

Illuminationist Texts and Textual Studies

Iran Studies

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Hossein Ziai (1944–2011)

Illuminationist Texts and Textual Studies

Essays in Memory of Hossein Ziai

Edited by

Ali Gheissari
John Walbridge
Ahmed Alwishah



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Preface

The late Professor Hossein Ziai's interests focused on the Illuminationist (*Ishrāqī*) tradition of philosophy. He was convinced of the importance of the Islamic, and particularly Iranian, philosophical tradition in developing concrete intellectual encounters with western philosophical trends, as well as of the importance of this tradition for broader philosophical exchanges and communication. He believed that the historical and analytical approaches are equally important in investigating Iranian philosophical tradition and that this tradition enjoys a universality that gives it continued relevance in transcending academic boundaries and affords it a potential for shaping Iranian, Islamic and, by extension, world intellectual culture. His first book dealt with logic in the Illuminationist tradition. The bulk of his later scholarly work was devoted to making the texts of the Illuminationist tradition available, both through editing previously unpublished texts and translating them into English.

In his memory and honor several former colleagues and students of Ziai have contributed various chapters to this volume which on the whole represents different aspects of his broad interests and scholarly commitments. The present volume, more specifically, deals with the post-Avicennan philosophical tradition in Iran, and in particular the Illuminationist school and later philosophers, such as those associated with the School of Isfahan, who were fundamentally influenced by it. The focus of various chapters is on translations, editions, and close expositions of rationalist works in areas such as epistemology, logic and metaphysics rather than mysticism more generally, and also on specific texts rather than themes or studies of individual philosophers. The purpose of the volume is to introduce new texts into the modern canon of Islamic and Iranian philosophy. Various texts in this volume have not been previously translated nor have they been the subject of significant Western scholarship.

The present volume consists of fifteen chapters that are divided in four main parts.

Part 1 (Introduction) begins with a general Bio-Bibliographical Introduction of Hossein Ziai, by Ali Gheissari (Chapter 1), followed by an account of Hossein Ziai's contributions to Suhrawardī Studies, by John Walbridge (Chapter 2).

Part 2 (Suhrawardī and the Philosophy of Illumination) consists of five essays on various aspects of the formative periods of the Illuminationist Philosophy. In Chapter 3, "Illuminationist Manuscripts: Rediscovery and Reception of Suhrawardī," John Walbridge examines what the earliest manuscripts of Suhrawardī's works and certain later manuscript families can tell

us about the reception of his works and thought. The very limited number of manuscripts from the half century after his death seem to indicate that his works were known only in central Anatolia. Possibly as a result of the visit of the Jewish scholar Ibn Kammūna to Aleppo, probably around 1260, there was a flowering of interest in his works in the later 13th century with major commentaries and independent works by three significant figures. The article next examines the very different manuscript histories of Suhrawardī's Persian allegories and occult works. It also looks at the role of elegant manuscripts of works by Suhrawardī and his followers commissioned by the Ottoman Sultan Mehmet I. It concludes with some reflections on the choice of manuscripts as the basis of modern editions and the value of manuscripts as evidence for intellectual history.

In Chapter 4, Mohammad Karimi Zanjani Asl offers "Some Observations on the *Kashf al-Ghiṭā' li-Ikhwān al-Ṣafā'*" with a translation of the text by John Walbridge. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the author of *Kashf al-ghitā' li-ikhwān al-ṣafā'*, one of the short treatises on the theory of knowledge that is most debatable with regard to its author. There are numerous copies of this treatise, which show us that philosophers and mystics were interested in it from 8th century to 13th century A.H. In spite of the identical motto/title of the text, they attributed to it some different authors. These manuscripts and their authors can be generally divided into four groups: the first one ascribes the work to Shihāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā Suhrawardī (d. 587 A.H.); the second group attributes it to Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn 'Arabī (d. 638 A.H.); the third group of copies names Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kīshī (d. 695 A.H.) as its author; and finally, the fourth group, being included in a collection of manuscripts, does not mention an author at all. This chapter further aims to identify the author of *Kashf al-ghitā'* by reviewing the codicological information and comparing its content with the opinions of the attributed authors, as well as making accessible this treatise for readers. Thus, it includes two parts: The first, discussion about its authorship, explains its content, especially its author's opinion on the theory of knowledge. In the second, it presents a critical edition of this treatise based on seven manuscripts from the 8th to 11th centuries A.H.

In Chapter 5, John Walbridge introduces Suhrawardī's *I'tiqād al-ḥukamā'*. Accordingly, both the content and channels of manuscript transmission of the philosopher Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī's short Arabic treatise, *I'tiqād al-ḥukamā'*, "The Creed of the Sages," show that this was an early work written prior to his "conversion" to Platonism/Illuminationism. Nevertheless, the concern with the compatibility of Sufism and philosophy is already present. Combined with parallel evidence from content and transmission of his Persian allegories, this provides evidence of his early philosophical and religious

standpoints. The *I'tiqād al-ḥukamā'* is a short treatise of about ten printed pages defending the position that doctrines held by the ancient philosophers were compatible with revealed religion in general and Islam in particular. The account given of philosophy is Avicennan and covers cosmology, the relationship of God and the universe, the nature of the human soul, the basic structure of the physical world, and the religious topics of the immortality of the soul and the nature and powers of prophets and saints. The text argues that while the doctrines of the philosophers may appear to differ from those of revealed religion, the underlying meaning is the same—for example, that the philosophers' notion of the contingency of the universe is essentially identical with the religious idea of its being created. The *I'tiqād* contains none of the distinctive ideas of Suhrawardī's masterwork, *The Philosophy of Illumination*: light as the fundamental reality, four rather than three metaphysical levels, the Platonic Forms, and the critique of Avicennan ontology. This points to an early origin in Iran prior to his philosophical conversion and later journeys in Anatolia and Syria. This impression is reinforced by the evidence of the ten known manuscripts, which indicate that the work initially circulated in Iran and then in Iraqi Shi'ite circles. It was seemingly unknown to the Sunni circles reviving Suhrawardī's works in the later 13th century in Iraq and Anatolia.

In Chapter 6, Malihe Karbassian explores "The Meaning and Etymology of *Barzakh* in Illuminationist Philosophy." This chapter examines the difference between Suhrawardī's usage of the term *barzakh* to mean 'body' and its common usage in Arabic and Persian as a 'barrier' and 'state between heaven and hell.' Starting with the origin and etymology of *barzakh*, the essay examines the definition of the term in Arabic and Persian classical dictionaries and its usage in the Qur'ān, in Ibn 'Arabī, and in Sufi literature. It also discusses the origin of the term, and concludes by explaining the relationship between concepts, body, and barrier. Acknowledging earlier works by authors such as Scher, Jeffery and Widengren on the Persian origin of *barzakh*, the essay arrives at a different conclusion about its meaning. Earlier scholarship on the etymology of *barzakh* had focused on its meaning as barrier and later studies attempted to link barrier with body, or the material state. The essay goes further and offers an inclusive etymology that accommodates both meanings. In Chapter 7, Nasrollah Pourjavady investigates the concept of *Sakīna* in Suhrawardī's philosophical and mystical works in general and in his Persian treatise *Şafīr-i sīmurgh* in particular. In the course of his investigation he shows that Suhrawardī defines *sakīna* as a particular inner light that a philosopher-mystic experiences on the path leading to the knowledge of God (*ma'rifa*).

Part 3 (The Illuminationists or Suhrawardī's Commentators), begins with Chapter 8, "Suhrawardī and Ibn Kammūna on the Impossibility of Having Two

Necessary Existents” Ahmed Alwishah explores Avicenna’s argument for the unicity of the Necessary Existent (God) and the impossibility of having two necessary existents is extensively debated in the post-Avicennian tradition. He further shows how, in his commentary on the Metaphysics of Suhrawardī’s *Sharḥ al-talwīḥāt al-lawḥiyya wa’l-‘arshīyya*, Ibn Kammūna reconstructs and develops Avicenna’s argument by introducing a set of complex and robust premises. Accordingly, in doing so, Ibn Kammūna, following Suhrawardī, recognizes that Avicenna’s argument is indefensible unless one justifies that (1) Avicenna’s claim that the “existence” of the Necessary Existent is His “essence,” and that (2) it is inconceivable for the human intellect to separate between the “essence” and the “existence” of the Necessary Existent. Alwishah further argues that in demonstrating the latter, Ibn Kammūna, using *reductio ad absurdum*, shows that were the intellect to separate the “essence” of the Necessary Existent from his “existence,” this would entail that his “essence” be a universal. A universal essence by definition includes existent intelligibles and non-existent intelligibles—i.e., contingent intelligibles. But, for the “essence” of the Necessary Existent to have non-existent intelligibles is for it to be contingent; thus the Necessary Existent would be contingent. Alwishah further states that, such a conclusion, according to Ibn Kammūna, would contradict what it is to be a Necessary Existent, and hence it is impossible to separate between the “essence” and the “existence” of the Necessary Existent. In addition to his examination of Ibn Kammūna’s argument, Alwishah also provides a translation of selected passages from Ibn Kammūna’s commentary relating to the inseparability of “essence” and “existence of the Necessary Existent in human intellect and the impossibility of having two necessarily existents.

Chapter 9, by Y. Tzvi Langermann, focuses on “*Ithbāt al-mabda’* by Sa’d b. Maṣṣūr Ibn Kammūna: A Philosophically Oriented Monotheistic Ethic.” Accordingly, Sa’d bin Maṣṣūr Ibn Kammūna (d. 1284) is best known as a philosopher in the Avicennian tradition and a writer on comparative religion. However, he has also left us two writings, with considerable overlap between them, which address *‘amal*—ethics and praxis—as well as *‘ilm*. Both the theoretical and practical philosophy in the two works are presented in a manner that would appeal to all monotheists, almost completely devoid of scriptural references and other denominational markers. The paper published here is an introductory essay and translation of the shorter of the two, *Ithbāt al-mabda’* (“Establishing [the truth concerning and the existence of] the Origin”). Langermann further argues that the theoretical philosophy deals with the establishing the existence of a Supreme Being, the “source” indicated in the title. Whether or not the universe had a beginning in time, it has its source or

principle in a single, utterly immaterial being. Ibn Kammūna, in this monograph as indeed in just about all of his works, delves deeply into the human soul, whose indestructability, unicity, and other qualities parallel those of the deity. The ethics, which in part are borrowed from Ghazālī, urge detachment from the hustles and worries of this world. One must divest oneself, not just from bad personal and social behavior, but from attachment to this mortal existence, which can come to an end at any moment. Ibn Kammūna's message speaks not only of character refinement, but also of worship and prayer, again, though, without relation to the practices of specific monotheistic communities.

In Chapter 10, "Constructing a World of Its Own: A Translation of the Chapter on the World of Image from Shahrazūrī's *Rasā'il al-Shajarah al-Ilāhiyya*," Cornelis van Lit and Christian Lange, argue that the idea of a world of image (*'ālam al-mithāl*) concerns a world beyond our earthly world, to be reached in sleep, meditation or after death. This world consists of non-physical (imagined) bodies, which can be of any form or kind, and which both humans and angels can enter and leave. Accordingly, this notion was principally developed by Muslim thinkers as a philosophical solution to the problem of bodily resurrection, but found other uses too, such as explaining mystical visions. The authors further argue that the theory behind such an approach is recognized as one of the most innovative developments of Islamic philosophy and is unique compared to other philosophical traditions. It was first fully articulated by Shahrazūrī (d. ≥1288), in his commentaries on the works of Suhrawardī (d. 1191). Shahrazūrī's most elaborate and detailed discussion of it is found in his *Rasā'il al-shajara al-ilāhiyya*, and is here translated for the first time.

Chapter 11, by Reza Pourjavady, is on Suhrawardī's Postscript to *al-Abwāḥ al-Imādīyya* and Nayrīzī's commentary on this work. *Tablets of Imād al-Dīn (al-Abwāḥ al-Imādīyya)* is a work by Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī's (d. 587/1191) written late in his career. Despite its philosophical contents, this work does not receive much scholarly attention throughout history. Najm al-Dīn Nayrīzī (d. after 933/1526), a philosopher of the early Safavid era was the author of the only commentary ever written on this work. The early version of the commentary which is completed in 930/1524 seems to have been based on a single copy of this work available to the commentator at the time. Two years later, Nayrīzī found another copy of the work with a longer text. He regarded the additional portion a 'postscript' (*dhayl*) by the author and commented upon it. This article examines if the additional portion is indeed a postscript and at the end, it includes Nayrīzī's commentary on this portion.

Part 4 (The Wider Tradition), consists of four additional chapters. Chapter 12, by Khaled El-Rouayheb, focuses on *Takmil al-manṭiq*, a manual on logic that was first discussed by Nicholas Rescher in his pioneering articles from the

1960s on the post-Avicennan tradition of modal syllogistic. Rescher had a vague and inaccurate idea of the date and provenance of the work, mistaking the scribe who copied the manuscript he used for the author. In this chapter El-Rouayheb attempts to identify the author of the manual on the basis of an extant, autograph manuscript.

In Chapter 13, “Fārābī’s Purposes of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* and Avicenna’s ‘Eastern’ Philosophy,” Charles Butterworth shows that Alfarabi’s *Treatise on the Purposes of Aristotle’s Metaphysics* or *Maqāla fī aghrād mā ba’d al-ṭabī’a* offers important insight into Aristotle’s most important book, insight whose merit has been recognized by no less a figure than Avicenna. Indeed, his famous declaration that this treatise provided the insight he needed for making sense of Aristotle’s book is high recommendation. The particular insight Fārābī provides has been well summarized by Muhsin Mahdi in the Introduction to his 1969 edition of *Kitāb al-ḥurūf* or *Book of Letters*. In a word, Fārābī insists in this treatise that the subject of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* is the categories, not God or divine being. That characterization of the treatise shows why anyone wishing to understand Avicenna’s Eastern or *Ishrāqī* bent must begin by making sense of Fārābī’s approach to Aristotle. That is the goal of this essay. To assist those who would like to come to their own judgment about this particular question, the analysis is preceded by an English translation of Fārābī’s treatise. Although it has already been translated four times into English, twice into French, and once into German as well as Spanish, none of them renders Fārābī’s prose accurately and precisely. To do so is the goal of this new translation.

Chapter 14, “Mind the Gap: The Reception of Avicenna’s New Argument against Actually Infinite Space,” by Jon McGinnis, offers a set of translations related to a novel argument by Avicenna for the finitude of the cosmos and that argument’s ultimate reception in the late classical and post-classical world of Islam. The translations include selections from the *Ishārāt* of Avicenna himself (d. 1037) along with *Sharḥ al-ishārāt* of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 1274); Abū ’l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī’s (d. 1165) *al-Kitāb al-mu’tabar*; *Hidāyat al-ḥikma* from the pen of Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī (d. 1264) and Mullā Ṣadrā’s (d. 1636) commentary on that work; Najm al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī al-Kātībī’s (d. 1277) *Ḥikmat al-‘ayn* and finally the historically late Indian thinker, Faḍl-i Ḥaqq al-Khayrābādī’s (d. ca. 1850) *al-Hadiyya al-sa’idīyya*. The accompanying explanatory notes occasionally supplement the discussion with comments from other post-classical Muslim philosophers. These philosophers include Sharaf al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Mas‘ūdī (f. 1186), Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1209), Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥṭānī (d. 1365) and Qaḍī Mir Ḥusayn Maybudī (d. 1504). Finally, Chapter 15, by Eiyad

al-Kutubi, offers a “Translation of Mullā Sadrā’s The Traveler’s Provision (*Zād al-Musāfir*).”

In the preparation of this volume we have been fortunate to receive various contributions from friends and colleagues whose work, in one way or the other, reflect a broad range of philosophical interests that were also shared by Hossein Ziai, in whose memory this volume has come together. We should also record our thanks to Kathy van Vliet the acquisition editor at Brill, the Iran Studies Editorial Board, and the two anonymous readers, for their perceptive comments and suggestions throughout. In later stages of production helpful support was given by Gera van Bedaf and by Pieter te Velde from Brill’s editorial office. Ultimately Wheeler M. Thackston, a longtime friend of Hossein Ziai, provided valuable attention and editorial advice for which we are very grateful. In different phases of working on this volume Mahasti Afshar Ziai has been a constant source of encouragement in seeing the project moving forward. This book would not have materialized without her dedicated vision and inspiration.

AG, JW, AA

October 2017

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Qāsim ‘Alī Akhgar Ḥaydarābādī, ed. with Introduction and Notes, by Malihe Karbassian and M. Karimi (Tehran, 2006; and *A Short Dictionary of Old Iranian Mythology* (Tehran, 2005).

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Y. Tzvi Langermann

received his Ph.D. in History of Science from Harvard, where he studied under A.I. Sabra and John Murdoch. He spent about fifteen years cataloguing Hebrew and Judaeo-Arabic texts in philosophy and science at the Institute of Microfilmed Hebrew Manuscripts in Jerusalem before joining the Department of Arabic at Bar Ilan. He teaches Qur'ān and tafsīr, Maimonides, and other courses based on the reading of texts in philosophy, Sufism, and other topics. He published together with Gerrit Bos two monographs in the history of medicine: *The Alexandrian Summaries of Galen's On Critical Days: Editions and Translations of the Two Versions of the Jawāmi'*, with an Introduction and Notes, Brill, 2014 and *Maimonides, On Rules Regarding the Practical Part of the Medical Art*. A parallel Arabic-English edition, Brigham Young University Press, 2014. *Texts in Transit in the Medieval Mediterranean*, a collection of brand new essays which he edited together with Robert Morrison, was published by Pennsylvania State University Press in the summer of 2016.

Jon McGinnis

is Professor of classical and medieval philosophy at the University of Missouri, St. Louis. In addition to numerous articles, he is the author of *Avicenna* in the Oxford University Press' Great Medieval Thinkers Series (2010), translator and editor of Avicenna's *Physics* from his encyclopedic work, *The Healing* (Brigham Young University Press, 2009) and is co-translator with David C. Reisman of *Classical Arabic Philosophy, An Anthology of Sources* (Hackett Publishing Co., 2007).

Nasrollah Pourjavady

is a prolific scholar, author, and translator who specializes in Islamic philosophy, Sufi Studies, and Persian Literature. He was the founding director of Iran University Press and has held academic appointments at Tehran University, Colgate University, the Gregorian University in Rome, and University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. In 2005 Professor Pourjavady received the Alexander von Humboldt Award for excellence in research.

Reza Pourjavady

received his PhD in Islamic Studies from the Free University of Berlin (in 2008). He is currently a Visiting Professor at Ruhr University Bochum. He is specialized in the history of philosophy in medieval and early modern Iran. He is the author of *Philosophy in Early Safavid Iran: Najm al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-Nayrīzī and His Writings* (2011) and *A Jewish Philosopher of Baghdad: 'Izz al-Dawla Ibn Kammūna and His Writings* (with Sabine Schmidtke, 2006).

L.W. Cornelis van Lit

obtained his PhD at Utrecht University in 2014, studying the philosophy of Suhrawardī and his impact on the post-classical Islamic intellectual discourse. His book, *The World of Image in Islamic Philosophy* (Edinburgh, 2017), is a result of this work, which is closely associated with the contribution to the present volume. From 2014 to 2016, he was a Postdoctoral Associate at Yale University. He is currently a Postdoc at Jyväskylä University, Finland.

John Walbridge

is Professor of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures and Adjunct Professor of Philosophy and of History and Philosophy of Science at Indiana University Bloomington. He has a B.A. from Yale and a Ph.D. from Harvard, both in Near Eastern Languages. His academic specialty is post-classical Islamic philosophy, particularly the Illuminationist school, though he has also published on Islamic science and medicine and Islamic studies more generally. He is the author, co-author, or translator of nine books, including three monographs on Suhrawardī and the Illuminationist school. He was the co-author with Hossein Ziai of the standard edition and translation of Suhrawardī's *The Philosophy of Illumination*. His most recent books are *God and Logic: The Caliphate of Reason* and *The Alexandrian Epitomes of Galen*, Vol. 1.

PART 1

Introduction



Hossein Ziai, Professor of Philosophy and Iranian Studies: A Bio-Bibliographical Introduction

Ali Gheissari

Hossein Ziai was born in Mashhad, Iran, on 6 July 1944, and passed away in Los Angeles, California, on 24 August 2011. He had deep roots in Khorāsān where eight generations in his paternal line had lived and practiced medicine. Ziai was particularly attached to Torbat-e Heydariyeh, the birthplace of his physician grandfather, Mīrzā Āqā Zīā' (Zīā' al-Aṭṭibbā') (1870–1952), and penned a number of his books as Hossein Zīā'i-Torbatī.¹

Ziai's father, Mahmoud Ziai, (1909–1993), graduated from the American University of Beirut and earned an MD from L'Université de Lyon in France. He later established a successful practice in obstetrics and gynecology in Mashhad where he was also the director of the Shah Reza Hospital. Highly cultivated and fluent in English, French, Russian and Arabic, and with a basic knowledge of German, he moved to Tehran with his family in the late 1950s as a Majles deputy from Mashhad and chaired the foreign relations committee in the parliament until 1979 revolution. Ziai's mother, Ozra Rad Moshiri (1908–1991), was from Azerbaijan, whose great grandfather, Mīrzā Ja'far Khān Moshīr al-Dawleh was Iran's first permanent ambassador to Great Britain in 1860.² Well-versed in Persian poetry and a gifted miniaturist, she was among a pioneering generation of educated and altruistic Iranian women who committed their lives to social work. She attended Jeanne d'Arc High School in Tehran and, in the 1960s, studied public health administration in London. She was recognized

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- 1 Mīrzā Āqā Zīā', a prominent physician, was the son of Ḥāj Mīrzā Maḥmud (Ḥakīm-bāshī), also a noted physician. He began his early medical training under his father before going on to Mashhad and later to Tehran for further studies at the Dār al-Fonun. Mīrzā Āqā Zīā' later resided in Mashhad and in addition to medical practice was also an elected Majles deputy in several sessions from Torbat-e Heydariyeh and in one session from Kāshmar. See, respectively, Mortazā Ḥasanī-Nasab, "Khāndān-e Zīā'i", in: http://www.pajooh.com/fa/index.php?Page=definition&UID=42331#_ftnref1; and the Islamic Parliament Research Center, in: http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/parliament_member/show/771320.
 - 2 Denis Wright, "Great Britain ii: An Overview of Relations: Safavid to the Present," *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, XI/2, 2002, pp. 201–208, online edition: <http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/great-britain-ii>.

for her work at the Iranian relief organization, the Red Lion and Sun Society, and her long service as director general of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, in particular for her part in transforming the living conditions of patients who had contracted leprosy.

Ziai's primary education began at a public school in Mashhad. When the family moved to Tehran, he attended the Alborz High School (formerly the American College of Tehran) and completed the eleventh grade before traveling to the United States where, in 1962, he graduated from the Blake School in Minnesota. He went on to complete his undergraduate studies in Intensive Mathematics and Physics from Yale in 1967, and a doctorate in Islamic Philosophy from Harvard in 1976, under the supervision of Professor Muhsin Mahdi. Ziai's doctoral thesis focused on the twelfth century Persian thinker Shihāb al-Din Suhrawardi and dealt in most part with the logical and epistemological questions of the Illuminationist (*Ishrāqī*) philosophy, a theme that remained a major focus in much of his subsequent work and distinguished him in the field of Suhrawardi studies in Iran and abroad.

In 1970 in Tehran, he met Mahasti Afshar, a director of drama and classical music at the National Iranian Radio and Television (NIRT). They married in the summer of that year and moved to the United States where their son, Dad-Ali Ziai, was born in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 1973, and where, at a later period, she earned a doctorate in Sanskrit and Indo-European Oral Literature and Mythology from Harvard in 1988.

In 1974–75, supported by NIRT's director general Reza Ghotbi, Ziai proposed and helped to establish a research center dedicated to explore the philosophical bases for dialogue among civilizations. The Iranian Center for the Study of Cultures, as it came to be called, was founded in Tehran in 1977 under the patronage of the Queen Farah Pahlavi and in collaboration with a number of close colleagues such as Daryush Shaygan. By 1979, the Center had established a multilingual library specializing in philosophy, organized an international symposium at a historic site in Tehran, and commissioned a list of publications that included over twenty titles.³

From the time Ziai completed his doctorate in 1976 and returned to Iran until the end of 1980 when together with his family he left for Paris, he taught at the Iranian Institute of Philosophy, Tehran University, and the Aryamehr (later Sharif) University of Technology. His offered courses on a broad range

3 In Shaygan's estimation, soon after its inauguration the library's collection acquired some 40,000 titles. See Dāryūsh Shāyigān, *Zamīni-hā-yi Fikrī-i ʿarḥ-i Guftugū-yi Tamaddunhā* (Intellectual Backgrounds of the Dialogue of Civilizations Proposal), tr. Farzād Hāji, *Bukhara*, No. 74, 1388 (2010), available: <http://bukharamag.com/1389.03.709.html>.

of topics that included comparative philosophy, Greek philosophy, primary sources in western philosophy, and logic. Among these was an innovative seminar on reading and analyzing *Cartesian Meditations*, an important text in the phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), focusing on its comparable grounds with Islamic philosophy.

In 1982 Ziai returned to Harvard where he continued his research and also offered courses on Islamic philosophy, Sufism, and Islamic philosophical texts. He also served as visiting assistant professor of religious studies at Brown University for two years before joining Oberlin College as assistant professor of religious studies in 1987 where he taught comparative religion, phenomenology of religion, and introduction to Islamic thought and institutions in the medieval period.

In 1988 he joined the faculty of the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) and directed the Program in Iranian Studies where he established an undergraduate degree in Persian. In subsequent years he also supervised a significant number of graduate research in various aspects of Islamic philosophy and intellectual traditions in Iran. In 2008 he was appointed the inaugural holder of the Jahangir and Eleanor Amuzegar Chair in Iranian Studies at UCLA. Ziai's academic work was further recognized by his election as president of the distinguished *Société Internationale d'Histoire des Sciences et de la Philosophie Arabes et Islamiques*, in 2010.

In addition to Persian and English, Ziai was fluent in classical Arabic and French, had a reading knowledge of German and classical Greek, and studied Sanskrit with Daniel Ingalls at Harvard.

In conjunction with his full time teaching and other academic responsibilities, in 1998, Ziai initiated the Bibliotheca Iranica: Intellectual Traditions Series in collaboration with Mazda Publishers (Costa Mesa, CA) and served as its chief editor; until 2012 a total of fourteen titles related to history, literature, and philosophy were published in this series, the last title posthumously.

Ziai authored, edited, and translated ten books, wrote over forty scholarly articles, and contributed a large number of book chapters and encyclopedia articles.

His books included *Anwāriyya* (1979), Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Shahrzurī's *Sharḥ-i Hikmat al-ishrāq* (1993), Suhrawardī's *The Book of Radiance* (1998), *The Philosophy of Illumination* (1999), Ibn Kammūna's *Al-Tanqihāt fi sharḥ al-Talwihāt* (2002), and Mullā Ṣadrā's *Addenda on the Commentary on the Philosophy of Illumination: Part I on the Rules of Thought* (2010). Ziai's critical editions of primary sources in Persian and Arabic, with his erudite notes and commentary, are valuable contributions to the study of Islamic

thought and are also indicative of the continuity of philosophical tradition in Iran.

In addition to his scholarly work, Ziai pursued calligraphy and painting as a life-long hobby and produced a body of work that was first exhibited in Adams House at Harvard in 1984. Few samples of his work are reproduced here (see below, pp. 11–12), courtesy of his wife, Mahasti, in whose words, “[Hossein’s] art expresses a state of transcendence that he either experienced or longed for.” “He embedded Islamic mantras such as *lā-ilāha illā-hū* (*There is no god but He*), in mandalas rooted in Hindu and Buddhist spiritual traditions, and painted mountains and landscapes that, though imaginative, evoke his connection with Iran as a physical and spiritual region and the emotional core of his being.” “[His] work transcends religion and nationality; true to his own character, it mediates a singular wisdom, humanity, and generosity that is universal in its reach.”⁴

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Hossein Ziai, *Calligraphy*



FIGURE 1.1




FIGURE 1.2




FIGURE 1.3



FIGURE 1.4




FIGURE 1.5



FIGURE 1.6



FIGURE 1.7

FIGURES 1.1–1.7
*Marker pen on paper, 22 × 28 in., Cambridge, MA
(1983–1988).*

Hossein Ziai, *Watercolors*



FIGURE 1.8



FIGURE 1.9



FIGURE 1.10



FIGURE 1.11



FIGURE 1.12

FIGURES 1.8–1.12
Watercolor and colored pencil on paper, 4 × 6 in., Los Angeles, CA (1988–2011).




FIGURE 1.13 *Watercolor and colored pencil on paper, 4 × 10 in., Los Angeles, CA (1988–2011).*

Hossein Ziai and Suhrawardī Studies

John Walbridge

The philosophical thought of Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī has not been systematically studied. This book is an attempt to fill that lacuna. It is hoped that it will serve as a preliminary to a comprehensive investigation of the ideas of a man who has had a monumental influence on philosophical thought in Islam in general, and on Iranian speculative mysticism in particular.

HOSSEIN ZIAI, *Knowledge and Illumination*¹



As it happens, Hossein Ziai was my introduction to Suhrawardī. When I arrived at Harvard in the fall of 1974 as a second-year graduate student, he was acting as a teaching assistant to Wheeler Thackston for second-year Persian. The course focused on literature—classical in the fall and modern in the spring. One of the texts that Hussein chose for his discussion section was Suhrawardī's *'Aql-i Surkh*, "The Red Intellect." I still remember one of the first lines: *Būd-i harchi buvad az būd-i ū buvad*, "The being of all that is is from His being"—syntactically puzzling, especially for someone who did not yet know that medieval Persian sometimes used *buvad* in place of *bāshad*. A more detailed introduction came in a doctoral seminar a year later when Hossein presented his thesis, which later became his major monograph, *Knowledge and Illumination: A Study of Suhrawardī's Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*, still the only serious study of Suhrawardī's logic in a Western language. It was both more and less than a study of *The Philosophy of Illumination*. It dealt specifically with logic, mostly ignoring the metaphysical and allegorical aspects of Suhrawardī's thought that had been the focus of almost all earlier Western-language study of Suhrawardī, but it systematically compared the critique of Aristotelian logic in *The Philosophy of Illumination* with the unstudied and largely unpublished logical portions of

1 *Knowledge and Illumination: A Study of Suhrawardī's Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq* (Brown Judaic Studies 97; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990), p. 1.

Suhrawardī's so-called "Peripatetic works," four books that contain the bulk of his systematic philosophical writing and that he himself identified as key to understanding his system. It remains the only book-length study in a Western language attempting to study a significant aspect of Suhrawardī's thought across the whole range of his works.

Thus, the passage quoted above from the introduction to his *Knowledge and Illumination* sets out Hossein's program of research on Suhrawardī: it should be studied systematically as philosophy; it should be comprehensive, drawing on all of Suhrawardī's philosophical works; and it should be understood in the context of his influence on the later Islamic and Iranian philosophical and mystical traditions. Hossein never again published a monograph on Suhrawardī, though he published many articles on various aspects of his thought. Instead, the greater part of his output was devoted to broadening the textual base for studying the Illuminationist philosophy by the publication half a dozen major textual editions of Illuminationist texts. Of course, being a true Iranian intellectual, Hossein's interests sometimes wandered to other areas such as poetry and art.

Hossein Ziai on Suhrawardī's Logic

As an undergraduate Hossein majored in mathematics and physics, an unusual background for scholars of Islamic studies. Among his earliest publications, published during the four years he spent in Iran after completing his doctorate, were several articles and translations dealing with mathematics and logic, both modern and Islamic.

When he began his work on Suhrawardī's logic, the subject was doubly neglected. Such scholarship as there was on Suhrawardī had ignored his logic. It was nothing personal, for the whole post-classical period in Islamic logic—which is to say, more or less everything written by authors not translated into Latin in the twelfth century—had been ignored. To be sure, a great deal had been written—starting in the thirteenth century, in fact—about the logic of earlier authors such as Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, and Ibn Rushd, but everything thereafter had been largely ignored. Nicolas Rescher's pioneering history of Islamic logic, apart from giving bibliographical information, refers to the whole period after Ibn Rushd as "The Age of the Schoolmasters" and "the Era of Ossification," dismissing it as a period of sterile commentaries.² So far as I know, Hossein's

2 Rescher did have something to say about Suhrawardī: "However, he sponsored various non-Aristotelian innovations in logic which merit study," *The Development of Arabic Logic* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964), p. 186.

dissertation and the resulting book were the first monographic treatment in a Western language on the logical views of an Islamicate author not already known to Thomas Aquinas. The situation is now beginning to change, but in general the whole Islamic logical tradition from about 1200 CE on remains largely unknown.

Hossein's interest in Suhrawardī's logic was philosophical, not simply technical. He zeroed in on the most philosophically fruitful portion of Suhrawardī's logic, his theory of definition. This, Hossein saw, was a key difference between Ibn Sīnā's Aristotelianism and the Platonism of *The Philosophy of Illumination*. Suhrawardī had argued that Aristotelian definition simply did not work, that ultimately it depended on direct knowledge of what was to be defined. (Oddly enough, Ibn Taymīya made much the same criticism.) This led to Suhrawardī's famous and profoundly influential theory of knowledge by presence. His critique of the theory of definition, in other words, was the key to his epistemology, which in turn was the key to the rest of his system.

The difference between this approach and that of the earlier important interpreters of Suhrawardī, most notably Henry Corbin and his follower Seyyed Hossein Nasr, is fundamental. As Hossein wrote in the introduction to *Knowledge and Illumination*:

Suhrawardī's thought constitutes neither a theology, nor a theosophy, nor *sagesse orientale*, as the volume of scholarship to date may suggest. Instead it represents systematic mystical philosophy. To ignore completely the logical and epistemological component of his works guarantees an incomplete and therefore unsatisfying analysis. Suhrawardī's thought is characterized by a lack of dogmatism, with a dynamic disposition that permits change as the subject changes. Although it embraces wisdom, σοφία, in the strict sense, it is ultimately a philosophy that aims at examining things as well as the responses they evoke in the human being; and it endeavors to express coherently and systematically the results of this examination.³

In other words, whatever the mystical content of Suhrawardī's writings, they must be understood as philosophy.

³ Ziai, *Knowledge and Illumination*, p. 2.

Illuminationist Texts

When Hossein began his career, Suhrawardī was known to Western scholarship mostly through the works of the French orientalist Henry Corbin and his Iranian follower Seyyed Hossein Nasr. Corbin, while trapped in Istanbul during the Second World War, had begun an edition of Suhrawardī's works by publishing the metaphysical portions of Suhrawardī's three most important Peripatetic works, followed by an edition of *The Philosophy of Illumination*. Seyyed Hossein Nasr continued this project with an edition of Suhrawardī's Persian works. These volumes provided the chief basis for the study of Suhrawardī for several decades thereafter and are only now being supplanted. Hossein saw that these editions, invaluable though they were, were lacking in several respects. Most obviously, they omitted the logic and physics of the Peripatetic works. (Corbin's French translation of *The Philosophy of Illumination* also omitted its logic, though it is included in his Arabic edition.) Second, they did not include the commentary tradition, apart from some selections in Corbin's edition and translation of *The Philosophy of Illumination*, even though Suhrawardī's key works were invariably understood in the later Islamic philosophical tradition through the commentaries. Finally, there was a philosophical tradition beginning with Suhrawardī whose members had written their own works, all virtually unknown to modern scholarship.

Thus, much of Hossein's scholarly career came to be devoted to the analysis, publication, and sometimes translation of the works of Suhrawardī and his school. The bulk of these are commentaries on Suhrawardī's works. The first of these and Hossein's first published book was the *Anwārīya*,⁴ a Persian commentary written in India in 1599 by an otherwise unknown Indian author. The work was unusual in its use of Indian names and themes. This was followed by an edition of Shahrazūrī's commentary on *The Philosophy of Illumination*, evidently the first commentary on this work and the main source for the better-known commentary of Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī.⁵ In 2002, he published Ibn Kammūna's commentary on the physics of the *Talwīḥāt*, the best-known of Suhrawardī's Peripatetic works.⁶ In *Knowledge and Illumination*, Hossein had already pointed out the importance of Ibn Kammūna, a Jewish philosopher active in Baghdad in the third quarter of the thirteenth century. It seems probable

4 Muḥammad Sharīf al-Hirawī, *Anwārīya* (Tehran: Amīr Kabīr, 1358/1979).

5 Shams al-Dīn al-Shahrazūrī, *Sharḥ Hikmat al-ishrāq* (Tehran: Mu'assasa-yi Muṭāla'āt va Taḥqīqāt-i Farhangī, 1372/1993).

6 *Al-Tanqīḥāt fī sharḥ al-Talwīḥāt: Refinement and Commentary on Suhrawardī's Intimations* (Bibliotheca Iranica.; Costa Mesa, Calif.: Mazda, 2002).

now that it was Ibn Kammūna who was mainly responsible for the rediscovery of Suhrawardī in the later thirteenth century. Finally, in 2010 he published the first half of Mullā Ṣadrā's glosses on *The Philosophy of Illumination*,⁷ previously only available in the virtually illegible marginal edition in the nineteenth century lithograph of Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī's commentary on *The Philosophy of Illumination*.

The best known of his editions is the edition and translation of *The Philosophy of Illumination* that Hossein and I collaborated on.⁸ The edition was done on the basis of carefully chosen manuscripts and on the two major commentaries. Its major contribution, however, was to provide a clear, sober, philosophically informed translation. This is now the standard translation of the work, being, for example, the version excerpted in *The Anthology of Philosophy in Persia* and used as the basis of the Turkish translation.⁹ Hossein also edited and translated Suhrawardī's *Partow-nāma*, *The Book of Radiance*, an early work in Persian.¹⁰ In this connection, it can be noted that he also republished Wheeler Thackston's translation of the Persian allegories, adding their Persian texts, in the Intellectual Traditions series that he edited for Mazda Publishers.

Finally, Hossein was concerned to make the independent works in the Illuminationist tradition known.¹¹ His earliest work in this area was a Persian article (1990) on the manuscript of Shahrazūrī's massive philosophical encyclopedia, *al-Shajara al-Ilāhīya*. He pointed out the importance of Ibn Kammūna's philosophical encyclopedia, known either as *al-Jadīd fī 'l-ḥikma* or *al-Kāshif*. Finally, in a work published posthumously, he edited with Mohammad Karimi Zanjani-Asl the *Nūr al-fu'ād* of the nineteenth century philosopher Shihāb al-Dīn Kumijānī.¹²

7 *Addenda on The Commentary on the the Philosophy of Illumination: Part One on the Rules of Thought; al-Ta'liqāt 'alā sharḥ Ḥikmat al-ishrāq fī dawābiṭ al-fikr* (Bibliotheca Iranica, Intellectual Traditions Series 13; Costa Mesa, Calif.: Mazda Publishers, 2010).

8 *The Philosophy of Illumination*, ed. and trans. John Walbridge and Hossein Ziai, (Islamic Translation Series; Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1999).

9 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *An Anthology of Philosophy in Persia*, vol. 4: *From the School of Illumination to Philosophical Mysticism* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2012), pp. 26–52.

10 *The Book of Radiance: Partaw-Nāma*, ed. and trans. Hossein Ziai (Bibliotheca Iranica; Intellectual Traditions 1; Costa Mesa CA: Mazda Publishers, 1998).

11 "The Manuscript of *al-Shajara al-ilāhīya*, A 13th c. Philosophical Encyclopedia by Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Shahrazūrī," *Irānshināsi*, 11/1 (spring, 1990), pp. 89–108.

12 Hossein Ziai and Mohammad Karimi Zanjani Asl, eds., *Inner Light [Nur Al-Fu'ad]: A 19th-Century Persian Text in Illuminationist Philosophy* (Bibliotheca Iranica: Intellectual Traditions; Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 2012) Hossein Ziai and Mohammad Karimi Zanjani

In all of his editions he was careful in his choice of manuscripts, something that is not always the case, and carefully explained the justification for his choice. In the edition of *The Philosophy of Illumination*, for example, he was able to show that there were two distinct textual traditions of the work, one going back to a manuscript read to Suhrawardī and represented in Shahrazūrī's commentary and another, also very early but edited to remove Persianisms and slips of the pen, represented by Qūṭb al-Dīn's commentary.¹³

Journal and Encyclopedia Articles

Hossein published several dozen articles and reviews. The journal articles often dealt with specific issues raised in the works of Suhrawardī and his followers. However, the articles that he wrote for encyclopedias and handbooks are perhaps of more importance, for they have helped set the agenda for the study of these writers. He wrote the article on Suhrawardī for the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, and Nasr and Leaman's *The Routledge History of Islamic Philosophy*, eleven other articles for *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, two other chapters in *The Routledge History*, and several articles in the *Encyclopaedia Iranica*.

Throughout his career, Hossein Ziai demonstrated a careful and sober scholarship that provided a basis for the work of those coming after him. His interpretations were careful, sensible, and philosophically grounded. His editions were models of philological scholarship. I had wanted to do another collaborative project with him, and I grieve that it will not happen.

رَوِّحَ اللهُ رَمْسَهُ

Asl, eds., *Inner Light [Nur Al-Fu'ad]: A 19th Century Persian Text in Illuminationist Philosophy* (Bibliotheca Iranica: Intellectual Traditions; Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 2012).

13 *The Philosophy of Illumination*, pp. xxx–xxxvii.

PART 2

Suhrawardī and the Philosophy of Illumination



Illuminationist Manuscripts: The Rediscovery of Suhrawardī and its Reception¹

John Walbridge

Introduction

Over the past decade I have been preparing a survey of the literature and manuscripts of the Illuminationist—Ishrāqī—school of Islamic philosophy.² So far I have identified about nine hundred Illuminationist manuscripts—that is, manuscripts containing works by or attributed to Shihāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā al-Suhrawardī, al-Maqtūl, Shaykh al-Ishrāq; the philosophical works of his three early commentators, Sa’d al-Dawla Ibn Kammūna, Shams al-Dīn al-Shahrazūrī, and Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī; commentaries and supercommentaries on the works of one of these authors; and works responding to issues raised in these works.³ I have seen the originals or photographs of about a third

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- 1 The original version of this paper was presented at a conference on 13th century Islamic philosophy sponsored by Yıldırım Beyazıt University in Ankara and was published in the conference proceedings, Murat Demirkol and M. Enes Kala, eds. *Uluslararası 13. Yüzyılda Felsefe Sempozyumu Bildirileri* (Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi İnsan ve Toplum Bilimleri Fakültesi Yayınları 1. Ankara: Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi İnsan ve Toplum Bilimleri Fakültesi, 2014). Pp. 37–49. I thank the editors of the proceedings for their permission to use this material.
 - 2 My main predecessor in this work is Helmut Ritter, “Philologika ix: Die vier Suhrawardī: ihre Werke in Stambuler Handschriften,” *Der Islam* 24–25 (1937–38), pp. 270–286, 35–86, who surveyed with remarkable thoroughness the Istanbul manuscript libraries. Not surprisingly, I found some things that he missed, but his survey has held up well. The other major basis for such manuscript study are the catalogs of Iranian manuscript libraries, which have appeared in a remarkable bibliographical efflorescence since the mid-20th century, culminating in the great union catalog edited by Muṣṭafā Dirāyatī, *Fankhā: Fihristagān-i nuskhahā-yi khaṭṭī-i Īrān* (Tehran: Sāzmān-i Asnād va Kitābkhāna-i Millī-i Jumhūrī-i Islāmī-i Īrān, 1390/2011–).
 - 3 There is, I am well aware, question as to in what sense figures like Ibn Kammūna and al-Shahrazūrī can be called Ishrāqī, “Illuminationist.” Indeed, the question of what it means to say that al-Suhrawardī himself was an Illuminationist is still very much up in the air; my most recent attempt to answer that question is “Suhrawardī’s (d. 1191) *Intimations of the Tablet and the Throne: The Relationship of Illuminationism and Peripatetic Philosophy*,” in Sabine Schmidtke and Khalid El-Rouayheb, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 255–277. In a sense, the point is moot since my

of these, in most cases in Turkish libraries. This number could be increased or decreased somewhat depending on the attributions of certain works and the criteria used to identify something as Illuminationist or a supercommentary.

Though almost all the most important Islamic manuscript collections have published catalogs, their quality varies, and in some cases lack of indexing makes the catalogs difficult to use. *Majmū'as*—manuscripts containing a variety of shorter texts—are particularly likely to be poorly cataloged, thus concealing the existence of manuscripts of shorter works. New manuscript catalogs are constantly being published, especially in Iran, often in editions that are difficult to find.

Taking all this into account, it seems likely that there exist something in excess of two thousand Illuminationist manuscripts. There is little doubt that almost all the most important manuscripts are known to us and are found in libraries in Turkey and Iran rather than in Europe. The reasons for this are straightforward. al-Suhrawardī and his 13th century commentators were recognized as important authors quite early. The regions where important Illuminationist manuscripts were likely to have been produced were, for the most part, under Ottoman rule for many centuries, and the best manuscripts in all fields tended to find their way to Constantinople. If they did not, they were likely to end up in the libraries of Safavid and Qajar Iran, where interest in philosophy has remained strong since the time of al-Suhrawardī. In neither country were the main libraries picked over by European collectors and adventurers as happened in North Africa and India.

This is not to say that there are not discoveries to be made, particularly for shorter works. Shahrazūrī's list of al-Suhrawardī's works,⁴ compiled about a century after the latter's death, contains about forty-nine titles, at least a dozen of which have no known manuscripts, and there are at least as many more whose identity with existing manuscripts is uncertain. Since some of the works we do have exist in only one or a few manuscripts, it is possible that

larger purpose in this chapter is to show how manuscripts can be used as historical sources, apart from their value as sources of particular texts.

4 The list is in the entry on al-Suhrawardī's life in al-Shahrazūrī's *Nuzhat al-arwāḥ wa-rawḍat al-afrāḥ*, published three times so far: ed. S. Khurshid Aḥmad (2 vols.; Hyderabad, Deccan: Dā'irat al-Ma'ārif al-Uthmāniyya, 1396/1976); ed. 'Abd al-Karīm Abū Shuwayrib ([Tripoli, Libya]: Jam'iyat al-Da'wa al-Islāmiyya al-'Ālamiyya, 1398/1978); reprinted Paris: Dar Byblion, 2007); ed. Muḥammad 'Alī Abū Rayyān (1st ed.; Alexandria: Dār al-Ma'rifa al-Jāmi'a, 1414/1988). A pre-modern Persian translation by Maḥsūd-'Alī Tabrīzī, an Indian writer of the early 12th/17th century has also been published; *Nuzhat al-arwāḥ wa-rawḍat al-afrāḥ*, ed. Muḥammad-Taqī Dānish-Pazhūh and Muḥammad-Surūr Mawlā'ī, (Tehran: Intishārāt-i 'Ilmī va Farhangī, 1365/1986).

new works may turn up in some *majmū'a* or other or in the collection of some newly cataloged mosque or madrasa library.

Given the material that we do have, what do the known manuscripts tell us about the transmission and reception of the works of al-Suhrawardī and his early commentators? Quite a lot, as it turns out. In this chapter, I will begin with the very limited evidence for the manuscripts produced by or on behalf of al-Suhrawardī himself and for the surviving manuscripts from the six decades after his death. I will then look at the rediscovery of al-Suhrawardī, as represented by the commentaries and related works of his three 13th century commentators: Sa'd al-Dawla Ibn Kammūna, Shams al-Dīn al-Shahrazūrī, and Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī. I will also look at the early manuscripts produced between the death of al-Suhrawardī and the 730s/1330s that are those most important for establishing the texts of his writings. This period is also important because it set the pattern for the reception of al-Suhrawardī's works. After that, I will briefly consider the Ottoman Illuminationist manuscripts and their significance. Finally, I will look at three patterns of transmission: those of the Persian allegories and related works, the occult works attributed with more or less plausibility to al-Suhrawardī, and the role of *majmū'a* in the transmission of the minor works.

The Evidence for al-Suhrawardī's Autographs and Contemporary Manuscripts

The evidence relating to the initial production and dissemination of al-Suhrawardī's works is extremely scanty. The biographical dictionaries do not mention how he produced his books, nor do his own works have much helpful to say. There are, however, two attestations of manuscripts read to al-Suhrawardī for correction. This was a standard means of producing a correct manuscript. Someone, usually a student, would copy a manuscript and then read it aloud to the author or to someone with the authorization to transmit the text, who would orally correct—or sometimes revise—the text.

Istanbul University AY 4302 (Halis 688r) is a complete manuscript of al-Suhrawardī's *al-Mashārī' wa'l-Muṭārahāt* (The Paths and Havens, a large philosophical encyclopedia in the Peripatetic style) dating by Henry Corbin's estimate to the first half of the 8th/14th century, a rich period for the production of Illuminationist manuscripts.⁵ My impression when I examined it was

5 Henry Corbin, ed., *Oeuvres philosophiques et mystiques/Majmū'a-i Muṣannafāt-i Shaykh-i Ishrāq* (Bibliothèque Iranienne N.S. 2; Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, and Tehran: Académie

that it was somewhat later, though still old. A collation note at f. 237b says, “Collated with a manuscript that was copied from a manuscript copied in his time and read to him, but God knows best.” Since the manuscript is neither signed nor dated, the most we can conclude is that a manuscript from al-Suhrawardī’s circle survived at least until the 8th/14th century.

In his commentary on the *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq* (The Philosophy of Illumination), Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī mentioned that he had used a manuscript copied from a copy read to al-Suhrawardī, which seems to be the manuscript referred to as “one of the manuscripts,” from which he occasionally cites variant readings. These variants in turn almost always agree with the text preserved in al-Shahrazūrī’s commentary. Quṭb al-Dīn, however, prefers another version that eliminates most of the Persianisms and corrects various minor slips of the pen. From this, Hossein Ziai and I inferred that the original text of *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq* contained some deviations from standard Arabic reflecting al-Suhrawardī’s native Persian and that someone prior to 694/1295 when Quṭb al-Dīn’s commentary was written, produced a more polished text.⁶ This was probably a scholar of the 7th/13th century, but he could have been al-Suhrawardī himself or one of his students.

The only other evidence of manuscripts of al-Suhrawardī prior to his death concerns the philosopher ‘Abd al-Laṭīf al-Baghdādī (557/1162–3–629/1231–2) who went to Mosul in 585/1189 where the following year, the year before al-Suhrawardī’s death, the scientist Kamāl al-Dīn ibn Yūnus (1156–1242) gave him manuscripts of the *Talwihāt* (The Intimations, a philosophical encyclopedia of intermediate size), the *Lamaḥāt* (The Glimpses), and the *Ma‘ārij* (The Stairs). ‘Abd al-Laṭīf was unimpressed, dismissing these works, particularly the *Lamaḥāt*, as inept adaptations of Ibn Sīnā’s *Ishārāt* (The Hints) inferior to his own rough drafts.⁷ ‘Abd al-Laṭīf believed al-Suhrawardī to be in Diyarbakır at that time, which was possible since he seems to have been in Anatolia at some

Impériale Iranienne de Philosophie, 1976), vol. 1. French p. lxxviii. Ritter, p. 282. There is a microfilm at Uppsala University, MF 15:2633–39; Bernhard Lewin, Oscar Löfgren, and Mikael Persenius, eds., *Catalogue of the Arabic Manuscripts in the Hellmut Ritter Microfilm Collection of the Uppsala University Library*, Acta Bibliothecae R. Universitatis Upsaliensis. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 1992.

6 See the editors’ introduction to *The Philosophy of Illumination*, ed. and trans. John Walbridge and Hossein Ziai (Islamic Translation Series. Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1999), pp. xxx–xxxii.

7 I am in the process of translating the *Talwihāt*, and it does seem to have a close connection to Ibn Sīnā’s *Ishārāt*.

point in the later 1180s.⁸ Tzvi Langermann suggests that the link between Ibn Yūnus, al-Suhrawardī, and ‘Abd al-Laṭīf was a common interest in alchemy. As for ‘Abd al-Laṭīf’s charge of inept plagiarism, the *Lamaḥāt* is by al-Suhrawardī’s own statement a presentation of the views of the Peripatetics, by which he means Ibn Sīnā and his followers, and is, in fact, a rather elementary introduction to philosophy.

Biographical sources mention that al-Suhrawardī’s students scattered after his execution, and we know none of their names. This is most likely the reason why autograph manuscripts were not preserved.

The Earliest Surviving Manuscripts, 588/1192–650/1252

Only a handful of manuscripts survive from the period between the death of al-Suhrawardī and Ibn Kammūna’s rediscovery of his works (of which more below). They do, however, document a representative sample of his works.

The oldest known manuscript of a work by al-Suhrawardī is Vatican arab. 873, a manuscript of the *Lamaḥāt* completed on 3 Šafar 588/19 Feb. 1192 by one Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Abī Muḥammad ‘Abd Allāh b. Mubārak b. Ḥamza al-Ḥalabī in Aleppo.⁹ Thus, this manuscript was copied only a few months after al-Suhrawardī’s death and in the same city. I do not know how this manuscript came to be in the Vatican library, but owner’s notes indicate that it was still in the Islamic world in 1666.

8 Tzvi Langermann, “Ibn Kammūna in Aleppo,” pp. 4–6. It is not clear what is meant by *al-Ma‘ārij*. There is an Arabic work on the hierarchy of the hidden Sufi saints entitled *Ma‘ārij al-albāb fī kashf mu‘ādalāt al-afrād wa’l-alqāb* (The Stairs for Hearts in Revealing the Levels of the Individuals and Titles) preserved in three Istanbul manuscripts, none of which mention al-Suhrawardī’s name. The other possibility is that it is the *Mi‘rāj-nāma*, a treatise on the Prophet’s ascent to heaven whose attribution of al-Suhrawardī is also uncertain but whose title is at least mentioned in al-Shahrazūrī’s bibliography.

9 Giorgio Levi della Vida, *Elenco dei manoscritti arabi islamici della Biblioteca Vaticana: Vaticani, Barberiniani, Borgiani, Rossiani* (Studi e testi; Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1935), p. 82. There are microfilms at St. Louis University, St. Louis, Missouri, Vatican Film Library, roll 10671; in the Markaz-i Iḥyā’-i Turāth-i Islāmī in Qom, Sayyid Ja‘far Ḥusaynī Ishkawārī, and Sayyid Šādiq Ḥusaynī Ishkawārī, *Fihrist-i nuskahā-yi ‘aksī-i Markaz-i Iḥyā’-i Mirāth-i Islāmī* (Qum: Majma‘-i Dhakhā’ir-i Islāmī, 1377/1998), vol. 1, pp. 115, 119; and in the Mar‘ashī Library in Qom, Muḥammad-‘Alī Ḥā’irī, *Fihrist-i nuskahā-yi ‘aksī-i kitābkhāna-i ‘umūmī-i Ḥaḍrat-i Āyat Allāh al-‘Uẓmā Mar‘ashī Najafī*. (Qom: Kitābkhāna-yi Mar‘ashī, 1369/1990), vol. 1, pp. 115, 119.

The most popular of al-Suhrawardī's works in this early period, at least to judge from the surviving manuscripts, was the *Tabwīḥāt*, a work in which al-Suhrawardī is unquestionably advancing his own views, albeit in the language of Ibn Sīnā.¹⁰ The earliest surviving manuscript is Tehran Majlis 114, which also contains a copy of the *Lamaḥāt*.¹¹ It was copied in 607/1210 in Malatya, a city in central Anatolia roughly between Diyarbakır and Aleppo, an area where al-Suhrawardī is known to have been active. It is an unimpressive manuscript, written in an unprofessional hand in a 9 × 14 cm pocket notebook.

The second manuscript is Manisa 2216, copied and annotated for his own use by Aḥmad b. 'Abd al-Ghafūr b. al-Khaṭīb al-Zaranī [?] in 616/1219.¹² No location is given. This is a well-produced manuscript—fully pointed and partially vocalized.

The third early al-Suhrawardī manuscript is Serez 1967, copied by Ghazālī b. 'Umar b. Ghazālī al-Qaṣabī [?] al-Tiflīsī in 626/1229 in Sivas, another central Anatolian city.¹³ This too is a fine copy—complete and handsomely written.

One manuscript of *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq* falls into this period: Konya, Yusuf Agha 5544, dated 640/1242.¹⁴ I have not seen this manuscript and thus can say no more about it.

The final pre-Ibn Kammūna manuscript is Leiden, Or. 2541/2 (Ar. 1899, Lb. 170), ff. 27–31.¹⁵ This is an extract that appears in a small manuscript otherwise containing two texts on astronomy copied by Aḥmad b. 'Abd Allāh b. Aḥmad al-Shīrāzī [?], the first of them in 646/1248.

There is not too much to say about the al-Suhrawardī manuscripts of this period. The oldest manuscript might be by one of al-Suhrawardī's elusive disciples; at any rate, it was copied in Aleppo a few months after his death. Second,

10 Walbridge, "Suhrawardī's (d. 1191) *Intimations*."

11 Al-Suhrawardī, *Majmū'ā-i Muṣannafāt* vol. 4, p. xxvi. Yūsuf I'tiṣāmī, *Fihrist-i Kitābkhāna-i Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Millī*, (Tehran: Kitābkhāna-i Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Millī, 1311/1932), vol. 2, pp. 58–59.

12 *Manisa İl Halk Kütüphanesi Tespit Fişleri* (n.p.: n.pub., 1995), vol. 8, p. 189. Ramazan Şeşen, *Mukhtārāt min al-makhtūṭāt al-'arabiyya al-nādīra fī maktabāt Turkīyā* (Istanbul: Waqf al-Abḥāth lil-Tārīkh wa'l-Funūn wa'l-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya (İsār), 1997). Available online through Yazmalar.gov.tr, archive no. 45 Hk 2216. Şeşen, *Navādir al-makhtūṭāt al-'arabiyya fī maktabāt Turkīyā* (Beirut: Dār al-Jadīd, 1975), vol. 2, pp. 100–101.

13 I have examined a scan of the manuscript, but there is no published information on it.

14 Şeşen, *Navādir*, vol. 1, p. 490.

15 P. Voorhoeve, *Handlist of Arabic Manuscripts* (2nd enlarged ed.; Bibliotheca Universitatis Leidensis: Codices Manuscripti; The Hague: Leiden University Press, 1980), p. 362. Jan Just Witkam, *Inventory of the Oriental Manuscripts of the Library of the University of Leiden* (Leiden: Ter Lugt Press, 2007), vol. 3, p. 155.

none of the manuscripts seem to be “public,” by which I mean that they do not seem to have been officially commissioned for mosque, madrasa, or royal libraries. Finally, all the manuscripts whose location of copying we know are from central Anatolia or Aleppo, regions that we know al-Suhrawardī traveled in. Two whose location of copying we do not know are in Anatolian libraries, an indication, though not a proof, that they originated in that area. From this we may cautiously infer that al-Suhrawardī was mostly known in this area in the half century after his death. This makes sense, given that most of his post-schooling travels were in this area and his “scattered students” would have been likely to end up there as well.

The Age of Ibn Kammūna, 650/1252–711/1311

As Tzvi Langermann has pointed out, sometime around the middle of the 7th/13th century a Baghdad Jewish ophthalmologist named Ibn Kammūna (d. 683/1284) visited Aleppo.¹⁶ The date and circumstances of this visit are not known with certainty, but it seems likely that he became acquainted with the works of al-Suhrawardī on this visit. In 667/1268 he completed a commentary on the *Talwīḥāt*, which regularly cited the *Mashāriʿ* and, to a lesser extent, *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, indicating that he had copies of these two works. This was followed by major commentaries on the *Talwīḥāt* and *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, the latter in 685/1286, by the mysterious Shams al-Dīn al-Shahrazūrī (d. after 687/1288), about whom virtually nothing is known.¹⁷ The third and last key figure of this period was Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (d. 711/1311),¹⁸ a major scientist who wrote the best-known commentary on *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq* as well as a Persian philosophical encyclopedia that is largely a translation of a similar

16 Langermann, “Ibn Kammūna.”

17 P. Lory, “al-Shahrazūrī,” in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., consulted online on 30 May 2017. Daniele Mascitelli, “L’identità di Šams al-Dīn Šahrazūrī filosofo ‘Išrāqī’: Un caso aperto,” *Rivista degli studi orientali* (1995), vol. 69, Fasc. 1–2, pp. 219–227. Emily Cottrell, “Šams al-Dīn al-Šahrazūrī et les manuscrits de ‘La promenade des âmes et le jardin des réjouissances: Histoire des philosophes’ (*Nuzhat al-arwāḥ wa-rawḍat al-afrāḥ fī ta’rīḥ al-ḥukamā*),” *Bulletin d’études orientales* (2006), vol. 56, pp. 225–260, 370–371.

18 On his life and works, see John Walbridge, *The Science of Mystic Lights: Qutb al-Din Shirazi and the Illuminationist Tradition in Islamic Philosophy* (Harvard Middle Eastern Monographs 26; Cambridge, Mass.: Centre for Middle Eastern Studies, 1992), particularly ch. 1 and the appendices.

Arabic work by Ibn Kammūna.¹⁹ From this point the story of al-Suhrawardī's manuscripts becomes a story of reception, not an account of isolated manuscripts. I will therefore comment on patterns, mentioning only a few particularly interesting or significant manuscripts.

Manuscripts of al-Suhrawardī multiply in this period and, for the first time, manuscripts of works responding to his works. There are three dated manuscripts of the *Mashārīf* from this period, one of the *Talwīḥāt*, five of *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, one of the *Lamaḥāt*, four of *Hayākil al-nūr*, and one of the *Muqāwamāt*. There are, in addition, eleven dated manuscripts of Ibn Kammūna's commentary on the *Talwīḥāt*, two (or perhaps three) of Shahrazūrī's commentary on the same work, one of al-Shahrazūrī's commentary on *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, and four of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī's commentary on the same work. This habit of reading al-Suhrawardī's key works through commentaries, particularly Ibn Kammūna's on the *Talwīḥāt* and Quṭb al-Dīn's on *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, became steadily more pronounced, so that there are more manuscripts of these commentaries than there are of the works in isolation. The effect of this is particularly significant in the case of Quṭb al-Dīn's commentary on *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, where al-Suhrawardī's striking metaphysics of light has been translated into the language of the Avicennan Peripatetics, setting the pattern for later interpretation of al-Suhrawardī's metaphysics, where it is understood as a critique of Ibn Sīnā and the light metaphysics survives mainly as poetic images rather than as a philosophical system.²⁰

A few manuscripts or groups of manuscripts by each these three authors are worthy of special mention at this point.

Sa'd al-Dawla Ibn Kammūna

Ibn Kammūna was an exceptionally interesting individual—a Jew who participated in the Islamic philosophical and theological discourse and was read by Jews and Muslims alike; the author of a fascinating and thoroughly fair-minded work comparing Judaism, Christianity, and Islam; and a philosopher of considerable ability.²¹ This intersection of cultures was made possible by

19 On this egregious piece of plagiarism, see Reza Pourjavady and Sabine Schmidtke, "Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī's (d. 710/1311) *Durrat al-Tāj* and Its Sources. (Studies on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī I)," *Journal Asiatique* 292 (2004), pp. 309–328. His commentary on *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq* is likewise largely derived from al-Shahrazūrī's commentary on that work.

20 See Walbridge, *Science*, where this phenomenon is discussed at length.

21 See the very thorough survey of his life and works by Reza Pourjavady and Sabine Schmidtke, *A Jewish Philosopher of Baghdad: 'Izz al-Dawla Ibn Kammūna (d. 683/1284) and His Writings* (Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science: Texts and Studies 65; Leiden:

the Mongol occupation of Iran and Iraq, the early Īl-Khāns being largely uninterested in the sectarian affiliations of their subjects. He himself seems to have been affiliated with a senior official in the Mongol administration, Shams al-Dīn al-Juwaynī.

There has been some controversy about whether Ibn Kammūna ever converted to Islam. Schmidtke and Pourjavady summarize the evidence and conclude that he did not.²² Köprülü, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa 1612, f. 241a, has a little debate on the subject. The original scribe, wrote “The book entitled *al-Jadīd*, by the great, learned, and perfect Shaykh, ‘Izz al-Dawla Ibn Kammūna, may God intend to treat him with His mercy.” Beside this a reader wrote, “May God lighten his punishment.” In response to these two sentiments another reader wrote, “Ibn Kammūna was a Jew, so it is inappropriate to pray for either mercy or forgiveness for him.” Finally, a third reader wrote, “No, he became a Muslim before he died and wrote *Kitāb Ifhām al-Yahūd* (Confounding the Jew) in which he explained their errors, denounced their views, their arrogance before the truth, and the lies they have devised against God and His prophets. May God requite him with good!” Since this last work is actually by another earlier Jew who did convert to Islam, the third reader is likely wrong. For whatever it is worth, most of the manuscripts of his works that I have seen contain blessings upon Muḥammad, though in the case of Şehit Ali Paşa 1740, made during his lifetime, a later reader had to add it.

The Russian National Library in St. Petersburg contains fragments in Judeo-Arabic—Arabic written in Hebrew characters—of at least five of Ibn Kammūna’s works: the commentary on the *Tabwīḥāt*, *The Treatise on the Differences between the Rabbanites and the Karaites*, the *Risāla fi al-kalām* (Essay on Theology), *The Tanqīḥ al-abḥāth* (The Rectification of Investigations), which is his treatise on comparative religion, and *al-Maṭālib al-muhimma min ‘ilm al-ḥikma* (Important Questions Concerning the Science of Philosophy).²³ These are part of a very large collection of Middle Eastern Jewish manuscripts assembled in the early 1860s by the Karaite scholar and polemicist Avraham Firkovic and most likely come from a Karaite geniza in Cairo. The Firkovic

E.J. Brill, 2006), a work to which I am deeply indebted for understanding the role of Ibn Kammūna in this story.

22 Pourjavady and Schmidtke, *A Jewish Philosopher*, pp. 18–21.

23 For details, see the relevant sections of Pourjavady and Schmidtke, *A Jewish Philosopher*. They are cataloged in Paul B. Fenton, *A Handlist of Judeo-Arabic Manuscripts in Leningrad: A Tentative Handlist of Judeo-Arabic Manuscripts in the Firkovic Collections* (= רשימת רשימת רשימת בלנינגרד-יד בערבית-כתבי (יהודית בלנינגרד-יד בערבית-כתבי). Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 1991. Microfilms of these fragments are held in the Jewish National Library at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

collection also contains fragments of two of al-Suhrawardī's works—the *Talwīḥāt* and *Hayākil al-nūr*—establishing that al-Suhrawardī's works were being read by Jews interested in philosophy. In this connection, it should be mentioned that Cambridge University has a fragment of the *Lamaḥāt* that presumably comes from the more famous geniza of the Ben Ezra Synagogue in Cairo.

Shams al-Dīn al-Shahrazūrī

Shams al-Dīn al-Shahrazūrī is a thoroughly mysterious figure. So far as I know, there is no biographical dictionary entry on him, a curious fact considering that his books were fairly well known. His biographical dictionary of philosophers *may* have been written by 662/1264. His philosophical encyclopedia, *al-Shajara al-ilāhiyya* (The Divine Tree), is said to have been written in 680/1282 or perhaps two years earlier, depending on which manuscript flyleaf one chooses to believe. He was likely alive in 687/1288. Two manuscripts are especially worth mentioning.

Köprülü, Fazıl Ahmed Paşa 880, is a manuscript of Shahrazūrī's commentary on the *Talwīḥāt*.²⁴ According to a note on 1a, the whole text is in the hand of the author, a "vile" or "idiosyncratic *naskh*," according to Şeşen and Ritter respectively. It is, in fact, an odd angular *naskh*, most certainly not the work of a professional scribe, but though inelegant it is legible with practice. Since the last folio is missing, there is no colophon to verify the attribution to al-Shahrazūrī. Thus, absent the appearance of another sample of al-Shahrazūrī's handwriting, there is no way to be sure that this is not just a trick by an unscrupulous bookdealer.

Veliüddin 2050, a complete manuscript of al-Shahrazūrī's *al-Shajara al-ilāhiyya* now in the Bayezit Library in Istanbul, has the following colophon:

‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz b. Mūsā al-Isrā’īlī from Bayt al-Ḥaddād, one in need of God most high, completed its transcription for his own use from a copy in the author's hand. He is the renowned shaykh and divine philosopher, the wonderful and wonder-working Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd al-Shahrazūrī, may God benefit all by extending his life! Sunday, 2 Jumādā 1 687/6 June 1288, in the city of Sivas. Praise be to God, the Lord of the worlds, and blessings and peace be upon the perfected ones, and in particular the chief of the prophets and messengers.

24 Ritter, p. 273. Ramazan Şeşen, Cevat İzgi, and Cemil Akpınar, *Köprülü Kütüphanesi Yazmalar Kataloğu*, ed. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu. (Manuscripts Catalogue Series; Istanbul: İslam Tarih Sanat ve Kültür Araştırma Merkezi, 1406/1986), vol. 1, p. 435.

How a Jewish scribe—he carefully refrains from naming “the chief of the prophets and messengers”—came to have an autograph copy of *al-Shajara* in Sivas at this early date is an interesting question. One possibility is Qutb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, who lived and worked in Sivas for a number of years, probably beginning in the latter half of the 670s/1270s and continuing at least until 684/1285 and possibly later. This manuscript is significant on several grounds. First, it is a very early manuscript, both in terms of date and order of copying. Second, it indicates that in 687/1288 al-Shahrazūrī was still alive—or at least news of his death had not reached Sivas. Third, it is an interesting example of the vicissitudes to which the copyists and editors of manuscripts are prone. At least four Istanbul manuscripts of *al-Shajara* were copied from this manuscript or from one copied from it. Here, so far as it can be reconstructed, is the history:²⁵

1. Shahrazūrī made a copy, now probably lost, of *al-Shajara*, probably in 680/1282 or soon after.
2. This manuscript was copied by ‘Abd Allāh al-Isrā’īlī in Sivas in 687/1288, producing Veliüddin 2050.
3. Carullah 1020 was copied from the previous manuscript, Veliüddin 2050, in 713/1313.
4. Sometime around 1600 one ‘Alī Efendi al-Ṭirmawī made another copy, probably now lost, of al-Isrā’īlī’s manuscript.
5. The Ottoman bibliophile Veliüddin Carullah—Jār Allāh Abū ‘Abd Allāh Walī al-Dīn b. Muṣṭafā al-Rūmī (d. 1141/1738)—made a new copy of *al-Shajara* from an unidentified but damaged manuscript in 1124/1712, producing Carullah 1021.
6. In 1127/1715 another copy of al-Isrā’īlī’s manuscript was made for the vizier ‘Alī Pāshā, this manuscript becoming Ahmet III 3227.²⁶
7. Carullah 1021 yielded pride of place in Carullah’s library when he acquired al-Isrā’īlī’s original manuscript, now Veliüddin 2050, in 1149/1736.
8. In the 12th/18th century, one Ismā’īl, known as Ibn al-Muṭahhira, made another copy of al-Isrā’īlī’s manuscript, creating Ragip 843.

²⁵ The following is based on my examination of the manuscripts mentioned.

²⁶ Corbin, *Oeuvres*, vol. 1, p. lxxi, n. 117. Shams al-Sīn al-Shahrazūrī, *al-Shajara al-ilāhiyya*, ed. M. Necip Görgün (1st ed.: Istanbul: Elif, 2004; 2nd ed., [actually a reprint]: Beirut: al-Şādir; Istanbul: İrsad, 1428/2007), vol. 1, pp. *nūn-ayn*. Fehmi Edhem Karatay, *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi Arapça Yazmalar Kataloğu* (Istanbul: Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi, 1966), vol. 3, pp. 653–54, no. 6753. There is a microfilm in the Uppsala University Library, Ritter MF 15.2730–2745.

9. In 1218/1803 one Darwīsh Muṣṭafā made a copy of al-Ṭirawī's copy of al-Isrā'īlī's manuscript, apparently unaware of the existence of al-Isrā'īlī's manuscript, thus creating Esad Efendi 1926.
10. In 1241/1826 someone made another copy of al-Ṭirawī's manuscript, now Bayezit 3949.
11. In the first decade of the 21st century two editions of the *Shajara* appeared, one by M. Necip Görgün, originally a doctoral thesis prepared in Turkey and a second by Najafqulī Ḥabībī, published by the Iranian Institute of Philosophy.²⁷ Neither was aware of al-Isrā'īlī's original manuscript. Görgün used Ahmet III 3227, presumably having been made aware of its second-order connection to an autograph by the excellent Topkapı catalog. He then compared it to two 18th century copies, though 8th/14th century manuscripts were available in well-cataloged collections, including Topkapı. Ḥabībī used Görgün's edition along with three relatively late manuscripts, one Iranian and two European.

So what is the moral of this tangled story? It is rare that we know so much about the interrelationships of manuscripts (though I have only discussed eight of the thirty-four manuscripts that I know of). First, it is vivid evidence that the genealogical age of a manuscript may be very different from its chronological age. There is an 18th century manuscript only separated by one intermediary from the autograph and two 19th century manuscripts separated by two links. It is likely that many of the older manuscripts may have a less distinguished genealogy. Second, the manuscript basis of even quite good editions can be deplorably haphazard. Neither editor was aware of the significance of Veliüddin 2050 even though the presence of 18th century Turkish copies made it very likely that it survived in one of the old Ottoman collections, most of which are within easy walking distance of each other in the old city of Istanbul and all of which had, at least, reasonably accurate card catalogs by the 1990s. Moreover, neither editor seems to have made a systematic survey of the other manuscripts—to determine if they were independent of al-Isrā'īlī's copy, for example.

Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī

Toward the end of his life, a period when he was frequently out of favor with the Īl-Khānid court and its chief minister Rashīd al-Dīn Faḍl Allāh, Quṭb al-Dīn

²⁷ Al-Shahrazūrī, *al-Shajara*, ed. Görgün; ed. Najaf-Qulī Ḥabībī (3 vols.; Tehran: Mu'assasat Pizhūhishī-i Ḥikmat va Falsafa-i Īrān [Iranian Institute of Philosophy], 1383–85/2004–06.

Shīrāzī compiled an encyclopedia of the sciences in Persian, which he entitled *Durrat al-tāj li-ghurra al-Dubāj*, taking its title from Amīr Dubāj, a minor ruler in western Gilan on the southwestern coast of the Caspian Sea, presumably in the hope of being paid by him. This is a huge work, which would be about 2,500 pages if it were completely published. The first half is on philosophy proper and mathematics. The philosophical portion of the first half is in large part a translation of Ibn Kammūna's most important independent philosophical work, *al-Kāshif* (The Revealer), otherwise known as *al-Jādīd fī 'l-ḥikma* (The New Philosophy). The other half, called a *Khātima* (appendix), deals with mathematics, practical philosophy (ethics, economics, and politics), kalām, fiqh, and mysticism. These are mostly translations and adaptations from various sources. At least five copies survive from Quṭb al-Dīn's lifetime, and of these at least three seem to have been prepared by Quṭb al-Dīn himself for presentation to royal patrons in 1306.²⁸ Professional scribes were employed, and the elegantly illuminated title pages bear the author's signature: "Read by its author, one who is far from saying the apposite. Signed by the one among God's creatures most in need of him, Maḥmūd b. Mas'ūd b. al-Muṣliḥ al-Shīrāzī, may God make his end good!" What is curious is that the name of the patron in the cartouche of two of the manuscripts—Fazl Ahmed Paşa 867 and Damad İbrahim Paşa 816—has been scraped out and not replaced. One wonders what happened. Did the intended patron fail to pay or refuse to accept the gift? Since the Dubāj's emirate was suppressed by the Mongols in 1307, it is likely that Quṭb al-Dīn was stuck with three or four very expensive manuscripts with fawning dedications to the deposed Amīr Dubāj. The biographical dictionaries note his money problems at the end of his life, for he had not yet been paid for his massive commentary on Ibn Sīnā's *Canon of Medicine*, and a student had to pay for his funeral.

Ragip Paşa 1480, the Oldest Comprehensive Collection of al-Suhrawardī's Works

Manuscripts of al-Suhrawardī and his commentators from the 8th/14th century are common, but among them is one of the two most important manuscripts

²⁸ These were Istanbul, Köprülü, Fazl Ahmed Paşa 867; Ayasofya 2405; Damad İbrahim Paşa 816. Ramazan Şeşen, Cevat İzgi, and Cemil Akpınar, *Köprülü Kütüphanesi Yazmalar Kataloğu*, ed. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu (Manuscripts Catalogue Series; Istanbul: İslam Tarih Sanat ve Kültür Araştırma Merkezi, 1406/1986), vol. 1, pp. 424–425.

of al-Suhrawardī's works: Ragıp Paşa 1480.²⁹ Ragıp Paşa (1699–1763) was a distinguished Ottoman statesman and litterateur, who left behind a fine library of more than a thousand manuscripts. This particular manuscript is the oldest surviving comprehensive collection of al-Suhrawardī's works, thus providing important evidence for the authenticity of lesser-known works. It was copied by one Badr al-Nasawī, of whom I have been able to learn nothing, in the Niẓāmiyya and the Mustanṣariyya madrasas in Baghdad between 732/1331 and 734/1334.³⁰ It contains eighteen works, including *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, the four major Peripatetic works, and a variety of lesser works, two of which are in Persian and several of which are of an occult nature. It is written in a truly appalling professorial scrawl with marginal corrections, variants, and glosses. Corbin, who used it in some of his editions, confesses to having to use another manuscript in order to read it.

How this manuscript came to be in Ragıp Paşa's library is not clear, but it is likely that Ahmet III 3217, and possibly Ahmet III 3377, were copied from it in 865/1461, which indicates that it was in Constantinople³¹ from the time of Sultan Mehmet II. This manuscript is thoroughly deserving of a facsimile edition.

The Transmission of the Persian Allegories and Related Works

Despite the modern fame of al-Suhrawardī's Persian allegories, the manuscript evidence for them is surprisingly thin. A distinction, in fact, must be made among the shorter Persian allegories, the Arabic allegories, and the longer Persian works.

The shorter Persian allegories have only a handful of manuscripts. Two of them—*Risālat al-ṭayr* (Treatise of the Birds), actually a translation of an Arabic work of Ibn Sīnā, and *Fī ḥālat al-ṭufūliyya* (On the State of Childhood)—have

29 This manuscript is described, with a couple of minor errors, by Ritter, pp. 76–77. See also Corbin, *Oeuvres*, vol. 1, pp. lxxvii, lxxiv, lxxviii, vol. 2, pp. 77, 94, and Nasrollah Pourjavady, *Lughat-i mūrān* (Tehran: Mu'assasa-i Pizhūhishī-i Ḥikmat va Falsafa-i Irān; Berlin: Mu'assasa-i Muṭāla'āt-i Islāmī-i Dānishgāh-i Āzād-i Birlin, 1386/2007), p. 9. Microfilm at Uppsala University; *Ritter Uppsala* 193–94, no. MF 15:1680–91, 1692–1700.

30 An anonymous reviewer suggests that when the colophon to *al-Abwāḥ al-Imādiyya* in this manuscript refers to “al-Madīna al-Sulṭāniyya,” it refers to the city of Sulṭāniyya near Zanjān in northeastern Iran. This is possible, since it was for a time the Il-Khānid capital, but I think that it is more likely that expression refers to Baghdad.

31 The Ottomans typically referred to their capital in official documents and manuscripts as al-Qusṭanṭaniyya, Constantinople, not Istanbul, and I follow their practice.

only two known manuscripts each. Three others—*ʿAql-i surkh* (The Crimson Intellect), *Rūzī bā jamāʿat-i šūfiyān* (A Day with a Groups of Sufis), and *Āwāz-i parr-i Jibrāʾil* (The Sound of Gabriel's Wing)—have a few more, but were clearly not widely circulated.

The Arabic allegories—*al-Ghurba al-gharbiyya* (The Occidental Exile) and *Risālat al-abrāj* (The Treatise of Towers, perhaps more commonly known as *al-Kalimāt al-dhawqiyya*, Words of Mystical Intuition; the attribution of the latter to al-Suhrawardī is uncertain³²)—have sixteen manuscripts each, and *Iʿtiqād al-ḥukamā* (The Creed of the Sages), which might be put into the same class, has ten. They are, moreover, mostly not in the same manuscripts nor even in manuscripts containing other al-Suhrawardī texts. They thus belong to a class of what we might call “interesting short books” that circulated in *majmūʿas*.

The longer Persian texts, on the other hand, seem to have circulated quite widely over many centuries. These were *Bustān al-qulūb*, *Partawnāma*, *Muʿnis al-ʿushshāq*, and *Ṣafīr-i sīmurgh*, the last being a borderline case. These dealt with Sufi and philosophical topics. At least one, *Bustān al-qulūb*, dates from al-Suhrawardī's student days.

Two manuscripts are worth special mention. *Milli 2412* is a small and poorly written manuscript copied by Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Dāmghānī Jājarmī in 654/1256–659/1261 and containing twenty-two texts, including nine to eleven by al-Suhrawardī, depending on whether certain works are accepted as authentic. It is the earliest and one of the few sources for the shorter Persian allegories. It is also the major source for most of the texts in Seyyed Hossein Nasr's published edition of al-Suhrawardī's Persian works.

Majlis 14590, nicknamed the “Safina-yi Tabrīz,” is a huge *majmūʿa* copied in 720/1320–736/1336 by Abū'l-Majd Muḥammad b. Masʿūd b. Muẓaffar Tabrīzī. It contains over two hundred works and fragments, including all but two of the al-Suhrawardī texts of the previous volume, including the rare shorter Persian allegories.

At this point, some synthesizing speculation is in order. In general, the Persian works do not appear in the same manuscripts as al-Suhrawardī's Arabic works. This is not altogether surprising, given that the Persian works tend to deal with mystical themes while the Arabic works are more or less technical

32 Nasrollah Pourjavady, “Masʿala-i Intisāb-i ‘Risālat al-Abraj’ bi Shaykh-i Ishraq,” in *Irfān va Ishraq: Maqālahā va naqdhā* (Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāhī 1030, Falsafa 40, ‘Irfān 3; Tehran: Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāhī, 1380/2001, 95–113, rejects its authenticity on stylistic grounds, but I do not find his arguments decisive. The themes are similar to those of his other allegories, and though the work is not in the old lists of his works, the manuscripts do attribute it to al-Suhrawardī.

philosophy. Al-Suhrawardī, though, does remark in the introduction to *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq* that he had written certain *risālas* in his youth. One we can identify with near certainty, the *Bustān al-qulūb* (The Orchard of Hearts), which was written in Isfahan, probably al-Suhrawardī's last stop in his student period after his early studies in northwestern Iran. It seems likely that some or all of the rest of these works date from this period. Likewise, the *I'tiqād al-ḥukamā'*, though in Arabic, contains no trace of the characteristic doctrines of his later Illuminationist period.³³ It is possible then that the rarity of the Persian allegories is due to their having been produced in central Iran and circulating only in that general region. Milli 2412, the earliest manuscript of them, was written by a Khurasani, while the *Safīna* was copied in Tabrīz. Given al-Suhrawardī's wandering lifestyle, it is certainly possible that he did not carry a complete set of his juvenilia with him so that these works did not find their way into influential manuscripts such as Ragip Paşa 1480.

The Manuscript Transmission of the Occult Works, Authentic and Spurious

I have already published an article discussing the transmission of al-Suhrawardī's occult works, so I will remark only briefly on these works.³⁴ There are two major sources. Ragip Paşa 1480 contains a number of these texts, magical invocations of the celestial souls. A second such collection, copied in Kashan in 1254, is found in Ayasofya 2144. Perhaps the most notable fact about these texts is that Ottoman royal copies were made of the material in both manuscripts. Finally, there are scattered texts found in other manuscripts.

To this may be added the *Forty Names*, a protean occult text based on a prayer of forty invocations of various names of God attributed to the Prophet Idrīs. It is often attributed to our al-Suhrawardī but has better claim to a connection with Shihāb al-Dīn 'Umar al-Suhrawardī, the famous author of the *Awārif al-ma'ārif*.³⁵

33 See chapter 5 below.

34 "The Devotional and Occult Works of Suhrawardī the Illuminationist," *Ishraq* 2 (2011), pp. 80–97. <https://iphras.ru/uplfile/smironov/ishraq/2/gwalbri.pdf>. Accessed 4 Sept. 2017.

35 A Polish doctoral student, Łukasz Piątak, is preparing a dissertation on these texts.

Majmū'as and Iranian Illuminationist Manuscripts

I have barely scratched the surface of the question of the use of *majmū'as*. These are the collected volumes that are extremely common in Islamic manuscript libraries. They fall generally into two classes. At one extreme are anthologies—sometimes almost libraries—of texts, usually on a great variety of subjects. In many cases, these are carefully prepared for a wealthy patron or perhaps assembled by an individual scholar for his own use. At the other extreme are commonplace books, sometimes on specific topics, that have obviously been assembled by an educated individual who copied interesting texts as he came across them. In either case, they are very useful in telling us which texts were in circulation and read in a particular period and what texts they were read in association with—their intertextuality, to use a piece of barbarous contemporary academic jargon. Nasrollah Pourjavady's publishing of a facsimile of the *Safīna-i Tabrīz*, his introduction to the text, and the scholarship resulting from its publication is an indication of what can be done with these manuscripts.³⁶

The Ottoman Royal Illuminationist Manuscripts

I will finish by mentioning the Ottoman royal manuscripts of the works of al-Suhrawardī and his early commentators, in particular the manuscripts prepared for Fatih Mehmet, Sultan Muḥammad II, conqueror of Constantinople. The manuscripts include Ahmet III 3183, Ahmet III 3267, Nuruosmaniye 2653, Damad İbrahim Paşa 819, Yeni Cami 765, and Istanbul University Library AY 5976. Other manuscripts can be identified as belonging to this collection by their date, calligraphic quality, and location in the royal libraries. These include all the important Illuminationist works, including those of Ibn Kammūna and the occult works of al-Suhrawardī. This should give pause to any portrayal of the Ottomans as fundamentalist Sunnis. More to the point, we might ask our Ottomanist colleagues, what was the significance of these works for the ideology and self-definition of the Ottoman regime?

