking about what she could do. She decided that organizing a mass solidarity march in Sarajevo would send a message that Bosnians support the Palestinian struggle. She first contacted five of her closest friends through Facebook. "Two friends responded. One of them, Amina, told me to open a group on Facebook in order to motivate as many people as possible to comment. I wanted them to know about the massacre but also about the long suffering of innocent children"- Nermina called her group "Stand for Justice", because, as she explains, she needed to be on the "right side of things". She needed the "voice of children from the once occupied Sarajevo" to resonate worldwide and show that injustices will not be tolerated. The protest was scheduled for November 20.

Sanjin (a pseudonym), a thirty-seven-year-old musician from Vratnik, was one of the first supporters of Nermina's initiative. "I was on Facebook, going through my friend's pictures and saw his event invitation to join the Stand for Justice protests. Of course, I knew what was happening in Gaza and prayed everyday for the children and their parents. I prayed that God gave them *sabur* [patience] to endure the injustices that fell onto them. I couldn't but recall my own childhood spent hiding from shells. So, it immediately hit me that I had to become an active participant in this gathering. I spoke to a few of my friends, mostly colleagues from work and over coffee we decided that we really felt the need to react. Initially, it was kind of intimidating for me to gather people and talk to them about Gaza, because people here are absorbed in their own problems, but from a conversation that I picked up with Alen [a pseudonym],

a friend from work who was one of group's most active participants, I realized that it was not shameful. I wanted to do it, so why would I felt awkward inviting people to join? I mostly invited them through Facebook, but also talked to many of them when I went to the mosque. Of course, that was much easier to do as people already knew what was happening there. It was too late for me to get engaged in the organization, but I 'picked up' on inviting people to come. I was not an organizer, but I like to say that I helped".

Alen was happy when Sanjin joined in. "I wasn't surprised, but pleased. Sanjin was also a good believer (*dobar vjernik*), so I knew he'd choose the right path. I had such a rough time helping with the protests, because people were so unwilling to get exposed. At one time I exploded, because everybody was posting pictures of dead children in Palestine, cuddled up at home and enjoying the comfort of a warm bed. That really made me angry. So many people were sitting in cafés, young people, all dressed up and smiley, yet all looked at me like I was nuts for asking if they wanted to join. It's an ugly feeling. What innerved me were the constant excuses. Being a good Muslim, a brother, is not just about sharing on Facebook, but joining in when it gets rough".

Unlike older Bosniaks who posit Islam as an individual faith against its supposedly "non-modern" postwar forms, Sanjin and Alen, just like Nermina, represent a new cohort of young and educated Muslims who reject such "privatization" of Islam and its integration into pre-established normative frameworks. This tendency is strengthened by their high degree of networking and interacting as well as "intellectual avatars" and political tools and, most importantly, "media literacy".[28]

TV Sarajevo, Al Jazeera, BHT, Network Plus and OBN were just some of the outlets eager to speak to Nermina. "I contacted Muhammad, a friend of a friend, and asked whether he'd be willing to talk to cameras and explain what is happening in Gaza and why it is important for us to get involved". Muhammad explains that he wanted the protest to show that "Bosnia is joining Britain, Germany, France the US and so forth in a global struggle. It is about educating people and raising awareness. It is not only about buying some foods and boycotting others. I think that people in Bosnia appreciated the fact that someone finally took initiative and stepped up after what seems like a lifetime of complete silence". BDS, in other words, is justified in part by the fact that the

28 Amir-Moazami, Schirin & Armando Salvatore, "Gender, Generation, and the Reform of Tradition: From Muslim Majority Societies to Western Europe", in *Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities In and Across Europe*, eds. S. Allievi & J.S. Nielsen (Leiden: Brill, 2003.), 52–78.; Karim, Karim H, "Muslim Encounters With New Media", in *Islam Encountering Globalization,* ed. A. Mohammadi (London: Routledge Curzon, 2002.), 1–14.

government had done nothing. Almira (a pseudonym) is Mahir's daughter. She is a law student and a human rights activist primarily concerned with children's rights. Seated in the cafeteria of Sarajevo School of Science and Technology (SSST), Almira raves about phlegmatic politicians in Bosnia. "They only care about the prestige of the university that their children will attend, without a glimpse into of the rest of the world. This is also true of the conflict in Palestine. Bosnian politicians are mute when it comes to Gaza. Even those parties that ate primarily Muslim are completely inactive. They judge the situation, but immediately turn their head to other issues. If Israel gave them money or invested in a business here they would accept it with their hands wide open, without even wondering what Israel does, every day, to the children, women, people of Gaza. There is no money involved in caring about Gaza, and that's why nobody cares. It's only sadness … which is good for publicity and keeping your supporters, but in the long-run and when it comes to money 'oh, no'!"