36 Abū'l-Majid Muḥammad b. Mas'ūd b. Muẓaffar Tabrīzī, *Safīna-i Tabrīz*, ed. 'Abd al-Ḥusayn Ḥā'irī and Nasrollah Poujavady. (Tehran: Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāhī, 1381/2003). Ṣādiq Ḥusaynī Ishkavarī, *Fihrist-i kitābkhāna-i Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī, Kutub-i khaṭṭī* (Tehran: Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī, 1311/1933–), vol. 41, pp. 67–114. N. Pourjavady, "Irfān-i aṣīl-i Irānī dar 'Safīna-i Tabrīz,'" *Nāma-i Bahāristān* (fall/winter 1379/2000); reprinted in idem. *Irfān va ishrāq*. Pp. 211–23. A.A. Sayed-Gohrab and S. McGlinn, *The Treasury of Tabriz: The Great Il-Khanid Compendium* (Amsterdam : Rozenberg; West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2007).

Conclusions: On the Misuse and Use of Islamic Philosophical Manuscripts

I will end with three observations.

First, there is no excuse for haphazard choice of manuscripts in the production of critical editions. The manuscript libraries are rich, of high quality, and, for philosophical texts, mostly well organized and increasingly accessible as their contents are put online. The Turkish manuscript libraries are well maintained and have been for centuries. A large portion of their collections are now accessible online. The quality of cataloging varies, although some collections, such as the Köprülü Library, are superbly cataloged. The major Iranian collections are exceptionally well cataloged, the product of almost a century's tradition of learned manuscript bibliographers. One hopes that better relations between Iran and the United States will make these collections more accessible to Western scholars, but the internet has already begun to open these collections to the world. Given the presence of very early manuscripts in accessible collections, editors should choose the manuscripts used in editions with thought and care.

Second, the manuscript record provides historical documentation for the reception of particular works, authors, and ideas. The absence of autographs, the paucity of manuscripts from the late 12th and first half of the 13th centuries followed by the explosion of manuscripts, commentaries, and adaptations of Illuminationist thought in the hundred years that followed is critical for understanding the reception of Illuminationism.

Finally, as Nasrollah Pourjavady and his collaborators have demonstrated, *majmū'as* can be used to document the intellectual environments of particular times and places.

It is time to stop thinking of manuscripts simply as sources of greater or lesser value for particular texts; they are historical documents in their own right with rich stories to tell.

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Some Observations on the *Kashf al-Ghiṭā' li-Ikhwān al-Ṣafā'*¹

Mohammad Karimi Zanjani Asl

Kashf al-ghīṭā' li-ikhwān al-ṣafā' is a short enigmatic treatise on the problem of knowledge.² That the treatise exists in numerous copies indicates the attention paid to it by philosophers and mystics from the eighth/fifteenth to thirteenth/nineteenth century. Though all copies bear the same title, the manuscripts differ from each other in one essential point: the name of the author.

The copies can be divided into four general groups: the first ascribes the work to Shihāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā Suhrawardī (d. ca. 587/1191); the second attributes it to Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn 'Arabī (d. 638/1240); the third names Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kīshī (d. 695/1296) as the author; and last, there is the fourth group, which does not mention an author at all.

For the purposes of this article, I selected one copy from each of the four groups of manuscripts to help identify the author of *Kashf al-ghīṭā' li-ikhwān al-ṣafā'*. My analysis of the texts will be guided by the methods of codicology and the predominance of the evidence given by the various versions of the text.

From the first group, I have selected a copy found in the manuscript of Ragıp Paşa 1480, now in the Süleymaniye Library in Istanbul. This very important collection of Suhrawardī's works was copied between 731/1331 and 735/1334 by an otherwise unknown Illuminationist philosopher by the name of Badr al-Dīn al-Nasawī al-Khurāsānī³ in the Niẓāmiyya and Mustanṣiriyya schools in

1 My thanks are due to Mrs. Brigid O'Conner and Professor John Walbridge (Indiana University) for reading and editing this article.

2 For a number of opinions with respect to this treatise see: Jamil ibn Muṣṭafā al-'Azm, *Uqūd al-jawāhir*, p. 35; Ritter, "Philologica IX", p. 279; Brockelman, *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur*, Supp. 1, p. 783; Abū Rayyān, *Uṣūl al-falsafa al-ishrāqiyya*, p. 57; Yaḥyā, *Mu'allafāt Ibn Arabī*, p. 536; Farrūkh, *Tārīkh al-adab al-'arabī*, vol. 3, p. 402.

3 He is not known as an Illuminationist philosopher; however, given the professorial scrawl of his handwriting and the numerous glosses, we may infer that he did indeed occupy such a position.

Baghdād as well as in Sulṭāniyyah near Zanjān (Iran).⁴ The collection consists of eighteen works by Suhrawardī, including *Hikmat al-ishrāq*, *al-Mashārī' wa'l-muṭārahāt*, *al-Talwihāt*, *al-Muqāwamāt*, *al-Lamaḥāt*, and *Hayākil al-nūr*. *Kashf al-ghitā'* is the eleventh text in this collection, ff. 307a–b between *al-Talwihāt* and *Hayākil al-nūr*.⁵ To go by his occasional marginal notes, the copyist was likely a lecturer in the tradition of Illuminationist philosophy. In the table of contents at f. 1a, he mentions that all the treatises in this collection go back to Suhrawardī:

فهرست ما في هذا المجلد من الشيخ المتأله الشهيد السعيد شهاب الدين
الملقب بشيخ الاشراق) زاد الله روحه ...: المشاريع والمطارحات،
المقاومات ذيل التلويحات، ... بعد (رسالة) الحكيمية، اللّمحات، رسالة في
اصطلاحات الصوفية، التلويحات، رسالة كشف الغطاء، رسالة الهياكل،
الاسد ... سالة، قصة (ال)غربة الغريبة، رسالة صفيير سيمرغ، المتفرقات من
التقديسات والواردات و ... في مواضع متفرقة.

According to the colophon of *al-Talwihāt*, that text was copied in Shawwāl 731/ July 1331 in the town of Sulṭāniyya,⁶ while the colophon of *al-Ahwāḥ al-imādiyya* states that the process of copying was concluded in Ṣafar 732/November 1331 in “al-Madīna al-Sulṭāniyya”.⁷ Since *Kashf al-ghitā'*, *Hayākil al-nūr*,⁸ *Qiṣṣat al-ghurba al-gharbiyya*⁹ and some fragments of *al-Wāridāt wa'l-taqdīsāt*¹⁰ by

4 Sulṭāniyya is a small town near Zanjān in Iranian Azerbaijan. According to some Persian classical sources, there was a school in Sulṭāniyya in the Mughal period (see, e.g.: Kashānī, “Tārikh-i Ūljāytū”, p. 46; Ḥāfiẓ Abrū, *Dhayl-i Jāmi' al-Tawārikh-i Rashīdī*, p. 9). Some philosophical and juridical manuscripts of the eighth/fourteenth century have been ascribed to this school. I should mention that in reading a draft of this article, Prof. Walbridge suggested that that “al-Madīna al-Sulṭāniyya” is Baghdād. I am grateful for this suggestion but have not been able to corroborate it in any sources.

5 See also Ritter, “Philologica IX”, p. 279.

6 See Ms. nr. 1480 of the Ragıp Paşa Library, fol. 306b; see also Ritter, “Philologica IX”, p. 272.

7 See Ms. nr. 1480 of the Ragıp Paşa Library, fol. 327a; see also Ritter, “Philologica IX”, p. 271.

8 See Ms. nr. 1480 of the Ragıp Paşa Library, fols. 307b–311a; see also Ritter, “Philologica IX”, p. 283.

9 See Ms. nr. 1480 of the Ragıp Paşa Library, fols. 311b–312b; see also Ritter, “Philologica IX”, p. 279.

10 See Ms. nr. 1480 of the Ragıp Paşa Library, fols. 313b–314a; see also Ritter, “Philologica IX”, p. 285.

Suhrawardī were copied in between these two books, it is plausible to conclude that they were copied during these years.

The second manuscript I have chosen is a collection housed in Istanbul's Veliyüddin Efendi 1826 in the Beyazit Library in Istanbul. All texts in this manuscript are attributed to Ibn 'Arabī by the copyist in the table of contents in the first folio; he enumerates the treatises as follows:

المجلد من الكتب والرسائل: مراتب علوم الوهب لمحيي الدين، رسالة الأنوار فيما يمنح صاحب الخلوة من الأسرار لمحيي الدين، كتاب نسخة الحق لمحيي الدين، كتاب مقام القرية له أيضا، كتاب السبعة والشأن له أيضا، الرسالة في أسرار الذات¹¹ الإلهية سبحانه له أيضا، لمعة الموسوية بكشف الغطاء لإخوان الصفاء له أيضا، سؤال كميل بن زياد، اختصار الشيخ قدس سره من فصوصه وسمى مفتاح الفصوص، رسالة الشيخ إلى فخرالدين الرازي قدس سرهما، كتاب الجلال والجمال انشاء الشيخ بمدينة موصل قدس سره.¹²

This collection was copied between 823/1420 and 825/1422.¹³ For example *Marātib 'ulūm al-wahb* and *al-Anwār*, as well as *Nuskhat al-ḥaqq* and *Maqām al-qurbah* were copied in 823/1420, while *Kitāb al-sab'a* was written down in 824/1421. Other treatises such as *Asrār al-dhāt al-ilāhiyya*, *Miftāḥ al-fuṣūṣ*, *Risālat al-shaykh ilā Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī* and *al-Jalāl wa'l-jamāl* were copied in 825/1422. *Kashf al-ghīṭā'* at ff. 32b–33a is found among the treatises copied in 825/1422; since the works that precede and follow it were copied in 825/1422, it must have been copied at the same time.

The works making up this collection can be divided into three categories: first, texts that according to the scribe's statements were copied from an autograph;¹⁴ second, works that were copied from manuscripts read aloud to

11 In the manuscript: "Dhāt" (ذات). See also Yaḥyā, *Mu'allafāt Ibn 'Arabī*, p. 344.

12 Ms. nr. 1826 of the Veliyüddin Library, fol. 1a.

On the previous page it states:

رسائل شريفة للشيخ الأكبر محيي الدين العربي قدس الله سره.

13 Ritter, "Philologica IX," p. 279) recorded the date 823/1420 to 829/1425.

14 For example, *Marātib 'ulūm al-wahb*, *al-Anwār*, *Maqām al-qurba*, *Kitāb al-sab'a*, *Kitāb al-qutb wa'l-imāmāyn wa'l-mudlajayn*. See also Yaḥyā, *Mu'allafāt Ibn 'Arabī*, pp. 214, 328, 516, 552, 576.

the author or to his famous student;¹⁵ and third, works that make no reference to the original text.¹⁶ Unfortunately, *Kashf al-ghīṭā'* belongs to the third category. This is important because there are no such references in other copies of this work that are attributed to Ibn 'Arabī.¹⁷ But I will return to this point later.

From the third group, I have selected a copy in Ayasofya 4862, ff. 275a–b, now in the Süleymaniye Library in Istanbul. This copy is one of the two well-known manuscripts whose copyist attributes it to Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kishī (d. 695/1295–6) in the following words:¹⁸

قيل أن هذه الفصول من فوائد شمس الملة والدين الكيشي تغمده الله
بغفرانه.¹⁹

This manuscript consists of numerous treatises in Persian and Arabic on philosophy, mathematics, and theology by thinkers such as 'Ayn al-Quzāt Hamadānī, Ibn Kammūna, Najm al-Dīn Kātībī and 'Alī ibn Badr' 'Uthmān Fakhr al-Dīn Bundihī (seventh/thirteenth century). The collection can be dated to the first half of the eighth century as the year 724/1324 appears in the colophon of Bundehī's text, titled *Fī dalālat al-alfāz wa-mā yata'allaqu bihā*.²⁰ It is worth mentioning that in this collection of treatises, *Kashf al-ghīṭā'* is followed by *Rawzat al-nāzīr* (ff. 278b–284b), a commentary on Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī's *Tafsīr qawl al-'ulamā' fi nafs al-amr* authored, according to the copyist, by Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kishī:

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- 15 For example, *Nuskhat al-haqq*. See also Yaḥyā, "Mu'allafāt Ibn 'Arabī", p. 609. These manuscripts name "Samā'ī," ed. See: Māyil Harawī, "Tārīkh-i nuskha-pardāzī", pp. 33–35.
- 16 For example, *Asrār al-dhāt al-ilāhiyyah*, *Miftāḥ al-fuṣūṣ*, *Risālat al-shaykh ilā Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī*, *Kitāb al-jalāl wa'l-jamāl*, *al-Raqā'iq al-rūḥāniyya*, *Kitāb al-a'lām bishārāt ahl al-ilhām*. See also Yaḥyā, *Mu'allafāt Ibn 'Arabī*, pp. 192, 217, 273, 337, 344, 574.
- 17 These manuscripts are Ms. nr. 2600 of the Yaḥyā Efendī Library in Istanbul, fols. 52b–53b (copied in 1034/1624–5, see also Yaḥyā, *Mu'allafāt Ibn 'Arabī*, pp. 257 "Taqṣīm al-maṭālib", 344 "Asrār al-dhāt al-ilāhiyya"); Ms. nr. 7410 of the Āyat Allāh Mar'ashī Library in Qom, fols. 28b–29a (copied in 1043/1633–5; see also Ḥusaynī Ashkivārī 1990, vol. 19, p. 218); Ms. nr. 2415 of the Yaḥyā Efendī Library in Istanbul, fols. 107b–108b (copied in 1293/1876; see also Yaḥyā, *Mu'allafāt Ibn 'Arabī*, pp. 197 "Kitāb al-alif", 216 "Kitāb al-bā"); Ms. nr. 3786 of the Izmir National Library in Izmir, pp. 15–17 (copied in 1318/1900; see also Yaḥyā, *Mu'allafāt Ibn 'Arabī*, p. 344 "Asrār al-dhāt al-ilāhiyya").
- 18 Another manuscript is Ms. nr. 6/5 of the Khādīm Ḥusaynī collection in Tabriz (copied in 10th century A.H.). See Dirāyatī, *Fihristvāra-yi Dastnivishtihā-yi Īrān*, vol. 8, p. 644.
- 19 See Ms. nr. 4862 of the Ayasofya Library, fol. 275b.
- 20 See Ms. nr. 4862 of the Ayasofya Library, fols. 35b–42b.

هذه رسالة للعالم شمس الدين الكيشي برد الله مضجعه.²¹

The manuscript I have chosen from the fourth group—those containing no mention of an author—is Majlis 10103 in Tehran, where *Kashf al-ghitā'* is found on pages 57–58. This manuscript contains thirty works on jurisprudence, literature, philosophy, ḥadīth and mysticism by scholars that include Ibn Naḥwī (d. 513/1119), 'Abd al-Razzāq Kāshānī (d. 730/1330), Muḥaqqiq Shīrvānī (d. 905/1499–1500), Rafī' al-Dīn Muḥammad Nā'īnī (d. 1082/1671–2) and Sayyid Kāzīm-i Rashtī (d. 1259/1843),²² and was compiled by various copyists between 1095/1684 and 1279/1862.²³ Considering that *Kashf al-ghitā'* and the preceding text are in the same handwriting, we can conclude that this version of *Kashf al-ghitā'* was written around 1238/1822–3.

As we have seen, the existing copies *Kashf al-ghitā'* are attributed either to three different authors or to none, meaning that these attributions alone cannot help us ascertain authorship; to achieve that end, we need to look elsewhere.

Let me first consider the copies attributed to Ibn 'Arabī. As mentioned before, none of the copies explicitly state whether the text was copied from an autograph or from an oral presentation to the author. Moreover, when he cites parts of *Kashf al-ghitā'* in the fifth chapter of his *Miṣbāḥ al-uns*, Muḥammad ibn Ḥamza Fanārī (d. 845/1441–2) implicitly ascribes that text to Abū 'Abd Allāh Ḥusayn ibn 'Īsā al-Ḥasanī al-Mawṣilī, known as Qazīb al-Bān (d. 537/1177).²⁴ This shows that a group of Ibn 'Arabī's followers did not consider *Kashf al-ghitā'* to be his work. We also know that Qazīb al-Bān was one of the Ṣūfis to whom Ibn 'Arabī paid particular attention in his *Futūḥāt al-makkīyya*.²⁵ Moreover, neither Ibn 'Arabī himself nor any previously published Sufi texts mention him as the author of such a work.

We also know that Shahrazūrī did not attribute this work to Suhrawardī in his writings. It appears that *Kashf al-zunūn* by Kātib Chelebī (d. 1067/1656–7) is the oldest catalogue that refers to *Kashf al-ghitā'* as a work by Suhrawardī,²⁶ likely based on a manuscript such as Ragıp Paşa 1480. Entries in *Ḥadīyyat*

21 See Ms. nr. 4862 of the Ayasofya Library, fol. 282b.

22 For a list of these works see Naẓārī, *Fihrist-i Nuskhahā-yi Khaṭṭī-yi Kitābkhāna-yi Majlis*, vol. 32, pp. 125–130.

23 See Naẓārī, *Fihrist-i Nuskhahā-yi Khaṭṭī-yi Kitābkhāna-yi Majlis*, vol. 32, p. 130.

24 Fanārī, *Miṣbāḥ al-uns*, pp. 113–115.

25 See Ibn 'Arabī, *al-Futūḥāt al-makkīyya*, vol. 1, p. 187; vol. 2, p. 632; vol. 3, p. 42.

26 See Ḥājji Khalifa, *Kashf al-zunūn*, vol. 2, p. 1492.

al-ʿarīfīn by Ismāʿīl Pāshā Baghdādī, which ascribe *Kashf al-ghīṭā'* to both Ibn ʿArabī and Suhrawardī,²⁷ suggest that Ismāʿīl Pāshā also saw Veliyüddīn Efendi 1826.

The next author in our list is Kīshī.²⁸ No mention is made of this treatise either in the old catalogues that list his work or in his biographies, among them, Junayd-i Shīrāzī's *Shadd al-izār*, Ibn Fuwaṭī's *al-Ḥawādith al-jāmi'a*, and al-Ṣafadī's *al-Wāfi bi'l-wafayāt*.²⁹ However, in *Sharḥ ḥadīth inna Allāh khalaqa ādam ʿalā ṣūratihī*, as well as in his *Munabbihā*, Kīshī refers to his writings on the confirmation of divine knowledge regarding the universals (*kulliyāt*) and the particulars (*juzʿiyāt*) and God's embracing knowledge with respect to the particulars.³⁰ We have seen that the copyist of Ayasofya 4862 attributes *Kashf al-ghīṭā'* to Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kīshī and states that this treatise represents one chapter of *Fawā'id* by Kīshī.

In view of the fragmentary nature of the information that we can gather using the above method, turning to the text of the treatise and dealing directly with its content seems to be the most suitable approach for ascertaining authorship.

Kashf al-ghīṭā' begins with a short prayer explaining the incompleteness of human knowledge for grasping Divine Beauty and Perfection, and goes on to salute the prophets and devout men, and the Prophet of Islam and his family. It follows by calling the treatise a "flash of light" (*lam'a*) titled *Kashf al-ghīṭā' li-ikhwān al-ṣafā'* and uses phrases such as *ikhwān al-tajrid*, a well-known term in the repertoire of Illuminationist philosophy. There is another interesting point

27 See Baghdādī, *Hadīyyat al-ʿarīfīn*, vol. 2, pp. 120, 521.

28 Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad Kīshī was born on Kish Island in southern Iran in 615/1218. We have less information about his education and his masters. He studied in the Mustanṣarīyya School in Baghdad around 665/1266–67; from there he traveled to Iṣfahān where he lived till 678/1279. Later, he left Isfahan for Shiraz where he taught philosophy, medicine and other classical subjects as well as mysticism. Kīshī died in Shiraz in 696/1296. He had good relationships with a number of famous scholars such as Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274) and Majd Hamgar (d. 686/1287). His students included Quṭb al-Dīn Maḥmūd Shīrāzī (d. 710/1311), Hindūshāh Nakhjavānī (d. after 724/1324), Jamāl al-Dīn Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf al-Ḥillī (d. 726/1326), and ʿAbd al-Razzāq Kāshānī (d. 736/1335). About his life and works see also: Nafīsī, "Shams al-Dīn Kīshī," pp. 408–413; Qazvīnī and Iqbāl, "Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kīshī," pp. 59–70; Jawkār, "Nigāhi ba Zindagī, āthār, va andīsha-yi Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kīshī," pp. 81–97.

29 See Junayd Shīrāzī, *Shadd al-izār*, pp. 110–113; Ibn Fuwaṭī, *al-Ḥawādith al-jāmi'a*, pp. 289–290; al-Ṣafadī, *al-Wāfi bi'l-wafayāt*, vol. 2, p. 141.

30 See Kīshī, *Majmū'a-i āthār*, pp. 237, 297.

in the introduction: evidently, mistakes by the scribes of treatises related to Ibn ‘Arabī changed the words “هذه اللمعة الموسومة بكشف الغطاء لآخوان الصفاء” to “هذه اللمعة الموسوية بكشف الغطاء لآخوان الصفاء” and treated phrases with words taken from Ibn ‘Arabī’s *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam*, such as “Faṣṣ Mūsawī” similarly. This could explain why this treatise was associated with Ibn ‘Arabī!

Arranged in four brief chapters on the gradations of perception (*mushāhada*), *Kashf al-ghīṭā* addresses the question of how knowledge can be achieved.

The first chapter discusses the relationship between cause (*‘illat*) and effect (*ma‘lūl*) and asserts that all perfections seen in the effect are in fact attributes of the cause and its manifestations in the effect; the author uses the image as reflected in a mirror to illustrate his thought.

The second chapter discusses the inseparability of knowledge from the knower’s self and the fact that what apprehends is a spiritual capacity rooted in the human essence, the latter being rooted in the spiritual world. By means of such apprehension, one can attain a higher degree of perception compared to the former grade. Instead of seeing an existing truth in others, one can see it in one’s own self.

The third chapter states that the essence of “one who apprehends/knows” (*mudrik*) is the possible or the contingent, but if the essence is set aside, one of the manifestations of “the Supreme Unity” (*al-ḥaḍra al-aḥadiyya*) will be the very thing to be understood. By passing from his self, which is the abode of seeing things toward the true intention, the one who apprehends will see only the manifestations of God and his soul will become joyful and obtain perfect insight.

The discussion of the fourth chapter revolves around the topic of returning to one’s self. It argues that having attained the previous stage (*maqām*), the one who apprehends finds out that he himself understands things by rescinding his self, which would be impossible. Hence, having experienced this stage, one has to distance oneself from the position of the one who comprehends things until it becomes evident that God is the true one who comprehends.

As we can see, the topic discussed in this treatise as well as the style of its explanations is so interwoven with philosophical concepts and doctrines that it cannot be ascribed to Ibn ‘Arabī. This problem may explain why Fanārī in his *Miṣbāḥ al-uns* only cited the short version of this treatise, while refraining from discussing its philosophical details.

A careful reading of the text, however, shows many examples of identical terms and phrases to be found in Suhrawardī’s *Hayākil al-nūr*. Yet we cannot attribute this work to Suhrawardī on the basis of these similarities. That is because on the one hand terms such as “the Supreme Unity” (*ḥāzrat-i*

al-aḥadīyyat: حضرت أهدت³¹) are also used by Ibn 'Arabī, and on the other, the topics are elucidated in a manner that does not reflect a close affinity with the Illuminationist theory of knowledge.

So, what is the answer to the question of authorship? Who was the author that while influenced by the content, terminology, and writing style of Suhrawardī, had a different approach to the theory of knowledge?

I would like to offer a plausible answer to these questions. I surmise that the author we are looking for is Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kīshī and that the answer lies in Kīshī's known works rather than in the copy of the manuscript housed in the Ayasofya Library (nr. 4862). A review of his works, particularly the *Munabbīha* and *Muḥāwarat al-arwāḥ*, indicates that Kīshī was well-acquainted with the repertoire of Illuminationist terms and knew Suhrawardī's terminology, *ikhwān al-tajrīd* included.³² These works also reveal Kīshī's writing skills in Arabic; in my view, his style ranks between Suhrawardī's and Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī's. Parts of his writing style echo Suhrawardī's *Hayākīl al-nūr* and *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq* in particular³³ while simultaneously following Ṭūsī's *Sharḥ al-ishārāt wa'l-tanbīhāt*. In addition, the explanatory style found in discussions of the principles of the theory of knowledge in *Kashf al-ghīṭā'* can be found exactly in Kīshī's *Rawzat al-nāẓir* and *Munabbīha*.³⁴

In the absence of any other document that allows for an in-depth study of *Kashf al-ghīṭā'*, it seems most plausible to attribute the treatise to Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Kīshī, a philosopher whose thinking and theories were very close both to Suhrawardī's Illuminationist philosophy and to Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī'.

31 For this concept in Kīshī's works see: Kīshī, *Majmū'a-i āthār*, p. 236.

32 See: Kīshī, *Majmū'a-i āthār*, pp. 247, 277; in Suhrawardī's works see: Suhrawardī, *Majmū'a-yi muṣannafāt-i Shaykh-i Ishrāq*, vol. 1, p. 113 (*al-Tabvīḥāt*); vol. 2, pp. 155–156 (*Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*); vol. 3, pp. 314, 330 (*Ṣafīr-i ṣīmurq*); vol. 4, p. 239 (*al-Lamaḥāt*).

33 For example, see this section:

علم أيها الأخ الطالب للكمال، رزفك الرحمة الأزليّة صرف الوصال إلى عين الجمال. إنّ هذه المسألة من المسائل الأخروية، أي من الأحوال التي تنكشف غاية الانكشاف بعد مجاورة النفس هذا العالم الخسيس الكثيف إلى العالم التوري الشريف اللطيف. وهي بالحقيقة رجوعها من بلاد الغربية إلى وطنها الأصلي، فهناك يتقن هذا المطلوب حقّ اليقين. فأما قبل مفارقة البدن فيصعب تصوّر هذا المطلوب إلّا بأمثلة ومقاييسات تقرب الطالب إلى التّصوّر الحقيقي.

Kīshī, *Majmū'eh-e Āthār*, p. 265.

34 See: Kīshī, *Majmū'a-i āthār*, pp. 185 ff, 234–235, 242–244.

In the following, I have edited *Kashf al-ghitā'* based on seven copies:

- A: Istanbul, Ayasofya 4862, ff. 277a–277b;
- M: Manisa 2964/19, ff. 107a–107b;
- N: Istanbul, Nuruosmaniye 4901, ff. 101a–101b, 10th/16th cent;
- P: Parliament Library in Tehran 10103, pp. 57–58.
- R: Istanbul, Ragıp Paşa 1480/6, ff. 307a–307b, copied by Badr al-Dīn Nasavī in 731/1330;
- S: Istanbul, Şehit Ali Paşa 1382, ff. 22b–24b, 1037/1627;
- V: Istanbul, Veliyüddīn Efendi 1826/7, ff. 32b–33a;

I have used the following abbreviations:

- (]) for “like this in the manuscript/s”;
- (⊘) for “the word/s is/are missing in the manuscript”;
- (→) for “on the right margin of the manuscript/s”.
- (←) for “on the left margin of the manuscript/s”.
- (↑) for “on the upper word note in the manuscript/s”.
- (↓) for “on the under word note in the manuscript/s”.

Copies of some of these manuscripts have been made available to me by my dear friends, Dr. John Walbridge and Mr. Ertugrul Ertekin. I am thankful to them for their support.

Edition of the *Kashf al-ghitā' li-ikhwān al-ṣafā'* (The Lifting of the Veil for the Brethren of Purity), with a Translation by John Walbridge

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

I. اللَّهُمَّ¹ أَعِدْنَا² مِنْ غَيْرِكَ إِلَيْكَ وَأَعِدْنَا³ لِلْمَشُورِ³ بَيْنَ يَدَيْكَ
وَأَجْعَلْنَا مَمَّنْ تَغْلُغَلُ⁴ فِي بَصِيرَتِهِ جَمَالَكَ⁵ وَتَوَعَّلْ⁵ فِي نَقِيصَتِهِ⁶ كَمَا لَكَ
وَصَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَى الْأُمَّةِ الْأَنْبِيَاءِ وَالْقَادَةِ⁷ الْأَتْقِيَاءِ
وَخَصَّصَ مُحَمَّدًا وَآلَهُ بِاسْنَى صَلَوَاتِكَ⁸ وَأَزَكِي تَحِيَّاتِكَ⁹
II. **وبعد** فإن¹⁰ هذه اللّمة الموسومة¹¹ بكشف الغطاء لإخوان الصّفاء¹² أبرزتها¹³ الرّحمة
الإلهية¹⁴ الأزلية لترقي أرباب¹⁵ النّظر والبرهان إلى رتبة أصحاب العبر¹⁶ والعيان جمع
الله تعالى¹⁷ إخوان التجريد¹⁸ في مقعد الصّدق¹⁹ عند الصّمّد الحقّ عزّ شأنه وبهوى
برهانه²⁰.

فصل

III. المعلول صورة العلة وظاهرها والعلة حقيقة المعلول وباطنه، لأنّ المعلول من
حيث هو هو²¹ ممكن الوجود وليس له إلاّ قبول الوجود، فإذا أوجده²² العلة فجميع ما
يشاهد²³ منه من الكمالات هو أوصاف العلة وكمالاتها التي تجلّي²⁴ في مظهر²⁵ ماهية

1 اللهم [M □ وما توفيقى إلاّ بالله اللهم S ربّ وما توفيقى إلاّ بالله ← A. 2 أعِدْنَا [أَعِدْنَا R S.
3 للمشور [المقول M للمشور NV. 4 تغلغل [تعقل NPV. 5 في بصيرته جمالكَ [في بصيرته M حقيقة جمالكَ
NPV. 6 نقيصته [نقيصته NPV. 7 والقادة والقادة N والهم RSA لعلّ وصلّ اللهم S →. 8 صلواتك [صلا
صلاتك S. 9 وصلّى الله على الأئمة الأنبياء... باسنى صلاتك وأزكى تحياتك [وصلّى الله على سيدنا
محمد وآله وصحبه أجمعين M¹⁰. فإن [M □. 11 الموسومة [موسومة APRS موسوية NV. 12 الصّفاء P □.
13 أبرزتها [أبرزتها R. 14 الإلهية [AMRS □. 15 أرباب [أرباب M. 16 العبر [العبر A العبرة P العين MS.
17 تعالى [سبحانه S. 18 التجريد [الصفاء التجريد A. 19 الصّدق [صدق MS الصّدق صدق عند
مليك مقتدر A. 20 الصّمّد الحقّ عزّ شأنه وبهوى برهانه [الصّمّد الحقّ عزّ شأنه M ملك مقتدر S
الصّمّد الحقّ عزّ شأنه وبهر دين برهانه A²¹. هو هو [هو NPV. 22 أوجده [أوجدت M. 23 يشاهد [ن
شاهد M. 24 وكمالاتها التي تجلّي [وكمالاته وكمالاتها التي تجلّي A ↑ وكمالاتها تجلّي M وكمالاته تجلّي NPV.
25 مظهر [فطر ← مظهر ط R.

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate!

I. O my God, give us, refuge in Thee from all save Thee.
 Bring us back to stand before Thee.
 Make us among those whose vision is filled with Thy beauty
 And whose deficiency is submerged in Thy perfection!

The blessings of God be upon the foremost among the prophets and the leaders of the sanctified, most especially Muḥammad and His family—the most splendid of Thy blessings and the purest of Thy greetings!

II. Now, the flash entitled “The Lifting of the Veil for the Brethren of Purity,” has been vouchsafed by the pre-eternal divine mercy in order to raise those possessing insight and demonstration up to the level of awareness and insight. May God gather the brethren of abstraction unto the seat of truth nigh unto the eternal Reality, great is His majesty and splendid His demonstration.

Chapter [One]

III. The effect is the image and exterior of the cause, while the cause is the reality and interior of the effect, for the effect insofar as it is an effect is contingent in its existence and has but to accept existence. Thus, if the cause gives it existence, all the perfections that may be seen in it are in fact the attributes and perfections of the cause that are revealed in the quiddity of its effect as its locus of manifestation to the extent that it is able to receive them. Therefore,

المعلول¹ على قدر ما كان قابلاً² له. فإذا نظر إلى المعلول³ من لا يعلم أنه معلول لغيره أو يعلم، ولم يتفطن لكونه معلولاً⁴ حال النظر إليه نسب كآلاته⁵ المشاهدة إلى المعلول. ومن تفطن لمعلوليته ونظر إليه حال التفطن⁶ شاهد⁷ كآلة العلة على الحقيقة، فكان⁸ ماهية المعلول من حيث ضرب⁹ المثل هي المرأة المصقولة فإنه ليس للمرأة سوى¹⁰ استعداد حكاية صورة¹¹ المحاذي وكآلة¹² العلة هو صورة¹³ الشخص المحاذي للمرأة، فمن نظر في¹⁴ المرأة وغفل عن كونها¹⁵ خالية عن جميع الصور من حيث ذاتها¹⁶ نسب الصور المرئية¹⁷ فيها إلى كونها صورة¹⁸ المرأة.

IV. ومن علم حال المرأة و¹⁹خلوها في ذاتها عن الصور نسبها²⁰ لا محاله إلى شخص خارج عن المرأة فاجعل جميع الممكنات مرايا وما ترى²¹ فيها من الكالات المحسوسة والمعنوية صوراً لمرايا²² بل اجعل جميعها²³ امرأة واحدة²⁴ لتصير من أهل المشاهدة.

فصل

V. ثم أرق²⁵ إلى²⁶ رتبة²⁷ أعلى من هذه وهي بأن²⁸ تتنبه لأن²⁹ مدركك غير خارج³⁰ عن ذاتك لأن³¹ المدرك محاط بالمدرك³² من حيث أنه مدرك³³، والمدرك محيط بالذات³⁴ من حيث أنه مدرك³⁵، ولا شك أن هذه الإحاطة إحاطة³⁶ علمية. والعلم

¹المعلول [المعلوم ← المعلول ظ M. 2 قابلاً [قابله P. 3 المعلول [معلول R. 4 لكونه معلولاً [معلولاً تر ← R لمعلوليته S لمعلوليته ← A. 5 كآلاته [الكالات P. 6 التفطن [النظر M. 7 شاهد [بشاهد N يشاهد P. 8 فكان [وكان MNPV. 9 ضرب [صور NPV. 10 سوى [إلا R. 11 صورة ← A. 12 وكآلة [فكآلة M وكان S. 13 العلة هو صورة [العلة صورة NP العلم بهذا V. 14 في [إلى A. 15 كونها [كونه NPV. 16 ذاتها [P. 17 الصور المرئية [الصورة المرئية M الصورة المرئية A. 18 صورة [صور NPV. 19 المرأة و [S. 20 نسبها [ينسبها MRA. 21 مرايا وما ترى [وما يرى NPV. 22 إلى شخص خارج عن المرأة فاجعل جميع الممكنات مرايا وما ترى فيها من الكالات المحسوسة والمعنوية صوراً لمرايا [M. 23 بل اجعل جميعها [بل اجعلها S با اجعل جميعها N فاجعل جميعها P. 24 واحدة [واحد P. 25 رقي السطح رقيقاً بيالاً برشدن، برآمد بر بام ← S. 26 إلى [لل S إلى S. 27 رتبة [مرتبة MS. 28 بأن [أن ARS. 29 تتنبه لأن [تتنبه أن AMS تنبه لأن NPV. 30 خارج [خال خارج A. 31 مدركك غير خارج عن ذاتك لأن [V. 32 بالمدرك [با المدرك P. 33 مدرك، والمدرك محيط بالذات [مدرك محيط بالمدرك MNV. 34 بالذات [با المدرك P. 35 والمدرك محيط بالذات من حيث أنه مدرك [R. 36 إحاطة [A →

if someone who does not know that it is an effect of something else considers the effect or does know but does not bear in mind that it is an effect while he is considering it, he will attribute the perfections that he sees in it to the effect. However, the one who does heed the fact that it is an effect and considers the effect while he bears in mind that it is an effect will behold the perfection of the cause in reality. To make an analogy, the quiddity of the effect is a polished mirror, for the mirror need only have the capacity to transmit that which is opposite to it. The perfection of the cause is the form of the individual opposite the mirror. Thus, someone who looks into a mirror yet is heedless of the fact that in itself it is utterly without forms will attribute the forms seen in it to the form of the mirror.

iv. Someone who knows what the mirror really is, understanding that in itself it is empty of any forms, will most surely attribute them to an individual outside the mirror. Thus, make all the contingents mirrors, making all the sensible and spiritual perfections you see therein to be the forms in mirrors—nay, rather, make all of them but a single mirror that thou might enter among the folk of contemplation.

Chapter [Two]

v. Then rise to a level yet higher than this, the realization that that in you which apprehends is nothing else than your own essence, for that which is apprehended is comprehended by that which apprehends insofar as it is

غير¹ منفكٍ عن ذات العالم، لجمع معلوماتك محاطٌ لذاتك فذاتك² محيط به، فإذا³ كل ما أدركته فهو في ذاتك ظرفية معنوية. فإن⁴ ذاتك من عالم المعاني فلا بد من كونها محيطاً بشيء أن يكون إحاطة معنوية فإذا انكشف لك هذا المقام رأيت نفسك محيطاً بجميع معلوماتك⁵. وكل ما حضر لك فتصير⁶ نفسك المرأة المذكورة. وهذه مشاهدة أخص من المشاهدة الأولى، فإتاك⁷ كنت تشهد⁸ الموجود الحقيقي قبل هذا في غيرك والآن تشاهده⁹ في ذاتك وبين الرتبين مسافة بارحة و¹⁰ بول بعيد.

فصل

VI. ثم فوق هذه المنزلة¹¹ رتبة أخرى أمثل¹² منها وهي بأن يتفطن¹³ لإمكان ذاتك وكونها غير موجودة من حيث هي هي¹⁴ قترفعها من البين فتدرك الأشياء كلها من حيث هي تجليات للحضرة¹⁶ الأحدية، فتغفل¹⁷ عن ذاتك من حيث هي¹⁸ محل لرؤية¹⁹ الأشياء فيها بل²⁰ ترى كلها منسوبة من حيث القيام²¹ إلى المطلوب الحقيقي، فتبقى أنت²² مشاهداً للتجليات فقط، ترى الأشياء كلها قائمةً بالحق تعالى وتقدس²³ وترى نفسك متبججة²⁴ بمشاهدتها وإذ²⁵ تعلم أنها جمالات للحق سبحانه²⁶ فيتأكد²⁷ المشاهدة غاية التأكيد²⁸ فيتضح المطلوب²⁹ وضوحاً يبه³⁰ البصيرة.

¹ غير [لا R. ² محاط لذاتك فذاتك [محاط لذاتك وذاتك A R محاطا بذاتك NV محاط P. ³ به فإذا [بها فإذا R به فإذا AMS. ⁴ فإن [فإذا R. ⁵ معلوماتك [معلوماتك وكل معلوماتك V. ⁶ حضر لك فتصير [حضرتك M. ⁷ فإتاك [فإن NPV. ⁸ تشهد [يشاهد P. ⁹ والآن تشاهده [فالآن يشاهده NV والآن تشهد R فالآن يشاهده P. ¹⁰ مساحة بارحة و [مسافة نارحة NV مسافة نارحة و AM¹¹ المنزلة [المرتبة S. ¹² أمثل [أعلى NPV. ¹³ يتفطن [تتفطن M. ¹⁴ هي هي [هي M. ¹⁵ قترفعها من البين فتدرك الأشياء كلها من حيث هي تجليات للحضرة الأحدية، فتغفل عن ذاتك من حيث هي [P. ¹⁶ للحضرة [M. ¹⁷ فتغفل [فتفصل AS. ¹⁸ هي [هي NV. ¹⁹ لرؤية [الرؤية N. ²⁰ فيها بل [وفيها M. ²¹ قيام [قايم M. ²² أنت [أثره M. ²³ تعالى وتقدس [ARS. ²⁴ متبججة [متبججة M مبتهجة APS. ²⁵ إذ [إذا M و إذا NP. ²⁶ جمالات للحق سبحانه [جمالات الحق سبحانه M جمالات للحق تعالى AR حالات للحق تعالى NPV. ²⁷ يتأكد [يتأكد S فتأكد A. ²⁸ التأكيد [التأكيد MNPV. ²⁹ المطلوب [المطلب M. ³⁰ يبه [يهذه M.

apprehended. That which apprehends comprehends by its essence inasmuch as it apprehends. This comprehension is a comprehension of knowledge, and knowledge cannot be separated from the essence of the knower. Thus, all the things you know are comprehended by your essence, and your essence comprehends them. Therefore, all the things you apprehend are contained within your essence spiritually, for your essence belongs to the realm of spiritual things, so the fact that it comprehends something implies that it is a spiritual comprehension. Thus, if this station is unveiled to you, you will see yourself comprehending all the things that you know and everything that is present to you. Thus, your soul will become the mirror that we have mentioned. This is a contemplation that is more exclusive than the first contemplation, for before this you contemplated the true existent in something other than you, but now you will contemplate it in your own essence. How vast, how very great is the distance between these two levels!

Chapter [Three]

VI. Above this degree there is another level yet nearer to the ideal,³⁵ which is when you bear in mind the contingency of your essence and that it is not existent in itself. In this way you will rise beyond and comprehend all things insofar as they are self-revelations of the Unitary Presence. You will become unaware of your essence insofar as it is a locus for seeing things in it. Instead, you will see all things with respect to subsistence as relative to what is truly to be sought. You will continually contemplate naught but these manifestations, and you will see all things subsisting by the Absolute, exalted and holy is He! You will see your soul enraptured in contemplating them, and, lo, you will know them to be beauties of the Absolute, exalted be He! This contemplation will reach the utmost firmness, and the object of your search will blaze before your eyes!

35 Some MSS read "yet higher."

فصل

VII. 1 إذا أمعت² النظر في هذا المقام وجدتک غير خارج عن المقام الذي فارقه وذلك لأنک³ كنت تجده⁴ الأشياء في ذاتک من حيث أنك كنت تدركها فلهذا⁵ النظر كنت تجدها في ذاتک وأما⁶ الآن فقد قطعت⁷ نظرك⁸ عن ذاتک من حيث هي محلّ الأشياء⁹ وكون الأشياء قائمة بها ولکتک بعد¹⁰ في مقام تثبت¹¹ فيه كونک مدرکاً للأشياء¹² فيفيد¹³ كونک¹⁴ محلاً لها¹⁵ وقد بأن لك استحالته فإذا¹⁶ كونک مدرکاً للأشياء¹⁷ يلزمه المحال¹⁸ فيكون محالاً فيتفصل¹⁹ في هذا المقام عن كونک مدرکاً للأشياء فيظهر لك أنّ المدرک بالحقيقة²⁰ هو الحق تعالى²¹.

A

قيل أن هذه الفصول من فوائد شمس الملة والدين الكيشي تغمده الله بغفرانه

M

وصلى على سيدنا محمد وآله أجمعين والحمد لله رب العالمين

N

والله أعلم بالصواب
تمت الرسالة بعون الله تعالى والحمد لله رب العالمين

1 [م] R. 2 [أمعت] أمضت P. 3 [لأنك] لأنك فارقه NPV فارقه ← V. 4 [تجد النظر] M. 5 [فلهذا] ولهذا NPV. 6 من حيث إتك كنت تدركها فلهذا النظر كنت تجدها في ذاتک وأما [وأنت] M. 7 [قطعت] ↓ R. 8 [نظرك] النظر AS. 9 [الأشياء] للأشياء NV. 10 [بعد] NPV. 11 [تثبت] تثبت M. 12 [لأشياء] فيفيد كونک محلاً لها وقد بأن لك استحالته فإذا كونک مدرکاً للأشياء [لها] MR. 13 [يفيد] فيعود AS. 14 [كونک] كونها P. 15 [يفيد كونک] محلاً لها وقد بأن لك استحالته فإذا كونک مدرکاً للأشياء [↓ A]. 16 [فإذا] فإذن A. 17 [لأشياء] لها ANV. 18 [يلزمه المحال] فيكون محالاً فيتفصل في هذا المقام عن كونک مدرکاً للأشياء [↓ P]. 19 [يتفصل] M. 20 [بالحقيقة] في الحقيقة NPV. 21 [الحق تعالى] الله تعالى R الحق تعالى وتقدس A وتقدس ← S.

Chapter [Four]

VII. If your vision is assiduous in this station, you will find that you have not left the station that you had departed from. That is because you have already found the things in your essence insofar as you had apprehended them. By this vision you had found them in your essence, but now you have cut your vision off from your essence insofar as it is the locus of things and the fact that things subsist in it. Rather, you have come later into a station in which you firmly apprehend things and you will have come to be³⁶ a locus for them. Its transformation will be obvious to you. Therefore, the fact that you apprehend things implies what is transformed, so it is transformed, so it is distinguished in this station from your apprehending things. Thus, it is manifest to you that what apprehends in reality is the Absolute, may He be exalted!

The manuscripts have varying endings:

A: It is said that these chapters are among the notes of Shams al-Milla wa-al-Dīn al-Kīshī, may God embrace him with His forgiveness!

M: Blessed be our Lord Muḥammad and his family, one and all, and praise be to God, the Lord of the worlds.

N: And God knows best what is right. Thus ends this treatise with the aid of God most high, and praise be to God, the Lord of the worlds.

36 Some MSS read "returned to being."

P

والله أعلم بالصواب
قد وقفت على إتمامه اللهم وفقني عما سلطه الله

R

تمت الرسالة
والحمد لله والصلوة على نبيه محمد وآله

S

والله سبحانه أعلم بحقائق الأمور الخفية وهو يقول الحق ويهدي السبيل

V

والله أعلم بالصواب تمت الرسالة بعون الله تعالى
والحمد لله وحده وصلى الله على سيدنا محمد وآله وصحبه وسلم

P: And God knows best what is right. I have now come to the end. O God, grant me success in that which God rules!

R: Thus ends this treatise. Praise be to God, and blessings be upon his prophet Muḥammad and his family.

S: God exalted knows best the realities of hidden matters. He speaks the truth and guides on the path.

V: God knows best what is right. Thus ends the treatise by the aid of God most high, and praise be to God alone, and may God bless our Lord Muḥammad, his family, and his companions and give them his greeting.

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FIGURE 4.1 Ms. nr. 1480, Rağıp Paşa Library. fol. 1a.



FIGURE 4.2 Ms. nr. 1826 Veliiyüddin Efendi library, fol. 1a.

Suhrawardī's *Creed of the Sages*

John Walbridge

At the end of Henry Corbin's edition of al-Suhrawardī's *Philosophy of Illumination* (*Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*), there is a little text entitled "The Creed of the Sages" (*I'tiqād al-ḥukamā'*), to use the title given in al-Shahrazūri's bibliography of al-Suhrawardī's works.¹ There are a number of variations of the title:

Risāla fī i'tiqād al-ḥukamā' in Qom, Ma'šūmiyya 473; Tehran, Majlis 630 and 4903; and Tehran, Tehran University 1792;

Risālat al-i'tiqād and *Risālat al-i'tiqādāt* in Tehran, Majlis 1219;

Aqā'id al-ḥukamā' ("Doctrines of the Sages") in the important early manuscript Tehran, Millī 2412 (992), as well as in Istanbul, Atatürk, Ergin 1313;

Risāla fī tawjīh kalām al-ḥukamā' ("Essay on the Implication of the Sages' Statements") in Istanbul, Bağdatlı Vehbi 2023;

Risāla fī bayān mu'taqad al-muta'allim min ahl al-ḥaqīqa ("An Essay in Explanation of What Is Believed by the One Taught by the People of Reality") in Istanbul, Karaçelebizade 346.

While it is by no means clear that al-Suhrawardī himself gave a title to the work—he does not himself name the work in the body of the text, referring to it only as "this book" (*hādihā al-kitāb*)—*I'tiqād al-ḥukamā'* is appropriate. The work is a brief summary of those areas of philosophy relevant to religious doctrines. At a number of points he introduces a topic with *ya'taqidūna*, "they hold the belief," a term with specific reference to adherence to a religious creed. In the introduction he identifies those he is discussing as *al-ḥukamā' al-muta'allihīn*, "the divine sages," a term that he also uses in *The Philosophy of Illumination* for the theistic ancient philosophers and in particular Plato. Among later Islamic philosophers the term *ḥukamā'*, which was used in the Qur'ān, largely supplants the Greek loan word *falāsīfa*, which by that time had acquired an unpleasant connotation of free-thinking and atheism.

1 In Henry Corbin, ed., *Oeuvres philosophiques et mystiques/Majmū'a-i Muṣannafāt-i Shaykh-i Ishrāq* (Bibliothèque Iranienne N.S. 2; Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, and Tehran: Académie Impériale Iranienne de Philosophie, 1976), vol. 2, pp. 261–271.

Manuscripts

When Corbin edited *The Creed of the Sages*, he used three manuscripts, two in Tehran and one in Paris. As the edition was going to press, a fourth turned up, leading him to comment, "It is a curious fact of experience that as soon as one publishes the rare or unique manuscripts of an unedited text, other manuscripts will unexpectedly appear!"² I know of six more manuscripts that have come to light since, though on the face of it Corbin seems to have found the most important.

I will discuss the manuscripts in detail, roughly in chronological order. All are in *majmū'as*, collections of shorter texts, the contents of which are important for understanding the transmission and circulation of this work.

Tehran, Millī Persian 2412/2 (= 992 *sīn*/1757), pp. 82–94, 9.5 × 19 cm, 264 ff., 19 ll., *naskh*, copied by Muḥammad b. 'Alī al-Dāmghānī Jājarmī in 654/1256–659/1261, "T" in Corbin's edition.³ This is the second most important al-Suhrawardī manuscript, rivalled only by Istanbul, Ragip Paşa 1480, the great fourteenth century compilation of his Arabic works, which does not include *I'tiqād al-Ḥukamā'*. Its importance lies in its early date and the fact that manuscripts of those works of al-Suhrawardī that it contains tend to be quite rare. It was Seyyed Hossein Nasr's source for most of the shorter Persian works that he edited in the third volume of al-Suhrawardī's collected works.

2 Henry Corbin, in *Oeuvres*, vol. 2, French p. 84.

3 Sayyid 'Abd Allāh Anwār, *Fihrist-i Nusakh-i Khattī-i Kitābkhāna-i Millī* (Tehran: Wizārat-i Farhang va Hunar, 1347/1968–), vol. 5, no. 536–55. Muḥammad-Taqī Dānish-Pazhūh, *Farhang-i Īrān-Zamīn* 14 (1346/1967), pp. 297–303. Muṣṭafā Dirāyatī, *Fankhā: Fihristagān-i nuskhā-hā-yi khattī-i Īrān* (Tehran: Sāzmān-i Asnād wa-Kitābkhāna-i Millī-i Jumhūrī-i Islāmī-i Īrān, 1390/2011–), vol. 4, p. 453. Aḥmad Munzawī, *Fihrist-i nuskhā-hā-i khattī-yi fārsī* (Tehran: Mu'assasa-i Farhangī-i Mīnṭaqā'ī [ca. 1970]), vol. 2/1, pp. 1015–16, no. 9312; p. 1179, no. 11023; p. 1271, no. 11929; p. 1287, no. 12077; p. 1344, no. 12720; p. 1430, no. 13703. Al-Suhrawardī, *Lughat-i mūrān*, ed. Nasrollah Pourjavady (Tehran: Mu'assasa-i Pizhūhishī-i Ḥikmat va Falsafa-i Īrān; Berlin, Germany: Mu'assasa-i Muṭāla'āt-i Islāmī-i Dānishgāh-i Āzād-i Birlīn, 2007), p. 7. There is are microfilms in the Tehran University Library: F1136, F3059, F4619; see Muḥammad-Taqī Dānish-Pazhūh, *Fihrist-i Mikrūfilmhā-yi Kitābkhāna-i Markazī-yi Dānishgāh-i Tihirān*, [Vol. 1.] (Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tihirān 1259; Ganjīna-i Fihrist wa Kitābshināsī 17; Tehran: Tehran University, 1348/1969), 1:566–67; vol. 2 (Intishārāt-i Kitābkhāna-i Markazī wa-Markaz-i Asnād 5. Tehran: Tehran University, 1353/1974), p. 51; vol. 3 (Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tihirān 1259/3. Tehran: Tehran University, 1363/1984), p. 80. The late Hossein Ziai probably had a microfilm, in which case the microfilm may be in the UCLA library, though I was not able to locate it.

The manuscript contains twenty-two works, nine of them known to be by al-Suhrawardī: *Qiṣṣat al-ghurba al-gharbiyya* (The Story of the Occidental Exile), *I'tiqād al-ḥukamā'*, *Āwāz-i parr-i Jibrā'īl* (The Sound of Gabriel's Wing), *Lughat-i mūrān* (The Language of the Ants), *Ṣafīr-i sīmurgh* (The Shrill of the Phoenix) *Aql-i surkh* (The Crimson Intellect), *Risāla fī ḥālat al-ṭufūliyya* (An Essay on the State of Childhood), *Rūzī bā jamā'at-i ṣūfiyān* (A Day with a Group of Sufis) and *Ḥaqīqat-i 'ishq* (The Reality of Love, also known as *Mu'nis al-'ushshāq*, The Friend of Lovers). One or two others are doubtfully attributed to him, but I will not consider them here. The fact that all these works, apart from the first two, which are in Arabic, are included in the great *majmū'a Safīna-i Tabrīz* (The Ark of Tabriz) may indicate that these Persian works circulated as a collection, though not widely, in Iran in the thirteen and fourteenth centuries.

The identity of the scribe is not known, though his name indicates a Khorasani origin, Jājarm being a village in the district of Juwayn.

Tehran, Majlis 630/5, pp. 16–19, 11.8 × 21.5 cm, 240 ff., varying lineation, early 8th/14th cent., reg. no. 9006, "M" in Corbin's edition.⁴ A philosophical and theological *majmū'a* written by or belonging to the great Shī'ite scholar al-'Allāma Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (648/1250–726/1325) containing fifteen works and extracts by al-Ḥillī, al-Samarqandī, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, Ibn Sinā, Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī, and others. The largest works are probably al-Ṭūsī's *Tajrīd al-i'tiqād* (The Abstraction of the Creed), which is accompanied by a note by al-Ḥillī stating that he had studied the book with its author, and al-Ḥillī's famous commentary on that work, the *Kashf al-murād* (Unveiling of the Desired). The manuscript is thus of Iraqi origin and reflects the interests of the circle of al-Ṭūsī and his students.

Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Arabic 1247/3, ff. 144–45, after 775/1373, 15 × 22.5 cm, 145 ff., 23 ll., 31 ll. (third item), second item copied in Baghdad on 7 Sha'bān 775/22 Jan. 1374 by Muḥammad b. 'Umar al-Dawḥī known as Badr al-Tūqātī, P in Corbin's edition.⁵ The bulk of the manuscript is occupied by two works

4 Corbin, *Oeuvres* vol. 2. French 84. Dirāyatī, *Fankhā* 4.453. I'tiṣāmī, Yūsuf. *Fihrist-i Kitābkhāna-i Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Millī* (Tehran: Kitābkhāna-i Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Millī, 1311/1932), vol. 2, pp. 388–391. Reza Pourjavady and Sabine Schmidtke, *A Jewish Philosopher of Baghdad: 'Izz al-Dawla Ibn Kammūna (d. 683/1284) and His Writings*. (Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science: Texts and Studies 65; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2006), pp. 123, 128, 211, 224.

5 Corbin, *Oeuvres* 2.84. William MacGuckin De Slane, *Catalogue des manuscrits arabes de la Bibliothèque Nationale. Département des Manuscrits* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1883–95), p. 239. Āqā Buzurg Ṭīhrānī, *al-Dharī'a ilā Taṣānīf al-Shī'a* (Beirut: Dār al-Aḍwā', n.d.), vol. 15, p. 9, no. 46. Louis Massignou, *Recueil des textes inédits concernant l'histoire de la mystique en pays d'Islam* (Paris: Geuthner, 1929), p. 113. Georges Vajda, *Index général des manuscrits arabes musulmans de la Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris* (Publications de l'Institut de Recherche et d'Histoire de Textes. Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1953),

on theology, apparently Shi'ite, dating from the late 7th/13th cent. and early 8th/14th cent. respectively, the second being a commentary on the first. Thus, like Majlis 630, this manuscript comes from Shi'ite circles around Baghdad.

Istanbul, Karaçelebizade 346/10, ff. 232b–237b, 13 × 18.2 cm, 17 ll., *naskh*, copied by 'Alī b. Abī Bakr b. 'Isā b. Raṣṣās, 9th/15th century. A *majmū'a* of twenty items of various sorts, which also includes al-Suhrawardī's *Hayākil al-nūr* (Temples of Light). The manuscript can be roughly dated by the fact that it contains two works of the Egyptian scholar Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Aqfahsī (d. 808/1405) and a note by one Yūsuf b. Aḥmad al-Sulaymānī dated Jerusalem, 890/1485. The manuscript thus seems to have a Western origin.

Istanbul, Bağdatlı Vehbi 2023/6, ff. 43b–48b, 12 × 17 cm, 316 ff., 19–21 ll., *nasta'liq*, beginning of 10th/16th century.⁶ An interesting *majmū'a* of forty-eight texts, mostly popular Sufi authors, including one other work by al-Suhrawardī, the *Taqsim al-mawjūdāt* (Divisions of Existents) ff. 36a–37a). The script is consistent throughout. The manuscript is not dated, but the title page (iiiia) has a note, recording that it was borrowed from 'Abd al-Raḥmān b. 'Alī b. al-Mu'ayyad in Constantinople on Wednesday, 17 Ṣafar 909/9 Aug. 1503. The cover has notes recording intentions of making *hajj*, the first by the same 'Abd al-Raḥmān dated after the *'aṣr* prayer, Friday, 9 Sha'bān 933/10 May 1527, and the second 3 Rajab 951/20 Sept. 1544 by Muḥammad b. 'Alī b. Ibrāhīm b. Khalīl in Constantinople. One of the texts concludes with a note that it was composed in 891/1486. The evidence thus places the origin of this manuscript in Ottoman Istanbul in about 1500.

Istanbul, Atatürk, Ergin 1313/14, ff. 168b–172a, 10 × 14.5 cm, 19 ll., small *naskh*, copied by Sha'bān al-Qunawī [sic] in 1026/1617. A *majmū'a* of mainly Sufi content, probably of Ottoman origin to judge by the *nisba* of the scribe and the contents. In addition to *I'tiqād al-ḥukamā'*, it contains a work entitled *Sharḥ al-munājāt al-ṣādira 'an Shihāb al-Dīn al-Maqtūl* (Commentary on the Prayer emanating from Shihāb al-Dīn, who was killed) by one Abū al-'Alā' Muḥammad al-Isfarā'īnī.

Tehran, Tehran University 1792/2, ff. 7a–12b, 10 × 18 cm, 14 ff., 15 ll., copied by Mīr Dāmād (d. 1040/1630).⁷ This is the manuscript that Corbin belatedly discovered. At that time it belonged to Fakhr al-Dīn Naṣīrī. The fact that it was

p. 413. Georges Vajda and Yvette Sauvan. *Catalogue des manuscrits arabes: Deuxième partie: Manuscrits musulmans* (Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale, 1985), vol. 3, pp. 120–121.

6 Dirāyatī, *Fankhā* 19.749, 30.376. Microfilm at Tehran University, F643; Dānish-Pazhūh, *Filmhā* 1.517–20.

7 Corbin, *Oeuvre* vol. 2. French pp. 84–85. Muḥammad-Taqī Dānish-Pazhūh, *Fihrist-i Kitābkhāna-i Markazī-i Dānishgāh-i Tihārān* (Tehran: Dānishgāh-i Tihārān, 1357/1978–), vol. 8, p. 357. Dirāyatī, *Fankhā* vol. 4, p. 453.

copied by Mīr Dāmād (950/1543–1041/1631), a founder of the so-called “School of Isfahan” and one of the teachers of Mullā Ṣadrā, leads me to suspect that this manuscript represents the rediscovery of this text in Iran. The other text in this manuscript is a quotation from Ibn Sīnā.

Tehran, Majlis 1219/30, pp. 511–516, 12.5 × 25 cm, 564 ff., 23 ll., *nasta‘līq*, 1064/1654, reg. no. 14814.⁸ A *majmū‘a* containing some thirty essays on philosophical topics by Ibn Sīnā, Ghiyāth al-Dīn al-Dashtakī, and others. Presumably this manuscript is of Safavid origin.

Qom, Ma‘šūmiyya 473/2, ff. 125–30, 11.5 × 20 cm, 21 ll., *naskh*, copied by Muḥammad-Ḥusayn b. Shaykh ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd b. Shaykh ‘Alī on 22 Ramaḍān 1176/6 April 1763.⁹ I have seen neither the manuscript nor the original catalog entry, so I cannot say anything more about the nature or contents of this manuscript, other than the fact that the scribe’s name and the manuscript’s location indicates that the scribe was Shī‘ite.

Tehran, Majlis 4903/9, ff. 84b–85b, 14.5 × 30 cm, 240 ff., 48 ll., *nasta‘līq*, copied by Muḥammad-Mu‘min b. ‘Alī-Naqī Bākī, Isfahan, 12th/18th cent., reg. no. 64971.¹⁰ This manuscript is also of Iranian origin.

Transmission

Manuscripts of *I‘tiqād al-ḥukamā’* are not common—ten known to me in total. Compare this to *Hayākil al-nūr*, for which I know fifty-three manuscripts and over eighty of its commentaries, or over 150 manuscripts of *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq* and its commentaries. It thus resembles the short Persian allegories, most of which have two to ten manuscripts each. The oldest copy is, in fact, in Millī 2412, which is the most important source for the Persian allegories. The origin of this 7th/13th century manuscript is certainly Iranian, much of it consisting of Persian works and the scribe having two *nisbas* pointing to northeastern Iran. The next two surviving manuscripts are from the Baghdad area in the 8th/14th century, both mainly devoted to Shī‘ite theological works. It is of note that the most important 8th/14th century manuscript, Ragip Paşa 1480, copied in the great Sunni Mustanşariyya and Nizāmiyya madrasas in Baghdad, does

8 Dirāyatī, *Fankhā* 4.453. ‘Abd al-Ḥusayn Ḥā’irī, *Fihrist-i kitābkhāna-i Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Millī, kutub-i khattī* (Tehran: Majlis, 1335/1957), vol. 4, pp. 11, 160–62, no. 1424.

9 Dirāyatī, *Fankhā* 4.454. Ḥasan Nafīsī, *Fihrist-i Nuskhahā-yi khattī-i kitābkhāna-i Āstān-i Muqaddas-i Ḥaḍrat-i Ma‘šūma* (Qom: Zā‘ir, Āstān-i Muqaddas, <1391/2012>), 2.81.

10 Dirāyatī, *Fankhā* 4.453–54. Aḥmad Munzawī, *Fihrist-i kitābkhāna-i Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Millī, kutub-i khattī* (Tehran: Majlis, 1933–), vol. 14, pp. 114–128.

not include this text. The next manuscript, Karaçelebizade 346, seems to be Syrian, since it contains texts by an Egyptian scholar and a signature of a scholar in Jerusalem dated 890/1485. After 1500 there are manuscripts from both Iran and the Ottoman Empire.

From the nature of these manuscripts and the distribution of the dates and places of their origins, some inferences can be—very cautiously—made.

First, while the content of the work and the testimony of al-Shahrazūrī's bibliography remove any doubt as to its attribution to al-Suhrawardī, the work was never very widely known. It is important to note that the same is true of his allegories, despite their fame and popularity today.

Second, the early stages of the work's transmission, so far as they can be documented from the surviving manuscripts, are Iranian and Shi'ite. The oldest manuscript was copied by a Khorasani from an area with various strands of Shi'ism, notably Isma'ilism. The next two manuscripts are from Baghdad, both unquestionably Shi'ite. This fact and the fact that the more or less contemporary, but Sunni, Ragip Paşa 1480 does not know this work, indicate that *I'tiqād al-ḥukamā'* was transmitted during the period by a small number of copies in Shi'ite hands.

Third, the text was rediscovered in Iran in Safavid times by Mīr Dāmād, perhaps from al al-Ḥillī's manuscript, Majlis 630, which could well have made its way to Iran by then. Thereafter, it was copied a few times more, falling into the category of interesting short works, but never becoming very well known.

Fourth, meanwhile in the west, Karaçelebizade 346 was in Jerusalem toward the end of the 15th century but ended up in the library associated with a family of 'ulamā' prominent in the 16th and 17th century. It is likely that the other two Istanbul manuscripts derive from this one.

Thus, we have a history of the transmission of this text in which it originates in Iran in association with the Persian allegories, remains in Shi'ite hands for most of the next two centuries, before being rediscovered in the west in the 15th century and in Iran in the 17th. This in general resembles the pattern of transmission of the shorter Persian works. Now, al-Suhrawardī himself mentions in *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, para. 3, that he had composed works in his youth. Al-Shahrazūrī, who had the most comprehensive knowledge of al-Suhrawardī's works of anyone before or since, glosses this as "like most of his *risālas*," while the other commentator, Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, says that they included *Hayākil al-nūr* and *al-Abwāḥ*, presumably *al-Abwāḥ al-Imādiyya* (The Tablets for 'Imād al-Dīn). Since al-Suhrawardī was not in the habit of dating his writings, the only one of his minor works that we can date with any confidence is *Bustān al-qulūb* (The Garden of Hearts), an essay on the soul that he says was written for a friend in Isfahan, which he probably never visited after his school days.

What does this tell us about the dating of *I'tiqād al-ḥukamā'*? There is a pattern of al-Suhrawardī's short Persian works circulating thinly and mostly in Iran. We do know that he lived a peripatetic life, wandering from place to place and dressed very poorly. It is thus not likely that he kept fair copies of his juvenilia. It is more likely that one or two copies of early works were left behind, most likely in Isfahan, when he began his wanderings to Anatolia and Syria, and that these copies became the basis for the small number of manuscripts of these works that we now have.

This reconstruction of the manuscript history indicates a very early date for *I'tiqād al-ḥukamā'*—before the conversion to Platonism that he describes in his later works. The content of the work also supports this early date, as I will explain below.

The Purpose and Content of *The Creed of the Sages*

Al-Suhrawardī begins this little treatise by defining its purpose: to show the falsity of the charge that the divine sages (*al-ḥukamā' al-muta'allihīn*) are atheists (*dahrīyya*) who do not believe in a Creator, prophets, or resurrection and judgment. This charge, he says, is false, at least insofar as it applies to the learned among the sages, who in fact believe in all of these things. He then considers their views in detail.

1. They demonstrate that the existence of the universe is contingent and must therefore have a Creator. This Creator cannot be body, since neither body nor accidents can originate something else. This Creator cannot be contingent and so therefore its existence must be necessary in itself.
2. The first creation of God in their view is an intellect, which by contemplation of God, its own contingency, and its own essence creates another, slightly lower intellect, sphere and soul. The next intellect does the same, until there are ten intellects, the last of which is identical with the Holy Spirit and Gabriel.
3. The universe is posterior to God in priority, not in time, but this is not the same as the heretical opinion that the universe has no creator.
4. God does not originate anything based on will, since that would imply that there was some benefit of which God was in need.
5. Man has a rational soul that is neither corporeal nor identical with the animal spirit that ends in death. This soul comes from the Giver of Forms, the tenth intellect.

6. By acquiring forms matter becomes earth, water, air, and fire.
7. The mixture of these elements leads to the generation of minerals, plants, and animals, with human beings being the noblest of animals.
8. Both human beings and the spheres have rational souls. The souls of the spheres move the spheres, these motions being the cause of good in our world.
9. There are three worlds: those of intellects, souls, and bodies.
10. The human soul is immortal and will be rewarded or punished after death for its knowledge or ignorance of God and the angels and for the good or evil traits that it has acquired.
11. Prophets are sent to reform the world, give laws, and remind people of the afterlife.
12. The spiritual adepts experience extraordinary things through a spiritual connection acting on the imagination.

It is not difficult to understand why al-Suhrawardī would have written such a work. It is tempting to see it as a response to al-Ghazālī, whom al-Suhrawardī never mentions by name, so far as I know. Ibn Rushd, writing at about the same time, had made similar arguments in *Faṣl al-maqāl* (The Decisive Treatise), his legal defence of the legitimacy of philosophy, and in much more detail in *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* (The Incoherence of [al-Ghazālī's] *Incoherence*). Al-Suhrawardī here defends the philosophers from two of the three most serious charges that al-Ghazālī made against them—their belief that the world had had no beginning in time and the charge that they did not believe in the resurrection and judgment. He does not mention the third charge, that God does not know particulars, but he does deal with a related issue, that God does not act by will. Whether or not al-Suhrawardī was specifically addressing al-Ghazālī, such charges against the philosophers were in the air, and an advocate of philosophy needed to address them.

Who then was the intended audience? The theologians, I think. The fact that it was written in Arabic tends to indicate that it was for a professional audience, particularly if it was written in Iran, as I believe it was. While it is not particularly difficult philosophically, it does require some knowledge of philosophical and theological concepts. If it had been written for laymen, it would have been in Persian, as the allegories were. Moreover, he tries to reduce disagreements between Islamic doctrines and the views of the philosophers to mere differences of terminology.

The other question to answer is what kind of philosophy this represents. It is, it seems, that of Ibn Sīnā—the “followers of the Peripatetics,” as al-Suhrawardī

would later call them. I have addressed elsewhere the question of what al-Suhrawardī's "Illuminatism" actually is and how the doctrines and language of *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq* are related to his so-called "Peripatetic" works such as *al-Talwihāt* (The Intimations) and *al-Mashāri' wa'l-muṭārahāt* (The Paths and Havens).¹¹ The best guides are the *ḥukūmāt ishrāqiyya* (illuminative judgments) at the end of the logic of *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, in which al-Suhrawardī criticizes a number of Ibn Sīnā's views, supplemented by some views expressed elsewhere in the book. Even these can be difficult to interpret; for example, it is not clear how his denial of prime matter or his three element theory of matter can be reconciled with his other works. Moreover, not all of these criticisms of Ibn Sīnā are relevant to the present case—for example, his denunciation of Ibn Sīnā's existence/quiddity ontology. Even the famous doctrine of knowledge by presence has little relevance to *I'tiqād al-ḥukamā'*.

There is one glaring evidence that this work precedes al-Suhrawardī's conversion to Platonism: the total absence of reference to the doctrine of Forms. Al-Suhrawardī tells us in a couple of passages that he had originally been a zealous Peripatetic, by which he means a follower of Ibn Sīnā but that mystical experience had converted him to Platonism. The two changes that he mentions specifically are the doctrine of knowledge by presence as a solution to the dilemmas of epistemology and the acceptance of the existence of Platonic Forms. In his view, the forms are angels, the product of the almost infinitely complex interactions among the celestial intellects. In Ibn Sīnā's system there is a hierarchy of ten celestial intellects accompanied by souls driving the spheres.¹² These entities also exist in al-Suhrawardī's system, but they are accompanied by innumerable other intellects that are the causes of the kinds of natural entities in the sublunar world. There was no reason for him to conceal this view, since he eventually came to believe that this doctrine was held by the

11 Most recently and systematically in "Suhrawardī's (d. 1191) *Intimations of the Tablet and the Throne: The Relationship of Illuminatism and Peripatetic Philosophy*," in Sabine Schmidtke and Khalid El-Rouayheb, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 255–277.

12 Damien Janos, "Moving the Orbs," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 21 (2011), pp. 165–214, argues that Ibn Sīnā believed that, given the complexity of their motions, many more than ten intellects were required to move the nine celestial spheres. While this very well may be so, it is also the case that al-Suhrawardī commonly refers to the ten intellects as a characteristic of the—inadequate—Peripatetic account of the structure of the universe. In any case, al-Suhrawardī's interest in additional intellects mainly has to do with their roles as counterparts of the Platonic Forms.

divine sages. The obvious conclusion is that this text predates his conversion to Platonism.

Finally, this text feels like an immature work. The tone is enthusiastic, and the arguments are neither complex nor particularly original. Al-Suhrawardī himself refers a little dismissively in his *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq* to other works using the Peripatetic method “which I composed in the days of my youth,” which both al-Shahrazūrī and Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī identify in their commentaries as “most of his short works (*rasāʾil*),”¹³ which I argue elsewhere also includes the Persian allegories; see p. 34, n. 36, above.

There are three counter-arguments that can be made in this connection that would put this little text into the blessed company of al-Suhrawardī's Illuminationist writings. First, his use of the term “divine sages” is characteristic of *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq* and his Illuminationist period. Second, the final page or so is a description of mystical experience that sounds very much like certain passages in *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*. Finally, he might have wished to avoid mentioning the scandal of fundamental disagreements among the philosophers, as al-Fārābī¹⁴ had done in his *Reconciliation of the Opinions of the Two Sages, Plato and Aristotle*. While these passages may show that mysticism and a mystical interpretation of the history of philosophy were part of his philosophical worldview from the beginning, I am still inclined to think that the systematic agreement of this little treatise with the well-known doctrines of Ibn Sīnā place it in the early period of al-Suhrawardī's short career.¹⁵

13 *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, ¶3; al-Shahrazūrī, *Sharḥ Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, ed. Hussein Ziai (Tehran: Amīr Kabīr, 1372/1993), p. 19; al-Shīrāzī, *Sharḥ Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, ed. Asad Allāh Harātī ([Tehran]: 1313/1895–1315/1897), p. 15.

14 Or whoever wrote this text; its attribution to al-Fārābī has been challenged; see Marwan Rashed, “On the Authorship of the *Treatise on the Harmonization of the Opinions of the Two Sages* Attributed to al-Fārābī,” *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 19 (2009), pp. 43–82, who suggests an attribution to the circle of Yaḥyā b. ‘Adī. The authorship is not relevant to my argument here.

15 In his French introduction to the text, Henry Corbin weighs similar considerations and comes to similar conclusions, though he also considers arguments for placing this work later in al-Suhrawardī's life; *Oeuvres*, vol. 2, French pp. 80–81. An anonymous reviewer suggests that this could be a text written later in al-Suhrawardī's life, after his Illuminationist conversion, to defend Avicennan philosophy, even though he no longer held these views himself. This is possible, of course, but there seems to be no particular evidence for it in the manuscript history, the content of the text, or the bio-bibliographical literature.

Translation

My translation is based on Corbin's text, which appears to be quite sound. The paragraphing follows Corbin.

Shihāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā al-Suhrawardī, Shaykh al-Ishrāq

The Creed of the Sages

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate!

This is the essay known as "The Creed of the Sages," which was dictated by the learned imam Shihāb al-Ḥaqq wa-al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī, the one who was killed, may God sanctify his soul!¹⁶

(1) After first praising God and praying for His Prophet Muḥammad and His family, I must explain the reason for composing this work. When I observed how people's tongues wagged about those learned men, the divine sages, and how they slandered them, I saw that the reason for this was that people supposed that they were those atheists¹⁷ who believe in neither the Creator, the prophets, the Day of Judgment and Resurrection,¹⁸ nor the reward and punishment after death. We take refuge in God from such a doctrine! Let God's curses be upon anyone who says such a thing and upon those who follow them!

(2) This thing that people say is wrong but is in part correct. What they suppose is not true of the learned among the divine sages, for in fact the learned among those who grasp reality believe that the universe has a creator and that He is one, single, and enduring,¹⁹ taking to Himself "neither spouse nor child" (Q72.3), that He is living, knowing, hearing, and seeing, that He is described by attributes of perfection in such a way that He is neither multiple nor numerous. They believe that the Prophets obey the command of God most high in

16 This introduction, which is obviously not part of the original text, varies in the manuscripts. One of them adds that he had written another essay on the creed of the sages.

17 *Dahrīyya*, which literally means those who believe in the eternity of the world. Their idea is that the world is self-subsisting with no beginning or end, and thus has no Creator. A reviewer took issue with translating this term as "atheist," but given how such a position would have been received by Suhrawardī's audience, "atheist" seems a reasonable rendering.

18 He actually uses four terms—*ḥashr*, *nashr*, *marjī*, and *ma'ād*—all of which refer to the resurrection and day of judgment.

19 *Ṣamad*, a notoriously problematic Qur'anic term.

that they convey that which they are obligated to convey. They believe that punishment and bliss are real and that happiness and torment are real, lasting, and attaching to man. The happy find bliss after death, and the damned meet punishment after death. They believe that the existence of the universe is contingent and that anything whose existence is contingent is temporal in the sense that its existence is dependent upon something else and it itself is not existent by virtue of its own essence. In this sense, the eternal can only be that whose existence does not require something else—which is to say, the Necessary of Existence, great and exalted be He! This is their belief in brief.

(3) Let us, however, consider this in detail. They demonstrate that the existence of the universe is contingent. It is easy to grasp that since accidents subsist in bodies, an accident is contingent due to its dependence on something else. If the existence of the accident were necessary, its existence would not depend on something else. Then too, bodies are the substrate of contingent accidents, and that whose existence is necessary cannot be the substrate of accidents. Thus, body too must be contingent. Moreover, bodies differ in accordance with the difference of their accidents—magnitudes, shapes, colors, heat and cold, and the rest of the diverse accidents. Therefore, there must be an originating²⁰ Creator, but the body cannot be the originator of the states, for the state are diverse, while body insofar as it is body is not diverse and so cannot be the originator of differing realities.

There are two reasons why accidents cannot originate the bodies. First, accidents are diverse, while body is a single reality, so that if the accidents were the originators of bodies, [264] the corporeality of bodies would be diverse. Second, accidents require bodies for their existence, so how could an accident originate that which it is dependent upon for existence?

Body cannot originate itself,²¹ nor can an accident originate itself, so there must be something that originates that is neither a body nor an accident. Thus, if that originator is necessary of existence in itself, then we have what we sought to prove, but if it is contingent, then it must eventually end in what is necessary of existence in itself. This is the Creator, may He exalted. A rational man can have no doubt of that: “Is there any doubt about God?” (Q14.10) It is, in fact, something innate, as the bedouin says, “Dung shows there are camels, and footprints show the path.” Thus, do not both the celestial temple by its subtlety and the lowest center by this coarseness point to the good Creator? However, the sages say that the Creator does not originate bodies directly, but that body

20 *Mubdi'*, that is, bringing something new into being. *Ṣāni'*, which I translate as “creator,” is a less technical term.

21 Or “originate due to its own essence.”

is generated as either fire, air, water, or earth. Since that is so, its origination can only be due to diverse aspects.

(4) Given all that we have said, it follows that the first thing that God most high originated was a rational entity that lives and knows, just as the Prophet, upon whom be peace, said: “The first thing that God most high created was intellect.”²² However, this entity has three aspects: by virtue of its contemplation of the Creator and its intellection of Him, by virtue of its contemplation and intellection of its contingency, and by virtue by its contemplation and intellection of its own essence. With respect to its contemplation and intellection of the Creator—this is noblest aspect—another intellect comes into existence. With respect to its contemplation and intellection of its own contingency [265]—this is the basest aspect—a sphere comes into existence. Finally, with respect to its contemplation and intellection of its own essence the soul of the sphere comes into existence. Likewise, a third intellect and a second sphere and its soul come to be from the second intellect, and from the third intellect a fourth intellect and third sphere and its soul. A fifth intellect and a fourth sphere with its intellect come to be from the fourth intellect, a sixth intellect and fifth sphere with its soul from the fifth intellect, a seventh intellect and sixth sphere with its soul from the sixth intellect, an eighth intellect and seventh sphere with its soul from the seventh intellect, a ninth intellect and eighth sphere with its soul from the eighth intellect, and a tenth intellect and ninth sphere with its soul from the ninth intellect. The world of the elemental beings and human souls comes to be from the tenth intellect. The sages call this intellect “the Giver of Forms,” but the prophets call it the Holy Spirit and Gabriel, that one who said, “I am but a messenger of your Lord, sent to give unto you a pure youth.” (Q 19.19)

(5) However, they say that the posteriority of these existents to the Absolute Originator is neither temporal nor spatial since time and place follow from these existents. In fact, the posteriority of these existents to God Most High is essential, the posteriority of that which is originated to the originator; for that which is originated is eternally²³ posterior to that from which it originates, while the originator is prior to it. If one but pays attention to the usage of “cause” and “effect,” there will no occasion to argue about terminology. Likewise, if someone wishes to say that the universe is perpetual,²⁴ meaning thereby that there is there is no posteriority, whether of time, place, degree, or

22 A well-known hadith not found in the authoritative collections.

23 *Abadan*, which is to say from time that had no beginning.

24 *Dā'im*, which normally means unending time, in contrast to *abad*, by which Suhrawardi means beyond time.

nature, between the originated and that which originates it, there will also be no occasion to argue about terminology, since the same thing is meant. On the other hand, if someone were to say, "The world is perpetual," meaning thereby that it had no originator or creator, that would indeed be unbelief and heresy.²⁵

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(6) Moreover, they believe that God most high does not originate anything based on His will, for will is nothing but the preference of one alternative over the other, either due to a benefit accruing to someone or a benefit accruing to that upon which he acts because he thinks it better that the benefit occur than not in that which is acted upon. In either case, a will occurs in him. This is something that one knows innately, for everyone knows that in his own case he only wills to do an action for the sake of some benefit that accrues to him or to someone else, and in the latter case only if this benefit for another is preferable to its non-occurrence for the one doing it. However, God most high is exalted above any need²⁶ and above the dependence of His need on anything. Therefore, His action is not based upon any need, for in fact His essence necessitates existence. If, however, they were to stoop to dialectic²⁷ and accept that God does have will, this would still not undermine their position, for His will too would be pre-eternal, and it would thus follow that that universe would not be posterior to him in time, space, or any other form of posteriority.

(7) The sages believe that man is the noblest of the terrestrial animals and that he has a rational soul. In the view of a sage, "rational soul" is an expression for a unitary rational substance that is neither in the elemental world nor in the aethereal world, which is to say the world of the heavens. In fact, it could not conceivably exist in the world of bodies, because if it were in the world of bodies, it could not conceivably apprehend the unity of the First Absolute, great is His glory, for the One can only be apprehended by something unitary, It indeed being a unitary entity, [267] as al-Ḥallāj said when he was about to be crucified: "It is enough for the One that one declares Him single." However, nothing in the world of bodies is a unity, so the soul cannot be conceived to exist in the world of bodies.

25 *Zandaqa*, which originally referred to Manicheans, but here, as with *dahriyya* above, is clearly used loosely for unbelievers of an atheistic bent.

26 *Gharāḍ*, which strictly speaking means "end" or "goal."

27 That is, if the divine sages were to admit for the sake of argument that God does act by will, it would still not refute their position that the universe has no beginning in time.

It can also be shown from the Qur'ān, the Sunna, and the stories passed down that the soul is neither in the world of bodies nor is a body or corporeal. The verse in the Qur'ān, "In a seat of truth, a mighty monarch," (Q 54:55) indicates that it is neither a body nor corporeal, since such attributes cannot be conceived to apply to bodies. In fact, these attributes apply to that divine spirit which by its substance is liberated from the world of bodies. The only difference between it and the angels is that it acts through bodies. An example of its attestation in the Sunna is when the Prophet—peace be upon him—said, "At night my Lord feeds me and gives me drink."²⁸ As for what has been passed down, one of the sheikhs among the ranks of the Sufis said, "He who is with God is without place." This indicates that he is not a body, for a body is composite and divisible, there being nothing in this world that is indivisible, whether in thought or actuality.

Therefore, the human spirit, which is the divine spirit, is not in this world. Yes, it does have a connection to the body resembling that of a king to his kingdom, and he controls it as he wills. So long as this connection remains firm, a person lives, but if his connection is cut, his life is cut off. Within the human body [268] there is a subtle smoky body called the animal spirit²⁹ that causes that connection to continue; without it a person dies. If this were not the case, how could the divine spirit that is the rational soul pierce the heavens and ascend beyond? After all, piercing the spheres is inconceivable, since the spheres have turned from eternity and cannot conceivably have rectilinear motion, for rectilinear motion cannot be what is necessitated by its nature, for it was mended after it was pierced. Therefore, it must move rectilinearly.³⁰

(8) The motions give rise to capacities, and the Giver of forms gives existence. For example, when water becomes extremely hot and its matter acquires the capacity to receive airiness, the Giver of forms then gives airiness. When the temperament of man becomes complete, it gives it a rational soul. A sage thinks that intellects and spheres continue so long as their cause continues, and anything that is renewed in the world of generation and corruption comes to be when its causes come to be.

(9) "Prime matter" is an expression for a substance that at one time acquires a fiery form, at another an airy form, at another a watery form, and at yet

28 Found in slightly different form in several hadith collections explaining the Prophet's ability to fast continually without taking normal food and drink.

29 This is the descendent of the Stoic *pneuma*. In Avicennan physiology it is what drives the functions of the physical body and is able to mediate between the body and the rational soul due to its extreme subtlety.

30 I do not understand the last part of this argument.

another an earthy form. An obvious example of water becoming air is when a person sees drops of dew at one time after another; that is air becoming water and water becoming air. The four elements are fire, air, water, and earth. Fire is the most distant from the center of the universe, and earth is the most distant from the encompassing sphere.