A 2008 media campaign initiated by a dozen of Islamic organizations in Bosnia called for a comprehensive boycott of goods produced by companies supposedly implicit in Israeli violation of international law and human rights. The rationale behind the campaign was solidarity with the Palestinian people, while the aim was to gather as many supporters to boycott well-known products such as Coca-Cola, Nestle or IBM and gradually expand the BDS network. Almira claims that, in 2008 when she saw these appeals, she "did not question their morale for one bit. It was a natural decision. Why would I buy a product only to support Israel's weapon industry used to systematically exterminate the children and people of Gaza? When Stand for Justice emerged, that seemed like a natural continuation of the initial idea. We are responsible for stopping this, because the bloodshed must end. I was much younger then, and was just out of high school, but I was old enough to understand what it meant. Today, Stand for Justice serves as a sign to our youth and even older people that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a real issue and that they are able to make a change. BDS is active engagement in a non-demanding way, everyone can and should do it… in fact, must do it!"

Social networks were fundamental in conveying a message that resonated with the youth. Sanjin believes that this message "can echo among all good Muslims", despite the lack of support for this initiative from the Bosnian government and even international actors. Medina (a pseudonym), Almira's sister and Mahir's younger daughter, is even more engaged than her sister when it comes to BDS. "I study economics and I can so clearly see how BDS can be effective in its aims. BDS is such an easy way to get involved, you don't have to do much, just make smarter choices which will economically damage Israel". She admits that she constantly tells her friends not to buy Coke and puts it back on the shelves

making them buy something else. "They have now learned and some of them have actually joined BDS. This is so easy to share, but what worries me is the lack of official support. As a country, we are constrained by our government. But we don't have to remain passive. I think that we must act in accordance with what Islam propagates; we must convince our leaders and our people that all they do now will come back to haunt them, one way or the other. BDS is a good deed and everybody who cares about others should be able to do it. I can't believe how some people, young guys, are so careless, but then, they are also prone to change. We are going, step by step, towards this mindset change".

"When the going gets tough the tough get going" says Alen, claiming that Bosnian Muslims have widely accepted the Stand for Justice and BDS. "I see change every day. I think that young people in Bosnia are so quick to choose wealth over a value system, but once you show them the right way you can see the good in these young people. That is why religious education is so relevant to young Bosnian Muslims. But, besides this, they must be educated about how to act in the name of faith. Don't get me wrong, I am not referring to extremism here, but the principles of Islam that teach you how to be a good person and give back what you get from God". In the same conversation Sanjin adds that Bosnian Muslims are European Muslims, but that they, just as Europeans do, get too absorbed in the consumerist culture. "What they fail to see when it comes to BDS is the fact that this is a European idea that calls upon all Europeans to abandon the loss of morale and value system and, in lieu, accept a more ethical approach to consumerism". Supporters of Stand for Justice put forth a highly intellectualized campaign driven by their enduring considerations on implications of what it means to be Muslim in Europe. BDS is seen as a vocal and open commitment to Islam that, in turn, inspires Europe's return to itself.

Medina often disagrees with her father Mahir who tries to push her towards education, telling her not to abandon her faith, but to be more discrete about "all this Muslim propagation", as he calls it. Medina smiles and says that she really agrees with her father that faith is an individual feeling, but in order to make people do good and care you must be open about your religious feelings. "When people openly show their faith they tend to attract others to do the same, as those who are not religious are sometimes ashamed to admit that they actually do something because they deeply believe that they are doing something noble and that they will be awarded for it, one way or the other. So, faith must be a visible part of our lives, for if it stays within is it is likely that it will get lost. I think we should not be afraid of expressing our Muslim identity". Azra (a pseudonym), student of Sociology at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Sarajevo, notes that, "Bosniaks are Europeans by origin, by language and by numerous elements of our culture". She continues: "Politicians will have us believe that 'Muslim' activism hinders Bosnia-Herzegovina politically. To openly side

with Palestine allegedly drives the country further away from its European aspirations. BDS does not 'radicalize' Muslims. If anything, it makes them the best possible Europeans they can be". She continues: "I think that somebody should reveal Dodik's [the President of the Republic of Srpska] ties to Israel. Then, the idiots from the Federation should recognize Palestine. For this to happen Bosnian Muslims need to stop being ignorant and realize that our interests are not Wahhabi interests. Missionaries and their local followers insist on a 'fruitless' religious formalism, but this is not what Islam in Bosnia is all about".