(10) The three generated entities—minerals, plants, and animals—result from the mixture of these elements. Animals are nobler than plants and have a more perfect temperament,³¹ and plants are more perfect than minerals. Plants share some faculties with animals, but animals have other things in addition. Those that plants share with animals are the faculties of nutrition, growth, and reproduction. Nutrition requires faculties of attraction, retention, digestion, and excretion. What animals have that plants do not are the faculties of apprehension, which are the five inner and the five outer senses. The five outer senses are hearing, vision, smell, taste, and touch, and the five inner senses are the common sense, mimesis, imagination, estimation, and memory.³²

(11) The human being is the noblest of animals, being distinguished by the possession of an incorporeal entity—that is, the rational soul. This soul is self-subsistent, non-spatial, living, knowing, and managing the bodies. It is alluded to in revelation by “those that precede in precedence,” (Q 79.4) which are the intellects, and “the managers of an affair,” (Q 79.5) which are the souls. The sages hold that just as our bodies have rational souls, so too the spheres have living rational souls that know and passionately love their Creator eternally with a continual ecstasy and ever-renewed pleasure. Their pleasure crosses to their bodies, so that their bodies move just as one of the brethren of abstraction does when in the grip of ecstasy. Each soul has a sphere, which is the reason that their motions differ. Their motions in turn are the reason that continual good exists in this world. This world does not have a connection worth considering to the ethereal world.

(12) According to the sages, there are three worlds—the world of intellects, which is the world of dominion (Jabarūt); the world of souls, which is the

31 *Mizāj*, which is from the same root as *imtizāj*, the word translated as “mixture” in the previous sentence. The term normally indicates a sort of chemical change rather than simply a mixing of heterogeneous parts.

32 “Common sense,” *ḥiss mushtarik*, is the faculty that combines the senses into a single coherent experience. “Mimesis,” *khiyāl*, is the faculty that allows the forms of senses to be extracted from the sense data, which differs from imagination, *mutakhayyila*, which can manipulate these images. “Estimation,” *wahm*, attaches meaning to sensible experiences, as when a sheep experiences fear at the sight of a wolf.

world of the divine kingdom (Malakūt); and the world of Mulk, which is the world of bodies.

(13) They believe that the soul of a human being (*ādami*) is immortal if it knows God and the angels and is inscribed with the realities. Its inscription with realities has a rank, for this is the ultimate perfection of the soul by which it finds pleasures that “no eye hath seen nor ear heard nor hath entered the heart of any man.”³³ If he is ignorant of God and the angels, he will be blind after separation from the body as has been said by One who is mighty, “He who is blind in this life will be blind in the next and will stray from the path.” (Q 17.72) The blind man is in darkness, “darknesses one above another.” (Q 24.40) Thus, they suffer from the torment of being veiled from God, from the pleasure of the world that has slipped away, and by the vile traits that they have acquired, as God most high has said, “Nay, but rather that which they have acquired will seize their hearts.” (Q 83.14) This refers to distance from God and the intervention between them and the pleasures of the world that they still desire, as God says, “and it will come between them and what they desire.” (Q 34.54)

(14) They believe that the prophets—peace be upon them!—are sent in truth to reform the order of the world and to remind people of the afterlife, for human beings are heedless of the afterlife and unjust in the affairs of the world. Thus, people must have someone who lays down legislation with exactitude. This individual must have a noble soul, possess knowledge, and be able to do by the nobility of his soul what no one else in his time can do, for if a soul is sufficiently noble and its power has increased, it can have a great effect on this world. This is because it is in contact with the Holy Spirit, from which it can take knowledge and from which it can acquire a luminous power [271] and a unique ability to cause effects. It is like hot iron that acquires a luminous quality and the property of being able to burn something when it is brought close to fire. This degree may be acquired by the saints, though the highest degree is reserved for the prophets since they, unlike the saints, have been commissioned to reform the world and deliver a message.

(15) Know that when the sciences are vouchsafed to the spiritual adepts and they have pondered with the utmost subtlety what they have come to know, beginning with the Cause of causes and then all the created things below it, having first weakened their faculties by eating little, that which they think in their hearts will correspond to what they say with the tongue. Sometimes they will employ the aid of a soft melody, pleasant scents, and looking at agreeable

33 A well-known *ḥadīth qudsī*, a *ḥadīth* that reports the words of God rather than the words or actions of the Prophet.

things. Then they are vouchsafed spiritual lights until that becomes a habit and a shechinah.³⁴ Then there appear to them unseen entities with which the soul has a spiritual connection and which act through the imagination in a way appropriate to the state of the imagination. These will be seen in the common sense. Thus it is that they see spiritual figures in the most beautiful forms imaginable and hear sweet speech from which they acquire knowledge. So too they may see hidden things. And so it is that they have an ample portion and a lofty station in this world and the next. Happy is he who apprehends his soul before death and acquires for himself in this world a degree that will give him pleasure in this ephemeral realm and in which he may rejoice in the realm everlasting!

(16) I beseech God for success, for He is all-powerful and quick to answer, and He is the creator of all things. Praise be to God, and blessings be upon Muḥammad, our prophet and our lord, and upon his family one and all!

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Thus is completed
The Creeds of the Sages
 as dictated by the imam of the people of wisdom,
 The shaykh, the spiritual divine, al-Suhrawardī,
 May God Almighty sanctify his spirit!

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34 On the complexities of this term, see the chapter by Nasrollah Pourjavady in the present volume.

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The Meaning and Etymology of *Barzakh* in Illuminationist Philosophy

Malihe Karbassian

Shihāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191),¹ the Iranian founder of Illuminationist philosophy (*ḥikmat al-ishrāq*), frequently attributes the source of his thoughts to early Iranian traditions preserved in ancient texts.² His references remain unverifiable, but the relationship between his usage of ancient terms versus their common usage has been studied by lexicographers and students of philosophy and merits re-examination. One such term is *barzakh*, “body” in Suhrawardī’s usage, a term that in New Persian denotes a realm between paradise and hell³ and has other connotations in Persian and Arabic in the medieval period as well.

The following is a brief review of various definitions and interpretations of *barzakh* in major sources, beginning with classical lexicons and texts where *barzakh* is identified as an Arabic term.

In Arabic lexicons, *barzakh* is defined as “barrier,” “a barrier between two things,” “a barrier between paradise and hell,”⁴ as well as “the grave,”⁵ and “wall.”⁶

1 For his life and works see: Ziai, *Knowledge and Illumination*, pp. 9–11; Ziai, “The Source and Nature of Authority”, pp. 304–344; Walbridge, *The Leaven of the Ancients*, ch. 2.

2 See, for example, Corbin, *Les motifs zoroastriens*, pp. 22–62; Corbin, *En Islam iranien*, vol. II, pp. 96–104, 141–159; Walbridge, *The Wisdom of the Mystic East*, pp. 42–50.

3 Pākatchī, “Barzakh”, p. 697; al-Tahānawī, “*Kashshāf iṣṭilāḥāt al-funūn*,” p. 322; Gheissari, “Fawākih al-basāṭin,” p. 791. The place between paradise and hell, called *a’rāf* in Islamic tradition, is *hamastagān* in Zoroastrianism. The reason why these two terms have been replaced with *barzakh* merits examination.

4 al-Farāhīdī, *Kitāb al-ayn*, vol. 4, p. 338; al-Jawharī, *Ṣiḥāḥ al-lughā*, vol. 1, p. 419; al-Ṭurayḥī, *Majma’ al-baḥrayn*, vol. 1, p. 186; al-Zabīdī, *Tāj al-’arūs*, vol. 4, p. 260.

5 al-Ṭabarsī, *Tafsīr Majma’ al-bayān*, vol. 7, p. 209.

6 Mashkūr, *Farhang-i taṭbīqī*, vol. 1, p. 60.

In three Qur'anic verses, *barzakh* signifies the distance between two rivers (Sūrat al-Furqān, verse 53; Sūrat al-Raḥmān, verse 20) and between this world and the next (Sūrat al-Mu'minūn, verse 23),⁷ or more generally, distance.⁸

In Sufi and mystical traditions, *barzakh* stands for the visible world between the realm of non-material, simple meanings and that of material objects,⁹ or in Ibn 'Arabī's words,¹⁰ suspended forms (*'ālam al-mithāl al-miqdārī*). To Sufis, the "all-inclusive barrier" (*barzakh-i jāmi'*) or the "barrier of barriers" (*barzakh al-barāzikh*) signifies the "presence of supreme unity" (*ḥaẓrat-i aḥadīyyat*) and the "first essence" (*'ayn-i awwal*), which is the origin of all barriers (*barāzikh*). As such, it is also called the "greater barrier" (*barzakh-i akbar*) and the "first barrier" (*barzakh-i awwal*).¹¹ As noted by Sayyid Ḥaydar Āmulī, some thinkers consider "the barrier of barriers" to be the first creature, or, in Aristotelian terminology, the First Intellect from which all other creatures are generated.¹²

Suhrawardī uses *barzakh* to signify bodies (*ghasaq*), i.e., created beings in this world, which al-Tahānawī and Muṣāḥab explain as follows:

To Illuminationists, *barzakh* refers to the body (*jism*). *Sharḥ Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq* describes the divine lights (*anwār ilāhīyya*) and explains that to Illuminationist sages, *barzakh* indicates the body because it refers to the barrier between two things. Opaque bodies share the same quality.¹³

Illuminationist sages call the body, which is dark and cannot be illuminated until it is connected to a foreign light (*nūr-i ghayr*), *barzakh*.¹⁴

While al-Tahānawī characterizes an "opaque body" as a barrier, he does not elaborate on the nature of things separated by a barrier. Assuming one side of the barrier comprises non-materiality, what, precisely, lies on the other side? It cannot be bodies (*jismānīyyāt*) because the body, the *barzakh*, acts as a barrier. As for Muṣāḥab, he observes that a "dusky body" cannot exit darkness without

7 al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, *Mufradāt gharīb al-Qur'ān*, p. 43.

8 Zaki, "Barzakh", pp. 204–207.

9 Jurjānī, *al-Ta'rifāt*, p. 41. Unfortunately, Jurjānī uses the vague term Sufi without further explanations, as does 'Abd al-Razzāq Kāshānī in *Mu'jam-i iṣtilāḥāt al-ṣūfīyya*, p. 63.

10 Ibn 'Arabī, *al-Futūḥāt al-Makīyya*, vol. 3, p. 46.

11 Jurjānī, *al-Ta'rifāt*, p. 45.

12 Āmulī, "Naqd al-nuqūd", p. 688.

13 al-Tahānawī, *Kashshāf iṣtilāḥāt al-funūn*, p. 322. According to Corbin (*En Islam iranien*, vol. II, pp. 108–109), *barzakh* is a barrier against light because it is darkness; *barzakh* as a barrier causes the light to appear.

14 Muṣāḥab, *Dā'irat al-ma'ārif-i fārsī*, vol. 1, p. 405; for original sources see Shahrzūrī, *Sharḥ Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, p. 288; Quṭb a-Dīn Shīrāzī, *Sharḥ Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, p. 285.

being connected to light, but he does not elaborate on the relationship between the relevant characteristics—i.e., being a dark body and being a barrier.

Though *barzakh* appears in the Qurʾān, some consider it to be a non-Arabic, Persian term, on which further below.¹⁵

We know that interactions between Persia and Arabia in the pre-Islamic era were close. On the one hand, al-Ḥīra served as a center from which Persian culture spread among Arabs;¹⁶ and on the other, Arabia provided a safe haven for Mazdakites and Manicheans who did not adhere to the official Zoroastrian doctrine.¹⁷ In the process, not only words but some Zoroastrian concepts found their way into early Islam, an example being the Ṣirāt Bridge, which originated from the Chīrvat Bridge in Zoroastrianism.

According to Ibn ʿArabī and his followers, *barzakh* is akin to the “world of ideas”; it is an intermediate world between the “celestial” and the “material” that shares characteristics with both, and is a filter through which spiritual beings enter the material world. While this notion is cogent and clearer than the previously noted explanations, it also differs from Suhrawardī’s.

Returning to etymology, Addai Scher, the Chaldean Catholic archbishop of Siirt in Upper Mesopotamia, may have been the first to question an Arabic origin for *barzakh* in his *al-Alfāz al-Fārsiyya al-muʿarraba* (1908). Based on the fact that *barzakh* does not appear in ancient Arabic poetry, he assumes the term entered Arabic from Persian and suggests *paržak*, “mourning” and “weeping” in Pahlavi, as its progenitor.¹⁸ Scher’s source may have been Rāghib Iṣfahānī’s *Mufradāt-i gharīb al-Qurʾān* (1984) where the original form of *barzakh* is registered as *barzah*.¹⁹

Arthur Jeffery questions a Persian root for *barzakh*, however, and in his *The Foreign Vocabulary of the Qurʾān* (1938) notes that *barzakh* has entirely different meanings in Pahlavi and Arabic texts.²⁰ In his analysis, *barzakh* derives from the Sogdian pronunciation of the Persian *farsang*, *farsakh* being a derivative of the Aramaic root *parsak* or *parsa* that is close to the Greek παρασάγγελος. Jeffrey further argues that the Pahlavi *frasangan*, a measure of distance, is consistent with the meaning of *barzakh* as the “barrier between two things.”

15 For instance, al-Tahānawī, *Kashshāf iṣṭilāḥāt al-funūn*, p. 322.

16 Jeffery, *The Foreign Vocabulary of the Qurʾān*, pp. 14–16.

17 Ibn al-Qutayba, *Kitāb al-maʿārif*, p. 261; Ibn al-Rusta, *Kitāb al-aʿlāq al-naḥīya*, p. 217.

18 Addai Scher, *al-Alfāz al-fārsiyya al-muʿarraba*, p. 19.

19 al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, *Mufradāt gharīb al-Qurʾān*, p. 43.

20 Jeffery, *The Foreign Vocabulary of the Qurʾān*, p. 77.

A third etymology has been offered by Geo Widengren.²¹ Widengren focuses primarily on the mystical meaning of *barzakh* and suggests a different root for it. He points out that the Persian words *barzakh* and *dūzakh* (“hell”), share an identical structure and ending; given that the earlier form of *dūzakh* appears in the *Avesta* as *duš-ax^v*, he concludes that the earlier form of *barzakh* would have had a similar ending (*-ax^v*). He further suggests that the first part of the term derives from the Sogdian *βrz’k*, “long,” from the Indo-European root **brzaka*. In this analysis, *barzakh* means the “higher world” or the “supreme world,” an interpretation that contrasts with Suhrawardī’s usage of the word in the sense of “body” (*ghāsiq, jism*).

It should be noted that each of the above etymologies focuses on a single possible meaning of *barzakh* and ignores others. Jeffery offers “partition and barrier,” and Widengren, the “world of suspended forms,” neither of which supports Suhrawardī’s usage. An alternate approach is to search for an inclusive interpretation of the term.

Widengren’s important finding about the literal closeness of *barzakh* and *dūzakh* leads to the assumption that both originated from the same language and, conceivably, the same text. If this is correct, the *Avesta* may be the best source for illuminating the meaning of *barzakh*.

The Avestan *-ax^v*, which Widengren proposes as the original ending of *barzakh* and *dūzakh*, means “life,” derived from the verb *ah*, a term that appears in the *Avesta* in noun and adjectival forms, examples being *astay* and *asna*. Given that declensions of words in Pahlavi have at times been translated with the same meaning, it is instructive to analyze these forms.

We may first examine the Avestan compound word *parō-astay*, which appears in the 25th verse of *Hurmazd Yasht*.

The second part of the word, *astay*, a derivative of the verb *ah*, “life” as mentioned earlier, metaphorically signifies the “universe” and has been rendered as “body” in Pahlavi. The first part, *parō* is a pronoun meaning “out of,” “apart from,” and “except,” and has been translated into Pahlavi as *abē az*. *Parō* as an adverb means “before” or “in front of,” both spatially and temporally, and has been translated into Pahlavi as *nazdīk* or *pēš* (near or before), hence, the phrase, *abē az tan rasišn*, “reaching apart from (or without) the body.” In New Persian, the phrase has been translated as “the other world;” thus, Bartholomea denotes it as “künftige Existenz” or “das künftige Leben,” i.e., the future life.²² The phrase from paragraph 25 of the Pahlavi version has been translated as

21 Widengren, *Muhammad: The Apostle of God*, pp. 181–182.

22 Bartholomea, *Altiranisches Wörterbuch*, p. 859.

“pious people reaching apart from the body” or “those people reaching apart from the body” and into Persian as “virtuous people entering the other world”.²³

The second Avestan compound word to examine is *parō-asna*, which appears in verse 2 of the 55th *Yasna*, and has been rendered as *nazdik-ax*^v in Pahlavi. In New Persian, it has been translated as “the other world;”²⁴ Bartholomea denotes it as “künftige seiend” or “künftig,” i.e., in the future.²⁵

Parō is a preposition or an adverb that could originate from two different sources: 1) “para”, an adverb meaning “apart” and “except,”²⁶ or 2) “para,” an adverb meaning “previous” temporally, or “farther” spatially.²⁷

Other forms of this word include the pronouns *parača* and *parš*. In Pahlavi, both š and ač are converted into z, examples being *hača*, which is converted into *az*, and *duš-ax*^v, into *duz-ax*^v. An example of the conversion of p into b is the Avestan word *xšap* (‘night’), which is converted into *šab* in Pahlavi and New Persian.

Astay is a noun that ends in the long vowel “ī,” or, alternatively, “ay.” In the *Hurmazd Yasht*, it is in the nominative, *parō-astī*. Thus, the New Persian translation of this word, “the other world,” does not make good sense.

Asna is a noun; in the 55th *Yasna* it appears in the dative case, *parō-asnāi*.

The two words *asna* and *astay* have been translated into Pahlavi in two ways: *tan* (body) as well as *ax*^v (the world). *Parō* has also been translated into Pahlavi in two ways: *abē az* (apart from, or far from), *pēš*, *nazdik* (previous, or near).

To conclude the foregoing, words such as *parš-aṅhav* or *parš-ax*^v that became *parz-ax*^v or *barz-ax*^v in Pahlavi were interpreted differently depending on the divergent doctrines current in the Sassanid era. If the first part of the word is taken to mean “apart from” or “far from,” we arrive at the notion of “the upper world,” i.e., apart from this world, and this is how some Sufis understand it. If the second part is taken to mean “body,” then the “separating body” may imply the meaning that was familiar to Arabs at the time of the Prophet Muḥammad. If the first and the second parts are rendered as “previous” and “the world,” respectively, then we obtain “the previous world,” which is not unrelated to Ibn ‘Arabī’s “world of suspended forms”.

It should be noted that some Sufi schools define the “world of suspended forms” as the realm through which the soul passes after leaving the body and before entering the material world. For instance, in *Jām-i Kaykhusraw*, Mubad

23 Pūrdāvūd, *Yasnā*, vol. 1, p. 63.

24 Pūrdāvūd, *Yashthā*, vol. 2, p. 53.

25 Bartholomea, *Altiranisches Wörterbuch*, p. 859.

26 Bartholomea, *Altiranisches Wörterbuch*, p. 860.

27 Bartholomea, *Altiranisches Wörterbuch*, p. 852.

Khudājūy ibn Nāmdār, while interpreting the ascension of Azar Kayvān, states that the souls of virtuous people enter the suspended forms in the world of barriers after leaving the elementary body, and eventually find a place in the heavens based on their deeds in this world.²⁸ Here, even “the other world” or “the future world” is included in the meaning of this term. Until the fifth century, the word “*pīshūn*” held both meanings in theology. For instance, Avicenna, in *Dānishnāma-i ‘Alā’ī*, compares “divine knowledge” to “prior knowledge” (*‘ilm-i pīshūn*) and to “primary knowledge” (*‘ilm-i barīn*).²⁹

We know that Zoroastrianism was not a homogeneous system in Sassanid Iran;³⁰ according to orthodox Mubads who continually complained that such a state of affairs disturbed the religion, the variations resulted from differing interpretations of the *Avesta*.³¹ For instance, the first part of the word may have been taken to mean “previous,” and the second, “body”. This would have rendered “the previous body” (*tan-i pīshūn*), which differs significantly from the well-known phrase “the future body” (*tan-i pasīn*). In Zoroastrianism, “future body” refers to the body given to the dead after the Last Day in a world forever emptied of evil forces. The “previous body” is therefore the body in this world that is destroyed after death.

The question is, which meaning does Suhrawardī have in mind for *barzakh*? In *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, Suhrawardī defines *barzakh* as follows: “The barrier is the body and may be described as a substance that can be pointed to” البرزخ هو الجسم و يرسم بأنه هو الجوهر الذي يقصد بالاشارة³² From his point of view, barrier and material are the same. In other words, barrier is prime matter without a state.³³

Suhrawardī uses *barzakh* to signify dusky substance (*ghāsiq*), which forms the creatures of the world. To Illuminationists, a thing includes light or potential luminosity. Light is of two kinds: first, accidental light, which needs a source

28 Khudājūy ibn Nāmdār, *Jām-i Kaykhusraw*, fol. 424 v.

29 Avicenna, *Dānishnāma-i ‘Alā’ī: Ilāhīyyāt*, p. 3.

30 See Daryaee, *Sasanian Persia: The Rise and Fall of an Empire*, pp. 70–72; Shaked, *Dualism in Transformation*, pp. 73–100.

31 See, e.g., Gignoux, *Les Quatre inscriptions du Mage Kirdīr*, p. 72; Skjærvø, “Kartīr”, p. 612.

32 Suhrawardī, *The Philosophy of Illumination*, p. 77; see also Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*, vol. 2, p. 107.

33 See also Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, vol. 2, p. 193: الهيولى هو البرزخ، نقول له في نفسه: برزخاً و بالقياس الى الهيات حاملاً و محلاً

“The prime matter is the barrier. As it is in itself, we gave it the name “barrier”; as it is in relation to states, the “bearer” and “locus.” See: Suhrawardī, *The Philosophy of Illumination*, p. 128.

to shine; and second, incorporeal light, which self-illuminates. Everything that is not light is dark. Darkness is also of two kinds: darkness that does not need a locus of dusky substance; and darkness that requires something else, which is the dark state.


Suhrawardī divides matter, or darkness, into two kinds: single (*fārid*) and dual (*muzdawij*),³⁴ meaning that the barrier either constitutes a single body or is composed of two bodies. Suhrawardī focuses mainly on the single.

The single body constitutes three kinds of bodies, opaque (*ḥājiz*), which completely blocks light; transparent (*latīf*), which does not block light; and translucent (*muqtaṣid*), which transfers light incompletely.

Matter (*barzakh*) is signified differently in different positions. The dominating barriers are identified as the heavens and the enkindled barrier (*al-barzakh al-qābis*) as the material world below the heavens.³⁵ Thus, the dominating barrier derives its name from its position above the enkindled barrier.

The dominating barrier is of two kinds: opaque and transparent. The fixed stars and some of the planets are transparent while the heaven of heavens—the stars together with the sun—are opaque because they are luminous.

Suhrawardī also discusses the enkindled barrier, namely, *al-barzakh al-qābis*. The chart below illustrates the different kinds of barriers:



These complicated divisions can be classified into two categories: the upper and the lower bodies. The upper bodies are equal to the heavenly orbs while the lower bodies are equal to the bodies in the material world.³⁶ Suhrawardī describes the characteristics of these barriers.³⁷

34 See also: Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, vol. 2, p. 187:

كل جسمٍ أَمَا ان يَكُونُ فاردًا و هو ما لا تَرَكيبَ فيه مِن برزخينِ مختلفينِ و أَمَا أن يَكُونُ مزدوجًا و هو ما يُتَرَكَّبُ مِنهُمَا.

“Each body is either single and not composed of two differing barrier, or dual and composed of two bodies’: see: Suhrawardī, *The Philosophy of Illumination*, p. 124.

35 Suhrawardī, *The Philosophy of Illumination*, p. 124; see also Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*, vol. 2, p. 187.

36 See: Dādbih, “Barzakh”, p. 177.

37 Suhrawardī, *The Philosophy of Illumination*, pp. 92–93; see also: Suhrawardī, *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, vol. 2, pp. 129–131.

We may never know Suhrawardī's source/s of reference, but he did attribute uncommon meanings to some words and referenced rare beliefs that were not current in his time. It is possible that he had access to, or knowledge of, ancient Iranian sources that were at variance with orthodox Zoroastrian beliefs. One example is his reference to three principal elements, not four, which, according to Shahrastānī's *al-Millal wa'l-niḥal*, corresponds to Mazdakite beliefs.³⁸

Suhrawardī uses many old forms of Persian words; to cite two instances, the Avestan *havarə khasha*, read *hūrahsh* by mistake, which he used for the sun—*khōshēd* in Middle Persian and *khurshīd* in New Persian—and the Avestan word *mangha* for *māh* (moon).³⁹ In addition, he introduces new concepts in the form of classical Persian terminology that are not found in extant Pahlavi texts, an example being *hevar qalyā*, which echoes *havar karpā* (solar body), a compound formed from two Avestan words.⁴⁰

To conclude, as in the case of *havar qalyā*, the Illuminationist word *barzakh*, meaning “body,” is a usage particular to Suhrawardī that cannot be traced back to Persian texts in pre-Islamic Iran.

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38 Shahrastānī, *al-Milal wa-al-niḥal*, p. 229.

39 See Karbassian, “Prayer of the Moon According to Suhrawardī, and Āzar Kaywānīs’ Translation,” pp. 103–110.

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The Concept of *Sakīna* in Suhrawardī

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The Light of *Sakīna* in Suhrawardī's Philosophy of Illumination

Sakīna is a term that Shaykh al-Ishrāq Shihāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191), the founder of the “philosophy of illumination” (*ḥikmat al-ishrāq*), uses in some of his philosophical and mystical works in more than one sense. The only clear definition he offers for this term is that it stands for a particular inner light that a philosopher-mystic experiences on the path leading to the knowledge of God (*maʿrifā*). This idea is elaborated in one of Suhrawardī's Persian treatises, namely the *Ṣafīr-i sīmurgh* (The song of [the mythological bird called] Simorgh).¹

Sakīna, according to Suhrawardī, is not the only kind of light that is experienced by a philosopher-mystic. The path that leads to the knowledge of God is divided by Shaykh al-Ishrāq, from the point of view of man's inner enlightenment, into three main stages: the elementary, the intermediate, and the final. At each stage a special kind of light is experienced by the traveler, to which Suhrawardī gives a different name. The light that illuminates the heart of man at the intermediate stage is called by him *sakīna*.

Sakīna is not, strictly speaking, a philosophical term, but rather a religious one. It appears in six verses of the Qurʾān and in several prophetic Traditions. In the *Ṣafīr-i sīmurgh*, Suhrawardī himself quotes two of these verses. One of these verses is about God sending down his *sakīna* on the Prophet when he is in the Cave with Abū Bakr: “Then God sent down on him His Shechina, and confirmed him with legions you did not see” (1X, 40). In the other verse,

1 This treatise was first edited by O. Spies and S.K. Khatak and published with an English translation in *Three Treatises on Mysticism by Shihaboddin Suhrawardī Maqtūl*, Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1935. Utilizing this edition and another manuscript, an older and more reliable one, S.H. Nasr prepared another critical edition and published it along with other Persian treatises by Suhrawardī in: Shihaboddin Yaḥyā Sohravardi, *Oeuvres Philosophiques et mystiques*, tome III, Tehran, 1977. I used these editions for the present study and also consulted two other manuscripts (Aya Sofya 4821, Majles-e Senā 14316) which helped me to solve some of the problems that exist in the published texts. The English translation, *Shrill Cry of Simorgh*, by W.M. Thackston, published in *The Mystical & Visionary Treatises of Suhrawardī* (London, 1982), is based on Nasr's edition. Both translations were consulted but not used.

quoted from another chapter, *sakīna* is said to have been sent down not merely upon the Prophet, but to the hearts of the believers: "It is He who sent down the Shechina into the hearts of the believers" (XLVIII, 4). In the same chapter, there are other verses that are not quoted here by Suhrawardī. In one of them God is said to have sent down the *sakīna* upon the believers and thereby given them victory over their enemy: "God was well pleased with the believers when they were swearing fealty to thee under the tree, and He knew what was in their hearts, so he sent down the Shechina upon them, and rewarded them with a nigh victory and many spoils to take" (XLVIII, 18). In the other verse, *sakīna* is again a divine aid said to have been sent down both to the Prophet and to the believers: "... then God sent down His Shechina upon His Messenger and believers" (XLVIII, 26).

I have taken the translation of these verses from A.J. Arberry's *The Koran Interpreted*,² and as we see he has not translated the Arabic word *sakīna*; instead, he has used the English loan-word 'shechina', borrowed from the Hebrew *shēkhīna*. This word in English, as in Hebrew, primarily stands for the presence of God in the world as it is manifested in natural or supernatural phenomena.³ This seems to be the idea that Arberry had in mind when he was using the English word 'schechina' for the Arabic *sakīna* in the Qur'ān. Other scholars have also made some connections between the meaning of *sakīna* in the Qur'ān and hadith on the one hand, and the Jewish idea of *shēkhīna* on the other.⁴ However, not all modern translators of the Qur'ān agree with Arberry. Marmaduke Pickthal, for example, following the opinion of most Moslem commentators, has translated this word, in all six verses, in his *The Meaning of The Glorious Koran*, as God's "peace of reassurance".

Moslem commentators of the Qur'ān have tended to treat *sakīna* as an Arabic word, derived from the root *s-k-n*, and interpreted it mostly to mean "calmness" or "tranquility" (*tuma'nīna*).⁵ They have also associated it with "gravity" or "staidness" (*waqār*). Commentators disagreed as to the nature of the *sakīna* that is said (in Sura II, verse 249) to have been in the Ark of the Israelites.⁶ In

2 Other Qur'anic quotations are also taken from Arberry's translation.

3 For the idea of *shēkhīna* in rabbinic literature and Jewish philosophy and mysticism, see "shekhinah", *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, 1970, Vol. 14, 1349–54; and Ellen M. Umansky, "shekhinah", *The Encyclopaedia of Religion*, 1987, XIII, pp. 236–9.

4 See, for instance, John Penrice, *A Dictionary and Glossary of the Koran*, London, 1970 (first published in 1873), p. 70.

5 See E.W. Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, London, 1984, (first published in 1863) Vol. 1, p. 1394 (under *Sakana*).

6 A major study on the idea of *sakīna* in Qur'anic commentaries and in hadith literature is I. Goldziher's article which appeared more than a hundred years ago, both in French and

his commentary, Ṭabarī (d. 310/923) collected a number of different interpretations concerning the nature of the *sakīna* that was in the Ark.⁷ According to some, it was a wind, shaped like an animal, with a face like human beings, or a head and a tail like those of cat plus two wings. It was also related that the *sakīna* was a basin in which the hearts of prophets were washed. There was another tradition according to which *sakīna*, instead of being a physical object, was said to be a spirit who could speak.⁸ In a later commentary, it was said that the Ark represented the heart and the *sakīna* was knowledge and purity in the heart.⁹ Being faced with various interpretations, a commentator claimed that it was not really known what was meant by the *sakīna* in the Ark.¹⁰

As we have seen, Suhrawardī does not refer to the *sakīna* in the Ark. He is concerned with the *sakīna* that God sends down to the heart of the Prophet and/ or the believers. The questions now arise: how does he interpret this *sakīna* in the *Ṣafīr-i sīmurgh*? Does he go along with the tradition of almost all commentators and see the *sakīna* as a divine aid that brings with itself tranquility in the heart and causes victory over enemies, or does he have something more to say?

with more details in German, in French as: "La notion de la *sakīna* chez les Mahométans", in *Revue de l'histoire de religions*, 1893, 1–13; in German as: *Über den Ausdruck "Sakīna", in Abhandlungen zur arabischer Philologie*, 1, Leiden 1896, 177–204. The following short articles, dealing with the meaning of *sakīna* in the Qur'an and in Hadiths, are available in English: B. Joel, 'al-Sakīna', *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, First Edition (reprint, 1987), VII, p. 78; A. Jeffery, *The Foreign Vocabulary of the Qur'an* Baroda, 1938. p. 173ff; T. Fahd, "Sakīna", *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, New Edition, Vol. VIII, 1995, pp. 888–9.

- 7 Abū Ja'far Muḥammad al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmi' al-bayān fī tafsīr al-Qur'ān*, Bulaq, 1323, Vol. 2, pp. 385–7. For an English summary of ṭabarī's account see Mahmoud Ayoub, *The Qur'an and its Interpreters*, Vol. 1, New York, 1984, pp. 240–41.
- 8 Though earlier Sufis do not seem to have commented on the *sakīna* in the Ark, later Sufi commentators like Qushayrī (*Laṭā'if al-ishārāt*, Cairo, 1981. I, p. 192; III, p. 419) and Maybudī (*Kashf al-asrār*. Vol. 1, Tehran, 1344. p. 668) have mentioned this animal figure. Ibn Arabī's view on this composite creature is that it is not important what kind of animal it looked like, the important thing being that it was a symbol or a standard which made people feel at peace when they saw it (*al-Futūhāt*, ed. Yahya. Cairo, 1988, 12, p. 198). For another Sufi interpretation of the *sakīna* in the Ark, see Sa'd al-Dīn Ḥammūyah, *Al-Miṣbāh fī 'l-taṣawwuf*, ed. N. Māyil Harawī, Tehran 1362, p. 59.
- 9 'Abdullāh b. 'Umar al-Baiḍāwī, *Anwār al-tanzīl wa asrār al-ta'wīl*, Beirut, n. d., Vol. 1, p. 254; see also 'Ayn al-Quḍāt Hamadānī, *Tamhīdāt*, ed. 'Afif Usayrān, Tehran, 1341/1962, p. 144.
- 10 Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī attributes this view to 'Amr b. 'Ubayd (*Tafsīr*, VI, p. 190). (Goldziher, *Über den Ausdruck Sakīna*, p. 182, n.1).

The answer is that Suhrawardī retains the traditional idea, whilst adding to it the concept of *sakīna* as a light in the heart. That is to say, on the one hand, he defines *sakīna* from the very beginning as a light that shines upon the heart and stays for a while, and on the other, he claims that this *sakīna* brings about tranquility in the heart. To support this idea, he quotes the Qur'anic verse that is usually associated with *sakīna*: "in God's remembrance are at rest the hearts of those who believe" (XIII, 28). It is important to note here that, for Suhrawardī, the hearts' state of being at rest is not the same as *sakīna*, but rather an outcome of it, something that the possessor of *sakīna* attains. It is, in other words, a state of the heart that follows *sakīna*.¹¹

Tranquility is not the only outcome of the *sakīna*. According to Suhrawardī the possessor of *sakīna* is endowed with the power of clairvoyance (*fīrāsāt*), by which he can read other people's minds and know about unseen events. One of the most important spiritual qualities of the possessor of *sakīna* is that he hears supernatural speech and is inspired by divine words. This is a quality that belonged to some of the followers of the Prophet, among whom was 'Umar b. Khaṭṭāb. To support this claim, Suhrawardī quotes a Prophetic tradition containing the word *sakīna*. According to this tradition, the Prophet said: "verily, the *sakīna* speaks through the tongue of 'Umar".¹²

Sakīna, as something that enables man to hear God's words and subtle speech, had been discussed before Suhrawardī by other Sufi writers and Suhrawardī must have been influenced by some of them. One such writer is Ḥakīm Tirmidhī (d. ca. 295/905), who explains in his *Sīrat al-awliyā'* how the power of clairvoyance and the ability to hear spiritual speech are associated with *sakīna*, and quotes the same tradition about 'Umar.¹³ 'Abdullāh Anṣārī (d. 481/1089) is another Sufi who writes about this meaning of *sakīna*. In his

11 The distinction between *sakīna* and *ṭuma'nīna* (tranquility) can be found in the writings of earlier Sufis. See 'Abdullāh Anṣārī, *Manāzil al-sā'irīn*, ed. de Beaurecueil, Cairo, 1962, pp. 67–8 (*manzil* 58 & 59); Anṣārī, *Ṣad maydān*, ed. De Beaurecueil, Cairo, 1954, p. 56 (*maydāns* 51 & 52); Abū Maṣṣūr Iṣfahānī "Nahj al-khāṣṣ", ed. N. Pourjavady. *Tahqīqāt-i Islāmī*, vol. III, n. 1–2 (1988–89), pp. 142–3. (Abū Maṣṣūr uses the term *sukūn* instead of *sakīna*).

12 *Oeuvre*, III, p. 322. For this tradition see: Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, I, p. 106; Abu Nu'aym al-Iṣfahānī, *Hilyat al-awliyā'*, Cairo, 1932ff, Vol. I, p. 42; al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, *Mufradāt al-fāḥ al-Qur'ān*, ed. Nadīm Mar'ashlī, Beirut, 1972, p. 243; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, *Manāhi al-sālikīn*, ed. M. Hamid Alfaqī, Vol. 2, Beirut, 1973, p. 506; Abū'l-Qāsim Ismā'il al-Ḥafiz al-Iṣfahānī, *Sīyar al-salaf*, MS. Bibliothèque Nationale, 2012, f. 16b; Goldziher, "La Notion", 12.

13 For the Arabic text of *Sīrat al-awliyā'* see Bernd Radtke (ed.), *Drei Schriften des Theosophen von Tirmid*, Beirut, 1992, pp. 54–5; and for its English translation see Bernd Radtke and John O'Kane, *The Concept of Sainthood in Early Islamic Mysticism*, London, 1996, pp. 121–3.

Manāzil al-sā'irīn he describes three kinds of *sakīna*: 1) The *sakīna* that was in the Ark, 2) the *sakīna* that speaks through the tongues of those who hear divine speech, and 3) the *sakīna* which comes upon the hearts of the Prophet and the believers and is a luminous thing which gives strength and brings peace. About the second kind, he writes:

The second *sakīna*, the one which speaks through the tongues of those who hear divine speech (*al-muḥaddathūn*), is not something that one can possess; it is simply one of those subtle things in God's creation, something that conveys wisdom to the tongue of the person who hears divine speech (*al-muḥaddath*), just like the angel who brings the Revelation to the heart of the Prophet.¹⁴

As we have noted before, in his *Ṣafīr-i sīmurgh*, Suhrawardī does not refer to the first kind of *sakīna* in Ansārī's definition. He refers to the second and the third kinds, without making a distinction between the two. The Qur'anic verses he quotes refer to the third *sakīna*, and the *ḥadīth* about 'Umar refers to the second.

So far, we have seen that the spiritual powers and experiences that Suhrawardī's possessor of *sakīna* acquires had to some extent been discussed by earlier Sufis, and when Suhrawardī quotes the Qur'anic verses about the *sakīna*, he is drawing upon this Sufi tradition. But what about his own definition of *sakīna*? How did Shaykh al-Ishrāq arrive at the idea of *sakīna* as a light that shines upon the heart of the philosopher-mystic and lasts for a while?

We may note that the idea of the *sakīna* as a kind of inner light had already been expressed by several classical Sufi writers and commentators of the Qur'ān. Thus, Sahl b. 'Abdullāh al-Tustarī¹⁵ (d. 283/896), who is mentioned by Suhrawardī as a true philosopher,¹⁶ and Ibn 'Aṭā al-Adamī¹⁷ (d. 309/922) both interpreted the term *sakīna* in the Qur'ān as tranquility and yet considered it

(the concept of *sakīna* and *muḥaddath* are discussed in other parts of the *Sīrat al-awliyā'*. See the indices of the Arabic text and its translation).

14 Anṣārī, *Manāzil*, p. 67.

15 Abū 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Sulamī, *Ziyādāt Ḥaqā'iq al-tafsīr* (*The Minor Qur'an Commentary*), ed. G. Böwering, Beirut, 1995, p. 178.

16 See *Oeuvres philosophiques et mystiques*, ed. H. Corbin, t. 1, second edition, Tehran, 1977 (first published with the title *Opera Metaphysica et Mystica*, Istanbul, 1945) pp. 74, 503.

17 See his commentary on the Qur'ān, extracted from Sulamī's *Ḥaqā'iq al-tafsīr* by Paul Nwyia, included in *Trois Oeuvres inédites de mystiques Musulmans*, Beirut, 1973, p. 144. (The same work is included in *Majmū'a-i āthār-i Abū 'Abd al-Raḥmān Sulamī*, ed. N. Pourjavady, Vol. 1, Tehran, 1369s).

as a kind of light that shines in the heart. Abu Sa'īd al-Kharrāz (d. 286/899) also defined the term *sakīna* in his *Kitāb al-ḥaqā'iq* as a light that illuminates the heart.¹⁸ Abū 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Sulamī speaks of another Sufi, without mentioning his name, who likewise believed *sakīna* to be an inner light.¹⁹

Suhrawardī may well have been acquainted with this Sufi view of *sakīna* as an inner light. However, it is not simply by way of these Sufis that he reaches his own idea of *sakīna*. While Shaykh al-Ishrāq relies heavily on Sufi sayings and ideas in his *Ṣafīr-i sīmurgh*, it can be shown that his understanding of the inner lights that the philosopher-mystic experiences is derived not from Sufi works but from one of the philosophical works of Avicenna (d. 429/1037), namely his *al-Ishārāt wa'l-tanbihāt*. The connection between Avicenna's *Ishārāt* and Suhrawardī's *Ṣafīr-i sīmurgh* has until now escaped the attention of both traditional and modern scholars of Suhrawardī's works. Here, I will try to make this connection clear by showing how Shaykh al-Ishrāq reaches his idea of the *sakīna* through an interpretation of Avicenna's words in the *Ishārāt*.

The *Ishārāt* is basically a philosophical work, written in the tradition of Moslem peripatetic philosophy, and is divided by the author into ten large chapters which he calls *namaṭ*. The last three *namaṭs* of this book, however, are not on philosophical topics, in the sense that the word philosophy is used among the Moslems, but rather on mysticism (Avicenna does not use the word Sufi or *taṣawwuf*). In the ninth *namaṭ*, he discusses the stations of the philosopher-mystic, the knower of God. After having gone through certain spiritual exercises, the knower of God, or rather the seeker after this knowledge, approaches the stations of inner spiritual enlightenment; and inner lights begin to shine, first in the form of momentary flashes, upon his heart. As he continues his exercises, he progresses to a higher stage where he experiences inner lights of longer duration.

What we have said briefly about Avicenna's first two stages of spiritual enlightenment is enough to allow us to compare his ideas with those of Suhrawardī. In the *Ṣafīr-i sīmurgh*, when discussing the state of man's knowledge of God, Suhrawardī begins from exactly where Avicenna has started, i.e. the experiences of momentary flashes, and then proceeds to the second stage which is the experience of lights with longer duration, again like Avicenna. Suhrawardī follows Avicenna's account quite closely and even employs some of the terms that Avicenna has used, such as *waqt* (moment), *nūr* (light), *ladhīdh* (pleasant, delightful), and, above all, *sakīna*.

18 *Rasā'il al-Kharrāz*, ed. Qāsim al-Sāmmarrā'ī. Baghdad, 1967. p. 53. See also Paul Nwyia, *Exégèse Coranique et langage mystique*, Beirut, 1970, pp. 301–2.

19 Sulamī, *Ziyādāt*, p. 178.

There are, however, differences between Avicenna's account of the experience of these inner lights in the *Ishārāt* and that of Suhrawardī in the *Ṣafīr-i sīmurgh*. Shaykh al-Ishrāq is not simply writing a commentary on this part of the *Ishārāt*. He takes the ideas from Avicenna, but he restates them in a more elaborate form in Persian. Moreover, he tries to explain the same ideas in the language of Sufism. Thus, he quotes, as often as he can, Qur'anic verses, Prophetic traditions, and sayings of the great Sufi shaykhs and their poems, both in Persian and Arabic. He also uses Sufi terms to explain his ideas, terms that Avicenna had not used. For instance, for the momentary lights that are experienced at the first stage he uses *ṭawālī* and *lawā'ih*, terms which he has borrowed from Sufism.²⁰

The term *sakīna* which Suhrawardī employs to refer to the lights that are experienced at the second stage is not absent from Avicenna's *Ishārāt*. In fact, Avicenna uses this word precisely at the point where he is discussing the inner lights that last for a longer period:

Spiritual exercises may bring him (i.e. the seeker of knowledge of God) to a stage where his moment (*waqt*) is turned into *sakīna*. Thus, what was previously passing away quickly from sight becomes familiar, and what was a momentary flash becomes a brilliant flame. (It is at this stage that) he gains stable knowledge—the kind of knowledge that remains with him—and he enjoys the sweetness of its company. Then, if this (experience) leaves him, he will miss it and feel regret.²¹

The term *sakīna*, as we can see, is used in association with the term *waqt*. It is *waqt* (the moment) that is converted into *sakīna*. Because of the connection between these two terms, if we are to understand clearly the meaning of *sakīna* in this passage, we need to see first exactly what is meant by *waqt*.

Waqt (pl. *awqāt*) is a term that Avicenna has borrowed from Sufism, though he does not use it in exactly the same sense that the Sufis do. The Sufis

20 For a definition of these two terms in Sufism, see Qushayrī's *al-Risāla*, vol. 1, Cairo, 1974, pp. 282–4. Suhrawardī uses these two terms synonymously, but the Sufis, including Qushayrī, make a distinction between them. For an historical account of the meaning of these terms in Sufism, see my "Iṣṭilāhāt-i ṣūfiyya dar Farhang-i Mu'īn" in *Ishrāq va 'irfān*, Tehran, 1380/2001, pp. 319–35.

21 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ishārāt wa'l-tanbihāt* (with the commentary of Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī and the notes of Quṭb al-Dīn Rāzī), vol. III, Qum, 1375s, p. 385.

themselves have given various definitions for this term.²² Generally, by *waqt* they mean the present moment, or rather the state of being observant and fully aware of the present moment—"now".

Naturally everyone, whether he is a Sufi or not, is going through these ever repeating moments constantly, but very often without being aware of them. If one were to be fully aware of "the moment", then he would become "the son of the moment" (*ibn al-waqt*) and subject to the spiritual state that each moment brings upon his heart, be it a state of joy or sorrow, union or separation, expansion or contraction, etc.

For Avicenna *waqt* is similarly a term used to refer to ecstatic moments experienced by the philosopher-mystic. This term is actually introduced when Avicenna wants to speak about the experience of the momentary flashes, at the first stage of illumination. He writes:

When he (the philosopher-mystic) proceeds to a certain limit through his will and spiritual exercises, he will have ecstatic experiences of the divine light shining upon him, and giving him pleasure. They are like lightning flashes (*burūq*; sing.: *barq*) that shine and then disappear. This is called by them *awqāt* (sing.: *waqt*).²³

What Avicenna is calling *awqāt* here are in fact those momentary flashes in the heart that are like lightning in the sky. This is how Suhrawrdī understands and interprets Avicenna's words, for when he himself writes about the experience of these flashes at the first stage, he says: "And the Sufis call these flashes (*ṭawālī*) *awqāt*."²⁴ In interpreting this passage of Avicenna, Shaykh al-Ishrāq has taken the pronoun "them" (*hum*) in the last sentence (*wa-huwa al-musammā 'indahum*) to mean the Sufis, but, as far as we know, the Sufis did not use the term *waqt* (or *awqāt*) in the sense of inner lights or *ṭawālī*, as Suhrawrdī calls them. "Ecstatic moment" might have been closer to the Sufi understanding of *awqāt*, although of course, for the Sufis a *waqt* might not necessarily bring pleasure; it might bring sorrow or pain, which is why their definition differs from Avicenna's, as stated above.

22 For some of the widely accepted definitions of *waqt*, see Qushayrī, *al-Risāla* pp. 230–33. and Maḥmud Kāshānī, *Miṣbāh al-hidāya wa-miftāḥ al-kifāya*, ed. Jalāl Humā'ī, Tehran, 1325, pp. 138–141. For some of the saying of the Sufis about *waqt*, see G. Böwering, "Ideas of Time in Persian Sufism", in Leonard Lewisohn (ed.), *Classical Persian Sufism: from Its Origins to Rumi*, London, 1993, pp. 223–5.

23 *Ishārāt*, p. 384.

24 *Oeuvres*, III, p. 319.

In any case, what seems to have led Avicenna to use the Sufi term *awqāt* here is not the illuminative nature of the experience, but the fact that what is being experienced quickly fades away. In other words, what is at issue is the transience or temporality of the lights.

If we understand the term *awqāt* in Avicenna's statement in this sense, then the meaning of the term *sakīna* in the *Ishārāt* becomes clear. When he states that in the second stage, where the duration of the inner lights is extended, the philosopher-mystic's *waqt* changes into *sakīna*, he is obviously putting *sakīna* in contrast to *waqt*. This means that just as he was referring to the momentary nature of those lights when he was using the term *awqāt*, he is referring to the stability of the lights experienced at the higher stage when he uses the term *sakīna*.

The term *sakīna* is used in a similar sense in another passage in the *Ishārāt*. Just before explaining how *waqt* changes into *sakīna*, Avicenna speaks of the ecstatic experiences becoming so frequent at the first stage of illumination that they cause the philosopher-mystic to lose his *sakīna*. As Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī in his commentary on the *Ishārāt* has interpreted, *sakīna* here means "repose" or "steadiness" (*waqār*).²⁵ Thus, the meaning of the term here is more or less the same as that in the earlier quoted passage. The difference between these two usages of the term is that the former refers to the duration of the lights, while the latter refers to the external state of the man.²⁶

Coming back to the *Ṣafīr-i sīmurgh*, Suhrawardī follows the passage in the *Ishārātī* where Avicenna uses the term *sakīna* to indicate the duration of the inner light. He writes:

When these lights²⁷ (i.e. the momentary flashes) reach full development and remain for a long time instead of passing away quickly, they are called *sakīna*. The pleasure of experiencing this light is more perfect than that of the momentary flashes. When the person leaves the *sakīna* and comes back to humanity (i. e. his ordinary level of consciousness), he feels great regret at loosing it.²⁸

25 *Ishārāt*, p. 385.

26 In her French translation of the *Ishārāt*, Goichon, noticing to some extent the significance of the word *sakīna* in Islamic mysticism, has translated this word first as *calme* and then as *quietude*. (Ibn Sina. *Livre des directives et remarques*, Paris, 1951, p. 494).

27 Following better and more reliable manuscripts, I have read *in anwār* (these lights) instead of *anwār-isīrr* (the lights of secret) which is in both printed editions.

28 *Oeuvres*, III, 321–2; *Three Treatises*, 23.

Though Suhrawardī is following here Avicenna's description closely, it cannot be said that he is using the term *sakīna* in exactly the same way. As was pointed out above, in the *Ishārāt*, *sakīna* refers to a characteristic (of the experience) of the light, namely to its length of duration and stability, just as *waqt* designates the momentary nature (of the experience) of the first flashes. Suhrawardī, however, takes one more step and uses the term *sakīna* to refer to the light itself. In other words, *sakīna* is a name for a particular inner light, the kind of light that endures and is experienced with great pleasure at the second stage of spiritual enlightenment.

Suhrawardī also adds more substance to the idea of *sakīna* that was expressed by Avicenna, and thereby he highlights it. The light of *sakīna* not only brings tranquility and gravity to its possessor but also gives him certain supernatural powers. In the physical world, he can see things that people normally cannot see, and he can read people's minds and make prophecies. This is because the possessor of *sakīna* has gone to a higher level of consciousness. Having reached this level, his inner senses are so developed as to enable him to hear in his heart the most subtle calls coming from the sublime abode (*janba-i 'ālī*)²⁹ and listen to divine speech.³⁰ He can also see, with his inner eye, perfectly pure and subtle forms. The man of *sakīna* is said here to have reached the intermediate stage, between the stage of the momentary flashes (*lawā'ih*), and the effacing light (*nūr ṭāmis*).

The idea of the *sakīna*, as a remaining light, shining at the intermediate stage of enlightenment, is also discussed in several other works of Suhrawardī, though never as elaborately as in the *Ṣafīr-i sīmurgh*. In his *Kitāb al-talwīḥāt*, he mentions all the three inner lights by name, as lights that are experienced by the Sufis and other Moslem mystics.³¹ At the end of his *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, when Suhrawardī is enumerating all the different inner lights that may be experienced by the philosopher-mystic, he mentions a light that is remaining (*nūr thābit*), by which he obviously means *sakīna*.³² In fact, the expression '*nūr thābit*' is specifically used instead of *sakīna* or *nūr sakīna* in the *Kitāb*

29 In both printed editions, the editors have relied on a weak manuscript and have chosen *jannat-i 'ālī* (supreme paradise) instead of *janba-yi 'ālī*.

30 This is why the possessor of *sakīna* is said to be *muḥaddath* and *mutakallam*. According to the Persian translator of Abū Ḥāmid Ghazālī's *Iḥyā*, the difference between these two is that one sees the speaker while the other does not (*Iḥyā' 'ulūm al-dīn*, translated into Persian by M. Khwarazmī, ed. H. Khadīv Jam. Vol. III, second edition, 1368s, pp. 50–51).

31 *Oeuvre*, I, pp. 113–4.

32 *Oeuvres Philosophique et mystiques*, ed. H. Corbin, tome II, second edition, Tehran, 1977 (first edition, 1952) p. 271. The word *sakīna* itself is used in the *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq* (p. 250), when Suhrawardī speaks of the advanced mystics as "the people of the major *sakīna*".

al-mashāri‘ wa’l-mutārahāt. In this book, Shaykh al-Ishrāq twice refers to the intermediate inner light, once as “the divine *sakīna*” (*al-sakīna al-ilāhiyya*),³³ the other time simply as *nūr thābit*.³⁴

Just as the word *thābit* (remaining or abiding) is used instead of *sakīna* (the intermediate light), the word *sakīna* is used in one of Suhrawardī’s works simply in the sense of *thābit*. In his short treatise *Risāla fī ṭṭiqād al-ḥukamā*, the Shaykh makes an allusion to the inner lights by calling them “spiritual lights,” and he explains that these lights (being momentary at the beginning) will become remaining (*sakīna*).³⁵

Among Suhrawardī’s works, there is a relatively short treatise in Arabic called *Kalimāt al-taṣawwuf* or *Maqāmāt al-ṣūfiyya*³⁶ in which the author defines a number of Sufi terms including *sakīna* and *lawā’ih*. In fact, these two terms are treated together:

al-lawā’ih: these are luminous delightful raptures which shine and disappear with the speed of dazzling lightning (*al-burūq al-khātifāt*). About the *lawā’ih* God has said: “It is He who shows you the lightning for fear and hope (and produces heavy clouds)” (XIII, 12). *Sakīna* is a delightful rapture (*khulsa*) which remains for a while; or it is a series of successive and uninterrupted raptures for a period of time, and it is a noble spiritual state. In fact, all noble spiritual states originate from the *lawā’ih* and the *sakīna*, and the *sakīna* is “the heavy clouds” (mentioned in the verse quoted above).³⁷

The definition of *sakīna* here, as a delightful or sweet rapture that remains, is almost the same as that which Shaykh al-Ishrāq has said so far about this term in his other works. What is added here is Suhrawardī’s interpretation of the “heavy clouds” in the Qur’ān as the *sakīna*. The lightning flashes mentioned in that verse are said to be the *lawā’ih*, but the *sakīna* is not a lightning flash, since this flash rapidly disappears.

33 *Oeuvres*, I, 443.

34 *Ibid.*, 501–3.

35 *Oeuvres*, II, 271.

36 Initially, this treatise was edited and published by Najaf-quli Habībī in *Sih risāla az shaykh-i ishrāq (al-Abwāḥ al-Imādīyya, Kalimat al-taṣawwuf, and al-Lamahāt)*, Tehran 1397/1977. Emile Maalouf prepared another edition (without knowledge of the first critical edition) under the title *Risalat maqāmāt al-ṣūfiyya*, Beirut, 1993.

37 *Kalimat al-taṣawwuf* in *Sih risāla*, pp. 124–5; *Maqāmāt al-ṣūfiyya*, p. 75.

The idea of the *sakīna* as “heavy clouds” is also discussed in *al-Alwāḥ al-imādīyya*,³⁸ a treatise that Suhrawardī wrote for an Artuqīd prince in Diyar Bakr. He quotes the same Qur’ān verse, followed by his mystical interpretation of it: “It is He who shows you the lightning, for fear and hope, and produces the heavy clouds”.

In his commentary of this verse, Suhrawardī reminds his reader that God is speaking here of the spiritual domain. The lightning, in other words, is shown in the inner sky, and so it is the *lā’ih* (pl. *lawā’ih*).³⁹ Since the lightning is momentary, upon seeing it the philosopher-mystic fears that it will disappear and so he wishes it to remain. This wish is fulfilled by the appearance of the “heavy clouds” that Suhrawardī interprets as “the station of abiding *sakīna*.” The clouds are said to be heavy, because they are pregnant with the rain of true knowledge.⁴⁰

The word *sakīna* is used in three other places in the *Alwāḥ*. Once when Suhrawardī speaks of the “fire of the station of *sakīna*”⁴¹ in the soul. In another place, he explains how a purified soul is illuminated by the divine light by saying, “When the divine lights shine upon it and the holy *sakīna*⁴² is realized in it, then will it be radiant and can affect bodies and souls.”

The third place is where Suhrawardī is speaking of the ancient Iranian idea of *khorra*, a light that gives confirmation (*ta’yīd*) to man and illuminates his soul and his body and makes them strong. Whoever possesses this light becomes superior to others. When this light is specially vouchsafed to kings, it is called *kayān khorra*.⁴³ Suhrawardī mentions Fraidun and Kay Khosraw as two Iranian kings who were in possession of this royal light of strength and domination. It was because of this light that Kay Khosraw could defeat his enemy Afrāsiyāb, a cruel and evil man who was in fact an enemy of God. According to Suhrawardī, Afrāsiyāb had countless men in his army, but he was defeated

38 Suhrawardī seems to have written this work originally in Arabic and then he himself, or one of his followers, translated it into Persian. The Arabic text is edited by N. Ḥabībī and included in *Sih risāla az shaykh-i ishraq* and the Persian translation is included in *Oeuvre*, III.

39 For similar mystical interpretations of this verse see the saying of Abū ‘Alī Shaqafī in Sulamī’s *Haqā’iq al-tafsīr* (Ms. Velieddin, 148, f. 158), and Qushayrī, *Latā’if al-ishārāt*, Vol. II, pp. 219–20.

40 *Sih risāla*, 75–6; *Oeuvre*, III, 193.

41 *Sih risāla*, 72; *Oeuvre*, III, 188–9.

42 The Persian version (*Oeuvre*, III, 185) replaces the word *sakīna* with *sukūt* (silence), obviously an incorrect reading. The correct reading is *sakīna* (as in the Arabic text) or probably *sukūn* (repose).

43 *Sih risāla*, 70; *Oeuvre*, III, 186.

by the holy and gracious king, Kay Khosraw, because the latter was vouchsafed with the *sakīna* of glory (*sakīnat al-majid*).⁴⁴

Though Suhrawardī, in this context, seems to be identifying *sakīna* with *khorra*, or more specifically with *kayān khorra*, he is still following the Qur'anic conception of the *sakīna*. Since *sakīna* is said here to have been vouchsafed to the king Kay Khosraw, the closest Qur'anic verse to this *sakīna* would be the one which says: "Then God sent down on him (the Prophet)⁴⁵ His Shechina and confirmed him with legions you did not see." (IX, 40).

The idea of *khorra* is discussed by Suhrawardī, in some of his other works as well,⁴⁶ but without making any reference to the idea of *sakīna*. Even in the *Abwāḥ*, Suhrawardī does not explicitly state that by the *sakīna* that is vouchsafed to Kay Khosraw in the battlefield he means exactly *kayān khorra*. And yet the French scholar Henry Corbin thought that Suhrawardī had identified *sakīna* in this phrase with the *kāyan khorra*.⁴⁷ Corbin was so impressed by the phrase, that he wrote:

Ici s'accomplit le passage mettant en equivalence la notion zoroastrienne de *Xvarnah* (Lumière-de-Gloire) et celle de Sakina/Shekhina, passage d'une portée spirituelle inappreciable, puisqu'il typifie tout le projet sohravardien: la prophétie de l'ancien Iran est intégrée au prophétisme sémitique; les extatiques du *Xvamaḥ* sont mis sur la même voie spirituelle que les mystiques de l'Islam par la *sakina* et les mystiques du judaïsme par la *Shekhina*.⁴⁸

44 The Arabic and the Persian texts of this crucial phrase in the *Abwāḥ* both seem to be corrupt. The Persian text, I believe, should be read as follows: "*va malik-i qiddīs chun ba sang-i sakīnat bar u musallaḥ shud*" (and when the saintly king overcame him [Afrāsiāb] with the stone of *Sakīna*) (*Oeuvre*, III, 187).

45 This verse is about the Prophet and Abū Bakr hiding in the cave, and some Sunni commentators have said that the pronoun 'him' refers to Abū Bakr and not the Prophet (See Fakhr al-Dīn Razī's, *Tafsīr*, XVI, pp. 65–6). Other commentators, including the Shiites, have claimed that the reference is to the Prophet himself (see Abū Ja'far al-Tūsī, *al-Tibyān*, v. 2121–2). Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Karīm Shahrastānī has an interesting interpretation of this verse. He says that the *sakīna* that is sent to the Prophet is the word which appears in the person of Abū Bakr. Shahrastānī compares this *sakīna* of the Prophet Muhammad with the star that Abraham sees and says "This is my Lord" (Kor. VI, 76). See *Du maktūb az Muḥammad 'Abd al-Karīm Shahrastānī*, ed. M.R. Jalālī Na'īnī, Tehran, 1369, p. 115.

46 Such as "Partawnāma" (*Oeuvre*, III, 81), *Al-Mashārī' wa'l-mutārahāt* (*Oeuvre*, I, 504), and *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq* (*Oeuvre*, II, 157).

47 H. Corbin, *L'Archange empourpré*, Paris, 1976, pp. XIX–XX, 13, 125, 181, 466; *Philosophie Iranienne et philosophie comparée*, Tehran, 1977, pp. 89–90; *En Islam iranien*, II, Paris 1971, pp. 36–8; *La philosophie de Suhrawardī*, Tehran, 1976, p. 23.

48 *L'Archange*, p. 128.

This is obviously an overstatement, to say the least. To sustain the claim that the phrase typified the whole Suhrawardian project of bringing together the mystical traditions of ancient Zoroastrianism, Judaism, and Islam, one first needs to show how exactly Suhrawardī's idea of *sakīna* is related to the Jewish *shēkhīna*.⁴⁹ In fact, Shaykh al-Isḥrāq has made no reference to the Jewish idea of *shēkhīna* in any one of his works. Furthermore, before claiming that *kayān khorra* and Islamic *sakīna* are the same, we need to know what precisely this *sakīna* stands for. We know that *kayān khorra* is a light.⁵⁰ This is something that Suhrawardī himself has clearly stated. If the *sakīna* is supposed to be identical with *kayān khorra*, then it has to be a luminous entity too. Now, Suhrawardī's idea of *sakīna* as a light is that which shines upon the heart of philosopher-mystic in the intermediate stage and remain. Could we then say that Suhrawardī considers this light to be the same as *kayān khorra*? I believe not, for the light of *sakīna*, though not as transient or temporal as the flashes that are experienced at the first stage, are still lights that are experienced in a certain mystical stage, and once the mystic comes out of that state, then that light is no longer experienced. But the *kayān khorra* is a light that is vouchsafed to kings and may last a whole life time, not something temporal that is experienced in a mystical state. Obviously this kind of permanent light could not be the same as the light of *sakīna*, which shines only at an intermediate stage. In fact, being the most noble light which brings about majesty and superiority to the person who possesses it, the *kayān khorra*, therefore, might be more appropriately identified with the light which shines at the third and last stage (*ṭamas*) and Suhrawardī mentions Plato, Hermes, Kayūmarth, Faridūn, and Kay-Khosraw as those who experienced this light.⁵¹

The identification of *kayān khorra* and *sakīna* was not recognized by any one of the commentators of Suhrawardī's *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*. Even the concept of *sakīna* as an inner light was not observed by all commentators. Shams al-Dīn Shahrazūrī, the first commentator of Suhrawardī's *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*,

49 The idea that Jewish *shēkhīna* was related to the Iranian notion of *khōrra* or *farr* had been expressed before Corbin by other scholars. See Pūr-i Dāvūd, *Yashthā*, vol. 1, Tehran, 1356s [first published, 1307/1928], pp. 512–3.

50 For the idea of *khōrra* or *farr*, as a divine light, in Iranian literature, see Pūr-i Dāvūd. *Yashthā*, vol. 11, pp. 303–322; H. W. Bailey, *Zoroastrian Problems in the Ninth-Century Books*, Oxford, 1971 (first published in 1943), chs. 1&2; M. Mu'īn, 'Ḥikmat-i ishrāq va farhang-i Irān', *Majmū'a-yi maqālāt-i Duktū doctor Muḥammad-e Mu'īn*, Vol. 1, Tehran, 1364s, pp. 412–420 (first published in *Majalla-yi āmuzish u parvarish*, 1328s); and A. Sh. Shahbazi, "An Anchaemenid Symbol: 11. Farnah > (God-given) Fortune < symbolized," in *Archaeologische Mitteilungen aus Iran* 13 (1980).

51 See *Oeuvre*, I, 502.

said nothing about *sakīna*.⁵² The next commentator, Qutb al-Dīn Shīrāzī (d. 710/1311), however, observed Suhrawardī's definition of *sakīna* (*aṣḥāb al-sakīnat al-kubrā*) which are mentioned in Shaykh's *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, Shīrāzī explains as: those for whom the dazzling lights and the momentary flashes and lightning have become stable.⁵³ Shīrāzī does not identify the light of *sakīna* with *kayān khorra*.

The Persian translator and commentator of *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, Maḥmūd Sharīf al-Hirawī in his *Anwāriyya*, has also observed Suhrawardī's idea of *sakīna* as an inner light, without identifying it with *kayān khorra*. Hirawī describes the "possessors of major *sakīna*" as "those who worship God with perfect tranquility because of ex-periencing many lights and flashes".⁵⁴ In another place, Hirawī interprets "the major *sakīna*" as an intermediate light which brings peace of mind, tranquility, and rest.⁵⁵

Besides *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, some of other works by Suhrawardī attracted the interest of commentators. The *Ḥayākil al-nūr* was commented on by Jalāl al-Dīn Davānī (d. 908/1501) under the title *Shawākil al-hūr fī sharḥ Ḥayākil al-nūr*.⁵⁶ In the *Ḥayākil* Suhrawardī does not mention the light of *sakīna*, but he mentions briefly the inner lights that a philosopher-mystic experiences. In fact, these lights are said to shine upon one's heart after purification and after meditating on the divine grandeur and the expanding *khorrā*.⁵⁷ In his commentary, Davānī explains the idea of *khorrā*, with the help of Suhrawardī's words on *khorrā* and *kayān khorra* in the *Abwāḥ*, without identifying it with *sakīna*.⁵⁸

The only commentator of Suhrawardī who seems to have identified *kiayān khorra* with *sakīna* is a less known philosopher by the name of Maḥmūd Nayrīzī who wrote a commentary on the *Abwāḥ* entitled *Miṣbāḥ al-arwāḥ fī kashf haqā'iq al-Abwāḥ*. Henry Corbin, who misread his name and called him

52 Shahrāzūrī's commentary has recently been critically edited by Hossein Ziai: *Sharḥ Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, Tehran, 1372s/1993. For Shahrāzūrī's philosophy see Hossein Ziai, "The Illuminationist Tradition", in S.H. Nasr and O. Leaman (eds.), *History of Islamic Philosophy*, part I, London, 1996, pp. 476–82.

53 Qutb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *Sharḥ Ḥikmat al-ishraq*, lithograph edition, Tehran, 1315, p. 548.

54 M. Sharīf al-Harawī, *Anwāriyya*, ed. H. Ziai, Tehran, 1358s/1980, p. 236.

55 *Ibid.*, p. 239.

56 Both these works are published in Jalāl al-Dīn Davānī, *Thalāth rasā'il*, ed. Aḥmad Tūyserkānī, Mashhad, 1411. There is another commentary on Suhrawardī's *Ḥayākil al-nūr* by Mīr Ghiyāth al-Dīn Maṣṣūr Dashtakī (d. 948/ 1541) which has not been published yet.

57 *Ibid.*, p. 89.

58 *Ibid.*, p. 202.

Wadūd Tabrizī, introduced his work.⁵⁹ Corbin seems to have been influenced by him in identifying the *kayān khorra* with *sakīna*. Unfortunately, Nayrīzī's commentary is still unpublished.

Finally, there is one other author that needs to be mentioned here for having followed Suhrawardī's idea of *sakīna* as an inner light and for having identified it with *kayān khorra*, namely 'Abd al-Razzāq Kāshānī or Kāshī (d. 730/1329). Kāshānī is well known for his commentaries on Ibn Arabī's *Fuṣuṣ al-ḥikam* and Anṣarī's *Manāzil al-sā'irīn*, as well as his rather extensive work on Sufi terminology called *Iṣṭilāḥāt al-ṣufiyya*. *Sakīna* is a term that is elaborately explained both in the *Iṣṭilāḥāt al-ṣufiyya*⁶⁰ and in the commentary on the *Manāzil al-sā'irīn*.⁶¹ It is also mentioned in the commentary of the *Fuṣuṣ* where Ibn 'Arabī has spoken of the *sakīna* in the Ark.⁶² In none of these three places can we say that Kāshānī is taking his idea from Suhrawardī. It is in another of Kāshānī's works, namely his Sufi commentary of the Qur'ān, *Ta'wīlāt al-Qur'ān*, falsely attributed to Ibn 'Arabī, that Suhrawardī's idea of *sakīna* can be seen.⁶³ Commenting on chapter XLVIII, verse 5 of the Qur'ān, he defines *sakīna*, in the same way as Shaykh al-Ishrāq, as a light in the heart which gives tranquility and peace, as well as pleasure and joy.⁶⁴ In another place, commenting on the verse, "It is He who shows you the lightning, for fear and hope, and produces the heavy clouds" (XIII, 12), he follows Suhrawardī's interpretation of "the heavy clouds" as the *sakīna* that is made heavy, or pregnant, with the water of knowledge.⁶⁵ And finally, the identification of *Kayān khorra* with *sakīna*, supposedly implied by Suhrawardī in the *Alwāḥ*, seems to have crossed Kāshānī's mind when he was commenting on the controversial verse of the Qur'ān about the Ark of Israelites and what was in it: "And their Prophet said to them, 'The sign of his kingship is that the Ark will come to you, in it a Shechina from your

59 See his *Philosophie iranienne et philosophie comparée*, pp. 95–9.

60 'Abd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī, *Iṣṭilāḥāt al-ṣufiyya*, ed. 'Abd al-'Āl Shāhīn. Cairo, 1992, pp. 300–301.

61 'Abd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī, *Sharḥ manāzil al-sā'irīn*, ed. Muḥsin Bīdārfar, Qum, 1372, pp. 361–370.

62 See Kāshānī's commentary on Ibn 'Arabī's *Fuṣuṣ al-ḥikam*, Cairo, 1321, p. 252.

63 This commentary has been published several times in Egypt, India, and Lebanon. I have used the Beirut edition (1968), in two volumes, entitled *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-karīm*, attributed to Ibn 'Arabī. For the authenticity of this book, see Osman Yahya, *Histoire et classification de l'oeuvre d'Ibn Arabī*, t. 2, Damas, 1964, pp. 483–4; Pierre Lory, *Les Commentaires esotériques du Coran d'après 'Abd al-Razzāq al-Qashānī*, Paris, 1980, pp. 23–4; Bīdārfar's introduction to *Sharḥ manāzil al-sā'irīn*, p. 25.

64 *Tafsīr*, II, 507.

65 *Ibid.* I, 636.

Lord, and a remnant of what the folk of Moses and Aaron's folk left behind, the angels bearing it" (II, 249).

In his commentary on this verse,⁶⁶ Kāshānī mentions the idea of *kayān khorra* or *farr* twice, once when he is explaining the meaning of "the sign of his kingship", and the second time when explaining the "remnant of what the folk of Moses and Aaron's folk left behind". Thus, it seems that Kāshānī is identifying the *kayān khorra* with the remnant in the Ark. However, since *sakīna* is also one of the things in the Ark, it might well be identified with the *kayān khorra*.

Kāshānī offers another interpretation for the meaning of *sakīna* in the Ark. What is said to be in the Ark, according to him, may be a talisman for bringing victory to the army, in which there is the form of a composite animal, with the head of a human being, or the head and a tail of a cat. Kāshānī then adds that this sign was something like the royal banner or standard used in the time of the Persian king Faridun and called "*dirafsh-i kāvīān*."⁶⁷ This interpretation, however, which vies the *sakīna* as an object in the external world and not as an inner light, had no place in Suhrawardī's philosophy of Illumination.

66 Ibid., I, 139–140.

67 On this ancient standard, see A. Shapur Shahbāzī, "Derafš," *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, 1994, VII, 312f., and Djalal Khaleghi-Motlaq, "Derafš-e Kavīān," *Ibid.*, 312–6.

PART 3

The Illuminationists or Suhrawardī's Commentators



Suhrawardī and Ibn Kammūna on the Impossibility of Having Two Necessary Existents

Ahmed Abwishah

Avicenna's philosophical demonstration that there cannot be more than one "Necessary Existent" (*wājib al-wujūd*, the technical term for God in Islamic philosophy) was challenged and critically advanced in post-Avicennian metaphysics, first by Ghazālī, and then significantly refined in the writings of Suhrawardī and Ibn Kammūna.

The purpose of this chapter is to show how Suhrawardī and Ibn Kammūna defended and developed Avicenna's argument for the impossibility of having two necessary existents in light of Ghazālī's critique. Focusing primarily on the analysis of key passages from Ibn Kammūna's commentary on Suhrawardī's *al-Tabwīḥāt al-lawḥiyya wa al-'arshiyya*, I will show how Suhrawardī and Ibn Kammūna hold Avicenna's argument to be indefensible unless one demonstrates (a) Avicenna's claim that the "existence" of the Necessary Existent is His "essence," and that (b) it is inconceivable for the human intellect to separate between the "essence" and the "existence" of the Necessary Existent. Before showing that, I will sketch out key aspects of Avicenna's argument and Ghazālī's critiques of it. And at the end of this chapter, I provide a translation of the pertinent passages from Ibn Kammūna's commentary of Suhrawardī's *al-Tabwīḥāt*.

Avicenna's Argument for the Impossibility of Two Necessary Existents and Ghazālī's Critiques of It

The question of whether there can be two necessary existents emerges naturally and logically from any discussion of the nature and unicity of the Necessary Existent. In his *Metaphysics*, having argued for the necessity of a Necessary Existent,¹ Avicenna presents an extensive and detailed argument to prove the impossibility of having two necessary existents. In it, Avicenna affirms some

1 For more on this see Stephen Menn, "Metaphysics: God and Being," pp. 147–170, and Jon McGinnis, *Avicenna*, pp. 159–168.

aspects of an earlier argument of Fārābī.² In *Kitāb ārā' ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila*, Fārābī asserts that to have another being (say Y) equivalent to the First Existent (say X) entails either (a) there is no distinction between X and Y, such that X is one and the same with Y, or (b) there is a distinction between X and Y. If (b), then there is something that distinguishes X from Y and distinguishes Y from X. But if that is the case, then that which distinguishes between X and Y would be part of what sustains the existence (*qiwām wujūdhimā*) of both X and Y. It follows that X would have both that which distinguishes it from Y and that which is common with Y; and same goes for Y. Having established that much, Fārābī concludes that one may then conceive that the reality of each First Existent is a composite of that which distinguishes it from the other and that which they have in common. This, according to al-Fārābī, entails that there must be a prior being that causes the unicity of the composite nature of both X and Y. Thus, neither X nor Y would be the First Existent.³

Fārābī bases his argument on the impossibility of having a valid relation between X and Y that allows each to be the First Existent. A relation that is contingent on what is common or distinct between X and Y would invalidate what it is to be the First Existent. Avicenna follows this line of thinking and goes further, positing more complicated hypotheses for the relation between the two necessary existents, X and Y.

At the outset, Avicenna argues that if there are two equivalent (*mukāfi'*) necessary existents, say X and Y, then they must exist in such way that X exists with (*ma'*) Y and Y exists with X; moreover, neither one is the cause of the other, rather they are “equal with respect to necessity of existence.”⁴ It is not clear how we should understand the proposition “with” or what X and Y are partaking in concomitantly. Avicenna may have had in mind that they share unqualified being, or the “with” may simply indicate the conceptual synthesis of two necessary existents in our mind.

2 Toby Mayer observes: “the roots of Fārābī’s argument reach back, via al-Kindī (d.c. 252/866) to Plotinus’s *Enneads*. In the fifth *Ennead*, Plotinus gives an argument against the duplication of the first of the Plotinian hypostases, the One. Two perfectly self-identical “Ones” are inconceivable. The hypothetical duplicate would have to be a compound of the shared “oneness” and a difference of some kind. So the duplicate would be “one” only in the relative sense of the word or, as Plotinus puts it, it would have to be a “one-many.” If the two hypothesized first hypostases are instead thought of as “one” in the absolute sense, they would lose their distinctness and resolve into one.” (“Fāḥr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī’s Critique of Ibn Sinā’s Argument for the Unity of God in the *Iṣārāt* and Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī’s Defence,” pp. 200–201).

3 Al-Fārābī, *Kitāb ārā' ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila wa muḍāddātihā*, pp. 27–28, see also *al-Farabi on The Perfect State*, pp. 58&60. Cf. Stephen Menn, “Metaphysics: God and Being,” p. 157.

4 Avicenna, *al-Shifā', al-Ilāhiyāt*, p. 32, Marmura’s translation.

In any case, having stipulated these two conditions, Avicenna asks in which sense we ought to consider each one to be a necessary existent. Either we take X and Y to be each (a) a Necessary Existent in-itself or (b) *not* a Necessary Existent in-itself. Avicenna objects to assumptions (a) and (b).⁵ Assumption (a) would entail one of two possible conclusions—either:

- (i) X would be a Necessary Existent in-itself and necessary in virtue of being “with” (*maʿ*) Y; in this case X is a Necessary Existent in virtue of itself *and* in virtue of Y, and that is impossible.
- (ii) X’s existence is not necessary in virtue of the existence of Y, nor does it follow upon (*yatbaʿ*) the existence of Y; thus the existence of X has no relation to the existence of Y, and this would violate the first condition, namely that X and Y exist in such way that X must exist with Y and Y must exist with X.⁶

Thus, for Avicenna, it is impossible to have X be a Necessary Existent in-itself and be existent with Y.

Having established that, Avicenna turns his attention to assumption (b). For him, this assumption can be defended by showing that X is a contingent existent in virtue of itself and a necessary existent in virtue of Y; in turn, Y is a contingent existent in virtue of itself and necessary in virtue of X. This would mean that the necessity of Y is conditioned by posteriority (*baʿdiyya*) with respect to the existence of X, and that of X is conditioned by posteriority with respect to the existence of Y. Hence, neither X nor Y could have necessity with respect to their existence, for such necessity would be contingent on some posteriority with respect to something else’s existence and not in itself. Moreover, both X and Y would be cause and effect with respect to each other, and that is absurd.⁷

For Avicenna, whatever relation we assumed of X with respect to Y, this relation would negate the necessity of their existence. Similar problems would arise if we assume that the necessary existence of X and Y was caused by something external to X and Y. That is to say, X and Y would be related in such way that “one is not necessitated by the other but is [necessary] with the other, that which necessitates them being the cause that brought them together.”⁸ This, for Avicenna, suggests that X and Y would be contingent existents; neither

5 Ibid. p. 32. See also Avicenna *al-Najāt*, pp. 263–264.

6 Avicenna, *al-Ilāhiyāt*, pp. 32–33.

7 Cf. Jon McGinnis, *Avicenna*, p. 164.

8 Avicenna, *al-Ilāhiyāt*, p. 33, Marmura’s translation.

would be the cause of the relation of “with-ness” (*al-māʿiyya*) obtaining between them, and thus an independent (prior) cause would be required.⁹

Having rejected the possibility of there being two necessary existents, Avicenna proceeds to show that the very meaning of “Necessary Existent” must be free from any form of multiplicity.¹⁰ He justifies this view by arguing that if there is multiplicity within the meaning of “Necessary Existent,” it must be in one of three aspects: in terms of differentiae, accidents, or species. None of these options, according to Avicenna, is logically compatible or applicable to the meaning of “Necessary Existent.”¹¹

Ghazālī, as A. Yaqub rightfully noted, reconstructs Avicenna’s arguments against any form of multiplicity applicable to the Necessary Existent by grouping them “into meaningful categories ... [and] giving them an argumentative structure that unlocks much of their force.”¹² Ghazālī takes Avicenna’s argument for the impossibility of two necessary existents to be the following:

If one were to suppose two necessary existents, they would be either similar in all respects or different. If they were similar in all respects, multiplicity and duality among them would be unintelligible ... And if similarity in all respects [among them] is impossible, and there must be a difference, and this difference is not in time or place, then it only remains to be a difference in essence. Regardless of what they differ in, they must either share something or share nothing. If they share nothing, then this is impossible; for in this case they must not share existence, necessary existence, or that each one subsists in itself and not in a subject. On the other hand, if they share something and differ in something, then what they share is not the same thing as what they differ in. Hence, there would be composition and division in expressing [that which is a necessary existent]. But a necessary existent admits no composition; and as it does not divide in terms of quantity, it also does not divide in terms of explanatory expression; for its essence is not composed of aspects, which can be enumerated by explanatory description ... and such composition is inconceivable for a necessary existent, and without it, a duality is not conceivable.”¹³

9 Ibid., p. 33.

10 Avicenna, *al-Ilāhiyāt*, p. 34.

11 Ibid. pp. 35–36; for more on Avicenna’s argument on this issue, especially in *al-Ishārāt*, see T. Mayer, pp. 201–207.

12 A. Yaqub, “Al-Ghazālī’s Philosophers on the Divine Unity,” p. 284.

13 Al-Ghazālī, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, pp. 87–88, Yaqub’s translation modified, p. 284.

Ghazālī agrees with Avicenna firstly that “duality is inconceivable without there being some difference,”¹⁴ and secondly that “the difference between two things that are similar in every aspect is inconceivable.”¹⁵ However, he takes Avicenna’s assertion that composition is impossible with respect to the Necessary Existent to be a purely unwarranted judgment (*taḥakkum maḥd*).¹⁶ He argues that Avicenna—or “the philosophers,” as he consistently puts it—demonstrates this assertion by showing how the Necessary Existent cannot be susceptible to different types of plurality or, more specifically, “composability.” He proceeds to reconstruct what he deems to be Avicenna’s scheme of five types of common compositions, each of which must be inapplicable to the Necessary Existent:¹⁷ composition of (a) that which is divisible in actuality or in imagination (*wahm*);¹⁸ (b) that which is divisible conceptually into form and matter; (c) that which is divisible by many attributes, such as knowledge, power, and will; (d) that which is divisible conceptually into genus and species; or (e) that which is divisible by its essence and its existence.¹⁹ Having established that, Ghazālī dedicates four chapters of the *Incoherence of the Philosophers* to question and refute key premises of Avicenna’s arguments.²⁰ The argument against (e)—the composition of essence and existence—dominates Ghazālī’s critique and subsequently, as we will see, becomes the center of focus for Suhrawardī and Ibn Kammūna’s discussion regarding the impossibility of two necessary existents. With that in mind, before we dive into Suhrawardī and Ibn Kammūna’s discussion, let’s first outline Avicenna’s justification of why (e) is impossible and Ghazālī’s critique of it.

14 Al-Ghazālī, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, pp. 87–88, Yaqub’s translation.

15 Al-Ghazālī, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, p. 88, Marmura’s translation modified.

16 While Yaqub (p. 286) translated the phrase “*taḥakkum maḥd*” as “merely arbitrary,” I take the word “*taḥakkum*” in this context to mean “*lā mubarrir lahu*” as it is followed by al-Ghazālī asking “*fa-mā al-burhān ‘alayhi*” (what is the proof of it?), hence I prefer to translate it as “unwarranted judgment.”

17 See al-Ghazālī, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, pp. 88–90. A. Yaqub presents a logical reconstruction of these arguments, see A. Yaqub, pp. 289–304.

18 The term *wahm* is often translated as “estimation,” but in this context, contrasted to “actuality,” “imagination” is more appropriate; it should refer not to a particular faculty, but to the capacity for theoretical divisibility.

19 Yaqub divided these types of plurality into two categories: “quantitative plurality, which is type (a), and qualitative plurality, which includes types (b)–(e).” (see A. Yaqub p. 288).

20 For more see A. Yaqub, pp. 289–304.

In *al-Ilāhiyāt*, Avicenna affirms that the Necessary Existent “has no quiddity (*māhiyya*) other than His individual existence (*annīyya*).”²¹ He explains that “there is no quiddity for the Necessary Existent other than His being the Necessary Existent.” This is His “individual existence,” (*annīyya*).²² In his later work, *al-Ta’līqāt*, Avicenna makes it clear that “the meaning of Necessary Existent in itself (or in its essence: *fī dhātihī*) is precisely that it is the same (*nafs*) as necessity (*wājibiyya*), and its existence in itself is the necessity.”²³ In this context, Avicenna grounds the relation between the essence and existence of the Necessary Existent on the concepts of “necessity” and “sameness.” By necessity His essence is His existence and His existence is necessary. If His existence is not something that needs to be added to His essence, then it must be part of His essence or the same as His essence. It cannot be part of His essence, because then His essence would not be simple. Hence *His existence must be the same as His essence* (hereafter I refer to this as Avicenna’s Principle of Sameness).

In contrast, the essence of any contingent existent precedes its existence, and its existence is superadded to its essence.²⁴ The essence of a triangle, for example, is the cause of the attributes and the definition of what it is to be a triangle, but it is not the existence of that (or any) triangle. But even if the existence of a contingent existent is not superadded to its essence, it would not be same as its essence unless the latter is perfectly simple. For example,

21 Avicenna, *al-Ilāhiyāt*, p. 274, Marmura’s translation. Elsewhere I have explained this term as follows: “*Annīyya* is an abstract noun derived from the Arabic particle ‘*anna*,’ which is used to introduce the topic of a nominal sentence and has no direct translation into English, although ‘it is the case that’ is functionally similar. According to some modern scholars, the earliest text to contain the term *annīyya* is the *Theology of Aristotle*. In his translation of this text, Friedrich Dieterici takes *annīyya* to be an equivalent to the Greek term τὰ ὄντως ὄντα, and in turn takes this term to mean essence (see R. Frank, “The Arabic Philosophical Term *Annīyah*,” *Les Cahiers de Byrsa* 6 (1956), 181). Paul Kraus concludes that the term *annīyya* is the equivalent of both the Greek infinitive τὸ εἶναι and the Greek participle τὸ ὄν (see Frank, “The Arabic Philosophical Term *Annīyah*,” 183). Al-Kindī was the first to use the term *annīyya* in Arabic philosophical writings to mean existence.” (See Alwishah, “Ibn Sīnā on Floating Man Arguments,” p. 37).

22 Ibid., p. 276, Marmura’s translation. Stephen Menn argues that Avicenna’s view above is influenced by Aristotle’s claim that the “definition of a thing does not include ‘being’ or ‘one.’” According to Menn, “Avicenna takes the underlying reason for this to be that if X is a thing other than God, being the unity are not contained in the essence of X, which is what the definition expresses. (And God does not have a definition).” (“Averroes Against Avicenna on Being and Unity,” p. 53-).

23 Avicenna, *al-Ta’līqāt*, §313, p. 294.

24 For more, see Menn, p. 55.

consider the essence of the number 2 and its evenness. The number 2's evenness is not something that needs to be added to its essence, so it must be part of its essence or the same as its essence. But the essence of the number 2 is not simple, so, in this case, the evenness is not something added to the essence, but it is also not the same as the essence.²⁵ But given that essence and existence are one and the same for the Necessary Existent, why do we still apply these terms to describe it?

Avicenna argues that any "judgment [about the existence of] God, who has no essence besides His individual existence (*annīyya*), is analogous to [a judgment] that His existence is His essence (*ḥaqīqa*) when it is taken as an attribute. That attribute is the affirmation (*ta'akkud*) [of His] existence, but the affirmation of existence is not an existence specified by [that] affirmation; rather it is an ineffable concept from which the affirmation of existence is expressed. [Thus it is said of God] that His essence (*ḥaqīqa*) is necessary absolutely: it is not necessary in a general sense. This means that He must necessarily have existence."²⁶

Here Avicenna suggests that the use of the term "existence" in describing the Necessary Existent is merely a way of affirming His essence with respect to a certain attribute. When the Necessary Existent has the attribute of being willing (*murīd*) or omnipotent (*qādir*) as an aspect of His essence, the term "existence" is affirming that essence insofar as it is willing or omnipotent.²⁷ He elaborates further on this view when he objects to the Mu'tazilite view of the divine attributes. If God "is necessary in Himself and [the Mu'tazilites] attribute power (*qudra*) to Him contingently, then He would become both a necessary and contingent [existent], or else contingency would become an attribute of the Necessary Existent in-itself, and [both of] these are impossible. Thus, it must be that everything [attributed of] Him is Necessary in actuality (*bil-fi'l*)."²⁸ In this sense, and in order to avoid the problem of contingency with respect to divine attributes, Avicenna suggests that we ought to view divine attributes as necessarily existing (in actuality), and this necessity is affirmed by the application of the term "existence." Avicenna's remarks in *al-Ta'liqāt* explicate some aspects of the relation between the essence and the existence of Necessary Existent, but have not sufficiently justified why they are one and the same, unlike the case for other contingent existents.

25 I am grateful for David Sanson for providing me with this example to explicate my point.

26 Avicenna, *al-Ta'liqāt*, §343, p. 310.

27 Ibid., §312, p. 294.

28 Ibid., §341, p. 309.

The ambiguity, one might even say the opacity, of Avicenna's Principle of Sameness immediately provoked Ghazālī to level two major objections against him in the Eighth Discussion of the *Incoherence*. First, Avicenna fails to explain how he arrives at this principle. Ghazālī asks, "how do you know this? By [logical] necessity or through reflection? It is not [known by logical] necessity; hence, the method of reflection would have to be mentioned."²⁹ In addition, Ghazālī is not convinced that a logical contradiction would result if one posits that existence is superadded to the essence of the Necessary Existent. He attributes this contradiction to the ambiguity of Avicenna's term "Necessary Existent." This term, according to Ghazālī, simply means that there is a being that "has a reality and an essence and this reality exists—that is, it is not non-existent [or] negated and its existence is not added to it (in reality)."³⁰ In having this understanding of what it is to be a Necessary Existent, Ghazālī assumes one need not commit to Avicenna's Principle of Sameness nor be concerned that a logical contradiction would result from rejecting it. Furthermore, for Ghazālī, the essence of any given being, be it contingent or eternal, does not precede or cause the existence of that being.³¹

Ghazālī's second objection is that it is inconceivable to have existence without essence, just as "we cannot conceive unattached non-existence except by adding it to an existent whose non-existence is supposed."³² Ghazālī goes as far as to claim that assuming that there is existence without essence is equivalent to assuming that there is existence and non-existence simultaneously.

Suhrawardī and Ibn Kammūna on the Impossibility of Having Two Necessary Existents

Ghazālī's reconstruction and critiques of Avicenna's argument for the impossibility of two necessary existents impacted Suhrawardī and Ibn Kammūna's understanding of Avicenna's argument, drawing their attention to its shortcomings. In order to save Avicenna's argument, they develop a robust strategy that primarily rests upon re-establishing Avicenna's Principle of Sameness. Having said that much, let's begin by presenting Suhrawardī's formulation of Avicenna's argument. Working with Ghazālī's reconstruction, Suhrawardī presents a condensed version of Avicenna's argument as follows:

29 Al-Ghazālī, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*, p. 118 Marmura's translation modified.

30 Ibid., Marmura's translation modified.

31 Ibid., p. 119.

32 Ibid., Marmura's translation modified.

If there were two necessary [existents] in Being, then (a) there would not be commonality between them in all aspects, for there must be something which distinguishes (*mumayyiz*) between them; (b) nor would there be difference between them in all aspects, for they must share necessity of existence. Thus, there must be both commonality and distinction between them, and this entails the possibility of that which is divided (*al-muqassam*) and that which divides (*al-muqassim*), while we have assumed two necessary existents: but this is impossible. [Furthermore,] the Necessary Existent has no partition in some other way such that it comes to be caused according to its partition and thereby made possible.³³

Remarking on this passage, Ibn Kammūna, in his Commentary on Suhrawardī's *al-Talwihāt*, explains that Suhrawardī intentionally presented the proof of unicity [of the Necessary Existent] only *after* he had demonstrated Avicenna's Principle of Sameness (as it is restated in the Commentary: that "the existence of a Necessary Existent is neither a [conceptual] supposition nor superadded to its essence").³⁴ The reason for such a move, according Ibn Kammūna, is that without establishing Avicenna's Principle of Sameness, the possibility of having two necessary existents is conceivable. Ibn Kammūna's explanation of Suhrawardī's reasoning can be summed up as follows:

1. If the necessity of existence (*wujūb al-wujūd*) of each necessary existent (X and Y, as in our previous examples) is either a mental suppositional or superadded to the essence of them, then:
2. One may assume that the two necessary existents are sharing this necessity of existence.
3. Moreover, this necessity of existence would not be the same as the essence of either necessary existent; rather it would be accidental to each.
4. Each necessary existent would have a complete and independent essence (*tamām al-māhiyya*), despite sharing this necessity of existence.
5. It follows from 1–4 that each necessary existent would be a necessary existent in itself (or in virtue of its essence).
6. Thus, it is possible to have two necessary existents.³⁵

33 Ibn Kammūna, *Sharḥ al-talwihāt*, p. 177.

34 Ibid.

35 Reza Pourjavady and Sabine Schmidtke reported another version of this argument attributed to Ibn Kammūna in his *al-Maṭālib al-muhimma* (see *A Jewish Philosopher of Baghdad: 'Izz al-Dawla Ibn Kammūna (d. 683/1284) and His Writings*, footnote 171, p. 38).

This argument establishes that if the essence is not the same as the existence of a necessary existent, then it is possible to have two complete and independent essences. In this case, the criteria of duality—for X and Y to be two things, X must be distinct from Y—would be satisfied by each necessary existent having a complete essence, while at the same time sharing the necessity of existence (this will be explained further below).

Thus, for Suhrawardī and Ibn Kammūna, justifying and establishing Avicenna's Principle of Sameness becomes critically significant in order to prove the impossibility of having two necessary existents. As we mentioned above, Suhrawardī carried out this task prior to justifying the impossibility of two necessary existents; let us now examine how Ibn Kammūna explicates Suhrawardī's strategy.

At the outset, Suhrawardī concedes to Ghazālī's objection—which he calls “a persuasive objection” (*naqd iqnā'ī*)—that the existence of the essence should not precede existence in any form of being, be it contingent or necessary. Suhrawardī states that the objection that “it is invalid [to claim] that the existence of the essence precedes the existence *is necessary* [true], regardless of whether the existence of the Necessary Existent is the same as its essence or not.”³⁶ For him, the assumption that the essence precedes the existence of a contingent existent implies that its existence is an accidental property predicated upon the essence (that which bears it: *maḥmūl*), but asserting that the existence of that accident must be posterior to the existence of the essence itself would entail that the essence has existence prior to the existence of a contingent object, and this, for Suhrawardī, is absurd.³⁷ Ibn Kammūna explains Suhrawardī's justification by using the concept of “identity” (*huwīyya*). According to Ibn Kammūna, if we are to uphold Avicenna's claim that for a contingent being, “existence is superadded to the essence,” then there would be an identity for the essence and an identity for the existence, and the former is prior to the latter and the latter is in need of the former. It follows that the “identity of the essence” would have an existence prior to the actual existence of the contingent being, and that is absurd.³⁸

Having rejected that the claim “existence is superadded to the essence” implies the existence of an essence prior to the actual existence of any given being, Suhrawardī suggests that it simply means that existence is mentally (*dhihnī*), and not in actuality, superadded to the essence. That is to say, the human intellect is able to conceive the essence of X as something separable from the actual

36 Ibn Kammūna, *Sharḥ al-taḥwīḥāt*, pp. 169–170, my emphasis.

37 Ibid., p. 168.

38 Ibid., p. 168.

existence of X.³⁹ For example, one can conceive the essence of a man in a way that is distinguishable from conceiving the existence of Socrates. But if that is the case, what stops us from saying the same of conceiving the essence of the Necessary Existent, and what prevents the intellect from separating it from its existence?

In response to this question, Ibn Kammūna claims that Suhrawardī comes up with an innovative argument (*ṭarīqan ikhtara'ahā*) in demonstrating how mental separation is not applicable to the essence and the existence of the Necessary Existent. Ibn Kammūna sums up Suhrawardī's argument in the following steps:⁴⁰

- (a) If the human intellect is able to separate between the essence and the existence of Necessary Existent, then:
- (b) The essence of the Necessary Existent would be a universal essence (*māhiyya kulliyya*).
- (c) Nothing prevents a universal essence from having an infinite set of conceivable particulars.
- (d) Some of these particulars are grasped by the intellect, while others are not. That is to say, for any universal essence, there will be always some contingent particulars that have not yet been conceived by the human intellect.
- (e) But if (d), then the Necessary Existent would not be a necessary by virtue of having a universal essence.
- (f) Thus, it is impossible for the human intellect to separate between the essence and the existence of Necessary Existent.

Later, Ibn Kammūna explains premises (c) and (d) by arguing that every universal essence must have contingent particulars that are not yet grasped or conceived. For him, if an essence is universal, then it must have intelligible particulars, some of which exist and others which do not yet exist. We would not assume the latter to be impossible for the essence, for we have to say the same thing for the existing particulars, given that both are intelligible particulars.⁴¹ With that in mind, there is nothing preventing the non-existent intelligible particulars from coming to be, though not yet existent; thus some particulars of the universal essence of the Necessary Existent would be contingent, and in

39 Ibid., p. 170.

40 Ibid., pp. 171–173.

41 Ibid., p. 172.

turn the Necessary Existent, in-itself and in virtue of His essence, would be a contingent existent, and that is a sheer contradiction.⁴²

Thus, for Suhrawardī and Ibn Kammūna, the human intellect cannot separate between the essence of the Necessary Existent and His existence. The Necessary Existent is a perfect being (*kāmil*) in sense that the whole of His existence is the whole of His essence. There is neither any contingent aspect within His essence nor anything that is in the state of becoming.

The human intellect conceives an essence in virtue of how its particulars partake in it or belong to a category: thus it fails to conceive the essence of the Necessary Existent, which lacks both criteria.

This is expressed explicitly by Suhrawardī when he states that the Necessary Existent “does not have an essence that is not His existence such that the human mind could separate them into two aspects (essence and existence). For He (the Necessary Existent) is pure existence that is not mixed by anything at all, be it general or specific.”⁴³

It is noteworthy that in the process of explicating Suhrawardī’s view above Ibn Kammūna suggests that the Necessary Existent, unlike contingent existents, can be described as both perfect being and as that which is lacking something. He explained the latter by showing that the Necessary Existent “is that which, due to its perfection, is lacking that which sustains its essence.”⁴⁴ In this sense it seems that there is a way in which one may speak of the Necessary Existent in negative terms, that is, as “lacking.”

What’s more, Ibn Kammūna takes Suhrawardī’s claim that the “whole of the Necessary Existent is existence”⁴⁵ to mean that unlike contingent existents, the Necessary Existent is the only being that the human intellect cannot separate into an essence and existence. Having a perfect existence (*wujūd kāmil*) for the Necessary Existent means that His existence is not mixed (*mukhālat*) with anything else and does not “include any distinguishing thing that causes multiplicity for it.”⁴⁶ The human intellect can only conceive the essence of any contingent existent in conjunction with its particulars in such a way that these particulars belong to a category, so that its existence is mixed with others.⁴⁷

So far, I have outlined how Suhrawardī and Ibn Kammūna defended and re-established Avicenna’s Principle of Sameness. It remains to explain why this

42 Ibid., pp. 172–173.

43 Ibid., p. 173.

44 Ibid., p. 174.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid., p. 175.

Principle is essential to their version of the argument for the impossibility of having two necessary existents.

As we explained earlier in this section, Ibn Kammūna maintains that failing to establish Avicenna's Principle of Sameness would result in the possibility of having two necessary existents. For him, one can conceive that each necessary existent would have a complete essence that is distinct from the other's, while at the same time they share the necessity of existence, which is not contained in their essences. The human intellect thinks of each necessary existent in the same way it thinks of the existence of Socrates or Plato. Each individual has its independent essence, and yet they share the accident of existence. The key difference here is that the two necessary existents do not belong to a category, and do not have an external cause. However, this difference, for Ibn Kammūna, does not prevent the human intellect from conceiving the two necessary existents.

To counter this possibility, Ibn Kammūna, following Suhrawardī, insisted on upholding Avicenna's Principle of Sameness, especially after it was restored on more rational grounds, thereby addressing Ghazālī's objection. The impossibility of having two necessary existents can only be established when we assume that the existence and the essence of the Necessary Existent is one and the same. For Ibn Kammūna, in assuming there are two necessary existents, we are obliged to choose one of three hypotheses:⁴⁸

- First hypothesis: they are sharing in all respects
- Second hypothesis: they are differing in all respects
- Third hypothesis: they sharing in one respect and differing in another

The first two hypotheses are invalid, for on the one hand the two necessary existents need to be distinct in order to be numerically two; on other hand, they cannot be totally distinct, for they share the necessity of existence.⁴⁹ The third hypothesis is unacceptable precisely because of Avicenna's Principle of Sameness: namely, that which distinguishes between the two necessary existents would have to be an accident to their existences, but given that the existence of each, based on Avicenna's Principle of Sameness, *is* the essence of each, the existence of the two necessary existents would no longer be necessary but rather contingent on the existence of that which distinguishes between them. Similarly, to assume there is a sharing between the two necessary existents is to assume that what is shared between them is accidental with

48 Ibid., p. 177.

49 Ibid., p. 178.

respect to the existence of each necessary existent; thus their existences are contingent on having this shared thing. Given that the existence of each one is the same as its essence, the two necessary existents would therefore be contingent, and that is a contradiction.

Conclusion

Suhrawardī and Ibn Kammūna show that it is only by re-establishing Avicenna's Principle of Sameness that one can prove the impossibility of two necessary existents. The concept of the Necessary Existent is not immune to the problem of multiplicity, unless it is established on the principle that its existence is the same as its essence. They show us that rejecting this relation of sameness opens the possibility of considering the essence of the Necessary Existent to be a universal that allows for further contingent particulars, while simultaneously casting the Necessary Existent as contingent. By restoring Avicenna's Principle of Sameness, Suhrawardī and Ibn Kammūna not only enrich the case for the unicity of the Necessary Existent, but also offer a unique argument for His existence.

Sa'd Ibn Maṣṣūr Ibn Kammūna

*Sharḥ al-talwīḥāt al-lawḥiyya wa'l-'arshiyya*⁵⁰

*Commentary on Suhrawardī's Intimations of the Tablet and the Throne*⁵¹

Al-Ilāhiyāt (Metaphysics)

[The Necessary Existent in itself is pure being, and the human mind does not separate it into an "essence" and an "existence"] (pp. 170–173).

Suhrawardī:

I profess the throne way:

This is that the human mind's separation of the existence of the Necessary Existent from His essence [entails] that nothing of His essence becomes existent if its existence is precluded in itself. But if something of His essence becomes existent, then its universal has other intelligible particulars which are not precluded on account of their essence or anything else; rather they are

50 Ibn Kammūna, *Sharḥ al-talwīḥāt al-lawḥiyya wa'l-'arshiyya*, part three, *al-Ilāhiyāt*, edited by najafqoli Habibi, Mīrās-i Maktūb, Tehran 2009.

51 I am grateful to John Walbridge for suggesting the translation of "*al-lawḥiyya wa'l-'arshiyya*" as the "Tablet and the Throne."

infinitely contingent. You already know that [171] for every particular of a universal that comes to be, further contingents remain. If this occurrence is the Necessary Existent, and He has some essence which is not His existence, then His essence would be taken to be a universal, allowing for the possibility of Him having another particular existence in His essence. For were existence to preclude essence, what is supposed to be necessary would be impossible with respect to His essence—and that is absurd. The point here is that it is precluded on account of something other than [His] essence such that it is possible in itself.

Question: Is it necessary, then?

Response: The particulars of the universal essence beyond what [actually] occurs are contingent [particulars], as we have said; they are not necessary. If something of their essence is contingent, the Necessary too would become contingent, with respect to His essence—and that is absurd. Therefore if He is necessary in His existence without having an essence besides [His] existence by means of which the human mind can separate them into two aspects, then He is pure, unmixed existence with which absolutely nothing, specific or general, can be mixed. That which is other than Him is a flash (*lum'ā*) from Him, or a flash of a flash; it is only distinguished by His perfection. All of Him is existence, and He is all of existence.

Question: But if the existence [of the Necessary Existent] is universal then it must have contingent particulars in accordance with what was said before.

Response: When you reflect on the Pure Existence—more perfect than which there is nothing—all that you can suppose it that He is He (*huwa huwa*). For nothing can be distinguished within a pure thing, and that which is mixed is not the aforementioned Necessary [Existent]. For that which the human mind can separate into an essence and an existence is susceptible to the accidental, and is not immune to partnership; thus it necessarily falls under one of the two categories.

These are inspirations of the throne: the Necessary Existent does not admit of any multiplicity whatsoever, and there are not two Necessary Existents.

Ibn Kammūna's Commentary

I say:

When he refuted that view [i.e., that the essence of the Necessary Existent precedes the existence of the existence of the Necessary Existent], Suhrawardī presented a way he had invented to establish that the human mind cannot separate the Necessary Existent in itself into an essence and an existence, unlike

the case of contingent essences. For when contingent essences are realized in the intellect, the intellect can separate them into an essence and an existence generally. In the intellect, the essence of the Necessary Existent is nothing but [172] [His] individual existence. He (Suhrawardī) demonstrated that He (Necessary Existent) does not admit multiplicity in any sense, and that there is no “second” to Him in existence.

The summary of the argument: if the Necessary Existent in itself could be separated in the human mind into an essence and an existence, then the Necessary Existent would have a universal essence. Nothing prevents any universal essence in itself from having an infinite set of particulars. The existence of one of these particulars requires its own essence due to the impossibility of having a *preponderance* without preponderant (*al-tarjih min ghayr murajjah*). If the existence of one of these [non-occurring] particulars does not require its own essence, then the Necessary Existent is not necessary in itself in virtue of His own essence; but that is absurd.

A broader account of his argument, based on what he stated in this book, is as follows: The human mind’s separation of His existence from His essence [entails] that if His essence is precluded from existing in itself, then no single [particular] of that essence could become existent, for whenever the universal in itself is prevented from existing, the particular which falls under it must also be prevented from existing, as you know from the last part of the *Logic* [of this book]. It is established that some of its particulars become existent, so there are other particulars belonging to that universal which do not exist, which are intelligible without precluding their essence; otherwise there would not exist instances equivalent to them in essence, since the essence of all the particulars is one and the same, such that when one instance of them is precluded by its essence, the rest are precluded, thus they do not exist. We are talking about establishing the existence of some of them, but allowing for the preclusion of those of the particulars of the universal which do not exist; this is not due to the same essence shared among them, but rather on account of another cause. As for their essence, it cannot be precluded; rather it is infinitely contingent, in the sense that every single non-occurring particular which is infinite in itself is truly contingent on account of its essence.

And the meaning of “the particulars of every universal are infinite,” as you learned, is that for all the particulars of that universal which come to be, however many or few, there still remain contingent particulars that have not yet occurred. And if the particular that occurs is the Necessary Existent, and this Necessary Existent has an essence that is not His existence, and it is taken to be a universal, then it is possible that another particular can exist for this essence.

For if it were not possible, then it would be either precluded or necessitated. There is no way that it is impossible, since if the existence of a thing were itself precluded from the essence of that thing, then what was supposed would be necessary (it would be a particular whose occurrence is shared with it in its essence), necessitating that it also be precluded with respect to its essence. Then the Necessary [Existent] in itself would be precluded in itself, and that is absurd. The other particular which does not occur precludes the impossibility of its essence; rather, the objective [173] of this section is to show that it is precluded because of something other than its own essence, such that it is precluded by something else while contingent on account of its own essence, since there is no way for it to be necessary on account of its essence. In the book, this is what al-Suhrawardī did in response to the question [of whether they are necessary, asserting] that particulars of the universal essence which do not occur are possible in themselves, since if they were precluded in themselves, nothing which shared in their essence would occur at all; and if they were necessary in themselves, then all of them would occur, which is not the case.

For any universal, some of its [particulars] occur and some do not, but each one of its particulars is contingent, as we have explained before. For if some of the non-occurring particulars of the universal are contingent in virtue of the essence of this universal, then the occurring particulars too must be contingent in virtue of this essence. Thus if something of the universal essence were contingent, then the Necessary Existent in itself would be a contingent existent in virtue of its [universal] essence, and you already know this is impossible.

Thus, if there is a Necessary [Existent], then He does not have an essence that is not His existence such that the human mind could separate them into two aspects (essence and existence). For He (the Necessary Existent) is pure existence that is not mixed by anything at all, be it general or specific. And the rest of existents have their existence from Him either without an intermediary, such as the first caused, or by an intermediary or intermediaries, such as the rest of the caused things. [...]

Suhrawardī: The “Throne Way” [in Proving The Unity of God] (177–178):

If there were two necessary [existents] in Being, then (a) there would not be commonality between them in all aspects, for there must be something which distinguishes (*mumayyiz*) between them; (b) nor would there be difference between them in all aspects, for they must share necessity of existence. Thus, there must be both commonality and distinction between them, and this

entails the possibility of that which is divided (*al-muqassam*) and that which divides (*al-muqassim*), while we have assumed two necessary existents: but this is impossible. [Furthermore,] the Necessary Existent has no partition in some other way such that it comes to be caused according to its partition and thereby made possible.

Ibn Kammūna:

I say:

He only presented this proof of unicity [of the Necessary Existent] after the prior one because it does not work (*lā yatamashshā*) unless it is already established that the existence of the Necessary Existent is not [mental] supposition (*i'tibārī*) nor superadded (*zā'id*) [to the essence].⁵² For if it were [mental] supposition or superadded, then one may say that they (two necessary existents) are sharing the necessity of the existence, and that this existence is a [mental] supposition and not the same (*'aynī*) of [his essence]; hence the existence would not be the same of the essence of [the Necessary Existent] nor a part of it, but rather would be an accident to it. In that case, the difference between them [the two necessary existents] the wholeness of the essence [of each necessary existence], and the necessity of existence would be inseparable from each of them, since commonality of differences in the inseparable [thing] is not impossible. Thus each of them is a Necessary Existent in-itself. It is not necessary that the distinguished thing is possible, since the distinguished thing [within the Necessary Existent] is nothing but the wholeness of the essence of the necessary. Rather it is necessary for the distinguished thing to be possible if the existence of the Necessary [Existent] is the essence of the Necessary [Existent], and in which case the distinguished thing is an accidental thing and thus it must be possible. Furthermore that which shares between the two necessary existents would be possible too, since the two necessary existents lack that which distinguished them.

Regarding his saying that this “entails the possibility of that which is divided and that which divides,” by “that which divides” (with a *kasra* over the *sīn*), he means that by which there is distinction; by “that which is divided” (with a *fatha*), he means that by which there is commonality, namely the necessity of existence which is the same as the necessary essence, and not superadded to it—otherwise, as you know, the demonstration would not work.

52 By using the terms *i'tibārī* and *zā'id*, Ibn Kammūna is referring to the early discussion (in page 170) when Suhrawardī used these terms to refer to *i'tibārī dhihnī* (mental supposition) and *zā'id 'alā 'l-māhiya* (superadded to the essence).

Suhrawardī's intention here is that if there were two necessary existents in existence, then each one of them would be an abstracted (*mujarrad*) existent, as we have shown. Then at the same time they would either be (1) sharing in all respects, (2) differing in all respects, or (3) sharing in one respect and differing in another. Since each of these three ways of supposing the existence of two necessary existents is invalid, the existence of two necessary existents is invalid.

The first [option is invalid] because there must be something which distinguishes one of them from the other, due to the impossibility of there being a duality without a distinction.

The second [option is invalid] because they would [at least] have abstracted necessary existence in common.

The third [option is invalid] because that by which there is a distinction, namely, "that which divides" (*muqassim*), is accidental to the abstracted existence insofar as it relates to the wholeness of the essence of the Necessary Existent, while also being that by which there is commonality between them insofar as they are necessary existents. Yet the accidental, due to its subject's essential lack of what it is accidental to, is not necessary; rather it is possible.

Likewise, that by which there is commonality, namely, "that which is divided" (*muqassam*), must also be possible, due to its lacking in each of them; if it were in only one of them as a distinguishing feature, then the necessary would be possible, and this is absurd.

Had he restricted [his argument] to the possibility of "that which is divided" (*muqassam bil-faḥḥ[a]*), that by which there is commonality, it would have been sufficient for the proof. For that is the wholeness of the quiddity of the necessary existent, as you know. But with this argument he intended to demonstrate that "that which divides" (*muqassim*), by virtue of which there is distinction, also entails its possibility.

The other way by which he demonstrates that the necessary existent, due to its essence, has no partition, may be stated as follows: (1) everything that has partition is caused; (2) everything which is caused is possible; therefore (3) everything that has partition is possible.

The minor premise (1) [stands] because everything which has partition is in need of its part which is other than itself, since if it were not from the part, the whole would not exist. Everything in need of something else is possible, so everything possessing a part is caused.

The major premise (2) was explained before.

Thus, if it is established that everything which has partition is possible, and nothing which is possible is necessary, then nothing which has partition is necessary, which is what we sought to establish. So the necessary existent cannot be composite.

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Ithbāt al-Mabda' by Sa'd ibn Manṣūr ibn Kammūna: A Philosophically Oriented Monotheistic Ethic

Y. Tzvi Langermann

Preface

Ithbāt al-mabda', “Establishing [the truth concerning and the existence of] the Origin” is the shorter of two very similar treatises by Sa'd ibn Manṣūr Ibn Kammūna (d. 1284); the longer of the two is *Kalimāt wajīza*.¹ Both essays can be characterized as statements of a philosophically oriented monotheistic ethic. By “philosophically oriented” I mean that both elaborate a system whose basic conceptions of the highest being, the structure and workings of the cosmos, the human soul and human purpose, are grounded in the medieval philosophical tradition; more specifically, though not entirely, in the philosophy that developed in the Islamic east in the wake of the formative oeuvre of Ibn Sīnā. To be sure, even that specific tradition was diverse and differentiated, and there is cause for the scholar to locate as best as he or she can each idea in its proper context; however, there is also good reason to take a step backwards, and to recognize philosophy as such as an alternative or competitor in the market place of ideas, defined against literalist readings of sacred scripture, popular quasi-magical beliefs, and other options. Though Ibn Kammūna's allegiances on a host of philosophical issues are not hidden at all, I do not think that he intended to rebuff all alternatives. By “monotheistic” I have in mind his filtering out any and all markers of one particular faith, markers which would signal to readers belonging to other communities that this treatise was not addressed

1 On Ibn Kammūna's life and works see Reza Pourjavady and Sabine Schmidtke, *A Jewish Philosopher of Baghdad: 'Izz al-Dawla Ibn Kammūna (d. 683/1284) and his Writings* (Leiden: Brill, 2006); both texts were edited for the first time in that seminal work on pp. 95–99. I have written two papers on the *Kalimāt*: “The Soul in *Kalimāt Wajīza*, Ibn Kammūna's Statement of Abrahamic Philosophical Piety,” *Nazariyat. Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences* 3 (2016), 23–42; and “*‘Ilm, ‘amal*, and the stability of the self in a short treatise by Ibn Kammūna (d. 1284),” to appear in Günther Mensching and Alia Mensching-Estakhr, ed., *Die Seele im Mittelalter. Von der Substanz zum funktionalen System* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, end of 2016). My annotated translation and study of the *Kalimāt* is now under consideration by Yale University Press.

to them. The reader is referred to as “the one desiring perfection” and phrases of that sort. Finally, by “ethic” I refer to his emphasis on how one should live one’s life.²

In this paper, which I offer as a memorial to the late Hossein Ziai, I present a translation of the *Ithbāt*. I have tried as best I can to provide a clear, accurate, and understandable English rendition. The translation is literal, but literalism will cede to clarity whenever the two may conflict; if necessary, a strictly literal translation will be given in a note. For ease of reference the text has been divided into numbered passages, indicated by numbers within square brackets. The translation is introduced by an essay which discusses the structure of the essay, its purpose and structure, and provides a brief overview of the contents. Notes to the translation have been kept to a bare minimum.

Purpose and Structure of the *Ithbāt*

The *Ithbāt* begins with theoretical issues concerning the “source” (or the “origin”, Arabic *mabdaʿ*; Ibn Kammūna’s philosophical appellative for the deity) and the human soul, followed by an ethic, that is to say, a regimen for one’s personal comportment and social relations. The emphasis is on a minimal involvement in affairs of this world and a praxis (including prayer) that brings one closer to the deity. These are the same ideas, and the same order of presentation, that one finds in *Kalimāt wajīza*, but formulated more concisely. Both treatises apply the very widespread organizational principle of *ʿilm* and *ʿamal*, theory and praxis, which was very popular among Sufis but by no means restricted to them. However, unlike the *Kalimāt*, the *Ithbāt* does not deal with “economics” and “politics”, that is, the management of one’s household and one’s subjects. Clearly, the last of these topics was included in the *Kalimāt* because it was written for high official about to assume a new governorship. Moreover, the *Ithbāt* is presented as one uninterrupted essay, unlike the *Kalimāt*, which is divided and subdivided into sections. Pourjavady and Schmidtke have shown that the *Kalimāt* must have been completed by 1279; we have no information when the *Ithbāt* was written. Hence we do not know whether the *Ithbāt* is a shortened version of the *Kalimāt*, as Pourjavady and Schmidtke suggest, or whether the *Kalimāt* is an expansion of the *Ithbāt*.

² Ibn Kammūna’s contribution to ethics has not yet been studied; I devote several paragraphs to it in the entry I prepared for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, online at <<<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ibn-kammuna/>>>.

There is a certain ambiguity in the title of Ibn Kammūna's treatise. Pourjavady and Schmidtke vocalize *mabda'*, which means "origin" or "source". I accept their reading; however, one cannot exclude the possibility that the word is to be vocalized *mubdi'*, "originator". That vocalization would assign a more active role to the supreme principle and object of worship. Ibn Kammūna's clear statement (see below) that the teachings of this monograph are equally valid whether or not one holds that the world was created certainly argues in favor of *mabda'*, rather than *mubdi'*. In any case, both terms are philosophical connotations for the deity. Like so many other features of his language in the two treatises, *mabda'* is a term equally acceptable to members of all monotheistic faith communities, provided that they have similar philosophical understandings of reality and its organization, and the purpose of human existence.

Only one copy of the *Ithbāt* is known to exist, and this in the form of a microfilm. The edition of Pourjavady and Schmidtke is a very reliable piece of work; however, in a number of places I have been able to make sense of the text as reported by Pourjavady and Schmidtke in a footnote, thus dispensing with their emendation. These have been indicated in the translation with an asterisk followed by the number of the footnote in the edition. For example, "His Goodness*14" indicates that my translation follows the manuscript, as reported in note 14, rather than the edition. Pourjavady and Schmidtke frequently note parallel passages between the *Ithbāt* and the *Kalimāt*; the overlap between the two looks to be even greater than their notes reveal. However, these correspondences are as a rule not taken into account in the present study.

Another organizational feature of the *Ithbāt*—and one that is not generally found in the *Kalimāt*—is the use of pairs of concepts. Already in the full title Ibn Kammūna announces that he will establish "the Origin, its attributes, and the praxis that brings one close to It." The divine attributes are a matter for speculative theology or philosophy; praxis involves prayer, abstinence, and more generally one's lifestyle. Indeed, in the opening sentence we learn that there are two paths leading to perfection of the soul—the unstated goal towards which this treatise guides the reader—the one knowledge, the other praxis.

Overview and Highlights of the *Ithbāt*

Contemplation of the order and workmanship manifest in our world leads one to recognize that it certainly has a governor or administrator (*mudabbir*). This being has gone by many different names, and taken on many personalities, over the ages. It may be thought of as the Platonic logos, the "charioteer" of

Peri cosmou, or the Agent Intellect of many medieval philosophers, to name a few. Ibn Kammūna now asks whether or not this “governor” has been created. Either the world “does not stand in need of a creator”, that is to say, it is eternal and ungenerated, with the logos or governor an inseparable part of the universe and coeternal with it; or else it does require a creator, an entity that brought into being the (presumably lower) entity that manages creation [10–11]. Whichever option one prefers, there stands at the head a supreme being, a deity. Ibn Kammūna was certainly well aware that the question of whether or not the world is created was one of the weightiest and recondite issues of his epoch. But this short epistle is meant to be accessible to anyone who recognized that the orderliness of the world leads inexorably to recognition of a supreme being who is responsible for its organization and administration; whether this being created the universe, or stands at the head of a universe coeternal with it, is a complex question that, in view of the goals of the treatise, can be left aside.

The description of the deity, its omniscience, inscrutability, simplicity, immateriality and so on, is not particularly remarkable. However, two polemical points in this otherwise fairly uncontroversial theology do stand out. One is the relatively long rejection of the notion of a divine “inherence” (*ḥulūl*) in some other object [22]; this appears to be a barb aimed at Christian doctrine.³ The other is an even longer [25–29, and again 33–37] refutation of dualism. Why the latter should be of such concern to Ibn Kammūna is not clear to me; perhaps it can serve as evidence that dualism was still an active competitor in the religious marketplace of his time.⁴

3 The term was also used in some Sufi thought, particularly that of the martyr al-Ḥallāj, to refer to a sort of union with the divine, and also by some Shiites; but one reason for the abhorrence with which Muslims viewed the Sufi usage was the Christian context of *ḥulūl*. See Louis Massignon and Georges C. Anawati, “Ḥulūl,” *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition*. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Brill Online, 2014. Reference. Bar Ilan University. 20 July 2014 <http://referenceworks.brillonline.com.proxy1.athensams.net/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/hulul-SIM_2944>, and the literature cited there.

4 One possibility is the role of dualism in anti-Ismaili polemics. Ghazālī misrepresents (perhaps intentionally) al-Sābiq (“the one preceding” or Intellect) and al-Tālī (“the one following” or Soul), two important elements in Ismaili cosmology, as two “eternal divinities” (*ilāhān qadimatān*) (*Faḍā’ih al-bāṭiniyya*, ed. Abd al-Raḥmān Badawī, Cairo, 1964, 28, 38–39; trans. Richard J. McCarthy, *The Infamies (Enormities) of the Batinites and the Virtues (Merits) of the Mustazahirites*, New York: Twayne Publishers, 1980. The Mongols crushed the Ismaili entity in Iran, and Nasir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, himself once attracted to Ismaili esotericism and an associate of Ibn Kammūna, played an important role in negotiating the surrender of the fortress at

The human soul, an immortal and self-sufficient entity even if it must devote some attention to managing a body of flesh and blood, is one of Ibn Kammūna's favorite topics, and one which he wrote about at length on different occasions.⁵ In the *Ithbāt* the soul is given relatively little space. The theoretical discussion, called here "the highest [branch of] knowledge", ends at passage [48]. The section on praxis is announced in the following passage as "the knowledge that brings one closer to the Holy Presence" and, later on in the same passage, "the knowledge of revelations and awesome secrets". Thus the practical side of things is also a form of knowledge, just as it is in Ibn Sīnā's definition of the practice of medicine.⁶ One must first know how to pray, and which ethical traits to acquire and which to avoid; only then can one put this knowledge into practice.

The first practical piece of advice is to observe the fixed, obligatory services; here as always, Ibn Kammūna is careful not to be specific. All the faiths that he knew of had fixed prayers and, indeed, the doxographical literature transmitted prayers said to have been said at fixed times by Aristotle, among others.⁷

Alamut. The state of religious affairs under the Mongols is a complex and controversial topic; see Peter Jackson, "The Mongols and the Faith of the Conquered," in Reuven Amitai and Michal Biran, eds., *Mongols, Turks, and Others: Eurasian Nomads and the Sedentary World*, (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 245–290.

- 5 Pourjavady and Schimidtko, 100–105, describe three monographs; in addition, Ibn Kammūna's comprehensive works all contain discussions of the soul.
- 6 The point is made by Ibn Sīnā in the very first chapter of his medical masterpiece. It seems clear to me that Ibn Sīnā wishes to correct the dichotomy between theory and practice established in repercussive treatises such as Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq's *Madkhal fi 'l-ṭibb*, replacing it with the assertion that medicine in its entirety is a science, *'ilm*. This Avicennan project deserves a deep study of its own. For now, see Leigh Chipman, "Is Medicine an *'ilm*?" A Preliminary Note on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī's *al-Tuḥfa al-sa'diyya* (MS Şehid Ali Peşa 2047), in Y. Tzvi Langermann, ed., *Avicenna and His Legacy: A Golden Age of Science and Philosophy* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009), 289–300. I believe that Dimitri Gutas puts the cart before the horse when he remarks, "It thus appears that medicine and pharmacology, as in any case his example with scammony indicates, first directed his attention to the significance of testing and proving, which he then fully articulated in his epistemological discussions in the logic sections of his philosophical works." (Dimitri Gutas, "The Empiricism of Avicenna," *Oriens* 40.2 (2012), 391–436, 400). I offer a preliminary response to Gutas in "Tajriba/Nissayon: Texts in Arabic, Judaeo-Arabic, and Hebrew," *Aleph* 14.2 (2014), 147–176.
- 7 The very concise prayer said to have been recited by the Stagirite every morning is recorded in Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq's *Adāb al-falāsifa*; the Hebrew version was found in the pockets of Jewish seminary students, causing no little consternation for their rabbis. See my "Prayers of the Philosophers in a Parma Codex," to appear in Talya Fishman et al. eds., *Formation and Reformation in Jewish Subcultures* (Oxford University Press).

Sufi writers like al-Qushayrī were careful to insist upon strict observance of traditional praxis as a *sine qua non* for spiritual progress; and Maimonides and Judah ha-Levi, the two Jewish thinkers upon whose writings Ibn Kammūna drew for his *Examination of the Three Faiths*, urged the recitation of fixed, traditional prayer, rather than innovative supplications.⁸ Ibn Kammūna does however go on to say that one should offer as many supererogatory prayers as possible. I believe that “knowledge about the worship of his Lord” in [51] refers to Maimonides’ insistence that one must know as best one can just to Whom prayers are addressed; prayers should be addressed to an entity conceived in the mind on the basis of truthful philosophical statements, rather than to a figment of the imagination.

Ibn Kammūna urges the reader to rid himself of vices: listening to calumny, argumentativeness, sexual overindulgence, anger, and pride are all named. The vices just listed are progressively more injurious; they are also seen to follow one upon the other. At the head of the chain stands love of this world, which leads to thirst for fame, pride, envy, and on down the line. Only after describing these evil character traits does Ibn Kammūna offer a definition for *khulq*, character trait [82]: it is “a [certain] configuration of the soul, from which action readily issues, without deliberation or imposition (*takalluf*); imposition may in fact be a path towards the acquisition of the character trait, by means of habituation.” Imposition means mostly self-imposition, adopting a personal discipline by means of which the virtues are embedded within the personality and then drive our actions almost on their own.

For all “wayfarers” the path begins with repentance, which leads to abstinence and turning away from this world [84]. Ibn Kammūna emphasizes that someone who is obsessed with merely hating this world is not on the right track at all: this world is on his mind all of the time! True abstinence consists in taking one’s mind off of this world, to the extent possible.

As noted, the ethics of the *Ithbāt* is developed in large measure by contrasting pairs of concepts. One such pair comes up in the discussion of worship, which is composed of the intent and the act (such as reciting) [93–95]. Both are necessary, but intent is clearly superior, since it is “the course of the spirit”, whereas the act is “the course of the body”. *Ikhlāṣ* and *ṣidq* form another pair of

8 See in the introduction to the famous epistle of Abū al-Qāsim al-Qushayrī in *Al-Qushayrī’s Epistle on Sufism*, translated by Alexander Knysh (Reading, UK: Garnet Publishing, 2007), 3–4. The input of Maimonides and ha-Levi was established by Moshe Perlmann, *Ibn Kammūna’s Examination of the three Faiths* (Berkeley-Los Angeles-London: University of California, 1971), 5. On the two Jewish thinker’s recommendation of fixed prayers, see *Kuzari* III, 1, and *Guide of the Perplexed* III, 51; further discussion in Langermann, “Prayers of the Philosophers”.

concepts, introduced in [95]. In this case Ibn Kammūna does not explain just what each one does, and how they complement each other. I translated the two terms as “sincere devotion” and “truthfulness”, but translations of loaded concepts such as these are only approximations. We can get a better grasp of what they mean here from the discussion that follows. *Ikhlaṣ* means something like “giving oneself over totally”, that is to God. Ibn Kammūna writes that the *mukhlis* “will not see anything in Reality other than Him.” *Ṣidq*, “truthfulness”, means acknowledging natural causality without compromising one’s belief in divine goodness and wisdom. One is true to the findings of natural science but also true to one’s commitment to one’s concept of the deity. As a result, one relies upon God without denying the wonderfully operating cosmos whose contemplation has led one to recognize the divine being in the first place.

The god of the philosophers is not considered to be a personal god. The notion that the deity would respond to a prayer or some other act of service, that the divine being would alter the course of events and intervene in the harmonious natural order which He either instituted, or, alternatively, stands at the top of its causal chain, did not jibe well with philosopher’s notion of the divinity. If this is the case, then, Ibn Kammūna offers some unphilosophical advice. The deity, the object of the wayfarer’s love, is pleased by acts. Moreover, supplication is encouraged, even if one thinks that one is deserving of some divine favor. Should the request remain unanswered, this does not necessarily mean that it has been rejected. Everything has its appointed time, and sometimes the delay in response turns out to be for the good [105–107].

One must never forget one’s mortality, the ever present threat of extinction which, sooner or later, will be realized. So be prepared! Indeed, life is preparation for death.⁹ [109–111] The *Ithbāt* ends with four short pieces of advice. It seems to me that each has been drawn from a different tradition—deliberately so—even though the particular idea is not limited to that tradition. (1) A daily account of one’s actions (Pythagoreans). (2) Not to harm even an ant (Buddhism?). (3) Justice is the pillar that supports both heaven and earth (Judaism). (4) Perfection consists in resembling God (variety of traditions, emphasized by Sufis).¹⁰

9 This idea can be traced to *Phaedo* 81A, where philosophy is defined as “training for death” (*meletē thanatou*).

10 The Pythagorean practice of a daily account is given in lines 40–44 of the Golden Verses; see Johann C. Thom, *The Pythagorean Golden Verses: Translation and Commentary* (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 153; Ali Ibn Ridwan was one Muslim who put this into practice, see Y. Tzvi Langermann, “One Ethic for Three Faiths,” in *Monotheism and Ethics: Historical and Contemporary Intersections between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam*, edited by Y. Tzvi

Translation

[1] A Noble Epistle Establishing the Origin, his Attributes, and the Praxis that brings one close to Him;¹¹

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate; in Him I trust;¹²

[2] Said the servant, he who stands in need of his Master's mercy, Sa'd ibn Maṣṣūr ibn Sa'd ibn al-Ḥasan [ibn] Hibat Allāh ibn Kammūna, may God forgive him in this world and the next;

[3] The perfection of the person's soul will come either from the direction of her speculative powers, by way of knowledge, or from the direction of her practical powers, by way of praxis. All perfections in knowledge and praxis, in all of their variations and many ramifications, trace back to the perfection of these two powers. [4] However, human capacity falls short of encompassing all of these, or even of total mastery of one of them, let alone [them] all! The one desiring perfection must rather attain as radiantly as he can the most important [part] of it and that which he can concentrate his attention upon the most.

[5] There is no doubt that the root of all [fields] of knowledge (*'ulūm*) is the knowledge (*ma'rifa*) of the First Truth, his Unity, and the attribute of majesty and honor that belong to Him.¹³ [6] The most noble of the [forms of] praxis is that which brings [one] close to Him and near to His presence. This too is a vast sea. [7] How many a vessel of thoughts has been wrecked in the clash of its waves! Its refuge is holy, but few have been rightly guided to its paths and ways.

Langermann, Brill, Leiden, 2011 (Studies on the Children of Abraham, vol. 2), pp. 197–218, at p. 215. The prohibition of killing an ant is mentioned by Peter Harvey, *An introduction to Buddhist ethics: foundations, values and issues*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 267; but I am far from sure that the stricture derives solely from Buddhist sources. The Hebrew Mishnah (Abhot 1:18) states that “the world stands upon justice, truth and peace”. The Muslim version of *imitatio dei* is *al-takhalluq bi-akhlāq Allāh*, literally “acquiring for oneself the moral virtues possesses by God.” See William C. Chittick, *Faith and Practice of Islam: Three Thirteenth-Century Sufi Texts* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), 10.

11 I follow the gendered discourse of Ibn Kammūna (and all other writers of his epoch), referring to the Origin (Supreme Being, God, Allāh) in the masculine or the neuter (it), and to the soul in the feminine. At the very least, this usage makes the reference of pronouns unambiguous.

12 The *basmala* may have been inserted by a copyist, but there is no reason to suppose this. Jews and Christians use Allāh in their writings; the *basmala* alone does not give the work an exclusively Islamic character.

13 The two Arabic words that I translate as “knowledge”, *ilm* and *ma'rifa*, are not exactly coterminous in their meanings. The former usually denotes discursive, scientific knowledge, whereas the latter usually refers to intuitive or illuminative knowledge.

[8] But [even] someone who does not command a deep penetration into the ocean of these truths, nor is he advanced in these paths and straits, will not do less than to rely upon a consideration of this world and that which is in it, with an eye towards reflecting upon the precision of its workmanship and the beauty of its order; the subtle harmony, wondrous ordering, and profound precision that it exhibits; the tremendous wisdom that is found in the human body as well as [that of] other animals, in its limbs and their functions, the binding of the soul to it and the effects that her faculties [exercise] upon it. [9] When he considers these things, he will perforce attain complete belief [literally: believe with a complete belief] that this world has a governor that exists, who is wise and capable, and chooses the most suitable and excellent.

[10] If this governor does not stand in need of a creator, then it is the deity, great is its majesty! [11] But if it does require a creator, then it [our search for the creator] must end up in the creator whose knowledge is [all-]encompassing, whose power is complete, and whose wisdom is profound. For the creator of the masterly effect must be more masterful than the effect that issues from him; he possesses the highest perfection. [12] He is the true benefactor; the name "benefactor" is applied to others figuratively. That is because all selfless bestowing of good and benefaction traces back to Him.

[13] He is one who lacks nothing whatsoever, since He is not attached to anything exterior to Him, neither in His essence nor in His attributes; everything besides Him stands in need of Him. He is the true king, since the essence of everything belongs to Him, because it either derives from Him or from something whose essence and perfection derive from Him. There is nothing that does not stand in need of Him in some way [literally; with regard to any [other] thing]. Taken relative to His essence, every [other] thing is null; truth lies within Him.

[14] Nothing concerning His creations escapes His knowledge, because He who acts intentionally and willfully necessarily knows that which He creates. [15] We know nothing of His characteristics unless it be by analogy to what we understand of ourselves. [16] Yet what we do grasp concerning Him is some sort of perfection, but even more [than that, extending] to a limit that we have no way of representing to ourselves, since an increase of this sort simply does not exist for us. It is rather an infinite increase. Hence [only] in this way can the status of His knowledge, His power and the like be known. [17] Mention is made only of those characteristics of His majesty that are of a measure that lies within our capacity for knowing, but not of the measure that truly appertains to His essence. [18] His holy true reality (*ḥaqīqa*) is not identical to the true reality of any of His creations; otherwise, creation would not be*⁸ any better suited for being creation that it would be for being Creator; but He has no

counterpart. [19] Since He is Knowing, He therefore is not compound, because knowledge of the part has essential priority over knowledge of the whole. He who knows his own essence, knows his part [part of himself] first. Whoever knows something, knows that he knows it; and that includes knowledge of his own essence [as a knowing being, one who knows a certain something]. He then would know his own essence before knowing his part, which is [in fact] known before his essence, and that is impossible.¹⁴

[20] Since He is not compound, He is not a body. And since He is not a body, He is not contained in a place (*mutaḥayyiz*), because everything that is contained in place is a body.¹⁵ Thus He is not contained in place, the Creator of all being above that.

14 The best that one can say about the argument here is that it is skeletal; here is a more complete version of the argument, taken from *Kalimāt wajīza* (Pourjavdy and Schmidtke, 145–146): “The Knowledge of the Necessary is productive (*fi’l*). Changes [all dynamics in the universe] stem from it, since it [His knowledge] encompasses them, at the times [of their occurrences], in perpetuity. Therefore He does not change along with the change in the objects of His knowledge. Ignorance [of particular events] and change [in His knowledge as they change] would be necessary consequences [only] if His knowledge were passive (*infi’āl*, i.e., a reaction to events, rather than their cause), following upon the existence of the [particular earthly event or] thing and its disappearance [146]. The Necessary is necessarily eternal, since each event (*ḥādith*; thing that comes to be) requires something to give it existence (*mūjid*); and it [the Necessary] is necessarily sempiternal, since, were it possible for it not to exist, it would require a preponderance factor (*rājih*) which would give preponderance to its aspect of existence over its aspect of non-existence, and thus it would be contingent. [Were non-existence a possibility, something would be required to mandate its existence; and its dependence on that something makes it contingent; see [25] below]. ‘He is the First and the Last, the Apparent and the Hidden’.

“Now that His knowledge of His creations is established, and it proves absolutely His Knowledge of His own Essence [or: Self; dhāt], it thus must be that He is not compound. For knowledge of the compound depends upon knowledge of each one of its parts; thus knowledge of the part is essentially prior to knowledge of the whole. But were the whole [i.e. the All, the Necessary, the deity??] to know its part, which is other than it, it would [also] know that it knows that it is He who knows it, which would mandate its knowing its essence. Then knowledge of the whole would be prior to knowledge of the part. But the matter is not like this; and this is impossible.” At first blush at least, the argument seems to be circular, and the reader obviously deserves a fuller explanation than this; given the restraints on this publication, and on my own understanding, I would comment only that divine knowledge is in effect divine introspection; the deity knows itself in its (infinite) entirety eternally and immediately.

15 I emend here the Arabic, omitting *laysa* on Pourjavady and Schmidtke 187:21. Their text would state that “everything that is contained in place is not a body”, which is patently false.

[21] Since He has no counterpart, nor is He compound, He therefore has no spouse [female counterpart] nor offspring; otherwise something identical to Him in species or genus would be separated off from him. [22] He will not inhere in something other than Him, because inherence (*ḥulūl*) can be conceptualized only through the particularization of that which inheres through the intermediary of the thing inherited in.¹⁶ Since He does not inhere in anything, He has no opposite with which He is joined in that within which He inheres. [188] [23] He also has no opposite, in the sense of something that is equal to Him in power and [thus able to] thwart Him. [24] He is not attached to a body like the soul is, for His power is too vast and extensive for it to be confined within a body, out of which it would issue. [25] Nor is it possible for Him to cease to exist; otherwise, His existence would not derive from His essence, and would thus stand in need of something that brings Him into being. In that case, that something which brings Him into being would be the deity, and not He.

[26] Moreover, He is unitary (*waḥdānī*), having no stipulation (*shart*) to His essence (*dhāt*), nor anything contrary. [27] Everything other than Him is subsequent to Him.¹⁷ [28] One cannot represent to oneself anything that would nullify Him; rather, He is the first and the last.¹⁸ [29] From the interconnections of the components of the cosmos, one to the other, we know¹⁹ that its Maker is one and nothing else. If it had two makers, then the doings of the one would be distinct from the doings of the other; the interconnection and the mutual aid would be disrupted, and the order would disintegrate. A sound mind needs no other proof.

[30] In one contemplation, the need which its [the cosmos'] accidents have for its substances proves this mutual aid; in another contemplation,

16 I find it necessary to offer here a weighty translation in order to display the different forms of *ḥalla*, to inhere, and the key term in the passage. "Inherence" requires one to designate, itemize, or particularize that which inheres by naming the thing or substrate within which it inheres; this involves localization, being bound by place. On the subtlety of *ḥalla* in its various forms, see Peter Adamson, "Avicenna and his Commentators on Human and Divine Self-Intellection," in *The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics*, edited by D.N. Hasse and A. Bertolacci, Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2012, 97–122, esp. 101.

17 Subordinate ontologically, subordinate in the reality of its being.

18 The phrase echoes one of the rare scriptural quotations in the *Kalimāt*, occurring in the first of the four sections, is the Qur'anic verse, "He is the First and the Last, the Apparent and the Hidden" ("Iron", 57:3). The choice was deliberate, in line with the meta-denominational monotheistic character of this essay; the same verse is found in Isaiah 48:12 and Revelation 1:8.

19 Literally: "it is known".

the need which its substances have for its accidents. [31] Likewise, its beings that are confined to place, abstract beings, elemental beings, celestial beings (*falakiyyāt*), animals, plants, and compounds stand in need of its simple beings.²⁰ Its simple beings stand in need, one of the other, in order to generate the compounds. [31] The species of animals and their individuals stand in need one of the other, and so also the organs of each single individual. We have no way of exhausting all of the ways in which things are interconnected [literally: the manners of interconnection].

[32] The cosmos is like a single individual, compounded of a soul which possesses many faculties, and a body composed of similar [e.g. in pairs] and dissimilar organs, which possess faculties that either do or do not differ from each other. Some maintain themselves by means of others; each derives some benefit from the other; some are sensed, some are intellectized.

[33] If one of the Makers rules freely in his governance, then He and no one else is the deity. But if they are together, with each one being capable of influencing and governing the cosmos, then the cosmos would [at one and the same time] stand in need of each one of them and not need each on them. They would both be stymied from influencing together [precisely] to the extent that they influence together. [34] Having one of them specialize in influencing one part, and the other in influencing another part is acceptable in this case, because that which does one thing, and following upon its existence [of the thing he “did”] there comes to be another existence [the second Maker made another thing]; or, [alternatively] the other one benefited from it. Then [in such a scenario] it is not impossible for it to exert influence on two things. But the second does not rule freely over the part for which its free rule had been supposed. [35] When those who possess sound intellects think about it, having one of the two act at one time and the other act at another time is obviously impossible. How can a state of affairs be assumed when, upon contemplation, it leads to an impossibility? [36] Were another cosmos possible, His goodness*¹⁴ would mandate His bringing it into being. [37] Thus the cosmos’ God has neither partner nor counterpart, neither cause nor counselor. Praise and Elevated is He, above the vain musings of those who take [the deity] to be similar [to something else] or those who associate with Him [other beings].

[38] These are some witty remarks that are useful in what concerns knowing God, what must hold true of Him, and what is not true about Him. How happy is the person who establishes their truthfulness for himself, and how rightly

20 This passage is not entirely clear. Some of the items in the list, such as “abstract”, i.e. immaterial, beings, are themselves simple.

guided is the person who takes direction from them! [39] He who establishes for himself the truthfulness of what has been explicated, and has made clear [at least] some of the Creator's watching over (*'ināya*) His creatures and His compassion for them, will know that His watching over humankind (*khalq al-insān*) is not something passing; rather, the more evident it is, the greater the fear of its removal. How [189] good is the caring of the likes of this Wise One with regard to the lowliest gnat among the animals! How much more so in the creation of humans, within whose creation the manifest products of [this] caring are wondrous in the extreme!

[40] There must certainly be a soul that does not cease to exist; it is not the same as this mortal structure [the body]. [41] The body has rather been perfected in order to serve as a tool for her achieving perfection. Her final goal is eternal bliss. [42] You already know that whatever perceives itself is not compound; hence the soul is not compound.²¹ [43] When you contemplate the acquired traits (*malakāt*) that are not divided by severing the connection [between parts], such as the traits of cleverness, knowledge, bravery, cowardice, and carelessness, and the others, [all of] which accept strengthening and weakening, but do not accept division [achieved by severing] connections [between independent sub-units], you will ascertain for yourself that the substrate for these [traits] is the soul, which is neither a body nor a state within it [the body] in the sense of the inherence of a flow (*ḥulūl al-sarayān*) flowing within it. For whosoever's locus is like that, accepts division, and thus its locus must accept [it as well].²²

21 The notion under attack here seems to be that of a soul inhering in several locales within the body, the parts linked together by something that flows throughout the body. This recalls, even if the details are omitted, the Platonic-Galenic tripartite soul; in that system *pneuma* (spirit, *rūḥ*) that flows through the body, linking together the parts of soul one with the other and with the body as well. Ibn Kammūna's critique resonates with earlier discussions of the problematics of the Platonic division of the soul in the ethical sphere, for example, in the thought of Evagrius of Pontus and Gregory of Nyassa, which has been studied by Kevin Corrigan, *Evagrius and Gregory: Mind, Soul and Body in 4th Century*. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009). Though I can point to no textual links between Ibn Kammūna and these two Church fathers of the fourth century, their deliberations are nonetheless very relevant, since they grappled with Platonic psychology as part of their commitment to asceticism. For further discussion please see my paper cited in note 1 to the introduction.

22 For example, were the locus of bravery to accept division, then the soul, the "super-locus" of all the character traits would have to accept division.

[44] The soul cannot be a state [of affairs] that concerns something other than itself.²³ Otherwise her existence would be existence for the sake of something else, and it would not be independent in any of her activities. Instead, the action would be ascribed to her locus (*maḥall*), through her [the soul's] agency, just as activity is ascribed to the locus of capacity and will by her agency, but not to the two of them [independently].²⁴ One says: he acted by means of [his] will. But one does not say: The will acted by means of its locus. This issue is clear to the intellects of the people of truth.

[45] The soul is a simple substance. When you have firmly ascertained for yourself [the existence of] simple substances in the cosmos, you will find that they do [not] accept non-existence; rather what comes first is composition and compilation.²⁵ Perhaps this will suffice for the astute person [to realize] that the soul does not accept non-existence, by means of the endowment that he^{*21} has received for [making] a universal judgment on the basis of the consideration of the situation of particulars, just as in repeated experience (*tajriba*).²⁶

[46] The coupling (*ta'alluq*) of the soul to the body is limited to the couplings [needed] for management, usufruct, and fulfillment, but it is not a coupling

23 Arabic *ḥālatun fī ghayrihā*; the soul cannot be some state of affairs, some array of forces or dispositions, in the service of something other than herself—meaning here, of course, the body.

24 When we say that the will does something, we mean that the will is the soul's instrument; the soul carries out her action by means of the will. The same applies to other traits.

25 I have emended the text on 189:12, adding *ghayr* so as to make the statement negative, as it ought to be. Ibn Kammūna means to say that what people may take to be nullification of an entity is just the nullification or dissolution of its composition; the composite no longer exists, but its simple components have never ceased to exist. For further discussion on the not-so-simple concept of the soul's simplicity, I refer again to my "Ibn Kammūna on the Soul", cited above, note 1.

26 *Tajriba* is a somewhat problematic source of knowledge in medieval epistemology. It refers to inferring general conclusions concerning causes and effects from repeated observation of phenomena (more precisely, what are claimed to be accurate observations). The conclusions are held to be true even though no formal cause can be demonstrated. *Tajriba* is the main underpinning of "occult" arts such as astrology and alchemy, but was applied widely in other fields as well, especially medicine. See now Dimitri Gutas, "The Empiricism of Avicenna," *Oriens* 40.2 (2012), 391–436; for additional texts, and a preliminary critique of Gutas, see my "Tajriba/Nissayon: Texts in Arabic, Judaeo-Arabic, and Hebrew," *Aleph* 14.2 (2014). But what are the particulars here, and what is the judgment? Is it an induction that certain fixed elemental things persist, despite the continuous flux of the everyday world?

[characterized by] inherence (*ḥulūl*).²⁷ [47] Just as is the case with the decay of a single organ, so also the decay of all of the organs does not entail the disappearance of the soul. Death is not incumbent upon all of the organs,²⁸ and the demise of the instrument does not entail the demise of its user. Consider how your body is always disintegrating and exchanging [materials], and how you know [all the same] that you are the same you that you were, say, thirty years ago!

[48] These reminders should convince everyone who possesses understanding. The amount [of argumentation] adduced here has brought about the belief in the (*ḥāl*) status of the Origin and the hereafter, by way of generality, without going deeply into the fine proofs, the subtle decisions, the manifold premises, and the difficult paths. Whoever wishes to do that must attain those matters of inquiry and what goes along with them by clarification and study of what is found in the lengthy books, if insight and success help him along. This is what belongs to the highest [branch of] knowledge.

[190] [49] As for the knowledge that brings one closer to the Holy Presence (*al-ḥaḍra al-quḍsiyya*) and which is required for the eternal bliss: he who is not capable of ascending to the stations (*maqāmāt*) that bring one to the knowledge of revelations and awesome secrets, nor can he master that which is necessary for what lies below it: [a person of this description] must not neglect anything of what I am about to mention in this flash (*lum'a*), as follows.

[50] He should occupy himself with the appointed obligatory [religious] services. They follow the pattern of the capital that is the basis of trade. He should offer as many supererogatory prayers as possible; they are like the profit by means of which one achieves success in the gradations.²⁹ [51] Whatever time is left should, first of all, be devoted to study, which will increase his discernment of his own shortcomings [or: of his soul] and knowledge about the worship of his Lord as well. He will lessen his desire for this world and increase

27 The soul makes use of the body in order to secure its own perfection and fulfillment. Notice once again Ibn Kammūna's obsessive rejection of *ḥulūl*.

28 Ibn Kammūna appears to have in mind the spinal bone called in Hebrew *luz* and in Arabic *'ajb al-dhanab*, generally identified with the coccyx or os sacrum, which is indestructible, and from which the body will be rebuilt at the resurrection. See Leigh N.B. Chipman, "Mythic Aspects of the Process of Adam's Creation in Judaism and Islam," *Studia Islamica* 93 (2001), 5–25, at 23.

29 The additional prayers are profit that is produced by the "capital" of obligatory prayers, as the seeker moves up in the ranks.

his desire for the next world. [52] But if he is incapable of learning, then he should occupy himself with helping people or supporting his dependents.³⁰

[52] Know that the spirit of worship is devotion (*ikhlāṣ*) and the presence of the heart. [53] Sometimes the postures of the [bodily] limbs lift the lights into the heart, just as lights from the items of knowledge of the heart go down to the limbs. [54] It is harder for a person to abandon sins than it is perform the obligations. Should you sin with the limbs that are God Most High's blessing upon you, beware that you are availing yourself of his blessing for your sinning! [55] Do not gaze with your eye upon something forbidden, nor upon any of God's creations with contempt.

[56] Do not listen to calumny or obscenity, or discussion of falsities and mentioning people's bad deeds. Guard your tongue against lies, even if joking. If you want to know how repulsive it is, look at how you despise the person who does [such things]; then be repulsed with yourself for [exactly the same reason] you were repulsed by it in others. Don't disappoint the promise [of God's reward]; be heedful to keep the covenant. Do not mention anything about a person, if it is something he would not like had he heard it, neither explicitly, nor just by the way!

[57] Abandon hypocrisy, argumentativeness, and controversy when speaking. Neither vindicate nor praise yourself; that would be a deficiency in your estimation of [other] people.³¹ [58] Do not curse anything that God Most High has created, be it a person or anything else; do not come between the servants and God. There is no blame in not cursing Iblīs, so how can there be for [not cursing] anything else?³² [59] Do not pray that a bad thing happen to anyone, for your wrongdoing and its affairs are entrusted to God. Set aside mockery, derision, and excessive jest. [60] Guard against giving your belly anything forbidden or doubtful [as to whether it is permitted]. Take care to look for permitted [food].³³ Restrain yourself before satiety, because satiety weighs down the limbs, and aids Satan's soldiers.

30 Ibn Kammūna nods here to a traditional Jewish valuation scheme: for those able to do so, constant study is the most highly valued activity. Those unable to do so should help the rest. Notice, however, that those incapable of study should support financially those who can; that particular value had not yet struck roots in the Jewish communities of the east.

31 When other people do this, you consider it to be a deficiency of character; so don't do it yourself!

32 Ibn Kammūna has in mind the *ḥadīth* which states, "Do not curse Iblīs, it will only make him more arrogant!"

33 Notice again that the warning is non-specific; the different monotheistic communities (including even the Pythagoreans) have different food taboos.

[61] As for your [sexual] pleasure (*faraj*), guard it from all that God has forbidden; help yourself in this by avoiding satiety, and by neither looking at anything forbidden or thinking about it. [62] Keep your hands from hurting anyone with them, keep your feet from running after something forbidden, or going with them to any wrongdoing; this is what you must watch over in what concerns your exterior limbs.

[63] [191] The hidden vices of the heart are many, and their cure is difficult. The faculty of anger is one of them; it is unrestrained demons. One must break it by habituating forbearance (*hilm*), along with turning one's attention to the causes of anger, the depravity it [anger] comprises, and what reward and excellence there is in restraining one's wrath. [64] Its greatest cause is pride; when that is broken, so is it broken. The true nature of pride consists in a person's seeing himself to be above others, [thereby] contesting with God Most High in connection for one of His special [unique] traits.³⁴ [65] Its cure consists in the person's knowing his baseness relative to those who dwell in the higher world [i.e. angels], as far as knowledge, worship, and power are concerned. He should recall that he comes from a filthy drop [of semen], and that all that he has—money, beauty, retinue—are exterior to his essence and will not endure for him. He has no knowledge of the moment of her [his soul's] departure [from this world], indeed, of most his circumstances. Even the lowliest thing is beyond his capability.

[66] Vanity, the cause of pride, is pure ignorance. Should a person have a high regard for something, he should think about its³⁵ disappearance, fearing that it is near; he should be amazed that it was given to him, not by right, nor of his own. He should say to himself: just like this was given to me for no reason, so will it be quickly taken away without cause.

[67] Envy is one of the vices; it harms the envious person more than it harms the one envied. It consists in wanting God Most High's blessing to be removed from His servants. It is enough for the intelligent person (*'āqil*) to be aware of this for it to go away. [68] All people are God's servants, so one must love them, because they are the servants and dependents of the Beloved. [69] Stinginess (*bakhl*) is a malady; its remedy is to know that money belongs to God. He gives some to him [the servant] in order that he dispose of it for the most important things [that he needs], and he withholds it should he be indulging his passions. But the [otherworldly] reward and a good reputation are more pleasing! [70]

34 I believe that there is a play on words here: *kibr*, meaning pride, and *kabīr*, and its superlative *akbar*, which is said of God alone.

35 The pronoun could refer either to the person's imminent demise, or the object's imminent disappearance; the message is essentially the same.

However, if it [stinginess] is for the purpose of bequeathing it to his child, then he is leaving his child with something good, but meeting God with something bad!³⁶ If his child is upright, then God Most High will provide for him; but should he be nefarious, then He has afflicted him on account of his sin. [71] He who takes upon himself repeated expenditure by way of a [moral] imposition will have it become for him a habit.³⁷

[72] Love of honor is [a] more serious [defect] than love of money, because attaining money by means of honor is easier than attaining honor by means of money. [73] It [honor] is one of the divine attributes, and for that reason, it is something that is naturally loved, on account of a hidden secret having to do with the relationship of the spirit to the divine things.³⁸ For that reason man, who is incapable of mastering the heavens, the angels, the mountains and the seas, longs to master all of them by means of knowledge. Similarly, someone who cannot put in place [in his mind] the wonders [of creation] longs to know how they are arranged. [74] Thus when a person pictures to himself that [another] person is enslaved to him, he would love to have him be enslaved to him, so that he would take possession of his heart.

[75] For this reason, the human being [192] wants to have his fame spread and his command carried to lands where his feet have not passed, nor has he seen their people. [76] Now true high standing consists in closeness to God, and it is praiseworthy; what is blameworthy is to seek after fanciful perfection, for that is something transitory that has no permanence. Were all of the inhabitants of the earth to prostrate themselves all together before you, neither the one who prostrates nor the one prostrated to would endure [any longer than their natural lifespan]. [77] A small amount of honor is enough for you, for the purpose of protecting yourself against wrongdoing and hostility. Seeking more than this is ignorance and a vice.

36 The person meets God tarnished with the vice of stinginess.

37 A freer translation would be: he who imposes upon himself to spend all of the time will find that it has become a habit. This is Maimonides' advice, to rid oneself of vices—here, stinginess—by taking upon himself to repeatedly do the opposite—here, spending—will acquire the virtue by habit. See Y. Tzvi Langermann, "L'oeuvre médicale de Maïmonide, un aperçu général," in *Maïmonide Philosophe et Savant* (1138–1204), edited by Tony Lévy and Roshdi Rashed (2004), 275–302, at p. 287.

38 I understand Ibn Kammūna to mean that there is some affinity between the human spirit and the divine (as indeed he seems some affinity between the human soul and the divine), and that this causes humans to seek to attain properties that truly belong to God alone. But this same trait motivates the human quest for all-encompassing knowledge.

[78] Love of this world is the chief of all offenses. Whatever does not endure along with you after death belongs to this world. [79] You were created only so as to obtain provisions here for the next world. Whoever limits himself only to the amount absolutely necessary has saved himself; but whoever busies himself with its [this world's] pleasures, and forgets the goal, is lost. And whoever imagines that he will take it on [only] with his body, but his heart will be free of it, is fooling himself.

[80] Hypocrisy is one of the greatest scourges. It consists in seeking high standing in people's hearts by means of [ostentatious] devotions and acts of goodness. Whoever intends his devotion for the servants [i.e. to impress them] believes that they are more capable of doing him good or harm than God is. [81] His remedy is close to the treatment for love of honor. It is enough for the hypocrite [to consider:] were people to know the hypocrisy in his innards, they would hate him. Safety from hypocrisy is found in hiding one's devotion.³⁹

[82] Character trait (*khalq*) is a [certain] configuration of the soul, from which action readily issues, without deliberation or imposition (*takalluf*); imposition may in fact be a path towards the acquisition of the character trait, by means of habituation.⁴⁰ [83] The gap between people with regard to inner goodness is like the gap between the goodness [seen] on the outside. A person may think himself to be of good character, when in fact he is devoid of it. One occasion for delusions, for example, is when a person becomes angry for reasons unconnected to God, but he thinks to himself that he is being angry on behalf of God.

[84] The beginning of the path of the wayfarers (*sālikīn*) and the key to the felicity of those who are guided is repentance. It is turning back from the path of removal⁴¹ towards the path of closeness. [85] The import of taking it on yourself is that a readiness to take on the shine of the lights of knowledge transpires in your heart.

39 Ibn Kammūna is not talking here about dissimulation (*taqiyya*), practiced by members of some persecuted Islamic sects, especially Shi'ites. Rather, he recommends not performing one's devotions ostentatiously.

40 Medieval thinkers held that the soul had a certain configuration (*hay'a*), which, like the configuration of physical objects and even the celestial orbs, is responsible for the actions that issue from it. Ethical refinement consists in large measure in imposing upon the soul the proper configuration, by means of habitual repetition of good actions, so that these actions become quite literally natural for her.

41 "The path of removal": making oneself distant from God, putting distance between oneself and God.

[86] The beginning of wisdom is fear of Exalted God.⁴² However, one ought not to exaggerate [the aspect of fear] to the extent that it leads to despair, for that is blameworthy. But hope replaces [mere] wishing. Someone who takes care of the land, but does not plant a seed, and then looks forward to a crop, is wishing in vain. However, he who hopes is the one who attains every goal that depends upon his choice [decision to act]; he then continues to hope that Exalted God will remove the obstacles. Whoever looks into God's mercy and compassion for His creation, and His care for them, [will find] his hope overcoming his fear. He will know with certainty that mercy and good are intended in and of them themselves, whereas evil in the world is an unintentional by-product.⁴³

[193] [88] The culmination of abstinence is abstinence from this world.⁴⁴ But if one thinks [much] of abandoning it [this world], one aggrandizes it!^{*53} [89] Indeed, to those who can see,⁴⁵ this world is like nothing, because this world is something finite, whereas the hereafter has no bound. The abstinence of the verifiers⁴⁶ is disdain for anything other than God, [whereas] the abstinence of the rest is a confrontation. [90] Whatever the servant encounters in this life, whether it conforms to his desire or confounds it: in both cases he stands in need of forbearance. As for that which conforms [to his desire, he must forbear] lest it overcome him, and he forget his origin and his [place of] return; but as for that which confounds, why, that is clear. [91] He who knows that all blessings come from Exalted God, and that the means are all enslaved and coerced, will give thanks only to Exalted God alone.⁴⁷ But whoever believes that something other than God has a hand in the blessing that reaches us, will not properly praise Him, nor will his knowledge and thanks be complete.

42 Another citation that appeals equally to Jews and Christians (Proverbs 9:10) as well as Muslims (a hadith).

43 Literally: intended by way of accident.

44 I have rearranged the words in the Arabic to make sense of the sentence.

45 A common epithet for the "gnostics," those whose spiritual accomplishments allow them to remove the veil from their eyes and see.

46 *Al-muḥaqqiqūn*, yet another epithet for those meeting success on the spiritual path, serving thus as role models for readers of this essay. "Verifiers" is a good English equivalent, but it does not do full justice to the Arabic term, which indicates for those who diligently inquire, reflect, and reason so as to arrive at the truths that populate the cosmos, and the Truth that stands at its head.

47 *Al-wasā'it*, the "means" or intermediaries that convey the blessing in the seemingly ordinary functioning of the world, are "coerced", i.e., they can do only God's will.

[92] It is like the case of someone on whom the sultan, that is, the king, has conferred [a gift]. Had he [the recipient] seen the king registering this bestowal in his bureau, he would not have turned his heart to the bureau, nor to the treasurer or the agent, since they are [all] enslaved and compelled. [93] Intent and action: it is by means of both of them that worship is made complete. However, intent is the better of the two parts, because it is the course of the spirit, whereas action is the course of the body. [94] Intent is the inclination of the heart towards the good; try to get plenty of it! The reward for action is a function of the intent. Sleeping with the intention of restoring briskness in the doing of good is better than worship in a state of fatigue.⁴⁸

[95] Sincere devotion (*ikhlaṣ*) and truthfulness (*ṣidq*)⁴⁹ are incumbent upon you. Among the totality [of values] that constitutes truthfulness is the heart's verifying that God is the Provider, and that there is no agent other than He. Indeed, he will not see anything in reality other than Him. Its [reality's apparent] multiplicity exists only for he who divides his gaze, like someone who sees the human as one organ after another. Were he to view him as a totality, the thought of single [individual entities] would not come to his mind, nor the sight of multiplicity.

[96] Linking causes to effects does not infringe upon the servant's true reliance on God; rather, if one adds to it faith in [divine] kindness, goodness, and wisdom, the result is firmness in reliance.⁵⁰ Whatever defect that one may imagine to be in reality [i.e. all that exists] is in fact bound to a perfection and an immense good. [97] God is definitely not stingy towards creation, nor does he delay anything [that is needed] for their well-being. He is worthy of being entrusted with your affairs; you may be sure of Him!

[98] However, reliance [upon God] does not stipulate abandoning earnings or medication, for example, because the linking of causes to effects are part of God's way of doing things (*sunnat Allāh*), and it will not change. One must rather hold that the hand, the food, the seed, and the capacity to take nutrition

48 In the ethical section 3 of his great law code (*Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot De'ot* 3:3) Maimonides states that sleeping so as to have strength to worship God later is itself an act of devotion.

49 I translate *ṣidq* "truthfulness" in order to distinguish it from *ḥaqq*, "truth", or, as a connotation for the deity "the Truth".

50 Ibn Kammūna touches here upon a major issue in Islamic thought, the value of *tawakkul*, "reliance [upon God]", and its limits. Taking medicine does not diminish one's reliance on God since, in fact, one is relying upon the processes and causal linkages that God has placed in the cosmos.

are all within the power of Exalted God. We rely only upon their Creator, not upon them.

[99] Perfection is loved for its own sake. Every perfection, beauty, and brilliance in reality comes from God's perfection, His beauty and His brilliance. Nonetheless, the perfection of anything else is not proportional to His perfection. How can the finite be proportional to the infinite?

[194] [99] The Knower loves only Exalted God. If he loves someone else, then he loves him for His sake, since the lover may love the servant of the beloved and [indeed] since everything [that the lover does] is related to him [the beloved]. [101] Moreover, hearts are naturally disposed to love whoever does the good and bestows favors upon them, and there is no one who does the good or bestows favors other than God. [102] The intensity (*shidda*) of love is commensurate with the intensity of knowledge.⁵¹ Knowledge of God is concealed despite its clarity on account of the intensity of its splendor (*zuhūr*); it is like light on whose account things become manifest.⁵² [103] Thus, were it [the splendor of the knowledge of God] to perpetuate, so that he [the seeker after knowledge] would not know darkness, then he would deny its [darkness'] existence, nor would he distinguish between it [darkness] and colors. [104] Were the lights [not] a veil [hiding] God's might, he would perceive right away the disparity which would free him to recognize the might and the Mighty One.⁵³

[105] Doubtless the One whom he loves is pleased by his carrying out [that which the Beloved commands]. [106] He who believes that it [sin] is decreed by God may even be pleased by sin, insofar as it is by His decree; but he stares [in horror] at it insofar as it alienates [him] from His refuge.⁵⁴ [107] But contentment does not make supplication unnecessary: even if the granting [of

51 This too is a Maimonidean concept: love of God is a product of, and its intensity a function of, love of God.

52 Knowledge of God—*ma'rifa*, gnosis, here spoken of as an intense illumination—is so resplendent that it is not seen, even though it enables other things to be seen. The analogy is to the light that illuminates our world, which too is not seen as such, but which allows us to see other things. In other words, all knowledge—all that we are able to see—is made possible by gnosis, even though we generally do not sense, or are not aware of, knowledge of God.

53 I find it necessary to intervene heavily in the Arabic text in order to make sense of the passage; I emend *wa-law yakūna* to *wa-law lam yakun*. The veil of power, *hijāb al-qudra*, is a concept known to Shi'ism. The idea is that, were it not for the lights which veil God's power, the distinction between the light of gnosis and all other lights would be immediately apparent.

54 Ibn Kammūna nods here to the kalam denial of human freedom of action; even sins are committed by divine decree. But should one be pleased in that by sinning, he has carried

one's request] is in accordance with one's deserving it, supplicate often, and it will help you to receive kindnesses and lights.⁵⁵ [108] Do not despair if the response is long in coming, because everything has its precise [literally: measured] moment which it will not pass by. Perhaps the delay is a good thing.

[109] Do not neglect recalling death; reflect upon those bygone centuries and colleagues who have passed, and what each one of them enjoyed with regard to honor, glory, money and servants.⁵⁶ There are many benefits in this. [110] The root of neglect is long-standing hope, which is ignorance itself. [111] Though he lives this evening, the intelligent person should not tell himself that he must necessarily be here on the morrow; and if he does not die suddenly [today], a sudden death may yet befall him. So prepare yourself, for your life is [preparation] for your death.

[112] Give an account of yourself every day. [113] Do not harm even an ant, for God's care (*ināya*) extends to it just like it extends to you. [114] Be just towards yourself, your people, and your flock, because heavens and earth stand upon justice. He who has access to the secrets of creation knows this. [115] In general, perfection consists in resembling God, as far as possible. Beneath these [are stored?] secrets and victory.⁵⁷

[116] This is what he [Ibn Kammūna] composed as a token presentation to the author's master, may God forgive him and relieve him of his illness.⁵⁸ We beseech God Most High to be of help to us in what we learn, and to teach us that which may be of help to us; and that He protect us in this world and the next. [117] May He bring us to the utmost felicity and perfection; may He make our situation a good situation, for He is the lord of good things and the one to whom prayers are ultimately addressed. [118] May God pray for the best of his creation, Muhammad; his family and his companions are the best family and companions.

out divine command, he should still be abhorred at the distance sin puts between him and his Lord.

55 Do not let your own belief in the validity of your request hold you back from praying for it often.

56 Constant recalling human mortality and the inevitability of death (*dhikr al-mawt*) is part of the Sufi ethic.

57 Concerning these ethical imperatives, see the introduction. The imperative to resemble the divine as best we can is nearly a direct quote from Plato, *Theaetetus* 176 B.

58 We have no information concerning this "master" or his illness.

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Constructing a World of Its Own: A Translation of the Chapter on the World of Image from Shahrazūrī's *Rasā'il al-Shajara al-Ilāhiyya*

L.W. Cornelis van Lit and Christian Lange

Introduction

Even though Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī (d. 1310) may have written the more influential commentary on Suhrawardī's (d. 1191) *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, it was Shams al-Dīn Shahrazūrī (d. ≥1288) who authored the more original one.¹ Hossein Ziai made a significant contribution towards this appreciation by publishing his edition of Shahrazūrī's *Sharḥ Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, thereby complementing the earlier publication of Quṭb al-Dīn's commentary. In the same spirit, we offer here a translation of Shahrazūrī's chapter on the world of image (*ʿālam al-mithāl*) from his *Rasā'il al-shajara al-ilāhiyya*, whose importance was first pointed out by Hossein Ziai.² With this translation we aim to follow the example of John Walbridge's accessible translation of Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī's "epistle of the 'Allāma al-Shīrāzī ascertaining the reality of the world of image."³

The world of image, or imaginable world (*al-ʿālam al-mithālī*), was primarily conceived to provide a way to understand from within the medieval philosophical discourse such religious notions as a physical afterlife and divine inspiration. The world of image, in its fullest state of development, was thought of as a world beyond our earthly world. It is a world in the sense of consisting of all kinds of things such as mountains, seas, plants, animals, not as Platonic Forms but as individual entities in all their particular details such as color, taste, and scent. The world of image is beyond our own world in two ways. Firstly, it is not bound to any physical laws; time and space are fluid concepts invoked and revoked whenever necessary, and entities can be of whatever kind they need

1 The research for this translation was supported by the ERC Starting Grant "The Here and the Hereafter in Islamic Traditions" (no. 263308), hosted at Utrecht University. This introduction provides in summary form some of the results which are fully discussed in Lit, L.W.C. van, *The World of Image in Islamic Philosophy*; Lange, C.R., *Paradise and Hell in Islamic Traditions*.

2 Ziai, H., "The Illuminationist tradition," p. 478ff.

3 Walbridge, J., *The Science of Mystic Lights*, pp. 196–271.

to be, even the fabulous. Secondly, we cannot ordinarily witness it with our five senses. Only by crossing the boundaries of the physical world, such as may happen in sleep, meditation, or after death, can we reach this world, witness it, and interact with entities in it. The mode in which the soul can achieve this is the imagination, a faculty that is located right at the threshold between the material and the immaterial.