In his article "Naše bošnjastvo i naše evropejstvo" (Our Bosniak Identity and Our European Identity), Enes Karić, a professor of Qur'anic Studies at the Faculty of Islamic Studies, University of Sarajevo, writes that the Islam of Bosniaks is under attack from all sides, but first of all from "neophyte and aggressive local Muslims working for [Islamic] humanitarians with dubious intentions".[29] They, the author suggests, assault the Islam exactly where it contributes the most to "the affirmation of Bosniak national identity and spiritual matrix".[30] Both Almira and Medina agree that the perception of Islam has changed in recent years, especially among the young. "If you say you are Muslim, *gradska raja* (urban crowd) often tend to think of you as an extremist since you are walking around openly expressing your faith. This is the fault of Wahhabis who have embarked on a completely distorted interpretation of Islam. But, they are not real Bosnian Muslims. In fact, I was once a subject of a verbal assault by a young Wahhabi [former] friend. We went to high school together and he won a scholarship to go to the United States. We were very good friends before, used to hang out a lot, but when he came back he would not shake my hand or give me a hug like before. He said he could not touch women. He started hanging out by the King Fahd mosque in Alipasino Polje and we drifted apart after high school. When I met him some five years after, at a conference, he started with some baloney about a camp in Konjic and how I should join. I cut him off and then he started openly insulting me about how I pretend that I am Muslim and how I act like one for the sake of being liked…I really have a problem with being identified with them". Wahhabism emerges as a common counterpoint for organizations that otherwise prefer to operate separately. Unlike older Bosniaks who call upon individualized and secularized Islam, young cohorts of Stand for Justice encourage its collective expressions through social and political activism that cautions against a reduction of Muslim identity to a coarse and sterile faith.

29 Bougarel, Xavier, "Bosnian Islam as 'European Islam': Limits and Shifts of a Concept", in *Islam in Europe: Diversity, Identity and Influence*, eds. A. Al-Azmeh & E. Fokas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.), 108.

30 Ibid, 109.

6 Conclusion

In this chapter, we looked at local adaptations of the BDS in two very different sociopolitical and ethnic contexts. The two ostensibly different groups, the Bengali and Bosnian Muslims, the old and the young, became the subjects of our study with a goal of examining their perceptions of BDS and, accordingly, drawing possible conclusions regarding their varying interpretations of Islam and religious identity. When it comes to elderly Bengali Muslims in Tower Hamlets, they developed an isolationist approach concerned with preserving homeland values and customs. Watchful of citizenship and identity issues and positioned cautiously in relation to the state, the first generation encloses BDS within the private realm. By contrast, the British-born generation of idealistic activists whose main organizing principle is determined by Islamic perceptions demand that Britain takes on a more inclusive definition of itself – one that makes room for Islam and Muslims in it. For them, BDS expresses a more general explanation of what it means to be a Muslim in Britain.

Moving toward the heart of the European continent, we encounter similar uncertainties. Bougarel notes that Bosniaks experience the same "difficulty in defining their Muslim identity in a context where the state claims to be secular".[31] At the onset of war, Bosniaks typically put their hopes in a foreign military intervention and tried to appear as the "unanimous defenders of democracy and multiculturalism".[32] The prolonged conflict, however, sparked an outbreak of grievances and disputes that had remained concealed up until then. Islam became one of the main sources of disagreement and it continues to play that role today. Older Bosniaks we refer to that belong to country's most educated and skilled groups define Islam as individual faith. For them, BDS is a part of a continuous effort to belong to Europe and a rejection of supposedly "non-modern" versions of Islam relegated to the rural population and a new wave of religious believes. By comparison, young followers of Stand for Justice strive to restore Islam as the fundamental position around which the variety of the Bosniak community needs to be organized, thus opposing the "introverted" Islam of the older generation. They develop outlooks that are openly confrontational as well as intensely political and social. From this perspective, BDS is a reform movement characteristic of the intergenerational struggle for the transformations of Islam in Europe.

31 Ibid, 123.
32 Ibid, 98.

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