The notion of a world of image can be seen as one of the most important contributions of late medieval Islamic philosophy, if not already for being unique when compared to other areas of the history of philosophy.⁴ Its development into the notion as summarized here knows three major contributors. A first step was taken by Ibn Sīnā (d. 1037), who spoke of using the imagination after death in order for the soul to have experiences similar to sense perception. In this way, according to Ibn Sīnā, such a soul could experience a material Heaven or Hell by imagining it. According to Ibn Sīnā, the imagination is a bodily faculty. Therefore, souls will still need a physical substrate for the faculty of imagination to function. Ibn Sīnā found a suitable candidate for this in the celestial bodies; after death, he suggested, souls can attach to celestial bodies and utilize them to imagine their eschatological fate. Suhrawardī received this idea favorably and developed it further towards an independent, matter-free realm. He did so by suggesting that what we experience were suspended images (*ṣuwar mu‘allaqa*), which are images with particular sensory qualities that are “suspended”, that is, “in neither a place nor a locus.”⁵ Instead, they merely manifest themselves in a place of manifestation (*mazhar*). In this way, Suhrawardī turned celestial bodies from substrates into places of manifestation. Since these suspended images are neither intellects, nor souls, nor bodies, they must be of a fourth ontological category, an additional realm, as Suhrawardī argued. Details concerning these new ideas that Suhrawardī proposed were not always provided in his writings, but the direction of his argumentation was clear. Eventually, it was Shahrazūrī who took Suhrawardī’s ideas further into that same direction and turned the notion of suspended images into the world of image: independently existing images which together formed a world just like ours, which we can enter and leave by mediation of our imagination. Celestial bodies are not necessary anymore to facilitate this experience.

Whereas in Ibn Sīnā and Suhrawardī, these ideas were only present in parts of their eschatology, in Shahrazūrī’s writings the world of image procured its

4 Already argued for by Henry Corbin, who was one among the first modern scholars to thoroughly study this notion. See Corbin, H., *Terre céleste et corps de résurrection*.

5 Suhrawardī, *The Philosophy of Illumination*, p. 138 (§225).

proper place. In *Rasā'il al-shajara al-ilāhiyya* he devoted a separate chapter to it and placed this chapter in the part on ontology and cosmology. This confirms that Shahrazūrī thought of the world of image as an important subject that transcends the discussion on eschatology. Because of its comprehensiveness, the chapter makes for a unique gateway into Shahrazūrī's thinking about the world of image.

However, we should point out that the chapter was not written from scratch. In a similar fashion as Shahrazūrī's comments in the *Sharḥ Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, the chapter in the *Rasā'il* relies and expands on *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*. Indeed, word-by-word overlap between this chapter and Shahrazūrī's commentary can be observed in more than one place. In comparison to the commentary, there are two reasons to translate this chapter rather than his commentary. Firstly, Shahrazūrī's comments on the world of image in his commentary are scattered throughout the last chapter of *Sharḥ Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, while the chapter in *Rasā'il al-shajara al-ilāhiyya* combines all his comments in one place. Secondly, where the *Sharḥ* and the *Rasā'il* deviate, it seems that the latter provides the more detailed and developed thought. A good example of this is Shahrazūrī's statement that inanimate objects, such as stones, do not have souls in the world of image, just like such objects would not have souls in our world. This statement is also found in the *Sharḥ*.⁶ However, in the *Rasā'il* Shahrazūrī continues to say that "it is conceivable that they do have souls that move and control them."

Some of the more important contributions Shahrazūrī made can be easily identified, as the paragraphs which represent these ideas begin with "It is conceivable that ..." (*wa-yajūzu an ...*), probably to soften the impact of the following idea. To us it seems that the most dramatic expansion Shahrazūrī makes is in regard to the two questions of how the world of image is populated and how human beings can interact with it. We shall give a sketch of Suhrawardī's and Shahrazūrī positions, to draw out the background to Shahrazūrī's chapter. A more detailed analysis of these problems can be found in our studies referred to in the first footnote.

For Suhrawardī, in short, both questions are reduced to the same, as suspended images in most instances only come about along epistemological lines. Though its application to extraordinary cases such as premonitions, prophecies, or eschatological experiences is particularly intriguing, suspended images are simply that which the soul perceives in whichever way. Even in a simple act of seeing suspended images are involved. For example, when we see a mountain, Suhrawardī asks, "how could this great magnitude be contained within the

⁶ Shahrazūrī, *Sharḥ Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, p. 554.

tiny pupil?"⁷ Suhrawardī proposes that such a mountain occurs as a suspended image, with the crystalline humor of the eye as its place of manifestation. With this argument, Suhrawardī sets aside the theory of vision by impression in the eye. In short, then, suspended images come to be when they are required for an act of perception, and cease to be when this act of perception stops. This process seems to be facilitated by the active intellect, in accordance with the specific situation of a soul. As Shahrazūrī summarizes Suhrawardī's position in this chapter, "the Divine Shaykh claims that the entity abstract from matter which is the lord of the species is the one emanating onto the bodily places of manifestation in accordance with the description of that person."

Shahrazūrī sees the matter entirely differently. He does not emphasize the term "suspended images" but rather promotes the term "the world of image". Further, he virtually never speaks of the connection with ordinary perception but mostly speaks of extraordinary phenomena such as veridical visions. For him, such images are much less ephemeral than Suhrawardī thought. In fact, there are even things in the world of image that exist forever. Shahrazūrī proposes three principal ways for such images in the world of image to come into existence: 1) a finite number of things are emanated from the intellects, being forever in the world of image; 2) a potentially infinite number are created in a process of generation and corruption similar to our world; 3) intellects may directly emanate onto the world of image a temporary representation of themselves. Numbers two and three are the two ways to ensure that potentially any kind of thing can exist in that world. A fourth way is acknowledged by Shahrazūrī, but his argumentation seems to suggest he is not convinced of it. This fourth way is Suhrawardī's idea that an intellect will emanate a specific image onto a person, for example when he is asleep, in accordance with that person's specific situation. Shahrazūrī immediately continues after mentioning this by saying that "it is conceivable that the soul puts on one of the images that exist over there as a place of manifestation." In other words, whereas Suhrawardī's idea suggests that a specific image is created at the time a person starts to dream, Shahrazūrī suggests that at the time a person starts to dream, it travels to the world of image and takes control of an already existing body over there.

In summary, if we stay with the example of a veridical dream, the difference is as follows. On the one hand we have Suhrawardī, who merely wants to describe the process how people can see veridical images in dreams, suggesting that in such a case one enters into contact with an intellect, a contact by which the ineffable intellectual knowledge that emanates from the intellect is

7 Suhrawardī, *The Philosophy of Illumination*, p. 71 (§102), translation adapted.

translated into images. On the other hand we have Shahrazūrī, who wishes to suggest that people actually travel to a different world in their dreams, where they will take an already existing entity as their body. With that body, they can move around in that world and interact with others, for example enter into an exchange with an intellect who has taken on the garb of another entity of that world.

It is all the more striking, then, that Shahrazūrī remains silent about any personal experience. The description he gives of the world of image is vivid, and at one point he says that “were we to go into a detailed description into some of the states of this great world, we could fill many volumes with it.” This would seem to suggest he has personal experience of the world of image, through dreams or meditation, but he never explicitly says so. While he happily borrows passages from Suhrawardī’s *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq* and *al-Mashārī‘* to construct his text, without admitting in every case that he is doing so, when it comes to the personal experience that Suhrawardī claimed to have had (“I myself have had veritable experiences ...”) Shahrazūrī distances himself by adding the preamble that it is Suhrawardī who says so.

There are of course many more interesting aspects to this chapter, but instead of drawing out all of them we rather give Shahrazūrī the opportunity to speak for himself. One drawback of this chapter that we wish to note is that, at times, it does not feel very orderly. Having all of Shahrazūrī’s thoughts on the world of image in one place is convenient, but at times his remarks seem strung together somewhat haphazardly. The very end of the chapter is a good example of this. With the third to last paragraph, the chapter seems to have come to a natural end. However, Shahrazūrī then appends two more paragraphs that do not directly continue the train of thought of the previous paragraph, nor are they naturally connected to each other.

For this translation we consulted both existing editions of the *Rasā’il*.⁸ The differences are marginal, but we followed Ḥabībī as he seems to provide the better reading. In some cases, indicated in the footnotes, we felt compelled to deviate from both editions. Square brackets indicate page numbers from Habibi’s edition, while curly brackets indicate page numbers from Görgün’s edition.

8 Shahrazūrī, *Rasā’il*, ed. by N. Ḥabībī, vol. 3 pp. 457–471; Shahrazūrī, *Rasā’il*, ed. by M.N. Görgün, vol. 3, pp. 389–402.

Translation

{389} [457]

In explanation of the imaginable, apparitional world

You know from the book on the soul, which belongs to Physics, from the inquiries about the faculties, and from the forms in mirrors, that the imaginable forms that a person imagines while awake or sees while asleep, are not at all in the brain, nor in any of its parts, whichever part it may be. This is because of previously-explained proofs that a big thing like half the globe of the world or an immense mountain cannot possibly be imprinted in a small part of the brain. [The imaginable forms] are not in the sensory world, otherwise everyone with sound sense perception would see them, while this is not the case. Neither are they purely non-existent, as the pure non-existent cannot be pictured or imagined. However, we conceive of these imagined forms in a sound and complete way, and we distinguish them from other sensory and imaginable forms or judge them to share [something with] other sensory and imaginable forms. No pure non-existent shares anything with something else or is distinguished from it, so nothing from the imagined forms or forms that people see in their sleep is purely non-existent. If they are not purely non-existent, nor in one of the parts of the brain, nor in the sensory world, they must be specified to be in another world. That world is called the imaginable, imaginative world (*al-‘ālam al-mithālī al-khayālī*). It is above the world of sense and space, and below the world of intellect. So it is in between these two worlds.

[458] All the shapes, magnitudes, and bodies that the masters of mathematical knowledge imagine, and all the moments of motion and rest, places, states, planes, lines, and points, etcetera, that are connected to it, are existent in this middle world. This is why the philosophers call it “middle wisdom” and “middle knowledge”.⁹ Likewise, the forms in mirrors—as you know—do not inhere in the mirrors, due to proofs we have explained in Physics. Neither are they imprinted in the air, nor in the eye, nor are they purely non-existent after they have been witnessed. So, undoubtedly, they are in the afore-mentioned imaginable world.

The Divine Shaykh explained in *The Philosophy of Illumination* that all the mountains, seas, lands, immense and awesome sounds, and the many and big individuals that are seen in dreams are all images that do not exist in a place or locus (*makān wa-maḥall*). The same goes for accidents, which only exist for

9 A reference to the *mutawassiṭāt*, the corpus of mathematical texts to be read after Euclid’s *Elements* and before Ptolemy’s *Almagest*. Cf. Lit, L.W.C. van, “The measurement of the circle in Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s Revision of the ‘middle books’ (Tahrīr al- mutawassiṭāt).”

us in combination with bodies, like flavors, scents, sounds, the four active and passive qualities,¹⁰ and other accidents. [They are] images that exist not in matter.

It is not the case, as the Peripatetics explain, that everything that is imagined or seen in a dream exists in one of the cavities of the brain, as we have explained; how could the cavities of the brain accommodate an immense sea or awesome mountain, or any other excessively big body, when it is exceedingly small by comparison. Therefore, it must be in the imaginable, imaginative world.

You have come to know from the inquiries into sound that rarefaction and compression, and the vibration of the air are not part of the essence of sound. So it does not follow that something to which these things are not ascribed would be devoid of sound, as it is possible that it has other reasons and conditions, similar [459] to how, for us, air and rarefaction and compression are reasons and conditions for the occurrence of sound. The sounds of the ethereal world (*al-ʿālam al-athīrī*) are not caused by air, as it is devoid of it. Nor is there rarefaction and compression. Therefore, it must be caused by something else, just as the sounds of the imaginable world are caused only as sound, not by air, nor by rarefaction and compression.

In the same way, sight, hearing, and smell in the celestial spheres are not contingent on eyes, ears, and noses. Due to the smoothness and polishedness of the celestial body, which is similar to the polished crystalline humor [of the eye], the essence of every celestial sphere has in itself an eye by which it sees its essence and the entire world of bodies, be it ethereal or elemental. For the same reason it hears by its essence all the high and low sounds, as its essence, on account of its polishedness and smoothness and subtleness, corresponds to the skin that is stretched over the ear canal¹¹ in the way skins are stretched over drums. Thus it hears, sees, and smells everything, as its essence corresponds to the front lobes of the brain. The faculty of hearing, sight, and smell do not exist in a particular part of it to the exception of another, but in all. So as it is in its entirety an organ for these faculties, so the faculties are in its entirety, not in one nobler and more befitting part [of it].

Celestial spheres [also] have touch and their entirety is an organ for touch because it is characterized by being alive, as touch follows from embodied life (even though in elemental bodies [being alive] comes about by primary opposing qualities). Celestial bodies share this [organ of touch] with earthly

10 The reference is to Aristotle's theory of the four elements and their qualities. Hot and cold are active qualities, while wet and dry are passive qualities.

11 Reading *ṣimākh* instead of *ṣimāgh*.

living things, applying to it generally and spread among it, not specified by a particular organ.

However, there is no taste for celestial bodies, because the bodies in them have no metabolism in their bodies, whereas the benefit of the existence of taste in living things is only due to that.¹²

[460] Just as the celestial bodies have the utmost subtleness, purity, capacity, and endless desire, so likewise are these faculties appropriate for those bodies in terms of capacity, strength, nobility, and excellence. As there is no relation between their bodies and ours, so there is no relation between [their] faculties and [ours], except for perception, which is the thing that is shared. But as for the intensity and purity, and perception,¹³ there is no comparison between the celestial faculties and ours. The reasons and conditions that necessitate the occurrence of sight, hearing, and smell over there are not [the same] reasons and conditions that necessitate those for us over here.

If you have come to know this for the world of celestial spheres, and their difference from the animal faculties, even though both are part of the sensory world, then it should not surprise you that the difference between the world of images and the world of sense¹⁴ is [even] greater than that. Things apprehended by the five senses are accidents that do not occur to us over here [except]¹⁵ by bodies. However, they occur in the world of suspended images by themselves, not in need of another cause other than their selves. All the planets, stars, elements and composite things, movements, and the other accidents in this world of ours exist in the imaginable world, except that {392} these things in the world of images are subtler, more beautiful, nobler and more excellent than they are in this world of ours, due to their proximity to the First Cause and the intelligible principles.

You must know that the imaginable world is an immense world, very extensive, without any constraints. This is because constraints only occur in places and in the dimensions of prime matter, while the forms over there exist on their own without requiring matter, therefore not requiring place, as place is only needed by that which possesses matter. So there is no rivalry between those spiritual forms over a locus or place.

12 That is to say, since celestial bodies do not need nourishment to sustain their bodies, they do not have appetite and therefore do not delight in food.

13 This second occurrence of the word “perception” (*idrāk*) seems odd, but is attested in both editions.

14 The text reads *al-‘alam al-ḥiss* but this should be either *‘alam al-ḥiss* or *al-‘alam al-ḥissī*.

15 The logic of this sentence seems to demand to add *illā*, but it is not attested in either edition.

The basis of the created imaginable world, which derives from the intelligible principles, and which consists of planets, [461] stars, their souls, elements, composite things [such as] minerals, plants, animals, and human beings, is finite, because they depend on causes and finite intelligible aspects, following the proof that establishes that the ordered chain of intellects has an end. So if the intelligible causes are finite, it is necessary that its imaginable and sensory effects are also finite. But in another sense, one can picture infinity in it. For the imaginable world is parallel to the sensory world. As the planets and stars of the sensory world are ever in motion, and the elements and the composite things are ever receiving preparatory influences from the planets and the souls [are receiving influences] from angels¹⁶ without end, so are also the planets and stars of the imaginable world ever in motion, and so are the elemental apparitions and forms of minerals, plants, animals, and humans, ever receiving influences from those imaginable motions and illuminations from the intelligible worlds, due to their correspondence to abstract apparitions in being abstract from matter, therefore [able to] receive intelligible illuminations. From those illuminations occur, commensurate with the receptivity of those apparitions, different kinds of forms such as planets, stars, elements, forms of minerals, plants, animals and humans, without end, by reason of the different correspondences existent in that world.

Perhaps these suspended images come about by way of occurrence and renewal, on account of {393} the occurrence of forms in polished mirrors and objects of the imagination of living beings. It is possible, then, that these forms cease to be after their coming about, on strength of their being in front of [the mirror] or being imagined. They do not remain after ceasing to be in front of [the mirror] or being imagined, existing on their own, independent by their essence, like the rest of the fixed forms (*al-ṣuwar al-thābita*) in the world of images.

Perhaps the abstract planetary and astral lights displace forms that become visible in mirrors and objects of imagination, to become places of manifestation

16 The word used here, *al-amlāk*, is normally the plural of *milk*, "property". However, it can also be used for "angels," as it is sometimes used to refer to the three archangels Gabriel, Michael, and Israfil. For example, according to the 17th century author Munāwī, they are "the three angels who are the most noble of the angels [...] they are the custodians of life." (... *al-amlāk al-thalātha annahā ashrafu l-malā'ik* ... [*hum*] *al-muwakkala 'alā l-hayāt* ...) al-Munāwī, *Fayḍ al-qadīr*, vol. 2, pp. 101–102.

for them among the barriers (*al-barāzikh*),¹⁷ according to those with insight. And perhaps the abstract intelligible lights displace them. What the abstract lights displace is luminous, and spiritual generosity accompanies it. Various imaginable forms therefore occur on account of two afore-mentioned things, without end, in different layers that are differentiated by subtlety and coarseness. [462] The individuals of this imaginable world are without end due to the occurrence of infinite individuals on account of the two afore-mentioned causes, even though the [number of] layers is finite.

In this immense world without end there are, due to the First Cause and the First Intellect, many apparitions in the utmost perfection, completion, beauty and splendor, as excellently as possible. The same applies to the other intellects; each of them has many apparitions in the form of various things, in accordance with the nobility and excellence of the intellect; the nobler to the nobler and the baser to the baser. They [the apparitions] are places of manifestation by which they [the intellects] become visible in this world in as much as there are reasons that necessitate their appearance over here.

An image of each thing as it is here, whether it is a substance or accident, is in the world of suspended images existent on its own. If matter is non-existent in the world of image, then the accidents do not inhere in matter in the sense of being imprinted. If we see ourselves alive—in a dream or something else—enjoying food and drinks that have enjoyable taste and resplendent colors and good scents, that does not mean they are impressed, as matter is absent over there. Would there be matter there, then bodies [over there] would be composed of matter {394} and form. Then they would [also] be in this world of ours, the world of sense, distinguishable and visible by any sound eye, but this is not the case. So forms and accidents that are witnessed in the world of image are purely apparitions. Accidents are given form in these apparitions not by way of impression but rather by way of picturing and imagining, nothing else. All accidents that exist through matter to us over here, are over there substances, as they exist on their own and are in no need of inherence, which is what characterizes substances. Therefore, everything in the world of image are simple substances. This is an idea to which the Divine Shaykh alludes and upon which we have expanded.

It could be said that these bodily forms are shaped according to those imaginable accidents, like tastes and scents etcetera, in accordance with their spiritual nature, in contrast to the accidents [463] over here with us, which

17 'Barriers' is a term derived from Suhrawardī's *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*, meaning 'bodies' or 'the bodily world.'

need a material locus. You have known that forms and matter are mutually exclusive according to the teaching of the Peripatetics. Among the celestial and elemental simple things [i.e., substances] there is nothing but bodiliness and dispositions. It is allowed that imaginable bodies only contain spiritual forms and dispositions, but what inheres in the spiritual is [itself] spiritual.¹⁸ We, however, know by necessity that if we eat or drink or have intercourse or smell [something] or see a color or hear a sound in a dream or somewhere else, then we enjoy the food, drinks, and bodies, and the tastes, scents, colors that are in them, and we enjoy the sound that emerges from them. So these imaginable bodies, without doubt, are shaped by those spiritual accidents and the attributes that are in them.

The things in the world of image and intellect do not oppose each other, nor do they negate one another, nor do they impede each other or compete for a locus or place. For opposites are two essences that act successively on one subject and one matter, between them being the utmost degree of difference. In the intelligible and imaginable world there is no place or matter, so there is no opposition over there, nor competition for a locus or place. {395} As these apparitional forms are extremely subtle, they do not [require] a place or locus. Sometimes we imagine, when seeing them [i.e. apparitional forms] in a dream or waking state, that they shift (*tantaqilu*) from state to state and from shape to shape. It is conceivable that this shift and [new] shape is possible for them in their essence due to their subtlety, and it is conceivable that they do not shift or change in their essence, but rather that this is imagined but not the case in the thing itself (*fī nafs al-amr*).¹⁹ Rather, it [may] become invisible and another form appears, as when we see a specific human being, and in the moment we are looking at him that form turns into the form of a horse or some other form, without that being a change (*qalb*) [of the essence]. Whatever may be the manifestation that makes the vision of that human being necessary, that is what we see. When the first manifestation changes and the second manifestation arises that necessitates the appearance of a form of a horse, then the human form swiftly becomes absent and the form of a horse becomes visible, as [quickly as] sudden lightning. The seeing person imagines that [464] the

18 It seems that Shahrazūrī wants to point out that for the Peripatetics things can be spiritual or material, but whatever is spiritual cannot be or behave as though material and vice versa.

19 Shahrazūrī proposes two interpretations for how it is possible that we see a thing change from for example the shape of a man into the shape of horse; either the essence of the thing seen has changed, or only its appearance.

first, human form has shifted into the form of a horse, while this is not the case. The proof relies on the impossibility of absolute change in concrete things.

[Concerning] the bodily image that the rational soul utilizes in a dream, or, for those good enough, in a waking state, the Divine Shaykh claims that the entity abstract from matter which is the lord of the species (*rabb al-naw'*) is the one emanating onto the bodily places of manifestation in accordance with the description of that person [who is dreaming] to whom occurs that image and place of manifestation. The form seen in a dream is judged to be the same in respect to how they come about as images visible in mirrors and the imagination. All of them [images in dreams] come from the emanation of the intelligible lights, even though they [images in dreams] are places of manifestation for sleepy souls, which are emanated in accordance with their predispositions and the prevailing characteristics that they attained through their [earthly] body. The images become visible for the dreamer, in accordance with his inner characteristics. When that [image] has emanated anew, and afterwards the soul returns to utilize the place of sensory manifestation, the imaginable manifestations disappear, remaining fixed in the imaginable world, or whose place of manifestation is one of the higher celestial barriers. {396} This is the third way by which those things can multiply and by which the imaginable images and accidents can renew into infinity.

It is conceivable that the soul puts on one of the images that exist over there as a place of manifestation, which befits the states of the soul and its preparedness for that. As [the aspects to] souls are infinite in respect of their past and future, so the apparitional, bodily forms and accidents are infinite in that imaginable world.

There are many layers in the imaginable world, whose number only God—the Exalted—and the intelligible principle know. In each level there are an infinite number of individuals from the species that exist on this world of ours. [465] Some of the layers are luminous, pleasure-bestowing, noble, and excellent; these are the layers of the gardens in which the average (*al-mutawassitūn*) People of the Garden have pleasure. These layers are [themselves] diverse, one being more noble and luminous, the other less so. The dark, pain-inducing layers are similar. They are the layers of Hell, in which the People of the Fire have pain, which are different in terms of the intensity of the darkness and desolation, with some of them lower [than others].

The most noble layer of the layers of light borders on the world of intellect; it is its horizon. And the lowest and darkest layer is the last of the layers, adjacent to the world of the senses; it is its [other] horizon. The rest of the layers, whose great number cannot be counted, is contained between these two

layers. Each of these layers is inhabited by a group from among the angels, jinn, and demons, whose number is infinite.

If you ascend on the path towards these layers, whenever you reach a higher level you will find it to be more subtle, greater in spirituality [*akthar rūḥāniyya*, that is, more immaterial] and luminosity, more beautiful in appearance, and more awesome in pleasure than that below it. The pleasures of he who resides in it are more complete and perfect than those who reside in the layer that is below it. Even though all these layers have in common that they are beyond time and space, they are different in the sense that whenever a layer is higher, it is more noble and more perfectly luminous, purer, and more perfectly spiritual. {397} The wonders of this infinite world are infinite. One cannot comprehend its peculiarities in this shadowy world. Only the First Principle—exalted and sanctified may He be—and the intellectual principles encompass its realities according to how it is.

One of the shaykhs from among those who affirm the existence of the world of image says: The imagination is a portion of the world of image from which it flows, like a distributary from a great river. He calls it “the dependent imagination” (*al-khayāl al-muttaṣil*), and he calls the world of image “the independent imagination” (*al-khayāl al-munfaṣil*). There is no harm in calling the dependent imagination a distributary relative to the world of image, which is the great river, since its [466] layers are many and cannot be comprehended and since its individuals are infinite, and since also the great number of general and detailed phenomena in it cannot be comprehended due to the deficient faculties of the rational soul in this regard. Rather, souls only comprehend a trifle and insignificant amount of these wonders and individuals. Therefore, certainly, the imagination is a little distributary from the great world of image.

Those people talk a lot about this world. They are correct about general things and in regard to the principle of affirming it. They are wrong, however, in regard to some of its details. They talk a lot about the branches, to the exception of the roots. For example, they talk about the awe-inspiring infinite trees in that world of every species and [even] of other species not found in our realm. One tree from among them shades the people of the world, and most of its delicate produce and the beautiful and good tasting and smelling fruits in it are, each one of them, bigger than an immense mountain. Likewise over there there is tasty variegated food and a variety of sweet drinks etcetera, that are pleasant to those who drink it. Also belonging to it are the likes of Tigris, Euphrates, Nile, Oxus, and Syr Darya,²⁰ flowing over the earth, in quantities

20 These are the English names. The Arabic names are, in order, *Dijla*, *al-Furāt*, *al-Nīl*, *Jayhūn*, and *Sayhūn*. In traditional literature it is said that these four rivers spring from paradise. Cf. al-Qurtubī, *al-Tadhkira fi aḥwāl al-mawtā wa-umūr al-ākhirā*, vol. 2, pp. 167–8.

and abundance that cannot be counted nor comprehended. Also belonging to it are things to be found in {398} rivers, small and big. Also belonging to it is that which is in big receptacles and basins, made of a variety of precious stones. The same goes for their immense, perfectly-built castles, the amenities made of precious stones, the well-arranged orchards, the free-flowing rivers, the diverse twittering birds, the houris, and the beautiful, handsome boys, who dwell in those castles and orchards. Perhaps [467] these orchards and castles extent so far that a rider who exerts himself, will pass its length and width [only] in years. These layers are the exact same gardens that the felicitous among the average people enjoy.²¹

In sum, not even perfect human beings are able to explain the wonders of this world and the marvels of the joy granted to the felicitous in it, nor the painful punishment for the miserable among the people of the fire, such as the immense consuming fire, terrifying terrors, and the harmful, ugly animals, such as certain snakes, scorpions, and vipers; as well as the immense mountain, the jet-black night, the tenebrous valleys, the slippery mountains, and other painful things.

How beautifully the Prophet—God bless him and grant him salvation—described the Garden, which is one of the layers of the world of luminous image, when he said: “In it is what no eye has seen, no ear has heard, and no mind has conceived.”²² This suffices for the smart and astute. Likewise did he [Muhammad] describe the states of the fire in terms close to ours.

Were we to go into a detailed description of some of the states of this great world, we could fill many volumes with it, and we would not cover a tenth of a tenth of it. The creator—exalted is He—and the things He brought into being and created are too great and too perfect to be comprehended by the minds of human beings. So let us move on from this great affair and noble matter.

When the imaginable apparitions appear in polished mirrors and in acts of the imagination, which appear in sleep or awake, they are not in mirrors, nor in the cerebral faculties of the imagination, nor do they inhere in a locus, as they are able to exist by themselves in the imaginable, spiritual world. {399} The sensory faculties can only comprehend them in places of manifestation, so it is conceivable that they have a place of manifestation in this world in which they

21 Next to the fact that the “average” were previously mentioned, we may note that this combination of “felicitous” and “average” can be found in Suhrawardī, *The Philosophy of Illumination*, p. 148 (§244).

22 Suhrawardī referred to this saying on multiple occasions, e.g. in *Hayākil al-nūr* and *Partaw-nāmah*, see Suhrawardī, *Opera Metaphysica et Mystica*, vol. 3, pp. 69 and 105. It also occurs in *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, Bk. 54, #467; Bk. 60, #302, #303, and *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*, Bk. 40, #6780, #6781, #6782; See also Bible, 1 Cor 2:9 which in turn is a reference to Isa 64:4.

occasionally appear, such as a polished object that occurs in the air or in some place on earth or in certain waters.

[468] The Divine Shaykh said in *The Philosophy of Illumination*: “Perhaps they shift its manifestations, from one manifestation to another.” He said: “From them derive a kind of jinn and demons, and a great group of people from Darband and Mayanij have testified to it, namely, that they witness these forms often. They used to see them in a great assembly, many times over, appearing to them at all times. But the hands of people would not reach them, nor any of their limbs. The people of spiritual exercises, exertions, and seclusions have occasionally witnessed untouchable, imaginable bodies, whose place of manifestation was not the common sense. Rather, it was as though it covered their entire body, fighting the body and wrestling with men.”²³

Further he said: I myself have had veritable experiences that indicate that there are four worlds. Intelligible, abstract lights; managing lights; the sensory worlds with its spheres, stars, and elements; and the imaginable world, in which are the illuminated and dark, suspended forms. In the illuminated ones is bliss for the felicitous, and in the dark ones is punishment for the miserable.²⁴

Every animal and human being in the world of image has a soul connected to it, as our souls are connected to our bodies. Some of those souls who reside in that world, in whichever layer they may be, belong to the souls of human beings whose attachment to the bodies of this world has been severed, and who [now] attach to bodies of that world. If they have virtuous traits of character and if they have praiseworthy manners, they attach to human-like bodies in the upmost layers. If, on the other hand, their traits of character and manners are base and not praiseworthy, they accordingly attach to one of the wild and low animals that befits them, in the lowest layers.

It is conceivable that some of those souls are not human souls whose {400} connection to this world has been severed. Rather, they come from the emanation of the abstract intellect, to which is attached [469] the power to bring into existence some of the things in the world of image.

Moreover, every soul whose connection to that world has been severed, is either completely abstract and attaches to the world of pure intellect, or it comes to attach to bodies in the higher layer. Thus it ascends from layer to layer after dwelling in every layer for a long or short while, according to its

23 Suhrawardī, *The Philosophy of Illumination*, p. 149 (§246).

24 We have omitted quotations marks since this paragraph is not a word-for-word quotation from *Ḥikmat al-ishrāq* but rather a paraphrase and commentary on it, similar (yet not exactly the same) to his *Sharḥ Ḥikmat al-ishrāq*.

predispositions, until it ascends to the highest layers of the world of images. From there it is released into the world of pure intellect. For the worlds are connected to one another to the point where they verge on the prime cause.

As for the elements of the world of image and its minerals and plants, it would seem that they do not have souls which control them, as is the case in this world of ours. Rather, that which controls and preserves every species, its particular instances being infinite, is the lord of the species, who belongs to the world of image.

It is conceivable that they do have souls that move and control them, for we find inorganic things that move and sometimes talk in dreams, and from which issue things that issue from living beings. So it is not inconceivable that some souls connect to them, whether they reach them from here or from there. That world is subtle to the extreme and its conditions are in many ways opposite to the conditions of this world.

From these suspended images and the souls of the people of this world that are attached to them derive jinn, demons, and ghouls. They have places of manifestation in this world, in which they occasionally appear in accordance with what the spherical predispositions and the movements of the stars require.

The imaginable world, I mean, the suspended forms, are not Platonic Forms, for Platonic Forms are purely luminous, being intellects abstract from matter, while the suspended images are dark and illumined, white and smooth for the felicitous, who take pleasure in them, and black-blue for the miserable, who are pained by them.

Plato and those who come before him, such as Socrates and those philosophers who preceded him, given that they affirm the existence [470] of the luminous images, which are the lords of the idols, also affirm the existence of the dark and illumined suspended images. They claim that they are fixed, separate substances in the soul's thoughts and {401} imaginations.

Plato said that we perceive the marks (*rusūm*) of particulars, such as the point, line, surface, and body, as they exist on their own. Likewise [we perceive] the consequences of bodies separately, such as motion, time, place, and shape. We regard them with our minds one time as simple things, another time as composites, even though there are no realities in their essences without carriers or substrates.

If you hear of the discussion of the ancients that there is among the existents a magnitudinous world, which is not the sensory world nor the intellect or the soul; that in it are cities, countless, without end; that among them are what the Lawgiver has called Jabalqa and Jabarsa, which are two of the cities of the world of image, both having a thousand gates, and creatures are in it,

uncountable except for God, who are unaware that God created Adam and his offspring; [if you hear of this then know that] The noble ones among the prophets and the sages confirm the existence of this world. So someone using his intellect should not rush into disbelieving them without proof.

Further, all the powerful wayfarers see this world in the course of their journeys. In it, they receive, among the manifestation of wonders and cases of grace and miracles where the natural order is interrupted, what they desire and aim for. Indeed, the group²⁵ [busy with] soothsaying and sorcery, and the masters of the spiritual sciences may witness it and make forms manifest from it and wondrous animals, marvelous plants and fruits, at will,²⁶ by [use of] contraptions and talismans that produce them. If you were to refute them with a proof, they would refute you with experience. So if you journey, and tend to spiritual matters with care, and if you devote yourself to looking into this book of mine, of which the like has not existed before, especially on this issue, then perhaps you will get to understand something about it.²⁷

[471] Some of the divines (*al-muta'allihān*) say that the philosopher whose body is like a coat, taking it off at one point and putting it on at another, can ascend to the world of light if he wants, and if he wants he can become visible in whatever form he desires. The appearance of the wayfarers among the philosophers, and others, in whatever form they desire, occurs in the world of image and the abstract lights, such as the Creator, the intellects, and the celestial souls.

25 We chose to read *al-fariqa* here. Both editions actually read *al-baraha*. Habibi suggests it may be *al-barhana* ("the demonstration") or *brahmin* ("Hindu priests"). However, Shahrāzūrī is using a passage from Suhrawardī's *al-Mashārī'* here (*al-Ṭabī'āt, al-Mashrī' al-rābī', fī 'l-ajsām wa'l-muḥaddad wa'l-makān*) and there *al-baraha* is not attested. Instead, in Leiden 365, folio 155b we read *al-fariqa*. The confusion about this word is already present in the manuscript evidence on *al-Mashārī'*, as we read in Topkapi 3377, folio 178a *al-faraha* (vocalized as such). Moreover, when Ibn Kammūna cites the passage, we read in the edition *al-'ariqa* and the editor, again Habibi, emphasizes that this is how he reads the manuscript, see Ibn Kammūna, *Sharḥ al-Ṭabī'āt*, vol. 3, p. 530. *Al-Fariqa* seems the most likely given the context, and it is also in agreement with a different version of the same passage that Shahrāzūrī offers elsewhere in the *Rasā'il* (Habibi's edition, vol. 2, p. 153), in which he speaks of *ba'd al-kahana wa-sahara* ("some of ...").

26 Literally: "in and outside their moment" (*fī waqtihā wa-ghayr waqtihā*).

27 It is surprising to see Shahrāzūrī write in this manner about his book, as this sentence is merely an appropriation of Suhrawardī's *al-Mashārī'*, in which Suhrawardī refers the reader to his *Hikmat al-ishrāq*.

The human, rational souls that have separated, or those who have perfected themselves without having separated, become visible in {402} forms varying in beauty and ugliness, subtlety and coarseness, awesome and meek, and in other such conditions and characteristics, in measure of the strength of the essence with which the image appears and the level of its preparedness for it, according to what is required by the time and the situation for and in which the image appears. The intellect and angel may at times appear in a beautiful, subtle, and pleasurable form, and at times in a awe-inspiring painful form, and at times in an ugly, obnoxious form, in accordance with the difference between the situations that motivate the appearance in generically and typologically different forms.

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Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī's "Postscript" to His *Tablets of 'Imād al-Dīn* and Najm Dīn Nayrīzī's Commentary on It

Reza Pourjavady¹

The Tablets of 'Imād al-Dīn (al-Ahwāḥ al-'Imādiyya) was written by Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī (d. 587/1191) sometime during the last six years of his life. It is therefore one of Suhrawardī's late works, if not his latest work.² Suhrawardī wrote this work at the request of the Artuqid king 'Imād al-Dīn Abū Bakr b. Qara Arsalān (r. 581/1185–600/1204), the ruler of Kharput in Anatolia, which was populated mostly by Armenians at the time. Its subject, as the author describes, is "provenance and destination" (*al-mabda' wa'l-ma'ād*). Structurally, the work is distinct from other works of Suhrawardī. It belongs to the *genre* of mirror for princes,³ modeled on an anonymous work of "one of the latest scholars (*ba'd fuḍalā' al-muta'akhhirīn*).⁴ The only other work by Suhrawardī which similarly belongs to the *genre* of a mirror for princes is his *Book of Radiance (Partawnāma)*, dedicated to the Seljuk prince, Rukn al-Dīn

1 I would like to thank Wilferd Madelung for reading and commenting on an early draft of this paper.

2 See Nasrollah Pourjavady, "Shaykh-i Ishrāq u ta'lif-i *Alwāḥ-i 'Imādiyya*", in *Ishrāq u 'irfān*, ed. Nasrollah Pourjavady, Tehran: Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāhī, 1380 Sh/2001, pp. 83–94. The author convincingly argues that the work was composed for 'Imād al-Dīn Abū Bakr b. Qara Arsalān when the latter was the ruler of Kharput. Since 'Imād al-Dīn captured Kharput in 581/1185–82, the date of composition of this work must be sometime after this date. However, the work was wrongly assumed by Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī to be an early work of Suhrawardī. See Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *Sharḥ Hikmat al-ishrāq*, eds. 'Abd Allāh Nūrānī and Mahdī Muḥaqqiq, Tehran: Anjuman-i Āthār u Mafākhir-i Farhangī, 1379 Sh/200, p. 14. This assumption was challenged by Najm al-Dīn Maḥmūd Nayrīzī in his commentary on the *Alwāḥ al-'Imādiyya*. See Reza Pourjavady, *Philosophy in Early Safavid Iran: Najm al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-Nayrīzī and His Writings*, Leiden: Brill, 2011, p. 132.

3 On the dedicatee of this work and the confusion on his name and identity in modern literature, see Nasrollah Pourjavady, "Shaykh-i Ishrāq u ta'lif-i *Alwāḥ-i 'Imādiyya*", pp. 88–84.

4 Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī, *Oeuvres philosophiques et mystiques*, vol. 4, ed. Najaf-Qulī Ḥabībī, 3rd edition, Tehran: Pazhūhishgāh-i 'Ulūm-i Insānī u Muṭāla'āt-i Farhangī, 1380 Sh/2001, p. 34.

Sulaymān Shāh (r. 592/1196–600/1204), the son of ‘Izz al-Dīn Qilīj Arsalān (r. 551/1156–588/1191–92).⁵

The Tablets consists of an introduction and four “tablets”. Tablet One: on proofs for the finitude of dimensions, on the boundaries of the sky and the world, on the simplicity of the elements and what originates from them (*fī ithbāt tanāhī al-ab‘ūd wa-fī ṭaraf min al-samā’ wa-l-‘ālam wa-fī basā’it al-‘unṣuriyyāt wa-mā yaḥduthu minhā*); Tablet Two: on the soul with reference to its faculties (*fī ‘l-naḥs wa-ishāra ilā quwāhā*); Tablet Three: on the proofs for the existence of the Necessary Existent and on His attributes of greatness and perfection (*fī ithbāt wājib al-wujūd wa-mā yaliq bihī min ṣifāt al-jalāl wa-nu‘ūt al-kamāl*); and Tablet Four: on the order of the world, the destiny and eternity of souls and their happiness and wretchedness, pain and pleasure and the influences of souls (*fī ‘l-niḏām wa-l-qaḍā’ wa-l-qadar wa-baqā’ al-nufūs wa-l-sa‘āda wa-l-shaqāwa wa-l-ladhdha wa-l-alam wa-āthār al-nufūs*). The work abounds with Qur’anic citations and allusions, particularly towards the end. Moreover, it contains a lengthy discussion on legendary Iranian kings, Afrīdūn (commonly known as Firiydūn) and Kay Khusraw, with details on their spirituality and manners, which seems to serve the author’s intention to advise the prince.⁶

The only known commentary on this work is by Najm al-Dīn Maḥmūd Nayrīzī (d. after 933/1526).⁷ Completed on 5 Rabī‘ 11 930/11 February 1524, this commentary is called *Miṣbāḥ al-arwāḥ fī kashf ḥaqā’iq al-Atwāḥ* (*The Lamp of the Spirits in Ascertaining the Truths in the Tablets*).⁸ In the introduction to this commentary, Nayrīzī explains how he encountered this work:

فصادفتُ بعضاً من هذه الأوان، أثناء السفر في البلدان، كتاباً وافق ما أردت
تصنيفه، وعزمت تأليفه، ألفه وحيد عصره وأوانه [...] مشحوناً بالغرائب، مخزوناً
بالعجائب، فيه زبدة أسرار أهل النظر والاستدلال، وخالصة مكاشفات

5 See *The Book of Radiance: A Parallel English-Persian Text*, edited and translated with an introduction by Hossein Ziai, Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1998. For more details about the authorship of this work and its dedicatee see Nasrollah Pourjavady, “*Partawnāma* u tarjuma-yi ingilīsi-i ān”, in *Ishrāq u ‘irfān*, ed. Nasrollah Pourjavady, Tehran Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāhi, 1380 Sh/2001, pp. 387–407.

6 See Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī, *Oeuvres philosophiques et mystiques*, vol. 4, pp. 91–93.

7 On Najm al-Dīn Nayrīzī and his works, see Reza Pourjavady, *Philosophy in Early Safavid Iran: Najm al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-Nayrīzī and His Writings*, Leiden: Brill, 2011. On this commentary, in particular, see *ibid.*, pp. 131–152 and 172–178.

8 A critical edition of this commentary is under preparation by Wilferd Madelung and the present author.

أهل الوجد والحال، ونفائس الأمور الشريفة المكنونة، ودقائق الأمور النفيسة المكنونة.

While I was travelling from one city to another, I happened to find a book which was in agreement with what I wanted to write. It was composed by someone with whom no one could compete in his age. It is filled with extraordinary and interesting things, containing a selection of the secrets of the theoreticians (*ahl al-naẓar wa'l-istidlāl*), a summary of the disclosures of the mystics (*ahl al-wajd wa'l-hāl*), valuable things which are noble and hidden, and precise matters which are precious and concealed.⁹

As mentioned in the above quotation, Nayrīzī found a copy of this work when he left Shiraz to travel through different cities, which happened sometime after 904/1498–99. The work, however, was known to the scholars of Shiraz before this date. This is evident from the citation of this work in Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī's (d. 908/1502) commentary on Suhrawardī's *Hayākil al-nūr* (*The Flashes of Light*), *Shawākil al-hūr* (completed in 872/1468) and Ghiyāth al-Dīn al-Dashtakī's (d. 949/1542) supercommentary on the aforementioned commentary by Dawānī, *Ishrāq Hayākil al-nūr* (completed before 895/1490–91).¹⁰

When Nayrīzī started commenting on the *Tablets*, he had only one copy of this work at his disposal. This single copy, however, was not complete at the end. The concluding section of the text, based on the copy at his disposal, was the following.

وللعلماء المتألهين أسرار في كيفية تخلص النفس إلى عالم الحق، أشرنا إليها في حكمة الإشراف. اللهم يا قيام الوجود، وفائض الجود، منزل البركات، وغاية الحركات، منتهى الرغبات، ونهاية الطلبات، نور التور، ومدبر الأمور، واهب الحياة العالمين، أيدينا بنورك، ووقفنا لمرضاتك، وألهمنا برشدك، وطهرنا من رجس الظلمات، وخلصنا من غسق الطبيعة إلى مشاهدة أنوارك ومعينة

9 Najm al-Dīn al-Nayrīzī, *Miṣbāḥ al-arwāḥ fi kashf ḥaqā'iq al-Alwāḥ*, ms Şehid Ali Paşa 1739, f. 2a.

10 See Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī, "Shawākil al-hūr fi sharḥ Hayākil al-nūr", *Thalāth rasā'il*, ed. Sayyid Aḥmad Tūysirkānī, Mashhad: Āstān-i Quds-i Riḍawī, 1411/1991, pp. 100–261 (esp. pp. 135, 202); Ghiyāth al-Dīn al-Dashtakī, *Ishrāq Hayākil al-nūr fi sharḥ Shawākil al-gharūr*, ed. 'Alī Awjabī, Tehran: Mīrāth-i Maktūb, 1382 Sh/2003, pp. 56, 135, 136.

أضوائك ومجاورة مقرّيك وموافقة سكّان ملكوتك، واحشرنا مع الذين أنعمت
 ﴿عليهم من النبيين والصدّيقين والشهداء والصالحين حسن أولئك رفيقاً﴾.¹¹

The scholars who practice *theosis* know the secrets of how to release the soul to the world of truth, as I indicated in my “Philosophy of Illumination”. O my God, O the One who subsists existence, emanates generosity, bestows blessings, the One who is the end of all motions, inclinations and quests, the Light of lights, the Manager of all affairs, the One who brings the worlds to life, help us with Your light, bring us into agreement with what please You, and inspire us with Your rectitude, purify us from the iniquity of darkness, and liberate us from the blackness of the nature to the witness of Your lights, to the observation of Your splendors, to the proximity of those who are close to You, and to the conformity with the rudder of Your heavenly court. And resurrect us with those You have bestowed favor, ﴿among the prophets, the steadfast affirmers of truth, the martyrs and the righteous. What a beautiful fellowship﴾.

At the time, Nayrīzī was not aware of the incompleteness of the text at his disposal. The prayer used in the above passage is like the prayer commonly used in the epilogues of the texts. It is, therefore, not surprising that it made Nayrīzī believe that Suhrawardī’s text ended there. With no further hesitation, Nayrīzī ended his commentary after commenting on this passage on 5 Rabīʿ II 930/11 February 1524. Two years later, however, he found another copy of the work with the additional section at the end. Comparing the two versions of the text at his disposal, Nayrīzī concluded that the final section was added later by Suhrawardī. He then started commenting on this addition, to which he refers as postscript (*dhayl*). He completed his commentary on this part in Jawzā (Rajab-Shaʿbān) 932/May–June 1526.

Whether or not Nayrīzī was right in assuming that the final piece is Suhrawardī’s postscript warrants further investigation. To that end, it is necessary to examine the extant manuscripts of the *al-ʿAlwāḥ al-ʿImādiyya*. The following copies of the work are known to have been preserved in the manuscript collections:

11 Q 4: 69; See Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī, *Oeuvres philosophiques et mystiques*, vol. 4, p. 96. I have amended the quotation with the help of a manuscript copy of the *al-ʿAlwāḥ al-ʿImādiyya*, MS Ahmet 111 3271, ff. 122a–168a (f. 166a).

1. MS Carullah 2078 (held at the Süleymaniye Library, Istanbul), ff. 127b–153b, completed in Tabriz in 669/1270–1
2. MS Ahmet III 3271 (held at the Topkapi Palace Museum, Istanbul), ff. 122a–168a, completed at the end of Jumādā II 708/December 1308 in the Mu'iniyya madrasa in Kashan
3. MS Ragip 1480 (held at the Süleymaniye Library, Istanbul), ff. 314b–327a, completed at the end of Şafar 732/November–December 1331 in Sulţāniyya
4. MS Al-Beruni Institute for Oriental Studies 2213 (Tashkent), completed in 745/1344–45
5. MS University of Leipzig 203/2 (Leipzig), ff. 63b–41b, completed on 26 Muḥarram 791/25 January 1389
6. MS Ayasofya 2384 (held at the Süleymaniye Library, Istanbul), ff. 1b–42a, completed in 799/1396–97
7. MS Esad 2684 (held at the Süleymaniye Library, Istanbul), copy completed in 870/1465–66
8. MS Milli A 32/2 (held at the Milli Library, Ankara), abridged version
9. MS Garret 4771Y (held at Princeton University Library, Princeton), ff. 2a–50b, abridged version, completed on 13 Rabī' I 994/29 January in Aḥmadābād
10. MS Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī 1400 (Tehran), completed in Kashan in 1016/1607–08, incomplete at the end
11. MS Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī 634/21 (Tehran), completed in 1043/1633–4
12. MS Madrasa-yi Gharb 700/4 (Hamadan), completed on 5 Jumādā II 1055/20 August 1643
13. MS Sipahsālār 8359/4 (held at the Shahid Motahhari University Library, Tehran), completed in Dhū l-Ḥijja 1063/October 1653
14. MS Nawwāb 60/7 (Mashhad), completed in 1069/1658–9
15. MS Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī 5283/42 (Tehran), completed in Dhū l-Qa'da 1079/April 1669
16. MS Mar'ashī 4353/21 (Qum), ff. 66b–76b, copied by Muḥammad Mahdī b. 'Alī Naqī Ḥusaynī known as "Tawḥīd", copied between 1084/1673 and 1117/1609
17. MS Petermann II 578 (held at the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Berlin), ff. 141–193, completed in Rabī' I 1116/July–August 1704
18. MS Ilāhiyyāt 239/29 (held at the Central Library of the University of Tehran, Tehran), completed in 12th /18th century
19. MS Esad 1933 (held at the Süleymaniye Library, Istanbul), ff. 121a–148a
20. MS Sipahsālār 2919/16 (held at the Shahid Motahhari University Library, Tehran), abridged version

21. MS Malik 4655/63 (Tehran), ff. 264b–278b, abridged version
22. MS University of Tehran 535/5 (held at the Central Library of the University of Tehran, Tehran)
23. MS University of Tehran 3152/5 (held at the Central Library of the University of Tehran, Tehran), copied by Murtaḍā Mūsawī Khwānsārī
24. MS Uppsala University Library 3939/10 (Uppsala)¹²

Of the manuscript copies of this work, which I was able to examine directly or make judgement based on the descriptions provided in the catalogues (no. 1–3, 5–6, 10, 13, 16–19, 21), no one seems to represent the same recension of the text, used primarily by Nayrīzī. However, a Persian translation of the work preserved in MS Millī 2928/11 (produced in 879/1474, held at the National Library of Iran, Tehran)¹³ ends in the same way that Nayrīzī's first copy of the work does.

If we agree with Nayrīzī in assuming that the last part was indeed a post-script, we need to explain why Suhrawardī did add this part to the text in the first place. In this piece, Suhrawardī emphasizes the significance of enduring thought on the immaterial world. He argues that such contemplation would facilitate the reception of the divine flashes. These flashes in turn may radiate certified knowledge for the wayfarer (*sālik*). The last point before the prayer in this piece is about the human being as the vicegerent of God on earth, where the author argues the following:

12 See Hellmut Ritter, "Philologica IX. Die vier Suhrawardī. Ihre Werke in Stambuler Handschriften", *Der Islam*, 24 (1937), 270–286 (271); Muṣṭafā Dirāyatī, *Fihristwāra-yi dast-nīwishta-hā-yi Īrān*, Tehran: Kitābkhāna, Mūzi u Markaz-i Asnād-i Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī, 1389 Sh/2010, vol. 2, p. 13; Carl Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur*, vol. 1, Leiden: Brill, 1943, p. 565; Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī, *Oeuvres philosophiques et mystiques*, vol. 3, ed. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, 3rd edition, Tehran: Pazhūhishgāh-i 'Ulūm-i Insānī u Muṭāla'āt-i Farhangī, 1380 Sh/2001, [Persian introduction] pp. 61–62; Rudolf Mach, *Catalogue of Arabic Manuscripts (Yahuda Section) in the Garrett Collection Princeton University Library*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977, p. 258, no. 3037; Muḥammad Taqī Dānishpazhūh, *Nashriyya-yi nuskhahā-yi khaṭṭī-i kitābkhāna-yi markazī-i dānishgāh-i Tihirān*, vol. 9, Tehran: Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tihirān, 1358 Sh/1980–81, p. 159.

13 'Abd Allāh Anwār, *Fihrist-i nuskhahā-yi khaṭṭī-i kitābkhāna-yi millī-i Īrān*, vol. 6, 2nd edition, Tehran: Kitābkhāna-yi Millī-i Jumhūrī-i Islāmī-i Īrān, 1379 Sh/2000, p. 667. There seems to be a mistake in the catalogue; what has been mentioned as the "incipit [=āghāz]" of the work must be the end of it. What has been mentioned as "the end of the copy [=pāyān-i nuskhā]" must be the colophon of the scribe.

واعلم أن النفس خليفة الله في أرضه [...] وقبيح بالخليفة أن يجعل المملكة التي هي له سببا لبطلان ملكه العالي الدائم. وهذا في حق الملوك أظهر، فإنه من القبيح أن يسبقهم في الآخرة من سبقوه في الدنيا. ومن الحسرة أن يسبق في الدائم، من يسبق في الزائل.¹⁴

Know that the [human] soul is the vicegerent of God on the earth [...]. And it is disgraceful for the vicegerent that his kingdom should cause the annulment of his permanent and sublime reign. And this is most evident with respect to kings, because it is disgraceful for them to stay behind people in the higher world whom they were leading in this world. And it would be a pity that someone who is behind others in the permanent [world] was the one ahead of others in the vanishing [world].

Assuming that this part was added later by the author, we might like to consider that mentioning this opinion had some significance for the author. Notwithstanding its very content, the indirect reference to the king might have had some stylistic significance for Suhrawardī. An indirect reference to the dedicatee, can be found also right at the end of his *Partawnāma*, the other work in the *genre* of mirror for princes he composed.¹⁵

In his commentary on this piece, Nayrīzī also notes that this portion was written as a piece of advice (*waṣīyya*) for the dedicatee of the book and it contains guidance and indications as to the things he should occupy himself with as well as to the things he should avoid. Nayrīzī explains that he decided to comment on this piece to multiply its benefits (*takthīran li-l-fawā'id*) and complete its intentions (*tatmīman li-l-maqāṣid*). It should be noted that Nayrīzī's commentary on this piece is entirely explanatory. Unlike the other parts, the commentator in this section did not present his own idiosyncratic philosophical positions. Moreover, he only embellishes his commentary on this section with some Qur'anic verses and a *ḥadīth*.¹⁶ This may signify that, according to the commentator, this piece was not of any particular philosophical significance.

14 Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī, *Oeuvres philosophiques et mystiques*, vol. 4, p. 98.

15 For the correct ending of *Partawnāma*, see Nasrollah Pourjavady, "*Partawnāma* u tarjuma-yi ingilīsī-yi ān", p. 401.

16 See below, p. 193, where the *ḥadīth*, "*kullukum rā' wa-kullukum mas'ūl 'an ra'iyatih*" (All of you are guardians and responsible for your wards) has been mentioned.

Another possibility should also be taken into account. The manuscript of the Princeton University Library, Garret 4771Y contains “The abridged form of the *Alwāḥ*” (*Mukhtaṣar al-Atwāḥ*), which ends exactly in the same way that Nayrīzī’s first copy of the work does. Rudolf Mach, the cataloguer of the collection, suggested that the text of the manuscript is an anonymous abridgment of Suhrawardī’s *al-Atwāḥ al-ʿImādiyya*.¹⁷ We might tend to believe that the first version of the text available to the commentator was likewise cut by someone other than the author. Although the possibility that someone else shortened the text cannot be ruled out, the fact that the prayer at the end of the shorter version is indeed by Suhrawardī makes such assumption less likely. Moreover, if someone excised the ending of the text in order to make an abridged version of it, he would make other changes to the text too. The text preserved in MS Garret 4771Y was shortened in several occasions. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that someone else reduced it. However, this assumption does not seem to be right about the first copy of Nayrīzī which was apparently complete with the exception of its ending.

For further investigation, an edition of this part of the text and the commentary on it is presented below. This edition is based on the MS Şehid Ali Paşa 1739, ff. 209a–213a, copied by the son of the commentator, Muḥammad b. Ḥājjī Maḥmūd al-Nayrīzī on 2 Rabīʿ 1 943/10 September 1536, which was reproduced from the holograph.

17 Rudolf Mach, *Catalogue of Arabic Manuscript (Yahuda Section) in the Garret Collection Princeton Library*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977, p. 258, no. 3037.

Edition

شرح ذيل الكتاب

ثم إني بعد الفراغ عن إتمام شرح الكتاب وجدت نسخة ذيل المصنّف كتابه هذا بإشارات وتلويحات، فيها الإرشاد والهداية والدلالة على أمور على المتصدّي بمطالعة كتابه هذا الاشتغال والمواظبة بها، وكان هذا منه وصيّة لمن صنّف الكتاب له. فرأيت أن أوردتها ههنا وأبين ما فيه من الإشارات تكثيراً للفوائد وتميماً للمقاصد. وأقول: قال المصنّف قدس سره: **واعلم، أيها الطالب لمعرفة المبدأ والمعاد، أنه يجب على المستبصر السالك إلى هاتين المعرفتين بالخبرة والبصيرة ودوام التدبّر والفكر والنظر في أحوال العالم¹ التي هي أنواع موجودات ممكنة مشتملة على أمور دالة على أن للعالم صناعاً له تعالى صفات كمالية وسمات جلالية، وعلى كيفية حدوث النفس الناطقة الإنسانية وكيفية تعلقها بالبدن وبقائها بعد قطع التعلق عنه، والظاهر أنه أراد بأحوال العالم أحوالاً أوردتها في فصول هذا الكتاب والأواح مشتملة على أحوال العالم الروحاني المشير إليه قوله: **وأسرار الوجود** وحكمه المشتمل عليها هذه الأحوال العارضة للموجود من حيث هو موجود وأحوال العالم الأثيري، المشير إليه قوله: **والسير في السماوات** والأفلاك الكليّة والجزئية وحركاتها المختلفة سرعةً وبطوءاً طويلاً وعرضاً، وأحوال العالم العنصريّ المشير إليه قوله: **والأرض**، أي عالم البسائط العنصريّة ومركباتها التي هي المواليث الثلاث وأنواعها والأصناف المندرجة تحتها كما ورد الأمر به بالتدبّر فيه مثاني منها **المثني** المشير إليه قوله وهو قوله تعالى ﴿ويتفكرون﴾ بعقولهم الخالصة عن شوب الوهم **(في خلق السموات والأرض)** استدلالاً واعتباراً، إذ هو أفضل العبادات، كما قال عليه الصلاة والسلام: لا عبادة كالتفكير لأنّه المخصوص بالقلب والمقصود من الخلق قائلين بقوله تعالى ﴿ربنا﴾ وخالقنا ومبدعنا **(ما خلقت هذا باطلاً² عاطلاً، أي ليس بصادر عنك بإرادة جزافية غير مشتملة على غاية عقلية كليّة لتكون أقدمت عليه، أي على فعله وإيجاده****

1 وفي الأواح: العوالم. 2 آل عمران، 191.

جزافاً عبثاً ضائعاً من غير مصلحة كليّة، إذ يقتضي بطلانه بعد حصوله، لئلا يكون أبدية، كيف، وليس جوده تعالى وعطاؤه وكرمه أبتّر، ولا يكون وراءه جود وعطاء آخر لا يشمل على جميع ما يطلبه الممكّات بالسنة الاستعدادات المشعر بها قوله تعالى ﴿وَأَتَاكُمْ مِنْ كُلِّ مَا سَأَلْتُمُوهُ﴾¹ أي بلسان الاستعداد، فإن كل شيء يسأله بلسان الاستعداد كما لا يفيض عليه بالسؤال بلا تخلف² وتراجح، كما قال ﴿يسأله من في السموات والأرض كل يوم هو في شأن﴾³ ولا يشغله شأن عن شأن علي ما يشير إليه قوله، **ولا ينقطع الطرفين**، ليكون له أول وآخر ﴿سبحانك﴾ أي أتزهك وأبعدك عن ما لا يليق بشأنك ﴿فقنا عذاب النار﴾⁴ للإخلال بالنظر والاقتدار والقيام بما يقتضيه من الأفعال والآثار، **ويثني هذه الآية الكريمة** المشتملة على الفكر والتدبر من حيث هو لزوم الفكر والنظر قوله ﴿أولم ينظروا﴾ نظر الاستدلال والاعتبار لا الرؤية والإبصار ﴿في ملكوت السموات والأرض﴾ التي هي من عظام العالم الجسماني المشتمل على دقائق وحقائق مشاهدة بوجود مبدعه وخالقه ووحدانيته وأحديته وصمديته واتصافه بصفات الكمال ونعوت الجلال، ولم ينظروا أيضاً في ﴿ما خلق الله من شيء﴾⁵ أي من مادة ومدّة وأجزاء أخر كالمواليد الثلاث الحاصلة من أمهات هي بسائط الأجرام العنصرية، ومن الآباء الكريمة الأثرية الفلكية وإتما قلنا أنّ هذه الآية تثني الآية المتقدمة إذ فيها أيضاً إشارة إلى تعميم الفكر والنظر، إذ إذا قرن **النظر بلفظة في تراد به الفكرة**، التي هي حركة النفس في المعقولات، لا في المحسوسات، يرشدك إليه قوله تعالى ﴿فانظر إلى آثار رحمة الله﴾⁶ التي هي الغيوث الممطرة للأنوار المثمرة لأنواع نباتات المعارف وأنه كيف يحيي بها الأرض، أي أرض القلب بعد موتها بالجهالات المركبة والاتصاف بالأخلاق الرديئة الممانعة عن الاتصاف بالعلوم اليقينية والأخلاق المرضية التي إنّما خلق لتحصيلها⁷ والاتصاف بها فيلأقي ربّها وخالقها وموجدّها ملاقة غير حسية ومقاربة غير جسمانية مكانية، أو وضعيّة، أو لم يتفكروا في أنفسهم وذواتهم أنه تعالى ﴿ما خلق الله في السموات﴾ أي

1 إبراهيم، 34. 2 تخلف: تخاف. 3 الرحمن، 29. 4 آل عمران، 191. 5 الأعراف، 185.

6 الروم، 50. 7 لتحصيلها: الاتصاف لتحصيلها.

سماوات نفوسها ﴿والأرض﴾ أي أراضى أبداننا ﴿وما بينهما﴾ من القوى الطبيعية والروحانية ﴿إلا بالحق﴾ والحكمة والعدل وظهور الخلق في مظاهره بالصفات على حسب الاستعدادات ﴿وأجل مستى﴾ هو غاية كل كائن وكمال كل واحد منهم وقيامه في الله بمقتضى الاستعداد الأول الذي خلق له حتى يشهد لقاء الله فيهم بصفاته وذواته ﴿وإن كثيراً﴾ من الناس بلقاء ربهم كافرون¹ لاحتجابهم عنه بحسبان انحصار كمالاتهم في الجسم والجسمانيات والغفلة من الكمالات الروحانية وطلبها واكتسابها وأن الدنيا التي هي النشأة التعلقية غير أبدية وأن الآخرة التي هي عند قطع التعلق عن الجسم والجسمانيات غير متحققة ﴿أولم يسيروا في الأرض فينظروا كيف كان عاقبة الذين من قبلهم كانوا أشد منهم قوة وأثاروا الأرض وعمروها أكثر مما عمروها وجاءتهم رسلهم بالبينات فما كان الله ليظلمهم ولكن كانوا أنفسهم يظلمون²﴾ بترك التدبر والتفكر والنظر والاستدلال، وإنما قلنا أن هذا لذاك أفراداً **لطفت الفكرة**، أي القوة المفكرة، **بالأمور³ الروحانية** الغير الجسمانية **تواترت⁴ بالبراقات الإلهية** من الأنوار **عليها** بترتيب وتفصيل أورده المصنف في الإشراق، وإليه مجملاً قد أشار في آخر كتابه هذا، ونقلنا عنه ما ذكره فيه مفصلاً، وكذا ما أشار إليه غيره **كما ورد** به **المتنى**، وهو **قوله** تعالى: ﴿لم تر أن الله يزجي⁵﴾ أي يسوق برياح النفحات والإرادات ﴿سحاباً﴾، أي سحاب العقل، متزجاً متزجاً من الصور الجزئية ﴿ثم يولف بينه﴾ على ضروب من التأليفات المنتجة ﴿ثم يجعله ركاماً﴾ أي حججاً وبراهين ﴿فترى الودق﴾ أي المطر الذي هو من نتاج يقينية ﴿يخرج من خلاله﴾ أي متفرقة ﴿وينزل من السماء﴾ أي من سماء الروح ﴿من جبال﴾ هي أنوار السكينة واليقين الموجبة للوقاء وللطمأنينة والاستقرار ﴿فيها﴾ أي في تلك الجبال ﴿من برد﴾ الحقائق والمعارف الكشفية والمعاني الذوقية، أو من جبال في السماء، وهي معادن العلوم اليقينية وأنواعها، فإن لكل علم وصنعة معدناً في الروح ثابتاً فيه بحسب الفطرة يفيض منه ذلك العلم، ولهذا يتأتى لبعضهم بعض العلوم بالسهولة دون بعض آخر، ويتأتى بعضهم أكثرها ولا يتأتى لبعض شيء شيئاً منها، وكل ميسر لما خلق له، فيكون معنى

1 الروم، 8. 2 الروم، 9. 3 وفي الألواح: في الأمور. 4 وفي الألواح: تولت. 5 التور، 43.

الكلام أنه ينزل من سماء الروح من الجبال التي هي فيها برد المعارف والحقائق ﴿فيصيب به من يشاء﴾ من القوى الروحانية والنفوس المستعدة ﴿ويصرفه عمّن يشاء﴾ من القوى النفسانية والنفوس الجسمانية المحجوبة ﴿يكاد سنا بركة﴾ أي ضوء بوارق ذلك البرد وهو ما مقدر من الأنوار الواردة الغير الثابتة القديمة الاستقرار، بل تلمع وتغيب إلى أن يصير سكينه ﴿يذهب بالأبصار﴾ من شدة الخطفات وقوة النفحات، فيعرض لأبصار البصيرة حيرة، وكلها ازدادات ازدادات تحيراً، ولذا قال عليه السلام: زدني تحيراً أي علماً ونوراً ﴿يقلب الله الليل﴾ أي ليل ظلمة النفس ﴿والنهار﴾ أي نهار نور الروح بأن يغلب تارة نور الروح فيتنور القلب والنفس، ويعقبه أخرى ظلمة النفس بالظهور فيكدر، وإليه يشير قوله : بالستر والكشف ﴿إن في ذلك لعبرة لأولى الأبصار﴾¹ القلبية، المستبصرين من أصحاب الاعتبار، فيلتجئون إلى الله في التلوّيات وظلم النقوش متوجهين إلى جناب الحق ومعادن النور يلجأون إليه لينكشف عنهم الحجاب وينورهم بالأنوار القدسيّة الذوقية والعلوم الحقيقيّة والمعارف اليقينية، يثنيه قوله تعالى ﴿هو الذي يريكم البرق﴾ أي برق لوامع الأنوار القدسيّة والخطفة الإلهية في فضاء الأرواح ﴿خوفاً﴾ يغشاكم² على الفوات والانقطاع لسرعة انقضائه وبطوء رجوعه ﴿وطمعا﴾³ على الثبات لسرعة رجوعه ﴿ينشئ السحاب﴾ أي سحاب السكينه ﴿الثقال﴾ بماء العلم اليقينيّ والعرفان الحقيقيّ، المشير إليه قوله : السكينه الثابتة الممطرة للعلوم ﴿ويسبح الرعد﴾ أي رعد سطوات التجليات الجلاية ﴿والملائكة﴾ أي ملكوت القوى الروحانية ﴿من خيفته وجلاله ويرسل الصواعق﴾⁵ أي معادن السبحات الإلهية يتجلي القهر الحقيقي المتضمن للطف الكليّ، فيسلب عن السالك المتجليّ عليه موانع الحجب الظلمانية النفسانية ويمحوها، على ما يشير إليه قوله عليه السلام: إن لله تعالى سبعين ألف حجاب من نور وظلمة لو كشفها لأحرقت سبحات وجهه ما انتهى إليه بصره، ومن آيات تدلّ على حال السالك في حال خطفاته العلوية والنغمات القدسيّة. قوله تعالى ﴿وآية لهم الليل﴾ أي ليل ظلمة الهياكل البدنية وغيرها ﴿نسلخ منه النهار﴾ أي نهار شمس الروح والنفوس

1 النور، 44. 2 وفي الألواح: يغشيك. 3 الرعد، 12. 4 وفي الألواح: في. 5 الرعد، 13.

المستضيئة عند الخطفة بالألق واللمعان فإذا هم مظلومون داخلون في الظلام،
يثنيه قوله تعالى ﴿وجعلنا الليل﴾ أي ظلمة النفوس ﴿والنهار﴾ أي نور
العلم والمعرفة ﴿آيتين﴾ أي علامتين هما ظلمة العلاقة العشقية التدييرية¹ التي للنفس
مع البدن وضوء البررة الروحانية من المعقولات المنور بها أراضى النفوس الناطقة
المجردة التي هي محال هذه الأنوار ﴿فمحنونا آية الليل﴾ وعلامته المكدره الحاجة
المانعة بسلطان الضوء البارح المبتدئ في الطلوع من الأفق الأعلى التجردى الذي
لا يظهر المعقولات ولا يطلع إلا منه ﴿وجعلنا آية النهار مبصرة﴾² مظهره للحقائق
المعقولة، المبرأة عن اللواحق المادية، والغواشي الغريبة المؤثرة في صيرورتها
جسمانية، وقد ورد فيما يلي من الحقائق عند ظهور الأنوار الروحانية الغير الجسمانية
مثنى وهو قوله تعالى ﴿وما جعله الله إلا بشرى لكم﴾، أي الإمداد بالملائكة التي هي
من عالم ملكوت القهر التي هي القوى السماوية وروحانياتها التي تناسب قلوبكم،
الإشارة لكم بالنصر والطمأنينة لقلوبكم بالاتصال بها عند التجرد عن ملابس النفس
وأحوالها ﴿وما النصر إلا من عند الله﴾ إلا أن حكمته يقتضى تعليق الأشياء بأسبابها
﴿إن الله عزيز﴾، أي قويم على النصر غالب ﴿حكيم﴾³ يفعل الأسباب والمسببات
على مقتضى الحكمة والمشئنة ولا تحسبوا النصر إلا منها ولا تياسوا منها بفقدانها
﴿إذ يغشيكم النعاس﴾ بعدو القوى البدنية والصفات النفسانية بنزول السكينة
﴿أمنة﴾ أي أمناً من عند الله وطمأنينة، أي السبات الإلهي والنوم الذي يكون
للسلاك عند خمود وسكون دنيوي ﴿وينزل عليكم من السماء﴾ أي من العالم العقلي
﴿ماء ليطهركم به﴾ علوماً وأنواراً عن حدث أحاديث النفس وهواجس الوهم ويريككم
عنه ﴿ويذهب عنكم رجز الشيطان﴾ أي رجز وسوسة الشيطان وتخوفه والعذاب فما
يتعلق بنفوسكم من الشواغل الهيولانية والعلائق الظلمانية الجسدانية الغير الروحانية
وإنما قلنا أن مراده تعالى من الإنزال هاهنا ما أشرنا إليه لأنه لما قال متصلاً به
﴿وليربط به على قلوبكم ويثبت به الأقدام﴾⁴، دل ذلك على أن المقصد الأقصى⁵
من إنزال الماء في الآية هذه ليس هو الماء البسيط الذي هو أحد العناصر

1 وفي الألواح: البدنية. 2 الإسراء، 12. 3 آل عمران، 126. 4 الأنفال، 11. 5 وفي الألواح:
الأصلي.

الأربعة **الحاصي**¹ أي المنسوب إلى السيلان، أي القالع الأجزاء إذ الحاصي² إنما هي أرض أكلته السيول، فيكون معنى الكلام أن تقيد إنزال الماء من السماء بربط القلوب وثبت الأقدام قرينة دالة على أن المراد بالماء العلوم والمعارف اليقينية لا الماء المنسوب إلى الجوخ وقلع الأراضي بالسيلان في الوادي، إذ الربط والتثبيت المذكوران لا يحصل إلا باليقين المتعلق بالعلوم والمعارف، لا بماء سائل اقتلع أحوال الموازي والأراضي المهلكة، **ويثني هذه الآية قوله تعالى** ﴿وهو الذي جعل لكم الليل﴾ أي ليل ظلمة النفس ﴿لباساً﴾ يغشيكم بالاستيلاء عن مشاهدة الحق وصفاته والنوم ﴿أي نوم الغفلة في الحياة الدنيوية﴾ سباتاً ﴿يسبتون به يغفلون به عن الحياة الحقيقية السرمديّة، كما قال عليه السلام: الناس نيام، فإذا ماتوا انتبهوا.﴾
 ﴿وجعل النهار نشوراً﴾³ يحيي به قلوبكم في فضاء القدس بعد نوم الحس ﴿وهو الذي أرسل الرياح﴾ أي رياح النعمات الربانية ﴿بشراً﴾ باشرة محببة أو مبشرة ﴿بين يدي رحمته﴾، أي ما يقع من حركة الروح النفساني مما يوجب اقشعرار البدن عند الظهور ﴿وأزلنا من السماء﴾ أي سماء الروح أو من الأفق العقلي ﴿ماء﴾ وعلماً ﴿طهوراً﴾⁴ مطهراً يطهركم عن لوث الرذائل والجهالات لكونه من جنس المعارف وأنوار اليقين ويزكيكم عن رجس الطباع والعقائد الفاسدة ﴿لنجي به بلدة ميثاً﴾⁵ أي نفساً جاهلة يمكن أن تحيي بماء حياة الحقائق ونحن نسقيه بما خلقنا فيه إنعاماً من الهوى النفسانية بالعلوم النافعة العملية وأناسي من القوى الروحانية كثيراً من العلوم النظرية . فعليك بدوام الفكر والنظر في المعقولات وقطع التعلق من الجسم والجسمانيات، إذ بملكة التدبر فيها يمكن أن يحصل لك ما لا عين رأت ولا أذن سمعت .
واعلم بعد ما علمت هذا أن النفس الناطقة الإنسانية خليفة الله في أرضه المتعلقة هي بها المدبرة التي هي لتعديل القوى والحكم العدل بين القوى النفسانية والروحانية ورفع مزاحمة إحداهما على الأخرى ورفع ظلم بعض منها على البعض الآخر، كما **ورد** به المثني في التنزيل والقرآن المنزل على سيدنا وسندنا ونبينا محمد المصطفى صلوات الله وسلامه عليه **كقوله تعالى** ﴿وهو الذي جعلكم خلائف الأرض﴾⁶

1 الحاصي: الجاصي. 2 الحاصي: الجاصي. 3 الفرقان، 47. 4 الفرقان، 48. 5 الفرقان، 49.

6 فاطر، 39.

بإظهار كمالاته في المظاهر ليتمكن انقاذه، فمن كفر وستر ما خلق لأجله فعليه وزر وبال كفره بدوام الحجاب والستر المانعين للإظهار المذكور، يثنيه قوله تعالى ﴿وهو الذي جعلكم خلائف الأرض﴾ والأبدان على ما ينادي عليه قوله عليه السلام: **كلكم راع وكلكم مسئول عن رعيته** ﴿ورفع بعضكم فوق بعض درجات﴾¹ **على حسب** تفاوت الاستعدادات المختلفة بها **فضائل النفوس ومعالي² الهمم** ليلوكم فيما آتاكم من الكمالات حسب الاستعدادات ويظهر أن أياً منكم يقوم يحقون تجليات ما ظهر منها عليه، ومن لا يقوم به فيكون خائئاً، ويظهر أعمالكم، فيترتب إما بعقوبة الاحتجاب حالة التقصير وإما بمثوبة البروز والانكشاف، **وورد فيه مثنى آخر، وهو قوله تعالى ﴿إني جاعل في الأرض﴾** أي أرض البدن **﴿خليفة﴾**³ حاكمة بين قواها المتعددة المتخالفة آثاراً وأفعالاً ليربط بعضاً منها ببعض ويمنع بعضاً منها عن مخالفة البعض الآخر مخالفة موجبة لفساد الأحكام والآثار والأفعال مؤدياً إلى الهلاك الأبدية والزوال السرمدية، وإنما فسّرنا الخلافة بما فسّرناه ليكون موافقاً لما أمر به من قوله تعالى ﴿جعلناكم⁴ خلائف﴾⁵ إذ من البين أن الخليفة إن كانت بمعنى آخر لا يكون كل واحد من المخاطبين خليفة له تعالى، والظاهر خلافه . هذا خلف . كيف لا، ولو كان كل واحد منهم خليفة على كل واحد فمن عداه لا يكون لشيء منهم حكم على غيره ولا يكون لواحد منهم مملكة ولا رعية فيفسد ما هو من لوازم الخلافة والحكومة ولا ترتب عليه ما هو المقصود من جعلها وخلقها خلفاء إلا بتأويل بعيد لحجة الفطرة ولا أن يواخذ واحد منهم بما وجب أن يواخذ به ، **يثنيه قوله تعالى ﴿يا داود إنا جعلناك خليفة في الأرض﴾**⁷ التي علتها **﴿فاحكم بين الناس﴾**⁸ التي هي رعاياك الموانسين لك لشدة الاتصال بها وعلاقة عشقية بينك وبينها **﴿ولا تتبع الهوى﴾**⁹ والمحبة الواقعة بينك وبينها عما يجب المنع عنها ليقع كل منها أو البعض فيما يفسد به مملكتك ويهلكه هلاكاً موجباً لهلاكك، وإذ ذاك كذلك **وقبيح بالخليفة أن يجعل حظوظ النفس في ملكه الزائل الديني سبباً لبطلان حظوظ**

1 فاطر، 39. 2 وفي الألواح: مراقي. 3 البقرة: 30. 4 جعلناكم: وجعلناكم. 5 يونس، 14. 6 لواحد:

الواحد. 7 ص، 26. 8 ص، 26. 9 ص، 26.

ملكه العالی الدائم وزواله، لأنّ ﴿من كان في هذه أعمى فهو في الآخرة أعمى وأضلّ سبيلاً﴾¹ إذ ليس له حينئذ إلا ما اكتسبته في الدنيا من الملكات الرديئة والجهالات الغير المرضية وفات عنه اكتساب الملكات الحسنة والعلوم الحقّة، وليس له حينئذ إزالة الأولى واكتساب الثانية، فهو حينئذ على ما مرّ إليه الإشارة أضلّ سبيلاً وهذا **في حق الملوك** الحاكمة في الدنيا الدنيّة على من عداهم من الخلفاء **أظهر، فاتّه** فيه حاكم على القوى البدنيّة التي لها ولغيرها، **ومن القبيح أن يسبقهم في الآخرة** ودار البقاء **من سبقوه في الدنيا** الدنيّة الفانية، **ومن الحسرة** والندامة التي لا حسرة ولا ندامة وراءها **أن يسبق في الدائم** من العالم الأبديّ **من سبق في العالم الفاني الزائل** ﴿ياحسرة على العباد ما يأتيهم من رسول إلا كانوا به يستهزئون﴾² فإنّ المستهزئين بالناصحين المخلصين المنوط بنصيحتهم في الدارين أحقّ بأن يتحسروا.

غفرانك **اللهم غفرانك**، اغفر لنا مغفرة هي من شأنك لأنّا ياربنا وسيّدنا ومولانا **آمناً** وصدقنا بوجودك وذاتك ووحدتك واتّصافك بصفات الكمال والترّه عن ما يوجب التقصان والزوال، **وأقرنا** بجملة مصنوعاتك ومفعولاتك، وأن ليس لنا صانع وموجد وخالق سواك، مجرداً كان ذلك المصنوع أو جسمانياً أثرياً يقال لها الآباء، المشير إليه قوله: **بآياتك**، كذا أو جسمانياً عنصرياً يقال لها الأمّهات الحاصل منها ومن الآباء المذكورة المواليد الثلاث ومن المحتمل بل الظاهر أن يكون المراد بالآباء المجردات من العقول التي هي وسائط في إيجاد الجسم والجسمانيات من النفوس البشرية وغيرها وتكون³ إضافته إليه تعالى بأنه موجدتها ومبدعها، وصدقنا رسالاتك الملزوم بوجود الأنبياء وما يرسل معهم من الحقائق والمعارف وما نكلّف به وعلمنا أن لا مذهب لنا أن نذهب إليه **وراءك، ولا حول إلا حولك، ولا قوة إلا قوتك**، إذ لو لم يكن ذاتك القويّة القادر على إيجاد كلّ موجود ممكن لا يكون شيء من الأشياء فضلاً عن قوتها وقدرتها وإرادتها وفعل وانفعال **خضعت لجلالك رقابنا**، إذ الممكن إنّما [لا] يربح وجوده على عدمه إلا بواجب الوجود لذاته، ولا معنى لخضوع الرقاب هاهنا إلا ذلك، **وخشعت لعرّتك نفوسنا**، عند كلّ شيء من الأشياء، إذ من علم أنّ الكلّ منه تعالى وأنّ حكمه عنده تعالى كحكم غيره، ولا يتكبّر

1 الإسراء، 72. 2 يس، 30. 3 وتكون: ويكون.

على شيء من الأشياء **اقبضنا من غضبك إلى رضاك**، أي تمنعنا عما يوجب غضبك، وتوفّقنا على أمور توجب² الوصول إلى رضاك، أي رضائك عنا برضائنا عنك، و**اقبضنا³ من عذابك** بالنهي من موجباته وهبناه ما يستعدّنا للوصول **إلى رحمتك** الخاصة بالمؤمنين يوم الدين كما لا تحرّمنا في الدنيا عن رحمتك الشاملة للطيع والعاصي و**خلصنا من ظلمات الجهالات إلى نورك** الذي هو العلم والمعرفة **أزل عتّا العمى**، أي الجهل المركب المانع من الإدراك العلميّ اليقيني، **وادفع عتّا سلطان الهوى** والمحبة والميل إلى الجسمانيّات من اللذات الوهميّة، يا أكرم الأكرمين، ويا أرحم الراحمين، **ما جعلت** وفوّضت **إلينا أمرنا ابتداء خلقنا** وكرّمت بكرامات لا تعدّ ولا تحصى قبل أن يكون لنا إيمان وعمل صالح فلا تجعل ولا تفوّض إلينا أمر كمالنا في الدنيا والآخرة، إذ كما أنّك بالابتداء ذو فضل ومنّ في خلقك ما ولنا ترى في خلق الإنسان من تفاوت كذا ذو فضل ومنّ في الإكمال والإفضال، **فارحمنا في الآخرة** والعود كما ترحمنا في الدنيا والبدء وأرضنا بإعطاء ما ترضيت عنك وبه **ارض عتّا، فإنك بالجود الأعمّ** الشامل، ولا يكون لك في فيضان الوجود والكمالات **على العالمين** منّا عوض ولا غرض فلا يكون رضاك عن إلا رضائنا عنك ﴿ربّنا إنّنا سمعنا منادياً ينادي للإيمان أن آمنوا بربّكم فآمنّا ربّنا فاغفر لنا ذنوبنا وكفرّ عتّا سيئاتنا وتوفّنا مع الأبرار ربّنا وآتنا ما وعدتّنا على رسلك ولا تحزنا⁵﴾ منك بدء الكلّ وإليك عود الكلّ، فارحم أذلة في عرتك وفي قبضتك ﴿يوم لا ينفع مال ولا بنون إلاّ من أتى الله بقلب سليم﴾⁶ خلّصنا من عسر هذا الوثاق، وسرّحنا إلى يسر الإطلاق، وأذق لنا حلاوة يوم التلاق برحمتك يا حتّان، يا متّان، يا رحيم، يا رحمن .

ومن نوادر الاتّفاقيّات أن كما أن إتمام الشرح وقع في وقت قران السعدين في الحوت على ما مرّ إليه الإشارة كذلك إتمام هذا الإلحاق به في وقته اجتمع السعدان في الجوزاء، في سنة اثنين وثلاثين وتسعمائة هجرية نبوية عليه وعلى آله الصلاة والسلام وصحبه التحيّة والإكرام.

1 تمنعنا: يمنعنا. 2 توجب: يوجب. 3 و**اقبضنا**: و**انقبضنا**. 4 وهبنا: ونهينا. 5 آل عمران، 3.

6 الشورى، 88-89.

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PART 4

The Wider Tradition



Takmīl al-Mantiq: A Sixteenth-Century Arabic Manual on Logic

Khaled El-Rouayheb

The history of Arabic logic after Avicenna (d.1037) is only just beginning to be explored. Until quite recently, it was widely believed that there would be little point in doing so. Ibrahim Madkour's *L'Organon d'Aristote dans le monde arabe* (1934, 2nd edition 1969) dismissed the entire post-Avicennan tradition—spanning almost nine centuries—as unoriginal and pedantic. In a short chapter entitled “La logique arabes après Ibn Sīnā”, he wrote that Arabic logic became dominated by the literary forms of short handbook (*matn*), commentary (*sharḥ*) and gloss (*hāshiya*) and consequently became focused on plodding exposition and irrelevant discussions of stylistic and grammatical points. The few departures from Avicenna that he encountered in his (superficial) perusal of a few later works, such as the recognition of the fourth figure of the syllogism, he decried as wrong-headed.¹

More recent scholarship has concluded that this overall interpretation is spectacularly wrong. Thanks especially to the path-breaking research of Nicholas Rescher and Tony Street, we now know that logic continued to be cultivated at an advanced level for centuries after Avicenna. Both Rescher and Street have drawn attention to the logical handbook entitled *al-Risāla al-Shamsiyya fī 'l-qawā'id al-mantiqiyya* by Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī (d.1277), which contains a sophisticated discussion of modal logic that is not simply lifted from the works of the “classical” Islamic philosophers, and that reflects the subtle and critical discussions of Avicenna's logic that raged throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. This handbook continued to be studied, commented upon and annotated by Muslim scholars until the early twentieth century.²

¹ I. Madkour, *L'Organon d'Aristote dans le monde arabe* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1934), 240–248.

² See especially, N. Rescher, “Temporal Modalities in Arabic Logic”, in N. Rescher, *Studies in Arabic Philosophy* (Pittsburgh, 1968), pp. 81–110; N. Rescher & A. van der Nat, “The Theory of Modal Syllogistic in Medieval Arabic Philosophy”, in N. Rescher, *Studies in Modality* (Oxford, 1974), pp.17–56; T. Street, “Toward a History of Syllogistic after Avicenna: Notes on Rescher's Studies in Arabic Modal Logic”, *Journal of Islamic Studies* 11(2000), pp. 209–228.

Rescher and Street have both drawn attention to another post-Avicennan logical work: *Sharḥ al-Takmīl fī 'l-manṭiq*, a manuscript of which is extant at the British Library.³ This work includes, among other things, a detailed analysis of modality propositions and the logical relations, immediate inferences, and syllogisms involving them. Rescher, who first drew attention to this work, wrote that “nothing further is independently known about” the author besides his name.⁴ The colophon of the manuscript consulted by Rescher states that it was written by a certain “Muḥammad Ṣādiq ibn Fayḍallāh ibn Muḥammad Amīn ibn Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shirwānī”. The manuscript containing *Sharḥ al-Takmīl* also contains what Rescher took to be glosses by Shirwānī on a work on logic by al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī, who died in the year 1413. Rescher accordingly concluded that the author lived after the fourteenth century. Less justifiably, he jumped to the conclusion that the author was “a late medieval Persian scholar of presumably the early 15th century”. Rescher’s reason for placing the author at the earliest possible date after the fourteenth century would seem to be related to his overall view of the course of Arabic-Islamic logic. Towards the end of his path-breaking article “The Theory of Modal Syllogistics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy” he invoked the well-known idea of “decline”, this time dated to the post-medieval period, i.e., after the fifteenth century:

The logical acumen of these medieval scholars was of a very high order indeed. But their successors were not able to maintain this standard ... When the logical tradition of Islam passed from the hands of the scholars into that of the schoolmasters, the standard of work went into a not surprising decline.⁵

As will be seen below, Rescher was quite mistaken about the provenance and date of the work, which does not really fit into his narrative of post-medieval decline. The author of *Takmīl al-manṭiq* was an Iranian-born scholar who was active in the Ottoman Empire in the early- to mid-sixteenth century, and he was not named Shirwānī.

3 British Library, London: MS Or. 12405, fols. 71b–104a.

4 Rescher & A. van der Nat, “The Theory of Modal Syllogistic in Medieval Arabic Philosophy”, 20.

5 Rescher, “The Theory of Modal Syllogistic in Medieval Arabic Philosophy”, 56.

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The first part of the manuscript that Rescher consulted does not, as Rescher thought, consist of Shirwānī's glosses on a work by Jurjani. Rather, it consists of Jurjani's Gloss (*Ḥāshīya*) on the commentary of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥṭānī (d.1365) on *al-Shamsīyya*. The colophon states:

This completes the minor gloss of the most learned master and enquirer ... al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī by the hand of (*bi-qalami*) the most inconsiderable and insignificant seeker of knowledge Muḥammad Ṣādiq ibn Fayḍallāh ibn Muḥammad Amīn known as Ṣadrūddinzāde.⁶

The term "minor gloss" (*al-ḥāshīya al-ṣuḡhrā*) refers to Jurjānī's Gloss on Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥṭānī's commentary on Kātibī's *Shamsīyya*. The term was used to distinguish this gloss from Jurjānī's so-called "major gloss" (*al-ḥāshīya al-kubrā*) on the same Quṭb al-Dīn's commentary on *Maṭāli' al-anwār* by Sirāj al-Dīn al-Urmawī (d.1283).⁷ Shirwānī is thus the copyist, not the author, of the first work included in the manuscript consulted by Rescher. This in itself throws doubt on Rescher's dating, since the manuscript he consulted seems to date from the eighteenth, rather than the fifteenth century.⁸

The grandfather of Muḥammad Ṣādiq b. Fayḍallāh al-Shirwānī is, as indicated in the manuscript, Muḥammad Amīn b. Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shirwānī. A scholar with that precise name is mentioned in *Sijill-i 'Uthmānī*, the standard biographical dictionary of Ottoman notables by Mehmed Süreyya (d.1909).⁹ He is also mentioned in the biographical dictionaries of Nev'izāde 'Aṭā'ī (d.1634) and Muḥammad Amīn al-Muḥibbī (d.1699).¹⁰ This scholar came from the province of Shirwān, roughly corresponding to what is today the Republic of

6 British Library, London: MS Or. 12405, fol.70b.

7 Qara Khalīl, *al-Risāla al-'awnīyya fī idāḥ al-Ḥāshīya al-Ṣadriyya* (Istanbul: Matba'a-yi 'Āmire, 1288/1871), p. 74; Katib Çelebi, *Kashf al-zunun 'an asāmī al-kutub wa'l-funūn* (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1941-43), 1063.

8 This is the date given in the inventory of Islamic manuscripts in the British Library *List of Oriental Manuscripts, 1948-1964*, entry for MS: Or.12405. This handwritten inventory may be consulted in the reading room of the Oriental and India Office in the British Library (Shelf number ORC GEN MSS 9).

9 Mehmed Süreyya, *Sijill-i 'Uthmani* (Istanbul: Matba'a-i 'Āmira, 1308-15/1891-7), 1, 403.

10 Nev'izāde 'Aṭā'ī, *Ḥadā'iq al-ḥaqā'iq fī takmilat al-Shaqā'iq* (Istanbul: Matba'a-yi 'Āmire, 1268/1851), 712; Muḥammad Amīn al-Muḥibbī, *Khulāṣat al-athar fī tarājim a'yān al-qarn al-ḥādī 'ashar* (Cairo: al-Matba'a al-wahbiyya, 1284/1867), 111, 475-476. Muḥibbī used

Azerbaijan. A prominent Sunni scholar, he emigrated westwards in the wake of the conquest of Shirwān by the Shiite Safavids in 1603–1607.¹¹ He wrote an encyclopedia of the sciences, entitled *al-Fawā'id al-khāqāniyya*, which he dedicated to Sultan Aḥmed I (r. 1603–1617), and was granted a teaching post at the newly established Aḥmadiyya College in Istanbul. Muḥammad Amīn b. Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shirwānī was a renowned logician. He wrote a widely studied treatise discussing a central passage in the commentary of Muḥammad b. Ḥamza al-Fanārī (d.1431) on the logical handbook *Īsāghūjī* by Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī (d.1265).¹² An Ottoman scholar who glossed Shirwānī's treatise, Qara Khalīl b. Ḥasan (d.1711), wrote that the most reliable copy of the work that he had found was that of the author's grandson "Muḥammad Ṣādiq ibn Fayḍallāh ibn Muḥammad Amīn".¹³ This is the exact same name as appears in the colophon of the manuscript consulted by Rescher.

The entry in the *Sijill-i 'Uthmānī* confirms that Muḥammad Amin al-Shirwānī, who died in 1627, left behind a number of sons, including the scholar and poet Feyẓullāh Efendī (d.1657). Feyẓullāh in turn is stated to have fathered the Ottoman Grand Mufti "Ṣādiq Efendī Ṣadrüddīnzāde". The *Sijill-i 'Uthmānī* includes a separate entry on the latter: "Ṣādiq Meḥmed Ṣadrüddīnzāde".¹⁴ He was born on the 21st of December 1630, the son of Feyẓullāh Efendī. He was appointed to a series of high posts in the Ottoman judiciary, culminating in the position of Grand Mufti in June 1694, albeit he held the post for only ten months. He was appointed to the post again in January 1707, this time for little over a year. He died on the 11th of November 1708.¹⁵

There can be little doubt that this is the Muḥammad Ṣādiq ibn Fayḍallāh ibn Muḥammad Amīn ibn Ṣadr al-Shirwānī who wrote the copy of *Sharḥ al-Takmil* that Rescher consulted. However, there is nothing to suggest that Shirwānī was more than the copyist of the work. Shirwānī's comments towards the end of the manuscript clearly indicate that he did not write the *Takmil* himself:

Nev'izāde's biographical work, but supplemented it with information he obtained directly from Muḥammad Amīn's grandson Ṣādiq, i.e., the copyist of *Sharḥ al-Takmil*.

11 For the Safavid reconquest of this area, see R. Savory, *Iran under the Safavids* (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 85–87.

12 Muḥammad Amīn b. Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shirwānī, *Risālat jihat al-waḥda* (Istanbul: Ḥājjī Muḥarrām Bōsnavī Maṭba'asī, 1288/1871).

13 Qara Khalīl, *al-Risāla al-'awniyya*, p. 3.

14 Süreyya, *Sijill-i 'Uthmani*, 3:188.

15 See also Abdülkadir Altunso, *Osmanlı Şeyhülislamı* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1972), 103–104.

Thanks to God that I have been able to collect the work and its glosses unto the same lines, but I have not been able to find a copy on which I could rely. I have also not been able to look at all copies so as to be able to correct the text, though on occasion I was able to correct some clear mistakes. I have also not been able to find the glosses relating to the section on syllogisms and integrate them into the work as a running commentary.

It is clear that Shirwānī is neither the author of *Takmil al-mantiq* nor an independent commentator on the work. Rather, he integrated existing marginal glosses on the work into his own copy, thus producing what he called a “commentary” (*sharḥ*) on *Takmil al-mantiq*. In the case of the section on syllogisms in which Rescher was interested, Shirwānī had nothing to add to the main text that he copied.

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One must therefore look elsewhere for clues concerning the authorship of *Takmil al-mantiq*. The work is not mentioned in standard bibliographic sources: the monumental *Kashf al-Zunūn* by Kātib Çelebī (d.1657), its supplement by Ismā‘īl Pāshā al-Baghdādī (d.1921), *Osmānlī Müellifleri* by Meḥmed Ṭāhir Būrsalī (d.1926), or *Geschichte der Arabischen Literatur* by Carl Brockelmann (d.1956). I have so far managed to locate three other manuscript copies of the work. One manuscript in the Süleymaniye Library in Istanbul contains another undated copy written by Muḥammad Şādiq al-Shirwānī.¹⁶ Much more important for the task of ascertaining the author of the work is another manuscript in the Süleymaniye that is an undated autograph.¹⁷ It ends with the words:

It has been completed by the grace of God ... for Mawlānā Ḍiyā’ al-Milla wa l-Dīn Aḥmad Çelebī by the hand of the author Ḥasan ibn Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad.

The same manuscript contains another autograph work on logic dedicated to Aḥmad Çelebī by the same author: A Super-gloss on the Gloss of Muḥyī al-Dīn al-Barda‘ī (d.1521) on *Sharḥ Isāghūjī* by Ḥusām al-Dīn al-Kātib (d.1359).¹⁸

¹⁶ Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Istanbul: MS Laleli 3715, fols. 21a–54a.

¹⁷ Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Istanbul: MS Laleli 2561, fols. 1a–39a.

¹⁸ Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Istanbul: MS Laleli 2561, fols. 40a–47a.

The author refers to himself on the title page as Ḥasan al-ʿAjamī, and in the colophon as Ḥasan ibn Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad al-ʿAjamī.

A third undated manuscript is extant in the Princeton University Library, and appears to date from the sixteenth century.¹⁹ It has the following colophon:

It has been completed by the grace of God ... for Mawlānā Ḍiyā' al-Milla wa'l-Dīn Aḥmad Çelebī ibn, Abū'l-Su'ūd, may God have mercy on him (*rahimahu Allāh*).

On the margin, it is stated that the manuscript has been copied from, and collated with, the autograph. The author, however, is not named. Interestingly, the colophon adds the name of the father “Abū'l-Su'ūd” to the otherwise entirely indeterminate name of the dedicatee “Aḥmad Çelebī”. The perhaps most well known of Ottoman Grand Muftis, Abū'l-Su'ūd Efendī (d.1574), is known to have had a son called Aḥmad Çelebī. This son died during the lifetime of his father, in 1563, “not having reached the age of thirty”.²⁰ The supposition that this is indeed the dedicatee of *Takmil al-manṭiq* is tempting since, as will be seen below, the work was produced in the Ottoman Empire by a scholar who was active during his lifetime. True, Abū'l-Su'ūd's son is not known to have had the honorific “Ḍiyā' al-Dīn” but rather “Shams al-Dīn”. But he might well have been a teenage student at the time of the dedication, and his honorific might not have been entirely fixed yet. There is no evidence for the existence of another “Aḥmad Çelebī b. Abū'l-Su'ūd” in the Ottoman Empire in the middle decades of the sixteenth century who was sufficiently prominent to be a dedicatee of a scholarly work.

The Süleymaniye autograph and the Princeton manuscript both have extensive marginal glosses, and it is these that Shirwānī integrated into his own copy of the work. The glosses in the autograph seem to be from the author himself, and in the Princeton manuscript the word *minhu* is appended after most glosses. This makes them an instance of the established literary form of

19 Princeton University Library, Princeton NJ: Islamic MS: New Series 274, fols. 19b–43a; R. Mach & E. Ormsby, *Handlist of Arabic manuscripts (New Series) in the Princeton University Library* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), nr. 1470.

20 Manḳ 'Alī Bālīzāde (d.1584), *al-ʿIqd al-manzūm fi dhikr afāḍil al-Rūm*, printed on the margins of Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-a'yān* (Cairo: al-Maṭba'a al-muyammaniyya, 1310/1892), II, 128–132; Nev'izāde 'Atā'ī (d.1634), *Ḥadā'iq al-haqā'iq fi takmilat al-Shaqā'iq* (Istanbul: Maṭba'a-i 'Āmirā, 1269/1852), 32–33; 'Aşīḳ Çelebī (d.1571), *Dhayl al-Shaqā'iq al-nu'māniyya*, edited by 'Abd al-Razzāq Barakāt (Cairo: Dār al-Hidāya, 2007), 61–64. Bālīzāde gives Aḥmad Çelebī the honorific “Shams al-Dīn.”

“auto-glosses” (*minhuyāt*). They are most extensive in the earlier parts of the work and become very sparse toward the end of the work. It is therefore no surprise that Shirwānī had difficulty finding glosses on the later section on syllogisms.

The name Ḥasan ibn Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad al-‘Ajamī is by itself not specific enough to allow an immediate identification of the author. There are no entries in the standard biographical dictionaries of Islamic and Ottoman scholars that are obviously identical with the author of the work. However, since the author commented upon the glosses of Barda‘ī (d.1521), and since his work was subsequently copied by Shirwānī (d.1708), we would be on safe grounds in assuming that he lived in the sixteenth or seventeenth century.

Another extant autograph manuscript by the same author allows us to date the *Takmil al-mantiq* somewhat more precisely. The Süleymaniye Library contains an autograph manuscript of a work entitled *Ḥall al-Uṣūl*, on the principles of Hanafī jurisprudence, by a certain Ḥasan ibn Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad al-Amlashī.²¹ Amlash is a town near the western coast of the Caspian Sea, in the Iranian province of Gīlān, and hence this scholar could very well have referred to himself in other contexts as Ḥasan ibn Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad al-‘Ajamī. In any case, the handwriting of the manuscript leaves little doubt that it comes from the same hand as wrote the autograph copy of *Takmil al-mantiq*. Significantly, the manuscript of *Ḥall al-Uṣūl* is dated: it was completed in 955/1548.

There are at least two other extant works by the same scholar. One is a commentary on *Tahdhīb al-mantiq*, a condensed handbook on logic by Sa‘d al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d.1390), entitled *Ḥall al-Tahdhīb*. An extant but water-damaged manuscript of the work in the Süleymaniye Library, which was copied from the autograph in 1065/1654–5, gives the author’s name as Ḥasan ibn Ḥusayn al-Amlashī al-‘Ajamī.²² On the margins of the colophon, a later hand has added that this Ḥasan ibn Ḥusayn al-Amlashī “is the author of *Baḥr al-afkār*”. This is a reference to the perhaps most widely copied work by this scholar: a Super-gloss entitled *Baḥr al-afkār* on the Gloss of the Ottoman scholar Aḥmed Khayālī (d.1460) on Taftāzānī’s *Sharḥ al-‘Aqā’id al-Nasafiyya*—one of the most popular handbooks on theology in the post-classical Sunni Islamic world. This super-gloss is mentioned by Kātib Çelebī, who wrote that its author “Ḥasan ibn Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad” was a teacher at one of the schools in Egypt and dedicated his work to Ayās Meḥmed Pāshā, who was Grand Vizier of the

21 Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, İstanbul: MS Kadizade Mehmed 104.

22 Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, İstanbul: MS Laleli 2644: fols. 50a–100b.

Ottoman Empire from 1536 to 1539.²³ Presumably on the basis of Katib Çelebî's observation, the Ḥasan b. Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad who wrote *Baḥr al-afkār* is sometimes given the attributive "al-Miṣrī" in modern catalogues of manuscript libraries. But there can be little doubt that the author was ethnically Iranian rather than Egyptian. He on a number of occasions quoted the Persian text of Avicenna's *Dānishnāma-yi 'Alā'ī*, and he repeatedly cited and discussed the ideas of the fifteenth-century Persian philosophers and theologians Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī (d.1502) and Mīr Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Dashtakī (d.1498).²⁴ This is in contrast to ethnically Egyptian theologians from the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries such as 'Abd al-Wahhāb al-Sha'rānī (d.1565), Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī (d.1566), and Ibrāhīm al-Laḡānī (d.1631) who display no indication of being comfortable with Persian and who do not even mention Dawānī and Dashtakī, let alone engage with their ideas, but instead tend to cite fifteenth-century Egyptian scholars such as Ibn al-Humām (d.1457), Kamāl al-Dīn Ibn Abī l-Sharīf (d.1500), Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī (d.1519) or earlier authorities.²⁵

The early twentieth-century Ottoman bibliographer Ismā'īl Pāshā al-Baghdādī believed the Ḥasan ibn Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad who wrote *Baḥr al-afkār* to be identical to Ḥasan ibn Ḥusayn al-Tālīshī al-'Ajamī (d. 964/1556–7) who wrote a commentary on *al-Burda* by al-Būṣīrī (d. ca. 1295), a popular poem in praise of the Prophet Muḥammad.²⁶ This commentary was written in Cairo in 956/1549 and dedicated to the Ottoman Governor of Egypt 'Alī Pāshā.²⁷ This Ḥasan ibn Ḥusayn al-Tālīshī al-'Ajamī is mentioned in the well-known biographical dictionary of Ottoman scholars by Aḥmed Ṭāṣköprüzāde (d.1561),

23 Kātib Çelebī, *Kashf al-zunūn*, 1147 (ll. 3–5).

24 I have consulted a manuscript of *Baḥr al-afkār* in Princeton University Library (Islamic MS: Garrett Y4591). See the references to Dawānī and Dashtakī on, for example, fols. 47b, 58b, and 72b. See the quotations from *Dānishnāma-yi 'Alā'ī* on fols. 34b, 48a, and 148a.

25 'Abd al-Wahhāb al-Sha'rānī, *al-Yawāqūt wa'l-jawāhir fī bayān 'aḡā'id al-akābir* (Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1959); Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī, *al-Ta'arruf fi l-aṣṡayn wa'l-taṣawwuf*, printed on the margin of Muḥammad 'Alī Ibn 'Allān al-Ṣiddīqī, *al-Talaṭṭuf fī l-wuṣūl ilā 'l-Ta'arruf* (Mecca & Cairo: Maṭba'at al-Taraqī & Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1912–1936); Ibrāhīm al-Laḡānī, *Hidāyat al-murīd li-jawharat al-tawḥīd*, edited by M. al-Bajāwī (Cairo: Dār al-Baṣā'ir, 2009). None of these works mention Dawānī or Dashtakī.

26 Ismā'īl Pāshā al-Bābānī al-Baghdādī, *Hadīyyat al-'arīfīn: asmā' al-mu'allifīn wa-āthār al-muṣannifīn* (Istanbul: Millī Eḡitim Basımevi, 1951–1955), 289.

27 KZ, 1334 (ll. 20–21). For an extant manuscript, see G. Flügel, *Die Arabischen, Persischen und Türkischen Handschriften der Kaiserlichen-Königlichen Hofbibliothek zu Wien* (Vienna: Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1865), I, 468–469 (nr. 479).

entitled *al-Shaqā'iq al-nu'māniyya*.²⁸ He was born in Tabriz, and had personal recollections of Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī and his inveterate rival Ghiyāth al-Dīn al-Dashtakī (d.1542), son of the aforementioned Mīr Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Dashtakī. Tālīshī recalled that Ghiyāth al-Dīn once challenged Dawānī to a scholarly debate in front of the ruler of Tabriz, and that Dawānī—who would have had everything to lose and nothing to gain from debating a much younger scholar—declined to do so and suggested that Ghiyāth al-Dīn instead debate with Dawānī's students in his presence. Since Ghiyāth al-Dīn's father is conspicuously absent from this incident, one might presume that it took place either just after the father's death in 1498 or shortly before that date. Tāṣköprüzāde reports that Tālīshī settled in the Ottoman Empire during the reign of Sultan Bāyezīd II (r. 1481–1512)—this was presumably after Tabriz fell to the Shiite Safavids in 1501. He must still have been a young man then, since he continued his studies in Istanbul with, among others, Muẓaffar al-Dīn 'Alī al-Shīrāzī (d.1516), a prominent expert on the rational sciences, who in turn had studied with both Dawānī and Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Dashtakī.²⁹ Tālīshī then left for Mecca towards the end of the reign of Bāyezīd and only returned to the capital some forty years later.³⁰ Upon his return, he was given a stipend and a post at one

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- 28 In the first printed version of the Arabic original of *al-Shaqā'iq*, “Ḥasan al-Tālīshī” (حسن التالشي) has been corrupted to “Ḥusayn al-Naqqāsh” (حسين النقاش); see the margin of Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-a'yān wa-anbā' abnā' al-zamān* (Cairo: al-Maṭba'a al-muyammaniyya, 1310/1894), II, 49–50. The Arabic printing is corrected on the basis of manuscript evidence in Oskar Rescher's German translation, *Eṣ-ṣāqā'iq en-no'maniyye von Taṣköprüzāde* (Konstantinopel-Galata: Phoenix, 1927), 323 (n.3). The correct form is also given in the Ottoman Turkish translation of Meḥmed Mecdī (d.1591), *Tercüme-yi Şekā'ik* (Istanbul: Maṭba'a-i 'Āmīra, 1269/1852), 511. The name is given as “Ḥasan al-Tālīshī” in the recent Iranian edition of *al-Shaqā'iq*; see *al-Shaqā'iq al-nu'māniyya fī 'ulamā' al-dawla al-Uthmāniyya*, edited by Sayyid Muḥammad Ṭabaṭabā'ī Bihbahānī (Tehran: Kitābkhāna-yi Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī, 1389/2010), 447–448.
- 29 In the first printed Arabic version, as well as in the printing of Majdī's Ottoman Turkish translation, the name of this scholar is given as Muẓaffar al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī. Oskar Rescher corrects this to Muẓaffar al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī on the basis of manuscripts; see *Eṣ-ṣāqā'iq en-no'maniyye von Taṣköprüzāde*, 323(n.4). The recent Iranian edition by Ṭabaṭabā'ī Bihbahānī agrees with Rescher (p.447, L19). There are no records of a scholar by the name of Muẓaffar al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī at this time. On Muẓaffar al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, see Tāṣköprüzāde, *al-Shaqā'iq al-nu'māniyya* (ed. Ṭabaṭabā'ī Bihbahānī), 290–291; O. Rescher, *Eṣ-ṣāqā'iq en-no'maniyye von Taṣköprüzāde*, 215; Meḥmed Mecdī, *Tercüme-yi Şekā'ik*, 340–341.
- 30 Tāṣköprüzāde's specified that Tālīshī stayed in Mecca until 955/1548. Tālīshī must have gone from there to Cairo where he finished his commentary on *al-Burda* in Rajab 956/

of the colleges there, and died a few years later, in 964/1556–7. Tāshköprüzāde mentioned that Tālīshī wrote a commentary on the *Burda*, and several other works, including a treatise on *ādāb*—a term that could mean either “art of disputation”, i.e., dialectic, or “rules of conduct”, i.e., ethics. The treatise itself appears not to be extant, but the title and incipit given in a later source suggest that it was a work on religious ethics.³¹ On the other hand, the Ottoman translator of Tāshköprüzāde’s *Shaqā’iq*, Meḥmed Mecdī (d.1591), clearly understood it to be on dialectic.³² Both the commentary on the *Burda* and the tract on dialectic/ethics are mentioned in Kātīb Çelebī’s *Kashf al-zunūn*, the author’s name being given as Ḥasan ibn Ḥusayn al-Tālīshī in both cases.³³ There is nothing to suggest that Kātīb Çelebī himself thought that this Ḥasan ibn Ḥusayn al-Tālīshī was identical to the Ḥasan ibn Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad who wrote *Baḥr al-afkār* and, as we have seen, also *Takmil al-mantiq*. Is there any reason, apart from the late testimony of Ismā’il al-Baghdādī, for supposing that the two names refer to the same person?

There is. The author of *Baḥr al-afkār* and *Takmil al-mantiq* was Ḥasan ibn Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad al-Amlashī al-‘Ajāmī. As mentioned above, Amlash is a town near the southwestern coast of the Caspian Sea (37° 5’ 51”N, 50° 11’ 11”E). The Tālīsh are a linguistically distinct people historically inhabiting that area, and today there are towns called Talish and Talish Mahalleh in the vicinity of Amlash (for example Talish: 37° 21’ 54” N, 50° 5’ 34” E and Talish Mahalleh: 37° 19’ 55” N, 50° 3’ 38” E).³⁴ It is therefore quite plausible to suggest that Ḥasan ibn Ḥusayn al-Tālīshī and Ḥasan ibn Ḥusayn al-Amlashī are one and the same person.

The link to Ottoman Egypt is also significant. It may be recalled that Kātīb Çelebī wrote that the “Ḥasan b. Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad” who wrote *Baḥr al-afkār* was a teacher at one of the colleges of Egypt and that “Ḥasan b. Ḥusayn al-Tālīshī” wrote his commentary on *al-Burda* in Cairo.

The name of the dedicatee, Aḥmad Çelebī b. Abū’l-Su‘ūd, may give additional support to the hypothesis that the author of *Takmil al-mantiq* is Ḥasan

August 1549, as stated in the extant copy described by Flügel, *Die Arabischen, Persischen und Türkischen Handschriften*, I, 468–469.

31 The title is *Khiṣāl al-salaf fī ādāb al-khalaf wa’l-salaf*. The incipit is: *al-ḥamdu li-llāhi mumītu ’l-aḥyā’i wa-muḥyī ’l-amwāti* (see Kātīb Çelebī, *Kashf al-zunūn*, 705). The term *khiṣāl* (character-traits) often appears in works on religious ethics. An incipit is often reflective of the topic of the work, and in this case it seems to set a homiletic tone.

32 Meḥmed Mecdī, *Tercüme-yi Şekā’ik*, 511.

33 KZ., 705, 1334 (ll. 20–21).

34 Today, the town of Amlash is south of Talish county in the province of Gilan. But the Talish-speaking area has by all accounts shrunk steadily since the sixteenth century.

ibn Ḥusayn al-Tālīshī. As mentioned above, one of the sons of the famous Ottoman Grand Mufti Abū'l-Su'ūd Efendi was called Aḥmad Çelebī. After Tālīshī returned to Istanbul around the year 1550, he received a teaching position there. Abū'l-Su'ūd, whose son Aḥmad would have been fourteen in 1550, would have had some influence over the allocation of teaching posts in the capital. Dedicating a work to the “completion” (*takmīl*) of his son's study of one of the core scholastic disciplines would have made sense from someone looking to obtain a position at one of the colleges of Istanbul.

On the other hand, it must be conceded that there are also reasons to doubt the identification of the author of *Takmīl al-mantiq* with Ḥasan ibn Ḥusayn al-Tālīshī. First, the author of *Hall al-Uṣūl*—identical to the author of *Takmīl al-mantiq*—was a Ḥanafī, whereas the biographer Ṭāṣköprüzāde wrote that Ḥasan ibn Ḥusayn al-Tālīshī was a Shāfi'ī. This may nevertheless not be as conclusive as it seems at first sight. It is likely that the Ḥasan b. Ḥusayn al-Amlashī who wrote *Hall al-Uṣūl* was originally a Shāfi'ī, like the great majority of Persian Sunnis, and only became a Ḥanafī after settling in the Ottoman Empire. It is also likely that Tālīshī, though originally a Shāfi'ī, became a Ḥanafī before he was given a teaching post in an Ottoman College in Istanbul. Ṭāṣköprüzāde's wording: “he was a Shāfi'ī (*kāna Shāfi'īyya l-madhhab*)” need not be understood in the sense “... until he died”, but merely in the sense “... until he became a Ḥanafī like almost all other scholars mentioned in this work”.

A second reason to doubt the identification is that neither Ṭāṣköprüzāde nor Kātīb Çelebī attributed *Baḥr al-afkār*—a relatively well-known work that survives in numerous manuscript copies—to Tālīshī. This is related to the curious fact that in Tālīshī's commentary on the *Burda* as well as in his treatise on ethics/dialectic, he gave his own name as “Ḥasan ibn Ḥusayn al-Tālīshī”. By contrast, in the four extant works that were certainly written by the author of *Takmīl al-mantiq*, including *Baḥr al-afkār*, the author did not use the attributive “Tālīshī” but instead “Amlashī” or “Ajami” or simply identified himself as “Ḥasan b. Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad”.

A third reason is that Ṭāṣköprüzāde wrote that Tālīshī was particularly knowledgeable in the fields of Qur'anic exegesis (*Tafsīr*) and Hadith.³⁵ This characterization is perhaps what one would expect of a commentator on the *Burda*, but not of someone who wrote works on rational sciences such as rational theology (*kalām*), logic, and the principles of jurisprudence. The strength of this consideration obviously depends on whether the treatise on *ādāb* written by Tālīshī was on religious ethics or on dialectic (the latter a rational science

35 This is according to the Arabic text. In Mecdī's Ottoman Turkish translation, Tālīshī is stated to have been particularly knowledgeable in law (*fiqh*) and hadith.

closely related to logic), but as noted above it seems that it is not extant. It must be kept in mind that Ṭāshköprüzāde nevertheless wrote that Tālīshī had studied with Muẓaffar al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, a specialist in the rational sciences who in turn had studied with Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī and Mir Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Dashtakī.

3

To sum up the case: The author of *Takmīl al-mantiq* should be identified with Ḥasan b. Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad al-Amlashī al-ʿAjāmī who was active in the Ottoman Empire in the 1530s and 1540s. His *Takmīl al-mantiq* was dedicated to a certain Aḥmad Çelebī b. Abū'l-Suʿūd, who is almost certainly the son of the famous Ottoman Grand Mufti Abū'l-Suʿūd. This would place the composition of the work in Istanbul in the middle of the sixteenth century. There are good reasons to think that the author is identical to Ḥasan b. Ḥusayn al-Tālīshī al-ʿAjāmī (d. 1556 or 57) on whom there is an entry in Ṭāshköprüzāde's classic biographical dictionary of Ottoman scholars *al-Shaqāʿiq al-nuʿmāniyya*. Though the identification is not as water-tight as one could have wished, it is very unlikely that there were two different scholars from the same distinct Talish-speaking region in Iran, both with the name “Ḥasan b. Ḥusayn”, both active in the Ottoman Empire in the 1530s and 40s, both spending time in Cairo, and both residing in Istanbul in the early years of the 1550s.

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Edition of *Takmil al-Mantiq*: A Sixteenth-Century Arabic Manual
on Logic

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الحمد لمن أعطى نوع الإنسان المنطق الفصيح، وأفاض عقلاً يميز الفكر الفاسد من الصحيح، وشرّفه بأنواع المعارف الضرورية، وكرّمه بأصناف الأحكام البديهية، وأهله لترتيب قياسات تؤديه إلى العلوم الحقيقية، ثم أمره بالنظر إلى التصديق بأوصاف الألوهية. اللهم يا من امتنع تصوّر كنه كمال ذاته، ووجب التفكر في أجناس مخلوقاته، ليوجب معرفة أنواع كمالات صفاته، اهديني نور طريق يُجني عن ظلمات شكوك تمنع عن إدراك براهين حكمتك، واجعلني بإفاضة لمعات [2] اليقين عليّ أهلاً لفيضان كمال مراتب معرفتك، والصلاة على نبيّ استقرّ مدارككيات الأمور برأيه، واستنار القلوب بانقياد أمره ونهيه، تظهر بإشاراته رسوم الحقائق، وتكشف بتلهيحاته حدود الدقائق، وعلى آل يتيسر باستمدادهم استقراء الأحكام الموجّهة من الشريعة القويمية، ويتعدّر من غير استعانتهم استنباط ضروريات الدين من الحجج المستقيمة، وأصحاب لا يسمع كلاماً يناقض لأحكامهم، ولا يقبل عكس قضايا تتقرّر في أفهامهم. على النبيّ وآله وأصحابه أفضل الصلوات، وأكرم التحيات.

أمّا بعد: فهذه أوراق كتبتها في علم المنطق تسهياً للطالبيين، وتكميلاً للقاصرين، وسميتها بالتكميل، وأسأل الله أن ينفع به الطلاب، ويجعله ذخراً لي في يوم الحساب.

العلم إن كان حصوله من غير نظر ضروري وإلا فنظري، وكل منهما إن كان إذعائاً للنسبة فتصديق وإلا فتصوّر، والعلم بوجود الأقسام وجداني.

النظر ملاحظة المعقول بالاختيار لتحصيل المجهول، وقد يقع في الاكتساب خطأ فأحتجج إلى قانون يعصم الذهن عن الخطأ فيه ويميّز النظر الفاسد من الصحيح، وهو المنطق. وموضوعه: المعلوم [3] التصوري من حيث أنه يوصل إلى مجهول تصوري، إيصالاً قريباً ويسمى معرفاً وقولاً شارحاً، أو إيصالاً بعيداً ويسمى الكليات

الخمس، أو من حيث أنه يوصل إلى مجهول تصديقي إيصلاً أبعد ويسمى المحكوم عليه والمحكوم به؛ والمعلوم التصديقي من حيث أنه يوصل إلى مجهول تصديقي، إيصلاً قريباً ويسمى حجةً ودليلاً، أو إيصلاً بعيداً ويسمى خبراً وقضيةً.

فصل

الدلالة هي كون الشيء بحالة يلزم من العلم به العلم بشيء آخر، فالأول الدال والثاني المدلول. وهي وضعيّة إن كان سببها الوضع، وطبيعية إن كان سببها الطبع بسبب اقتضائه الدال، وإلا فعقلية. وكل واحد منها لفظية وغير لفظية. واللفظية من الوضعية مطابقيّة إن كان المدلول تمام الموضوع له من حيث هو كذلك، وتضمنيّة إن كان جزء الموضوع له من حيث هو كذلك، والتزاميّة إن كان خارجاً عنه لازماً ذهنياً له من حيث هو كذلك. فلا بدّ للأولى من الوضع والعلم به، وللثانية من التركيب أيضاً، وللثالثة من اللزوم العقلي مع ما للأولى. والمطابقة لازم لهما من غير عكس، وهما قد يجتمعان فاجتماع الكلّ ممكن.

الدال بالمطابقة إما أن يُقصد بجزء منه الدلالة على جزء معناه، فهو مركّب [4] تام إن لم يبق معه حالة متترة معتدة بها، وهو إن احتمل الصدق والكذب بالنظر إلى مفهومه مع قطع النظر عن خصوصيته بل عن خصوصيّة المتكلم أيضاً خبر وقضية، وإلا فإنشاء سواء دلّ على الطلب بالوضع كالأمر والنهي والاستفهام أو لا بالوضع كالتمني والترجي والتعجب والنداء والقسم وغير ذلك.

وإن بقي معه حالة متترة معتدة بها فمركّب ناقص: تقييدي إن كان الثاني قيداً للأول، فهو وصفي إن كان التركيب من الوصف والموصوف؛ وإضافي إن كان من المضاف والمضاف إليه، وإلا فناقص غير تقييدي.

وإن لم يقصد بجزء منه الدلالة على جزء معناه فمفرد، وأقسامه ستة: الأول ما لا يكون له ولمعناه جزء، الثاني ما يكون له جزء دون معناه، الثالث ما يكون بعكس الثاني، الرابع ما يكون له ولمعناه جزء لكن لا دلالة لجزئه على جزء معنى أصلاً، الخامس ما يكون له ولمعناه جزء وجزئه دلالة على معنى لكن لم يكن ذلك المعنى جزءاً للمعنى المقصود من اللفظ، والسادس ما يكون له ولمعناه جزء وجزئه دلالة على جزء المعنى المقصود لكن لم تكن تلك الدلالة مقصودة.

المفرد إن استقلّ مفهومه - أي صلح أن يقع محكومًا عليه أو به - فإن دلّ بهيئته على أحد الأزمنة الثلاثة فكلمة وإلا فإسم. وإن لم يستقل فإداعة زمانية إن دلّ على الزمان، وإلا فغير زمانية.

وأيضًا: إن كان مدلوله واحدًا فإن دلّ بالوضع [5] على الشخص فهو علم وجزئي حقيقي، وإلا فكلي، متواطئ إن كان حصول معناه في أفرادهِ على السوية، ومشكك إن اختلف في الأوليّة والأوليّة والأشديّة بأن كان حصوله في البعض أقدم أو أولى أو أشدّه من البعض الآخر. وإن كان مدلوله متعددًا فإن لم يتخلل بينهما النقل بل وضع لكل منهما مع قطع النظر عن ملاحظة المناسبة بينهما فمشترك، وإلا فإن إشتهر في الثاني فنقول، شرعي إن كان الناقل صاحب الشريعة، واصطلاحي إن كان أهل الاصطلاح الخاص، وعرفي إن كان عرف العام؛ وإلا فحقيقة إن استعمل في المعنى الأول، ومجاز إن استعمل في الثاني. وقد تطلق الحقيقة على الاستعمال في الأول والمجاز على الاستعمال في الثاني.

وكل لفظ بالنسبة إلى لفظ آخر مرادف له إن كان معناهما واحدًا بالنظر إليه واللفظان مترادفان، ومباين له إن كان لكل منهما معنى سواء كان المعنيان متصادقين أم لا واللفظان متباينان.

فصل

المفهوم إن امتنع فرض صدقه على كثيرين - بمعنى أن لا يجوز العقل وقوعه متعددًا - جزئي حقيقي، وإلا فكلي حقيقي. والجزئي الإضافي هو الأخص، والكلي الإضافي هو الأعم لكن يعتبر فيه فعلية الصدق فهو أخصّ مطلقًا من الكلي الحقيقي، كما أن الجزئي الإضافي أعمّ مطلقًا من الحقيقيين والكلي الإضافي. [6]

الكلي قد يكون ممتنع الأفراد في نفس الأمر، وقد يكون ممكنًا غير موجود فيها، وقد يكون الموجود منه واحدًا واجب الوجود مع امتناع الغير، وقد يكون واحدًا ممكن الوجود مع إمكان الغير، وقد يكون متعددًا متناهياً، وقد يكون غير متناه.

والكليان إن تفارقا كليًا فهما متباينان والنسبة بينهما تباين كلي وبين تقيضيهما تباين جزئي، وإلا فإن تصادقا كليًا من الجانبين فتساويان والنسبة بينهما المساواة كما يكون

بين نقيضيهما كذلك، أو من جانب واحد فالكلي الصادق على جميع أفراد الآخر أعمّ مطلقاً والآخر أخصّ مطلقاً والنسبة بينهما عموم وخصوص مطلق كما بين نقيضيهما لكن الأمر فيهما بالعكس، وإلا فكل واحد من الكليتين أعمّ وأخصّ من وجه من الآخر والنسبة بينهما عموم وخصوص من وجه وبين نقيضيهما تباين جزئي.

الكليات خمس، لانه إذا نسب إلى حقيقة ما تحته من الأفراد فإما أن يكون عينها، أو داخلاً فيها، أو خارجاً عنها. فإن كان الأول يسمّى نوعاً حقيقياً وتمام الحقيقة، فهو المقول على الكثرة المتفقة الحقيقة في جواب ما هو، فإن تميز أفراد النوع لما كان بحسب التشخيصات الخارجة عن حقيقة أفرادها فقط كانت أفرادها متفقة الحقيقة، فإذا سئل عن واحد منها أو عن متعدد بـ"ما هو" كان الجواب النوع، لأن المطلوب بـ"ما هو" تمام الماهية، فإن كان السؤال [7] عن شيء واحد فالمطلوب تمام الماهية المختصة، وإن كان عن أكثر فالمطلوب تمام الماهية المشتركة، ولما كان النوع تمام الماهية المختصة والمشاركة بالنسبة إلى أفرادها فالجواب عن السؤال بـ"ما هو" عن أفراد النوع ليس إلا النوع. والنوع الإضافي هو الماهية المقول عليها وعلى غيرها الجنس في جواب "ما هو". والنسبة بين النوعين عموم وخصوص من وجه لتصادفهما على الإنسان وتفارقهما في الحيوان والنقطة. ومراتب الأنواع ثلاث: أعمّ الأنواع ويسمى النوع العالي، وأخصّها ويسمى النوع السافل ونوع الأنواع، وأخصّ من بعض وأعمّ من بعض ويسمى النوع المتوسط.

وإن كان الثاني فإن كان هو تمام المشترك بين الماهية ونوع ما من الأنواع المبينة لهما - بأن لا يكون بينهما جزء مشترك خارج عنه بل كل ما يكون مشتركاً إما عينه أو جزءاً منه - فيسمّى جنساً، فهو المقول على الكثرة المختلفة الحقيقة في جواب "ما هو". فهو إن كان تمام المشترك بين جميع المشاركات فيه فهو جنس قريب وإلا فبعيد. ومراتب البعد مختلفة فإن كان في مشاركات [د] جنس البعيد جوابان فهو بعيد بمرتبة واحدة، وإن كان ثلاثة أجوبة فهو بعيد بمرتبتين، وإن كان أربعة أجوبة فبعيد بثلاث مراتب. وعلى هذا [8] القياس فيزيد عدد الأجوبة على عدد مراتب البعد بواحد، لأن الجنس القريب جواب وكل واحد من مرتبة البعد جواب آخر. ومراتب الأجناس أيضاً ثلاث أبعداً يسمّى الجنس العالي وجنس الأجناس كالجواهر مثلاً، وأقربها الجنس السافل، وما بينهما جنساً متوسطاً، وقد يقع مفرداً كالنوع. وجزء المقول

في جواب ما هو إن كان مذكوراً بالمطابقة يسمّى واقعاً في طريق ما هو، وإن كان مذكوراً بالتضمّن يسمّى داخلياً في جواب ما هو .

والإ - أي وإن لم يكن تمام المشترك بين الماهية وبين نوع ما من الأنواع - فيسمّى **فصلاً**، لأنه إما أن لا يكون مشتركاً أصلاً، أو يكون مشتركاً لكن لا بين الجميع إذ البعض بسيط، فعلى التقديرين يميّز الماهية في الجملة، ولا نعني بالفصل إلا ذاتياً يميّز الماهية في الجملة ولا يكون تمام المشترك. فهو إن ميّزها عن جميع المشاركات في الجنس القريب فهو فصل قريب، وإلا فهو فصل بعيد. فالفصل هو المقول على الشيء في جواب "أي شيء هو في جوهره"، لأن المطلوب ب"أي شيء هو" ما يميّز الماهية عن المشاركات في الأمر العام، فإن قيّد ب"في ذاته" أو ب"في جوهره" أو ما شاكل ذلك فالمطلوب المميّز الذاتي، وإن قيّد ب"في عرضه" فالمطلوب المميّز العرضي. فالفصل مقوّمٌ للنوع وداخل في قوامه وتحصله، ومقسّمٌ للجنس لأنه يحصل قسمًا له إذا انضم إليه. وكل فصل يقوم النوع العالي يقوم النوع السافل لأن العالي يقوم السافل [9] ولا عكس، فإن الناطق يقوم السافل ولا يقوم العالي. وكل فصل يقسم الجنس السافل يقسم الجنس العالي لأن السافل قسم للعالي ولا عكس، فإن القابل للأبعاد الثلث يقسم العالي ولا يقسم السافل.

وإن كان الثالث فإما أن يختص بحقيقة واحدة فيسمّى **خاصة**، فهو الخارج المقول على ما تحت حقيقة واحدة في جواب "أي شيء هو في عرضه"، كالضاحك بالنسبة إلى الإنسان فإنه يميّز الإنسان عن جميع الأعمار تمييزاً عرضياً فيصح أن يقال في جواب "أي شيء هو في عرضه". وإن لم يختص بحقيقة واحدة بل يعمها وغيرها فيسمّى **عرضاً عاماً**، فهو الخارج المقول على الكثرة المختلفة الحقيقة ولا يصلح أن يقع في الجواب، لا في جواب "ما هو" ولا في جواب "أي شيء هو في ذاته" لأن العرض العام خارج، ولا في جواب "أي شيء هو في عرضه" لأنه لا بدّ في العرض العام من عمومٍ ينافي الخصوص الذي لا بدّ منه في التمييز. وكل واحد منهما:

إما لازم إن امتنع انفكك الملزوم عنه، فإن كان ذلك اللزوم بشرط الوجود الخاص والتشخص المعين فهو لازم الوجود كالسواد للحبشي، وإلا فلازم الماهية كالضحك بالقوة للإنسان. ولازم الماهية بين وغير بين. والبين يطلق على معنيين، أحدهما ما يكون تصوّر الطرفين مع النسبة كافيًا في الجزم بلزوم اللازم للملزوم ويسمّى اللازم

البين بالمعنى الأعمّ، والثاني ما يكون تصوّر الملزوم مستلزماً [10] لتصوّر اللازم ويسمى اللازم البين بالمعنى الأخصّ. وغير البين ما لا يكون تصوّر الطرفين مع النسبة كافياً في الجزم باللزوم؛

وإما عرض مفارق إن لم يمتنع إنفكاك المعروض عنه بل أمكن، فهو إما دائمي كالحركة بالنسبة إلى الأفلاك، أو غير دائمي بطيء الزوال كالشباب أو سريع الزوال كحرة الخجل وصفرة الوجل.

خاتمة: إذا قلنا الإنسان كليّ فيه ثلاثة أشياء: أحدها مفهوم لفظ الكليّ مع قطع النظر عن خصوصية المواد ويسمى كلياً منطقيّاً، الثاني مفهوم الإنسان الذي هو معروض الكليّ المنطقيّ ويسمى كلياً طبيعياً، والثالث المجموع المركّب من المنطقيّ والطبيعيّ ويسمى كلياً عقلياً. وكذلك يسمّى مفهومات الكليات الخمس منطقيّاً ومعروضاتها طبيعياً والمركّب منهما عقلياً. واختلف القوم في وجود الكليّ الطبيعيّ في الخارج، فذهب بعض إلى أن الموجود في الخارج هو الأفراد والأشخاص دون الطباع والكليات وهو المذهب المنصور، وذهب بعض إلى أن الطباع موجودة في الخارج متميّزة عن الأشخاص بالماهية متحدة معها بالوجود، وذهب بعض إلى أنها موجودة في الخارج متميّزة عن الأشخاص بالماهية والوجود، وهذان المذهبان سخيفان.

فصل

معرف الشيء ما يقال عليه لأفاده تصوّره. ويشترط أن يكون مساوياً للمعرف في الصدق وأجلى منه في المعرفة، فلا يصحّ التعريف بالأعمّ والأخصّ - لا مطلقاً ولا من وجه - ولا بالمباين ولا بما هو مثله [11] في المعرفة والجهالة ولا الأخرى. وأيضاً يجب أن يحترز عن الاشتراك والتجوّز والتكرار الغير الحاجي والاضمار وعن استعمال الألفاظ الغير الظاهرة الدلالة على المعنى المراد إلا إذا قام قرينة معيّنة للراد صارفة عن غيره. وأقسامه أربعة:

الحَد التام وهو المركب من الجنس والفصل القريبن كالحیوان الناطق بالنسبة إلى الإنسان،

والحد الناقص وهو المركب من الجنس البعيد والفصل القريب ويصح بالفصل وحده، كالجسم النامي الناطق والجسم الناطق والجوهر الناطق وكاناطق وحده بالنسبة إلى الإنسان،

والرسم التام وهو المركب من الجنس القريب والخاصة، كالحیوان الضاحك بالنسبة إلى الإنسان،

والرسم الناقص وهو المركب من الجنس البعيد والخاصة ويصح بالخاصة وحده، كالجسم النامي الضاحك والجسم الضاحك والجوهر الضاحك وكالضاحك وحده بالنسبة إلى الإنسان.

ولم يعتبروا التعريف بالعرض العام لا وحده ولا مع الغير، وأما القدماء فجزّوه بالأعمّ وبالعرض العام مع الفصل أو الخاصة، وجزّوه بالعرضيات المخصوصة جملةً بحقيقة واحدة، كقولنا في تعريف الإنسان: ماشٍ على قدميه عريض الأظافر بايدي البشرة مستقيم القامة ضحّاك بالطبع.

فصل

القضية قول يحتمل الصدق والكذب، وهي مركبة من أربعة أجزاء: المحكوم عليه ويسمى في القضية الحملية موضوعاً وفي الشرطية [12] مقدّماً، والمحكوم به ويسمى في الحملية محمولاً وفي الشرطية تالياً، والنسبة التي بها يرتبط المحكوم عليه بالمحكوم به وتسمى نسبة حكمية ومورد الإيجاب والسلب والنسبة بين بين، ووقوع تلك النسبة أولاً ووقوعها ويسمى حكماً. فهذه المعلومات الأربع من حيث أنها حاصلة في الذهن تسمى قضية، والعلم بها يسمى تصديقاً عند الإمام الرازي، وأما عند الحكماء فهو إدراك الحكم، فهو مركب عنده وبسيط عندهم.

وهي تنقسم إلى قسمين: حملية وشرطية، لأن الحكم فيها إن كان بثبوت شيء لشيء أو نفيه عنه حملية موجبة أو سالبة، وإلا فشرطية. والحملية قد تكون ثنائية إن لم يكن الدال على الرابطة مذكوراً فيها، وإلا فتلائية. وكل ما دلّ على الربط رابطة، سواء كان حرفاً أو اسماً مستعاراً كـ"هو" أو فعلاً في اصطلاح النحاة كـ"كان" أو حركة كالكسرة في "زيد دبير" أو غير ذلك.

الموضوع إن كان شخصاً سميت القضية شخصية ومخصوصة. وإن كان كلياً فإن كان الحكم فيها على نفس الطبيعة والحقيقة فالقضية طبيعية، وإلا، فإن بين كمية أفراده كلاً أو بعضاً فمحسوسة. والمحسورات أربع: الموجبة الكليّة وهي التي حكم فيها بالإيجاب على جميع أفراد الموضوع وسورها لفظ "الكل" و"الجميع" و"الجملة" و"القاطبة" ومثل ذلك، والموجبة الجزئية وهي التي حكم فيها بالإيجاب على بعض أفراده وسورها لفظ "البعض" و"الواحد"، والسالبة الكليّة وهي التي حكم فيها بالسلب على جميع الأفراد وسورها "لا شيء" و"لا واحد"، والسالبة الجزئية وهي التي حكم فيها [13] بالسلب على بعض الأفراد وسورها "ليس بعض" و"بعض ليس" و"ليس كل". والسور عبارة عما به بيان كمية الأفراد،

والإفهملة وهي تلازم الجزئية. والشخصية والطبيعية غير مستعملتين في العلوم. الحكم في القضية إن كان مطابقاً لما في نفس الأمر والواقع فالقضية صادقة وإلا فكاذبة. وأيضاً قد يكون الحكم على الأفراد المحققة الوجود في الخارج وهي الخارجية، وقد يكون على الأفراد المقدرة الوجود - أي كل ما قدر وجوده سواء كان موجوداً في الخارج في أحد الأزمنة الثلاثة أولاً -، ولكن يجب أن يكون ممكنة الوجود في الخارج، وهي الحقيقية، وقد يكون على الأفراد الموجودة في الذهن فقط وهي الذهنية. والمعتبر في جانب الموضوع في القضايا المتعارفة ذاته - أي أفراد الشخصية على رأي ومطلق على رأي - لا العنوان، وفي جانب المحمول الوصف لا الذات. فيعتبر فيها عقدين: عقد الوضع وهو اتصاف ذات الموضوع بالعنوان بالفعل أو بالإمكان وهو تركيب تقييدي، وعقد الحمل وهو اتصاف ذاته بوصف المحمول وهو تركيب خبري.

والعنوان قد يكون عين الذات، وقد يكون داخلياً فيها، وقد يكون خارجاً عنها. فالحكم في "كل ج ب" على التقدير الأول على الأفراد الموجودة في الخارج المتّصف بـ ج سواء كان ذلك الاتصاف حال الحكم أو قبله أو بعده، فإن المعدوم أولاً وأبداً يستحيل أن يكون شيئاً في الخارج.

وعلى الثاني على الأفراد المتّصفة بـ ج المقدرة الوجود، فإن كانت لها أفراد موجودة في الخارج فالحكم عليها وعلى المعدوم.

وعلى الثالث على [14] الأفراد المتّصفة بـ ج الموجودة في الذهن.

فالموجبة الكلية الخارجية أعمّ من وجه من الموجبة الكلية الحقيقية. والموجبة الجزئية الخارجية أخصّ مطلقاً من الموجبة الجزئية الحقيقية. والسالبة الكلية الخارجية أعمّ مطلقاً من السالبة الكلية الحقيقية. وبين السالبتين الجزئيتين تباين جزئي كما هو المشهور، والحق أن السالبة الجزئية الحقيقية أعمّ مطلقاً من السالبة الجزئية الخارجية.

فصل

القضية، إما معدولة إن كان حرف السلب جزءاً من جزء، فإن كان جزءاً من الموضوع فعدولة الموضوع، وإن كان جزءاً من المحمول فعدولة المحمول، وإن كان جزءاً منهما فعدولة الطرفين؛ وإلا فمحسّلة. والسالبة المحسّلة أعمّ من الموجبة المعدولة لاقتضائها وجود الموضوع دون الأولى. والموجبة السالبة المحمول - وهي أن يسلب ربط المحمول إلى الموضوع ثمّ يحمل ذلك السلب عليه - باطل بديهياً.

فصل

القضية إن لم يصرّح بكيفية النسبة فيها فطلقة وإلا فوجهة، وما به البيان يسمّى جهة. وكيفية النسبة - وهي الضرورة والدوام واللاضرورة واللادوام - تسمّى مادة القضية. والجهة في القضية اللفظية لفظ، وفي العقلية حكم العقل. والموجهة تنقسم إلى بسيطة ومركبة، لأن معناها إن كانت ملتئمة من إيجاب وسلب فهي مركبة، وإلا فبسيطة وهي أربع عشر قضية: لأن الحكم فيها إما بالضرورة أو بالدوام أو بسلب الضرورة [15] أو بفعليّة النسبة.

فإن كان الأول فهو إتما ما دام ذات الموضوع موجودة **فضرورية مطلقة**، فالموجبة منها ما حكم فيها بضرورة ثبوت المحمول للموضوع ما دام ذات الموضوع موجودة كقولنا "كل إنسان حيوان بالضرورة ما دام الذات موجودة"، والسالبة ما حكم فيها بضرورة السلب ما دام الذات موجودة، كقولنا "لا شيء من الإنسان بحجر بالضرورة ما دام ذات الإنسان موجودة"؛ أو ما دام الموضوع متصفاً بالعنوان **فشرطية عامة** فالموجبة منها ما حكم بضرورة الإيجاب ما دام الذات متصفة

بالعنوان، والسالبة منها ما حكم فيها بضرورة السلب ما دام الذات متصفةً بالعنوان، كقولنا "كل منخسف مظلم بالضرورة ما دام ذات المنخسف متصفةً بالانخساف"، و"لا شيء من المنخسف بمضيء بالضرورة ما دام ذات المنخسف متصفة بالانخساف"، وهي أعمّ مطلقاً من الضرورية المطلقة، وقد يقال المشروطة العامة على القضية التي حكم فيها بضرورة النسبة بشرط اتصاف ذات الموضوع بالعنوان، والنسبة بين المعنيين عموم وخصوص من وجه؛ أو في وقت معين **فوقية مطلقة** فالموجبة منها ما حكم فيها بضرورة الإيجاب في وقت معين والسالبة ما حكم فيها بضرورة السلب في وقت معين كقولنا "كل قمر منخسف بالضرورة وقت الحيلولة" و"لا شيء من القمر بمنخسف بالضرورة وقت التربيع"، وهي أعمّ مطلقاً من المشروطة العامة؛ أو في وقت [16] غير معين **فمنشرة مطلقة** فالموجبة منها ما حكم فيها بضرورة الإيجاب في وقت غير معين، والسالبة ما حكم فيها بضرورة السلب في وقت غير معين، كقولنا "كل إنسان متنقّس بالضرورة في وقتٍ ما" و"لا شيء من الإنسان بمتنقّس بالضرورة في وقتٍ ما"، وهي أعمّ مطلقاً من الوقتية المطلقة.

وإن كان الثاني فهو إما ما دام الذات موجودة **فدائمة مطلقة**، فالموجبة منها ما حكم فيها بدوام الإيجاب ما دام الذات موجودة، والسالبة ما حكم فيها بدوام السلب ما دام الذات موجودة، كقولنا "كل فلك متحرك بالدوام ما دام الذات موجودة"، "لا شيء من الفلك بساكن بالدوام ما دام الذات موجودة"، وهي أعمّ مطلقاً من الضرورية المطلقة ومن وجه من الثلاثة المذكورة الباقية؛ أو ما دام ذات الموضوع متصفةً بالعنوان **ففرعية عامة**، فالموجبة منها ما حكم فيها بدوام الإيجاب ما دام الذات متصفةً بالعنوان، والسالبة ما حكم فيها بدوام السلب ما دام الذات متصفةً بالعنوان، كقولنا "كل كاتب متحرك الأصابع بالدوام ما دام كاتباً"، "لا شيء من الكاتب بساكن الأصابع بالدوام ما دام كاتباً"، وهي أعمّ مطلقاً من الدائمة المطلقة والمشروطة العامة ومن وجه من الوقتيتين المطلقتين؛

وإن كان الثالث فإما أن يكون ذلك بسلب الضرورية الذاتية عن الجانب المخالف **فممكنة عامة**، فالموجبة منها ما حكم فيها بسلب ضرورة السلب، والسالبة ما حكم فيها بسلب ضرورة الإيجاب، [17] كقولنا "كل إنسان كاتب بالإمكان العام"، فالحكم فيه بأنّ سلب الكتابة عن الإنسان ليس بضروري، و"لا شيء من الإنسان بحجر

بالإمكان العام"، يعني أن ثبوت الحجريّة للإنسان ليس بضروري، وهي أعمّ مطلقاً من القضايا المذكورة؛ أو بسلب الضرورة الوصفية عن الجانب المخالف **فحينية** **ممكّنة**، فالموجبة منها ما حكم فيها بسلب ضرورة السلب ما دام الذات متصفة بالعنوان، والسالبة ما حكم فيها بسلب ضرورة الإيجاب ما دام الذات متصفة بالعنوان، كقولنا "كل من به ذات الجنب يمكن أن يسعل حين كونه مجنوباً"، يعني أن سلب السعال عنه ما دام مجنوباً غير ضروري، و"لا شيء من به ذات الجنب يمكن أن يسعل ما دام مجنوباً"، يعني أن ثبوت السعال له ما دام مجنوباً غير ضروري، وهي أخصّ مطلقاً من الممكنة العامة ومن وجه من الوقتين المطلقتين وأعمّ مطلقاً من سائر القضايا المذكورة؛ أو بسلب ضرورة الوقتية عن الجانب المخالف **فممكّنة** **وقتيّة**، فالموجبة منها ما حكم فيها بسلب ضرورة السلب في وقت معيّن، والسالبة ما حكم فيها بسلب ضرورة الإيجاب في وقت معيّن، كقولنا "كل قمر يمكن أن يخسف وقت الحيلولة"، يعني أن سلب الانخساف عن القمر ليس بضروري وقت الحيلولة، "لا شيء من القمر يمكن أن يخسف وقت التربيع"، يعني أن ثبوت الانخساف للقمر ليس بضروري وقت التربيع، وهي أخصّ مطلقاً من الممكنة العامة، ومن وجه من الحينية الممكنة، وأعمّ مطلقاً من العرفيّة [18] العامة والدائمة المطلقة والمنتشرة المطلقة، وهي أعمّ من الثلاثة الباقية المذكورة أيضاً؛ أو بسلب ضرورة المنتشرة المطلقة عن الجانب المخالف **فممكّنة دائمة**، فالموجبة منها ما حكم فيها بسلب ضرورة السلب في وقت ما، والسالبة ما حكم فيها بسلب ضرورة الإيجاب في وقت ما، كقولنا "كل إنسان يمكن أن يتنفس وقتاً ما"، يعني أن سلب التنفس عن الإنسان غير ضروري وقتاً ما، "لا شيء من الإنسان يمكن أن يتنفس وقتاً ما"، يعني أن ثبوت التنفس له ليس ضرورياً وقتاً ما، وهي أخصّ مطلقاً من الممكنة العامة والحينية الممكنة والممكنة الوقتية وأعمّ مطلقاً من الضروريات الأربع والدائمتين [ومن] وجه من الثلاثة الباقية المذكورة:

وإن كان الرابع فإن لم يكن الحكم مقيداً بوقت، معيّناً كان أو غير معيّن، **فمطلقة عامة**، كقولنا "كل إنسان كاتب بالفعل"، "لا شيء من الإنسان بكاتب بالفعل"، وهي أخصّ مطلقاً من الممكنة العامة والحينية الممكنة ومن وجه من الممكنة الوقتية والممكنة الدائمة وأعمّ مطلقاً من الست الباقية المذكورة؛ وإلا فإن كان ذلك في بعض

أحيان وصف الموضوع **فحينية مطلقة**، كقولنا "كل من به ذات الجنب يسعل بالفعل في بعض أوقات كونه مجنوباً"، "لا شيء ممن به ذات الجنب يسعل بالفعل في بعض أوقات كونه مجنوباً"، وهي أخصّ مطلقاً من المطلقة العامة والحينية الممكنة والممكنة العامة ومن وجه من الممكنة الوقتية والممكنة الدائمة ومن وجه من المنتشرة المطلقة والوقتية المطلقة وأعمّ مطلقاً من الأربع الباقية المذكورة؛ وإلا فإن كان مقيداً بوقت معين **فطلقة** [19] **وقتية**، كقولنا "كل إنسان متحرك الأصابع وقت الكتابة"، "لا شيء من الكاتب بساكن الأصابع وقت الكتابة"، وهي أخصّ من وجه من المنتشرة المطلقة ومطلقاً من الممكنة العامة والحينية الممكنة والمطلقة ومن وجه من الممكنة الوقتية والممكنة الدائمة والمطلقة العامة وأعمّ مطلقاً من الست الباقية المذكورة؛ وإن كان مقيداً بوقت غير معين **فطلقة منتشرة**، كقولنا "كل إنسان متنفس وقتاً ما"، "لا شيء من الإنسان بمتنفس وقتاً ما"، وهي أخصّ مطلقاً من الممكنة العامة والحينية الممكنة ومن وجه من الممكنة الوقتية والممكنة الدائمة وأعمّ مطلقاً من الثماني الباقية المذكورة، وأما الفرق بينها وبين المطلقة فبحسب المفهوم فقط. والحق أن الفعليات الأربع ليست من الموجّهات لكنا ادخلناها فيها وعددناها منها لشدة احتياج بيان أحكام الموجّهات وكيفية إنتاج اختلاطاتها إليها. وأما المركبات فثمان:

المشروطة الخاصة وهي المشروطة العامة مع قيد اللادوام، ومدلول اللادوام مطلقة عامة، موجبة إن كان الأصل سالبة لأن السلب إذا لم يكن دائماً يصدق الإيجاب بالفعل، وسالبة إن كان الأصل موجبة لأن الإيجاب إذا لم يكن دائماً يصدق السلب بالفعل، لكن يوافق الأصل في الكمية فالأصل إن [كان] كلياً فمدلوله كلي وإن كان جزئياً فمدلوله جزئي، كقولنا "كل كاتب متحرك الأصابع بالضرورة ما دام كاتباً لا دائماً"، "لا شيء من الكاتب بساكن الأصابع بالضرورة ما دام كاتباً لا دائماً"، فمدلول اللادوام في الأول "لا شيء من الكاتب [20] بمتحرك الأصابع بالفعل" وفي الثاني "كل كاتب ساكن الأصابع بالفعل"، وهي مباينة للدائمتين والممكنة الوقتية والممكنة الدائمة، وأخصّ مطلقاً من العشرة الباقية المذكورة؛

العرفية الخاصة وهي العرفية العامة مع قيد اللادوام، فالموجبة مركبة من موجبة عرفية وسالبة مطلقة عامة، والسالبة من سالبة عرفية عامة وموجبة مطلقة عامة، وهي

مباينة للدائمتين، وأعمّ مطلقاً من المشروطة الخاصة، ومن وجه من المشروطة العامة والوقيتين المطلقتين والممكنة الوقتية والممكنة الدائمة، وأخصّ مطلقاً من التسع الباقية المذكورة؛

الوقتية وهي الوقتية المطلقة مع قيد اللادوام، فالموجبة مركبة من موجبة وقتية مطلقة وسالبة مطلقة عامة، والسالبة من سالبة وقتية مطلقة وموجبة مطلقة عامة، وهي مباينة للدائمتين والممكنة الوقتية والممكنة الدائمة، وأعمّ مطلقاً من المشروطة الخاصة، ومن وجه من العامتين والعرفية الخاصة، وأخصّ مطلقاً من القضايا الباقية المذكورة؛

المنتشرة وهي المنتشرة المطلقة مع قيد اللادوام، فالموجبة مركبة من موجبة منتشرة مطلقة و[سالبة] مطلقة عامة، والسالبة من سالبة منتشرة مطلقة وموجبة مطلقة، وهي مباينة للدائمتين والممكنة الوقتية والممكنة الدائمة، وأعمّ مطلقاً من المشروطة الخاصة والوقيتية، ومن وجه من العامتين والعرفية الخاصة، وأخصّ مطلقاً من سائر القضايا المذكورة؛

الوجودية اللادائمة وهي المطلقة مع قيد [21] اللادوام فالموجبة منها مركبة من موجبة مطلقة عامة وسالبة مطلقة عامة، والسالبة بالعكس، وهي مباينة للدائمتين، وأعمّ مطلقاً من الخاصتين والوقيتين، وأخصّ مطلقاً من المطلقة العامة والممكنة العامة والحينية الممكنة والممكنة الوقتية والممكنة الدائمة والمطلقة المنتشرة، ومن وجه من سائر القضايا المذكورة؛

الحينية اللادائمة وهي الحينية المطلقة مع قيد اللادوام، فالموجبة مركبة من موجبة حينية مطلقة وسالبة مطلقة عامة، والسالبة من سالبة حينية مطلقة وموجبة مطلقة عامة، وهي مباينة للدائمتين، وأعمّ مطلقاً من الخاصتين والوقيتين، ومن وجه من العامتين والوقيتين المطلقتين والممكنة الدائمة، وأخصّ من سائر القضايا المذكورة، وأمثلة هذه القضايا ما مرّ؛

الوجودية اللاضرورية وهي المطلقة العامة مع قيد اللاضرورة الذاتية، ومدلولها الموجبة الممكنة العامة إن كان الأصل سالباً لأن سلب ضرورة السلب ممكنة عامة موجبة، وسالبة إن كان الأصل موجبة لأن سلب ضرورة الإيجاب ممكنة عامة سالبة، كقولنا "كل إنسان كاتب بالفعل لا بالضرورة"، "لا شيء من الإنسان

بكاتب بالفعل لا بالضرورة"، فدلول اللاضرورة في الأول "لا شيء من الإنسان بكاتب بالإمكان العام" وفي الثاني "كل إنسان كاتب بالإمكان العام"، وهي مباينة للضروورية [المطلقة]، وأعمّ مطلقاً من الخاصتين والوقيتين والوجودية اللادائمة والحينية اللادائمة، وأخصّ مطلقاً من المطلقة العامة والممكنة العامة [22] والحينية الممكنة والممكنة الوقتية والممكنة الدائمة والمطلقة المنتشرة، ومن وجه من القضايا الباقية المذكورة:

الممكنة الخاصة وهي التي حكم فيها بسلب ضرورة الطرفين - أي المخالف والموافق - فهي مركبة [دائماً] من ممكنتين عامتين إحداهما موجبة والأخرى سالبة، ولا فرق بين الموجبة والسالبة إلا في اللفظ، فإن اشتملت على حرف السلب فسالبة وإلا فموجبة، كقولنا "كل إنسان كاتب بالإمكان الخاص"، "لا شيء من الإنسان بكاتب بالإمكان الخاص"، فأن معنيهما أن ثبوت الكتابة للإنسان وسلبها عنه ليسا بضروريين، وهي مباينة للضرورة المطلقة، وأخصّ مطلقاً من الممكنة العامة، وأعمّ مطلقاً من الخاصتين والوقيتين والوجوديتين والحينية اللادائمة، ومن وجه من سائر القضايا المذكورة.

فصل

الشرطية على قسمين: متصلة ومنفصلة. والمتصلة إما موجبة وهي التي حكم فيها بصدق التالي على تقدير صدق المقدم كقولنا "إن كانت الشمس طالعة فالنهار موجود"، أو سالبة وهي التي حكم فيها بنفي التالي على تقدير صدق المقدم كقولنا "ليس إن كانت الشمس طالعة فالليل موجود". والمتصلة إما لزومية إن كان الاتصال لعلاقة بين الطرفين بأن كان أحدهما علّة للآخر أو كانا معلوليّ علة واحدة أو كانا متضائين أو غير ذلك، وإلا فاتفاقية خاصة إن كان لتوافق الطرفين في الصدق، وعامية إن كفيّ بمجرد صدق التالي.

والمنفصلة على ثلاثة أقسام: حقيقية موجبة وهي التي حكم فيها بالتنافي بين القضيتين في الصدق والكذب، أي حكم بأنهما لا يصدقان [23] معاً ولا يكذبان، وسالبة وهي التي حكم فيها بسلب ذلك التنافي كقولنا "هذا العدد إما زوج أو فرد"، و"ليس هذا

العدد إما زوج أو منقسم بمتساوين"، ومانعة الجمع وهي موجبة إن حكم فيها بالتنافي بين القضيتين في الصدق فقط أى لا يصدقان ولكن يكذبان، وسالبة إن حكم فيها بسلب ذلك التنافي كقولنا "هذا الشيء إما شجر أو حجر" و"ليس هذا الشيء إما لا شجر أو لا حجر"؛ ومانعة الخلو والموجبة منها ما حكم فيها بالتنافي بين القضيتين في الكذب فقط أى لا يرتفعان ولكن قد يصدقان، والسالبة منها ما حكم فيها بسلب ذلك التنافي كقولنا "زيد إما أن يكون في البحر أو لا يغرق" و"ليس هذا الشيء إما إنساناً أو جماداً". وكل واحد منها إما عنادية إن كان التنافي لذات الجزئين والإفريقية.

والمتصلة الموجبة يصدق عن صادقين وعن كاذبين، وعن مجهولي الصدق والكذب، وعن مقدم كاذب وتالي صادق دون عكسه لامتناع استلزام الصادق الكاذب؛ وتكذب عن جزئين كاذبين، وعن مقدم كاذب وتالي صادق وبالعكس، وعن صادقين إذا كانت لزومية وأما إذا كانت اتفاقية فكذبها عن صادقين محال.

والحقيقية الموجبة يصدق عن صادق وكاذب ويكذب عن صادقين وكاذبين، ومانعة الجمع يصدق عن كاذبين وعن صادق وكاذب ويكذب عن صادقين، ومانعة الخلو يصدق عن صادقين وعن صادق وكاذب ويكذب عن كاذبين، والسالبة يصدق عما تكذب الموجبة وتكذب عما تصدق.

اعلم أن أجزاء الزمان في الشرطيات بمنزلة أفراد [24] الموضوع في الحملات، فالحكم فيها: إن كان على جميع أزمان المقدم وأوضاعه فالقضية الشرطية كلية، موجبة إن حكم فيها بالإيجاب، وسالبة إن حكم بالسلب، وإن كان على بعض الأزمان والأوضاع لكن لا بعينه بل مطلقاً جزئية موجبة أو سالبة؛

وإن كان على البعض المعين فشخصية؛

وإن أهمل بيان كمية أجزاء الزمان كلاً أو جزءاً فهاملة.

وسور الموجبة الكلية في المتصلة "كلما" و"مهما" و"متى"، وفي المنفصلة "دائماً"، وسور السالبة الكلية فيهما "ليس البتة". وسور الموجبة الجزئية فيهما "قد يكون"، وسور السالبة فيهما "قد لا يكون"، وقد يكون بإدخال حرف السلب على سور الإيجاب الكلي "كليس كلما" و"ليس مهما" و"ليس متى" في المتصلة و"ليس دائماً" في المنفصلة. وإطلاق لفظة "لو" و"إن" و"إذا" في الاتصال و"إما" و"أو" في الانفصال للإهمال.

وطرفا الشرطية في الأصل قضيتان حملتان أو متصلتان أو منفصلتان أو مختلفتان إلا أنهما خرجتا بزيادة اداة الاتصال والانفصال عن التمام إلى النقصان.

فصل

اللزوم الكلي بين أمرين يستلزم منع الجمع بين عين الملزوم وتقيض اللازم ومنع الخلو بين تقيض الملزوم وعين اللازم وإلا لبطل اللزوم الكلي، وهما معاً يستلزمانه، وإلا لبطل الانفصال. والانفصال الحقيقي يستلزم أربع متصلات يكون مقدم الثنتين منها عين أحد الجزئين وتاليهما تقيض الجزء الآخر، والاثنتان الآخريان بعكسهما، وإلا لبطل الانفصال الحقيقي. ومنع الجمع بين أمرين يستلزم منع الخلو بين تقيضيهما وبالعكس، وإلا لبطل منع الجمع والخلو.

فصل

التناقض اختلاف القضيتين في الإيجاب والسلب [25] بحيث يلزم من صدق كل كذب الآخر لذاته، فلا بد للتناقض من الاختلاف في الكليّة والجزئية والإيجاب والسلب والجهة، والاتحاد في الموضوع والمحمول والزمان والمكان والجزء والكل والقوة والفعل والشرط والإضافة؛ قيل يكفي وحدة الموضوع والمحمول والزمان، وقيل يكفي وحدة الأولين، وقيل لا بد له من وحدة النسبة فقط، ومآل الكل واحد. فنقيض الكليّة لا يكون الا جزئية وبالعكس لأن الكليتان قد تكذبان والجزئيتين قد تصدقان، كقولنا "كل حيوان إنسان"، "لا شيء من الحيوان بإنسان"، "بعض الحيوان إنسان"، "بعض الحيوان ليس بإنسان". والنقيض للضرورة المطلقة الممكنة العامة، وللمشروطة العامة الحينية الممكنة، وللوقتيّة المطلقة الممكنة الوقتيّة، وللمنتشرة المطلقة الممكنة الدائمة، وللدائمة المطلقة الممكنة العامة، وللعرفية العامة الحينية المطلقة. والنقيض للقضية المركبة الكلية المفهوم المردّد بين نقيضيّ الجزئين أي القضية المنفصلة المركبة منهما. فالنقيض للمشروطة الخاصة المنفصلة المركبة من الحينية الممكنة والدائمة المطلقة، وللعرفية الخاصة المنفصلة المركبة من الحينية

المطلقة والدائمة المطلقة، وللوقتية المنفصلة المركبة من الممكنة الوقتية والدائمة المطلقة، وللمنتشرة المنفصلة المركبة من الممكنة الدائمة والدائمة المطلقة، وللوجودية المنفصلة المركبة من دائمتين مطلقتين، وللحينية اللادائمة المنفصلة المركبة من عرفية عامة ودائمة مطلقة، وللوجودية اللاضرورية المنفصلة المركبة من دائمة مطلقة وضرورية مطلقة، وللممكنة الخاصة المنفصلة المركبة [26] من ضروريتين مطلقتين، والتقيض للمركبة الجزئية هو المفهوم المراد بين تقيضي الجزئين لكن يلزم أن يكون ذلك الترديد بالنسبة إلى كل فرد فرد.

فصل

عكس المستوي تبديل طرفي القضية مع بقاء الصدق والكيف، يعني لو كان الأصل صادقاً كان العكس صادقاً. فالموجبة - سواء كانت كلية أو جزئية - إنما تنعكس موجبة جزئية لتلاقي الطرفين مع جواز عموم المحمول أو التالي. والسالبة الكلية تنعكس كفسها وإلا لزم سلب الشيء عن نفسه. وأما السالبة الجزئية لا عكس لها لزوماً لجواز عموم الموضوع أو المقدم. وأما بحسب الجهة فمن الموجبات تنعكس الدائمتان والعامتان والحينية المطلقة حينية مطلقة، والخاصتان والحينية اللادائمة حينية لادائمة، والوقتيات والوجوديتان والمطلقة العامة مطلقة عامة، ولا عكس للممكآت على رأى الشيخ وتنعكس عند الفارابي. ومن السوالب الكلية تنعكس الدائمتان دائمة أو كفسها، والعامتان عرفية عامة أو كفسها، والخاصتان عرفية لادائمة في البعض والمراد بها مطلقة عامة جزئية. والبيان في انعكاس جميع ما ذكرنا أن تقيض العكس مع الأصل ينتج المحال. ومن الجزئية تنعكس الخاصتان عرفية خاصة بالاقتراس، ولا عكس للبواقي بالنقض.

فصل

عكس التقيض على رأى القدماء تبديل تقيضي الطرفين مع بقاء الصدق والكيف. وحكم الموجبات ههنا حكم السوالب في المستوي وبالعكس، والبيان والبيان والنقض

النقض. فمن الموجبات الكلية تنعكس الدائمتان دائماً أو كنفسيها، والعامتان عرفيةً عامةً أو كنفسيها، والخاصتان [27] عرفيةً لادائمةً في البعض. ومن الجزئية تنعكس الخاصتان عرفيةً خاصةً، ولا عكس للبواقي. ومن السوالب تنعكس الدائمتان والعامتان والحينية المطلقة حينيةً مطلقةً، والخاصتان حينيةً لادائمةً، والوقيتات والوجوديتان والمطلقة العامة مطلقةً عامةً، ولا عكس للممكات على رأى كما أشرنا إليه سالفاً. وعلى رأى المتأخرين جعل نقيض الثاني أولاً مع مخالفة الكيف. وحكم الموجبات ههنا حكم السوالب في المستوي دون العكس. فمن الموجبات تنعكس الدائمتان سالبةً دائماً، والعامتان سالبةً عرفيةً عامةً، والخاصتان الكليتان عرفيةً لادائمةً في البعض، والجزئيتان عرفيةً خاصةً. ومن السوالب تنعكس الخاصتان موجبةً حينيةً لادائمةً والوقيتات والوجوديتان مطلقةً عامةً، ولا عكس للبواقي. ويشترط في عكس الشرطيات الاتحاد في الجنس والنوع كالاتصال والانفصال واللزوم والعناد والاتفاق وغير ذلك، وليس في انعكاس المنفصلات فائدة معتد بها.

فصل

الحجة على ثلاثة أقسام لأن الاستدلال إما بالكلي على الجزئي، أو بالعكس، أو بالجزئي على الجزئي. الأول القياس وهو مركب من قضايا يلزم لذاته قول آخر، فإن كان صورة النتيجة أو نقيضها مذكورة فيه بالفعل فهو إستثنائي، وإلا فاقتراني حملي إن كان مركباً من الحملات الصرفة كقولنا "العالم متغير وكل متغير حادث فالعالم حادث"، وإلا فشرطي سواء كان مركباً من الشرطيات المحضة أو منها ومن الحملات. ثم نقول: موضوع المطلوب [28] من القياس الحملي يسمى حداً أصغر، ومحموله يسمى حداً أكبر، والقضية التي تقع جزء القياس تسمى مقدمة، والمقدمة التي فيها الأصغر الصغرى، والتي فيها الأكبر الكبرى، والمتكرر بينهما حداً أوسط. واقتران الصغرى بالكبرى في الإيجاب والسلب والكلية والجزئية تسمى ضرباً وقرينةً. والهيئة الحاصلة من وضع الحد الأوسط عند الحدّين الآخرين - بحسب حمله عليهما أو وضعه لهما أو حمله على أحدهما ووضعها للآخر - يسمى شكلاً.

والأشكال أربعة لأن الأوسط إما محمول في الصغرى وموضوع في الكبرى فهو الشكل الأول، أو محمول فيهما فهو الشكل الثاني، أو موضوع فيهما فهو الشكل الثالث، أو موضوع في الصغرى ومحمول في الكبرى فهو الشكل الرابع. ويشترط في الشكل الأول إيجاب الصغرى وفعليتها وكلية الكبرى، لينتج الموجبتان الصغريان مع الموجبة الكلية الكبرى الموجبتين، ومع السالبة الكلية الكبرى السالبتين بالضرورة. فالضروب المنتجة فيه الحاصلة من اقتران المحصورات الأربع أربع تنتج المطالب الأربع كقولنا "كل ج ب كل ب أ فكل ج أ"، "بعض ج ب كل ب أ فبعض ج أ"، "كل ج ب لاشيء من ب أ فلا شيء من ج أ"، "بعض ج ب لاشيء من ب أ فبعض ج ليس أ"؛ ومن اختلاط الموجهات ثلثمائة وأربع وسبعون، والنتيجة كالكبرى إن كانت غير الوصفيات الأربع، وإلا للصغرى [29] مع حذف اللا ضرورة واللا دوام والضرورة المخصوصة بها إن وجدت فيها، منضمّاً إليها لا دوام الكبرى إن وجدت فيها.

ويشترط في الشكل الثاني اختلاف المقدمتين في الكيف وكلية الكبرى، مع كون الصغرى ضرورية أو دائمة، أو كون الكبرى من القضايا المنعكسة السواب، وكون الممكنة إذا كانت كبرى مع الصغرى الضرورية المطلقة، وإذا كانت صغرى مع الكبرى الضرورية أو المشروطة العامة أو الخاصة، لينتج الكليتان سالبة كلية والمختلفتان في الكرم أيضاً سالبة جزئية، بالخلف في الكل، أو بعكس الكبرى في الأول والثالث، أو بعكس الصغرى ثم الترتيب ثم النتيجة في الثاني، أو بالاقتراض في الصغرى في الثالث والرابع. فالضروب المنتجة الحاصلة من اقتران المحصورات الأربع أربع، لكن لا تكون النتيجة إلا سالبة لاشتماله على [30] السلب، كقولنا "كل ج ب لاشيء من أ ب فلا شيء من ج أ"، "لا شيء من ج أ ب فلا شيء من ج أ"، "بعض ج ب لاشيء من أ ب فبعض ج ليس أ"، "بعض ج ليس أ ب فبعض ج ليس أ". والضروب المنتجة الحاصلة من خلط الموجهات مائة وأربع وأربعون والنتيجة فيها دائمة إن كان إحدى المقدمتين ضرورية أو دائمة، وإلا فكالصغرى بحذف اللا ضرورة واللا دوام والضرورة - وصفية أو وقتية - إن وجدت فيها.

ويشترط في الشكل الثالث إيجاب الصغرى وفعليتها مع كلية إحدى المقدمتين، لينتج الموجبتان مع الموجبة الكلية، أو الموجبة الكلية مع الموجبة الجزئية موجبة

جزئية، [31] ومع السالبة الكلية، والموجبة الكلية مع السالبة الجزئية سالبةً جزئيةً، بالخلف في الكل، أو بعكس الصغرى في الأول والثاني والرابع والخامس، أو بعكس الكبرى ثم الترتيب ثم النتيجة في الأول والثالث، أو بالافتراض في الصغرى في الثاني والخامس، أو بالافتراض في الكبرى في الثالث والسادس.

فالضروب المنتجة الحاصلة من اقتران المحصورات الأربع ستُ، كقولنا "كل ب ج كل ب ج كل ب أ فبعض ج أ"، "بعض ب ج كل ب أ فبعض ج أ"، "كل ب ج بعض ب أ فبعض ج أ"، "كل ب ج لا شيء من ب أ فبعض ج ليس أ"، "بعض ب ج لا شيء من ب أ فبعض ج ليس أ"، "كل ب ج بعض ب ليس أ فبعض ج ليس أ". والضروب المنتجة الحاصلة من خلط الموجهات ثلثمائة وأربع وسبعون، والنتيجة فيها كالكبرى إن كانت غير الوصفيات الأربع، وإلا فعكس الصغرى محذوفاً عنه اللادوام إن كانت الكبرى إحدى العامتين، مضموماً إليه لادوام الكبرى إن كانت إحدى الخاصتين. [32]

ويشترط في الشكل الرابع إيجاب المقدمتين مع كلية الصغرى، أو اختلافهما مع كلية أحدهما، لينتج الموجبة الكلية مع المحصورات الأربع، والموجبة الجزئية مع السالبة الكلية، والسالبتان مع الموجبة الكلية، والسالبة الكلية مع الموجبة الجزئية موجبةً جزئيةً إن لم يكن فيها سلب، وإلا فسالبةً جزئيةً أو كليةً، بالخلف في غير الرابع والسابع والثامن، أو بعكس الترتيب ثم النتيجة في الأول والثاني والسادس والثامن، أو بعكس المقدمتين في الثالث والخامس، أو بالرد إلى الشكل الثاني بعكس الصغرى في السابع، أو بالرد إلى الشكل الثالث بعكس الكبرى في الرابع، أو بالافتراض في الكبرى في الثاني، أو الصغرى في الخامس. والضروب المنتجة الحاصلة من اقتران المحصورات الأربع ثمان: "كل ب ج كل أ ب فبعض ج أ"، "كل ب ج بعض أ ب فبعض ج أ"، "كل ب ج ولا شيء من أ ب فبعض ج ليس أ"، "كل ب ج بعض أ ليس ب فبعض ج ليس أ"، "بعض ب ج لا شيء من أ ب فبعض ج ليس أ"، "لا شيء من ب ج كل أ ب فلا شيء من ج أ"، "بعض ب ليس ج كل أ ب فبعض ج ليس أ"، "لا شيء من ب ج بعض أ ب فبعض ج ليس أ".

ويشترط بحسب الجهة فعلية المقدمتين، وانعكاس السوالب المستعملة فيه، وصدق الدوام في السادس على الصغرى، أو كون الكبرى في السابع من القضايا المنعكسة

السوالب، وكون الصغرى في الثامن من إحدى الخاصتين وكبراه من القضايا المنعكسة السوالب. والاختلاطات المنتجة الحاصلة من خلط الموجهات [33] في الضرب الأول والثاني منه مائتان وتسع وثمانون من ضرب الموجهات الفعلية السبع عشرة في أنفسها، والنتيجة فيها عكس الصغرى إن كانت ضرورية أو دائمة أو كان القياس من القضايا المنعكسة السوالب، وإلا فطلقة عامة. وفي الثالث والخامس مائة واثنان من ضرب الصغريات الفعلية السبع عشرة في الكبريات الست المنعكسة السوالب، والنتيجة فيهما دائمة إن كانت الكبرى ضرورية أو دائمة، وإلا فعكس الصغرى محذوقاً عنه اللادوام. [34] وفي الرابع أربع وثلثون من ضرب الكبريين الخاصتين في الفعليات السبع عشرة، والنتيجة فيه كما في الشكل الثالث بعد عكس الكبرى. وفي السادس ثمان وخمسون من ضرب الصغريين الدائمتين في الفعليات السبع عشرة ومن ضرب الصغريات الوصفيات الأربع في الست المنعكسة السوالب، والنتيجة فيه دائمة إن كانت إحدى المقدمتين ضرورية أو دائمة، وإلا فعكس الصغرى. وفي السابع والثامن اثنا عشر من ضرب الصغريين الخاصتين في الست المنعكسة السوالب، والنتيجة في السابع كما في الشكل الثاني [35] بعد عكس الصغرى، وفي الثامن كعكس النتيجة بعد عكس الترتيب.

فصل

الشرطي من الاقتراني: إما أن يتركب من متصلتين وأقسامه ثلث، لأن المكرر إما جزء تام منهما، أو غير تام منهما، وإما تام من أحدهما غير تام من الآخر، مثال الأول: "كلها كان ج د فه ز"، مثال الثاني: "كلها كان أ ب فح د وكلها كان د ه فو ز"، مثال الثالث: "كلها كان أ ب فح د وه ز وكلها كان ه ز فوط"، والقريب بالطبع هو الأول.

أو يتركب من منفصلتين وأقسامه أيضاً ثلث والمطبوع الثاني. أو يتركب من حملية ومتصلة وأقسامه أربعة لأن الحملية إما أن تكون صغرى أو كبرى وأيا ما كان فالمشارك لها إما المقدم أو التالي، والمطبوع هو الرابع أي ما يكون الحملية كبرى والشركة مع التالي.

أو يتركب من حملية ومنفصلة وأقسامه ثلث لأن الحمليات إما أن تكون بعدد أجزاء المنفصلة، أو أقل، أو أكثر. وفي الأول قد يكون التأليف [36] من الحمليات وأجزاء الانفصال متحدة في النتيجة فيسمى القياس [المقسّم]، وقد يكون مختلفة والنتيجة حينئذ مركبة من نتائج التأليفات. وفي القسم الثاني قد يكون الحملية واحدة والمنفصلة ذات جزئين ومانعة الخلو ومشاركة الحملية مع أحد جزئها وهو الأقرب، والمطبوع هذان القسمان، والقسم الثالث بعيد عن الطبع.

أو يتركب من متصلة ومنفصلة وأقسامه ثلث لأن الشركة بينهما إما في جزء تام منهما، أو غير تام منهما، أو تام من إحداهما غير تام من الأخرى. وعلى التقادير فالمتصلة إما صغرى أو كبرى، فالمجموع ست والمطبوع هو الأول والثالث. وينعقد في الكل الأشكال الأربعة فعليك بتصفح الأمثلة.

فصل

القياس الإستثنائي دائماً مركباً من مقدمتين إحداهما شرطية متصلة أو منفصلة والأخرى وضع لأحد جزئها أو نفيه. ويشترط فيه إيجاب الشرطية الواقعة فيه، وكونها لزومية إن كانت متصلة وعنادية إن كانت منفصلة، وكلية الشرطية أو الإستثناء. فإن كانت الشرطية الواقعة فيه متصلة ينتج وضع المقدم وضع التالي ورفع التالي رفع المقدم، وإلا لزم الإنفكاك بين اللازم والملزوم فيبطل اللزوم. ولا ينتج رفع المقدم رفع التالي، ولا وضع التالي وضع المقدم لجواز أن يكون اللازم أعم، ولا يلزم من إنتفاء الخاص إنتفاء العام، ولا من وجود العام وجود الخاص بعينه. وإن كانت منفصلة حقيقية فينتج وضع كل من الجزئين رفع الآخر [37] لامتناع الجمع، ورفع كل منهما وضع الآخر لامتناع الخلو عنهما، فله أربع نتائج. وإن كانت مانعة الجمع فينتج وضع كل رفع الآخر لامتناع الجمع، ولا ينتج رفع جزء منها وضع الآخر لجواز الخلو. وإن كانت مانعة الخلو ينتج رفع كل وضع الآخر لامتناع الخلو، ولا ينتج وضع جزء منها رفع الآخر لإمكان الجمع، فلكل منهما نتيجتان.

فصل

قياس الخلف ما يقصد به إثبات المطلوب بإبطال نقيضه. ومرجعه إلى قياس اقتراني مركب من شرطية متصلة مقدّمها دال على فرض كذب المطلوب، وتاليها دال على وضع نقيض المطلوب، وهي صغرى، ومن حملية صادقة في نفس الأمر وهي كبرى، وإلى إستثنائي مركب من نتيجة القياس الأول واستثناء نقيض تاليها.

فصل

القياس: إما مركب، وهو المؤلف من مقدمات ينتج مقدمتان منها نتيجة، وهي مع المقدمة الأخرى نتيجة أخرى، وهلمّ جرّاً إلى أن يحصل المطلوب. فإن صرح بنتائج تلك القياسات سمي موصول النتائج، وإلا سمي مفصول النتائج؛ وإما بسيط لا يكون كذلك.

فصل

القياس: إما برهاني يتألف من اليقينيّات، وأصولها: الأوليات والمشاهدات والتجريبات والحدسيات والمتواترات والفطريات. والبرهان لبيّ إن كان الوسط علةً لثبوت الحكم في الذهن والواقع، [38] وإلا فإيبيّ؛ وإما جديلي يتألف من المشهورات والمسلمات؛ وإما خطابي يتألف من المقبولات والمظنونات؛ وإما شعري يتألف من المخيّلات؛ وإما سفسطي يتألف من الوهميّات والمشبّهات.

فصل

ومن أقسام الحجّة الاستقراء، وهو إما تام إن كان ذلك بتصفّح جميع الجزئيات، وهو يفيد اليقين؛ وإما ناقص إن كان ذلك بتصفّح البعض، وذلك لا يفيد إلا الظن.

فصل


التمثيل وهو بيان مشاركة جزئي لجزئي آخر في علة الحكم ليثبت ذلك الحكم الثابت للجزئي الثاني للجزئي الأول. والجزئي الأول يسمى أصلاً، والثاني فرعاً، والمشارك علةً وجامعاً. والجامع إنما يفيد ذلك إذا ثبت عليته للحكم، والعمدة في الإثبات الطرد والعكس المسمى بالدوران وجوداً وعدمًا، أي كليهما وجد الجامع وجد الحكم وكليهما عدم عدم، والسبب والتقسيم المسمى بالترديد وهو إيراد أصناف الأصل وحصرها وإلقاء البعض وإبطاله ليتعين الباقي للعلية.

خاتمة

أجزاء العلوم ثلاثة: الأول الموضوعات وهي التي يبحث في العلم عن أعراضها الذاتية؛ والثاني المبادئ وهي حدود الموضوعات وأجزائها وأعراضها الذاتية ومقدمات بيّنة أو غير بيّنة محتاجة إلى وسط هو من ذلك العلم، [39] ويسمى هذه المبادئ بالأصول الموضوعية والعلوم المتعارفة، أو من علم آخر أعلى منه أو أدنى؛ والثالث المسائل وهي قضايا يطلب في العلم البراهين عليها إن لم يكن بيّنة، وموضوعاتها موضوع العلم أو نوع منه أو عرضي ذاتي له أو مركب، ومحمولاتها أمور خارجة عنها لاحقة بها لذواتها.

هذا آخر ما أوردناه في هذا الكتاب؛ ثم بحمد الله وحسن توفيقه والصلاة على نبيه محمد وآله أجمعين لأجل مولانا ضياء الملة والدين احمد چليبي على يد مؤلفه حسن بن حسين بن محمد عفى عنهم.

Facsimile



بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

الحمد لله على نعمة الإنسان المنطق الفصيح والآن
 عقله غير الفكر الفاسد من الصبح وتزده بالبحر
 المعارف الصورية وتزده بركمه أصناف الكلام
 المدبحة وأهله لترتيب فاسات توديه إلى الملو
 المحضفة ثم من النظر إلى الصديق بأوصاف
 الأوصاف المبهمة من استصوابه كمال ذاته
 ووجه رتبة أحبار مخلوقة بوجه موهوب
 أنواع كالتب سفينة الهدى ووسط طريق
 حجي فخلات نكوك منع عن إدراك
 بزهر حلكات واجعلني بأخاصة لمعات

اليقين على أملة لفضان كال مراتب من رتبة
 والصلوة على نعمة اسم مدارجات الأمور
 زيادة واستار القلوب بانفراد أمره ونعمته
 نظهر رايان ربه وسوء الحقاو وتكيف
 بليغاته حذوة الذانوب وعلى اليسر
 استمدادهم استغفار الحكماء الوحمة من
 التربة العونية وعقد من غير استعجابهم
 استنابهم من ربات الذين من الخ المستهبة
 وأصابت لا يسمع كلامه يرض لأخطاها ولا
 يقبل عن صفاتها تزيدها فهم على النشأ
 وأجابه أفضل الصلوات وأكرم الحاجات

أقابعده فهدى أو لم تكن بها علم المنطق سبلا
 للطالبين وتكلمه للباشرين ونعمها بالتكلم وأل الله
 أن نفع به الطلاب ويجعله ذخرا في يوم
 الحساب العلم كان حصوله من غير
 نظر ضروري ولا فطران وكل منهما ان كان
 ادعانا للتسعة تصديق والافتقار والعلم
 بوجود الأقسام وحدائق النظر من جهة
 المصون بالاختار تحصل المجهول وقد يقع في
 الاستنباط خطأ فأجح إلى قانون بعضه
 الدهن عن الحطافه ويغير النظر العاسد
 من الصحيح وهو المنطق وموضوع المعلو

التصور من حيث انه يوصل إلى المجهول تصور
 أيضا لأقربا ويسمى موقفا ولا نارا أو أصلا
 بعيدا ويسمى الكليات الخ من حيث انه
 يوصل إلى المجهول تصديقا أيضا لا يعد ويسمى
 مخلوقا عليه والمخبر والمعلوم التصديق من
 حيث انه يوصل إلى المجهول تصديقا أيضا لا
 يقربا ويسمى حجة ودليل أو أصلا أيضا
 ويسمى حجة وقضية **فصل الثلاثة**
 كون الشيء محال لمزونه من العلم به العلم في حيز
 فالأول الدال والثاني المدلول وفيه وضعية
 ان كان سببها الوضع وطبيعتها ان كان سببها
 الوضع

تامة ان لم يبق معه حالة منتزعة معناه هون
 احتل الصدق والكلب بالظن والمفهومه
 مع قطع النظر عن خصوصيته بل عن خصوصية
 الكمال ايضا حتى قضية والآفات سواء دلت
 الطلح بالوضع كالامر والنهي والاستفهام والامر
 بالوضع كالنهي والترمي والتعجب والندبة
 والقسم وغير ذلك وان بقي معه حالة مسطرة
 معناه تامة كذا في تصديق ان كان الثاني
 فيقال له اول فهو موصوف ان كان الترتيب من
 والموصوف وانما ان كان من المضاف والمضاف
 اليه والاما فاقص غير تصديقي وان لم يقصد بخروج
 من غير مضمون

الطرح سبب انقضا له الدال واللا مقابلة وكل
 واحد من المفردات عن نظير المفردتين الوضعية
 مطابقة ان كان المدلول تاما للوضوع له من
 حيث هو ذلك وقضية ان كان جزائيا
 له من حيث هو كذلك والترسمية ان كان تاما
 عنه لا رماد هيا له من حيث هو كذلك فلان
 لا يول من الوضع والعلم به والثبات من الكبر
 الصانع والثبات من الوجود والعلم به والوجود
 والمطابقة لا فرعها من فرع علم وهما تدعيها
 ما حجاج الكمل على الدال المطابقة ايمان بقصد
 بجزء منه الدال على جزاء معناه فهو مركب



منه الدلالة على جزاء معناه فقرة واقامة
 ستة الاول ما لا يكون له ولعناه جزء الثاني
 ما يكون له جزء دون معناه الثالث ما يكون بعين
 الثاني الراجح ما يكون له ولعناه جزء لكن لا لالة
 لجزءه على جزء معاني الخامس ما يكون له ولعناه جزء
 ولعناه جزء وجزءه دلالة على جزاء للمعنى ولكن
 كقولك في مقصود المفرد ان استعمل مفهومه
 اصح ان يقع محكوما عليه اوبه فان دل تصديقه
 على احد الائمة الثالثة فكله والآفات وان
 لم يستعمل فادارة رماثة والآفات في رماثة
 وايضا ان كان مدلوله واحدا فان دل الموضوع
 اذ دل على الثاني

على الشخص فهو علم وجزء حقيق والاكلل يتولى
 ان كان حصول معناه افراده على السوية وممكن
 ان احتلت في الاولية والاولوية والاشدية
 بان كان حصوله في المعنى اذ فذوا اولى او اشد
 من البعض الاخر وان كان مدلوله متعددا فان
 لم يتخل بينهما التماثل وضع لكل منهما مع قطع
 النظر عن ملاحظة المناسبة بينهما مشتركة
 والآفات اشتملة الثاني يقول ثم ان كان
 الثاني صاحب الشريعة واصطلاح ان كان اهل
 الاصطلاح الخاص وعمد ان كان عرف العالم
 والاشتملة ان استعمل المعنى الاول وتجارة

ان استعمال الثاني وقد ظن للحقيقة على الاستعمال
 في الاول والحجج على الاستعمال الثاني وكلما نظرت
 الى نظير مرادك ان كان معاهما الحد بالظن
 والنظائر مرادان وما ينزه ان كان لكل منهما
 معنى وان كان المعاني متضادتين املا واللفظان
 متباينان **فصل** المهوران استمع وفي صفة
 على كثيرين بمعنى ان لا يجوز العقل وقوعه متعدد
 حقيق والاكمل حقيق والخير الانسان هو الاكمل
 والاكمل الانسان هو الاكمل لكن غير زيد فلهذا
 فهو احض مطلقا من كل الحقيق كما ان الخير
 الانسان اعلم مطلقا من المفسدين والكل انسان

ان استعمال الثاني وقد ظن للحقيقة على الاستعمال في الاول والحجج على الاستعمال الثاني وكلما نظرت الى نظير مرادك ان كان معاهما الحد بالظن والنظائر مرادان وما ينزه ان كان لكل منهما معنى وان كان المعاني متضادتين املا واللفظان متباينان فصل المهوران استمع وفي صفة على كثيرين بمعنى ان لا يجوز العقل وقوعه متعدد حقيق والاكمل حقيق والخير الانسان هو الاكمل والاكمل الانسان هو الاكمل لكن غير زيد فلهذا فهو احض مطلقا من كل الحقيق كما ان الخير الانسان اعلم مطلقا من المفسدين والكل انسان

الكل الذي يكون مستحق الافراد غير الاعم وقد يكون
 ملكا غير موجود فيها وقد يكون الموجود منه
 واحدا واحب الوجود مع استماع الغير وقد يكون
 واحدا يمكن الوجود مع امكن الغير وقد يكون
 متعدد امتناها وقد يكون غير متاه **والكلان**
 ان تعارفا كليا فهما متباينان والنسبة بينهما ثابتة
 على عين بعضها ثانيا جزئيا والا فان تضادا
 كليا من المتباينين ثانيا وان النسبة بينهما المتأخر
 كما يكون بين بعضها كذلك او من خارجا واحدا
 ناكلي الصادق على جميع الافراد الاخر اعلم مطلقا
 والاخر اعلم مطلقا والنسبة بينهما غير موجودة

عن شي واحد فالطوبى تمام الماهية المختصة
 وان كان عن اكثر فالطوبى تمام الماهية المشتركة
 ولما كان النوع تمام الماهية المختصة والمشاركة
 بالنسبة الى افراده فالجواب عن السؤال انه هو
 عن افراد النوع ليس الا النوع والنوع الانسان في
 هو الماهية المقول عليها على غير الجنس في
 جواب ماهو والنسبة بين النوعين عن جزئ
 من وجه لصادقهما على الانسان وتعارفهما
 في الجنوان والنسبة وعرايب الابواع ليست
 اعز الانواع وسبق النوع العاقل واصحها في
 النوع السافل ونوع الانواع واحسن من بعض
 الجنس الا ان الجنان

مطلقا كما بين بعضها لكن لا يرضى بالعلم والاكمل اوله
 من كل عين اعلم واحسن من وجه من الاخر والنسبة
 بينهما غير موجودة من وجه بين بعضها ثابتة
 جزئ **الكليات** خير لانه اذا ثبت حقيقة ما
 من الافراد تاما ان يكون عينها او اداه بها او
 عنها فان كان الاول نسي نوعا حقيقيا وتام الحقيقة
 فهو المقول على الكثرة المتقنة للحقيقة في جواب
 فان تعارفا النوع لما كان حسب التخصيصات الفارقة
 عن حقيقة افرادها كانت الافراد متقنة للحقيقة
 فاداسين واحدهما او عن متعدد ماهو كالجنوات
 النوع لان الطوبى تمام الماهية فان كان


عن شي واحد فالطوبى تمام الماهية المختصة وان كان عن اكثر فالطوبى تمام الماهية المشتركة ولما كان النوع تمام الماهية المختصة والمشاركة بالنسبة الى افراده فالجواب عن السؤال انه هو عن افراد النوع ليس الا النوع والنوع الانسان في هو الماهية المقول عليها على غير الجنس في جواب ماهو والنسبة بين النوعين عن جزئ من وجه لصادقهما على الانسان وتعارفهما في الجنوان والنسبة وعرايب الابواع ليست اعز الانواع وسبق النوع العاقل واصحها في النوع السافل ونوع الانواع واحسن من بعض الجنس الا ان الجنان


أعم من بعض وتسمى النوع المتوسط وإن كان الثاني
 فإن كان هو قائما مشترك بين المعية ونوع ثابت
 الأنواع المباشرة لهما بأن لا يكون بينهما جزئية
 خارج عنه بل كل ما يكون مشتركا متاعنه او حاشا
 بتسوية هو المقول على الكثرة المختلفة الحقيقت
 في جواب ما هو فهو ان كان عام للمترك بين
 المشاركات فيه فهو عين قريب والاشهد
 وعزل العد مختلفة فان كان في مشاركتين
 البعد جوابان فهو بعيد مرتبة واحدة وإن
 كان ثلثة اجوبة فهو بعيد مرتبتين وإن كان
 اربعة اجوبة فتعد ثلاث مرات وعلى هذا


8
 القياس بتريد عدد الاجوبة على عدد مرات
 البعد بولحد لان الجنس القريب جواب وكل
 واحد من مرتبة البعد جواب آخر وموت
 الاجاب ايضا ثلث ابعدها سبب الجنس العالي
 وجنس الاجاب كالموهر مثلا واقر بها الجنس العالي
 وما بينهما حاشا تنوعا وقد يقع مفردا كالنوع
 وجزء المقول في جواب ما هو ان كان مذكورا
 بالمطابقة سببى واعلم ان طريق ما هو ان كان
 مذكورا بالفتوى يسمى اعادة جواب وهو
 الاى وان لم يكن عام للمترك بين المعية
 وبين نوع مناس الأنواع فيسمى اتصاله لانه يمكن

لا يكون مشتركا أصلا او يكون مشتركا لكن لا بين الجميع
 اذ البعض بسيط على المتدبرين غير المهمة في الملاحة ولا
 تمن الفصل الا اذا تميز المهمة في الملاحة ولا يكون تمام
 المشترك فيكون مبرها عن جميع المشاركات الطرفين
 القريب فهو فصل قريب والانه هو فصل بعيد
 فالفصل هو المقول على التي في جواب اى في موعنة
 جوهره فان المطلوب باى في موعنة المهيبة
 عن المشاركات في الامور العام بان يقد يوق اليه او يجره
 او ما شاكل ذلك فالمطلوب الميزل الذي وان فقد
 بغير موعنة فالمطلوب الميزل هو في الفصل مقوق
 النوع وامل في جوابه ومخصاه ومقسم الجنس لا يحصل
 للمعنى مشترك

9
 ولا عكس فان الناطق يتوفر في السافل ولا يتوفر العالي
 وكل متصل يقسم لجن السافل يقسم لجن العالي لان
 السافل ليس للعالي ولا عكس فان السافل لا يعلو اليه
 يقسم العالي ولا يقسم السافل وان كان الملائمة
 فاما ان يختص بحقيقة واحدة فيسمى خاصة فهو
 الخارج المقول على ما تحت حقيقة في جواب اى في
 موعنة خاصة كالصاحك بالنسبة الى الانسان فانه
 تميز الانسان عن جميع الاعيان غير عرضة يقسم انما
 في جواب اى في موعنة غير موعنة وان لم يختص بحقيقة
 واحدة بل في جميعا وغيرها فيسمى عرضة عما فهو
 الخارج المقول على الكثرة المختلفة الحقيقت ولا يصلح









القضايا المذكورة وأشئلة هذه القضايا ما هو **الوجودية**
اللا ضرورية وفي المطلقة العامة مع هذا اللا ضرورية ألدأ
 وتدلوها الموجبة المكتنة العامة ان كان الاصل بالالان
 سلب ضرورية السلب مكتنة عامة موجبة وسألته ان كان
 الامل موجبة لان سلب ضرورية الايجاب مكتنة عامه سالك
 قولنا ان الانسان كان بالفعال بالضرورية لا يثنى من الانسان يكتب
 بالفعال بالضرورية فذلك هو اللا ضرورية الاول لا يثنى من
 الانسان يكتب بالامكان العام وبه الثاني لان كاتبه بالامكان
 الامكان العام وهو سببية الضرورية المطلق واعم مطلقا
 من الخاصين والوقوفين والوجودية الاله دامة والنجنية
 الاله دامة واحسن مطلقا المطلقة العامة والمكتنة العامة
 والنجنية

والنجنية المكتنة وموضوعه من القضايا الباقية المذكورة
المكتنة الخاصة وهي التي حكم فيها سلب ضرورية
 الطرفين اى الخالف والوافق فهي مركبة دامة من مكتن
 عامتين احدهما موجبة والاخرى سالبة ولا فرق بين
 الموجبة والسالبة الاله القطع فاما اشتملت على حرف السلب
 فسالبة والاخرى كقولنا كل انسان كاتب بالامكان
 العام لا يثنى من الانسان كاتب بالامكان للناس فان معناها
 ان ثبوت الكتابة للانسان وسلبها عنه ليس ضرورية بين
 وهي سببية للضرورة المطلقة واحسن مطلقا من المكتنة
 العامة واعم مطلقا من الخاصين والوقوفين والوجودية
 والنجنية الاله دامة ومن وجه من سائر القضايا المذكورة

القضايا المذكورة وأشئلة هذه القضايا ما هو الوجودية
 اللا ضرورية وفي المطلقة العامة مع هذا اللا ضرورية ألدأ
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 والنجنية


فصل **التربية** عاقبين متصلة ومتفصلة و
 المتصلة اما موجبة وهي التي حكم فيها صدق التالي على عدم
 صدق المقدم كقولنا ان كانت الشريعة بالعلمة فالعلماء موجود
 رسالة وهي التي حكم فيها نفي التالي على عدم صدق المقدم
 كقولنا ليس ان كانت الشريعة بالعلمة فالعلماء موجود
 اما لزومية ان كان الاصل بالعلمة بين الطرفين بالعلم
 احداهما بالعلمة والاخرى بالعلمة واحدة او كانا متصفا
 او طرف للعلمة والافان متصلة حاصنة ان كان لتوفيق الطرفين
 والصدق وعاقبة ان التوفيق صدق التالي والصدق
 علمية انتم حقيقته موجبة وهي التي حكم فيها التباين بين
 بين النقيضين والصدق والكتب او حكم بانها لا يصدقان

سما ولا يكليات وسالبة وهي التي حكم فيها سلب ذلك التباين
 كقولنا هذا العدد اذ زوج او فرد وهذا العدد اذ زوج
 او مستقيم عينا وبين واعده الجمع وهي موجبة ان حكم فيها
 بالتباين بين النقيضين والصدق فقط اى لا يصدقان ولكن
 يكليات وسالبة حكم فيها سلب ذلك التباين كقولنا
 هذا الشيء لا يخرج اذ ليس هذا الشيء الا لا يخرج ولا يخرج
 الخلو والموجبة منها ما حكم فيها بالتباين بين النقيضين
 في الكتب فقط اى لا يصدقان ولكن قد يصدقان والتباين
 منها ما حكم فيها سلب ذلك التباين كقولنا ارد الما ان يكون
 في الخرج ولا يرفق وليس هذا الشيء اما انما نارد اذ وفي
 واحد منها اما عادية ان كان التباين الذات للخرين والافان

القضايا المذكورة وأشئلة هذه القضايا ما هو الوجودية
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 والنجنية







من الحليات وأجزاء الانفصال متحدة في النتيجة فيسبب القياس
 المنقسم وقد يكون مخلصة والنتيجة مركبة من نتائج المبالغات
 وفي القسم الثاني قد يكون للحلية واحدة والمنفصلة ذات
 جزئين وأنها الخلو ومشاركة الحلية مع احد جزئها وهو
 الاقرب والمطبيع وهذا الضمان والقسم الثالث بعد عن الطبع
 او مركب من متصلة ومنفصلة واقسامه ثلث لان الشكوة
 بينها اربعة اجزاء تام منها او غير تام منها او تام من احد جزئها
 من الاخرى وعلى التقادير فالمتصلة اما صغرى او كبرى للمجموع
 ست والمطبيع هو الاول والذات وتبعده الكل الاشكال
 الاربعة فغلبك تصحح العائلة **فصل** القياس الاستثنائي
 داما وكما من مقدمتين احداهما شرطية متصلة او منفصلة و

فصل الشرط من الامتراني اما ان يتركب من متصلتين واما
 ثلث لان الكثرة لا يجر تام منها او غير تام منها واما تام من احد
 جزئها من الاخرين الاول كما كان في ذمة زمان الثاني كما
 كان آية في ذمة المكان فورا زمان الثالث كما كان آية في ذمة
 وة ووكما كان في ذمة الوقت والتوب بالطبع هو الاول او يتركب
 من منفصلتين واقسامه ايضا ثلث والمطبيع الثاني او يتركب
 من حلية ومنصلة واقسامه اربعة لان الحلية اما ان تكون صغرى
 او كبرى واما ما كان فالتارك لها اما المقدم او التالي للمطبع
 هو الرابع اي يكون للحلية كبرى والشكوة مع التالي او يتركب
 من حلية ومنفصلة واقسامه ثلث لان الحليات اما ان تكون
 بعدد اجزاء المنفصلة او اقل او اكثر والاول قد يكون المايه

من الحليات

لاستماع الجموع ورفع كل منها وضع الاخر لاستماع
 الخلو عنها فله اربع نتائج وان كانت مانعة للجمع
 فينبغ وضع كل رفع الاخر لاستماع الجموع ولا
 ينجح رفع جزئ منها وضع الاخر لخلو الخلو وان كانت
 مانعة الخلو ينجح رفع كل وضع الاخر لاستماع الخلو
 ولا ينجح وضع جزئها رفع الاخر لان مكان الجموع فكل
 منها يتبين **فصل** قياس الخلف بايقصده اثباتا
 المطلوب باطال نقيضه ومرجعه الى قياس افتراض
 مركب من شرطية متصلة مقدمها دل على افتراض كذب
 المطلوب واثباتها دل على وضع نقيض المطلوب
 وهي صغرى ومن حلية صادقة في نفس الامر وهي

الاخرى وضع لاحد جزئها او نقيضه ويشترط
 فيه ايجاب الشرطية الواقعة فيه وكونها
 لزومية ان كانت متصلة وعاديه ان كانت منفصلة
 وكلية الشرطية او الاستثناء فان كانت الشرطية
 الواقعة فيه متصلة ينجح وضع المقدم وضع التالي
 ورفع التالي رفع المقدم والالزم الانتكاث بين
 اللزوم والملازم يبطال اللزوم ولا ينجح رفع المقدم رفع
 التالي ولا وضع التالي وضع المقدم لوجوه ان يكون
 اللزوم اعم ولا يلزم من انتفاء الخاص انتفاء العام و
 لا من وجود العام وجود الخاص بعينه وان كانت
 منفصلة حقيقته ينجح وضع كل من الجزئين رفع الآ

للتسام

كبرى والاشتمال مركب من نتيجة القياس الاول
 واستثناءه بغير البها **فصل** القياس امر
 وهو المؤلف من مقدمات ينتج مقدمتان منها
 نتيجة وهي مع المقدمة الاخرى نتيجة اخرى
 وهم جزء الى ان يحصل المطلوب فان صرح بنتائج
 تلك القياسات سمى موصول النتائج والاسمي
 مفصول النتائج واما بسيط لا يكون كذلك
فصل القياس اما برهاني يتألف من اليقينا
 واصولها الاوثان والمشاهدات والتجربيات
 والحدسيات والموازات والقطريات البرهاني
 يعني ان كان الوسط علة لنوت الحكم والذهن والواقع

والافاني واما جدي يتألف من المشهورات
 والمسلمات واما خطابي يتألف من المقبولات
 والمظنونات واما شعري يتألف من الخيالات
 واما سطحي يتألف من الوهيات والمشتهات
فصل ومن اقسام المحجة الاستقراء
 وهو اما تام ان كان ذلك بتصنيف جميع الجزئيات
 وهو بعيد اليقين واما ناقص ان كان ذلك بتصنيف البعض
 وذلك لا يفيد الا الظن **فصل** التثنية وهو
 بيان مشاركة جزئى لجزئى اخر في علة الحكم
 يثبت تلك الحكم الثابت للجزئى الثاني للجزئى
 الاول والجزئى الاول يسمى اصلا والثاني فرعاً

ولا

والمشرك علة وجامعاً والجماع اغا يفيد ذلك
 اذا ثبت عليه للحكم والعروة في اثبات الطرد والعكس
 السمي بالبوركن وجوداً وعدلاً وكلا وجد الجماع مع
 وجد الحكم وكلا عدم عدمه والسر والتقسيم
 السمي بالترديد وهو اراء اصاف الاصل وحصر
 والقاء البعض وابطاله لتبين البلاء للعلية **خاتمة**
 اجراء العلوية ثلثة الاول الموضوعات وهي التي
 يخرج العلم عن عرضها الذاتية والثاني
 المبادى وهي حدود الموضوعات والجزئيات
 واعراضها الذاتية ومقدمات بينة وغير بينة
 محتاجة الى وسط هو من ذلك العلم

وتسمى هذه المبادى بالامول الموضوعية والعلوم
 المتعارفة ومن علم اخر اعلى منه اودى والثالث
 المسائل وهي قضايا يطلب العلم البراهين عليها
 ان لم يكن بينه وموضوعاتها موضوع العلم او فرع
 منه او عرض ذاتي له او مركب وتحمل لانها
 امور خارجة عنها لاحقة بها لذواتها هذا
 اخرها وردناه في هذا الكتاب ثم بحمد الله وحسن
 توفيقه والصلاة على نبيه محمد
 وآله اجمعين ثم جعله لانا فيه
 المدة والذليل ليرى على
 بينة لافرح من
 عمدهم
 عم



ويسمى

Fārābī's *Purposes of Aristotle's Metaphysics* and Avicenna's 'Eastern' Philosophy

Charles E. Butterworth

This essay, part of the collective effort to sustain warm memories of a good friend and trusted colleague, Hossein Ziai, strives to take a step further the debate he and I carried on over several years. Conducted most often via email exchanges, it centered on the question of whether intellectual apprehension is bounded by reason and its sphere or extends to some supra-rational faculty. My recourse to Fārābī here shows clearly where my sympathies lay, and all those acquainted with Hossein are fully aware of his. Hopefully, what follows will suggest a new way to consider the issue.

Introduction

Fārābī's *Treatise on the Purposes of Aristotle's Metaphysics* or *Maqāla fī aghrād mā ba'd al-ṭabī'a* provides a concise, but exceptionally thoughtful, account of what Aristotle seeks to accomplish in the *Metaphysics*. The Arabic text has been preserved in four manuscripts, two of which (London and Berlin) were used by Friedrich Dieterici for his 1890 edition; the anonymous editor who published a new edition in Hyderabad four decades later did not identify the manuscripts used for it, even though he introduced important variant readings. It has also been translated once into German and Spanish, twice into French, and four times into English. In her French translation, Thérèse-Anne Druart makes excellent use of the Dieterici and Hyderabad versions of the text and also provides variant readings from two other manuscripts (Leiden and Ankara) used neither by Dieterici nor, apparently, by the Hyderabad editor. A new translation follows this introduction. In it, I strive to render Fārābī's exposition precisely and literally without introducing undue awkwardness, and, more important, without allowing my own conjectures as to what he must be trying to say intrude upon what he actually does say. In addition to bringing the number of English translations to five, this new one serves as the focal point for the subsequent analysis.

Valuable and instructive in its own right, Fārābī's treatise nonetheless benefits from the high praise accorded it in the autobiography of Avicenna. This scholar, so widely acclaimed for his acumen, notes that after having "mastered logical, natural, and mathematical science" and thus having arrived at "divine science," he turned to Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Then, however, he found himself able neither to understand its contents nor to discern Aristotle's purpose in writing it. Not even after having re-read it "forty times" did he gain greater clarity about it. Only a chance encounter with a book-dealer, from whom he purchased a copy of Fārābī's treatise more as a charitable gesture than out of conviction it would teach him anything, delivered Avicenna from this impasse. His explanation of what ensued is captivating and intriguing in its exceptional brevity:

I returned to my house and quickly set about reading it. Then the purposes of that book [i.e., the *Metaphysics*] were instantly revealed to me.¹

So extraordinary is this claim that it deserves close attention. To brush it aside on the supposition that the treatise before us does not provide an extensive enough account of the *Metaphysics* too blithely ignores the emphasis Avicenna places on the term central to its exposition, namely, purposes (*aghrād*). These were what had escaped him in his previous readings of Aristotle's treatise. Let us begin, then, by considering what Fārābī says, in his own words, about Aristotle's purposes in the *Metaphysics*.

*Treatise on the Purposes of Aristotle's Metaphysics*²

1. A venerable treatise by the sage, the philosopher, the second teacher, Abu Naṣr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Ṭarakhān ibn Awzalagh al-Fārābī about the purposes of the sage in every treatise of the book denoted by letters; it is a verification of Aristotle's purpose in the *Metaphysics*. [D 34:1–5]

1 See William E. Gohlman, *Avicenna: The Life of Ibn Sina, A Critical Edition and Annotated Translation of Sirat al-Shaykh al-Ra'īs* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1974), Arabic, pp. 30, 32, and 34; English, pp. 31, 33, and 35.

2 The translation is based on Friedrich Dieterici's edition of the text as presented in *Alfārābī's philosophische Abhandlungen, aus Londoner, Leidener und Berliner Handschriften* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1890; reprint, Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1982), pp. 34–38. I have divided the text into numbered paragraphs. Square brackets at the end of each signal the page and lines of Dieterici's text (referred to by the letter D) and are also used within the text to indicate its pages. Emendations are indicated in footnotes, as are relevant explanations about the translation.

2. He said: our intention in this treatise is to signify the purpose and the primary divisions that Aristotle's book known as *Metaphysics* comprehends, for many people have fancied that the purport and content of this book is a discussion about the Creator (may He be glorified and exalted) the intellect, the soul, and the rest of what pertains to them and that the science of metaphysics³ and the science of [divine] unity are one and the same. Therefore, we find that most of those who look into it become perplexed and go astray; for we find that most of the discussion in it has nothing to do with this purpose; indeed, we find nothing in it specific to this purpose except for what is in treatise eleven, which has the designation *lām*.⁴ [D 34:6–13]
3. Now, there is not [to be] found any discussion among the ancients providing a proper commentary on this book, as occurs with the rest of the books [of Aristotle]; rather, if it is [to be] found, it is in Alexander's incomplete [commentary] on treatise *lām* and in the complete one of Themistius. The other treatises are either not commented on or have not come down to our time; so, upon looking into the books of the later Peripatetics, it may be presumed that Alexander had explained it fully. [D 34:14–18]
4. We want to point to its purpose and to the one comprehended in each of its treatises. [D 34:19–20]
5. So we say that some sciences are particular and some universal. The particular sciences are those whose subjects are some of the existent things or some of the things fancied. In looking into them, focus is on their specific accidents [D 35]—as with natural science. For it looks into one of the existent things, namely, body, insofar as it moves, changes, and rests from motion and insofar as it has both principles and consequences of that. Geometry looks into measured things insofar as they accept the qualities specific to them and the relations befalling them with respect to their principles and consequences and insofar as they are like that. Arithmetic is similar with respect to number, and medicine with respect

3 Literally, “the science of what is after nature” (*‘ilm mā ba’d al-ṭabī‘a*); see below, sec. 7 and n. 7.

4 As Aristotle's Greek text has come down to us, it is treatise twelve that has the designation *lām* (*lambda*). In Fārābī's account, the first treatise (*alpha maior*), is omitted. For an explanation of this, see Averroes, *Tafsīr mā ba’d al-ṭabī‘a* (Large Commentary on the Metaphysics), *Notice*, 2nd ed., ed. Maurice Bouyges, S.J. (Beirut: Dar el-Machreq, 1973, pp. lvi and cxviii–cxix; also Amos Bertolacci, On the Arabic Translations of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*,” *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* (15/ 2, September 2005): 241–275., esp. pp. 258–260.

to human bodies insofar as they become healthy and sick. And [so too] the other particular sciences; looking into what is common to all of the existent things does not occur in any of them. [D 34:21–35:7]

6. Now universal science is the one that looks into the thing common to all of the existent things, like existence and oneness; into its species and consequences; into the things that do not specifically apply to any of the subjects of the particular sciences, such as priority and posteriority, potentiality and actuality, completeness and deficiency, and what is like this; and into the principle shared by all of the existent things, namely, the thing that ought to be called by the name of God (may His magnificence be magnified). The universal science ought to be a single science; for if there were two universal sciences, each one of them would have a specific subject. Now a science having a specific subject that does not comprehend the subject of another science is a particular science. So both sciences would be particular. And this is absurd. Thus, the universal science is one. Divine science ought to enter into this science since God is the principle of the unqualified existing thing, not of one existing thing to the exclusion of another. So the division [of the universal science] that comprehends providing the principle of existence⁵ ought itself to be divine science. [D 35:8–19]
7. Because⁶ these meanings are not specific to natural things, but are generally higher than natural things, this science is higher than the science of nature and [comes] after the science of nature. Therefore, it is obligatory that it be called the science of metaphysics.⁷ Even though mathematics is higher than the science of nature since its subjects are divested of material, it ought not be called the science of metaphysics because its subjects are divested of material [D 36] in fancy not in existence; indeed, the existence they have is only with respect to natural affairs.

Now some of the subjects of this science⁸ have no existence at all in natural things, neither in fancy nor in reality. Not only are they fancied to be abstracted from natural things, but their very existence and nature are to be abstracted. And some do exist in natural things, even though they have been fancied to be abstracted from them. However, they do not exist

5 Reading *al-wujūd* with Hyderabad (henceforth H), instead of *al-mawjūd* (“the existent”). with D.

6 Reading *fa-li-anna* with London and Berlin or *wa li-anna* with H, instead of *li-anna* with D. Either *fa* (“thus”) or *wa* (“and”) provide a transition so that the clause it introduces becomes independent from the preceding one.

7 Literally, “the science of what is after nature” (*‘ilm mā ba’d al-ṭabī‘a*).

8 Namely, metaphysics.

in them essentially in that their existence cannot be divested of them or they be objects constituted by natural things. Rather, they exist for the natural things and for the objects separable in reality or in fancy from the natural things.

Thus, the science deserving to be called by this name is this science. It alone, then, apart from the rest of the sciences, is the science of metaphysics. The first subject of this science is unqualified existence and what is generally equivalent to it, namely, the one.

Yet, since the science of contraries is one, in this science privation and multiplicity are also looked into. Then, after [looking into] and verifying these subjects, it looks into the things from which the species are constituted such as the ten categories of the existent and the species of the one like the individual one, the specific one, the generic one, the proportional one, and the divisions of each one of these; and, similarly, [it looks] into the species of privation and multiplicity; then [it looks] into the attachments of the existent like the potential and actual, the complete and deficient, the cause and caused; and the attachments of oneness like identity, similarity, equality, conformity, parallelism, proportion, and other [things], and the attachments of privation and multiplicity; then [it looks] into the principles of each one of these; and it diversifies and divides that until it reaches the subjects of the particular sciences. At the point that⁹ the principles of all of the particular sciences and the definitions of their subjects are explained in this science, it comes to an end. So these are all of the things that are inquired¹⁰ about in this science. [D 35:19–36:20]

[A Summary Account of Each Treatise of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*]

8. The first treatise of this book comprehends something like a preface and [introductory] lecture to the book by explaining that the divisions of all the causes end up at a primary cause. [D37]
9. The second treatise comprehends an enumeration of abstruse questions about these meanings, an explanation of what makes them abstruse,¹¹ and a presentation of the contrary proofs concerning them by way of a mental alert to the sort of inquiry and its character.

9 Reading *fa-ḥīna'idhīn* with H, instead of *wa* ("and") with D.

10 Reading *yubḥathu* with H, instead of *nabḥathu* ("we inquire about") with D.

11 Literally, "the aspect of their abstruseness" (*wajh al-ta'wīṣ fihā*).

10. The third treatise comprehends an enumeration of the subjects of this science, which are the meanings it looks into along with the accidents specific to them¹²—and they are the ones we have enumerated.
11. The fourth treatise comprehends an elaboration of what is signified by each one of the utterances signifying the subjects of this science, its kinds of subjects, and their attachments whether they¹³ be synonymous, equivocal, or truly ambiguous.
12. The fifth treatise comprehends an explanation of the essential differences between the three theoretical sciences—namely, the natural, mathematical, and divine—and of them being only three; and [it comprehends] drawing awareness to the fact that divine science enters into this science¹⁴ only in a particular way, for it looks into identity said of essence not identity said of accident; and [it comprehends an explanation] of how the latter¹⁵ shares with dialectic and the art of sophistry.
13. The sixth treatise comprehends a verification of the statement about the identity said of essence, especially with respect to substantiality, and an elaboration of the divisions of substance: that they are primary material, the form, and the compound; that if the true definition [of substance] pertains to existents, then to which existents; if it pertains to substance, then to which substances; how compounds¹⁶ are defined, and which parts are to be found in the definitions; which forms are separable and which are not; and that the ideas¹⁷ do not exist.
14. The seventh treatise comprehends a summary of the former treatise; a completion of the statement about the Platonic forms—that things coming into being do not need them to come into being; and a verification of the statement about the definitions of the separable [forms]—that when they exist, their definitions are their essences.
15. The eighth treatise is about the potential and the actual and about which of the two is prior.
16. The ninth treatise is about the one and the many; and about the other, the difference, and the opposite.
17. The tenth treatise is about distinguishing between the principles of this science and its accidents.

12 Reading *bi-hā* with H, instead of *bi-hi* (“to it”) with D.

13 That is, the utterances.

14 Namely, metaphysics.

15 Understanding the antecedent of *annahā* as “identity said of accident.”

16 Reading *al-murakkabāt* with H, instead of *bi'l-murakkabāt* with D.

17 For this translation of *muthul* as “ideas,” see the summary of treatise seven.

18. The eleventh treatise is about the principle of substance and of all existence, the establishment of its identity and its knowing essence truly, about the separable existents subsequent to it, and about how their existence is ordered from it.
19. The twelfth treatise is about the principles of natural and mathematical things.
20. This is the explanation of the purpose of this book and its divisions.

The Teaching of the Text

As presented here, Fārābī's treatise consists of 20 sections that seem to divide into six parts. The first (sec. 1) is clearly a heading appended by a scribe and the last (sec. 20) a concluding summary statement that may well be by Fārābī. An introduction (sec. 2), assessment of the way others have approached Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and declaration of Fārābī's goal here (secs. 3–4), explanation of what metaphysics as a science comprises as well as what distinguishes it as a universal theoretical science from the other particular theoretical sciences that appear to be like it (secs. 5–7), and summary of the purposes of each of the treatises comprising Aristotle's *Metaphysics* as it was known to Fārābī (secs. 8–19) constitute the four core divisions of the treatise.

Declaring that he intends to point to “the purpose and the primary divisions” of Aristotle's book, Fārābī justifies his undertaking as providing a necessary corrective to the way most people understand the *Metaphysics*. Its “purport and content” is not the Creator, the intellect, the soul, or other subjects related to them. Nor is metaphysics as a science to be identified with the science of God's oneness or divine unity, that is, theology. Because people are so intent on exploring these subjects, they “become perplexed and go astray” when they search for an account of them in this book (sec. 2). To be sure, metaphysics—the universal science that “looks into the thing common to all of the existent things” and eventually into “the principle shared by all of” them, this latter being what “ought to be called by the name of God”—necessarily touches upon some of the concerns of divine science (sec. 6).

Metaphysics does so, however, solely insofar as it investigates the “principle of existence”; and this is no more than a part, rather than the whole or even the goal, of its inquiry. Indeed, Fārābī limits this particular focus of metaphysics to the subjects pursued in what he calls “treatise eleven, which has the designation *lām*.”¹⁸ For Aristotle, at least as Fārābī understands him, the universal

18 See above, sec 2 and n. 4; also secs. 4–5 and 18.

science of metaphysics looks into or investigates this along with numerous other subjects. Ignorance about Aristotle's goal in the *Metaphysics* and confusion about what this science comprehends are direct consequences of there being no explanations of it and no commentaries on it, except for those devoted to treatise *lām* or *lambda*. Fārābī adumbrates, therefore, the purpose of the *Metaphysics* as a whole in secs. 5–7 and, following that, the purposes of “each of its treatises” (secs. 8–19).

From these statements, we learn that Fārābī understands metaphysics to follow upon and complete the inquiry into the particular sciences begun with the discussion of natural science. The focus on body and motion as well as rest in that inquiry prepares the way for investigating the soul and what pertains to it. Even though Fārābī is silent here about the inquiry into the soul, we know from other writings of his that he deems it propedeutic to metaphysics. That is, it prepares the way for the inquiry proper to metaphysics, but is not part of it.¹⁹ Among other considerations, the reason for such an emphasis is that metaphysics ought to be understood not as a particular, but as a universal, science (sec. 5). Although it alone “looks into the thing common to all of the existent things,” Fārābī says here only that this common thing is “like existence and oneness” (sec. 6).

Still, since it is, as he notes in the same long sentence, “the principle shared by all of the existent things” and thus what “ought to be called by the name of God,” divine science does have some share in metaphysics. It is, nonetheless, divine science (*al-‘ilm al-ilāhī*) that he understands to be part of metaphysics, not the science of dialectical theology (*‘ilm al-kalām*). Elsewhere, Fārābī makes ample room for the inquiries properly associated with divine science, considering them an integral part of virtuous religion while refusing to accord dialectical theology any place in it. The reason is that the latter is too easily distorted by its practitioners and made to serve their own purposes rather than those of theoretical inquiry.²⁰

19 See, for example, Alfarabi, *Philosophy of Aristotle*, secs. 74–88 and 89–99. The Arabic text is in *al-Fārābī, Falsafat Aristūṭālīs*, ed. Muhsin Mahdi (Beirut: Dār Majallat Shi‘r, 1961); and the English is in *Alfarabi, Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle*, trans. Muhsin Mahdi (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001).

20 The passages in question occur at the beginning of Fārābī's *Book of Religion* and the very end of his *Enumeration of the Sciences*. For the English, see Alfarabi, *Book of Religion*, sec. 1, pp. 93–94; and *Enumeration of the Sciences*, sec. 5, pp. 80–84 in *Alfarabi, The Political Writings: “Selected Aphorisms” and Other Texts*, trans. Charles E. Butterworth (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). For the Arabic, see *Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, Kitāb al-milla wa-nuṣūṣ ukhrā*, ed. Muhsin Mahdi (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1968), sec. 1, pp. 43–44; and *Iḥṣā’*

In sum, the brevity of the exposition notwithstanding, Fārābī is as intent here as in his other writings on clarifying what subjects are part of the investigations pursued in the science of metaphysics and what ones are not. It stands alone as the universal science, and other inquiries are presented in terms of their relationship to it. It is the universal science because it comprehends the inquiries pursued in all of the particular sciences. That is to say, metaphysics preserves and builds upon the topics examined in those inquiries while striving to go beyond the impasses reached in them. But, as Fārābī indicates at the end of the *Philosophy of Aristotle*, the inquiries pursued in the *Metaphysics* do not resolve all human questions. Rather, the kinds of questions that must be investigated for them to be resolved are made explicit in it and pursued as far as they can be. Then, a new impasse is reached, one that calls for the kind of inquiry pursued in philosophy.²¹ Once this is grasped, Fārābī's admonitions about according divine science too great a place in metaphysics begin to make sense. So, too, do his insistence upon the importance of the categories for these inquiries and denial that they are about the Creator, the intellect, or the soul.

Avicenna's Approach to Metaphysics

Whatever Avicenna learned from Fārābī about the purposes of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, it was obviously not sufficient to persuade him of the need to distinguish that science clearly from divine science nor to insist upon the science of dialectical theology belonging to an inquiry other than the one pursued in the science of metaphysics. Indeed, his writings that serve as introductions to metaphysics as well as those on that particular science reveal that he heeds none of the strictures set forth so sharply in the second section of Fārābī's *Treatise on the Purposes of Aristotle's Metaphysics*. That becomes evident from his introductory remarks about metaphysical inquiries in his *Madkhal* (Introduction) to the *Manṭiq* (Logic) of the *Shifā'* (Healing); from comparisons he makes between first philosophy (the usual synonym for metaphysics), dialectic, and sophistry in his explanation of demonstration in that same series of writings; and, finally, from what he says in the opening chapters of his explanation of metaphysics in the *Healing*. Even the title he accords that work

al-'ulūm lil-Fārābī, ed. with an introduction and notes, 'Uthmān Amīn (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-'Arabī, 1949), pp. 107–113.

21 For this conclusion, see Appendix.

indicates clearly how much he strives to distance himself from both Aristotle and Fārābī: he entitles the inquiry *Ilāhiyyāt* (Divine Matters), rather than *Mā Ba'd al-Ṭabī'a* (What is after Physics).

As a preface of sorts to his discussion of logic, Avicenna offers an overview of the sciences to whose inquiries it provides guidance and rules. He begins by identifying the goal of philosophy as “seizing upon the truths of all things to the extent possible for a human being.” Since existing things are such that some exist “not due to our choice and action,” while others exist “due to our choice and action,” awareness of the first group “is said to be theoretical philosophy” and awareness of the second “practical philosophy.”²² Now that is perfectly consonant with what Aristotle and Fārābī say about existent things. So, too, is the further division proposed by Avicenna, namely, that “individual existing things whose existence is due not to our choice and action are first divided into two divisions: one is entities that are mixed with motion; the second is entities that are not mixed with motion.” However, the examples he provides of the latter, “intellect and the Creator,” place him clearly among those singled out by Fārābī in section two of the text presented here, namely, those who have failed to understand the purpose of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.²³ He also ignores the guidelines proposed by Fārābī with respect to identifying the science of metaphysics with dialectical theology.

In agreement with both Aristotle and Fārābī, Avicenna understands practical philosophy to set forth opinions for organizing communal human living. These opinions have to do with governing the city, the household, or the individual. Yet his subsequent assertion, namely, that the soundness of those opinions is verified by “theoretical demonstration and legal testimonies while their details and precise application are verified by divine Law,”²⁴ finds corroboration neither in Aristotle nor Fārābī. Indeed, the term translated here as “divine

22 See *Ibn Sīnā, al-Shifā', al-Mantiq, al-Madkhal*, ed. Fr. Georges Anawati, Maḥmūd al-Khuḍairī, and Fu'ād al-Ahwānī (Cairo: al-Maṭba'a al-Amīriyya, 1952), Treatise One, chaps. 1–2, 12:1–10 and also 11:1–18 with 9:5–10:17, esp. 10:11–13.

23 For Avicenna's text, see *ibid.*, Treatise One, chap. 2, 12:11–13.

24 *Ibid.*, Treatise One, chap. 2, 14:10–16. He says something quite similar when explaining the art of demonstration as distinct from those of dialectic and sophistry; see *Ibn Sīnā, al-Shifā', al-Mantiq, al-Burhān*, ed. Abū al-'Alā 'Afīfī (Cairo: al-Maṭba'a al-Amīriyya, 1956), Treatise Two, chap. 7, 165:17–166:15. It is important to note that Avicenna draws attention to this passage in the beginning of *al-Ilāhiyyāt*; see *Avicenna, The Metaphysics of The Healing: A Parallel English-Arabic Text*, translated, introduced, and annotated, Michael E. Marmura (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2005, Treatise One, chap. 1, sec. 8,

Law," *al-sharī'a al-ilāhiyya*, is not only completely foreign to Aristotle but never occurs in Fārābī's writings.

Given these prefatory remarks about metaphysics, it is not surprising that Avicenna introduces his explanation of it in the *Healing* by characterizing the theoretical sciences as being "limited to three divisions, namely, the natural, the mathematical, and the divine." Even though Fārābī notes that Aristotle divides the theoretical sciences in the same manner in Treatise Five of his *Metaphysics*,²⁵ Avicenna goes further with the latter division than either of his predecessors. Indeed, for him the investigations of divine theoretical science focus upon "the cause of causes and principle of principles, namely, God (may His greatness be exalted)."²⁶ Then, reminding the reader of the distinctions made in the *Treatise on Demonstration*, Avicenna notes that the present inquiry will make it possible to seize "the true subject of this science" and to discern whether it is "the essence of the first cause, so that what is desired is awareness of its attributes and actions"²⁷ or something else. The question arises because he insists that the deity and its essence cannot be the subjects of this science. They are, rather the objects sought after in it.²⁸

The significance of this caveat or distinction is not relevant to the present discussion. Whether these topics are subjects of metaphysical science or objects pursued in it, Avicenna accords them greater importance than either one of his predecessors. Differently stated, he does not recognize in his own expositions the purposes of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* outlined by Fārābī in the treatise he praised so highly. Above all, the direction taken by Avicenna in his own metaphysical inquiry differs notably from that taken by Fārābī or the Aristotle he presents to us.

2:18–3:2. Marmura's text is based on *Ibn Sīnā, al-Shifā', al-Ilāhiyyāt*, ed. Fr. Georges Anawati and Sa'īd Zā'id (Cairo: al-Hai'a al-Āmma li-Shu'ūn al-Maṭābī' al-Amīriyya, 1960).

25 Alfarabi, *Treatise on the Purposes of Aristotle's Metaphysics*, above, sec. 12.

26 Avicenna, *Healing*, Treatise One, chap. 1, secs 3 and 6–7, 2:8 and 16–17 with slight modifications to Marmura's translation.

27 Ibid., Treatise One, chap. one, sec. 8, 3:3–4.

28 See ibid., Treatise One, chap. 1, secs. 10–12, 3:11–4:19; Treatise One, chap. 1, sec. 17, 6:14–16; Treatise One, chap. 1, sec. 18, 6:17–18; and Treatise One, chap. 2, secs. 16–20, 11:4–12:17.

Conclusion

Simply stated, the difference between Fārābī and Avicenna—and thus between Fārābī and the host of theosophically or mystically inclined thinkers who follow in the path of Avicenna—is that Fārābī obliges the thoughtful reader to acknowledge the importance of carefully studying Aristotle's writings in order to learn about the world and its parts. He does so without ever settling the fundamental questions, respecting in that respect the ambiguities not resolved by Aristotle. From him, Fārābī learns that inquiry begins with language and the way it is used to signify the things perceived by the senses and apprehended by the intellect. It moves to an investigation of how words and sentences are used to speak about these perceptions or apprehensions as well as to how they are used to inquire more deeply about them.

At that point, wonder arises about the things constituting the world and about how they function or operate. At first, one inquires into body and its motions or rest therefrom and then into the causes of both. That inquiry leads to an assumption, even a reasoned conjecture, that body consists of material and form. But then wonder arises about what imparts motion to bodies, and it looks as though the source might be a cause of motion that is not itself moved. It looks that way, but it is not certain.

Then another question arises, namely, that about how things move themselves or appear to do so. It looks as though—again, the same kind of tentative apprehension—they do so due to some principle of motion within themselves. Now awareness of differences among existent things becomes more pronounced. It, in turn, engenders inquiry into what characteristics distinguish one kind of existent things or beings from another.

Because it is not possible to examine existent things without asking about what it is that allows them to exist, that is, about existence, inquiry into existence now arises. As we have seen from Fārābī's *Treatise on the Purposes of Aristotle's Metaphysics*, at this point the inquiry forces a return to the beginning investigations, those having to do with the way existent things first come to be apprehended—the categories. For the inquiry to be fruitful, the ways in which existent things appear must be fully grasped. No less important is being strict about the subjects to be investigated and precise about the way they are discussed.

Fārābī offers no simple answer to any of these questions in the treatise examined above. Nor is he of the opinion that Aristotle arrived at a solution in the larger treatise to which it refers. For him, these fundamental questions remain as questions. Thoughtful persons will pursue them without presuppositions, for that is the task of philosophy. It is this understanding of philosophy

as pursuit rather than settled doctrine that sets him and his presentation of Aristotle apart from Avicenna.

Appendix

“It has become evident from what has preceded that investigating and looking into the intelligibles that are not useful for the soundness of bodies and the soundness of the senses is necessary and that seizing upon the causes of the observed things the soul longs for is more human than that cognizance that was set down as necessary.

“It has become evident that the former necessary one is for the sake of this latter one and that the one we previously supposed to be superfluous is not, but is the one necessary for a human being to become substantial or to arrive at his final perfection. And it has become evident that the science he [Aristotle] investigated at the outset out of love and searched for so as to seize upon the truth about the pursuits mentioned above has turned out to be necessary for attaining the political activity for the sake of which the human being is generated. The science subsequent to it is investigated only for two purposes: one, to make perfect the human activity for the sake of which the human being is generated, and the other to make perfect what we are missing in natural science, for we do not have metaphysical science.

“Therefore philosophy must necessarily be brought into existence in every human being in the way possible for him.”²⁹

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Mind the Gap: The Reception of Avicenna's New Argument against Actually Infinite Space*

Jon McGinnis

Professor Hossein Ziai is almost certainly best known for his research and publications on Illuminationist philosophy and its founder, Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī (d. 549/1191). In this vein, Professor Ziai made available to the world critical editions and translations of some key texts of the late classical and post-classical Islamic intellectual world. Perhaps less known is Professor Ziai's early interest in physics and mathematics. In his spirit of making available the riches of later Islamic philosophical thought combined with an interest in the history of physics and mathematics, I offer here as tribute to Professor Ziai a set of (working) translations with brief commentaries.

The texts translated herein relate to a novel argument by Avicenna for the finitude of the cosmos and that argument's ultimate reception in the late classical and post-classical world of Islam.¹ The translations include selections from Avicenna himself (d. 427/1037), Abū'l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (d. c. 560/1165), Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274) Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī (d. 663/1264), Najm al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī al-Kātībī (d. 675/1277), Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1050/1640) and Faḍl-i Ḥaqq al-Khayrābādī (d. 1861). In my accompanying explanatory notes, I occasionally supplement the discussion with comments from other post-classical Muslim philosophers. These philosophers include Sharaf al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Mas'ūdī (d. c. before 600/1204), Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥṭānī (d. 766/1364) and Qaḍī Mir Ḥusayn Maybudī (d. 909/1504). While I offer brief commentary on the texts and indicate potentially interesting and/or novel moves, I do not pretend to provide a detailed study of the subsequent history of Avicenna's new argument. Instead I let the texts speak for themselves for the most part.

* I am extremely grateful to Sajjad Rizvi, who provided me with a copy of an Indian lithograph of Mullā Ṣadrā's *Sharḥ al-Hidāya* as well as the relevant pages from a new edition of Mullā Ṣadrā's *Sharḥ*, which as far as I can discern is not yet available anywhere in the US. I also want to thank Taleb Tabatabai and an anonymous reader for valuable material and organizational suggestions.

1 For a discussion of the argument and its historical background see McGinnis (forthcoming).

1 Avicenna's New Proof for the Finitude of Spatial Magnitudes

At III.8 [esp., 5–7] of the *Physics* of the *Cure*, Avicenna criticizes Aristotle's arguments for the finitude of the cosmos.² The Sheik's general complaint against the First Teacher's arguments is that they rely on questionable premises or at least premises that not everyone would accept, particularly certain medieval Islamic mathematicians.³ In the process of trying to amend Aristotle's argument so as to eliminate the questionable premises, Avicenna in fact hits upon a new argument, an argument that appeals only to premises that Aristotle's detractors themselves employ. The argument, as we shall see, became widely popular appearing in virtually all of the post-classical textbooks treating physics and metaphysics (*ḥikma*). Part of the lure of the argument is no doubt its seeming simplicity and yet forcefulness.

While I present a complete translation of Avicenna's own version of the proof from his *Ishārāt* in section 3, for now I let al-Qazwīnī al-Kātibī provide his summation of the argument as it appears in his popular handbook of philosophy and science, *Ḥikmat al-ʿayn* (*Wisdom of the Font*):

⟨Text 1⟩⁴

<63> (Spatial) intervals are finite. If not, it would be possible for the estimative faculty to imagine two lines [ab and ac] emerging from a single point [a]. Also, the two grow farther apart in such a way that [if] the initial interval is a cubit, the second is double [the first], the third is three of those similar units and so on infinitely. Now if that were possible, then between [ab and ac] there could be an interval that contains the infinite units similar to the first interval. In that case, what is infinite is bounded between the two boundaries [ab and ac].

2 Aristotle's argument with which Avicenna finds fault can be found at Aristotle, *De caelo*, 1.2–7, esp. 1.5.

3 I am thinking specifically of certain mathematicians such as Thābit ibn Qurra (288/901) and Abū Sahl al-Qūhī (ca. 390/1000). Relevant studies include Sabra, A.I. (1977), Rashed, R. (1999), Rashed, M. (2009) and McGinnis, J. (forthcoming).

4 Al-Qazwīnī al-Kātibī, *Ḥikmat al-ʿayn*, *Maqāla*, 3.7.3, "Investigations of quantity," p. 63. The translation is based upon 'A. Ṣadrī's edition.




FIGURE 14.1 *Avicenna's "Ladder Argument"*.

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While al-Kātibī will go on to critique this argument based upon a criticism of Abū'l-Barakāt—a criticism that I consider in the next section—his presentation sets out the general structure of the argument well enough. Figure 14.1 provides the basic set up of the argument. Assume that space is actually infinite in magnitude. Next from some point, *a*, allow a line, *ab*, to extend infinitely, which must be possible given the initial assumption of an actually infinite space. Similarly, allow a second line, *ac*, to extend infinitely from *a*, so as to form an angle $\angle bac$. Between the lines *ab* and *ac*, there is an ever-increasing interval or gap, extending proportionally with the extension of the two posited lines. Consequently, as the lines *ab* and *ac* extend to infinity, so must the interval grow infinitely; however, the interval is always bounded by the lines *ab* and *ac*, and so must be finite. Therein lies the apparent contradiction: If *ab* and *ac* are actually allowed to be extended infinitely, as the initial assumption seems to permit, then one must also allow that the interval or gap between *ab* and *ac* is infinite, but the interval by necessity is finite, since it is bounded on both sides by the lines *ab* and *ac*. Given the initial assumption, then, the interval must both be finite and infinite, a blatant contradiction. On the basis of this derived contradiction Avicenna and most of those who came after him concluded that space must therefore be actually finite.

2 Abū'l-Barakāt's Criticism of Avicenna's New Argument

While most of the authors considered herein were sympathetic to Avicenna's new argument, or at least the argument's general strategy, not all were. Most notably the independent thinker Abū'l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī found the argument questionable. In his *al-Kitāb al-mu'tabar* (*Book of Consideration*), he

begins by providing a presentation and then elaboration of key features of Avicenna's proof. His reconstruction shows a clear and sophisticated understanding of the proof, and his elaboration points to the further implications of the argument with respect to one's understanding of the nature of infinity. In the chapter following his presentation of the proof, however, he levels a powerful critique—in fact anticipated by Avicenna himself—which would become the catalyst for much of the subsequent discussion surrounding Avicenna's new proof.

Abū'l-Barakāt's general criticism is that the proof has not shown that an *actually infinite* interval would be bounded and so finite, but only that a *potentially infinite* would be finite. That a potentially infinite should always be actually finite, however, is obviously true and does nothing to tell us whether an actual infinity is possible. Thus, Abū'l-Barakāt concludes that Avicenna's proof is sterile.

Here is Abū'l-Barakāt's two discussions of our argument in full:

⟨Text 2⟩⁵

<84> They also proved [the finitude of space] by positing in the infinite (spatial) interval two lines [ab and ac] that emerge from a single point, [a], describing a given angle, and proceeding infinitely in their extension. They said that that is impossible, because inasmuch as [ab and ac] grow ever farther apart, the range between them expands. Thus, when they both proceed infinitely, what is between them is infinite and yet it is bounded by [ab and ac], since it is between them, and so it is finite, which is a contradiction. From this they, then, conclude that the interval of two infinite extensions is not [something] in reality (whether a void or a plenum) but there is [only] the finite in reality.

Also, part of [this proof] is that the infinite is only in the operation of the estimative faculty (*fi l-tawahhum*) not in reality. The sense of its being in the operation of the estimative faculty is not that the operation of the estimative faculty encompasses it, but only that in it there is the conceptualization of the sense of "being finite" and of "(spatial) interval" and then it negates [being finite]⁶ of [the interval]. Consequently, the infinitude of the extended interval (whether void or plenum) enters into the operation of the estimative faculty.

5 Abū'l-Barakāt, *al-Kitāb al-mu'tabar*, vol. 2, selection from chapter 19, "On the finite and infinite being said of place, time and the like" p. 84.

6 Reading *yaslubuhā 'anhu*—in which the feminine *hā* pronoun refers back to "being infinite" (*nahāya* f.) and the masculine *hu* refers to "(spatial) interval" (*bu'd* m.)—for the text's *yaslubuhumā 'anhu* "it denys/negates the two of it."

In other words, the operation of the estimative faculty does not reach some limiting point belonging to [the interval] that has nothing after [it].

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⟨Text 3⟩⁷

<85> The other argument is the one that puts forth the two lines [ab and ac] going on finitely while forming an angle. In that case, the incremental increase of the range between them also is an infinite width, [bc], since [bc] is increased by the increase of [ab and ac]; however, it (I mean this width) is always finite, since it is between two lines, and so the two [lines] are finite. [This argument] is of the [same] kind as the first argument,⁸ because in reality these two lines are not such, infinitely showing up, existing and moving outward toward infinity. It is only in the operation of the estimative faculty that [bc's] moving outward toward some limiting point beyond which there is no increase is infinite. Hence it always moves outward and outward and the width always increasingly increases and however much the estimative faculty expands [bc's] range, length after length, it is finite. Consequently, that upon which [bc] follows [namely, ab and ac] is also a finite width. It is infinite only inasmuch as it does not reach some limiting point such that the occurrence there entails that there is no increase. The same goes for the width. If [bc] were increased in proportion to the two lines [ab and ac], in reality <86> or in the estimative faculty, to whatever limiting point one wished, it would be finite and infinite. On the one hand, it is finite as long as the power of the estimative moves it outward and one conceptually notices it, while, on the other hand, it is infinite inasmuch as one increase after another is possible, and through this neither is a contradiction necessitated nor a proof [against the existence of an actual infinite] established.

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7 Abū'l-Barakāt, *al-Kitāb al-mu'tabar*, vol. 2, selection from chapter 20, "A closer consideration of what is said about the finite and infinite with respect to place," pp. 84–85.

8 The reference is to an argument against an actual infinity found in al-Kindī; see *On First Philosophy* (al-Kindī, 1997), ch. 2, pp. 28–31 and "On Divine Unity and the Finitude of the World's Body" (Al-Kindī, 1997), pp. 136–147. For a discussion of al-Kindī's proof see Rescher, N. & Khatchadourian, H. (1965) and McGinnis, J (2001). A version of al-Kindī's argument is also found in Avicenna, *Physics of the Cure*, 111.8 [1] and Avicenna, *Najāt*, "On the Finite and the Infinite," 11.11 pp. 244–245, Ibn Bājja, *Shurūḥāt al-Samā' al-ṭabī'ī*, p. 36, Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*, pp. 76–77 as well as in Suhrawardī, *The Philosophy of Illumination*, part 1, discourse 3 [55], p. 44.

What is initially noteworthy in Abū'l-Barakāt's presentation of Avicenna's argument is his appeal to the role of the estimative faculty (*wahm*) in the proof, namely that we are to *imagine* the various lines posited in the proof as extending infinitely. In his positive account of the proof, he notes that for Avicenna the estimative faculty is not thought to grasp the infinite fully and in its entirety, as it were, when positing the various lines. Instead, claims Abū'l-Barakāt, for Avicenna, one conceptualizes the notion of finite space and then negates being finite from that conceptualization. In other words, one never fully grasps an infinite but only that something is not this sort of thing, namely, finite. In the *Physics* of the *Cure* III.9, Avicenna indeed discusses in which sense infinity enters into reality. In that place, he does introduce the notion of the estimative faculty, albeit only explicitly in his discussion of infinite divisibility. At the end of that section, however, Avicenna does suggest that the only sense that infinity exists is "in the act of the estimative faculty."⁹ Thus Abū'l-Barakāt's extension of this Avicennan idea from infinity divisibility to infinite increase seems apropos.

Exploiting this feature of Avicenna's account of the infinite, namely, how we imagine the infinite, Abū'l-Barakāt complains that while it is true that one can always imagine the interval, *bc*, farther along on the lines *ab* and *ac* than any place that it is posited, nonetheless, at any point that one imagines *bc*, it is always at some finite (and so non-infinite) distance away from *a*. In other words, from the claim, "there is no point beyond which *bc* cannot be posited farther," Abū'l-Barakāt denies that one can go on and posit *bc* such that it is beyond every point such that it would be actually infinitely far away from the original vertex *a*. This last point is just the one that he made about the limited manner in which the estimative faculty imagines an infinite magnitude. Consequently, while *bc* is potentially infinitely far from the vertex *a*, it never is actually infinitely far from *a*, and so is never actually infinitely extended. Hence, according to Abū'l-Barakāt, the contradiction does not arise.

Simply put, Avicenna wanted to show that on the assumption of an actually infinite magnitude a contradiction could be derived: the interval between the two lines would be both infinite and finite. Abū'l-Barakāt agrees that the interval is both finite and infinite but in a non-vicious way, namely, the interval would be *potentially* infinite while *actually* finite. The notions of finitude and infinitude are being used equivocally, or at least so suggests Abū'l-Barakāt, and so the purported contradiction does not follow.

⁹ Avicenna, *Physics* of the *Cure*, III.9 [8].

3 Avicenna's New Argument in the *Ishārāt* and al-Rāzī and al-Ṭūsī's Commentaries

Avicenna had mentioned in the *Physics of the Cure*, 111.8 [6] a criticism similar to the one that Abū'l-Barakāt would raise later. Still Avicenna must have thought that the objection could be surmounted and indeed in his shorter encyclopedic work *al-Ishārāt wa'l-tanbihāt*, he makes an effort to provide just such a response. One can only assume that he found his response adequate, since his new argument is the only one he presents in any detailed way in the *Ishārāt* for the finitude of spatial magnitudes. One further point relevant to the transmission of Avicenna's new argument is that the *Ishārāt*—and works arguably based on the *Ishārāt*—was the primary vehicle for the study of physics and natural philosophy in the post-classical Islamic world.¹⁰ Hence Avicenna's new argument for the finitude of spatial magnitudes became widely disseminated and equally widely discussed. In this section I provide Avicenna's own account of his new argument from the *Ishārāt* and a quick summary of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's commentary on that section as well as elements from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's presentation of the argument from the latter's *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*. (I have provided a complete translation of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's commentary on this argument, which itself incorporates large portions of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's discussion, as appendix 1 at the end of this paper.)

⟨Text 4⟩¹¹

<94> You need to realize that no (spatial) interval (*bu'ḍ*) extends infinitely, whether in a plenum or a void (if [a void's] existence is [even] possible). Otherwise, two infinite [lines, ab and ac,] may be posited extending from a single starting point [a] between which the interval is capable of being increased without ceasing. Between [ab and ac], intervals may be posited that are capable of increasing as a single sum of the increases. [Finally], these latter intervals may be posited infinitely between the two. <95> In that case, then, there is a possibility of positing infinite increases to the initial finite distance (*tafāwut*)¹² [between ab and ac]. Now on the grounds that each increase exists,

10 For a discussion of the place of the *Ishārāt* in the subsequent history of natural philosophy in the post-classical Islamic world, see McGinnis, (2013).

11 Avicenna, *Ishārāt, namaṭ* 1.11, pp. 94–95. The translation is based upon Forget's edition, although Dunyá's edition was also consulted.

12 *Tafāwut* is the mathematical Arabic for "difference." Since in English a mathematical difference is sometimes referred to as the "finite distance," I have chosen this (slight) over translation because it exactly gets at Avicenna's point.

it, along with what is increasing, may exist in one [interval], where every one of the increases is possible, and so there is, then, an interval that contains the entirety of that possible thing. Otherwise it would be possible for the intervals to reach some limiting point beyond which there would be no increase, and so the existence of only that which contains what is delimited from the set of what is potentially unlimited would be possible. In that case, with respect to the capacity to be extended, the interval between the two extending [lines] would become limited at some limiting point beyond which it cannot pass in size. Inevitably, the two extensions [ab and ac] will come to an end there and not go beyond its interval, otherwise it would have been possible for the increase to be greater than what is possible, namely, that which is delimited from the set of what is unlimited, which is absurd. Clearly, then, it is possible that there exists an interval, [bc] between the initial two extensions [ab and ac] in which those increases exist infinitely. In that case, what is infinite [namely, bc] is bounded between two boundaries [ab and ac], which is absurd.

The impossibility of that might also be seen in other ways in which one makes use of motion or does not make use of motion, but what we have mentioned is sufficient.

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Again, instead of commenting Avicenna's argument, let me summarize some of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's more important comments on Avicenna's argument. Moreover, since the lion's share of al-Ṭūsī's commentary is direct quotations from and responses to al-Rāzī's *Ishārāt* commentary, I hope to provide a sense of what both men thought of Avicenna's new argument. Both thinkers obviously find Avicenna's argument convincing and believe that Abū'l-Barakāt's objection (as well as that same objection taken up by al-Mas'ūdī) can be successfully addressed. Exactly how they think the objection is addressed is perhaps less obvious.

Rāzī believes that Avicenna's argument rests upon four primary premises:

1. if infinite intervals were possible, then two infinite extensions, ab and ac, can emerge from a single point, a;
2. Between ab and ac there can be intervals capable of increasing as a single sum of the increases;
3. The increasing (spatial) intervals between ab and ac can be posited as a single sum to infinity;
4. Every increase exists.

Al-Rāzī adds an interesting qualification to premise 2. He notes that the increasing intervals must involve in principle some fixed unit of increase, for, he observes, if the increases involved a geometrical decrease the argument would not follow. Thus, for example, add to some unit 1, $\frac{1}{2}$ -unit, followed by $\frac{1}{4}$ -unit and then $\frac{1}{8}$ -unit and so on decreasing each addition by half of the preceding increment. In this case, while the lines *ab* and *ac* might extend infinitely, the gap between them would never be greater than 2 units.¹³ Whether al-Rāzī's qualification was directed toward some determinate individual (perhaps an atomist) who thought that the infinite addition of finite magnitudes must always lead to an actual infinite or just some potential objector is not clear.

Al-Rāzī's more substantive discussion involves premise 4, "every increase exists," for it is this very premise the Abū'l-Barakāt finds potentially equivocal. More specifically, do the increases exist actually or only potentially? If they were to exist actually, then the argument goes through, but it was just their actual existence that Abū'l-Barakāt challenges, whereas if the increases exist only potentially, Avicenna's purported contradiction does not follow.

Al-Rāzī's response, as he reads Avicenna, is this: Either there exists an infinite interval, which is the sum of every increase, or there does not. Obviously if such an interval exists, then it is bounded by *ab* and *ac*, and so there is a finite infinite, a contradiction. Contrariwise, if there is no such interval, then there is some last finite interval beyond which the gap between *ab* and *ac* grows no further; however, in that case *ab* and *ac* terminate at that interval and so they are finite, but they were assumed to be infinite, again a contradiction.

Unfortunately, the response seems wholly insensitive to Abū'l-Barakāt's insistence that while the gap is indeed potentially infinite, it is never actually infinite. Moreover, as al-Ṭūsī himself notes, al-Rāzī's reconstruction seems to rely on the fallacy of composition, namely, inferring some property of the whole based upon some property of each part. Certainly, if I told you that each tessera in a mosaic was blue and square, then, while you could infer that the mosaic was blue, you could not also infer that the mosaic was square, since the actual shape of the whole only exists potentially in the individual tesserae. Similarly, Abū'l-Barakāt can concede that while every intervallic increase potentially exists, at no point does the whole of them actually exist. Whatever the case, presumably, al-Rāzī understands premise 4 such that if each increase exists, the whole of them exists, but again one would like more on this point.

13 Aristotle at *Physics*, 3.6 206b3–12 makes a similar point about how the infinite addition to one magnitude of a geometrically decreasing magnitudes does not result in an infinite magnitude.

Al-Ṭūsī's own response to Abū'l-Barakāt is to claim that al-Rāzī had misinterpreted premise 4. According to al-Rāzī, Avicenna's fourth premise again is "Every increase exists." Al-Rāzī then takes as the first derived proposition that the entire sum of increases is possible. Al-Ṭūsī, in contrast, takes the possibility that the entire sum of increases exists as an integral part of premise 4 itself rather than as a conclusion. Thus, for al-Ṭūsī, Avicenna's fourth premise is something like, "if every increase exists, it is possible that the entire sum of those increases exists." Presumably, then al-Ṭūsī understands premise 4 such that if space is actually infinite, then the interval's being infinitely extended must be a real possibility, but real a possibility cannot entail a contradiction. Simply put, for al-Ṭūsī premise 4 should be understood as the modal proposition, "*It is possible that there exists an interval that contains the sum of the infinite possible increases.*"

Al-Ṭūsī's modalized version of the argument, then, takes as the assumption to be rejected that space is actually infinite. From this assumption, he infers that if possibly the lines *ab* and *ac* are actually infinite, then it is possible that the interval between them is infinite (based upon his modalized version of premise 4). Again, if space is actually infinite, then the possibility of these intervals should exist. Consequently, then, it is possible that the infinite interval between *ab* and *ac* is bounded by *ab* and *ac*. Of course, this conclusion is impossible, since it involves a contradiction. No infinite, and so unbounded, interval is (or even can be) bounded.

Further expositions of Avicenna's *Ishārāt* and our argument continued after the commentaries of al-Rāzī and al-Ṭūsī, and indeed those later works frequently engaged these earlier commentaries. One such work was the *Muḥākamāt bayn sharḥay al-Ishārāt (Litigations between the two commentaries of the Ishārāt)* of Quṭb al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Rāzī al-Taḥṭānī.¹⁴ While I have not translated the discussion of our argument from this text, Mullā Ṣadrā in his commentary on al-Abharī's *Hidāyat al-ḥikma* presents al-Taḥṭānī's judgments on our argument. Thus, I now turn to al-Abharī's account from *Hidāyat al-ḥikma* of Avicenna's new argument and the further development of that argument at the hands of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥṭānī and Ṣadr ad-Dīn Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī, the famed Mullā Ṣadrā.

14 Cf. al-Taḥṭānī (1375 [1996]). Unfortunately, there appears to be only one lending library in the US that has al-Taḥṭānī's complete commentary, Yale's Beinecke library, and that work has been on extended loan such that I could not consult it before the publication date.

4 Al-Abhari's *Hidāyat al-ḥikma*: al-Taḥṭānī, Maybudī and Mullā Ṣadrā

Al-Abhari's presentation of Avicenna's new proof follows the model of the *Ishārāt*. Thus, as in the *Ishārāt*, the argument is imbedded within a larger discussion of showing that matter is never wholly stripped of form. The general strategy of that larger argument is again to observe that if matter ever were stripped of form, then it must exist either as something finite or infinite. If matter is finite, then, it is argued, it must have some shape, but shape is the result of possessing some form. If matter were infinite, then the contradiction of our proof follows.

As in *Ḥikmat al-'ayn* of his contemporary al-Kātibī, al-Abhari's presentation of Avicenna's new proof in *Hidāyat al-ḥikma* (*Wisdom's Guide*) is minimal. Unlike *Ḥikmat al-'ayn*, which included multiple arguments against the infinitude of space, al-Abhari again follows the model of the *Ishārāt* and includes only our proof. Moreover, al-Abhari seems to have found the proof acceptable as presented, since there is no discussion of any potential weakness in the argument. Here is his version of the proof:

⟨Text 5⟩¹⁵

<13> If [form] were to exist through itself without its being in matter as in a substrate, then either it is finite <14> or infinite. The second [option, namely that it is infinite] comes to naught because all bodies are finite <15>. Otherwise, it would be possible that from a single starting point [a] two extensions [ab and ac] emerge uniformly like the two legs of a triangle. In that case, whenever they became greater in size, the interval between them would increase. Thus if [ab and ac] were extended infinitely, it would be possible for there to be an infinite interval in between them, despite [that interval's] being bounded between two boundaries [namely, ab and ac]. This is a contradiction.

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Despite al-Abhari's cursory presentation of the proof (or perhaps because of it), his text was the occasion for much commentary. Important commentaries on the *Hidāya* include those of Qaḍī Mir Ḥusayn Maybudī and Ṣadrā al-Dīn al-Shirāzī, the famed Mullā Ṣadrā, and indeed our proof received extended attention by both. Of Maybudī and Mullā Ṣadrā, the latter seems more willing to engage the earlier tradition at least explicitly. Thus, Mullā Ṣadrā's commentary

15 Al-Abhari, *Hidāyat al-ḥikma*, selection from *Fann* 1.3, "That the corporeal form cannot be stripped from matter," pp. 13–15. The translation is based upon M.S. Hussain's edition.

helps fill in some of the gaps in the story between al-Ṭūsī and Mullā Ṣadrā's own time, which I quickly summarize here. I also supplement my summary with an occasional comment from the work of Maybudī and the marginalia to Mullā Ṣadrā's own commentary. (I have provided a complete translation of Mullā Ṣadrā's commentary on our argument as appendix 2 at the end of this paper.)

From his initial introductory comments, it is clear that Mullā Ṣadrā is of the mind that the true purpose of this chapter of the *Hidāya* is to show that space must be finite. We also learn that by Mullā Ṣadrā's time there were two versions of the argument: the so-called Armored Demonstration and the Ladder Demonstration, the one Mullā Ṣadrā himself presents. These titles do not appear in Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Ṭūsī or even Maybudī's texts. Given Mullā Ṣadrā's interaction with Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥṭānī throughout this chapter, these nicknames may have come from the latter's *Muḥākamāt bayn sharḥay al-Ishārāt* and are found in the *Mawāfiq* of 'Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 756/1355).

While Mullā Ṣadrā does not himself present the Armored Demonstration, it is limned in the marginalia of an Indian lithograph of Mullā Ṣadrā's commentary.¹⁶ There the annotator suggests an argument (which I am not certain I fully comprehend) that runs something like this: If there were a body that is infinite in all directions, then one could posit on it a circle, which is then divided by three lines that intersect at the circle's center so as to form six equal angles, each one of which is 60° (literally, "two thirds of a right angle"). The annotator then appears to appeal to book 2, proposition 13 of Euclid's *Elements*, from which the so-called "Law of Cosines" can be derived.¹⁷ For our purposes, what is noteworthy is that the proposition provides a mathematical means of calculating the length of a side opposite a given angle, if one also knows the lengths of the other two sides. The argument continues by extending the three-intersecting lines infinitely. Thus, based upon the Law of Cosines, one can calculate that the intervals opposite each one of the angles formed at the center are also infinite. The argument concludes in a fashion common to Avicenna's new argument, "The cosmos would be bounded between the lines and divided

16 Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī [Mullā Ṣadrā], *Sharḥ al-Hidāya al-Athīriyya* (Indian Lithograph), p. 126.

17 Euclid's proposition reads, "In acute-angled triangles the square on the side subtending the acute angle is less than the squares on the sides containing the acute angle by twice the rectangle contained by one of the sides about the acute angle, namely that on which the perpendicular falls, and the straight line cut off within by the perpendicular towards the acute angle" (Euclid, *Elements*, Book 11, proposition 13, trans. T.L. Heath). From this proposition one can derive the law of Cosines, and so determine the length of the interval or gap bc , thus: $bc = (ab)^2 + (ac)^2 - 2(ab)(ac)(\cos \angle bac)$.

into the plane surfaces between them.” From the premise the annotator concludes that the cosmos would be finite, and so in contradiction with the initial assumption that there is an infinite body.

Returning to Mullā Ṣadrā’s commentary, he interestingly claims that the argument is derived from the ancients. Perhaps, he merely means that Aristotle’s discussion provided the occasion for Avicenna’s innovation. Alternatively, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī had claimed that Plato introduced the general argument that matter can never be stripped of form because matter must be finite and so must have a shape. Mullā Ṣadrā may have confused the scope of al-Rāzī’s claim to include our argument as well.

Thereafter Mullā Ṣadrā mentions Avicenna’s objection from the *Cure*—which again anticipated the one picked up by Abū’l-Barakāt—and Avicenna’s subsequent solution to it as found in the *Ishārāt*. Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī apparently did not find the solution of Avicenna or his earlier commentators completely satisfying, for Mullā Ṣadrā notes that al-Taḥṭānī offers a different sort of response to Abū’l-Barakāt.

Perhaps most notably, al-Taḥṭānī, as Mullā Ṣadrā presents him, appears to recognize that Abū’l-Barakāt’s critique rest on a particular conception of number, which does not apply to magnitudes; for one simply cannot treat a (purportedly) infinite spatial magnitude in the same way as an infinite series of numbers as Abū’l-Barakāt had done. Concretely, an infinitely extended cosmos would exist completely and all at once in a way that numbers do not. Numbers simply are not rigid objects (*ṣammā’*). What Abū’l-Barakāt is doing, according to al-Taḥṭānī, is treating the purportedly infinite interval, *bc*, as if it is a number line, which one is counting up. Of course there is no number “infinity,” and so *ipso facto* one can never reach it. Avicenna’s new argument, al-Taḥṭānī reminds us, is not about an actually infinite number, but about an actually infinite space, which is being granted for the sake of argument. In short, one cannot treat these two different kinds of magnitudes—continuous (spatial) magnitudes and discrete (numeric) magnitudes—alike. Al-Taḥṭānī, it would seem, is accusing Abū’l-Barakāt of conflating these two ways of thinking about magnitudes in his critique of Avicenna’s argument, and so Abū’l-Barakāt’s critique rests on an equivocation.

Despite this flaw in Abū’l-Barakāt’s criticism, al-Taḥṭānī also seemingly provides a strategy for setting up a numeric ratio that corresponds with the increase of the growing interval, such that Avicenna’s proof goes through. Mullā Ṣadrā tells us that in doing so the latter refers to the “proportionality of four terms.” The reference is probably to Euclid’s *Elements* book v, defn. 5: “Magnitudes are said to be in the same ratio, the first to the second and the third to the fourth, when, if any equimultiples whatever are taken of the first

and third, and any equimultiples whatever of the second and fourth, the former equimultiples alike exceed, are alike equal to, or alike fall short of, the latter equimultiples respectively taken in corresponding order.” Al-Taḥṭānī’s strategy would likely have been to argue that if increases in the base of the triangle by a common unit are proportionate to increases in the legs of the triangle by a common unit, then, owing to that proportionality, when the legs are infinite, the base must be too.

Mullā Ṣadrā finds Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s suggestion wanting as stated. He complains that it is invalid to move from something’s being true of each member of the whole to a claim about the whole as a whole, a point similar to the one al-Ṭūsī leveled against Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. Moreover, continues Mullā Ṣadrā, there is no reason necessarily to think that the numeric increases can be put into a one-to-one relation with the increase of the magnitude. While Mullā Ṣadrā does not provide an example of what he means, perhaps the following gets at it. If the angle $\angle bac$ is a right angle so as to create a right isosceles triangle Δabc , with legs ab and ac both 1 unit in length, then, according to the Pythagorean Theorem, bc must be $\sqrt{2}$, and so incommensurate with ab and ac . In other words, there simply is no common unit of spatial magnitude that can measure the sides ab and ac as well as the interval bc .

This point seems small and indeed Maybudī in his commentary on the *Hidāya* had already found a solution.¹⁸ He constructs a series of equilateral triangles, based off an original equilateral triangle and its interval, where the legs of the equilateral triangles are progressively increased by one cubit. (See figure 14.2.) Since the constructed triangles are all equilateral, each successive increase increases all the legs equally. Consequently, with each numeric increase there is a proportional increase of the magnitude.




FIGURE 14.2 *Maybudī's reconstruction of the "Ladder Demonstration."*

18 Maybudī, *Sharḥ li-Qāḍī Mīr 'alā 'l-Hidāya fi 'l-hikma*, pp. 15–18.

After rejecting Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī's attempts to resolve Abū'l-Barakāt's objection, Mullā Ṣadrā offers a simple solution to the problem, which if not fully novel, neither is it explicitly emphasized nor exploited by earlier commentators. Abū'l-Barakāt had cast Avicenna's new argument in terms of imagining successive increases to a pre-existing unit. In this respect the production of the infinite interval is analogous to the production of infinitely many numbers using the $n+1$ functor. Of course this way of thinking about infinity and its production ensures that whatever number or magnitude is actually produced is always finite, and so there is only ever a potential infinity. It is this point that Abū'l-Barakāt exploits in his critique. Al-Taḥṭānī had already noticed that there is something dis-analogous between Abū'l-Barakāt's comparison of numbers and magnitudes, but at the same time he could not free himself from thinking in just those terms of producing an infinite through successive additions.

Mullā Ṣadrā's break with this tradition is simply to posit actually infinitely extended magnitudes, "vanishing to infinity" instead of adding successive increases to some finite unit. Thus, for example, if one is asked simply to posit some actually infinite line from some point a , there seems to be no particular problem with such a posit given the assumption that space itself is actually infinite. Similarly, positing some different actually infinite line from that same point a , so that the two lines form an angle $\angle bac$, does not seem problematic again given that space is supposed to be actually infinite. Our minds only reel when we are asked to posit a purportedly infinite interval between these two lines—we simply cannot imagine it. Of course, we cannot imagine such a line anymore than we can imagine a round square, since we are being asked to consider a contradiction, a finite infinite. In other words, Abū'l-Barakāt's objection is persuasive only because it primes us to think about infinity in light of Avicenna's account of a *potential infinity* with its appeal to the estimative faculty imagining never ending increases. Mullā Ṣadrā, in contrast, claims that we should be thinking of Avicenna's argument in terms of a purported *actual infinity*. That is to say, do not posit a progressively increasing interval, as Abū'l-Barakāt would have you do, but posit the infinite interval as coming to exist full and complete all at once.

Mullā Ṣadrā concludes his discussion of the finitude of body by presenting one further (failed) attempt, which presumably came after al-Taḥṭānī's discussion and is not found in Maybudī's commentary, to prove (rather than simply posit) an infinite interval between two lines increasing toward infinity. The general strategy is to construct infinitely many surfaces marked off by the infinitely many traversals and infinitely many lines parallel to one of the legs. Each parallelogram is finite but since there are infinitely many of them, they

purportedly mark off an infinite area, which is nonetheless bounded. Mullā Ṣadrā rejects the argument, since it is subject to the same sort of Abū'l-Barakāt style objection raised against the successive production of infinity as opposed to merely positing an actual infinity.

5 After Mullā Ṣadrā: al-Khayrābādī

It would be too hasty to say that Mullā Ṣadrā quailed the dispute surrounding Avicenna's argument and the objection raised against it. Still, by the time of the Indian scholar Faḍl-i Ḥaqq b. Faḍl-i Imām Khayrābādī (d. 1861) the issue seemed settled along the lines that Mullā Ṣadrā presented. Indeed Khayrābādī's *al-Hadiyya al-sa'idiyya fi l-ḥikma al-ṭabī'iyya* is perhaps the last independent work written within the Avicennan tradition of *Ṭabī'iyyāt*. Here is his brief synopsis of Avicenna's argument:

⟨Text 6⟩¹⁹

<18> The affirmation of the Ladder Demonstration is that if an infinite (spatial) interval were to exist in the directions of length and breadth, it would be possible that in it two extensions [ab and ac] emerge from a single point [a] in single way as if they were two infinite legs of a triangle. Now if they were extended to infinity *actually*,²⁰ then the separation between [ab and ac] would be infinite despite its being bounded between two boundaries. This is absurd. Hence clearly the existence of an infinite (spatial) interval in two directions is absurd.

•••

Little needs to be said here other than to observe that there is no mention of the role of the estimative faculty or producing the interval through progressive additions. The whole of the argument rest on allowing the initial two lines to be posited as extended infinity in actuality.

19 Al-Khayrābādī, *al-Hadiyya al-sa'idiyya, Muqaddima*, 1.4, "Form of corporeality cannot be stripped from matter." The translation is based upon 'A.R. Barqūqī's edition.

20 Emphasis added.

6 Conclusion

While there are certainly gaps in my presentation of the history of Avicenna's new argument for the finitude of spatial magnitudes, neither do I want to extend my discussion indefinitely. What is clear is that Avicenna's new proof was immensely popular in the post-classical period of Islamic philosophy and that lively and creative debates about it and infinity continued on in the various commentary traditions of post-classical Islam. Hopefully the set of translations and brief commentary included herein both gives one a sense of the riches of the post-Avicennan *Ṭabīʿiyyāt* tradition and also do homage to one of the pioneers of post-Avicennan thought, Professor Hossein Ziai. May his spirit live on.

<Appendix 1: Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's commentary on the *Ishārāt* with large sections from the commentary of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī>²¹

<93>, {183} **You need to realize that no (spatial) interval (*buʿd*) extends infinitely whether in a plenum or a void (if its existence is [even] possible).**

This issue of the finitude of (spatial) intervals is one of the aims of physics and is also a principle for other issues. {184} One of them is the issue of establishing that directions are delimited, which you will learn later,²² and also is among the physical topics. <94> Also among them is the issue of the impossibility of the separation of form and what follows it, I mean magnitude, from [prime] matter (*hayūlá*), [an issue] that pertains to metaphysics.²³ On account of the proof of this issue he mentioned it here and already indicated that it is one of the important things sought by saying, “**You need to realize.**” The Excellent Commentator [that is, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī] said:

«47» Since the Sheik [that is, Avicenna] proved that the body is composed of [prime] matter and form, he thereafter wanted to prove the

21 Ṭūsī, *Sharḥ Ishārāt, namaṭ* 1.11, pp. 93–104. The translation is based upon Āmolī's edition, although Dunyá's edition was also consulted. Angle brackets, ⟨⟩, refer to Āmolī's pagination, while curly brackets, {}, refer to Dunyá's. Bold text refers to the base text of Avicenna's *Ishārāt*. I have also compared al-Ṭūsī's citation of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī with the edition of al-Rāzī's *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt* established by 'A.R. Najafzāda, pp. 46–54 and given (significant) variations as well as the page numbers of al-Rāzī's texts in double angle brackets, «».

As a general observation about al-Ṭūsī's use of al-Rāzī's text, the former takes frequent small stylistic liberties with al-Rāzī's text, not all of which I have noted. At other times, however, he quickly paraphrases longer discussions in al-Rāzī without noting as much; he also reorganizes al-Rāzī's discussion. These more significant modifications I have noted and in some cases filled in missing material.

22 At Avicenna, *Ishārāt, namaṭ*, 2.2.

23 At Avicenna, *Ishārāt, namaṭ*, 1.12–17.

impossibility²⁴ of the separation of form from matter «...» by this demonstration of its form: Every body is finite and whatever is finite has a shape. Hence the corporeal is not separated from shape, but shape occurs only together with the material (*mādda*), and so the corporeal is not separated from it «material». Now Plato relied on this argument in order to [show] that (spatial) intervals are not separate from the material, for about him the Sheik related at VII.2 of the “Metaphysics” of the *Cure*²⁵ that there cannot be a (spatial) interval that does not subsist in some material because either it is finite or infinite. The second [alternative] is false because the existence of an infinite interval is absurd. [As for the first] when [the interval] is finite, its being bounded at some delimited limiting point and its having some determinate shape is only on account of being acted upon,²⁶ which accidentally belonged to it from something external and not on account of its own nature. Now the form will not be acted upon «49» except on account of its material, so it would be withdrawn and <95> not withdrawn, which is absurd.

([Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī] next said [that] this issue—I mean establishing the finitude of (spatial) intervals—is based upon four premises.

«49» The first is that if infinite intervals were not impossible, then there should be no problem with two infinite extensions [ab and ac] emerging from a single point. The interval between [ab and ac] would never cease and would be capable of increase, such as two legs of a triangle extending infinitely.

The second [premise] is that between «those two extension» [ab and ac] there may exist intervals that are capable of increasing as a single sum of the increases. For example, the first interval is a cubit, while the second interval increases «the first» by half a cubit and a third one increases the second also by half a cubit and so on «according to this progression infinitely».

[Paraphrasing the remainder of al-Rāzī’s comments on the second premise] the increases ought to be as a single sum so that the interval undergoing the increase between [ab and ac] becomes something that contains the infinite increases in length {185}. Except you see that when we halve a line and make

24 *Imtinā’* added in al-Ṭūsī’s text.

25 See Avicenna, *Metaphysics* of the *Cure*, VII.2 (6).

26 Reading *infī’āl* with Dunyā and Najafzāda for Āmulī’s *infīṣāl* (non-continuous).

one of its two halves a base, and increase [that base] by half of half of the other [side of the line], and then half of half of what remain and so on ad infinitum, this is not impossible according to the assumption because the whole magnitude allows the infinite divisions.²⁷ Thus the sum of the increases to the base are infinite, and the base is capable of being increased without limit, even though it does not reach the original line that was halved. So it has been established that when these increases are by decreasing [increments], it does not follow from the fact that they are infinite that what is being increased will be infinite, <96> whereas when [the increases] are as a single sum or something undergoing increase, then what is sought occurs. Since the example is something that exists with respect to increasing, the Sheik chose the example that did not exclude the occurrence of increasing.

[Returning back to al-Rāzī's text itself]:

«49» The third [premise] is that between «these» two extensions [ab and ac] these increasing (spatial) intervals may be posited as a single sum «increasing» to infinity. In that case, then, there is a possibility of increases to the initial finite distance (*tafāwut*) [between ab and ac] being posited infinitely.

The fourth [premise] is that each increase exists, and so it, along with that which is increased by it, may exist in a single (spatial) interval.

[Quickly paraphrasing al-Rāzī's long discussion of premise four before returning to his text]: Hence any interval that you take, you make the entirety of the increases that existed before it to exist in it.

... «51» We now return to [Avicenna's] text and say that “(if its existence is [even] possible)” qualifies only “void”. That is because in the opinion of [Avicenna] the existence of the void is impossible.²⁸ Thus it is incorrect to describe it as infinite,²⁹ but it is correct to say that if (counterfactually) its existence were established, then it would be finite.

“Otherwise, two infinite [lines, ab and ac] may be posited extending from a single starting point between which the interval is capable of being increased without ceasing,” «52» states the first premise. “Between [ab and ac] intervals may be posited that are capable of increasing as a

²⁷ Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* 3.6, 206b3–12.

²⁸ See Avicenna, *Physics of the Cure*, 11.8.

²⁹ Al-Rāzī literally says, “... because in his opinion the void is not something that exists and it is impossible to attribute to what does not exist its being finite.”

single sum of the increases,” indicates the second premise. “These latter intervals may be posited between the two infinitely. In that case, then, there is a possibility of increases to the initial finite distance [between *ab* and *ac*] being posited infinitely,” indicates the third premise. “Now on the grounds that each increase exists, it along with that which is increased by it may exist in a single [interval]” indicates <97>, {186} the fourth premise.

([Paraphrasing al-Rāzī, next] he said: [Avicenna] begins to set up the proof resulting from [those premises]. His statement, “Every one of the increases was possible, and so there is, then, an interval that contains the entirety of that possible thing” begins the proof. He means that each one of the increases can exist and so nothing but some interval can contain them. This proposition is explained by, “Otherwise it would be possible for the intervals to reach some limiting point beyond which increasing it is not possible.”

I [Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī] say: it is also possible that “Every one of the increases was possible” concerns what he takes to be the fourth premise. In other words, every one of the increases was possible when taken together, for they also are something existing along with what is being increased in a single [interval]. Also “and so there is, then, an interval that contains the entirety of that possible thing” is a proposition explained by “Now on the grounds that (*li-anna*) each increase...”. Thus this latter “and so” is the apodosis [or consequent] of the former “on the grounds” (*li*). The implicit argument of the discussion is [this]: Now because each one of the increases and the whole sum of them exists in some interval, it is therefore possible that there exist an interval that contains the sum of the infinite possible increases. According to the way that the Commentator [al-Rāzī] interprets him, [however], the explaining [phrase] “on the grounds” in “on the grounds that” does not explain, and so there is no reason for the particle “that”.³⁰

[Al-Rāzī earlier had] said that the structure of the demonstration says:

«49» either [(1)] there is a single interval that contains the entirety of those³¹ infinite increases or [(2)] there is not. Option (2) is false because between the two extensions [*ab* and *ac*] either [(2a)] there exists an interval <98> beyond which there does not exist another interval or [(2b)

30 Al-Ṭūsī’s criticism is difficult to capture completely in English. In general, however, I think that his point is clear: al-Rāzī’s interpretation of the text purportedly does not make syntactical sense of the Arabic.

31 *Jamī’ tilka* added in al-Ṭūsī’s text.

such an interval] does not exist. {187} Option (2a) necessitates that [ab and ac] come to an end despite being posited as infinite, which is false,³² «50» whereas (2b) requires that there is no increase save one that shows up in some other interval. Hence, it holds true of every increase that it shows up in some interval,³³ and when it holds true of each one that it shows up in another [interval], it «necessarily» holds true of the sum that it shows up in an interval. «...»³⁴ Therefore, between the two extensions [ab and ac] a (spatial) interval must be posited that includes the infinite increases, and yet it is bounded between two boundaries [viz., ab and ac]. This is absurd. Thus he established that the doctrine of infinite (spatial) intervals leads to certain disjuncts all of which are false.

He [i.e., al-Rāzī then] says:

... «51» All of these premises are simple facts except one, namely, our saying that since each one of those increases shows up in an interval, all must show up in an interval³⁵ [i.e., premise 4], for the claimant can demand proof of it. If [Avicenna] can demonstratively establish this premise, the demonstration [for the finitude of all spatial intervals] goes through, otherwise it collapses.

I [Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī] say that [Avicenna] did not think that all [of the intervals] show up in an interval simply as an effect of each one's showing up in an interval; rather, he made it an effect of each one and the whole sum, which can also exist as something showing up in an interval. Since the Excellent Commentator believes that [Avicenna's] claim, "Every one of the increases was possible" is not associated with the fourth premise, he derived from the aforementioned interpretation and his construction of the demonstration according to his interpretation a premise that is not a simple fact. As for the way that we interpreted [Avicenna], that is not so. [That is] because when it is established that the whole existing sum shows up <99> in an interval and

32 Al-Rāzī's text literally reads, "The first necessitates [that] the two extensions between which the intervals were posited come to an end, since «50» were the two not to come to end, then inevitably some other interval is posited above that one; however, the two extensions were posited as infinite. This is a contradiction."

33 Al-Rāzī's text reads simply *fī ghayrihi* (in something other than it).

34 Al-Rāzī additionally has, "Because we have already proven that there exists in the interval that is higher above it the totality of the increases that occur in the intervals below it."

35 Al-Rāzī's text has *fī shay' ākhar* (in another thing).

the sum of the infinite increases is an existing sum, then its showing up in an interval is also necessary.

Next [Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī] said [that] since this proposition—I mean the judgment that a (spatial) interval that contains the entirety of the increases exists—is disputable, [Avicenna] intended to establish it by falsifying its opposite, when he says, **“Otherwise it would be possible for the intervals to reach some limiting point beyond which increasing it is not possible.”** {188} [Al-Rāzī then] said:

«52» The aim of [this claim] is to explain the absurdity that follows from the nonexistence (*ʿadam*) of an interval that contains the entirety of the increases. The sense, then, is that if an interval that contains the entirety of «these» increases were not to exist, there necessarily is some interval in which the increases in it do not show up in some other interval, in which case some interval beyond that interval does not exist. Thus, the possibility of intervals being posited between [ab and ac] is limited at some determinate limiting point [beyond], which there can be no more increase.

The meaning of **“and so only the existence of that which contains what is delimited from the set of what is potentially unlimited would be possible”** is that, from that former [claim], it follows that there does not exist some interval that contains only a bounded finite number from the set of infinite (spatial) intervals that exist potentially.

“In that case, with respect to the capacity to be extended, the interval between the two extending [lines ab and ac] would become limited at some limiting point beyond which it cannot pass in size.” In other words, when intervals that can be posited between «the two extensions» [ab and ac] are finite, the interval between «the two extensions» [ab and ac] must terminate at some interval of which none greater than it exists.

«53» **“Inevitably, the two extensions [ab and ac] will come to an end there and not go beyond its interval,”** that is, when it terminates at an interval than which none greater exists, then [ab and ac] must have come to an end.³⁶ <100>

“Otherwise it would have been possible for the increase to be greater than what is possible, namely, that which is delimited from the set of

36 Al-Rāzī’s text literally reads, “When the intervals posited between these two extensions, necessarily terminate at an interval than which none greater exists, then the two extensions must come to an end and cannot continue effectively extending (*nāfidhayni mum-taddayni*) beyond that.”

what is unlimited, which is absurd.” In other words, if the two extensions did not come to an end, there might be an interval greater than what was posited as the greatest of the intervals. In that case, an interval would exist that contains «from the infinite intervals» more than the finite set of which we posited that it was impossible [for any set] to contain more than it, which is absurd.

[Avicenna] next said, “**namely, that which is delimited,**” that is, “that which is delimited” is greater than what is possible according to the initial posit. [Al-Rāzī] then said:

Obviously from all of that, if some single interval were not to come to be that contains «all of those» infinite increases, it would follow that the two extensions [ab and ac] came to an end «and were finite» despite their being posited as infinite. The Sheik was not explicit about it, relying [instead] on the understanding of the educated [reader]. {189}

The meaning is obvious for: “**Clearly, then it is possible that there exists an interval, [bc], between the initial two extensions [ab and ac] in which those increases exist infinitely. In that case, what is infinite [namely, bc] is bounded between two boundaries [ab and ac], which is absurd.**”

[Al-Rāzī earlier] said,³⁷ one might [object] saying that the argument is based upon positing an interval that is the last interval and that is impossible unless one simultaneously posits the finitude of the two extensions [ab and ac], since were the two infinite, there would be no interval unless there were another one beyond it. Hence there is no (spatial) interval that is the last of the interval. <101> Therefore your proof is based upon a premise that cannot be established until the [very] thing sought has been established.

[Al-Rāzī responded]:

«50» We say, undoubtedly when we posit the infinite interval, it is impossible to indicate some single interval that «51» contains those infinite increases. Still that does not hurt us «concerning the inference» because the claim that the two «extensions» are infinite leads to the claim that the two are finite.

37 Al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, p. 50.

[Paraphrasing al-Rāzī] there would then be a contradiction. That is because we'll say either [(1)] there is an interval, [bc], that contains the entirety of the increases or [(2)] there is not. If [(1)] there is, there must not be any other interval beyond [bc], because if there were an interval [b'c'] beyond [bc], then [bc] would not contain all the increases of the interval [b'c'] that are beyond [bc]. In that case, [bc] would not contain the entirety of the increases. If [(2)] there is not an interval that contains the entirety of those intervals, then with respect to those increases there is an uncontained interval, [df], and that which is uncontained must be the last of the intervals. [That follows] since if [df] were not the last of the intervals, there would be some other interval beyond it and that "more beyond" [interval] would include [df]. We posited, however, that [df] is uncontained. This is a contradiction. <102> Thus it is established that the aforementioned doubt [in fact] confirms this argument.

I [Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī] say, this last disjunct, [(2)]—in which the interval is posited as something not containing the entirety—is an unclear antecedent (*muttaṣila*) of the consequent (*luzūm*). So if some fault touches on this discussion [of the finitude of spatial intervals], it is purely the result of [Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī].

In answer to an objection of Sharaf al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Mas'ūdī³⁸ this commentator [i.e., al-Rāzī] had mentioned this account [but] expressed [it] differently, thus:³⁹

Each one of the infinite increases either shows up in some other interval beyond it or does not. If each one does not show up in another interval, there is some increase that does not exist in another interval. Hence, beyond those increases there is no other interval, since were there, something would exist in it. In that case, the two [lines ab and ac] would come to an end and be finite. {190} If each one of them shows up in the interval, then either the whole shows up in an interval <103> or it does not. Now it is absurd that [the whole] not [show up in the interval], because it is already clear [to] us that the ten-unit interval, for example, does not merely have within it an increase up to nine units, but rather it is equivalent to the initial interval together with the sum of those increases up to the

38 The reference is to al-Mas'ūdī's *al-Shukūk 'alā 'l-Ishārāt* (*Doubts over the Ishārāt*), question 2 (pp. 201–4). On al-Mas'ūdī and his work, see Shihadeh (2005) 153 ff. and (2016), which also includes an edition of the *Shukūk*.

39 Al-Ṭūsī is now probably citing or paraphrasing from al-Rāzī's *al-Jawāb 'alā 'l-Mas'ūdī* (*Responses to Mas'ūdī*), which as far as I know does not yet exist in edited form.

ten-unit interval. Obviously those increases completely exist in a single interval.

Also the former [option, namely that the whole does show up in an interval] is absurd on two counts. First, that interval is infinite despite being bounded between two boundaries. Second, if beyond the interval that contains the entirety of the increases there is some other interval, [the interval that contains the entirety of the increases] does not contain the entirety, since it does not include what is beyond it[self], whereas if there is no other interval beyond it, the two intervals [ab and ac] have come to an end. Thus the claim for the infinitude of the two extensions arrives at a [set of] disjuncts all of which are false.

[Al-Rāzī's] aim in mentioning the subsequent [or second]⁴⁰ noted antecedent (I mean the existence of an interval that was not contained by some other) is to make it a necessary concomitant of, on the one hand, the entirety of the increases not showing upon in an interval, and, on the other hand, of each one's not showing up in an interval. Besides that this antecedent becomes a clear [antecedent] of the consequent. The confusion about each increase's needing to show up in an interval on account of the whole's showing up in an interval persists only in the course of his narration.

So this is what can be said about this passage. We have painstakingly followed the Excellent Commentator's discussion only because he went to such pains over it.

“The impossibility of that might also be seen in other ways in which one makes use of motion or does not make use of motion, but what we have mentioned is sufficient.” <104> The way in which one makes use of motion is based upon positing a [rotating] sphere from whose center there emerges a diameter, [pq], that is parallel to some infinite line [rs]. After having been parallel, [pq] must project toward [rs] as a result of the sphere's motion. Thus it follows [that] in the line [rs] there exists some first point [t] towards which the diameter [pq] is projecting. {191} It is impossible, however, that [some first point, t] exist [in the infinite line, rs] because before every point there exists some [different and prior] point towards which [pq] is projecting. Thus a contradiction follows.⁴¹

40 Amulī reads *tālī* (subsequent), while Dunyá reads *thānī* (second).

41 This argument appears in both Avicenna, *Physics of the Cure*, 11.8 [8] and *Najāt*, “Physics,” 11.10, “On Place,” pp. 241–242, where he discusses the impossibility of an infinite void. For a discussion of this argument see McGinnis (2007).

The way in which one does not make use of motion is based upon mapping (*taṭbīq*) onto an infinite line, [which is limited] on one side but not the other,⁴² what remains of [the line] after separating off a certain amount of it from that side on which it is limited.⁴³ Clearly it is impossible for the two to be equal, owing to the impossibility of the part's being equal to the whole, whereas it is impossible to fall short (*tafāwut*) on the side on which they are limited, owing to the posit that there is a mapping onto [one another]. Hence a contradiction follows from the necessity that they are finite on the side with respect to which the two are infinite. Both are well known.⁴⁴

• • •

<Appendix 2: Mullā Ṣadrā's commentary on the *Hidāya*>⁴⁵

<110>, {65} You know well that the aim of the preceding chapter [viz., "On Establishing Matter"] is nothing but establishing matter, whereas the aim of this chapter is the necessity of its having form. Thus, the issue there is [whether] "matter is something established," just as the heading indicates, or, "every body is a composite of matter and form." Here it is [whether] "matter is not separated from form." What, then, is this compared with that? The claim that the two have one and same intention—as occurred to the author of the *Muḥākīmāt* [*bayn Sharḥay al-Ishārāt*, namely, al-Taḥṭānī] and others—is unsatisfying. Certainly, the final end of what is said is that the form's essentially being something that needs matter entails the impossibility of its being stripped from matter. In that case, that should not be made an independent

42 For example, think of an infinite ray extending from the Earth into the far reaches of space or, to give a numeric example, think of the positive integers starting from 0 toward $+\infty$.

43 The argument is just that of al-Kindī, mentioned in fn. 8.

44 Āmulī glosses "both" as referring to the two sides; however, "both" could just as easily refer to the two impossibilities just noted or, as I suspect, to the two arguments of this section, namely, a proof for the finitude of space using motion and the other not using motion.

45 Ṣadr al-Dīn Shirāzī [Mullā Ṣadrā], *Sharḥ al-hidāyat al-Athīriyya*, selection from *Qism* 2.3, "That the corporeal form cannot be stripped from matter." My initial translation was based upon Fülādkār's edition, which is wanting in several places. Since completing my translation, I was made aware of a new edition of Mullā Ṣadrā's text edited by M. Muḥammad-i, which is far superior. The current translation is based upon Muḥammad-i's edition, with references to Fülādkār. Additionally, I consulted a 19th century Indian Lithograph of the text (pp. 125–131). Page numbers to Muḥammad-i's text are given in angel brackets, <>, while those to Fülādkār are given in curly brackets, {}. Bold text refers to the base text of al-Abhari's *Hidāya*.

future aim; rather, its explanation is transformed into that which was mentioned thereafter. The excuse for it can be that the goal {66} is to establish it through a proof different from the one that was mentioned in order to introduce a significant benefit, namely, the finitude of intervals.

From that it is also understood that [being] finite, subject to shape and other things like those happen to belong to the body only by reason of its containing material. <111> [That] is “because if it were to exist through itself without its being in the matter as in a substrate, then either it is finite or infinite. The second [option, namely that it is infinite] comes to naught because all bodies,” (in fact [all] intervals) “are finite. Otherwise, it would be possible that from a single starting point [a] two extensions [ab and ac] emerge uniformly like the two legs of a triangle and whenever they became greater in size, the interval between them would increase. Thus if [ab and ac] were extended infinitely, it would be possible for there to be an infinite interval in between them, despite [that interval’s] being bounded between two boundaries [namely, ab and ac]. This is a contradiction.”

Know that since the author [i.e., al-Abhārī] talked about establishing matter and explained the composition of bodies from material and form, he wanted to explain the verification of the necessary connection between them in that each one of them is essentially not separated from the other. The demonstration upon which the impossibility of form’s being separated from material is based rests on the finitude of intervals. Hence there is no need to provide a demonstration [of that proposition] for body (*jirm*). [That is] because the insertion of this issue—which belongs to the physical inquiry into the essential accidents of the natural body inasmuch as it contains matter—explained the establishment of matter and the manner of the necessary connection. Both of [these issues] belong to the above book on account of what we mentioned.

Know that this demonstration is derived from the ancient philosophers, being nicknamed the “Ladder Demonstration” (*burhān sullamī*). It is not the “Armored Demonstration” (*burhān tursī*), which is based on six equilateral triangles and angles each one of which is two thirds of a right [triangle, i.e., 60°], the clarification of which is in need of long geometrical premises. Its [i.e., the Ladder Demonstration’s] affirmation is in that you say if the extension of the substantial form were infinite, it would be possible that the infinite⁴⁶ be bounded⁴⁷ between two boundaries. Now the truth of the opposite of the consequent⁴⁷ entails the falseness of the [initial] premise. The manner of the entailment is that if there turned out to be an infinite (spatial) interval, then there

46 Fūlādkār simply has *mutanāhiya* (finite), which clearly is a mistake.

47 Fūlādkār has *al-thānī* (the second).

could exist two legs of a triangle [ab and ac], which emerged from some starting point [a] vanishing into infinity. It is known that the greater the two legs are in size, the more the separation [between them] is. Hence, the possibility of the separation <112> increases through the increase of the two legs. Now it is known that when the two legs are infinite, vanishing and separating, the interval between the two legs is infinite. In that case, the infinite interval is bounded between two boundaries,⁴⁸ namely, the two legs. This is absurd.

In the *Cure* the Sheik [i.e., Avicenna] raises an objection against [the argument] by not conceding the existence of the infinite interval between the two lines, even though the two lines' capacity to increase (*tazāyud*) is infinite with respect to the interval between them.⁴⁹ [This is the case] since it does not follow from the capacity to increase infinitely with respect to the interval that an interval exists [whose] increase is infinite.⁵⁰ Instead every interval that was posited increases a finite interval below it only by a finite amount. To increase the finite by the finite is nothing but a finite, just as the series of numbers is capable of increasing infinitely {67} despite the fact that any point on the infinite [number] line is finite, increasing whatever is below it only by one.

Thereafter [Avicenna] affirmed the aforementioned demonstration by positing on the two lines that goes to infinity two points opposite one another and a line connecting the two, which is the intersecting hypotenuse (*watar*) of the angle, designating the base as the "interval". Now, the traversing lines are ultimately infinite (*khuṭūṭ 'arḍīya akhir ghayr mutanāhiya*) increasingly increase the base in a single way so that infinite increases show up in that interval as some infinitely existing thing. Those latter increases are equivalent such that there follows the existence of a single interval containing the whole of those infinite equivalent increases to the initial⁵¹ interval on account of each increase existing in some interval. Thus [the increases] do exist in whatever is beyond, and the interval, which contains <113> the infinite equivalent increases, increases the initial interval infinitely. In that case, it is infinite, and so a contradiction follows.

The author of the *Muḥākamāt* [i.e., al-Taḥṭānī] mentioned in [that work] an example of what was mentioned in the preceding affirmation to resist the existence of an interval that contains those infinite increases and instead [that] every one of the steps of the increases only increases the step below it by a

48 Fūlādkār has *ḥādīrayni* (two present moments).

49 See Avicenna, *Physics*, 3.8 (6).

50 Literally, "an existence of an interval increasing infinitely" (*wujūd bu'd zā'id ghayr mutanāh*^m).

51 Fūlādkār has *al-aṣlī* (original).

unit increase. Additionally, [he also mentioned the view of some folks that] whether the increases are equal or they gradually decrease makes no difference to the proof of what is intended, since if an interval that contained the infinite increases showed up, that interval would be infinite, whether the increase were equal or gradually decreasing, and so there is no advantage to positing the equality of the increases.

He responded to the allegation that when the ratio of the increase of the interval to the increase of the interval is either like the ratio of the number of increases to the number of increases (a whole due to its like), or like the ratio of the number of intervals to the number of intervals (likewise where the increases are posited as equal), then when the number of the sum of increases equal to the first is infinite, the existence of an interval that contains those infinite increases follows by means of the judgment of the proportionality of four terms. The ratio is preserved only when the increases are posited as equal, whereas when they are gradually decreasing, then [it is] not, owing to lack of the ratio's being preserved⁵² and so the contradiction does not follow. Also, what they introduced to the well-known demonstration of proportionality to undermine the school of [Ibrāhīm] al-Nazzām (d. c. 221/845) would no longer apply.⁵³ [What they introduced] prohibited the ratio of increases to increases to be like the ratio of the number of increases to number of increases, since the first involves ratios of magnitudes, which may⁵⁴ possibly be rigid objects (*ṣammā'*), <114> while the second involves ratios of number concerning which that is not possible. [That is] because inasmuch as the posited increases are equal and every increase has some magnitude, the increase of the increases [then] increases the magnitude of the sum according to the ratio of the number of increases. Hence the ratio of increase to increase is like the ratio of number to number, but there is no rigid objects. This is what is said at the conclusion of the *Muḥākimāt's* discussion.

I say: a gap⁵⁵ in his discussion remains open, namely that the inference [to] the whole sum (*al-kull al-majmū'*) from each of {68} the individuals (*al-kull al-afrādī*) is invalid. So, from [the fact that] a ratio of every increase of some interval to an increase of some other interval is like the ratio of the number of

52 Fülādkār has *inkhifāḍ* (geometric decrease).

53 The reference is to Avicenna, *Ishārāt, namaṭ* 1, chapter 2, and the accompanying commentaries, which is addressed specifically to Nazzām's theory that bodies are composed of an actually infinite number of parts.

54 *Qad* omitted in the Indian lithograph and Fülādkār.

55 Mullā Ṣadrā is punning, since the word "gap" (*bu'd*) is also the same word used for "interval" (*bu'd*).

increases existing in it to the number of increases existing in that other one, there does not follow a confirmation of some interval whose ratio of increase to an increase of another interval is like the ratio of the infinite number of increases to a number of finite increases such that the aforementioned contradiction follows. [That follows] since an interval may not be in a one-to-one correspondence (*bi-izā'i*) with the sum of multiple numeric increases (*majmū' a'dād ziyādāt*), even though it is in a one-to-one correspondence with each single numeric increase (*kull 'adad ziyāda*) of an interval.

It might then be said: The sum of multiple numeric increases' being in an interval is not explained by⁵⁶ each single numeric increase's being in an interval to the point of deflecting the impossibility. Instead, its being in an interval is explained by⁵⁷ each single numeric increase's being in an interval, where the ratio of that interval to the other interval is like the ratio of that number to the increases that existed in it. It also holds true of the sum of the number of infinite increases that it is a single numeric increase. Then [from all that] necessarily [a single numeric increase] would be in some interval, where there is a ratio to a finite interval like the ratio of the infinite number to the finite number.

[To this] we say: If one meant by⁵⁸ "each single numeric increase's being in an interval" that the number is finite, then it is conceded⁵⁹ that each finite numeric increase is in an interval according to the previously mentioned ratio. From [that concession], however, it does not follow that the infinite number of increase is in an interval. If one meant an absolute numeric increase, whether finite or infinite, we do not concede that each numeric increase is in an interval. How could the universal be conceded <115> from the impossibility of the particular? If this premise were established, it would be hampered in establishing this thing that is sought.

It might be said: It is more fitting that the aforementioned demonstration affirms that initially two legs of a triangle be posited vanishing to infinity and in the separation between the two an infinity of intervals capable of increase above the base interval be posited increasing it. In that case, an infinity of equal increases to the base interval will be there and an infinity of intervals able to surpass a single measure, and consequently⁶⁰ every increase and a whole sum of increases occurs in a certain one of those intervals. [That follows], since

56 Fūlādkār has *yakūna* ("which is...").

57 Again, Fūlādkār has *yakūna* ("which is...").

58 Once more Fūlādkār has *yakūna* ("which is...").

59 Fūlādkār has *mamnū'* (it is impossible).

60 Fūlādkār has *fa-inna* (so indeed).

were it not the case, it would follow that there exists an interval that [both] contains the set of increases below it and does not contain them, and on top of the one that increases it there would be another interval above it; however, there is no body other than the separating intervals. This is a contradiction. Consequently, then, every increase and the whole sum of increases, whatever sum it was, is in some interval above [that increase or that sum of increases]. Hence the sum of infinite increases is in some single interval above them. In that case, an actual infinity bounded between two boundaries would have come to be. Additionally, the two legs would have come to be finite vis-à-vis that interval as everyone knows. Hence what is sought is established correctly and the contradiction is complete.

This [is one way], but you know that the previously mentioned impossibility has not fallen away and some of the learned have another explanation concerning the Ladder Demonstration.⁶¹ It is that we posit through [both] what intersects each width line and at the same time one of the [triangle's] two legs a line parallel to the other leg [see figure 14.3], so that there comes to be an infinity⁶² of parallels {69} <which marks off an infinity of surfaces>⁶³ on the side of the width. When the infinite number of surfaces in the width⁶⁴ delimiting the width is added to the surface magnitude itself, it necessitates the unlimited width of the whole, but the width is a width bounded between two boundaries.




FIGURE 14.3 *Diagram from the ḥāshiyā of the Indian Lithograph*

61 While the accompanying figure is not found in Mullā Ṣadrā's text, it is based upon one found in the *ḥāshiyā* of the Indian lithograph, which I believe accurately conveys the construction that Mullā Ṣadrā has in mind.

62 Fūlādkār adds *bi-fi'l*, (actual).

63 *Tafrizu suṭūḥ^{an} ghayr mutanāhiya* omitted in Fūlādkār.

64 Fūlādkār has *gharaḍ* (goal).

It is said: it is well known that this way is complete only if the angle of the two lines passing into ∞ is acute so that each column based on the parallels is intersected by the [triangle's] other leg. In that case, it follows that what is not limited by two borders is bounded. As for when it is a right [angle], the previously mentioned width columns are parallel to the other leg. In that case, it does not follow that [it] is bounded and so the proof is incomplete. In the separation, it is more obvious.

I say that I do not concede the existence of infinitely [many] surfaces in the width, even if the angle is assumed to be acute. That follows only if between the two legs there exists a hypotenuse (*watar*)⁶⁵ that passes beyond all of those surfaces, which is impossible. [That follows] since every hypotenuse that is posited at one or another of its two sides terminates at a starting point of one of the parallel lines and above the line that is the hypotenuse there are inevitably infinitely [many] lines through those parallels none of which [the hypotenuse] encounters, but [they are] not though the surfaces occurring between them, as is well known.

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65 Strictly speaking, Mullā Ṣadrā means a transversal.

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Translation of Mullā Ṣadrā's The Traveler's Provision (*Zād al-Musāfir*)

Eiyad S. al-Kutubi

Introduction

The fate of human beings was usually discussed by Muslim theologians and philosophers under the title of “the Return” (*al-ma‘ād*),¹ a topic frequently mentioned in the Qur’ān and one of the fundamental beliefs of Islam. It means that human beings will continue their lives after death as individuals, and their lives after death, as it is described in the Qur’ān and *ḥadīth*, mostly are identical to that they have experienced before death. Muslim philosophers and theologians accepted the Return as a revealed truth, believing in the compatibility of revealed truth and reason and generally thinking that there is no contradiction between them, and they directed their investigations into its nature and how it would be actualized. They based their explanations of the nature of the afterlife on their understanding of the human nature, which is primarily the prevalent view inherited from the Greek, namely, that the human being is composed of two components: Soul and body. The difference between these components is that the soul is immaterial and naturally indestructible while the body, the carrier of the soul, is material and corruptible. Thus, the dominant views among Muslim philosophers concerning the afterlife are: (1) individuals continue their lives in virtue of their souls after the death of the body. This view is generally discussed under the title of spiritual return (*al-ma‘ād*

1 *Ma‘ād* means: a place or time to/in which a person or a thing returns. Muslim theologians and philosophers used it to signify the final state of being in the world to come. It is used only once in the Qur’ān in its literal meaning: a place: “He who imposed the Qur’ān upon you will assuredly return you to a place (*ma‘ād*).” (28:85), that is “Mecca.” It is a promise from God to Muḥammad to enable him to return to Mecca after he was forced to leave it, or it refers to a return to the “paradise” after his death. See al-Rāghib al-Isfahānī, *Mufradāt alfāz al-Qur’ān*, edited by Ṣafwān ‘Adnān Dāwūdī, (Beirut: Dār al-Qalam, 1997), 594, and Muhammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr al-Ṭabarī: Jami‘ al-bayān ‘an ta’wīl āy al-Qur’ān*, 25 volumes, edited by ‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Abd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī, (Cairo: Dar Hajr, 2001), 20: 79–81.

al-rūḥānī); (2) afterlife includes both the soul and body by reuniting the soul with either a new created body or with its resurrected body.

The Persian philosopher Šadr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Qawāmī al-Shirāzī (1571–1640 or 1635 CE),² commonly called Mullā Šadrā, rejected both views and considered them as a far-fetched interpretations of the Return that contradict the teaching of the Qur'ān and introduced a novel theory that explains how the afterlife is a continued existence of the present life. He is one of the central figures in the history of Islamic philosophy. He lived in a period in which Islamic philosophy (specifically Avicennian philosophy) underwent a substantial development because of the influence of two trends of thought: the philosophy of illumination that is introduced by Suhrawardī (1157–1191 CE), and the theoretical mysticism, especially that of Ibn 'Arabī (1164–1240 CE) and his followers who elaborate on his thought and presented it systematically and infused it with philosophical terminology, chief among them are Šadr al-Dīn al-Qawnawī, 'Abd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī, and Dawūd al-Qayṣarī. Hence, Islamic philosophy took quite different turn in term of its subjects and terminology in the thirteen century and this new way of doing philosophy becomes apparent at the time of Mullā Šadrā whose philosophy is the best representative of that transformation. His philosophy is a development of the thought of Avicenna, Suhrawardī, and Ibn 'Arabī, but he departs from them in three respects: Firstly, he was able to integrate the Qur'ān, *ḥadīth* and the assertions of the mystics, especially those of Ibn 'Arabī, into philosophical discussions, giving his philosophy a unique flavor. This, of course, is a reflection of his educational background, that is, although he studied philosophy (especially the works of Avicenna and Suhrawardī) he was also trained in religious sciences, which is commonly called transmitted sciences (*al-'ulūm al-naqlīyya*). His main teacher in this regard is al-Shaykh Bahā' al-Dīn al-'Āmilī; the chief jurist then of the Safavid empire and a well-known mystic.³ This explains Šadrā's rejection of speculative philosophy as the primary source for understanding of reality and the nature of human beings as many Muslim philosophers have maintained. He accused his predecessors of neglecting revelation (Qur'ān and *ḥadīth*) and focusing on theoretical speculations even though "discursive reasoning cannot

2 For life and works of Mullā Šadrā, see Sajjad H. Rizvi, *Mullā Šadrā Shirāzī: His Life and Works and the Sources for Safavid Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), and Muhammad Khāminahī, *Mullā Šadrā: zindaqī, shakhsīyyat va maktab-i Šadr-i muta'allihīn* (Tehran: SIPRI, 2000).

3 For this period of Mullā Šadrā's life see Rizvi, *Mullā Šadrā Shirāzī*, pp. 8–10.

grasp what is beyond the sensory world ... [and] the affairs of the hereafter.”⁴ For Mullā Ṣadrā, one must consider what the Qur’ān and *ḥadīth* say about issues that philosophers discussed, such as existence, change, and the nature of human beings, because they (the Qur’ān and *ḥadīth*) provide insight about these vital metaphysical issues that might change our perspectives. He was also deeply influenced by the theoretical mysticism of Ibn ‘Arabī and his school that had led him into adopting a mystical approach to reality and considered it as a complementary source of knowledge to speculative philosophy (but not the only source as the mystics maintained) without which one cannot comprehend reality. Moreover, his approach to the Qur’ān is different. While previous philosophers adopted symbolic interpretation of the Qur’ān, he insists on literal understanding of the Qur’anic verses that describe the hereafter. He affirms that all sensible descriptions of the hereafter in the Qur’ān are not figurative; rather, these descriptions literally reflect the nature of the hereafter. He agreed that the Qur’ān used metaphors (*amthāl*) to convey meanings and concepts but he explains this usage in a different manner. From a linguistic point of view, Ṣadrā explains that allegorical expressions in the Qur’ān are not arbitrary because our experiences after death are based on what we have experienced in our worldly material life. Hence, words and expressions the Qur’ān used in describing the hereafter must literally signify things that exist both in this life and the hereafter. This is because “whatever God created in this world has an equivalent in the intellectual world (*‘ālam al-ma’nā*), and everything He created in the intellectual world, which is the next world (*al-ākhirā*), has a reality in the Divine World (*‘ālam al-ḥaqq*).”⁵ For instance, the word ‘apple’ denotes a fruit of certain color, shape, and taste. Since the apple has simultaneous levels of existence, its signification is not limited to the material external existence we had encountered in our material lives; rather, it also refers to its other levels of existence among which is the existence of the hereafter. Therefore, Ṣadrā avows that words and expressions, such as “Paradise”, “Hell”, “castles”, “rivers”, “fruits” that the Qur’ān used to describe the nature of the hereafter are not figurative expressions and any attempt to reinterpret them will distort their real intended meanings.⁶

4 Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī, *Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-karīm*, edited by Muḥammad Khwājavi, 7 volumes (Iran/Qom: Intisharat-i Bidāfir, 1361 H.S.), 2: 239.

5 Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Shīrāzī *Mafātīḥ al-ghayb*. 2 volumes. Edited by Najafqulī Ḥabībī. (Tehran: SIPRI Publication, 2003) 1: 87. It must be noted here that Mullā Ṣadrā adopted this idea from Ghazālī. See Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *Jawāhir al-Qur’ān*, edited by Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā al-Qabbānī, (Beirut: Dar Ihyā’ al-Ulūm, 1990), 48–52.

6 *Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-karīm*, 5: 66.

Secondly, he presented a number of cardinal interconnected philosophical theories such as the primacy of existence, gradation of existence, substantial motion, and the principle of individuation. The main factor that helped Mullā Šadrā to introduce new theories in metaphysics, epistemology, and psychology is his new approach to philosophy, as mentioned above, and his usage of certain mystical concepts and theories of Ibn 'Arabī and his school in a philosophical discussion. He formulated the conclusions of these theories and presented them as principles (*uṣūl* or *mabādī*). These principles became the backbone of his philosophy, through which he presented new perspectives concerning the metaphysical understanding of reality and the nature of the human being. Thirdly, he was able to employ these interconnected principles in discussing certain philosophical and theological issues that had occupied Muslim philosophers for centuries, central among which is the belief in the afterlife.

Šadrā has discussed and presented these philosophical principles in many of his works, but his presentation of these principles varies according to the purpose and the scope of each of his works. He presented the longest versions in his major work *al-Asfār al-arba'a*⁷ and then he devoted his short treatise *Zād al-musāfir* (the Traveler's Provision) solely for presenting these principle so that the reader will have a synopsis of all his major premises and is able to grasp their logical order. He also mentioned shorter versions of these principle in his other shorter works such as *al-Mabda' wa-al-ma'ād*, *Shawāhid al-rubūbiyya*, *al-Ḥikma al-'arshīyya*, *Mafātiḥ al-ghayb*, and *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-karīm*. In all of these works, the number and the order of these principles are varied. Although, Mullā Šadrā's goal in writing *Zād al-musāfir* is to present a complete version of his premises, he mentioned in his other work (*al-ḥikma al-'arshīyya*) three other principles that are not included in *Zād al-musāfir*.

These principles (*uṣūl*) are condensed versions of Šadrā's conclusions concerning central issues in metaphysics, psychology, and epistemology. He presented these perspectives as fundamental premises for one long argument toward articulating the meaning of the Return and solving the problem of bodily resurrection. Here is a summary of the principles Šadrā presented in *Zād al-Musāfir*, followed by 3 other principles which he mentioned in other works:

7 Šadr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ibrahīm al-Shirāzī, *al-Ḥikma al-muta'āliyah fi 'l-asfār al-'aqliya al-arba'a*, 9 volumes, edited by Luṭf Allah al-Šafi, (Tehran: al-Maktaba al-Islamiyya, 1981), 9: 185–194. (Henceforth *Asfār*).

1. The reality of each thing is its own specific existence, not its essence.
2. The existence and individuation are essentially one, but they are different only in name and consideration.
3. Existence essentially admits of being stronger and weaker.
4. Existence is receptive to intensity and weakness and the substance in its substantiality is receptive to essential transformation and substantial motion.
5. The form in every composite thing is the principle of its reality by which it is what it is.
6. The being of the body and its individuation is by its soul, not by its material mass.
7. The imaginative faculty is a substance such that its existence is not dependent on the body or any of its organs, and it does not exist in any place in this natural material world.
8. The imaginative form (*al-ṣūra al-khayālīyya*) does not inhere in the soul. Rather, the imaginative form subsists by the soul just like the subsistence of the act by the doer.
9. Vision does not take place by imprinting the visible image in an organ such as the cornea or something similar, as the materialists believe. Rather, vision occurs by creating a form that is identical to the form that exists extra-mentally.
10. The worlds and instantiations are many but existence is one.
11. Mankind has a peculiar status in that it is possible for one of its members to have many instantiations one before the other, but in spite of that its individuality remains the same.
12. The cause of death is the soul's perfection.
13. God has created the soul in such a way that it is able to create forms that are hidden from the material senses.
14. Conceptions, habits, and firmly rooted dispositions (*malakāt*) lead to external effects.
15. The individual unity of each thing, which is its own existence, is not of one degree.

These premises fall into three categories: metaphysical, Psychological, and epistemological. Premises 1, 2, and 3 present Ṣadrā's theory of primacy of existence and its gradation. The theory of primacy of existence is the backbone of Ṣadrā's entire metaphysics and the basis of the remaining of his principles. The one fundamental idea that fascinated Ṣadrā and was the main thrust of his life's work was the conception of existence as the reality that underlies all beings. In Ṣadrā's metaphysics, existence ceases to be a mere concept in the

mind. Rather, existence is a concrete reality that constitutes the makeup of every being and configures it as a moment of its continuous unfolding.

Premises 2, 5, 6, 11, and 15 present Mullā Šadrā's theory of individuation. He highlights in these premises many aspects of his theory and how it is related to the individual existence. Šadrā discussed the subject of individuation at length in many of his works because he recognized its significant role in explicating the status of the human being in terms of its relationship with its primordial source to which it will return. He shows how the individuality of beings is determined by their existential modes; not by an external factor. In case of the human individual, he maintained that his whole being determines his individuality and any attempt to envision the individuality through one of its presumed components, such as its accidents, matter, soul, or body is incoherent and inadequate.

Premise 4 represents Šadrā's theory of substantial motion. The principle of "substantial motion" indicates that although existence is primarily what constitutes the reality of each existent and through which each retains its individuality and identity, it is a subject of constant fundamental change that transforms it from one level of existence to another. Then Šadrā proceeds to show that although existence is the principle of individuality, it is also of a dynamic nature, for he maintains that there must be motion in its existence that explains its modulation. Every natural object undergoes change, and this change occurs in the heart of its substance, even if it is accidental change, since accidents do not have an independent existence of their own. Thus, all kinds of change are primarily substantial, and the traditional division of change into accidental and substantial disappears. This is a significant departure from of the standard view that envisions the change that human beings are subjected to is only an accidental change that does not change the nature of his substance (the soul).

The above-mentioned theories, namely, the primacy of existence, the principle of individuation, and substantial motion (change) constitute the basis upon which Šadrā articulated his psychology and epistemology. Premises (7) (8) (9) (12) (13) and (14) present Šadrā's understanding of human physical and psychological development together with his theory of human perception and imagination.

Premises 5, 6, and 12 represent Mullā Šadrā understanding of the nature of the soul of the human being in the light of his theory of substantial motion (or change). In Šadrā's conception of substantial motion, the problem of the relationship between soul and body disappears, since his theory requires that the soul be bodily in origination and spiritual in subsistence.⁸ The human being's

⁸ See *Asfār*, 8: 374–348.

existence starts with matter and as it moves gradually, it becomes a rational being after it traverses the vegetative and animal levels. This movement is in the very existence of the human being, not something added to its stable reality. For Ṣadrā, the unity of the soul, despite its various faculties, means that the soul in its movement becomes itself the faculties of sensation, imagination, and reasoning. As the soul at its beginning is the body, the powers or faculties of the soul in traditional philosophy are not the soul's tools that it leaves behind when its earthy existence comes to an end; rather they are modes of its graded existence. Premises 8, and 9 represents Mullā Ṣadrā's theory of knowledge in general and his understanding of the nature of imagination and its role in the existential development of the human beings. Probably, Mullā Ṣadrā's understanding of the imagination as the second level of human becoming represents a significant step toward understanding imagination that goes beyond the views of earlier philosophers and mystics. Muslim philosophers had emphasized the importance of imagination in human psychology, but they presented it as a faculty of the soul that is conditioned with the presence of a material body. The mystics on the other hand, specifically Ibn 'Arabī and his followers, stressed the authenticity of imagination and connected it with a world of imagination but without explicating the nature of this connection. Ṣadrā identified imagination not as a faculty of the soul or a mediator for the world of imagination but as the basis of human psychological development and fused it with the modality of existence. For him perception, whether it is sensible, imaginative, or intellectual, is being. Perhaps Ṣadrā's most significant contribution toward solving the problem of bodily resurrection begins with his identification of imagination as the second level of human existential development. Thus, although the material body is subjected to corruption and disappearance, it is preserved in a higher mode of existence which Mullā Ṣadrā identified it with the imaginative and intellectual modes in the hereafter.

What follows is a translation of Mullā Ṣadrā's short treatise *Zād al-Musāfir* (The Traveler's Provision) which he wrote to function as a synopsis of the long argument of his theory of the nature of afterlife and his view concerning the problem of bodily resurrection (*al-ma'ād al-jismānī*). I have tried to be as literal as possible and at the same time to present a readable version of the essay in Standard English. The version I used is that of Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī which he edited and published with his long commentary in *Sharḥ bar Zād al-musāfir*.⁹ For the sake of presenting a comprehensive version of Ṣadrā's philosophical principles, I have included at the end of the essay other three principles that Ṣadrā did not include in *Zād al-Musāfir*, but he mentioned them in other

9 Jalāl al-Dīn Āshtiyānī, *Sharḥ bar Zād al-Musāfir*, (Qom: Būstān-i Kitāb, 1381 H.S.), pp. 17–25.

works. I also included in the footnotes another version of the same principle whenever I found that it more clearly conveyed Šadrā's idea.

The Traveler's Provision (*Zād al-musāfir*)

Praise to Him that from Whom is the beginning and to Whom is the return. And a blessing is upon him whose reality connects the circle of existence, whose perfection completes the arch of ascending to the Real and the worshiped, and who has the praiseworthy station (*al-maqām al-maḥmūd*),¹⁰ [I mean,] Muḥammad and his family; the people's guidance to the path of knowledge and witnessing, and the means to the gate of mercy and generosity.

Now to our topic, Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, who is called Šadr al-Dīn al-Shīrazī, and who is the least among those who adhere to God's strong rope, says: I want to mention in this essay an opinion in a concise manner that points to the verification of bodily resurrection, a subject that the scholars' discursive power was incapable of demonstrating, and the minds of the virtuous were incapable of believing except through following the traditions.¹¹ The utmost that they (the philosophers) were able to mention in verifying the status of the forms of the hereafter that are mentioned in the Qur'ān and *ḥadīth*, is that these forms either attached to heavenly bodies or to apparitional images (*ashbāḥ mithāliyya*) that appear in material manifestations (*maẓāhir māddiyya*),¹² and that these forms do not exist objectively; rather, they exist

10 This is a reference to what is commonly believed among Muslims concerning the status of the prophet Muḥammad in the Hereafter; a belief that is based on the Qur'ān and *ḥadīth*. In the Qur'ān, (17: 79): (And [Muḥammad] keep vigil in prayer for part of the night, as a supererogatory act for you. It may be that your Lord will resurrect you in a praiseworthy station). Based on *ḥadīth*, the commentators on the Qur'ān understood the "praiseworthy station" as a reference to the Muḥammad's intercession (*shafā'ah*) in the Hereafter on behalf of the believers who committed sins for the sake of forgiveness. See, *Tafsīr al-Tabarī*, 15: 43–50.

11 Mullā Šadrā refers here to Avicenna who maintained that the idea of bodily resurrection is beyond capacity of reason to demonstrate and thus must be held as an article of faith. See Avicenna, *The Metaphysics of The Healing: A Parallel English-Arabic Text*, translated, introduced and annotated by Michael E. Marmura, (Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 2005), p. 347.

12 The reference here is to the theory of Suhrawardī who maintained that "those who attained an intermediate bliss ... may escape to the world of suspending images whose locus is some of the celestial barriers. There they can and do bring images into being." See *The Philosophy of Illumination*, pp. 148–150.

only in the mind, or they are but similitudes referring to intellectual meanings rather than concrete particular forms.

Know that demonstrating this noble topic needs verifying certain principles and premises which we have mentioned them in our books of philosophy, especially in *The Four Journeys (al-Asfār al-arbaʿa)*,¹³ in a suitable elaborate manner with excellent demonstration, and sufficient explanation. But in this essay it is enough to mention them without these detailed demonstrations, seeking only to attract the hearts of the seekers and those who are thirsty for knowledge, to awaken their thought and reasoning, and to motivate their souls and the power of their thought toward seeking the truth and certainty. These are the principles:

The First [Principle]

The reality of everything is its own specific mode of existence, not its essence. What objectively exists of each thing is its mode of existence, not its thingness (*shayʿiyya*). Existence is not, as it has been mistakenly thought, one of the second intelligibles (*al-maʿqūlāt al-thāniyya*,) or it is one of the abstract concepts that do not correspond to something outside the mind. Rather, the truth is that Existence is an objective reality and, there is nothing in the mind that corresponds to it.¹⁴

The Second [Principle]

The individuality of each thing—I mean also its own specific being—is exactly its existence. The existence and individuation are essentially one, but they are different in respect of naming and [mental] consideration (*ʿitibār*). As for those that are named by the philosophers as “individuating accidents” (*al-ʿawāriḍ al-mushakkhīṣa*,) they are only concomitants and signs of the individual being. [These accidents] endure not as they are; rather, they remain the same as they are changing. For each of these accidents there is a wide range of degrees from one limit to another similar to the wide range of the variation of the temperament (*mizāj*.) It is possible for that which is completely

13 See *Asfār*, 9: 185–194.

14 Ṣadrā mentioned this premise only here and in *Asfār* 9: 161: “The existence in each thing is the root in being existent, and the essence is caused by it. The reality of each thing is its own specific mode of existence other than its essence and thingness. Existence is not, as most modern thinkers thought, among the secondary intelligibles and abstract concepts that do not correspond to things outside the mind. Rather, the right thing to say about it is that it is an objective reality without mental concept that corresponds to it, and it is not possible to point to it except by pure knowledge through witnessing.”

changed [i.e., the accident] to disappear and the individual remains the same individual, as is the case of the members of human being.

The Third [Principle]

Existence essentially admits of being stronger and weaker—that is, its reality is one, simple and has neither genus nor differentia, nor composition, whether mentally or extra—mentally. There is no difference between its members in virtue of essential or accidental differentia, or by an individualizing factor that is added to it. There is no difference between its members except in virtue of priority and posteriority, and strength and weakness. I mean, they differ in virtue of perfection and deficiency [in their existences]. But the concepts that are true of them [the individuals], which are abstracted from their different levels of strength and weakness, are different. These concepts are called “essences” (*māhiyyāt*.) That is why it is said: “the levels of strength and weakness of existence are different species.”

The Fourth [Principle]

Existence is receptive to intensity and weakness, and the substance in its substantiality is receptive to essential transformation and substantial motion. It is known that the parts and limits of one motion do not actually exist separated from each other. Rather, the whole is one existence, and none of these essences, which correspond to the existing levels, actually exists in a differentiated aspect. Rather, they exist indifferently, just like the parts of definition, as I have explained it in its place.¹⁵

The Fifth [Principle]

The form in every composite thing is the principle of its reality by which it is what it is. Matter and its motions are dependent on form [in existence]. This is also true in case of the final differentia (*al-faṣl al-akhūr*) of everything that has genus and differentia, whether it is simple essence or compound. It (the last differentia) is the principle of its being, and all that is called ranking genus (*al-aḡnās al-murattiba*) and differentiating species (*al-fuṣūl al-munawwi'a*) are its concomitants and are dependent on it. They were not brought about separately. This is also true for matters and forms of the compound essences.¹⁶

¹⁵ See *Aṣfār* 3: 81–85.

¹⁶ In *Aṣfār* 9: 162 Ṣadrā stated the relationship between matter and form as follows: “Every composite thing is what it is by its form, not by its matter. For example, a bed is bed by its form, not by its matter, a sword is sword by its sharpness not by its iron, and the animal is animal by its soul, not by its matter. Matter is only the receptacle of the thing’s

If you look at the form itself without considering its relation to matter, you find that it itself is the origin of these concomitants and their efficient cause. It is their comprehensive unity and the substantiation of their meanings and essences. Although the form needs in its origination (*ḥudūth*) many types of these concomitants that prepare its instantiation, these factors are something other than these concomitants in numbers. Generally speaking, if you look at the reality of this perfective form, you find that all these concomitants united with it and exist by it in a more delicate, simpler, and more perfect manner than their own separate existences.

The Sixth [Principle]

The being of the body and its individuation is by its soul, not by its material mass (*jirmuhu*). For example, Zayd is Zayd by his soul, not by his body. Therefore, the existence and individuation of the body continue as long as the soul remains and exists in it despite the fact that its parts have been replaced and its concomitants such as its place, quantity, quality, and time have all changed during its life span. The same is true if its material form changed into a celestial form (*ṣūra barzakhīyya*), such as in sleep (dream), and in the grave until the day of resurrection, or it is changed into a hereafter form (*ṣūra ḥkhrawīyya*) in the hereafter. The human being is the same in all these changes and transformations because these changes take place in a continuous unified manner. This is because the specific modes of its existence and its degrees along the path [of development] are not significant [for its individuation and identity]. What is significant for its subsistence is the subsistence of its soul because the soul is its perfective form (*ṣūratuhu al-tamāmiyya*) which is the principle of its being, the locus of its essence, the source of its powers, and the locus and the sustainer of its mixture and organs as long as (the individual) is a natural being. [The soul then] gradually replaces the natural material organs with spiritual organs and so on until these organs become intellectual and simple. For example, if one asks: Is Zayd's body the same body at youth, childhood, and old age? The answer from both aspects of negation and affirmation is true according to two considerations: [The first is that] it is not the same body if the body is considered to mean the material body. [The second is that] it is the same body if the body is considered to mean a body as genus. But if one ask: Whether Zayd the youth is he who was a child and then he became an adult and then an old man, or not? The answer is one: Yes.

potentiality and the subject of its activities and motion. Generally speaking the relation of matter to form is the relation between deficiency and perfection.”

The difference between matter and genus is mentioned in books of logic and in the investigation of essence in first philosophy. This difference is just like the difference between essence that is considered absolutely (*lā bi-shart*), regardless whether it is mixed or abstracted, and essence that is considered as abstracted. The same is true regarding the difference between species, form, genus, subject, accident and the accidental, self and the essential, and part and particular. All these are predicated of the thing in accordance with the first consideration but not according to the second consideration.

The Seventh [Principle]

The imaginative faculty is a substance that does not subsist by the body or by any of its organs, and it does not exist in any place in this natural material world. Rather, it is an immaterial being. It exists in an intermediary world between two worlds: the intellectual immaterial world and the material world, which is the subject of corruption. We have proved this subject in our books by clear demonstrative reasoning and by conclusive evidences. One who wishes to know them must consult these books.¹⁷

The Eighth [Principle]

The imaginative form (*al-šūra al-khayālīyya*) does not inhere in the soul. Rather, the imaginative form subsists by the soul just like the subsistence of the act by the agent, not like the subsistence of that which is received by the receiver.

The Ninth [Principle]

Vision does not take place by imprinting the visible image in an organ such as the cornea or something like that, as the materialists believe. And it is not by a light coming out [of the eye], as the mathematicians believe, nor does the soul acquire illuminative relation (*'iḍāfa ishrāqīyya*) to that which exists outside when certain conditions are fulfilled.¹⁸ All of these opinions are futile, as

¹⁷ See *Asfār*, 3: 476–487.

¹⁸ This is a reference to the three theories common at the time of Mullā Šadrā that explain the mechanism of vision (*'ibṣār*). The first is the imprinting theory which explains the vision through imprinting of an object's image in the gelatinous part of the eyeball (*al-ruṭūba al-jalīdiyya*). This theory is going back to Aristotle, and is adopted by Avicenna. The second theory explains the vision by a light that issues from the eye (extra-mission theory of vision). This theory is adopted by Plato, Galen, Euclid and al-Kindī. Probably, Mullā Šadrā has Euclid in mind when he attributed this theory to mathematicians. The third theory is that of Suhrawardī, which explains the vision through illuminative relation between the object and the agent. See Ibn Sīnā, *al-Nafs min kitāb al-Shifā'*, edited by

has been made clear in its place. Rather vision occurs by creating a form that is identical to the external form. [This created form] does not exist in a place or in this world; rather, it exists in the soul, and the soul has creative and illuminative relations to this form. This is the relation that deserves to be called illuminative relation, not that which is so called by the master of the Illuminationists (Suhrawardī) since the soul do not have any relation to the external material objects except through its connection with (its) natural material body. Every relation that takes place through this aspect (i.e., its relation to the material body) is a materialistic relation and is bounded by a place; it is not perceptive and illuminative relation. Therefore, our opinion about the relation is better and is more proper to be called an “illuminative relation.” Moreover, we have demonstrated that the material form cannot be perceived as a material form. This was a matter of disagreement between the prestigious philosophers (*mu'tabarī al-falāsifa*), and therefore they have mentioned that every perception takes place by a kind of abstraction (*tajrīd*).¹⁹

Know that the soul's vision and all its senses, as long it is in this world, are something other than its imagination because in vision and sensing the soul needs external matter and special conditions, but in imagination it does not need that. Moreover, imagination here in this life is not a vision except sometimes when it sees the imaginative forms, but when the soul departs the body's dust and when it peels itself from this shell (the body) as the snake peels off its skin, then there is no difference between vision and imagination since the imaginative faculty, which is the reservoir of the senses, becomes strong, weakness and deficiency having removed from it. The veil is removed, and all faculties united, then the soul does by the faculty of imagination what it does by other [faculties], it sees by the eye of imagination what it saw by the sensible eye, and its power, knowledge, and desires become one thing.²⁰ Its perception

Ḥasanzāda Āmulī, (Iran/Qom: Markaz al-Nashr al-tābi‘ li-Maktab al-‘Ilām al-Islāmī, 1417 AH/1375 HS), pp. 163–179, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥith al-mashriqīyya*, 2 volumes, edited by abd al-Mu‘taṣim al-Baghdadī, (Lebanon: Dār al-Kitāb al-‘Arabī, 1990), 2: 299, and Suhrawardī, *The Philosophy of Illumination*, Translation, Notes, Commentary and Introduction by John Walbridge & Hossein Ziai, (Provo, 1999), pp. 70–72.

19 *Tajrīd* is an Arabic term used by Avicenna and Muslim philosophers to denote the process by which the mind drew out the thing's form by taking off or stripping away some accidental features that are attached to it. See F. Rahman, *Avicenna's Psychology*, (Westport/CT: Hyperion Press, Inc. 1952) p. 38.

20 In *al-Risāla al-‘arshīyya*, Ṣadrā explains this activity in the fourth principle as follows: “Extended forms and shapes occur through the activity of the maker, because of the preparedness of the materials and in association with receptive conditions. But those forms may likewise occur by immediate creation (*al-ibdā’*) which is a creation through only the

of the desirable things is its ability to present them to itself. In other words, there is nothing in paradise except that which the soul desires, as the Exalted said: "In it (the paradise) all that the souls desire and the eyes delight in" (Q 43:71).

In the holy tradition (*ḥadīth qudsī*) concerning the people of paradise, says: "The angel comes and, after he greets them, he hands them a letter from God, in which [it is written]: From the Living and the Sustainer to the living and the sustainer: Now, I say to the thing "be" and it is, and I have made you to say to the thing "be" and it is." Then, the prophet, peace be upon him and upon his family, said: "Whenever a person from the inhabitants of paradise says to a thing "be", this thing becomes being."²¹

The Tenth [Principle]

The worlds and instantiations (*nasha'āt*) are many, but the house of existence (*dār al-wujūd*) is one because although the worlds are many, they are enclosed by each other and all of them are subsumed into three instantiations:

- [1.] The lowest is this material world which transforms and decays and has places and conditions. This world is the world of contradiction and competition, and it must disappear and come to an end. The same is true of everything that exists in it or has a connection with it; namely, it is followed by disappearance, disintegration, and an end.
- [2.] The intermediate world is the world of extended forms (*'ālam al-ṣuwar al-miqdāriyya*) that are separated from matter, [but] they are receptive of contraries and they are the carriers of possibilities and potentialities.
- [3.] The highest of these worlds is the world of the intellectual forms (*ṣuwar 'aqliyya*) and the divine forms (*muthul ilāhiyya*).

The first world is this material world which has neither stability nor endurance (*baqā*). The last two worlds are both enduring and have neither disappearance nor an end. One of them is divided into (two realms): (The first is) the paradise of the blissful people who are the righteous, and (the second is) the hell of the damned who are the "companions of the left hand." (Q 56: 9) The other world

maker's conception and that the maker being the efficient cause, without any association with material receptacle and its location and preparedness." The translation is of James Winston Morris, *The Wisdom of the Throne: An introduction to the Philosophy of Mulla Sadra*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1981), p. 157.

21 This presumed hadith is mentioned only by Ibn 'Arabī. See Ibn 'Arabī, *al-Futūḥāt al-makkīyya*, 4 volumes, (Beirut: Dar Ṣādir, n.d.), 3: 295. Ṣadrā also mentioned it in his *Tafsīr*, 5: 233.

is the holy world, which is the paradise of those who are the foremost in faith and the proximate to God, and it is the goal of the archetypal angels.

The Eleventh [Principle]

The human being, among many types of creatures, is peculiar in that it is possible for one of its members to have many instantiations one before the other, but in spite of that his individuality remains the same. A single human being has at the beginning of his childhood a material being according to which he is a human being, and then his (material) existence gradually moves and becomes pure and subtle until he acquires a hereafter psychic being (*kawn ukhrawī nafsānī*) in which he possesses psychic organs. This is the second human being. Then, it is possible that he moves from this (psychic) being and acquires an intellectual being according to which he is an intellectual human being (*insān ‘aqlī*) that possesses intellectual organs. This is called the third human being, as the master of the philosophers (i.e., Aristotle) mentioned in the book of Theology (*Uthūlūjiā*).²²

Know that although a human being acquires these two worlds (the psychic and intellectual worlds) after being a material being, these two worlds were in his possession before this origination (*hudūth*). Plato affirmed that the human soul has intellectual instantiation before the origination of this body. It also has been established in our true religion that for human individuals there is a particular and distinguished existence (*kaynūna juz’iyya mutamayyiza*) before their material existence, as the Exalted said: “When your Lord took from the Children of Adam their descendants from their loins and made them bear witness over themselves, [He Said to them:] Am I not your Lord? They said ‘Yes indeed! We bear witness. [This,] lest you should say on the Day of Rising, ‘indeed we were unaware of this’” (Q7: 172). And there are many traditions from our Imams, peace is upon them, that point to this understanding. These traditions point to the fact that the Imams’ souls were created from the sublime clay (*tīnat ‘līyīn*) before the creation of heaven and earth, and that their bodies were created from clay that is lower in rank than that one. In the same manner, the souls of their followers were created from the clay of Imams’ bodies, and the hearts of their opponents were created from clay of *sijjīn* and the hearts of their followers were created from the clay of their bodies.²³ This tradition,

22 See abd al-Rahmān Badawī, ed., *Uthūlūjiā: Aflūṭīn ‘ind al-‘Arab*, reprint edition, (Qum: Intishārāt-i Bidār, 1413 AH), pp. 142–158.

23 See Muḥammad Bāqir al-Majlisī, *Bihār al-anwār*, 110 volumes, (Beirut: Dār al-Wafā’, 1982), 25: 8 (*ḥadīth* no. 12). For other traditions that deal with this subject see *Ibid.*, 1–34.

and other similar to it, is explicit in pointing to the fact that there is a previous instantiation of the human being before the material instantiation.

The Twelfth [Principle]

It must be known that the meaning of the necessity of death and its being a natural (event) is not as the materialists and the physicians have asserted; that is, since the bodily powers are limited in their actions and reactions, annihilation must take place. For it is possible that a bodily power continues performing unlimited activities through renewal of the Divine assistance. This answer is applied too for other proofs that are based on the necessity of depletion of the (bodily) power and its expiration. Rather, the cause of death is the soul's gradual perfection and its (becoming) independent in existence. The soul through its (substantial) motion and its natural endeavor moves toward another world, and when it gradually becomes stronger and its existence becomes another mode of existence, its connection with this (physical) body is severed and is replaced by another body that is acquired in accordance with its moral conduct and its psychic state. Thus, what first essentially occurs to it is a second life that accidentally causes the disappearance of the first (material) life. Thus, death occurs accidentally, not essentially; otherwise, it has no point since it entails that nothingness is something natural, whereas [in fact], everything is moving toward perfection and is travelling toward the active principle. But those who end their journey at the ultimate goal are but a few individuals and they are only from among human species; not from other species (i.e., plants and animals). If it is supposed that some other species arrived through its laborious and continuous movement at the Divine Realm (*al-ḥaḍra al-ilāhīyya*), then it must necessarily arrive first at the gate of humanity and then from it (move) toward the Holy Realm (*al-ḥaḍra al-qudsīyya*). This is because the reality of the human being is God's gate through which He is approached.

Generally speaking, since a human being, from the start of its origination and becoming, is in (a states of) existential renewal, substantial intensity, and innate orientation toward the hereafter, and then toward the Holy Realm, it is necessary that it, through the essential transformation and substantial intensity, arrive at a degree of existence in which it detaches itself from the worldly natural body and becomes free and sufficient by itself with no need for that [body] to occupy all or part of its faculties. Thus, the individual's existence is transformed into the hereafter existence (*wujūd ukhrawī*) since the relation of this life to the hereafter is the [same as] the relation of deficiency to perfection, and the relation of a child to an adult. A human being as long as it is a material being is like a child who needs, due to the weakness of its existence and the deficiency of its substance, a cradle which is the body, and to a place

which is temporal world (*dunyā*), and to a carrier (*dābba*) which is time. When it reached its substantial limit and arrived at its utmost formal hereafter intensity, it departs this house to the house of stability.

This degree of substantiality, actuality, and independence is common to the believer and nonbeliever, to the monotheist and polytheist, the one who denies God's attributes, and many animals that have the faculty of imagination in actuality. There is no contradiction between the existential perfection and substantial independency and the misery and punishment in hell fire, the painful chastisement, the eating from the tree of "*zaqqūm*" (Q37: 62; 44:43; 56: 52), and drinking the boiling water (Q6: 70; 10:4; 38: 57). Rather, it confirms it because the strength of existence and its intensification and departing from material bodies certainly cause intensification of perceiving the agony and the suffering from the psychological diseases that had been forgotten due to the numbness of nature and the veil on the insight (*baṣīra*). When the veil is lifted, chastisement arrives. And "in the morning the travelers would appreciate their night journey".²⁴

The ancient philosophers mentioned that the definition of human being is: "the substance that senses, speaks, and dies." They have regarded death as the part that completes the definition of human being. The meaning of death here is not nothingness; rather, its meaning is part of the returning motion toward the final goal—I mean, the transference from this life to the hereafter. Thus, in this sense death is a natural event that necessitates the annihilation of the material body. This is because every mover, unless it passes all the supposed limits that exist between the beginning and the end of the road, cannot reach the end and the ultimate goal. The human being, unless he departs from this life and passes all the natural limits, and then the psychic limits, will not reach the vicinity of God, and he will not deserve the station of servitude. Death is the first station of the hereafter and the last degree of the material life. Death is like an isthmus (*barzakh*) between two poles and a barrier between two houses: the house of the material life and the house of the hereafter. Perhaps a human being after departing this life will become prisoned in one of the intermediary worlds for a long or short time. He might ascend quickly through the light of knowledge, the power of pious deeds, the divine attraction, or intercession of the intercessors. The last who will intercedes is the most merciful, as it is narrated in the tradition.

These are principles and laws which we have explained and discussed detail and that we have firmly established by luminous demonstrations and by

24 This is an Arabic proverb which means: after reaching a goal, the hard work would be appreciated.

conclusive evidences in our books, especially in *"The Four Journeys."* A person who deeply contemplates them and has a pure nature devoid of deviation from that which is right, rejecting envy, stubbornness, and obstinacy, will have no doubt concerning the issue of the Return and the belief that this body itself will be resurrected in the hereafter in the form of the bodies.

This topic (The Return) is the best of knowledge in rank and the greatest in quality and its path is the most subtle. I have spent many years of my life in exercising meticulous thought and deep insight, abandoning the company of people, occupying myself with the invocation of God, thinking deeply about His book, and contemplating many prophetic traditions that reached us through the household of the prophet—peace be upon him who declares those traditions and upon his household—until the issue becomes clear, the truth arrives, and the decree of God and His light and proof became clear without relying on a teacher's instruction or reading a book. This is because I have not seen on earth any person who has a (worthy) idea about the science of the Return (*'ilm al-ma'ād*), nor did I find a book in which there is a demonstrative explanation and a conclusive opinion and belief concerning the resurrection of the bodies and corpses. I also did not find in the heritage of the famous philosophers or in the books of ancient philosophers an opinion about this issue that cures the sick and quenches the one who is thirsty. Nor did I find in the fabrications of the modern philosophers and the theologians (anything) except conjectures and guesses, or just imitations of others, narrating the traditions, and relying on the sensible. Since belief is a light that God throws in the heart of the believer, it cannot be acquired by senses, and cannot be obtained from narration, from writing, from hearing, or from testimony. "This is the grace of God which He grants to whomever He wills, and God is the possessor of a great grace." (Q57: 21)

The essay was completed by the hand of one who is in need of the mercy of the Eternal God, Muhammad b. Ibrāhīm who is known as "Ṣadr al-Shīrāzī," may God give them their book in their right hands. I wrote this in a state of praising God, venerating His greatness, and glorifying Him, and offering my prayer to His prophet and his family, asking forgiveness for my sins and wrong doings.

What follows are three other principles that Ṣadrā mentioned in his other works.

[*Thirteenth Principle*]

All that man actually conceives or perceives—whether through intellection or sensation, and whether in this world or in the hereafter—are not things separate from his reality and different from his being. Rather, that which he perceives exists in his being, not in something else. It has already been mentioned

that what is essentially seen of the heavens and earth and other things are not the external forms of the material objects that exist in the dimensions of this world. Only at the very beginning of the development of sensation in man, when he is potentially able to sense, is there any need for an association with material things and their spatial relations in order to perceive them. This is because man at the beginning of his development is only potentially able to sense, and therefore the perceptive faculty accidentally needs matter with certain conditions and configurations—that is the external form that corresponds to the one present in the soul, which is the thing essentially perceived. Thus, when the perception has occurred in this fashion once or several times, then, in many cases the soul sees a form of the thing in its own world without the need for an external material object, as happens to the sleeper, to those afflicted with certain disease, and in other conditions. Therefore, in the state of death there is nothing to prevent the soul from perceiving all that it perceives and senses without any association with external material or bodily organ that are separate from the world of the soul and its reality.²⁵

In his commentary on the Qurʾān, Ṣadrā presented this principle as follows:

God has created the soul in a way that it is able to create forms that are hidden from material senses. Every form that is induced essentially by its efficient cause is not something other than the instantiation of the efficient cause. At the same time, if this form is a material form, its instantiation is the instantiation of its material cause. Its instantiation and subsisting by its efficient cause does not mean that it inheres in it and becomes its attribute. This is the characteristic of the instantiation of the form to its material cause because the material cause is deficient in existence and therefore it improves its existence by the form—whether it is substantial or accidental form—and this form becomes its attribute, and has an effect on it. But the efficient cause does not improve by that which it instantiates, and the instantiation does not become its attribute nor is it affected by it. This is because the efficient cause is an emanative agent whose emanative instantiation is of a lower degree of existence.²⁶

[*The Fourteenth Principle*]

The conceptions, habits, and firmly rooted psychological dispositions cause external effects. This happens quite frequently, as in the blushing of an embarrassed person, the pallor of someone who is frightened, and the excitement of the sexual organ simply by the conception of intercourse, or nocturnal emissions during sleep. Indeed, severe illness may even result from imagination so

25 *The Wisdom of the Throne*, pp. 159–160 (principle no. 6).

26 *Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-karīm*, 5: 443 (principle no. 6).

that the malignant and destructive humor is formed in the body without any external cause. This and similar things have often been experienced.

Among the testimony to this is the man who becomes infuriated. At the outset, his anger is a quality of the soul, but then the blood spreads out in his vessels so that his face becomes flushed; next, his veins stand out and his limbs shakes. Then a fire may rise up in his heart that burns up the bodily humors and destroys the moistness of the body, and his sight may even be blinded when the cavity of the brain is filled with the blackness of the vapors arising from it. Sometimes, indeed, the angry person may even die from the extremity of his rage, if the balance of the bodily spirits is destroyed and the animating material is cut off from the healthy blood which generates the vaporous spirits.²⁷

[*The Fifteenth Principle*]

The individual unity of everything, which is its own existence, is not according to one manner and of one degree. It is like existence which is not of one mode. The individual unity of that which is extended in space and whose parts are connected (i.e., material bodies) is its own extension and connection. And (the individual unity) of things that are extended in time and move in existence is its own renewal and termination. In number, is its own actual multiplicity, and of natural bodies is its own being potentially multiple. But the unity of the immaterial substances is different from that of the material substances. This is because it is impossible for a single material body to become a subject of contradicting attributes such as blackness and whiteness ... this is because of its deficient existence ... which cannot contain contradicting things. This is indicated by the fact that the location of the organ of vision in the human body is separated from that of hearing, and the location of smelling is separated from that of tasting. But the human soul, although it is one, contains the forms of blackness and whiteness and other contradictory things ... what explains this matter and clarifies it is the fact that what perceives by all senses, imagination, and intellection and that which executes all natural, animalistic, and human activities is his managing soul. It is capable of descending to the degree of the senses and material faculty, and at the same time it is capable of ascending to the active intellect and what is beyond it. This is because its existence is more comprehensive.²⁸

²⁷ The *Wisdom of the Throne*, 160 (principle no. 7).

²⁸ *Asfār* 9:164 (principle no. 6).

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